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PART V.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS.

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July to December 1920.

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137 To the Earl of Derby No. 3260	Oct. 1	Situation in Anatolia. Refers to No. 125, and French Government reply to same, in which they propose that any mission sent to Anatolia should be preceded by a change of Ministry at Constantinople. His Majesty's Government consider mission should be preceded by ratification of Peace Treaty ...	163
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140 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 1085. Tel. Secret	" 1	General. Ferid Pasha is concerned regarding personal safety of himself and Sultan if Nationalist Government comes into power. High Commissioner requests authority to inform him that His Majesty's Government would not tolerate any action against him or Sultan ...	165
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142 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 1339	Sept. 24	Situation in Anatolia. Transmits copy of note from Grand Vizier regarding scheme for raising taxes to suppress Nationalist movement ...	166
143 To Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 928. Tel.	Oct. 6	General. Refers to Nos. 140 and 141. Terms of message in first telegram and suggested assurance to Grand Vizier are approved. Sultan should be impressed not to abdicate ...	168
144 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 1349	Sept. 28	Situation in Anatolia. Transmits memorandum by Mr. Ryan giving review of general situation ...	168

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146 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 1100. Tel.	" 13	General. Mission to Anatolia. Reports that note regarding despatch of mission to Anatolia has been forwarded to Grand Vizier, also reports result of a meeting of the Allied High Commissioners with Sultan on subject of ratification of Peace Treaty ...	173
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148 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 1103. Tel.	" 14	General. Reports substance of a letter received from French High Commissioner regarding concerted action of Allies to obtain ratification of Peace Treaty and forcible change of Turkish Government ...	175
149 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 1104. Tel.	" 14	General. Comments on French communication above (see No. 148), and states that French programme would involve complete departure from principle of non-interference hitherto observed ...	176
150 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 1105. Tel.	" 14	General. Suggests alternative to French programme ...	176
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155 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 1405. Very Conf.	" 21	General. Situation in Anatolia. Reports substance of an interview with the Sultan, and transmits translation of a note handed by High Commissioner to Sultan on the subject of general situation in Anatolia ...	178
156 To Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 998. Tel.	" 23	General. Ratification of treaty. Refers to Nos. 146, 148, 149 and 150. His Majesty's Government still consider ratification of Peace Treaty first essential, and would prefer not to send representative with proposed mission to Angora ...	181
157 To the Earl of Derby No. 1129. Tel.	" 23	General. Ratification of treaty. Requests that French Government may be informed that His Majesty's Government consider instruction sent to French High Commissioner and consider next step to be speedy ratification ...	182
158 To Mr. Kennard No. 479. Tel.	" 23	Ratification of treaty. Requests information regarding prospects of Italian Government ratifying Peace Treaty ...	182
159 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 1147. Tel.	" 24	General. Anatolian Mission. Asks for early decision regarding presence of Allied delegates with Turkish Mission in Anatolia ...	182

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161 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 1394	" 2	Military establishment. Transmits copy of letter which he has addressed to General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of Black Sea, regarding Grand Vizier's scheme for raising forces with which to repress Nationalist movement, together with copy of General Wilson's reply to same.	187
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163 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 1139. Tel.	" 21	General. Change of Government. Gives political aspect of new Cabinet.	190
164 To Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 1014. Tel.	" 26	Mission to Anatolia. In event of British delegates accompanying mission, he should take up question of release of Colonel Rawlinson and others.	189
165 To the Earl of Derby No. 1143. Tel.	" 26	Mission to Anatolia. Requests that French Government be urged to agree to Allied delegates accompanying mission to Anatolia.	190
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167 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 1421	" 18	Situation in Cilicia. Transmits copy of letter received from Dr. Chambers, a Canadian missionary, on situation in Cilicia, and a note of situation at Adana.	191
168 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 1157. Tel.	" 28	Ratification of treaty. Collective note demanding immediate ratification of treaty presented, and Porte have published statement of policy. Gives High Commissioners' view on possibility of ratification.	193
169 To the Earl of Derby No. 1190. Tel. To Mr. Keimani No. 486. Tel.	Nov. 5	Ratification of treaty. Refers to No. 168, and requests that representation be made to French Government to the effect that in opinion of His Majesty's Government Allies should insist on immediate ratification.	195
170 Mr. Lindsay No. 1299. Tel.	" 5	Mission to Anatolia. Reports French Government reply regarding Allied representation on mission to Anatolia. They consider there are serious drawbacks to such representation unless peace is previously ratified and Turkish Government changes.	191
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173 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 1430	Oct. 22	General. Gives a general notion of events.	195
174 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 1457	" 26	General. New Government. Transmits translation of "Hatt-i-Humayun" appointing Tefik Pasha and reviews personalities and previous careers of members of the new Government.	200

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176 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 1173. Tel.	Nov. 7	Ratification of Peace Treaty. Reports results of his endeavours to obtain ratification of treaty and results of his conversations with Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject.	204
177 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 1174. Tel.	" 8	Ratification of treaty. States that Turkish Government have no intention of evading ratification, and gives their reason for desiring postponement.	205
178 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 1470	Oct. 28	Ratification of treaty. Refers to No. 156. Transmits copy of joint Allied note of October 25th to Grand Vizier regarding necessity of early ratification.	205
179 Sir G. Buchanan No. 487. Tel.	Nov. 9	Ratification of treaty. Refers to No. 169. States that Italian Government concur and have instructed their representatives at Constantinople.	206
180 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 1189. Tel.	" 19	Ratification of treaty. Gives substance of reply of Turkish Government to note from Allied High Commissioners stating their reasons for postponement, also substance of proposed reply from Allied High Commissioners insisting on immediate ratification.	206
181 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 1190. Tel.	" 19	General. General situation. Reviews situation brought about in consequence of General Wrangel's defeat and junction of Kemalists and Bolshaviks.	207
182 Sir G. Buchanan No. 694	" 13	Italian activities. Reports conversations with Count Sforza and Signor Contarini who deny the existence of Italian agents at Angora or Italian intrigues in Turkey.	208
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Receipt by H. L. T. of
the letter
in the name of
the government

Such a letter to the H. L. T.
concerning the prospects of peace
in the future

as noted previously in the report. Transmitted
by Major Marshall on the quarantine at
Jeddah for the 1021 pilgrims giving

the report. Report for the H. L. T.
by the British representative of Mecca
King's quarantine with the French and
other regarding the H. L. T.

along with the H. L. T.
the British representative of Mecca
King's quarantine with the French and
other regarding the H. L. T.

Transmits a letter addressed to
the H. L. T. by a member of the H. L. T.
concerning the prospects of peace
in the future

CHAPTERS III, IV AND V—PALESTINE, SYRIA AND MESOPOTAMIA, AND ADEN
AND ARABIA—contd.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART V.

CHAPTER I.—THE CAUCASUS

E 8130 1/58

No. 1

Commander Luke to Earl Curzon. (Received July 12.)

Mr. [redacted] is to enclose copy of a memorandum which [redacted] the Ministry's consul at Batoum, giving a forecast of what [redacted] would be if the Allies should now evacuate the province.

I agree with Mr. Stevens's conclusions, which are based on long and intimate knowledge of Batoum province, and would invite attention to paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 260 of the 23rd May and to my telegram No. 280 of the 11th June.

I have, &c.
H. C. L. K.

H. C. LUK

Enclosure in No. 1

Commodore Stevens to Commander Luke (T) 1812

Sr, Batoum, June 11 1920

I HAVE the honour herewith to enclose a memorandum in which I have set forth the conditions likely to arise upon the withdrawal of the Allied forces from Batoum.

I have no hesitation in affirming from my own knowledge and experience of Batoum and Transcaucasia that, without the presence here of a sufficient force of British or Allied troops, the town and province of Batoum will revert to a condition of anything worse than that which existed immediately prior to the advent of the British forces in 1918.

I have, &c.
P. STEVENS

Enclosure 2 in A 11

Memorandum on the probable Effect of the Withdrawal of the Allied Forces from
Haiti

WHAT is to be expected after the withdrawal of the Allied forces from Batoum? Local Bolsheviks will use their utmost endeavours to gain power and proclaim a Soviet Government, joining, if possible, for this purpose with other Bolshevik elements in the Caucasus. Russian nationalists will do all they can to obtain dominating power in the Government of the country. Georgians will undoubtedly make every effort to seize hold of power and to

maritimes ou comprend dans cette clause les bâtiments et le matériel flottant et toutes les pièces d'artillerie, articles d'intendance sans excepter les vivres et les équipements, matériel de génie et d'aviation.

4. Remettre à la Russie, après les avoir désarmés, les contingents, organisations, groupes et équipages des bâtiments mentionnés dans la 1^{re} clause du présent article. Les armées de la Russie s'engagent à conserver sans les livrer à tous ceux qui le seront en vertu du présent article.

5. Faire des démarches pour éloigner du territoire de la Géorgie, dans les limites indiquées dans l'article 4 du présent traité, tout genre de troupes et de détachements armés ne faisant pas partie des troupes gouvernementales de la Géorgie.

6. Prendre des mesures pour ne pas autoriser à l'avenir sur le territoire de la Géorgie le séjour de troupes et de contingents armés énumérés dans la clause précédente du présent article.

7. Défendre aux personnes faisant partie des contingents, organisations et groupes énumérés dans les clauses 1^{re} et 3 du présent article, en tant que ces personnes ne sont pas de nationalité géorgienne, d'entrer à n'importe quel titre, même comme volontaires, dans les troupes gouvernementales de la Géorgie.

8. Ne pas admettre la formation et le séjour sur son territoire, dans les limites établies dans l'article 4 du présent traité, de n'importe quelle organisation et groupe pro-russe ou pro-russe, ou de n'importe quelle organisation et groupe du Gouvernement des Etats alliés à la Russie, de même que des représentations et des employés, des organisations et des groupes ayant pour but de renverser le Gouvernement de la Russie ou de ses Etats alliés; la Géorgie s'engage également à ne pas admettre le transport par les organisations, groupes, représentations et employés à travers le territoire de la Géorgie de matériel appartenant à pareilles organisations, à l'exception des cas établis par le droit international relativement aux bâtiments avariés et autres.

9. Si des tentatives sont faites par les organisations, groupes, représentations et employés énumérés dans la clause 8 du présent article de violer l'interdiction dans la clause 8 indiquée, ou agira à l'égard des personnes et des biens devant être retenus en vertu des obligations prises dans la clause 8 du présent article par le Gouvernement géorgien conformément aux clauses 3 et 4 du présent article.

ARTICLE 6.

La Russie s'engage à ne point admettre sur son territoire le séjour et l'activité de toute sorte de groupes et d'organisations prétendant au rôle de Gouvernement de la Géorgie ou d'une partie de cette dernière ainsi que toute sorte de groupes et d'organisations ayant pour but de renverser le Gouvernement de la Géorgie. La Russie s'engage d'user de toute son influence sur les Etats alliés avec elle afin de ne pas admettre sur leur territoire des groupes et des organisations mentionnées dans le présent article.

ARTICLE 7.

Afin d'éviter tout malentendu, les deux parties contractantes consentiront à ce qu'au moment de l'application des clauses 5 et 6 de l'article 5 du présent traité sur les territoires géorgiens, qui en feront partie d'après la clause 2 de l'article 4 du présent traité, les armées de la Russie s'engagent à ne pas livrer à tous ceux qui le seront en vertu du présent article. Les armées de la Russie s'engagent à ne pas livrer à tous ceux qui le seront en vertu du présent article. Les armées de la Russie s'engagent à ne pas livrer à tous ceux qui le seront en vertu du présent article.

ARTICLE 8.

Une commission mixte des représentants des deux parties avec un nombre égal de membres sera créée pour surveiller l'accomplissement exact des articles 5 et 6 du présent traité et par la livraison et la réception des personnes et du bien mentionnés dans les clauses 3 et 4 de l'article 5. L'ordre des travaux de la commission sera déterminé par la commission elle-même. La livraison et la réception des personnes et du bien mentionnés dans les clauses 3 et 4 de l'article 5 du présent traité doivent être effectuées dans le délai de deux mois à partir du jour de la signature dudit traité.

ARTICLE 9.

1. Les personnes d'origine géorgienne habitant le territoire de la Russie et ayant atteint l'âge de dix-huit ans ont le droit d'opter pour la naturalisation russe. Egalement les personnes n'étant pas d'origine géorgienne, habitant le territoire géorgien et ayant atteint l'âge ci-dessus indiqué ont le droit d'opter pour la naturalisation russe.

2. Les détails de la réalisation dudit article doivent être confirmés par une convention spéciale entre les deux parties contractantes.

3. Les citoyens des deux parties contractantes, désirant jouir du droit qui leur est accordé par le présent article, seront obligés d'accomplir les formalités requises dans le délai d'un an, à partir du jour de l'entrée en vigueur de la convention mentionnée dans la clause 2 du présent article.

ARTICLE 10.

La Géorgie s'engage à libérer des peines et des poursuites judiciaires et administratives toutes les personnes qui ont été condamnées en vertu de lois ou de règlements en vigueur en faveur du parti communiste.

Remarque.—La Géorgie s'engage à mettre immédiatement en liberté les personnes se trouvant en reclusion pour actes mentionnés.

ARTICLE 11.

Les deux parties contractantes s'engagent à reconnaître et à respecter le pavillon, et les armoiries de l'autre, comme emblèmes d'un Etat associé. Les dessins du pavillon et des armoiries ainsi que toute modification apportée dans ces derniers seront communiqués réciproquement par la voie diplomatique.

ARTICLE 12.

Les relations commerciales entre la Géorgie et la Russie sont fixées provisoirement par le présent article. Les deux parties contractantes s'engagent à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour faciliter le développement de ces relations.

Les deux parties contractantes s'engagent à établir une commission mixte des représentants des deux parties pour surveiller l'accomplissement exact des dispositions du présent article. La commission mixte des représentants des deux parties pour surveiller l'accomplissement exact des dispositions du présent article. La commission mixte des représentants des deux parties pour surveiller l'accomplissement exact des dispositions du présent article.

ARTICLE 13.

Les dispositions des clauses 1^{re} et 2 de l'article 12 précédent du présent traité doivent être prises comme base du traité de commerce qui doit être passé entre les deux parties contractantes en vertu du même article 12.

ARTICLE 14.

Les relations diplomatiques et consulaires entre la Géorgie et la Russie seront établies dans le plus court délai. En attendant la conclusion d'une entente spéciale entre les deux parties contractantes, les relations diplomatiques et consulaires, dans quel but seront prises des mesures, les droits et les devoirs de ces derniers seront déterminés par les décrets promulgués en ce cas chez chacune des parties contractantes.

ARTICLE 15.

Les questions des questions relatives au droit public et privé qui surgissent entre les citoyens des deux parties contractantes, de même que le règlement de certaines questions se référant aux deux Etats des deux parties, seront traités dans le plus court délai possible après la signature du présent traité. Le personnel, les droits et les devoirs de ces commissions seront fixés par instruction spéciale de chaque partie contractante. Les clauses suivantes notamment sont soumises à la compétence de ces commissions.

1. L'élaboration d'un traité de commerce et d'autres conventions de caractère économique.

2 La solution des questions réglant la séparation des archives et documents juridiques des dépôts administratifs et de l'état civil. La solution de la question relative à l'ordre de la jouissance, de la disposition et de l'utilisation du conduit de pétrole Batoum-Bakou, dans la région qui en vertu de l'article 4 du présent traité se trouvera sur le territoire de la Géorgie. Cette question sera légalisée par une convention spéciale entre les deux parties contractantes.

ARTICLE 16

Le présent traité entre en vigueur par le fait et du moment de la signature et ne sera pas soumis à une ratification spéciale. En foi de quoi les délégués des deux parties ont signé le présent traité et y apposeront leurs sceaux.

Fait en double à Moscou, le 7 mai 1920.

G. OURATADZE,
L. KARAKHAN

Pour traduction conforme

Fr. CHESNVAL

Secrétaire-Interprète du Ministère
des Affaires Étrangères

Accord supplémentaire au Traité de Paix conclu entre la Russie et la Géorgie
le 7 mai 1920

Les soussignés: Représentant de la République fédérative socialiste soviétique russe, Léon Mikhaïlovitch Karakhan, et le représentant de la République démocratique géorgienne, membre de l'Assemblée constituante de la Géorgie, Grégoire Ilarionovitch Ouratadze, prenant en considération que le Gouvernement russe a le consentement du Gouvernement soviétique d'Azerbaïdjan pour ce qui suit, concluent

ARTICLE 1^{er}

La question des territoires en litige entre la Géorgie et l'Azerbaïdjan et l'arrondissement de Zakatali sera soumise à la décision de la commission mixte composée des représentants des Gouvernements de l'Azerbaïdjan et de la Géorgie en nombre égal, sous la présidence du représentant de la République socialiste fédérative russe. Toutes les décisions de cette commission seront reconnues comme obligatoires par les Gouvernements de l'Azerbaïdjan et de la Géorgie.

ARTICLE 2

Jusqu'à la décision de la commission concernant les questions mentionnées dans l'article 1^{er}, le présent accord sera en vigueur et l'Azerbaïdjan ne pourra pas dans l'arrondissement de Zakatali de nouvelles troupes outre celles qui s'y trouvaient au moment de la signature du présent accord supplémentaire.

ARTICLE 3

Le présent accord supplémentaire sera considéré comme partie intégrante du traité entre la Russie et la Géorgie signé le 7 mai 1920 à Moscou, et, de même que le traité, entre en vigueur à partir du moment de la signature, sans ratification.

En foi de quoi les soussignés ont apposé leurs signatures et leurs cachets.
Fait en double à Moscou, le 12 mai 1920.

OURATADZE
KARAKHAN

Pour traduction conforme

Fr. CHESNVAL, Secrétaire-Interprète du

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères.

Enclosure 2 in No. 2

Joint Allied Note to the Georgian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Your Excellency,

Tiflis, June 15, 1920.

IN the official translation of the treaty recently concluded between the Georgian Democratic Republic and the Soviet Republic of Russia there are observed certain provisions the meaning of which does not correspond to the original. In particular, in the several clauses of article 16, the obligation to take certain steps to ensure the peaceful and amicable relations between the waters and Georgian territory, as defined by the treaty, of ships, ports, etc., representatives and goods of Governments of "pays alliés à la Russie."

In view of the ambiguity in the wording of these clauses, the undersigned would feel obliged if your Excellency would be good enough to clarify the meaning of the article alluded to above.

We avail ourselves, &c.

H. C. LUKE

1^{re} DE MARTEL

COLONELLO MELCHIADE GABBA

Enclosure 3 in No.

Georgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the British High Commissioner, Tiflis.

Excellency,

Tiflis, le 18 juin 1920.

EN réponse à la note collective des Représentants des Puissances alliées du 15 juin 1920, j'ai l'honneur de vous déclarer que :

1. Le traité conclu entre la Géorgie et la Russie soviétique dans un bref délai sera soumis à la ratification de l'Assemblée constituante. Les modifications proposées par l'Assemblée constituante ainsi que le Gouvernement géorgien peuvent y apporter les modifications qu'ils jugeront utiles.

2. Le Gouvernement géorgien n'admettra en aucun cas et de la part de n'importe qui des restrictions à son souveraineté quant à ses relations d'amitié avec l'étranger.

3. Quant à l'expression, voir clause 5 dudit traité, "les pays alliés à la Russie," le Gouvernement géorgien entend par ses termes les républiques formées de l'ancien empire russe et avant à leur tête à l'heure actuelle les Gouvernements soviétiques, la Russie et l'Azerbaïdjan. C'est bien dans ce sens que le Gouvernement géorgien accepta ladite expression "les pays alliés à la Russie."

Veuillez agréer, &c.

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères
Le Vice-directeur de la Chancellerie.

E 8641/1 58)

No. 3

Commander Luke to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 21)

(N. 1)

Mr. Luke

Tiflis, June 22, 1920.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 12, dated June 15, 1920, regarding my conversation with Mr. Curzon, I have the honor to transmit for your Lordship's information a report, dated June 22, 1920, by this office, which may be of some assistance in the event of any subsequent communication to the 280. Aff.

I have, &c.

H. C. LUKE

Enclosure in No. 3.

Captain Cowen to Commander Luke

Sir,

Tiflis, June 2, 1920

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report of the circumstances attending the Bolshevik uprising in Baku on the morning of the 28th April, 1920.

About noon of the 27th April rumours were circulating to the effect that the Soviet forces had crossed the frontier and would be in Baku the following morning. This report was not taken seriously at first, but when it was confirmed that the banks and Ministers who tried to leave on the night of the 27th, and those at Gandja were arrested at the station and no trains allowed to depart.

About 4 o'clock on the morning of the 28th April the uprising started. The Azerbaijan army surrendered to the Bolsheviks without resistance, except in the case of one soldier who evidently had not been informed. He was killed. About 4.30 A.M. revolutionists came to the garages of Major Daly, Captain Cook, the Near East Relief, Italian Mission, &c., and requisitioned their motor-cars. At about 5 A.M. the officers and personnel of all the foreign missions were arrested, as well as the British and French consuls and a number of French and British civilians. All the day troops in armoured cars and motors paraded the streets firing in the air and waving the red flag.

The shops were all closed, proclamations from Moscow were posted on the walls. The foreign prisoners taken the first day were all locked up in a room in an unfurnished house, the electric lights first having been removed along with all furniture, and they were forced to lie on the bare floor; no food was given to them. They were assisted by friends from outside. The first arrests were all made by the Turks. Foreign prisoners then being turned over to the Russians.

From my prison I was able to see, on the 30th April, a great number of troops who had come down from Derbent and Daghistan, marching down the Nikolavsky Street, en route for the Georgian front. About 10,000 infantry, two regiments of cavalry and three batteries of field guns and transport.

About 3 P.M. of the 3rd May the British prisoners were all moved to the big prison at Bulloff being marched through the streets under a heavy guard.

At Bulloff the prisoners were given British uniforms (which had been brought here to be sold to the old Government), the remainder wearing British uniforms. About 3,000 passed accompanied by about ten batteries of field guns and light howitzers.

On the 13th May I was released and went to the American Relief Commission and to the Dutch consulate, who had been working for the relief of the prisoners. The Dutch consul had been able to have one conversation with Commander Frazer, R.N., and Mr. Howelke, His Majesty's consul, and succeeded in having the latter put back with the other British, instead of being kept with the Russian political prisoners. I was released for execution on account of their anti-Bolshevik activities two years ago.

At Bulloff prison food was issued in the form of soup, bread and hot water, anything else being supplied through the efforts of the Dutch and the Americans in the form of money and various food, being assisted by Mr. Sewon, interpreter of the British Mission, who was given his freedom; friends of the officers also provided food.

During all this time the price of food mounted continually owing to the requisitioning of all foodstuffs. The principal shops and the best houses and hotels were taken over.

Dr. Spoer, the head of the Near East Relief, made unceasing efforts to see the prisoners and to investigate personally their living conditions, but he was unsuccessful, and both he and the Dutch consul were warned that it would be best for them not to evince any interest for other nationalities than their own.

On Wednesday, the 9th June, the Dutch consul and three companions left for Enzeli, which place together with Ruest were in the hands of revolutionists. On the 10th June I was allowed to inspect the flying equipment of the Soviet Republic in company with an acquaintance who is chief instructor. It consisted then of seven hydroplanes: one single-seater Nieuport, two Havilands (one numbered N. 2978), and four old machines incapable of prolonged flying. A week later the tank steamer "International" brought four more seaplanes, but they were sent to Enzeli without being assembled.

Before I left Baku on the 18th June, the American Commission were told that the Georgians were empowered to look after the British interests, and that in a few days the British civilian prisoners would be interned in their own homes, while the military

and naval party would be interned in a house in Nobel's Gardens, where they would have more freedom and exercise. I managed to get a note to Captain Cook and one to Mr. Chvely, who are in good health, as are all the others, with the exception of Mr. Howelke.

Baku is full of new recruits, aged from 14 years upwards. They are being given very little training and it is expected that they will be sent to assist the Soviet forces in the Caucasus. It is also reported that the Xth Army, which is now in Azerbaijan, with headquarters at Gandja, will be withdrawn and replaced by the Xth Army which is considered much better.

The transport is nearly all horse or camel-drawn, the draught horses being all mangy and badly debilitated.

The prices of food are very high. On the day I left bread was 120 kopecks the pound, sugar 100 kopecks, and meat 20 kopecks per ox. All wines and spirits have been requisitioned and are only obtained by commissars.

I have, &c.

WM. COWEN,
Captain, late Fort Garry Horse,
Canadian Cavalry Brigade

P.S. The Turkish staff who carried out the arrests the first days are now themselves under arrest, along with about 3,000 Armenians and 40,000 Tartars.

E 8369:1/58)

No. 4

Commander Luke to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 11—(Continued))

My Lord,

Tiflis, June 30, 1920

IN continuation of my telegram No. 281 of the 12th June, 1920, I have the honour to enclose for your information a copy of the Declaration of the Government of Azerbaijan, which was signed by the Azerbaijani Government on the 1st June, 1920, and which is a copy of the Declaration of the Government of Azerbaijan, which was signed by the Azerbaijani Government on the 1st June, 1920.

2. Your Lordship will observe that one of these Declarations contains a request for the release of the prisoners of war who are detained at Baku. I understand that this is a part of the Declaration of the Government of Azerbaijan, which was signed by the Azerbaijani Government on the 1st June, 1920.

3. Your Lordship will also observe that this Treaty is subject to ratification.

I have, &c.

H. C. LUKE

Enclosure 1 in No. 4

Traité de Paix entre la République socialiste soviétique d'Azerbaïdjan et la République démocratique d'Azerbaïdjan

(Traduction)

LA République socialiste soviétique d'Azerbaïdjan, représentée par M. Davoud Khassanov, Commissaire du Peuple des Affaires Étrangères, remplaçant le Président du Comité révolutionnaire de la République socialiste soviétique d'Azerbaïdjan, d'une part, et la République démocratique d'Azerbaïdjan, représentée par MM. Grigorie Lorkipandzé, Ministre de la Guerre; Siméon Mdivani, Vice-Président de l'Assemblée constituante, et Alexandre Andronikoff, d'autre part, après vérification de leurs pleins pouvoirs, ont conclu le traité ci-après de paix et d'amitié.

ARTICLE 1.

Toutes les opérations militaires cessent entre la République socialiste soviétique d'Azerbaïdjan et la République démocratique d'Azerbaïdjan. Ces deux parties ont des relations stables, pacifiques et amicales. Les armées de guerre sont immédiatement réduites de part et d'autre.

ARTICLE 2.

La frontière entre la République socialiste soviétique d'Azerbaïdjan et la République démocratique géorgienne est déterminée comme suit : la frontière administrative entre les districts de Bortchalo et de Kazakh partant de la zone arménienne qui traverse le mont Povertchal, plus loin à travers le mont Vartich par la frontière administrative dans la direction nord-est jusqu'aux sources qui se trouvent à 2 verstes au sud-est du mont Koul-Kain, de là elle suit une ligne de convention le long du versant oriental de [illegible] elle suit encore l'ancienne frontière le long des fleuves Kram et Kour, puis le milieu du pont de Poili, de là dans la direction nord-est par l'ancienne frontière administrative jusqu'aux derniers versants des montagnes Palan-Tiken, puis au nord-est [illegible] administrative jusqu'à la frontière du district de Zakhatali (la carte de 3 verstes pour un pouce).

ARTICLE 3.

Les zones devant le pont de Poili et le pont Rouge, de même que la rive gauche du fleuve Kours sur le territoire de l'Azerbaïdjan, sont reconnues comme neutres pendant une année à partir du jour de la signature du présent traité dans les limites suivantes : (1) dans le district de Bortchalo et de Tiflis, (2) dans le district de Kazakh, la région bornée par la ligne qui suit les villages Koul-Gadjali, Penkanti, Khalfali, la station [illegible] de la rive Goussan-Sou, de là par la ligne droite au nord-est, vers les [illegible] de la chaîne de montagnes Tchoban Dag, par la frontière administrative du district de Signakli. Tous les points énumérés, limitrophes, peuplés, exclusivement (voir la carte de 3 verstes pour un pouce).

ARTICLE 4.

Dans les zones neutres indiquées dans la 3^e clause, aucune fortification ne peut être construite et des contingents militaires ne peuvent y être introduits; l'indivision et la direction restent azerbaïdjanaises.

Remarque : Une commission spéciale mixte, composée de quatre personnes, deux de chaque partie, est formée pour surveiller l'accomplissement exact de la présente clause.

ARTICLE 5.

Le pont Rouge (Kramy) est gardé du côté du territoire géorgien par les gardes géorgiens et du côté de l'Azerbaïdjan par des gardes azerbaïdjanais, la Géorgie ayant le droit de se servir du pont pour le transport des marchandises et des personnes.

ARTICLE 6.

La question du district de Zakhatali est transmise à la commission d'arbitrage prévue dans l'accord supplémentaire conclu entre la République socialiste fédérative soviétique russe et la République démocratique géorgienne le 12 mai 1920. Jusqu'à la solution de la question par la commission d'arbitrage aucune des parties contractantes n'a le droit d'introduire dans le district de Zakhatali de nouveaux contingents armés, selon l'article 2 de l'accord supplémentaire de Moscou conclu le 12 mai 1920.

Remarque : Cette clause est adoptée en raison du désaccord survenu entre la Délégation de la République socialiste soviétique d'Azerbaïdjan et la Délégation de la République démocratique géorgienne quant à l'interprétation de l'article 10 du traité de Moscou conclu le 7 mai 1920 et de l'article 1^{er} de l'accord supplémentaire conclu le 12 mai de la même année, car on n'a pas abouti à un accord relativement au point essentiel du litige.

ARTICLE 7.

La République socialiste soviétique d'Azerbaïdjan et la République démocratique géorgienne reconnaissent réciproquement, sans restriction, l'indépendance et la souveraineté des deux parties, ainsi que leur droit de disposer librement de leur territoire et de leurs affaires intérieures de l'une et de l'autre.

ARTICLE 8.

Chacune des parties contractantes s'engage à reconnaître et à respecter le pavillon et les armoiries de l'autre comme emblèmes d'un Etat souverain. Les drapeaux du pavillon et des armoiries, ainsi que toutes les modifications apportées dans ces derniers, seront communiqués réciproquement par voie diplomatique.

ARTICLE 9.

Les relations diplomatiques et consulaires entre la République socialiste soviétique d'Azerbaïdjan et la République démocratique géorgienne sont établies immédiatement après la signature de la paix. En attendant la conclusion d'une entente spéciale quant à la situation réciproque, les droits et les devoirs des consuls et des représentants diplomatiques, l'activité de ces derniers est établie d'après la norme et les règlements déjà établis.

ARTICLE 10.

La République socialiste soviétique d'Azerbaïdjan et la République démocratique géorgienne s'engagent réciproquement à ne prêter aucun concours aux groupes, organisations et personnes prétendant au rôle du Gouvernement de l'Azerbaïdjan ou de la Géorgie, de même que de n'importe quel groupe, organisations ou personnes, ayant pour but de renverser les Gouvernements existants des deux républiques contractantes.

ARTICLE 11.

La République socialiste soviétique d'Azerbaïdjan et la République démocratique géorgienne s'engagent réciproquement à ne prêter aucun concours aux groupes, organisations et personnes prétendant au rôle du Gouvernement ou travaillant à renverser les Gouvernements des Etats contractants.

ARTICLE 12.

Les deux parties contractantes comme base de leurs relations réciproques économiques et commerciales établissent le principe de la nation favorisée et, autant que possible, le principe d'échange de marchandises.

ARTICLE 13.

En attendant l'élaboration et la signature d'un traité de commerce et de transit, les parties contractantes réalisent le principe de libre transit.

ARTICLE 14.

Les deux parties contractantes reconnaissent en principe l'obligation réciproque de ne pas les uns aux autres et à l'autre Etat contractant et réciproquement par suite des opérations militaires ou de l'autre Etat. Le principe ainsi elles reconnaissent qu'elles indemnisent réciproquement les institutions gouvernementales, gouvernementales publiques, zemstvos et municipales et leurs sections, ainsi que les organisations coopératives de l'un des Etats contractants, les dommages causés par la nationalisation, séquestration, réquisition ou par d'autres dispositions ou actes des organes des autorités gouvernementales s'étant produits dans l'autre Etat; en ce cas la norme de l'indemnité de ces dommages sera établie dans le protocole d'accord par lequel les deux parties contractantes s'engagent à élaborer la norme de l'indemnité des dommages causés aux autres institutions publiques. Les comptes et les rôles existants entre l'Azerbaïdjan et la Géorgie avant les opérations militaires collectives réciproquement par les parties contractantes.

ARTICLE 15.

Les questions relatives au droit public et privé qui surgissent entre les citoyens des deux Gouvernements et les citoyens de l'autre ainsi qu'entre les citoyens d'un Gouvernement et l'autre Gouvernement, ainsi que les questions particulières qui surgissent entre les républiques contractantes seront réglées par une commission arbitrale géorgienne et azerbaïdjanaise de l'autre Etat. Les représentants des deux parties, en attendant l'élaboration d'un accord spécial relativement à ces questions.

ARTICLE 16.

En attendant l'élaboration d'un accord spécial relativement aux nomades de l'Azerbaïdjan et de la Géorgie, les nomades jouissent libre et sans obstacles des pâturages, aux conditions établies en Géorgie pour les nomades sujets géorgiens.

ARTICLE 17

Aux titulaires des fonctions administratives ou militaires de leur pays ou sociale et de leurs états de service, il est accordé le droit de partir sans obstacle pour leur pays, ainsi que le droit d'emporter le bien qui leur appartient d'après les règlements et les normes établis par la Commission mixte composée d'un nombre égal de représentants des deux parties.

ARTICLE 18.

Le présent traité entre en vigueur du moment de la signature et est soumis à une ratification; l'échange de ratifications doit avoir lieu dans le courant de deux semaines à partir du jour de la signature du présent Traité de Paix à Tiflis.

GREGOIRE LORDKIPANIDZE

Ministre de la Guerre de la République.

SIMEON MDIVANI,

Vice-Président de l'Assemblée constituante de la Géorgie.

ALEXANDRE ANDRONIKOFF

DAVOUD GOUSSEINOFF

Substitut du Président du Comité révolutionnaire A.S.S.R.

Commissaire du Peuple des Affaires Étrangères.

Station d'Aktsafa, le 12 juin 1920.

Enclosure 2 in No. 4

A la Délégation pacifique de l'Azerbaïdjan, Déclaration de la Délégation pacifique de la République démocratique géorgienne

AU sujet et en connexion de la conclusion du Traité de Paix entre A.S.S.R. et la R.D.G. la Délégation géorgienne croit de son devoir d'exprimer ses sentiments de sympathie pour les efforts de paix et de réconciliation entre les deux peuples. Cependant, les conditions de la paix absolue entre la Géorgie et l'Azerbaïdjan ne peuvent être réalisées que si la question de la paix est résolue par la voie pacifique. Ne voulant pas élucider la question laquelle des deux parties est agressive, la délégation géorgienne, toujours fidèle à son ancienne politique pacifique, déclare l'absolue nécessité de résoudre tous les conflits existant entre l'Azerbaïdjan et la Géorgie par la voie pacifique. La solution des questions litigieuses entre l'Azerbaïdjan et l'Arménie par les armes menace la paix générale, l'équilibre de la Transcaucasie et peut ébranler les bases de la paix conclue entre la Géorgie et l'Azerbaïdjan.

Le Gouvernement de la République géorgienne exprime sa certitude que le Gouvernement de l'Azerbaïdjan soviétiste de son côté fera ses efforts pour aboutir à une solution pacifique des litiges arméno-azerbaïdjanais.

Le Président de la Délégation pacifique géorgienne.

Les membres.

Enclosure 3 in No. 4.

Déclaration de la Délégation pacifique de la République démocratique géorgienne faite à la Séance des Délégations de la République socialiste soviétique d'Azerbaïdjan et de la République démocratique géorgienne, le 12 juin 1920, à Aktsafa.

AU centre de la Transcaucasie, à Tiflis, capitale de la République géorgienne, près du Gouvernement de cette dernière ont été accrédités les représentants des Puissances étrangères. Ces mêmes missions en la personne de leurs membres séparés ont été

chargées de la représentation de leurs Gouvernements respectifs dans les autres républiques de la Transcaucasie—l'Azerbaïdjan et l'Arménie. Certains représentants des Puissances mentionnées, telles la Grande-Bretagne, la France, la Pologne, ayant des lettres de créance près du Gouvernement géorgien et se trouvant à l'époque du coup d'Etat à Bakou, ont été privés de leur liberté par ordre du Gouvernement socialiste soviétique de l'Azerbaïdjan.

Considérant l'arrestation des personnes accréditées près du Gouvernement géorgien comme une violation des droits souverains de la République, le Gouvernement de cette dernière estime que la République socialiste soviétique de l'Azerbaïdjan ne tarde pas à réparer l'erreur commise et donnera des ordres conformes pour mettre immédiatement en liberté les personnes précitées.

Le Président de la Délégation pacifique géorgienne.

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No 5

Minute by Mr Osborne on M. Khatusian's Views on Armenia

IN the absence of Sir John Tilley, Mr. Malcolm, the Armenian representative in London, brought to me this morning M. Khatusian, who until two months ago was President of Armenia.

In a long interview, which opened with fulsome expressions of the eternal gratitude of all Armenians to Great Britain, whom they regarded as their chief champion and on whom they relied for the future prospects of his country with complete frankness; while fully realising the many difficulties confronting them, he was quite sanguine as to the future.

He is visiting Europe as the special and fully accredited emissary of his Government to raise a loan from the various Armenian colonies of 20,000,000 dollars; a half of this will be devoted to the military expenses of the occupation of the Turkish vilayets and the other half to the development and reorganisation of the country. It would be a patriotic loan to set the country on its feet financially, and he anticipates no difficulty in obtaining the money from rich Armenians in Europe and America. The money will be deposited at a National Bank in Armenia, which is also to be formed.

When asked as to the future of Armenia, he said that a large income was to be expected from the cultivation of cotton alone, but that at present all available ground was devoted to raising grain; wool, copper and salt were the other resources of the country.

I raised the question of the present Government, and pointed out that being composed entirely of the Dashnak element it did not inspire complete confidence and was accused of being practically Bolshevik. M. Khatusian said that he expected to have to return to the Armenians to raise the money, and that he intended to assure them that the present Government had the entire confidence of the country in the crisis which it was called to meet, and so far from being Bolshevik, was displaying the utmost energy in resisting the demands of the Russian Bolsheviks. He added that when the elections take place in the autumn, it was anticipated that a Coalition Government, representing the moderates as well as the extremist Dashnaks, would be called to power.

He stated that in his opinion Russia, whatever modification its form of government undergoes, will advance eventually to Constantinople and Tabriz. He does not anticipate that Russia will ever be able to establish a State of Azerbaijan. At the same time, he does not consider that Russia will either now or in the future attempt to reabsorb Georgia and Armenia, provided these States are supported by the Western Allies, but he is very anxious that the question should be considered at any forthcoming negotiations between the Allied and Soviet Governments.

The present negotiations of the Armenian delegation in Moscow have reached a deadlock owing to the Bolshevik demand for control of Armenian foreign policy and occupation, by Bolshevik troops, of Karabagh and Zangezur. These demands have both been refused, and he stated that it was at Commander Luke's advice that the Armenian troops have advanced into these two disputed provinces to forestall an

advance of the Bolsheviks from Azerbaijan. There are at present about 300,000 Armenians in Azerbaijan, and it is the responsibility of the population that the Armenian cause is lost.

With regard to the fate of the Armenians in Cilicia, he seemed philosophical to the point of indifference, remarking that some final patriotic sacrifices were necessary to attain the long awaited end. He added that the American demand for a Greater Armenia had done much harm to the cause, to which I agreed.

The following are the points of chief importance which he wished to submit to the Secretary of State, —

1. He begs for a short interview with the Secretary of State formally to express to him the gratitude of his country to Great Britain, and to obtain valuable advice as to its future policy; his visit to England would be a failure in the eyes of his countrymen were he not to enjoy this privilege. If possible he would prefer this interview to take place between the 1st and 3rd August, and I promised Mr. Malcom to let him know Lord Curzon's wishes.

2. He asks that at any forthcoming negotiations between representatives of the Allied Governments and of the Soviet Government the recognition of Armenian independence be obtained from the latter; for this purpose Armenian representatives should be permitted to take part in the Conference.

3. He asks that Armenia be authorised at once to occupy the Turkish vilayets since an immediate advance by the Armenian troops, in conjunction with the present Greek operations in Anatolia, and with, if possible, the support of the British fleet at Trebizond, would have considerable chances of success without serious cost.

4. That His Majesty's Government should take any steps possible to obtain an early publication of President Wilson's decisions as to the frontier of Armenia.

5. That Armenian representatives should sign the final text of the preliminary agreement regarding Batoum recently concluded by Colonel Stokes (I assured him that this was always intended).

6. I was asked there be no question of a future mandatory for Armenia a British military and British military advisers should be appointed without delay (I reminded him of the financial difficulties that had hitherto precluded the despatch of military advisers, he admitted that his Government would be unable at present to find the amount necessary for their pay, but added that they could find the salary for a financial adviser, and begged that a first-class man might be selected for the post without delay.)

7. He supported M. Aharonian's request that an Armenian Minister be appointed to London at once, stating that as Armenia had been invited to sign the Turkish Treaty this implied de jure recognition of the country, and there should therefore be no difficulty in this. When I told him that M. Aharonian's candidature was not considered desirable, I said that were this proposal entertained it would be essential to appoint someone who had the full confidence of His Majesty's Government, and I promised that this, as well as the other questions, should be submitted to the Secretary of State.

I was aware that Armenia had been invited to sign the treaty and it was therefore difficult to adduce any valid objections to the appointment of an Armenian Minister, though I do not think it is at all desirable at present, it would involve similar recognition of Georgia and reconsideration of British representation in the Caucasus. M. Khattissian stated that he had been considerably annoyed by the necessity of going to Tiflis each time that he wished to consult the Chief Commissioner.

F. D. G. OSBORNE.

Foreign Office,
July 29, 1920

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No. 6

Report on Situation in Trans-Caucasia, dated July 15 1920 — (Received August 5.)

1. Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan is now in the hands of the Bolsheviks. The responsibility for this lies with Mustafa Kemal and Murt Pasha. The former desired to establish contact

with the Bolsheviks, as he hoped to get large supplies of arms and ammunition from there. He therefore made every effort to persuade the Azerbaijan Government to accept Bolshevik rule promising them that the Bolsheviks would leave them to manage their own country and not interfere with them. The Azerbaijan Government as a body, and Yusufbekov, Fath Ala Khan, and General Mehmandarov in particular declined absolutely to agree to Mustafa Kemal's suggestion, but Gajinski, one of the Ministers, and General Shaikhinski, Assistant Minister of War, backed by the Ittihad Party, betrayed the Government and carried out the coup d'Etat of the 2nd April with the help of a number of Turkish officers in the Azerbaijan forces. Fath Ali Khan Haiski has paid with his life for his determined opposition to Mustafa Kemal and the Bolsheviks. General Mehmandarov is a prisoner in Bolshevik hands. Yusufbekov is in a place of safety.

Once in possession of Baku the Bolsheviks at once began to show their hand, and it was soon evident that they had no intention of allowing any Tartar to enjoy any measure of power. Gajinski and others hold office but all power is in the hands of the Bolsheviks. This has caused a split between the Bolsheviks and the Tartars.

Although firmly established in Baku, the Bolsheviks quickly realised that they were by no means acceptable to the Tartars in the provinces as revolts against their rule broke out in many places. The most serious revolt and one which might well have succeeded but for the local Armenians assisting the Bolsheviks, took place at Ganja. The Bolsheviks quelled it massacring it is stated, 15,000 Tartars. This has seriously widened the Bolshevik Tartar breach, and the Bolsheviks are now seeking to win back the Tartars by inviting them to assist in a joint attack on Armenia. The Tartar does not forgive easily, and there is little doubt that serious anti-Bolshevik risings could be organised all over Azerbaijan without much difficulty.

The Armenians in Azerbaijan are actively co-operating with the Bolsheviks. This is due partly to their overpowering animosity towards the Tartars and partly to the desire to save their own skins. The Armenian representative at Tiflis, Bagradian, admitted to me that the Armenian Government is unable to influence them.

It is safe to state that Azerbaijan as a whole is quite disillusioned as to the true character of the Bolsheviks and is bitterly anti-Bolshevik. The Bolsheviks have inaugurated a deliberate policy of putting to death every Tartar intellectual in order to destroy the only element in the population which might be of use to the Allies. Witnesses state that some hundreds of Tartars are interned on Nargin Island, and so effective is the Bolshevik espionage system that people speak in whispers in the streets. In short, a reign of terror prevails.

2. Georgia

It has been the misfortune of Georgia that for the past year or more it has been consistently misrepresented in London and Paris as being Bolshevik at heart. It is unnecessary to discuss here the sources of this misinformation, but I wish to place on record as an individual who has had probably as good opportunities as anyone of studying the situation in Georgia, my conviction that Georgia is anti-Bolshevik. The number of Bolshevik agents and propagandists put to death by the Georgian Government alone affords adequate proof of this, but it has nevertheless failed to kill the calumny, emanating from the entourage of General Denikin, that because Georgia wishes to be independent of Russia she is Bolshevik. As for the Georgian Government, its members realise very clearly that, if ever the Bolsheviks take Georgia, they will be the first to pay the penalty of their opposition. The arrival of the Bolsheviks in Azerbaijan immediately placed Georgia in a very difficult position. Deprived by the policy of the Allies of any chance of obtaining adequate arms and ammunition, she found herself attacked by Bolshevik forces from Baku. Her troops fought and defeated the Bolsheviks, but it is improbable that they would have succeeded but for the fact that when their ammunition ran out the Italians provided them with 2,000,000 rounds. The representatives of our Italian ally in Trans-Caucasia have accordingly profited by every occasion to secure popularity at our expense.

It is worth noting that Georgia did not hesitate to fight the Bolsheviks, although she was greatly preoccupied at the moment with an unfortunate misunderstanding with our military authorities at Batoum regarding the province of Batoum. It is not my intention to enter into the merits of this controversy, which is now a matter of the past. But it should be noted that the atmosphere created by it was hardly favourable to an impartial expression of opinion regarding Georgia by our representatives at

Batum. After the fighting, Georgia made a treaty with the Soviet Government. Neither side at heart intends to observe the provisions of this treaty. The Bolsheviks have signed the treaty only because they feel they are not at the moment ready to attack Georgia, Georgia because she was committed by the action of her representative at Moscow to a treaty of which she does not approve. The representative in question was sent to Moscow to negotiate. He sent a wireless message stating that it was essential for him to be given the powers of a plenipotentiary. The Georgian Government despatched two wireless messages to him, the first making him a plenipotentiary, the second giving the terms the Georgian Government was prepared to accept. The representative received the first message at once, but the second was delivered to him only after he had already signed the treaty drawn up by the Bolsheviks. Georgia is therefore hardly bound by the treaty. It is more correct to say that a truce exists between them which either party can terminate at pleasure.

The Bolsheviks lost no time, once the treaty was signed, in sending an envoy, Kirov, with a mission of some fifty members to Tiflis. The real object of this mission appears to be to register all property claimed as Russian. Presumably when the Bolsheviks feel in a position to threaten Georgia more actively they will present a demand for payment for such property under threat of war. The Georgian Government has confiscated a large amount of money and propaganda publications which the Bolshevik Mission endeavoured to smuggle into Georgia, it has arrested several members of the mission for engaging in propaganda work on the murder of Fath Ali Khan Hovskii. It informed Kirov that if any member of a foreign mission in Georgia came to harm at Bolshevik hands the whole of his mission would be killed. As regards popular feeling, it may be mentioned that when half a dozen of the Bolshevik Mission entered a restaurant those in the restaurant rose in a body and insisted on their immediate expulsion.

As regards her internal affairs Georgia's main difficulty has been, in the words of one of her Ministers, that "she has been so preoccupied with her foreign relations that she has had no time to devote to her internal affairs." One question which needs careful handling is that of the Ajarians. There is every reason to believe that the Georgian Government will adopt a sane and sympathetic attitude towards the Ajarians, and that it will succeed in gaining their sympathies. There is no intention to interfere with their particular system of land tenure.

The Georgian Government is most anxious to secure the economic development of the country, and would prefer British assistance to any other for this purpose. British capital will naturally demand some guarantee of Georgian stability, and such stability in turn depends upon the satisfactory solution of Georgia's foreign problems.

In the first place it is essential to Georgia that the independence of Azerbaijan be restored. If this is arranged by the Allies, well and good. If not, Georgia will be compelled to help in any way she can the anti-Bolshevik Government of Azerbaijan to re-establish its power.

Secondly in her own interests, Georgia must prevent Armenia from going under Bolshevik rule, whether peacefully or by force. Her relations with Armenia are at present very close, and it is probable that the realisation by both parties of the community of their interests will shortly lead to a military alliance between Georgia and Armenia. To make this alliance effective, both States look to the Allies to help them to obtain adequate supplies of munitions of war.

For both political and economic reasons the Georgian Government is anxious to establish as close contact as possible with Great Britain. Little as the Georgian Government really wished British troops to leave Batum, the handing over to it of the province and port of Batum has created an atmosphere of trust in us and encouraged the Georgian Government to do its utmost to encourage British trade with Georgia. It is ready to ask the British Government to establish a British naval base at Batum and will give every facility for that purpose. Apart from Georgian wishes in this matter, it is perhaps worthy of consideration on other grounds, viz., that if, as is possible, the Bolsheviks defeat General Wrangel and occupy the Crimea, Bolshevik submarines may appear in the Black Sea. Failing the establishment of a British naval base at Batum the presence there of one of His Majesty's ships is very desirable, if only as an outward and visible sign that we have not entirely abandoned Georgia.

In the existing state of affairs Tiflis has become and is likely long to remain the centre of political and commercial activity in Trans-Caucasia. It is important

therefore, if British interests are to be properly safeguarded, that the British Mission should be second to none in efficiency, and for this purpose no time should be lost in the selection and despatch of suitable and numerically adequate personnel. In this borderland of West and East a certain measure of display is not only advisable but necessary, and this should not be ignored.

To sum up, Georgia is the foundation on which alone we can build in order to restore our very favourable situation, which the Bolshevik invasion of Azerbaijan has partly destroyed. I submit that it is to our interest to give Georgia all possible political and moral support. By helping Georgia alone can we hope to save Armenia or restore independence to Azerbaijan and so safeguard our interests in Persia.

3 Armenia

The present unhappy position of Armenia is in great measure due to the failure of the Armenian Government to control its animosity towards Azerbaijan. Even now the Armenian Government would prefer to see Russia permanently established in Azerbaijan than that Azerbaijan should regain her independence.

The Government presided over by Ohanginian is an improvement on its predecessor under Khatisian, as the latter really always wished to go back under Russian rule. This is not Ohanginian's policy, and he and his Government have wholeheartedly opposed the Russian policy. They have dealt skilfully with internal Bolshevism and have on two occasions attacked and repulsed Bolshevik troops wishing to enter Armenian territory. They are now threatened with a joint Bolshevik-Tartar invasion, but the arrival of arms and ammunition has encouraged them, and it is probable that they will offer a stubborn resistance. If, however, Mustafa Kemal can send any considerable forces to attack them simultaneously from the Turkish side their position will be precarious. They are daily recognising more clearly the necessity of making common cause with Georgia, and a military alliance with the latter appears to be imminent.

4 The North Caucasian Tribes

Like Azerbaijan, these tribes were persuaded to accept Bolshevik rule by Nuri Pasha, and, like Azerbaijan, they now see their error and cordially detest the Bolsheviks. There have already been anti-Bolshevik revolts amongst the tribes and a serious rising of perhaps 50,000 men requires only organisation and funds. No great sum of money would be required and efficient organisers of such a movement could be found. It is probable indeed that, whether supported from outside sources or not, a rising will take place. It would be a most important step towards the restoration of the Caucasus and would be followed by the expulsion of the Bolsheviks from the Caucasus south of the Terek River. The Kuban Cossacks would almost certainly seize the opportunity of attacking the Bolsheviks at the same time. If the rising succeeded, the North Caucasus Republic would come into being again, and in this event should be granted recognition by the Allies as soon as it shows its capacity to administer the tribes.

5. The Allied Missions in Trans-Caucasia

Thanks to the conduct of the French and Italian Missions, the inhabitants of Trans-Caucasia are convinced that, whatever may be the state of affairs further west, there is no solidarity of the Allies in Trans-Caucasia. Members of the French and Italian Missions have consistently decried Great Britain to the Georgian Government. When the trouble arose about Batum province, both missions urged Georgia to invade that province or she would never get it. It will be remembered that on this occasion the Italian representative did not scruple to report to the Italian High Commissioner at Constantinople that Georgian troops had entered Batum province with the authorisation of the British military authorities.

The Italian Mission.—This mission originally came out to report with a view to Italy taking a leading part in Trans-Caucasia. When this fell through the mission remained and displayed considerable political and commercial activity, the necessary funds being provided from German sources through the Banca di Roma. Similarly large quantities of German goods were imported. Indeed, the Italian Mission has worked throughout in German interests. At a time when the Supreme Council decided not to allow the Trans-Caucasian States to obtain munitions of war, the Italian Mission contracted to supply Azerbaijan with arms, ammunition, &c., and

the contract was signed by Colonel Gabba, the head of the Italian Mission. The contract was not fulfilled owing to the change of His Majesty's Government. The Italian Mission was recently sold 2,000,000 roubles to the Georgian Government.

The powerful wireless installation at Tiflis belonging to the Georgian Government is managed for them by the Italians and is largely used by them in Italian commercial interests, besides, there is good reason to believe, for communicating with Bolshevik headquarters at Moscow. In the light of events in Trans-Caucasia it is more true to say that Italy is an ally of the Bolsheviks than of Great Britain. The Italian Mission at Baku is allowed to fly its flag and to communicate with Tiflis. The Italian officer in charge, Captain Intson, is free to travel to and from Tiflis. The officer, when asked for help by a British officer in Baku, replied that he could do nothing. He has made no attempt to ameliorate the lot of our prisoners there, while the representative of Georgia, so frequently accused of being Bolshevik, has been sitting in his efforts to help them.

The failure of the Italian Minister at Tiflis, M. Mercatelli, to call on his British and French colleagues, while he was daily exchanging visits with the Bolshevik envoy, is another indication of Italian policy.

The French Mission.—The French Mission is composed of a military and military. Their diplomatic representative is Comte de Martel. He has missed no opportunity of decrying us to the Georgians. When our intention to evacuate Batum was announced, he impressed on the Georgian Government that this was due to our weakness. Annoyed at not being able to take part in my negotiations with the Georgian Government, he announced that he would take his own line. He then went to Batum, where, although well aware that the province was under British administration, he received an Ajarian deputation. He subsequently informed me of this. It is significant, however, that about the same time an officer of the mission at Batum visited Alanduri and there addressed an Ajarian meeting, and a few days later addressed a similar meeting within five miles of Batum. On each occasion he urged the Ajarians to resist the Georgians, promising that the French would secure them their independence.

A few days before he left Tiflis for Batum Comte de Martel ordered the French battalion at Batum to place a guard on certain cotton in dispute between him and the Armenian Government. This was carried out, although the French battalion was under the orders of General Cooke Collis and not of Comte de Martel, and although General Cooke Collis had ruled that the Armenian Government was at liberty to export the cotton from Batum.

The French Military Mission has recently been increased from six to ten officers. It is in charge of Colonel Corbelle, who may be described as openly Anglophobe. His policy appears to be identical with that of his predecessor, Colonel Chardigny, whose anti-British policy is largely responsible for the present unsatisfactory situation in Trans-Caucasia. During my recent visit to Tiflis, Colonel Corbelle informed the Georgian War Office that he had received orders to arrange for the evacuation of the French battalion from Batum. He was informed that arrangements for the evacuation of all Allied troops from Batum had already been made. The French Military Mission has, since the evacuation of Batum, attached to itself two members of General Wrangel's Mission to Batum, the remainder of which left for the Crimea just before our occupation. The idea appears to be to further anti-Bolshevik Russian propaganda and to prevent the de facto recognition of the three States by the Allies.

It is not clear for what purpose France maintains a military mission in Trans-Caucasia. In any case its activities in no way help the Allied cause.

6. Communication with Tiflis

Both in our own interests and in those of Georgia it is very important that something should be done to establish safe and rapid communication between Tiflis and Europe. Outside Georgia the land telegraph lines are in the hands of Bolsheviks or Turkish Nationalists. As regards wireless telegraphy, the station at Tiflis is in the hands of the Italians, who can communicate with a ship at Constantinople or with London. I have been told that the Italian Mission has been granted the use of the station for a certain period daily, in order to communicate with Baku. British messages marked urgent are sent by wireless by one of His Majesty's ships at Batum, but atmospherics in the Black Sea region are a frequent source of delay. Other messages are sent by ships. I understand from the High Commissioner at

Constantinople that a suggestion was made to erect a powerful installation on Balwer Island, but was vetoed. In view of the importance of establishing safe and rapid communication with Tiflis, this suggestion might perhaps be reconsidered. Telegrams at present often take ten days to a fortnight to reach Tiflis from London, and no regular mail service for British letters exists at all.

From the point of view of British interests the present situation in Trans-Caucasia is far from satisfactory. It does not mean, however, that it cannot be saved. In my opinion it can be saved if a consistent policy be adopted and followed. It would be both unwise and unfair not to realise that the three Trans-Caucasian Republics are less to blame for the existing situation than we ourselves. In our whole-hearted support of General Denikin we not only failed to make General Denikin concentrate his energies on the defeat of the Bolsheviks and to prevent him from stirring up unnecessary trouble in Trans-Caucasia, but we also sacrificed our own interests in withholding arms and ammunition from the three States which would have enabled them to meet the Bolshevik peril when it threatened them.

We still enjoy a greater influence than any other foreign Power in Trans-Caucasia, and we can maintain and increase this influence at relatively small cost. For this purpose we should give the Trans-Caucasian States all possible political and moral support and help them to obtain adequate quantities of munitions of war and equipment. No opportunity should be missed of showing the States that we are keenly interested in their future. The economic importance of Trans-Caucasia should not be ignored, and, given a definite friendly policy towards the States, any and every commercial concession we may desire can be obtained.

The importance of Tiflis as a centre of political activity for the Middle East is great and increasing and demands the maintenance there of a strong and efficient British Mission. Events are tending more and more to make Tiflis the centre of Russian and Turkish political activity in the Middle East.

C. B. STOKES, Lieutenant Colonel

(E 9346 1 58)

Colonel Stokes to Earl Curzon

My Lord

Foreign Office, August 5, 1920

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report on the special mission on which I was sent to Batoum:—

1. I left Constantinople, accompanied by M. Gombashidze, on the 14th June, and arrived at Constantinople on the 19th June. At Constantinople I had conversations with the High Commissioner and the General Officer Commanding, General Sir G. Milne.

2. I left Constantinople on the 22nd June with Admiral Sir M. Culme Seymour on H.M.S. "Emperor of India," and arrived at Batoum on the 24th June. At Batoum M. Gombashidze and I interviewed the British Military Governor, Colonel M. Gombashidze, and I proceeded to Tiflis by special train, arriving at Tiflis on the 25th June.

3. I at once got into communication with the Georgian Government, and the next two days were spent in negotiations with the representatives appointed by the Georgian Government: M. Giorgishvili, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and M. Kiknadze, Minister of the Interior. On the 28th June I signed two agreements, as reported in my telegram dated the 28th June to the Foreign Office.

4. I communicated agreement No. 1 to the French representative, the Comte de Martel, and the British representative, M. Begzadian, of the contents of both agreements. I requested M. Begzadian to inform the President of the Armenian Republic and to ask him to treat agreement No. 2 as secret. M. Begzadian agreed with me that the Georgian Government could not grant a concession for the Tchorokh River Valley Railway to Armenia without rousing the hostility of both Turks and Ajarians. I had

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intended communicating with Fath Ali Khan Hovaki as representative of Azerbaijan, but unfortunately he was murdered shortly before my arrival at Tiflis, and I was unable to find at Tiflis anyone of sufficient standing to take his place.

6. On the 28th June I informed the British Military Governor of Batoum that the Georgian Government was now ready to send its troops to Batoum and to take over the railway line, and suggested that this should be done on the night of the 29th June or that of the 30th June. I was informed, in reply, that transports to evacuate our troops would not be available before the 4th July at earliest. On the 30th June the Georgian authorities informed me that, after a meeting of Ajarians in the Kobuletti district, delegates had been sent by the Ajarians to the Georgian representatives at Batoum and Notanebi to say that the Ajarians had decided not to oppose the Georgian occupation of Batoum. The delegates requested that the Georgian troops should proceed to Batoum by railway and not by road, and added that they were returning to Kobuletti to disperse their armed men to their homes. I attribute this decision of the Ajarians to the fact that General Cooke Collis had informed them that if they opposed the Georgians, they would also be opposing the British. In communicating to me the decision of the Ajarians the Georgian authorities expressed their desire to take over the railway line from Notanebi to Kobuletti inclusive forthwith. I asked General Cooke Collis to consent to this, and he did not miss the opportunity afforded by the friendly relations of the Ajarians. General Cooke Collis agreed, and by 7 A.M. on the 1st July the handing over had been completed without incident. Two officers sent by General Cooke Collis, M. Gambushidze and I accompanied the Georgian troops.

7. I then proceeded to Poti, where I arranged for the unloading of the arms and ammunition from the steamship "Horseshoe." I arrived back at Tiflis on the 2nd July.

8. I had previously, on the 28th June, telegraphed to General Sir G. Milne asking his permission for Georgian troops to occupy Batoum province and town forthwith in order to release as much as possible their reserves concentrated on the Batoum frontier which might be required on their eastern frontier. My reason for sending this telegram was that I already knew from my conversations with them that both General Milne and General Cooke Collis considered undesirable a joint occupation of Batoum town by British and Georgian troops for more than one night. On my return to Tiflis on the 2nd July I received General Milne's reply, which was to the effect that General Cooke Collis and I should consult in this matter. At the same time I received a telegram from General Cooke Collis suggesting that the Georgians should take over the railway line from Kobuletti to Batoum Station inclusive on the 6th July, and the town on the 7th and 8th July. In reply, I requested General Cooke Collis to agree to the Georgians taking over Batoum as soon as possible for the following reasons:

- (a) That the Georgian Government was being put to considerable expense and its goods railway traffic seriously impeded owing to the retention of trains for moving troops.
- (b) That the Georgians wished to release the reserves they were keeping at Notanebi as soon as possible in case they were required on their eastern frontier.
- (c) That I had reason to believe that the French representative, Comte de Martel, intended to create trouble regarding the evacuation of Batoum, and I wished to forestall him if such should be his intention. In this connection further details will be found in paragraph 13 of this report.

General Cooke Collis kindly acceded to my request, but suggested that, in order to overcome the difficulty of finding adequate accommodation for Georgian troops as well as British and to obviate the danger of a dual control, the Georgians should on the 4th July take over the railway line entirely, but their troops should camp a couple of miles outside the town, the town to be handed over on the 7th and 8th July. This suggestion was immediately accepted. The handing over of the railway took place on the morning of the 4th July, and the Georgian troops camped outside the town. It was then decided by mutual agreement that the formal entry of Georgian troops into the town should take place on the morning of the 7th July, after which the civil administration would be handed over to Georgian officials, at 6 P.M. on the 7th July a parade to take place of British, French and Georgian troops, at which

the British and French flags would be lowered and the Georgian flag hoisted. This programme was duly carried out.

9. The parade, which took place in a wide street of the town, was attended by a large concourse of spectators. Some 800 troops, representative of the Russian Navy and the British and French military forces, were present. The parade was conducted with a military precision. The Georgian troops were in the front, followed by the British and French troops. After an inspection of all the troops by the Georgian Commander-in-Chief, a salute was fired by one of His Majesty's ships. The Marseillaise was then played, followed by the British National Anthem. The Georgian National Anthem was then played, and the Georgian flag hoisted on the mast from which the British flag had been lowered. Georgian artillery then fired a salute. The British and French troops then marched off to their ships and were not allowed outside the dock gates again. The Georgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Greguechkori, was present at the parade.

10. A banquet took place on the evening of the 7th July, which was attended by the British and French military and naval authorities, the Georgian Minister for Foreign Affairs and some fifty British and French officers. The Georgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Comte de Martel, and a number of French officers, the Georgian Minister for Foreign Affairs and many Georgian officers and officials. Speeches of a friendly character were made, and the appropriate toasts were honoured.

11. On the 8th and 9th July the transports completed loading, and the six transports, "Field Marshal," with General Cooke Collis and his staff on board, being seen off by a British and French fleet.

12. During the period the 24th June to the 9th July two battleships, H.M.S. "Polaris" and "Polaris," two destroyers, H.M.S. "Senator" and "Swallow," lay at anchor off Batoum. H.M.S. "Polaris" was replaced by H.M.S. "Centaur," light cruiser, on the 17th July. H.M.S. "Senator" is now stationed at Poti. H.M.S. "Swallow" brought me to Constantinople, leaving Batoum on the 18th July.

13. On the 2nd July the French diplomatic representative at Tiflis, Comte de Martel, informed me that he had received a telegram dated the 18th June from the French Foreign Office stating that the French Government had suggested that he should be associated with me in my negotiations with the Georgian Government. He wished to know what I thought of this suggestion. I replied that my negotiations had been completed on the 28th June, and, in the second place, I had received no instructions from my own Government as to associating him with myself. Comte de Martel then said that if I would show him any agreement I had made, he would sign it. I replied that I had no authority or instructions to show him the result of my negotiations. I had previously, as an act of courtesy, communicated to him agreement No. 1 through the chief British commissioner, Commander Luke. Comte de Martel then said that he did not wish to make trouble, but if I would not show him the results of my negotiations, he would follow an independent line of his own. What had I to say to that? I replied that I had no comments to offer on any line of action he might decide to take, as it was no affair of mine. I could not act as he desired without instructions from my Government, and I had received no such instructions. Commander Luke offered to telegraph to London for instructions for me, but Comte de Martel, after consideration, decided not to accept this offer. I did not receive Foreign Office telegram No. 598, dated the 30th June, until the 6th July. I therefore took no further action in the matter.

14. In conclusion, I request permission to express my thanks to:—

- (1.) The High Commissioner (Admiral Sir J. de Robeck) and the General Officer Commanding the British Naval Forces in the Black Sea, for the facilities and assistance so kindly given me.
- (2.) The British military authorities and especially to General Cooke Collis, who gave me all possible assistance and by his ready consent to my various proposals greatly facilitated my task.
- (3.) The Chief British Commissioner (Commander Luke), to whose help and advice I am greatly indebted.

I have, &c
C. B. STOKES

Figure 1 in Appendix 1

Agreement No. 1.

WE, the undersigned, Lieutenant-Colonel O. B. Stokes, on behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and the undersigned, on behalf of the Georgian Government, their Excellencies MM. E. P. Guegueskori, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and N. B. Ramishvili, Minister of the Interior, on the other side, hereby make the following agreement:-

On the handing over of the province, port and towns of Batoum to the Georgian Government by His Britannic Majesty's Government the Georgian Government guarantees free transit to and from the port of Batoum on the Georgian railways to the independent Republic of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and further undertakes to grant the said republic free use of the port of Batoum.

Note—Details to be arranged by mutual agreement between the Georgian Government and the Governments of the independent Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan.

Signed this 28th day of June, 1920

In the presence of

FIGURE 2 in No. 7

Agreement No. 2

WE, the undersigned, Lieutenant-Colonel C. R. Stokes, on behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government, on the one side, and the representatives of the Georgian Government, their Excellencies MM. E. P. Gnagnachkuri, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and N. B. Ramishvili, Minister of the Interior, on the other side, hereby make the following agreement:

The Georgian Government hereby grant a concession for the construction of a line of railway from the Armenian frontier along the Tchodorokh River Valley, with an outlet on the Black Sea.

2. The details of the said concession will be settled and the final agreement signed in London between His Britannic Majesty's Government and representatives of the Georgian Govt.

Signed the 28th day of June, 1920.

In the presence of

E 9127 134 581

No. 2.

Letter to Sir A. Geddes (Washington).

Foreign Office, August 5, 1920.

Topographie.)

I SHOULD be grateful if you could ascertain whether President Wilson's decision up to the boundaries of Armenia may be expected shortly. The imminent signature of the treaty renders the decision a matter of urgency, as the execution of part of the treaty is dependent thereon.

Sir A. Geddes to Earl Curzon. — (Received August 15.)

Washington, August 14, 1920

Y. 1. 1. Telegram No. 655 of 5th August

United States Government are also of opinion that under terms of article 89, section 6, Treaty of Peace with Turkey, decision of Pres L. W. L. would only be made after he had notification of signed agreement of parties interested.

E 10726 134 581

No. 10

Commander Luke to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 1)

No. 256. Confidential.

My Lord,

Tiflis, August 11, 1921

WITH reference to my telegram No. 355 of to-day's date, of which I have not received an answer from the Government as regards the provision of occupation of Karabagh, Zangezur and Nakhichevan by Russian Bolshevik troops.

2 In conversation to-day with M. Bekaschian and M. Babalian (one of the two Armenian Ministers who negotiated the accord) I referred in strong terms to the painful impression which this act on the part of Armenia, amounting in effect to a betrayal of trust, has been to me as His Majesty's Government, who would, I said, feel that I must thank them for their help to Armenia in the matter of unification and

I could not, I remarked, feel convinced that Armenia, having passed as she was, was now in a worse military position than at the beginning of July, when, without the munitions of war since received, she most properly rejected the terms she had now accepted. It seemed, I added, lamentable that the Armenian Government, after the outrageous manner in which they had hitherto dealt with both internal and external influences, should have been so easily misled, and that they, and their allies, have compromised their and their allies' security, without even taking counsel beforehand of their friends.

3. The two gentlemen requested that, in communicating the news of the accession to your Lordship, I would explain that it was only a temporary measure, the time being at the end of her powers of resistance. Further, I pointed out that under the present arrangement Sanatrukian with its access to the Maku-Bayazid Railway, together with the control of their own railway as far as Julfa, also that the Bolsheviks are not in control of the railways. I then pointed out to them, if it ever comes, the harm will have been done; while the Bolsheviks' guarantees to respect Armenian control of the railways are unlikely to be worth the paper they are written.

I have, &c

H. C. LUKE

Enclosure 1 in No. 10.

Commander Luke to Earl Carson

Tijlre, August 11, 1921.

July 31, 1920. [redacted] notified by Armenian Government of an agreement concluded by [redacted] and [redacted] with the Russian Soviet representative, Legrand, according to which, as a preliminary to the final peace negotiations to be continued at Erivan, Armenia has consented that Bolshevik troops shall temporarily occupy Zangezur, Karabagh and all the district of Nakhichevan south of Shakhakhti. The Armenian Government have been informed by Legrand that Bolshevik troops have already advanced by rail towards Tabriz, and that on the 31st July the Bolshevik

ambassador to Mustafa Kemal, a certain Eliava, proceeded via Maku and Bayazid to the headquarters of the Armenian representatives here.

I expressed to the Armenian representatives here my amazement at this reversal of their previous decision, which was reported in my telegram No. 315 of the 6th July (repeated Constantinople telegram No. 229), and said that the Armenian Government's consent to the Bolshevik occupation of Nakhichevan, which opened their road into North-West Persia and into Turkey, almost amounted to an act of treachery against the British. I said that the Armenian Government had received a large consignment of British munitions. The Armenians defended their position by saying that they had reached the limit of their resistance, and they asseverated the continued loyalty of Armenia to the Entente. Further, they claim that the time which they hope to gain by the negotiations to be continued at Erivan will enable them to organize resistance should the Bolsheviks fail to keep their promise ultimately to evacuate Nakhichevan.

Though the Armenians were undoubtedly hard pressed, I am not satisfied that their military position was as desperate as they claim.

I am despatching text of agreement by first opportunity, and will endeavour shortly to go to Erivan.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 272, and Tehran, No. 124.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 11

1. Agreement between Armenian and Soviet Governments respecting Provisional Occupation of Karabagh, Zangezur and Nakhichevan by Russian Bolshevik Troops.

LE 10 août 1920, la R.S.F.S.R., en personne du représentant plénipotentiaire, B. V. Legrand, d'un côté, et les représentants de la République d'Arménie, A. Jamalian et A. Babulian, de l'autre, partant du point de la reconnaissance de l'indépendance et de la complète existence libre de la République d'Arménie, ont conclu le présent traité suivant :

1. A midi le 10 août 1920, les opérations militaires entre les troupes R.S.F.S.R. et celles de la République d'Arménie sont considérées comme finies.

Remarque. — Les opérations militaires qui pourraient avoir lieu après ladite date, suite d'absence de communication ou d'autres obstacles techniques, ne peuvent pas avoir de conséquences contradictoires à un des points du traité ci-dessus.

2. Les troupes de la République d'Arménie occupent la ligne suivante : Chakhtakhti Ashavut-Soutanlek et, plus loin, la ligne plus au nord du Kouki et plus à l'ouest de Bazar-Chai Buzerkend, dans le rayon de Kazakh, la ligne qu'ils ont occupée le 30 juillet 1920. Les troupes de la R.S.F.S.R. occupent les rayons en dispute : Karabagh, Zangezur et Nakhichevan, excepté la zone destinée par le traité actuel à la disposition des troupes de la République d'Arménie.

3. L'occupation de ces territoires par des troupes soviétiques, la question des droits de la République d'Arménie et de la République azerbaïdjanaïenne socialiste soviétique sur ces territoires est bien loin d'être résolue. Par cette occupation temporaire la R.S.F.S.R. n'a en vue que de créer des conditions favorables pour résoudre paisiblement les disputes territoriales entre l'Arménie et l'Azerbaïdjan sur des bases qui seront établies par un traité entre la R.S.F.S.R. et la République d'Arménie le plus tôt possible.

4. La suspension des opérations militaires des côtés engagés doit mettre fin à la concentration des forces militaires comme sur les territoires disputés de même sur ceux limitrophes.

5. L'exploitation du chemin de fer dans la région Chakhtakhti-Djulfâ appartient à l'Administration des Chemins de Fer d'Arménie jusqu'à la conclusion du traité entre la R.S.F.S.R. et la République d'Arménie, mais à condition de ne pas l'employer pour l'usage des opérations militaires.

6. La R.S.F.S.R. garantit le passage libre, avec les armes et munitions, en Arménie à toutes les troupes du Gouvernement arménien se trouvant hors de la ligne occupée par les troupes soviétiques.

Le présent traité est signé en deux exemplaires, dont l'un est transmis aux représentants de la République d'Arménie et l'autre aux représentants de la R.S.F.S.R.

Le Représentant plénipotentiaire de la R.S.F.S.R.
en Arménie,

B. V. LEGRAND

Les Délégués de la République d'Arménie,

A. JAMALIAN

A. BABULIAN

Conformément

Signature de la Mission,

E 10728.134 58)

No 11

Commander Luke to Earl Curzon. — (Received September 1)

My Lord,

Tiflis, August 12, 1920

I HAVE the honour to advert to my despatch No. 244/47 of the 19th July, 1920, wherein I forwarded to your Lordship a letter from the Armenian Government concerning the return of refugees.

- (a) The repatriation of Turkish Armenian refugees;
- (b) The early occupation by Armenia of the territory to be allotted to her under the Turkish Treaty; and
- (c) The establishment of liaison with the Allied commands for the above purpose.

During my recent visit to Constantinople I had the advantage of discussing these points with His Majesty's High Commissioner as well as with General Milne. These discussions it was evident that there was little possibility of the Turkish Armenians returning to their homes in the near future. The Armenian Government, however, were anxious to see the return of their refugees and were asking for assistance at present, either in the shape of a demonstration at Trabizond or otherwise to enable them to occupy the valley of Alashgand. In point of fact the Armenian Government have no intention of occupying the valley of Alashgand. In August last I was asked by the Armenian Government to visit the Turkish frontier in this direction on the part of the Armenian Government. In the course of my interview with M. Bekzadian yesterday, I asked him to convey the sense of the above to his Government. He said that the Armenian Government were anxious to see the return of their refugees and were asking for assistance at present, either in the shape of a demonstration at Trabizond or otherwise to enable them to occupy the valley of Alashgand.

Acting on General Milne's suggestion, I also gave M. Bekzadian a word of warning as regards the return of refugees. He said that the Armenian Government were anxious to see the return of their refugees and were asking for assistance at present, either in the shape of a demonstration at Trabizond or otherwise to enable them to occupy the valley of Alashgand. In August last I was asked by the Armenian Government to visit the Turkish frontier in this direction on the part of the Armenian Government. In the course of my interview with M. Bekzadian yesterday, I asked him to convey the sense of the above to his Government. He said that the Armenian Government were anxious to see the return of their refugees and were asking for assistance at present, either in the shape of a demonstration at Trabizond or otherwise to enable them to occupy the valley of Alashgand.

I have, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

Commander Luke to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 11)

(No. 264 Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tiflis, August 16, 1920

IN your confidential despatch No. 248 of the 11th August I have the honour to enclose a document which I have received from the Armenian Government, setting forth at length the course of the Armenian negotiations with the Bolsheviks, and requesting that the Allied Governments should bring pressure to bear on the Russian Soviet Government to spare Armenia from further hostilities.

I have, &c.

H C LUKA.

Enclosure in No. 12

Armenian Diplomatic Representative to Commander Luke.

(Confidential.)

Excellence

Tiflis, le 14 août 1920

PAR l'ordre du Ministre des Affaires étrangères

Du moment même de l'occupation du Caucase du Nord et de l'Azerbeïdjan par les forces bolchevistes, devant les deux Républiques transcaucasiennes—la Géorgie et l'Arménie—surgit la nécessité de régler leurs relations extérieures avec le régime soviétique, désormais leur voisin.

Antérieurement le Gouvernement soviétique, par l'intermédiaire de son représentant au Caucase du Nord, ainsi que du délégué géorgien M. M. Tchikobava, menant les négociations avec le Gouvernement soviétique au nom de la Géorgie, avait à maintes reprises signalé que, si l'Arménie, de son côté, s'adressait audit Gouvernement avec des propositions de paix sur la base de la reconnaissance de l'indépendance et de la souveraineté de l'Arménie, de telles propositions seraient accueillies à Moscou de la manière la plus favorable.

Sur ce point, que le délégué géorgien M. M. Tchikobava a pu vous signaler, l'Arménie, par l'intermédiaire de son représentant au Caucase du Nord, ainsi que du délégué géorgien M. M. Tchikobava, menant les négociations avec le Gouvernement soviétique au nom de la Géorgie, avait à maintes reprises signalé que, si l'Arménie, de son côté, s'adressait audit Gouvernement avec des propositions de paix sur la base de la reconnaissance de l'indépendance et de la souveraineté de l'Arménie, de telles propositions seraient accueillies à Moscou de la manière la plus favorable.

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I. Par rapport à la Turquie et l'Azerbeïdjan.—(i.) En tendances des Kemalistes d'obtenir, par la liaison à travers l'Arménie avec les forces soviétiques russes et l'Azerbeïdjan, l'aide nécessaire pour la lutte que la Turquie a entreprise contre le Traité de Paix et les Puissances de l'Entente.

(ii.) En intention de déclencher avec le concours de la Russie bolcheviste, la campagne contre la domination européenne dans toutes les parties musulmanes de l'Orient et de l'Asie.

(iii.) En écrasement de l'Arménie indépendante comme d'un État entravant ladite liaison et présentant un obstacle à la formation d'une masse compacte musulmane depuis la Méditerranée jusqu'aux confins de l'Inde.

II. Par rapport à la Russie.—(i.) En vue de la liaison définitive avec elles pour les intérêts généraux que la Russie a en Asie, et en vue de la liaison définitive avec elles pour les intérêts généraux que la Russie a en Asie, et en vue de la liaison définitive avec elles pour les intérêts généraux que la Russie a en Asie.

celle de l'Europe, d'un côté, ainsi qu'au d'exercer une pression sur la marche des pourparlers entre la Russie soviétique et les Puissances de l'Entente, de l'autre.

(ii.) En amélioration de sa situation économique en pénétrant en Perse à travers l'Arménie et l'Irak.

(iii.) Porter un coup mortel aux intérêts européens et au capital européen par l'organisation du mouvement bolcheviste en Orient et en Asie.

Etant donné que l'Arménie présente l'obstacle principal à la réalisation des projets susmentionnés, et ayant en vue la situation actuelle, il est de toute évidence que, ces derniers temps, les intentions des Turco-Azerbeïdjanais, d'un côté, et des bolchevistes, d'autre, de réaliser le plan ci haut exposé se signalent d'une manière précise. Ainsi, les troupes bolchevistes russes, d'un côté, et les troupes turco-azerbeïdjanaises, d'autre, ont occupé le long des frontières arméniennes, et, d'autre côté, des troupes bolchevistes russes sous le prétexte des mesures préventives contre les conflits internationaux sur les territoires soi-disant contestés entre l'Arménie et l'Azerbeïdjan, ont occupé d'abord la province de Karabakh et de Zanghézour, et à présent celle de Nakhitchevan, où entrent aussi les troupes kémalistes et azerbeïdjanaises. Mais cet état de choses ne dura pas longtemps, les forces rouges, étant repoussées le 5 août sous Digue et ayant subi des pertes considérables, peu de temps après reçurent un renfort du Karabakh des forces soviétiques y compris, des cavaliers kurdes (selon des renseignements incertains, ces derniers atteignirent le chiffre de 6,000 hommes) venant de la partie nord-est du Zanghézour, tandis que les derrières des troupes arméniennes furent attaqués par les Molokans et les musulmans nomades ayant organisé des détachements considérables de volontaires et ayant pour intentions les premiers, d'accorder aide aux bolchevistes russes, leurs compatriotes, les derniers, de soutenir les milices de l'Azerbeïdjan dans leur lutte contre l'Arménie.

Dans ces conditions pénibles et extrêmement défavorables au point de vue militaire les troupes arméniennes à peine ont pu se frayer un chemin de retraite pour Bazar-Tchay à travers les masses des insurgés vers la frontière même de Charour, où ils furent l'objet des attaques de toutes les parties unifiées de l'armée rouge, des Kurdes, Tartares et Molokans, et en face desquelles le petit détachement du Général Dro se trouva impuissant.

Les Arméniens locaux, atteints au moment le plus difficile de l'année des récoltes de céréales par le coup foudroyant des forces supérieures, ne purent s'organiser et opposer résistance. En même temps, une concentration effrénée des forces soviétiques du côté de Kasakh fut poursuivie, d'où, le 2 août, ils commencèrent une marche contre la partie incontestablement arménienne de l'ancien district de Kasakh, ayant occupé les points Kerkend, Akhshara, Tarakhlou, d'une part, et s'avancèrent, d'autre, vers la zone neutre de la région. Cette dernière avance menaçait d'égorger totalement l'Arménie en coupant son unique voie ferrée et en lui préparant une situation d'isolement complet et de blocus. Tous ces faits furent portés à la connaissance du Gouvernement géorgien et M. le Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Géorgie avait présenté ces faits au Conseil Supérieur de l'Entente. Les milices arméniennes de la zone neutre à l'égard de l'Arménie. En ajoutant à ce qui précède le fait des mouvements des unités turco-kurdes dans la direction de Sarikamish, le tableau des conditions extrêmement pénibles parmi lesquelles se sont trouvées les troupes arméniennes serait accompli et évidemment la conclusion de l'armistice afin de sauver l'Arménie du bolchevisme devint tout à fait inévitable et indispensable.

Forcé par lesdites conditions, et craignant l'infiltration du bolchevisme dans les districts de Charour et de Kasakh, régions incontestablement arméniennes, le Gouvernement d'Arménie avait proposé à sa délégation menant les pourparlers avec les bolchevistes à Tiflis de hâter la conclusion de l'armistice. Ces derniers (bolchevistes) avaient exigé, comme conditions sine qua non de l'armistice à conclure, l'occupation des trois régions contestées par les forces russes. La délégation arménienne, n'ayant pas de choix à faire, avait donné son consentement à ces exigences, ayant pu pourtant se réserver la ligne de sa retraite d'été, c'est-à-dire la ligne de la zone neutre de Bazar-Tchay, ainsi que l'administration de la voie ferrée Chakhtakhty-Dyulfa. La délégation arménienne avait souligné que l'acceptation desdites conditions de l'armistice ne résolvait point l'attribution définitive des régions occupées par les forces soviétiques, et que l'Arménie continuerait à les contester à l'Azerbeïdjan et se réserverait le droit de les réclamer durant l'élaboration du Traité de Paix devant être conclu à Erivan entre le Gouvernement arménien et le représentant soviétique en Arménie, M. Legrand. Dans huit jours, M. Legrand se rend en Arménie, et vers ce temps sera de retour de Moscou notre

délégation présidée par M. Chanto et les négociations pour une paix définitive commenceront.

L'Arménie considère impossible de céder à l'Azerbeïdjan lesdites régions, et espère fermement de pouvoir s'entendre avec l'autre partie contractante par le moyen des compromis. Mais, si l'Azerbeïdjan, soutenu par ses alliés et protecteurs, n'accorde aucune concession à l'Arménie et que le conflit armé deviendrait inévitable, la faute ne serait pas à l'Arménie, violée durant les deux dernières années par des actions hostiles, de lever de nouveau les armes pour défendre son droit à l'indépendance et pour protéger la sûreté de ses frontières. L'Arménie espère que durant lesdites négociations son armée sera en mesure de résister à la révolte de céréales, et que, ayant achevé tranquillement tous les travaux de récoltes, il répondrait à la déclaration de mobilisation générale; pendant ce temps même, les troupes auront la possibilité d'apprendre le maniement des armements reçus d'Angleterre; ainsi, l'armée arménienne reposée, bien armée, et tranquille du sort de ses familles (concernant leur ravitaillement par le pain) serait prête à continuer d'accomplir son devoir envers la patrie. Mais il est à signaler les conditions proprement arméniennes qui pourraient présenter des obstacles substantiels et parfois insurmontables à l'accomplissement de ces intentions. Ce sont: (1) le manque de ressources financières, (2) l'absence des combustibles, et (3) l'absence en moyens de transport.

En appliquant des difficultés mentionnées, votre Gouvernement pourrait jouer un rôle important. L'emprunt de quelques millions de dollars accordé par votre Gouvernement à la République arménienne la sauverait d'une situation insupportable; car avant de se résoudre à un acte de haute portée politique on devrait peut-être bien suspendre brièvement l'entreprise commencée par suite du défaut en argent ou en autres moyens indispensables, faits assez fréquents dans l'existence de la République arménienne.

Grâce à cet état de choses, des situations menaçant à la sûreté et à l'existence de l'Etat surgissent plusieurs fois. L'absence des combustibles, de wagons et de locomotives, ainsi que de moyens de transport pour l'armée (camions-automobiles et de pneus) ne fut pas la seule cause de suspension fréquente de la circulation des trains omnibus chose presque admissible, mais parfois ne donna pas moyens de transporter des renforts, du pain et de l'armement aux unités combattantes.

Il est naturel que dans ces conditions purement arméniennes tous succès des armées et continus de l'armée et du peuple arménien voilà plus de deux ans. Mon Gouvernement, ainsi que tout le peuple arménien, ont résolu fermement de sauvegarder par tous les moyens possibles l'inviolabilité des frontières de l'Arménie et ses droits à l'indépendance. Des mesures urgentes ont été prises afin de...

En portant à votre connaissance ce qui précède, mon Gouvernement vous prie de vouloir bien le faire connaître à votre Gouvernement, ainsi que de faire savoir quel concours matériel et diplomatique votre Gouvernement pourrait prêter à l'Arménie dans sa lutte contre les forces turco-bolchevistes menaçant à son indépendance.

De son côté, mon Gouvernement considère extrêmement indispensable que les Alliés fassent une pression sur le Gouvernement soviétique par l'intermédiaire de Krassine et Kamenoff. Mon Gouvernement trouve également nécessaire l'envoi en Arménie des combustibles et des moyens de transports. J'attire votre attention sur ce fait que toutes les mesures susdiquées à entreprendre doivent être réalisées dans le plus bref délai, l'Arménie étant une petite nation, ne pouvant tenir face longtemps contre de voisins agresseurs beaucoup plus forts en hommes et en autres ressources.

Je me plais à espérer que vous voudrez bien me faire connaître les suites que comporteront la présente lettre, afin que je puisse en aviser mon Gouvernement.

Je vous prie, Excellence, d'accepter, &c.

(Pour Représentant diplomatique d'Arménie)

PR. M. TOUMANOFF

E 10962/1 58

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received September 6.)

(Confidential)

Sir,

Admiralty, September 2, 1920.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, extracts from reports, dated the 27th June and the 11th July, which have been received from the Senior Naval Officer, Batoum, covering the period from the 15th June to the 11th July, 1920.

2. A copy of the above has also been sent to the War Office.

I am, &c.

O. MURRAY

Enclosure in No. 19

Extracts from Reports by the Senior Naval Officer, Batoum

LETTER OF PROCEEDINGS, JUNE 15 TO 27, 1920

A) — Operations

1. LEFT Marseilles in "Ceres" on the 10th June intending, in accordance with "Ceres" sailing orders from the Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, to arrive at Malta on the morning of the 18th June.

On the evening of the 17th June, when off Marittimo, your message was received, directing "Ceres" to proceed to Chianak with all despatch. I proceeded at 25 knots and turned over to "Emperor of India" on the morning of the 19th June, arriving at Constantinople the same evening.

2. On the 21st June I sailed in "Emperor of India" for Batoum, with Colonel Stokes and M. Gambushidze on board, arriving at Batoum 0600 L. T. on the 24th June.

3. On that morning a conference was held on board between myself and the Military Governor of Batoum, and the mission to Georgia. The latter left by special train for Tiflis, arriving next morning.

4. The town and province of Batoum remain quiet. Colonel Stokes reported the case as would be ready to take over on the 30th June, but, owing to the transports being not yet loaded, this date cannot be accepted. As reported in my telegram of the 27th, the military authorities are not prepared for Georgian troops to be in Batoum in less than twenty-four hours, and I concur in the advisability of this.

His Majesty's transport "Mourino" sailed on the 25th June for Constantinople with the securities of the Raka Bank.

As regards the evacuation of Russians, the Military Governor considers that all Russians who are compromised can be accommodated in "Rio Pardo," and this ship accordingly leaves for the Crimea to-morrow, the 28th. It is observed that steamship "Negro" sailed for Crimea on the 20th June empty.

Inter Allied steamship "Kizil Ernak" sailed for the Crimea on the 22nd June with 1,000 Russians.

6. Steamship "Sviet," which was set on fire on the 18th June, is still burning.

Appreciation of Situation, June 28, 1920

BATOU M

In the town all is quiet, but much anxiety prevails as to what will take place when the British leave. We are now supplying 45,000 people with 1 lb. of bread daily at a price of 20 roubles per lb., and no one expects the Georgians will keep up this supply.

2. The Adjarians are strongly against the occupation of Batoum by the Georgians, and declare they will not allow the Georgian troops through, and if the latter come by sea they intend, with the assistance of the Turks, or rather the Lazes, to turn the Georgians out after our departure. This it is probable they will be able to do with little difficulty.

3. It is believed that Mustafa Kemal, while unable to give active support to the Adjarians, has promised to assist them with a division of Lazes, which is being organised, and which may amount to some 8,000 men with 6 mountain guns and two German officers. They are little more than brigands, and would doubtless rob the town. The opinion is universal that no attack on the town will be made while British troops remain.

4. Colonel Stokes has reported that the Georgians will be ready to take over on the 30th June, but that date cannot be accepted by us owing to lack of transports, as it is most undesirable for British and Georgian troops to be in the town together.

5. This delay in the removal of our troops, after their departure has been decided on, is very unfortunate, as it gives the Adjarians a considerable time to organise against the passage of the Georgian troops into the province.

6. The Georgians, Adjarians, and, it is believed, the Turkish Nationalists, are all anxious for us to remain.

GEORGIA

7. The Government remains strongly anti-Bolshevik, although they have made a treaty with the latter and accepted a Bolshevik mission in Tiflis. There is, however, a very strong element of Bolshevism among the Georgians generally, though it is possible that, as they become aware of the desolation and waste caused by Bolshevism in Azerbaijan, the desire to receive them in Georgia may be lessened. It is possible that, should the Georgians find themselves unable to hold Batoum against the Adjarians and Turks, they may call in the aid of Red troops from Azerbaijan. Whether these troops would be sent would probably depend largely on how far the Tartar revolt against the Bolsheviks progresses; the Reds would no doubt welcome the opportunity of getting even as far as Tiflis. Personally, I have no doubt that the Georgians will be unable to hold Batoum even if they ever get there.

AZERBAIJAN

8. I had a long conversation to-day with Mr. van Loo, the well-known American merchant of Batoum, who is most reliable and who is distinctly pro-British, who was in Baku when the Bolsheviks arrived and only left there last week.

9. There is no doubt that the arrival of the Bolsheviks was a complete surprise to the inhabitants generally, and that the town was really taken by a party of 30 Turkish officers, who handed it over to the Bolsheviks, and who since have been got rid of by the latter.

10. Although there has been no indiscriminate looting at Baku, the way the entire country has been systematically desolated and cleared of everything of value is remarkable; it has infuriated the Tartars. Their rising was well organised, and in and near Elizabetpol they entirely wiped out two Bolshevik detachments, one, a regiment of infantry, the other, a body of artillery. It is extremely probable that they would have succeeded in clearing the whole of the country of the Bolsheviks had they not, while attacking the Bolsheviks in front, been themselves treacherously attacked by the Armenians in the rear. Thereupon there ensued a massacre of Tartars. The report states that from ten to fifteen thousand of them were killed and further, which is unusual on these occasions, many of the Tartar women were violated.

11. The Tartars, and the Mahomedans generally, will not forget this, and any real liaison between the Turks and Bolsheviks now seems more impossible than ever. The latter are trying to make amends by giving Batoum to Mustafa Kemal, but as he will be able to take it when he likes, the gift is not of great value. Nuri Pasha is understood to be at the head of some 10,000 Tartars, and there are sure to be further Tartar risings against the Bolsheviks, and also, in co-operation with the Turks, massacres of Armenians.

12. Mr. van Loo says that many of the more intelligent Bolsheviks do not think that Bolshevism can possibly last through the winter, owing to lack of food, and that the mortality in Russia will be enormous. The discipline and moral of the Red Army appear to be low.

13. He tells me that our prestige among the Mahomedans has been greatly lowered by our abandonment of Luch and Reht. He says that if we do not reoccupy those places we shall be in danger of losing India, and that Bolshevism can never (though Pan-Islamism may) obtain any hold in Afghanistan or India.

14. As regards the British prisoners, they were badly treated at first, but, owing

to the good offices of the American Consul, Mr. van Loo says their position has improved and that there were prospects of further improvement. It is said it is untrue that they were made to clean the streets. It has since been reported that they have been removed from prison and are now under domiciliary arrest.

ARMENIA

15. While the Armenian Government is strongly anti-Bolshevik, the Armenians of the Azerbaijan frontiers have, under the influence of the Bolsheviks, been organised to fight against the Armenians. The Bolsheviks are reported to be organising the Armenians against the Bolsheviks.

16. The situation on the part of the outside Armenians is sure to result in serious massacre by both Tartars and Turks, which we cannot prevent. Any arms we may send to Armenia will doubtless be used against the Tartars, and consequently against the Bolsheviks, and it seems very questionable that we should permit their despatch.

LETTER OF PROCEEDINGS, JUNE 15 TO 27, 1920

(B) - Intelligence

During a conference with Brigadier General W. J. N. Cooke-Collis, C.M.G. on the 25th June, I heard that there was a rumour that when we evacuated Batoum the Americans intended to send a battleship here and land 600 marines to protect their communications with their Armenian Relief Commission.

Mr. van Loo, an American who has lived in Batoum and the Caucasus for several years, and has recently come from Baku, gave me the following information:

(i.) The oil at Baku, which the Bolsheviks are taking to Astrakhan, cannot be distributed to Russia owing to lack of transport.

(ii.) He was informed by a Bolshevik Chief of Artillery that no ammunition was now being, or could be, made in Bolshevik factories owing to lack of material. That now in use is from the stocks captured from Denikin and the White.

(iii.) The number of Tartars massacred by the Bolsheviks and Armenians was 10,000.

(iv.) Very small number of Chinese among Bolshevik troops at Baku.

(v.) Bolshevik Regular troops are now being withdrawn for service on the Polish front, and are being replaced at Elizabetpol and district by local levies raised largely from the workmen of the oilfields, many of whom are really anti-Bolshevik.

3. The following has been obtained from military sources:

GEORGIA

The Georgian Government have adopted a firm attitude towards Kirov's mission, which has already started propaganda. The mission is stated to have been sent to organise a Bolshevik revolution in Georgia. The Georgian Government have refused to receive the mission, and have ordered the Bolsheviks to leave the country.

4. Pavlov's Army Headquarters at Vladikavkaz are reported to have received orders to place themselves under Kirov's direction and control at Vladikavkaz. It is stated, there are 2,000 Bolsheviks now there. Concentration has been caused by risings in Chechnia and Daghestan.

AZERBAIJAN

5. It is reported that Persian Azerbaijan feeling against the British is very strong, and Kuchuk Khan's movement is popular.

6. A Tartar rising is feared at Baku. There are three international regiments at Baku, composed of Austrian and Magyar ex-prisoners of war from Turkestan, and Germans.

ARMENIA

At 7 o'clock Armenian Government troops attacked the Turks and
Tatars and captured 2 guns and much war material
Local Soviets have been formed at Karabagh

LETTER OF PROCEEDINGS, JUNE 28 TO JULY 11, 1920

(A)—Operations

His Majesty's ships "Emperor of India," "Ajax," "Senator," and
"Swallow" remained off Batoum till the conclusion of the evacuation on the
9th July

1. Transports arrived as follows: "Panama," the 30th June, "Mourino," the
4th July, "Wladimir," the 5th July, "R. P. L." and "F. L." the 6th July

5. Steamship "Hornsee" is still at Poti disembarking munitions for Armenia
and is expected to finish in about a week

6. At 1200 L. T. the 5th July, "Emperor of India" and "Ajax" fired a salute
of twenty-one guns on the occasion of American Independence Day, ships being
dressed over all

7. Russian destroyer "Zharki" arrived the 24th June, and submarine "Utka"
the 25th June. American destroyer "Trucey" arrived from Sebastopol the 2nd July.
American destroyer "Baker" arrived the 3rd July. American destroyer "Samsun"
and "Trebizond" arrived the 7th July and "Whipple" arrived the 9th July

8. The Russian volunteer transport "Margarita" arrived on the 29th June.
She had a small amount of ammunition on board and consequently was not allowed alongside. She, however, proceeded into harbour and
secured with her stern to the shore against the orders of the port authorities. The
Military Governor was anxious as to the destination of this ammunition, having
been informed that it was intended to help the Adjarians in their resistance to the
Russians entering Batoum. The presence of this vessel and of the Russian
destroyer "Zharki" and submarine "Utka" was a source of considerable uneasiness
both to the Georgian authorities and to the Military Governor, and I considered
that, if they remained in Batoum after we left, unfortunate incidents might arise.
I therefore requested General Dratsenko, the Russian Military Governor, to order
the "Margarita" to leave Batoum, and Admiral Gornostanov to see me on board "Emperor of
India" on the 4th July. The captain of "Ajax" and my flag captain also attended
the conference.

I pointed out the possibility of unpleasant incidents arising, and that attempts
might be made to detain the "Margarita" after our departure and strongly
recommended them, in the best interests of the Volunteer Army, to leave before our
evacuation. He told me he already intended to do so.

I also pointed out that the "Margarita" should have been
sent to Batoum and not to Poti, as it was a source of uneasiness. He told
me that the "Margarita" was a Russian vessel and that he had no objection to
her remaining in Batoum, but that he had no objection to her leaving Batoum if
I wished. I pointed out that the "Margarita" was a source of uneasiness to the
Georgians and that he should take it back to the Crimea in "Margarita." In the end the general gave me the following
guarantees—

- (1) That all Russian vessels would leave Batoum before the Georgians took
over.
- (2) That none of the ammunition brought to Batoum would be landed without
permission.
- (3) That they would take no active part either with men or material for or
against the Georgians.

and further expressed his regret that the "Margarita" should have disobeyed the
instructions given by the British Military Governor.

The general also informed me that he had instructions from General Wrangel
to keep on good terms with the Georgians.

He had also asked whether the Georgians wished for a Russian mission to
remain at Batoum, but had not at that time received an answer. I saw

M. Gambashidze on this matter the following day, and he informed me that the
Georgians were considering this (and confidentially, that Wrangel had given the
Georgians 3,000,000 rounds of small arm ammunition a short time ago). I, however,
told him that I thought it would be much better that all Russians should clear out,
and that, if they decided to receive a mission, it should come back after we had gone,
and I presume that they adopted this suggestion, as General Dratsenko was
officially informed that the mission was not required, but I have little doubt that
there are secret arrangements, in the case of certain eventualities, between Wrangel
and the Georgian Government.

The ammunition in the "Margarita" was eventually sold to the Georgian
Government, and "Margarita" sailed on the 7th July for Theodosia. "Zharki"
with the general and admiral on board, and "Utka" sailed for Sebastopol the
same day.

9. A telegram having been received from Commander Luke that there would be
an opportunity of sending money to the British prisoners in Baku, £500 was sent to
Tiflis on the 4th July.

10. During the period of waiting for transports the prospects of peaceful
evacuation varied somewhat from day to day. At first, it seemed to me the general
opinion that the Adjarians would endeavour to prevent the Georgians entering
Batoum. The prospects, however, gradually became more favourable, though there
was some doubt up to the end.

11. On the 3rd July it was reported that the attitude of resistance was
softening and that the Turks were advancing. The Military Governor went down
the coast to investigate, but found that all was quiet. Ships were, however, put at
two and a half hours' notice, except one destroyer at one hour's notice.

The gunnery and navigating officers of "Emperor of India" proceeded in
"Swallow" to reconnoitre the positions proposed to be taken up by His Majesty's
ships in case of a Turkish attack.

12. On the 4th July the army commenced moving stores down to the quay for
embarkation.

On the 7th July at 0800 L. T. the garrison commenced to embark, all transports
being alongside the quay, the "Margarita" being the last to leave. The evacuation was completed
Small guards were left in the barracks to turn over to the Georgians on arrival.

The Georgian troops entered the town at 1000 L. T. without incident.

At 1100 L. T. the town was handed over to the Georgians and a
formal parade took place near the late British Headquarters. Guards were provided
by the 2nd Durham Light Infantry, 89th Punjabis, and seamen and marines from
"Emperor of India" and "Ajax." British and French flags were saluted and
hailed down, the Georgian flag was then saluted. "Emperor of India" and
"Ajax" fired twenty-one gun salutes. A Georgian battery replied.

In the evening Commander Luke, Acting Chief Commissioner, Brigadier-
General Cooke-Collis and myself were invited to a banquet, at which the Foreign
Minister of Georgia presided. The tone of the numerous speeches was pro-British,
somewhat to the disgust of the French and Italians present.

13. On the 8th July I saw Commander Luke about various matters, and he told
me that he had decided that the British mission should remain at Tiflis for the
present, and I informed him of the disposition of ships remaining behind, namely,
a destroyer at Poti, in case communication with Batoum was cut, and the "Ajax"
at Batoum, "Swallow" also remaining at Batoum till Colonel Stokes was ready to
return to Constantinople.

On the same afternoon the Georgian Foreign Minister and Georgian
Commander-in-chief called on me and were shown round the ship. I saluted the
Commander-in-chief with seventeen guns. I had a good deal of conversation with
them and M. Gambashidze at the banquet and on board. They are most anxious to
impress on the British Government that they are quite capable of preventing any
internal Bolshevik rising in Georgia, and also that they anticipate no difficulty in
holding Batoum town and province.

Their only fear is that of a Bolshevik advance from Azerbaijan, in which case
they undoubtedly have a considerable amount of Allied assistance. They are extremely
anxious that British ships should remain in Batoum and that they should be protected by English
gunboats. They would be very glad of an assurance that British ships would protect their coast
from any attack of Russian men-of-war (either Volunteer Army or Bolshevik). I, of
course, gave them no guarantee or indication of British policy beyond stating that
one of our vessels would remain off Batoum for the present.

14. A certain number of men were landed from "Ajax" and "Emperor of India" to assist in the embarkation of stores, which was all completed by the 9th July, and the transports sailed as follows:

Varna" for Zonguldac with the stores and transport of the Algerian battalion, P.M., the 8th July.

Edvard Woermann" for Zonguldac at 1725 L.T. the 9th July with the Algerian battalion.

Constantinople at 1400 L.T. the 9th July with 27th C.C.S. and officers' wives and 1

Constantinople at 1230 L.T. the 9th July for Constantinople with 89th Punjab.

Constantinople at 1615 L.T. the 9th July for Constantinople with animals, vehicles and transport personnel.

Mourino" at 1620 L.T. the 9th July for Constantinople with 483rd Company R.A.S.C. and M.T. vehicles.

Field Marshal" at 1850 L.T. the 9th July for Constantinople with 2nd Durham Light Infantry and 80th Brigade Headquarters.

15. I left in "Emperor of India" after the last transport.

Two of the British motor boats that had been used for port duties were in "Emperor of India" and one in "Ajax" for passage to Constantinople.

Native prisoners, who had been arrested by the military authorities, were also transferred to "Emperor of India" for passage.

16. Steamship "Sviet" was still burning when "Emperor of India" left.

In this connection I should like to point out that, although I was not present at the time, I hear on all sides, both from the captain of the "Ajax" and from the military authorities, of the extremely able way in which Lieutenant-Commander Edye K. Buddam Whetham, D.S.O., of "Swallow," towed this vessel out of harbour when burning, and no doubt saved a serious disaster. It was undoubtedly an admirable bit of work.

I should like to take this opportunity of pointing out the great kindness and courtesy which have been received by the Navy from Brigadier General W. J. N. Cooke-Collis, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., and the force under him, during the past eighteen months. Liaison between the two Services has been admirable, and I hope I shall not be thought impertinent if I express my admiration, and that of other senior naval officers who have been at Batoum, of the way in which General Cooke-Collis has carried out a most difficult task with honour to himself and to his country.

LETTER OF PROCEEDINGS, JULY 28 TO JULY 31 1920

(R)—Intelligence

The following information was received from the captain of Russian submarine "Utka" on her arrival here from Kertch, Sea of Azov and Kabardinka.

2. The Bolshevik aeroplanes have been dropping bombs on Kertch, but practically no damage has been done so far. The Volunteers have two aeroplanes at Kertch. The obsolete Russian battleship "Rostislav" (10 in. guns) is there, and the Bolsheviks have done no firing from the other side.

3. The garrison in the town of Taman is a Red Cossack regiment of 600 strong. The number of troops in the peninsula is small.

4. The submarine anchored at Kabardinka on the night of the 30th June-1st July. An officer landed, disguised as a merchant, and went to Novorossiysk. Shooting and arrests occur daily, and a Chrestichaika has been established. The Chief Commissar is General Morozov, late of the Kuban army under Denikin (he took a prominent part in the armistice negotiations between the Cossacks and Bolsheviks at Adler). The garrison of Novorossiysk is small, as most of the troops have been sent to Ekaterinodar. A 6-in. battery has been established near the W.T. station. Nothing is known of any submarine or C.M.B. at Novorossiysk. No ships were seen entering or leaving the harbour.

5. At Kabardinka, two weeks ago, there was a garrison of one regiment of infantry, but this left for an unknown destination, and when the "Utka" arrived only seven men were left. Nothing is known of the whereabouts of the Green Army.

6. On the evening of the 7th July I had a long conversation with an Italian lieutenant commander, who had been some time at Baku, and had left there on the

1st July. I was informed afterwards that this officer was the one who had declined to help with regard to our prisoners, but I did not know this at the time. He appeared to be strongly anti-Bolshevik, and gave me the following information:

7. Our prisoners were being fairly well treated, and were in a private house with a certain amount of ground, sufficient to allow them to play games. There was a certain amount of malaria among them, and the consul was still in hospital.

8. The Bolshevik troops were all concentrated in Baku, and numbered from 35,000 to 40,000. They were being increased every day by forced enlistment of the oilfield workmen. The feeling in the town, including the workmen, was strongly anti-Bolshevik, but the strength of the Bolsheviks prevented any outbreak. The order kept in the town was very good, and it was quite safe to walk about either by night or by day.

9. A very large number of arrests had been made, and numerous executions were taking place, without apparently any form of trial. Batches of prisoners were sent to sea, shot, and thrown overboard. The Chrestichaika had been established, accompanied by the usual atrocities.

10. The officer himself had, at the request of the Bolshevik leaders, been to the island off the harbour where the Volunteer Army officers were confined, and had been allowed free communication with them, for the purpose of asking them whether they were prepared to join the Bolsheviks to resist the Poles. A considerable number agreed to go to the Polish front, largely in the hope that it would be more easy to desert from there, and he believes that all the remainder, who declined to go, were subsequently shot.

11. Everything of value has been taken from the houses and surrounding country, and all well-to-do people, without discrimination, have been turned out of their houses, and had to do as best they can in workmen's cottages in Black Town.

12. He states that the Bolsheviks have completely retired from Persia and come back to Baku. Enzeli and Resht now being in the hands of Kuchuk Khan, who stopped the Bolsheviks from taking away the stores and valuables they had collected. They, however, took all the ships at Enzeli, thirty-two in number, and brought them to Baku. Kuchuk Khan's object, he says, is not Bolshevism, but the establishment of a Socialist Republic in Persia. (It is also reported that Persian workmen from the oilfields are being armed by the Bolsheviks and sent to join Kuchuk Khan.)

13. Regarding the oil situation, he says that there are under 100 ships available as against over 200 in 1914. (This number of ships cannot have disappeared, so it is presumed that the difference must be accounted for by broken-down vessels.) This number is not sufficient to get the oil away as fast as it can be raised. I had heard before that there was a great block in the oil traffic at Astrakhan, and that it could not be got away fast enough. He told me, however, that this was not the case, and that they can take all that is sent there.

14. Besides the above, there is no special intelligence beyond what has been received through army sources, and which has no doubt been reported separately.

15. As regards the general situation, I still think there is a possibility of an intervention by the Allies. The situation in Georgia is, to a considerable extent, Bolshevik already, which may act as a safety valve and prevent them from going to extremes.

16. The signs of the Adjarians concentrating to cut the communications between Batoum and Tiflis, and I think this may happen at any time. It is also probable that the Lazas will join with the Adjarians and cause a great deal of trouble to the Georgians. There will no doubt be a considerable amount of fighting in the province of Batoum, but whether this will extend to the expulsion of the Georgians from the town itself remains to be seen.

17. In taking over the town of Batoum, the Georgian minor officials are showing signs of being influenced by the Bolsheviks. The well-known American merchant, Mr. van Loo, and by other actions of a similar nature. Their tendency is to nationalise all they can, and they are, in my opinion, quite unfitted to have the control of an important seaport, though owing to their natural conceit, they have not yet realised this. They are most anxious that Allied, and especially British, support should be given them to, at any rate, some extent, and are especially anxious for British naval protection.

Sir C. Blunt to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 336.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tokyo, September 4, 1920

YOUR telegram No. 286 of 25th August.

Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that Japanese Government have never had representatives in Turkey, but agree with views of His Majesty's Government.

[E 11703.134 58]

No. 15.

Commander Luke to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 272.)

My Lord

IN continuation of my telegram No. 271 of 21 August 1920, I have the honour to enclose copy of despatch No. 11703.134 58, dated 19 August 1920, from Captain Gracey at Erzurum.

I have, &

H. C. LUKE

Enclosure 1 in No. 15

Captain Gracey to Commander Luke

(No. 37.)

Sir,

Erzurum, August 19, 1920.

I HAVE the honour herewith to forward for your information copies of agreements, note from Kemal Pasha, official communiqués, private telegrams and press news:—

Agreement between Soviet Russia and the Republic of Armenia on the 10th August 1920 at Erzurum, dated 10th August 1920, and the Russian plenipotentiary representative of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic in Armenia.

Official communiqués of the Armenian Commander-in-chief's Staff, dated the 13th, 16th and 18th August, 1920.*

Confirmation copies of my telegrams to you Nos. 36, 37, 38, dated the 13th, 14th and 18th August, 1920.*

Press news:—*

(a.) A hideous crime relating to the murder of the two Armenian Members of Parliament in Gerssi by the Bolsheviks.

(b.) The Armenian Communists.

(c.) Relative to the murder of the Armenian revolutionists by the Bolsheviks in Karabagh and Zangezur.

Yours faithfully,
GEO F GRACEY

Enclosure 2 in No. 15

Agreement between Soviet Russia and the Republic of Armenia.

(Translation.)

ON the 10th August, 1920, the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, represented by the plenipotentiary representative of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic in Armenia on the one hand, and the Republic of Armenia on the other, admitting the full recognition of the Republic of Armenia as an independent State, have concluded an agreement which is as follows:—

Military operations between the troops of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic and those of the Republic of Armenia are supposed to be discontinued at 12 noon on the 10th August, 1920.

* Not printed.

1. All military operations which might occur on and after the above-mentioned date, owing to lack of proper communication and other technical obstructions, must not entail any serious consequences of contradicting or annulling any of these points now agreed upon.

2. The troops of the Republic of Armenia will occupy the following line: Shahakhti-Khok-Aznaburt-Sultanbek and farther along the line northwards from Khok-Aznaburt-Sultanbek to the district of Kazakh, the line they held on the 30th July, 1920. The troops of Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic will occupy the regions under dispute of Karabagh, Zangezur and Nakhichevan, except the zone determined by this agreement for the occupation by the troops of the Republic of Armenia.

3. The occupation by Soviet troops on the disputed territories does not decide beforehand the question concerning the rights of the Socialist Soviet Republic on the territories of the Republic of Armenia or Azerbaijan. This temporary occupation by the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic is to be done in order to create favourable conditions for the peaceful solution of the land disputed between Armenia and Azerbaijan according to the principles which will be laid down by the peace treaty to be concluded between Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic and the Republic of Armenia in the near future.

4. After cessation of all military hostilities by the negotiating parties, they must cease to concentrate military forces in the disputed areas or borders now under dispute.

5. Pending the conclusion of the treaty between Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic and the Republic of Armenia the railway line running between Shahakhti and Julfa to be controlled and administered by the Armenian Government, with the condition that it must not be used for military purposes.

6. The Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic guarantees the safety and free passage of all military forces with arms and munitions now beyond the lines which will be occupied by Soviet troops.

The plenipotentiary representative of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic in Armenia

The plenipotentiary representative of Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic in Armenia

B. V. LIGRAN

The delegates of the Republic of Armenia:

A. DJAMALIAN
A. BABALIAN

True copy

Secretary

Enclosure 3 in No. 15

Second Note from Mustafa Kemal's Government to the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Armenia.

(Translation.)

Sir,

Angora, July 8, 1920

I HAVE the honour to reply to your communication dated the 30th June, which was an answer to my letter of the 24th June, 1920.

Notwithstanding our and the Commander-in-chief's note of the Eastern army, Kiasim Karnoekir Pasha, to stop in the district of Olti all attacks which were made without legal foundation, and to recall to their districts all your troops, yet the above-mentioned district has not been evacuated, but, on the contrary, new attacks were made on the 2nd July, 1920.

Your and your Commander-in-chief's replies do not refute the attacks which have taken place, and you state that the movement has been produced according to the request of the Moslem population, and that this population has not been persecuted or violated, and that no aggression was made on the Ottoman boundary, which would upset the existing relations.

It is not unknown to you that the relations existing between the two Governments are based on the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, recognising officially the Republic of Armenia

and its complement the Treaty of Batoum, which, being signed by the empowered delegates, was accepted and ratified by both Governments.

The district of Olti, entering into three provinces, determined by the decisions of the above treaties, and according to the plebiscite freely carried on by the people, forms the personal property of the Ottoman Empire.

If owing to certain reasons the Ottoman administration or military forces are not found temporarily in the above-mentioned districts, this cannot cause the *de facto* nor *de jure* removal of the Ottoman Government therefrom.

At this moment, when it was expected to resolve in a peaceful way and on the principles of right and justice the controversies (if there are any) arising due to the complete compliance of the Treaty of Batoum, the aggressions of the Armenian troops in the district of Olti openly go against our wishes to maintain the friendly and good neighbourly relations, and at the same time they prejudice our indisputable rights.

The call or the request of the Moslem population of Olti is not a justification to look for the attack made by the Armenian troops, population having no such an appeal, then that will draw upon them the responsibility of this crime.

As I informed you in my first communication, our Government and the Turkish Government and the Armenian people, they were in a means in order to secure our mutual interests. If my points of view will be accepted by the Government of Armenia, from all sides and in an impartial way, I can hope that the sincerity of my observations and the friendliness of the sentiments that my people bears towards you will be trusted.

Finally, I request again the withdrawal, without any delay, of your troops, and if they are not withdrawn, I protest against these accomplished movements and lay the responsibility on those who have caused any injury to the Moslem population.

I beg, &c.

The Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the
Great National Turkish Council,
BEKIR SAMI

In copy

of the XIth Army, and Signature

[E 11868 194.58]

No. 16

Commander Luke to Karl Curson. — (Received September 27.)

(No. 282)

My Lord,

Tiflis, September 6, 1920.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 272 75 of the 24th August, I have the honour to enclose one copy of despatch No. 38, dated the 25th August, received by me from Captain Gracey at Erivan.

I have, &c.

H. C. LUKE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 16

Captain Gracey to Commander Luke

(No. 38)

No.

Erivan, August 25, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that M. Ohandjanian called upon me on the 20th instant, and the following is a brief outline of his conversation. I informed him that the agreement which they made with Soviet Russia, whereby they opened up Nakhichevan to Soviet troops, would be received very unfavourably in England.

He then stated that he had given me an official statement, also one from the Commander-in-chief, General Nazarbekof, describing the military situation.

He stated that if Commander Luke and the writer could not give them material assistance with troops, then it was very necessary that we should use our influence through diplomatic channels with the Bolsheviks. And that it was extremely necessary for us to come to their assistance. "Our own force is quite insufficient, and with the threatening attitude of Kemal Pasha, and with his troops and the Bolshevik troops on our frontiers, we are surrounded on every side. This was the chief cause of our signing

the agreement. There was no other alternative, and we had to make the best terms that we could. I am sure that the Government of Armenia will not regret this. And, of course, the precarious condition of our country forced us to agree.

"We had only half a battalion of tired troops at Nakhichevan against three regiments of infantry and a brigade of cavalry. And half of this force was destroyed by the enemy."

He then stated very decisively that the life of Armenia depended entirely upon the good will of Europe, and also to what extent they would assist her diplomatically.

He again requested that we procure for them fifteen minute periods daily with the Basm wireless station. He maintained that their military situation demanded this, that their communication from the Government of Armenia was cut off, and that it took three weeks to receive news from the Government.

(A) M. Ohandjanian's statement regarding the agreement made with Soviet Russia.

(B) General Nazarbekof's, Commander-in-chief of the Army of the Armenian Republic, report on the cessation of hostilities on the Nakhichevan front.

(C) Dr. Ohandjanian's note to M. Legeran, of the Mission of the Russian Government at Erivan.

(D) M. Ohandjanian's statement regarding the agreement made with Soviet Russia.

(E) M. Ohandjanian's statement regarding the agreement made with Soviet Russia, dated the 19th, 21st and 24th August, 1920.

(F) — Press news —

- (a.) Peace treaty signed by Turkey
- (b.) Bolsheviks in Karabagh and Zangezur
- (c.) Musavat Party

GEO. F. GRACEY, Captain

Enclosure 2 in No. 16.

(A)

Armenian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Captain Gracey.

(No. 4844. Very Confidential.)

Dear Sir,

Erivan, August 21, 1920.

TAKING into consideration the fact that the situation created in the south of Armenia cannot be deprived of interest for the Allied Powers, and that with regard to Armenia it can be interpreted erroneously, I have the honour to communicate to you the following for your information:—

As it is known to you from the very beginning, the Government of Armenia was at the time of the signing of the Treaty of Basm, in a very difficult position. The Turkish-Azerbaijani forces threatening the interests of Armenia, and the Allied Powers in the East.

Then even my Government was in a very difficult position. It was necessary to deliver help to be delivered in time to Armenia by the Allies. The decision of the Chief British Command in Transcaucasia, transferring the Armenian Karabagh to the administration of Azerbaijan, following the occupation of the region of Zangezur by Armenian troops, struck a sensible blow to the interests concerning the defence of the Armenian boundaries from the invasion of the Bolsheviks and Turkish-Azerbaijani forces.

Yet, in the beginning of June 1920, under the hardest conditions, when the

* Not printed.

promised armament had not arrived from England to Armenia, my Government decided to start immediately the attack on Vedi-Bassar, Sharur, Nakhichevan and Zangezur, in order to hinder the union of Bolsheviks and Turkish-Azerbaijani forces. My Government had to fight simultaneously almost on all the boundaries of Armenia, against the joined forces of the Bolsheviks and the Azerbaijanians, and against Karabekir Pasha's forces on the Turkish boundary.

In spite of these and other obstacles the troops of Armenia occupied first Vedi-Bassar, then Sharur; they repelled all the attacks of the enemy on the Kasikh and Olti fronts, took Peniak and even occupied temporarily Zangezur. But political and war conditions being complicated at that time, my Government was compelled to stop further movement of the Armenian troops on Nakhichevan.

The short report of the Commander-in-chief of the Armenian troops, herewith enclosed, could explain to you the fundamental reasons, having caused the discontinuation of the above-mentioned movement and having rendered temporarily impossible the further operations in the direction of Nakhichevan.

I avail myself &c
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,
H. OHANDJANIAN

Chief of Political Section,
P. YAKOBIAN

Secretary,
A. PAHLAVOUNI

Enclosure 3 in No. 16.

(B.)

(Translated copy from Russian text.)

Commander-in-chief of the Republic of Armenia to the Minister for Foreign Affairs

(No. 01126. Very Confidential.)

Erivan, August 20, 1920.

THE chief reasons which have caused the cessation of war operations in the direction of Nakhichevan are as follows:

1. The flight of the Moslem population from Sharur-Nakhichevan region, and their unwillingness to be subjected to the authority of the Government of the Armenian Republic. All our efforts to come to an agreement in this matter with the Moslem Council of Nakhichevan, as you know, have failed.

2. The troops which we have sent to occupy the Shahtakhti line were not nearly sufficient to make any further advance. And they require to be reinforced with new troops, because opposing our troops in the Sharur detachment have appeared large forces of Azerbaijanians, who are hostile to us. In addition, the Azerbaijanians are against us, and Zangezur and Karabagh have been occupied by Soviet troops.

3. The line of communication Erivan-Nakhichevan requires, of course, to be strongly secured, especially on the side of the Arax River, in order that the troops moving forwards should not find themselves surrounded or put into a critical position, so endangering their supplies and all the necessities that an army in the field requires.

We have now no free reserves in Armenia, and there is no reason to weaken other fronts on account of the Sharur front, as the situation in the most important directions, namely, that of Sarikamish and Diljan, is at the present moment obscure and not at all settled.

4. From the month of May our troops have been in continuous operations, and now need a natural respite, and so will be unavailable for any serious operation this year.

5. The English arms and munitions have arrived too late [with great delay], and therefore could only be used after the work of rearming the army and training them with these new arms, part of which have now arrived.

6. Finally, if Nakhichevan was expected to be occupied to establish commercial relations with Persia, it could only be done if the inhabitants themselves would agree to defend the regions Shahtakhti-Julfa. Under any other conditions the occupation of

Nakhichevan and Julfa would have involved the scattering of our troops, which would have meant the forcible withdrawal from the regions of Nakhichevan and Sharur.

General of Infantry
NAZARBEKOF

Chief of the General Staff,
Colonel (Signature)

(True copy), Secretary,
(Signature)

Enclosure 4 in No. 16

(C.)

(Translated copy from the Russian text.)

Armenian Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Legran, of the Mission of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic

Yalta, August 22, 1920.

[Printed literally]

A COPY to the Armenian Mission, Baku.

The execution by your troops in Karabagh and Zangezur of Armenian public workers and others mentioned in detail in my wireless letter of August 11, 1920, and the execution of the Armenian public workers in Karabagh and Zangezur, and the destruction by your troops of about thirty Armenian villages in Zangezur, and the destruction [execution] of the school organization Dashnaktizoutune, where school boys and girls of 12-14 years old. And according to the information received by my Government the persons of the Armenian public workers of the working classes from the public workers who are left in Karabagh, undergo the same kind of persecution from your authorities. I am leaving your letter to the Soviet Republics and the Karabagh and Zangezur were occupied by you according to the agreement of the 10th August that your troops were a neutral force, and the regions themselves would for the present represent a neutral zone.

For that reason the persecutions which are still going on in these indicated regions against the members of the revolutionary party Dashnaktizoutune are a direct violation of the fundamental conception of neutrality, they cannot but provoke the decisive protest of my Government. And the persecution of their families, it can only be considered as an inadmissible remnant of the dark ages, when political intolerance was spread not only over separate persons, but also over all their relatives. Evolving out of this same statement, namely, the neutrality of Karabagh and Zangezur, my Government cannot agree with the Azerbaijanian military troops residing in these regions taking revenge on the peaceful Armenian population for their unsuccessful war, and with the Azerbaijanian military troops who are settling in these regions with the population, whose political aims do not concure with theirs.

I therefore request my Government to request you to communicate immediately to whom it is necessary, and insist that:—

First, that further persecutions against the Armenian people and their families who are left in Zangezur and Karabagh be immediately stopped.

Second, that those who desire may be allowed to pass without hindrance to the other side of the line occupied by Armenian troops.

Third, that the Azerbaijanian military troops and the Armenian communist detachments be withdrawn out of the above-mentioned regions.

Please do not refuse to inform me what steps you are undertaking in this matter.

Minister for Foreign Affairs of Armenia,
OHANDJANIAN

(Signature)

(True copy), Secretary

(Signature)

(D)

(Translated copy from the Armenian text.)

W. Ter-Akopian to Colonel Mirimantian.

Sarikamish, July 28, 1920

[Printed Literally.]

I am requested that the present wire be despatched through the Commander of the Fifteenth Ottoman Regiment, Karabekir Pasha, to the following address -

ANGORA.

Hon. Bekir Sami, the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the Great Turkish National Council.

I have the honour to reply to your message of the 8th July, 1920. We will overlook now the normal rule of this question concerning the Brest-Litovsk and Batoum Treaties, which have been sealed by the Government of the Sultan, a Government which you do not recognise.

The Brest-Litovsk Treaty, in which Armenia has had no part, nor has she signed it; or again, the Batoum Treaty, which was signed by the Turkish Government, the Parliaments of the two countries, and the Armenian Government, are to Armenia.

I have never accepted as a basis the Brest-Litovsk and Batoum Treaties, which cause us great regret and deprive us of any hope of coming to a satisfactory agreement with you, because you are continuing to follow the aims of the revolutionary and impermanent Governments of the German Kaiser and the Sultan's, which have produced the above-mentioned two treaties, which I do not recognise the existence of a vital Armenia, and which deny the principles of right and justice and the right of self-determination of nations in international relations.

We sincerely wish to create good-neighbourly relations with all nations. But we, the Armenian people, have no intention of negotiating the historical rights of the Armenian people.

The Armenian nation, recognising the legal rights of each people, cannot naturally recognise the boundaries of the Armenian Republic, the boundaries of which were determined by the High Arbitrator of the Peace Conference of 1919.

Armenia, having signed this Peace Treaty, has decided to remain faithful to the decisions of the High Arbitrator, and awaiting his decision she has no intention to take any step to alter the Russian-Turkish frontier. And we had a full right to demand that you will not interfere in those questions related to the internal affairs of Armenia. And your claims concerning the withdrawal of the Armenian troops from the district of Olti, which forms an uncontested part of the Armenian Republic, and the aggressive movement of your soldiers in the above-mentioned districts are incomprehensible and cannot be understood.

The Armenian people, faithful to its love for peace, is ready to give a friendly hand to the people that will fully recognise its historical, ethnographical and governmental rights. The Armenian people is ready to give its entire support to the people that will fully recognise its historical, ethnographical and governmental rights entirely upon their attitude towards us.

Please accept the assurances of my consideration.

Secretary of Foreign Office.

TER-AKOPIAN

(True copy.)

(Signature)

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 1088.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 8, 1920

M. KHATISSIAN discussed situation in Armenia with me this morning. He was very concerned with difficulties resulting from lack of oil fuel. Owing to the war having cut off supplies, Armenia was now unable to work her railways, and railway transport and currency ceased. Armenia was now working on several fronts with a limited number of troops, and it was essential that she should be able to move these rapidly from one threatened point to another. Monthly requirements amounted to 16,000 tons.

In view of urgency of situation, I have requested the British Government at Batoum sufficient oil fuel for immediate requirements. M. Khatisian states that transport thence to Armenia is a serious problem, which has occurred and is taking action accordingly.

Arrangements which it is desirable to make to ensure regular supply in future will be discussed and put forward in a subsequent telegram.

If we can assist in supply of fuel necessary for railways, Kl. Khatisian will be very grateful. This is the subject of Bagdad's telegram No. 11575 of 22nd September to India Office, which please see.

(Repeated to Tiflis, No. 241.)

Commander Luke to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 301.)

My Lord,

Tiflis, September 21, 1920

I HAVE the honour to enclose, for your Lordship's information, a memorandum of considerable interest on the political situation among the mountain tribes in the North Caucasus, prepared by Captain H. D. Court, M.B.E., at present attached to this mission.

I have, &c.

H. C. LUKE.

Enclosure in No. 18.

Memorandum on the Caucasus Hill Tribes

(Confidential.)

1. Foreword.—The main characteristics of the hill tribes in the past have been

Firstly, their conservatism and love for ancient custom, which have strongly resisted a speedy assimilation, on their part, of modern progress and civilisation.

Secondly, the fact that in previous wars of independence they showed a lack of union in their efforts to combat the common danger, viz., their domination by the Russian Empire; and

Thirdly, their hatred of the Cossacks, a hatred which is easily to be understood, as the latter were by the old régime, and latterly also by Denikin, at the expense of the hill tribes whose most fertile lands they occupy.

Mention of the above three points is made, as it is considered that they have a particular bearing on the present situation in the North Caucasus.

Shortly after the outbreak of the revolution, when Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia proclaimed their independence, an attempt was made to form a North Caucasian Republic, including the country occupied by the hill tribes along the main Caucasus Range and the lowlands to the north (in the possession of the Kuban and Terek Cossacks).

The attempt to establish their independence proved abortive, mainly because the tribes lacked leaders of prominence and culture of anything approaching a European

(6 guns), and 1 battery of coast artillery (4 guns), 1 tank, 1 armoured train, and 2 armoured cars.

Growth.—Troops of the VIIIth Army, consisting of 1 infantry regiment (3 battalions), totalling 1,500 bayonets, and Gikalo's "partisan" detachment of 600 bayonets, 1 cavalry "division" (2 squadrons), totalling 500 sabres, a workmen's depot, Communist detachment of 600 bayonets, 4 armoured cars, 1 armoured train, and 2 tanks.

Vladikavkaz.—Troops of the XIth Army, consisting of 2 infantry regiments, 1 Communist battalion, 2 machine-gun companies, 4 cavalry "divisions" (each 2 regiments), 3 batteries of mountain artillery (12 guns in all), 2 4-gun field batteries and 3 tanks.

In other localities, such as Temir-Khan-Shura (Daghestan), Nalchik (Kabarda), and Vedeno Shatoi (Chechnia), a number of Bolshevik troops have been quartered for the maintenance of order and for the taking of hostages, whom it is intended to put to death in the event of a general revolt, and the withdrawal of the Bolshevik forces in consequence.

It is difficult to make an accurate estimate of the number of men the Whites could put into the field, though it is claimed by Suleiman Bek Daninloff that 300,000 is not an exaggerated figure, and that in the event of a levy *en masse* this might expand to 500,000. Daninloff also states that the mountaineers possess in all some 500 machine guns and about 60 guns (mostly mountain). About 75 per cent. of the machine guns are of the Lewis pattern, the remainder being

Janakoff also states that they have only rifles for 150,000, and that they are very short of shells and cartridges. Both he and Fund Bey agree in stating that the men would be well officered, the former stating that their ranks have been reinforced by 200 Cassack officers, but that if the revolt is to be of real and lasting success external aid in the shape of ammunition is absolutely essential.

3. *The various Groups working for the Independence of the Mountaineers, and their Policies*—A number of individuals, each with his own particular focus, are interested in and working for the independence of the various hill tribes.

The manner in which each group disowns the other as representing the union of tribes leaves one with the impression that there is little actual union among the leaders of the movement and the delegates of the various hill tribes in Tiflis. As previously stated, there can, however, be no doubt that the hill tribes themselves are in a ferment of revolt against the Bolsheviks. Furthermore, it would not be difficult to bring the only two important parties together for the pursuance of a joint plan of action.

Broadly speaking, the area in question may, for the sake of a ready appreciation of the situation, be divided into two halves: (i) the western half, comprising the Cherokee, Karibadi, Bulkar, Omwim and to a lesser extent the Chechen tribes, which flow

[illegible]

Money, too, is needed for the forming of an investment for the purpose of maintaining order and for the payment of men in the field in order that brigandage may not be resorted to for their maintenance, since it is realised that without this a state of anarchy could only result. As regards the Cossacks, both (i) and (ii) agree that a large percentage is ready to form part of the independent hill State of the North Caucasus.

The Georgian Government are also interested in the movement, mainly, it is supposed, for the purpose of creating a buffer State between Georgia and Russia. For this reason, Georgian officers and officials, like General Kerselidze, have been and are now actively working in these interests among the hill tribes.

The carrying into effect the proposal that arms and ammunition be supplied to the

hill tribes would naturally have to be made through the Georgian Government, whose representatives have already approached this mission on this point.

Of the pro-Bolshevik element, Haidar Bamatoff is the most notorious example. He is interested for everything Russian, and his aim is to see that the Bolsheviks intend to grant autonomy to the hill tribes is doubtful. He is known to have been in Bolshevik pay and to have sold the Russian Government the rights of the North Caucasus.

Said Shamil will, it is supposed, be used by the National Committee of Mountaineers for what he is worth.

4. Conclusion.—Whatever may be the outcome of the mountaineers' aspirations for autonomy, the fact that the Russian Government has given serious attention and consideration for the following reasons: (a) the hill tribes are so geographically situated as to be in a position to put the Russian Government to a severe test; (b) the Russian Government has a strong interest in the stability of the Caucasus; (c) the Russian Government has a strong interest in the stability of the Caucasus; (d) the Russian Government has a strong interest in the stability of the Caucasus; (e) the Russian Government has a strong interest in the stability of the Caucasus; (f) the Russian Government has a strong interest in the stability of the Caucasus; (g) the Russian Government has a strong interest in the stability of the Caucasus; (h) the Russian Government has a strong interest in the stability of the Caucasus; (i) the Russian Government has a strong interest in the stability of the Caucasus; (j) the Russian Government has a strong interest in the stability of the Caucasus; (k) the Russian Government has a strong interest in the stability of the Caucasus; (l) the Russian Government has a strong interest in the stability of the Caucasus; (m) the Russian Government has a strong interest in the stability of the Caucasus; (n) the Russian Government has a strong interest in the stability of the Caucasus; (o) the Russian Government has a strong interest in the stability of the Caucasus; (p) the Russian Government has a strong interest in the stability of the Caucasus; (q) the Russian Government has a strong interest in the stability of the Caucasus; (r) the Russian Government has a strong interest in the stability of the Caucasus; (s) the Russian Government has a strong interest in the stability of the Caucasus; (t) the Russian Government has a strong interest in the stability of the Caucasus; (u) the Russian Government has a strong interest in the stability of the Caucasus; (v) the Russian Government has a strong interest in the stability of the Caucasus; (w) the Russian Government has a strong interest in the stability of the Caucasus; (x) the Russian Government has a strong interest in the stability of the Caucasus; (y) the Russian Government has a strong interest in the stability of the Caucasus; (z) the Russian Government has a strong interest in the stability of the Caucasus.

Tiflis, September 5, 1920.

H. D. COURT, Captain.

E 12478 134 58]

No. 19

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 11.)

(N. 104.)
M. L. 1
With reference to N. 3013 of the 4th instant, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of a note, dated the 5th October, which I received from the head of the Armenian Delegation in Paris, soliciting the Allied Governments for his country against the Turks and Bolsheviks, and their occupation of Trebizond. M. Aharonian informs me that he has also made a similar appeal to the French, Italian, Japanese and United States Governments.

In view of the fact that the Armenian Government have no diplomatic representatives in London, I should be glad to receive your Lordship's instructions in regard to the reply which I should return to M. Aharonian's inquiry. I have acknowledged the receipt of his letter, and informed him that the matter has been referred to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
DERBY

Enclosure in No. 19.

Armenian Delegation to the Earl of Derby

M. l'Ambassadeur,
JE reçois de mon Gouvernement un télégramme du 2 octobre m'informant que des forces turques, composées de réguliers commandés par Kiazim Karabekir, ont entrepris une nouvelle avance dans la direction de Kars, à la suite de la remise d'un ultimatum invitant l'Arménie à se retirer de la région de Kars. L'armée arménienne sur tout son front ont pour objectif la réalisation de l'indépendance de l'Arménie et de la Libération de la Turquie, et de Brest-Litovsk attribuant les provinces de Kars et de Batoum à la Turquie.

elles visent ainsi à la jonction des Turcs avec les bolcheviks, et leur mouvement constitue une violation flagrante du Traité de Sévres. Le télégramme relève que la situation est sérieuse, vu le manque total de combustible pour les chemins de fer, Bakou étant en possession des bolcheviks, qui refusent toute livraison de pétrole à l'Arménie.

Dans ces conjonctures extrêmement graves, qui menacent l'Arménie et dont les conséquences éventuelles sont de nature à compromettre les intérêts des Puissances alliées elles-mêmes, le Gouvernement de la République arménienne ne saurait autrement faire que d'adresser un suprême appel aux principales Puissances alliées pour leur demander une aide efficace sous toutes les formes susceptibles d'être pratiquement réalisées.

Le Gouvernement arménien se rend compte des multiples difficultés auxquelles sont en butte les Puissances même les plus fortes et les plus prospères, et des raisons qui les contraignent à se consacrer à leur propre relèvement. Il comprend, également, que chaque pays est tenu de chercher en lui-même les éléments de sa défense et de son salut. Cependant, il constate que la guerre, si heureusement achevée pour les principales Puissances alliées et la juste cause qu'elles défendent, continue en réalité pour l'Arménie, dans les pires conditions d'isolement et de privation. Force lui est donc de solliciter, en sa double qualité d'allié et de pays à intérêts solidaires avec l'Entente, une intervention qui seule pourra assurer sa sécurité et le retour de la Paix en Orient.

L'Arménie assumerait aisément la défense de ses frontières contre les agressions des Turcs, si elle n'était menacée en même temps par les Turcistes de l'Azerbaïdjan et les bolcheviks. Mais, en ce moment, elle doit faire face à trois fronts à la fois, sans en armes, munitions, équipements, &c., et la pénurie de son ravitaillement.

Le mouvement entrepris par Kiazim Karabekir, lieutenant de Mustapha Kemal au Caucase, est une nouvelle tentative des Turcs tendant à relier les deux grands tronçons de la Turquie, la suppression de l'Etat qui fait obstacle à cette union, soit l'Arménie. La révolution du monde musulman ne manquerait pas de produire dans l'économie mondiale de l'Occident les bouleversements qu'ils escomptent pour la diffusion de leur système.

Le Gouvernement arménien a conscience de se tenir de près la réalité en évoquant les dangers qui menacent l'ordre général, si les Jeunes-Turcs étaient laissés à leur agier de conserve avec les bolcheviks. La nécessité d'aider l'Arménie n'en apparaît que plus urgente. Or, dans les circonstances actuelles, le Gouvernement arménien considère que le moyen le plus efficace pour réduire à néant le plan turco-bolchevik, consisterait dans l'occupation de Trebizonde par les Alliés. Elle aurait pour effet de diviser les forces kemalistes, d'alléger les fronts où s'exerce leur activité, d'empêcher Trebizonde continue à leur servir de base d'opérations et de ravitaillement, enfin, de rendre impossible toute collaboration efficace entre Jeunes-Turcs et bolcheviks.

Indépendamment de cette mesure primordiale, il appartient aux principales Puissances alliées de décider l'adoption de toutes autres mesures susceptibles de porter leurs fronts, telle qu'une pression à exercer sur la Turquie, conformément aux conditions qui lui ont été signifiées touchant son maintien à Constantinople, l'avance de la ligne de front sur les fronts qu'elle occupe, &c.

En attendant ce qui précède à la haute appréciation du Gouvernement de V. V. Excellence, le Gouvernement arménien croit agir à la fois dans son intérêt et dans celui de ses éminents Alliés. Il espère fermement que l'Arménie ne sera pas abandonnée à son sort et pourra remplir, aujourd'hui comme à l'avenir, le rôle qui lui est dévolu en Orient, pour le bien commun des Alliés.

J'ai l'honneur de prier votre Excellence de bien vouloir faire part de ce qui précède à son Gouvernement, et d'agréer, &c.

Le Président de la Delegation de la République arménienne à la Conférence de la Paix.
A. AHARONIAN

E 12566 134 58]

No. 20.

Colonel Stokes to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 425.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tiflis, via Constantinople, October 4, 1920.

Erevan, October 4.—Armenians are determined to resist Turkish attack on Kars. They have sent reinforcements and intend to counter-attack shortly.

Turks now at Karakoram and Noho-Selim on Sarakamish
Kars now has about 1,000 regulars and 2,000 to
3,000 irregulars, at latter about 4,000 regular infantry and 500 regular cavalry.

Armenians now have superior numbers in this area and appear confident.
Lack of fuel for railways and inability, owing to Bolshevik menace, to withdraw
troops from Azerbaijan frontier, render Armenians' position very serious
I leave for Kars to-night.

[E 12682 134 58]

No. 21

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 3141)

My Lord,

Paris, October 14, 1920

At the meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors yesterday, the United States
Ambassador raised, without notice, the question of the arbitration of the western
boundaries of Armenia by the President of the United States. If I had had notice of
the question I would have objected to its being discussed at the Conference, but as it
was I did not feel justified in refusing to take note of Mr. Wallace's request, on the
ground that it was not made through the proper channel.

Mr. Wallace reminded the Conference that the Supreme Council at San Remo had
requested the President of the United States to act as arbitrator for the western
boundaries of Armenia, and that the President had expressed his willingness to accept
the invitation.

Since then a clause submitting this question to the decision of the President has
been incorporated in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. As the United States are not
a party to this treaty, Mr. Wallace suggested that it would seem desirable that a
formal notification should be made to them on this subject, and he suggested that a
note from the French Foreign Office, or from the President of the Peace Conference
transmitting an authenticated copy of the treaty and calling attention to the sections
dealing with the arbitration would serve the purpose. This was agreed to, and it was
decided that the French Government should address the note in question to the United
States Government.

I have, &c.

DERBY

[E 12683 134 58]

No. 22.

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 3145.)

THE Earl of Derby presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note, dated the
13th October, from the Armenian Delegate to the Peace Conference, appealing for
assistance for Armenia against the Turks.

Paris, October 14, 1920

Enclosure to No. 22.

Armenian Delegate to the Earl of Derby

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Paris, le 13 octobre 1920.

LA Délégation de la République arménienne vient de recevoir d'Arménie le
telegramme officiel suivant daté du 5 courant

"Nous avons été forcés d'évacuer Kaghasman et Sarikamich. Les Turcs
attaquent aile droite et dans district de Novo-Selim avec appui de l'artillerie,
mais ils sont repoussés. Bataille continue dans direction Igdir. Volontaires
accourent, et moral troupes excellent."

Ce telegramme indique la gravité des événements en cours et confirme la situation
que j'ai eu l'honneur de signaler à votre excellence par ma communication du 5 octobre.
Propriété de l'Etat. Tous droits réservés. Imprimé par le Service de l'Imprimerie

que l'armée arménienne renferme des éléments qui sont sous les armes depuis huit ans
et se battent depuis six ans et que, par ailleurs, elle est en butte à toutes les difficultés
de la dite communication

La République arménienne a donc l'honneur de revenir à la
charge auprès du Gouvernement anglais pour lui signaler la gravité des événements en
cours et insister sur sa précédente demande d'intervention, ces événements menaçant
non seulement l'Arménie, mais encore les intérêts des Puissances alliées tant au Caucase
qu'en Asie Mineure, en raison de leur développement susceptible d'engendrer des
complications incalculables.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

Le Président de la Délégation de la République
arménienne à la Conférence de la Paix,

A. AHARONIAN

E 12836 134 58

No. 23

Colonel Stokes to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 426)

Telegraphic)

Tiflis (via Constantinople), October 7, 1920

[SAW Armenian Prime Minister and Minister of War at Erivan on 3th October
On absence of leave I visited Kars and saw Armenian troops at Serik
undecipherable] by good-will of Ahmed.

Armenian Government and people are united in determination to defend

Moral of troops is good and their leaders appear to be confident. There is no sign
of panic. Thanks to munitions and uniforms received by Armenians from us in July
Armenian regular troops are well equipped. Volunteers have flocked to the colours
and general mobilisation up to 35 years is in progress. A few military trains have
with coal or wood and immediately required reinforcements have reached Kars.

Troops in Kars region will probably take the offensive within a week. Armenian
Government's main difficulties are:-

1. Lumber, oil, fuel
2. Danger of weakening its Herat front in order to reinforce Kars

With regard to oil, the situation is complicated by the needs of Georgian
Government, which declares its own position to be critical in this respect, but I hope
to get for Armenia one month's supply.

With regard to point 2 above, Kars is for some time past being hit by
Armenian Igdir district, and latest reports state that Bolsheviks are preparing to
move from direction of Gorus and possibly also Nakhichevan.

Armenian Government is part of joint plan of Turks and Bolsheviks in
supported by offer made by Bolshevik representatives at Kulan to Armenian
Government to withdraw from Kars and Nakhichevan. Armenian Government
will sever all connection with Entente.

In view of very profitable manner in which Armenia is doing her utmost to meet
very serious situation in Middle East if Turks and Bolsheviks succeed in joining hands
Armenian Government will carefully consider every possible means
to save Armenia. In this connection I strongly support High Commissioner's
policy of occupation of an Allied occupation [two groups omitted, follow in later

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 329, and Tebran, No. 156)

[E 12829/134 58]

No. 24.

Colonel Stokes to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 427)

(Telegraphic)

Tiflis (via Constantinople), October 7, 1920

MILITARY situation in Kars region is as follows:-

Armenians believe they are opposed by two Turkish divisions, the 9th and 12th,
consisting respectively of 17th, 28th and 29th regiments and 34th, 35th and 36th
regiments plus three battalions, viz., 1st, 2nd and 3rd. Turkish and National

(a.) Near Martenek, on Oltu-Ardahan road, 17th or 34th regiment, plus Nariman and Tortum battalions, plus 15th cavalry regiment, plus unknown number of irregulars.

(b.) Near Novo Solim, on Sarika [two groups undecypherable]-Kars road, 28th and 29th regiments, plus either 17th or 34th regiments, plus possibly 35th, but this is uncertain, plus one cavalry regiment

14th regiment and Erzernon gendarmes not yet located

Distribution of guns not known. Approximate strength of infantry, 6,000; cavalry, 800, excluding irregulars. Turkish plan of attack believed to be repetition of that by which they took Kars in 1918, i.e., to engage Armenians near Novo Selim, while group under other commander moved from behind them, cut telegraph line at Ararat, immediately, and cuts railway north east of Kars.

When Turk (several groups omitted)ed. They therefore retired to concentrate, and now hold Baglannah, 12 miles south-west of Kars. Strong detachments are thrown out towards Merdenek and east of that place, while main force is held in reserve near Kars.

They are now superior in numbers to the enemy and intend shortly to attack

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 330, and Tehran, No. 157.)

No. 25

Colonel Stokes to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 18.

(Telegraphic.)

Tiflis (old Constantinople), October 8, 1920

FOLLOWING for information is from sources considered reliable.

4.) 3,000 troops 1st Soviet Army sent to fight in Kazakhstan.

6.) Bolshheviks and Kemal Pasha have come to an agreement to overran Armenia.

Turks are to take Batoum province and to drive Azerbaijan and Daghestan from Babberika. Eighty Turkish officers have been sent to organise Musliman forces in Azerbaijan and Daghestan, of whom some are already at Baku. The recent visit of Enver Pasha to Baku, presence of Khalil Pasha in Zangezur, intention to attack Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the fact that the Turkish army is being reorganised by the German General Staff, all factors favouring execution of above plan.

Armenian Government states that Armenian population of Kan district, roughly 15 miles south-west of Geras, has been driven out of district by Bolsheviks—Russians or Tartar or both is not clear.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 331, and Tehran, No. 158.)

No. 1

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received October 19.)

25

Admiralty, October 16, 1920.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a report, dated the 5th September, 1920, which has been received from the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. "Concord," relative to the situation at Batoum.

2. A copy of the above-mentioned report has also been sent to the War Office.

I am the

V. W. BADDELEY.

Senior Naval Officer, Batoum, to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean

Sir,

H. M. S. "Concord," at Batoum, September 6, 1920

I HAVE the honour to forward the following report of my ...

Appreciation of Situation

H.M.S. "Concord" relieved H.M.S. "Centaur" as British Senior Naval Officer at Batoum, on Monday, the 23rd August, 1920. Everything was reported at that time to be quiet, and has remained so.

One million rounds of small-arm ammunition for Armenian Government from General Wrangel arrived in steamship "Phoenix" from Rostov, and the Greek steamship "Eleftheria" brought 10,000 rifles and 1,000,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition also for the Armenians. I have not yet ascertained definitely whether these rifles and ammunition have been assisted to their proper destination.

Motor caiques from Novorossiysk report that Bolshevik commissars and troops are evacuating.

H. M. S. "Splendid" was sent on Monday, the 30th August, to cruise up the coast

received, and copy is forwarded herewith

The British consul informs me that Georgian Government are now considering the future policy to be pursued with regard to Soviet Government, Wrangel's Volunteer Forces, Armenia and Turkey. I understand that it is generally admitted by Georgian statesmen that it is impossible for Georgia to stand alone as an independent State without a protecting Power, who will be in a position to assist should help be required. In the past, before annexation, that Power was Russia, and it would seem that she is the only possible protecting Power in the future. General Wrangel's successes have, however, placed Georgia in doubt as to which force will constitute the ultimate Russian Government.

I have, &c

WALTER LAKE, Captain

Enclosure 2 in No. 26

Lieutenant-Commander Singleton, PoH, to Senior Naval Officer, Batoum.

(1) $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$ and $\beta \in \mathbb{R}$ are given by

Sir,

H. M.S. "Splendid," Poti, September 1, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to report that, in accordance with orders received, I left Poti at 5 p.m. on the 30th August and proceeded to northward along coast as near as possible to Cape Ilokapas, and therefore no information was obtainable. A long open goods train was observed at 8 a.m. on the 31st proceeding along east rail track from Golovinaki towards Socha. About an hour later another train, with covered trucks, passed through Golovinaki towards Tsuapse. At 10 a.m. on the 31st we were fired on from Cape Kadoch, apparently a howitzer, about 6-inch. Gun was situated between lighthouse and port of Tsuapse. No other vessels were observed. No steamers were visible in harbour, only a large floating crane. From this point we kept further from coast, and nothing further of interest was obtained. Socha was passed at a distance of 2 miles, both on outward and return journey, but no information was obtained with reference to it. Communication by motor schooner is kept up between Tsuapse and Socha.

I have

M SINGLETON.

[E 13011 134 58]

Colonel Stokes to Earl Curzon (received October 21.)

Encl. (apud)

MIDNIGHT 13th-14th October

Tiflis (via Constantinople), October 1.

Following telegram, dated 13th October, received from British representative at

... Affairs states that Bolshevik envoy has imperatively demanded qualified assent to Turkish demands and facilities for Bolshevik troops to join Turkish Nationalists in fighting Entente. ... decided to refuse above demands. ... Moscow telegraphs Bolshevik Government has determined to send troops to assist Turkish Nationalists, and must have use of Armenian railways. Moscow has decided to renounce Armenian front region is being brought up to full strength and being sent to Armenia via Evlakh and ...

In my opinion Armenia can probably withstand stream of Bolshevik ... posing her. She can mobilise some 10,000 to 12,000 more ... resident in Anatolia and Georgia. Volunteers will help her ... I am not yet convinced that ... force their Armenian front ... in that they are trying to bluff Armenia. In a short time extent to ... increase their force. Armenian front should be ... every available man ... overruling will ... rely, and will, I have reason to think, throw in its ... when its situation becomes one of imminent danger ... arrived to carry out suggestion contained in my ... 8th October, i.e., to start revolt in Daghestan and Caucasus (group undecipherable). I strongly recommend that a consignment of Turkish munitions of ... equipment similar to that sent to Armenia be kept ready at Constantinople for immediate despatch to Armenia or Georgia.

(Addressed to Constantinople, No. 33 and Tehran, No. 15.)

[E 13074.1 58]

Earl Curzon to Colonel St

Foreign Office, October 21, 1920

THE Georgian Foreign Minister, M. Gueguetchkoria, who had been for some time in this country, called on me a few days ago in the Foreign Office, accompanied by M. Ghambashidze, the Georgian representative in London. He was warmly for the part that I had played, with which he was ... for his country the recognition of her *de facto* ... He was also concerned with securing for Georgia the reversal of the port of Batoum and he assured me that the Georgian Government and ... regarded me as their main friend among the representatives of the Allied Powers with whom they had been brought into contact. He now came to appeal to me to render to his country the supreme service which it was in my power to confer, by arranging for the *de jure* recognition of the Georgian State. France and Italy had, he assured me, told him that they entertained no objection to this. Great Britain had simply to give the word and the fruition of Georgia's highest hopes would be achieved.

I asked leave, in reply to speak to him with the complete candour of a sincere and recognised friend. I was a little surprised, I said, at the information he had given me about France and Italy, because when at Spa, I had mentioned to the representatives of those countries the idea of a *de jure* recognition of Georgia, and had sounded them upon it, the answer from both quarters had been that, in their opinion, the proposal was premature. I thought, therefore, that this must be an illustration of a phenomenon

with which I was now quite familiar, namely, that other Powers tried to get a little cheap popularity for themselves by an apparent acquiescence in a proposal with which they did not really agree, leaving the brunt of refusal, if this had to be given, to be borne by Great Britain.

There were, I went on to say, certain objections to the proposal of the Georgian Government which it was difficult for the moment either to overlook or to overcome. In the first place, when *de facto* recognition had been given, at my instance, in Paris in January last, it had been given simultaneously to Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Did Georgia ask now to be treated alone; was it possible to recognise her *de jure* independence without doing the same thing simultaneously for Armenia? If these two were recognised, what measure was to be dealt out to Azerbaijan? And Georgia herself contended that, at this moment, it would be either impossible or a possible act on the part of the Great Powers to give a formal recognition to the Soviet Government of that State? But there was, I said, an even more formidable obstacle. If the *de jure* independence of a State was to be recognised, there must be a State so recognised would in all probability ask ... to the League of Nations, and ... who were members of the League would assume a responsibility for the integrity and defence of its frontiers. What, then, I asked, were the frontiers of the Georgian State which we might be asked to guarantee? Could the Foreign Minister himself tell me? Now, it was well known, I said, that on scarcely any side had the frontiers of Georgia been definitely fixed. Disputes still existed between ... it did not seem to ...

... their sympathy with Georgia and their recognition of her superior claims, to confer upon her the privilege that she desired. There was yet a further difficulty, namely, that *de jure* recognition had hitherto been withheld from ... of the Baltic States on the north-western side of Russia, who had ... for the best part of two years been appealing for this boon. There again a ... uncertainty prevailed, and the Powers had accordingly, and as I thought wisely, withheld recognition. The selection of Georgia alone for the privilege would at once raise an acute question with all these other States, and would precipitate an issue which ... to provoke. As time passed, the horizon ... in an those directions, and it might be possible for the Powers to pursue a ... and consistent policy on every side. In such a case none of the Border States of Russia was more likely to be treated sympathetically than Georgia; but for the moment I thought that she would do well to hold her aspirations in suspense.

There was, I told him, another aspect of the case which rendered it difficult at present to repose that complete confidence in the Government of his country which was predicated by his request. What, I asked, were the Georgian Government doing with ... validity of their alleged treaty with the Soviet Government, to which the latter were always pointing as more or less placing Georgia within their sphere? What was the truth of the report that the Georgian Government had recently accepted a considerable loan from the Soviet Government? What were M. Kyrol and the Soviet Delegation, reported at one time to consist of from seventy to eighty members, still doing in Tiflis as the guests of the Georgian Government? These rumours left us in some doubt as to what the real attitude and policy of the Georgian Government were, though his Government were always protesting to us their entire hostility to Soviet aggression. It was very desirable that the Minister should give me some explanation on this matter.

He replied that his Government had been in a very tight place with ... Bolsheviks appeared upon the scene, that it was quite true that they had been forced to conclude a treaty with Bolsheviks; that their dire straits ought to be taken into ... and that they had no intention of allowing themselves to be enslaved by ... powerful neighbours. Indeed, I gathered that his Government would evade or repudiate the agreement as soon as they safely could. As regards the alleged loan, he warmly denied that his Government either had accepted or would accept a penny of money in any form from the Soviet Government. As to the Russian Delegation in Tiflis, their numbers had now been reduced to seven or eight, and their dangerous activities had been circumscribed. M. Gueguetchkoria gave me, in fact, the most emphatic assurances about the good faith of his Government in the matter.

One further question I put to him, namely what were the relations of Georgia with Armenia? It seemed to me that the two countries were fighting the same battle, and that only by joint action could they hope to win it. The most sinister feature of

the situation in the Caucasus was the combination between Bolshevik forces coming from the north and Turkish Nationalist forces coming from the south. Their object was to overrun and destroy the independent existence of Armenia, and, if this were accomplished, where, I asked, would Georgia be? She would infallibly be the next victim. In these circumstances, it seemed to me to be to the interest of Georgia herself to throw in the whole of her forces with Armenia to protect the latter from the same fate.

The Minister assured me in reply that this was entirely the view of his Government. They were thoroughly conscious of the common danger, and were co-operating with Armenia to the best of their ability.

How far all the protestations and assurances of M Gueguetchkori were in strict accord with the facts I have not the knowledge to enable me to say, but I place them on record as being not unimportant in the history of the case.

I am, &c.

EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[E 13194 134 58]

No. 29.

Colonel Stokes to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 437)

(Telegraphic)

Tiflis (via Constantinople), October 1.

Erivan, 16th October.—Armenian Government is determined to refuse Bolshevik terms. They wish, however, to defer giving a definite refusal for as long as possible, in order to—

(a.) If possible, to postpone hostilities until snow falls in about six weeks and to clear part of their Azerbaijan frontier.

(b.) To justify their decision in the eyes of their own peoples.

Bolshevik terms, which Armenian Government know will be rejected, but which will throw onus of hostilities on Bolsheviks.

In view of nature of Armenian terms, which include [group undecypherable] withdrawal of Turks to west of Erzeroum and handing over to Armenia of Karabagh, Zangezur and Nakhichevan, I doubt whether negotiations will be prolonged. I see no harm in Armenian Government trying to gain time by offering these terms.

Armenian Minister of War proceeding with me to-day to Tiflis, where he will endeavour secretly to arrange defensive military alliance with Georgia.

If this alliance can be arranged Armenia will be able to withdraw sufficient forces from her Azerbaijan frontier to enable her to make clean sweep of Turks in Karabagh region.

I request that contents of this telegram be kept secret from Georgian representatives in London, but it will be useful if Georgian Minister for Foreign Affairs can be induced to send a message to his Government urging them to help Armenia in every way possible of secret defensive military alliance.

[E 13307 134 58]

No. 30.

Colonel Stokes to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 440)

(Telegraphic)

Tiflis (via Constantinople), October 18, 1920.

GEORGIAN Government to-day discussed request of Armenian Government for a secret defensive military alliance against Bolsheviks, but, owing to absence of President deferred decision until 21st or 22nd October, when he will return to Tiflis.

Previous to discussion, [group omitted] Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and strongly urged compliance with Armenian request. This evening Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me, while decision is deferred for a few days, Georgia will assist by—

(a.) Compulsory mobilisation of Armenians resident in Georgia;

(b.) By permitting export to Armenia of material for [group omitted].

(c.) On arrival of new Bolshevik representative Schainemann, who is expected to-morrow or the day after, by expressing to him their concern at Bolshevik attitude towards Armenia and towards [one group undecypherable].

He further stated that Georgian Government is determined to fight Bolsheviks if attacked by them, and is confident of support of entire nation in this contingency, but fears that war against Bolsheviks in support of Armenia, unless Georgia were herself attacked, would be unpopular and lack national support. He added that Georgian Government hoped that His Majesty's Government would assist Armenia and Georgia.

[group omitted] Trebizond.

(a.) Armenian [group undecypherable] southern shore of Black Sea.

(c.) Enabling Georgia to obtain arms, munitions of war and equipment to re-equip her army to 100,000 men, which number she is confident of raising if attacked by Bolsheviks.

I shall continue to press Georgian Government to sign military alliance with Armenians. I would be in a very much stronger position to do this were I authorised to inform them that [two groups undecypherable] assist Georgia immediately with arms and ammunition provided alliance is signed. Armenian Minister of War, who returns to Erivan to-morrow accompanied by M Khatisian, states that his Government will endeavour to prolong negotiations by replying to Bolsheviks in terms [group omitted] in my telegram No. 437 of 15th October.

There is no important change in the military situation in Armenia. Mazout sent from Constantinople for [two groups undecypherable] began to arrive at Erivan.

[group omitted] Acting as British representative at Erivan.

[group omitted] Constantinople, No. 316.

[E 13179 134 58]

No. 31.

Colonel Stokes to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 441)

(Telegraphic)

ARMENIAN Government reports in Kafan district, north-east of Ordubad, their squadron's defeat of Russian Bolshevik troops, capturing 400 men and 16 machine guns. Bolsheviks retired to Gorus. Kafan district is claimed by Armenia and Azerbaijan, and fighting between Bolsheviks and local inhabitants has been going on for some time. Region west and north-west of Gorus is reported to be in revolt against Bolsheviks.

No other change in military situation.

[E 13262 134/58]

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 27.)

Sir,

War Office, October 26, 1920.

In reply to Foreign Office letter of the 8th October regarding the attack on Armenia, I am commanded by the Army Council to say that the situation has now been cleared up considerably by telegrams from Colonel Stokes, numbered 426, 427 and 428 of the 18th October.

2. It appears evident that the main attack on Armenia is being delivered from the west by two divisions (9th and 12th) of the XVth Turkish Army Corps, with additional irregulars; totalling about 7,500 men. Another column, consisting probably of 11th Division, is moving from the north-east, and has reached Igdir, which is little more than 30 miles from Erivan, while, according to a Constantinople report, the Turks were attacking Echmiadzin on the 5th October. These columns are all under the direction of Kiazim Karabekir Pasha, and it seems evident that this action puts into execution the plans contemplated by the Nationalists as far back as May last, which were suspended during negotiations with Russia.

In view of the apparent inability of the Moscow Government to spare troops for

Anatolia at present, and the doubtful durability of their hold in the Caucasus, the Turkish Nationalists seem to have determined to embark on a direct attack upon the heart of Armenia, where success would not only yield the maximum result and the most booty, but would open up the most direct passage to Baku and Russia.

The attack by Bolshevik troops from the north-east on Doğan does not appear to have been pressed. The object may have been to divide the Armenian forces; and it would probably be carried out by a force containing a considerable proportion of Armenians opposed to Russians.

Similarly in the south, in Karabagh and Zangezur, guerilla fighting is taking place at various points. This has probably been initiated by the Turks or Bolsheviks, with the idea of holding as many Armenians as possible away from the main danger area.

Russian forces in trans-Caucasia have been considerably reduced in the past few months, and it is not likely that any large numbers of these are employed in the attacks on Armenia. The 3,000 men of the 1st Bolshevik Army lately reported as landing at Baku from Krasnovodsk, were probably merely the relief for a larger number of the 11th Army who were proceeding north.

In conclusion, I am to say that, from the somewhat confusing reports available, the Army Council consider that Armenia has been, and may still be in, considerable danger. Her economic situation is deplorable. The grain reserves are reported to be low. Paper money has been overissued. The railways have almost ceased running, not only from lack of oil, but owing to the bad state of both the rolling-stock and permanent way. But with the arms and equipment lately supplied by the Allies, an army of 40,000 should have been able to take the field. Moral is reported good. The approach of winter is, from the external point of view, in favour of Armenia. Should the Allies co-operate wholeheartedly, and essential material aid be supplied by the Allies, Armenia may be able to hold out till the spring, or until the Bolsheviks wish and are in a position to concentrate on her elimination.

I am, &c
B. B. CURRIE

E 13307 134 58]

Earl Curzon to Colonel Stokes (Tiflis)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, October 29, 1920

FOLLOWING is for your information only:—

Inter-Allied Military Commission at Versailles have decided that assistance that can be afforded to Armenia consists in the supply of arms and ammunition. There is no question of military support at Trebizond or elsewhere. Everything possible is being done to arrange despatch of military supplies.

E 14001 134 58]

No. 34

Colonel Stokes to Earl Curzon, (Received November 11.)

No. 480.)

(Telegraphic)

Tiflis (via Constantinople), November 4, 1920

Armenians and Turks agreed on 7th Nov. by mutual agreement a revolt of local Mohammedans in Alexandropol district to the continuance of struggle by Armenians impossible.

(Reopened to Constantinople, No. 383; Tehran, No. 178; Bagdad, No. 19.)

E 14649 134 58

War Office to Foreign Office

Sir,

War Office, November 4, 1920

I AM commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge receipt of your letter, dated the 17th November, relative to the advisability of supplying Georgia, for purposes of self defence, with the military material which had originally been intended for Armenia.

I am to say that your letter crossed Army Council letter, dated the 19th November, Foreign Office, in which the opinion was expressed that it would no longer serve any useful purpose to forward munitions to Armenia, and I am to say that the Army Council concur with the opinion expressed in Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 1219, dated the 18th November, that in the present situation the same remark applies to Georgia. Should, however, it be the intention of His Majesty's Government to reconsider their policy towards Turkey, with a view to the creation of a buffer State against Russia, the Army Council view the military support of Georgia in a totally different light. For they consider that Georgia, with the co-operation of Turkey, which in its turn would require Allied stiffening, might be able to present effective resistance to a Bolshevik advance into Trans-Caucasia, and might even secure the co-operation of Azerbaijan. The political adjustments which might be necessary in such case as regards Batum and Armenia are the concern of the Foreign Office. But, with out a friendly base in Turkey, the Council consider that such assistance as they could afford to Georgia would be of little use.

I am, &c

B. B. CURRIE

E 15522 134 58]

No. 36

Colonel Stokes to Earl Curzon (Received December 13)

(No. 120)

My Lord,

Tiflis, November 22, 1920

I HAVE the honour to submit the following observations on recent events in Trans-Caucasia.

Almost simultaneously with my arrival at Tiflis at the end of September the Kemalists began the invasion of Armenia. There is little doubt that this invasion was the outcome of a joint Bolshevik-Kemalist plan, having for its aim the junction of their armed forces and incidentally to compel Armenia to sever all connection with the Allies. The success of this plan would, it was thought, not only strengthen greatly the Bolshevik-Kemalist combination against the Allies, but show the world that the Treaty of Sévres remained a dead letter.

Being aware that the agreement concluded by the Armenian Government in August last with the Bolsheviks had somewhat impaired our confidence in their intentions, I visited Erivan and Kars at the beginning of October to ascertain for myself the attitude of the Armenian Government. I found not alone the Government, but all political parties and the people at large united in the determination to resist the Turkish invasion and not to accept Bolshevism.

About this time there were indications of the concentration of Bolshevik troops on the Azerbaijan frontier, and on the 13th October the Bolshevik representative at Erivan presented to the Armenian Government a demand that it should denounce the Treaty of Sévres and facilitate the passage of Bolshevik troops across Armenia in order that they might co-operate with the Kemalists. Despite the fact that Armenia had been promised by the Allies that they would not be asked to refuse the Bolshevik demand. At the request of the Armenian President, I pressed the Armenian Government to refuse the Bolshevik demand, but anxious to defer giving a definite refusal in the hope of a negotiated settlement, I suggested that they should (a) greatly shorten their line of defence against the Bolsheviks, (b) securing a secret defensive military alliance with Georgia.

The Armenian Minister of War accompanied me to Tiflis in order to discuss the question of a military alliance with the Georgian Government. His efforts and my own to convince the Georgian Government that its own interests demanded that they should make such an alliance, proved fruitless, and the Georgian Government refused to accept the suggestion. The reason given by the Georgian Government for its refusal was that a war undertaken by Georgia in support of Armenia would unless Georgia were herself attacked, lack the support of the Georgian people. This argument was supported by the fact that the existing friendship and alliance existing between Georgians and Armenians. But other factors which probably influenced the decision of the Georgian Government are:—

(a) The fear of Georgia that, if she supported Armenia, the Turks would retaliate by instigating risings among the numerous Mussulmans in Georgia.

S. 73]

1

- (b) The desire of Georgia not to jeopardise the result of negotiations then proceeding with Azerbaijan and the Bolsheviks for supplies of oil from Baku in return for merchandise from Georgia

Having failed to obtain Georgian support, the Armenian Government replied to the Bolsheviks with a letter which they were convinced would be unacceptable but which they hoped might prolong negotiations. The Bolshevik representative replied that the Armenian proposals would be considered, and on the 29th October left Erivan for Baku with the avowed object of obtaining a reply to the Armenian communication. Meanwhile the Kemalists attacked the Armenians from another direction, viz., that of Igdir, and considerable fighting took place within 25 miles of Erivan. About the same time, i.e., the 28th October, the Kemalists began a general attack on Kars, which place they captured on the 31st October. The Armenian forces offered but a feeble resistance, and withdrew almost intact in the direction of Alexandropol. The Turkish and Armenian forces were captured by the Kemalists. These battalions had displayed Bolshevik tendencies in May last at Alexandropol and are reported to have admitted the Kemalists into the defence of Kars without offering any resistance.

Strenuous efforts were made by the Armenian Government to reorganise their forces and re-establish their moral in order to defend a position a few miles west of Alexandropol, but even numerous summary executions of deserters failed to improve matters, and on the 7th November, at the request of the Armenian Commander at Alexandropol, an armistice was granted by the Kemal Corps Commander, Kiazim Karabekir.

By the terms of this armistice the Kemalists occupied Alexandropol and the Armenian troops withdrew from the west bank of the Arpachai. On the 9th November the Kemalists occupied the town of Igdir, which had been held by the Armenians. The withdrawal of the Armenian troops to a line running roughly from the north-west corner of Lake Gokeba to Araks station on the Alexandropol-Erivan Railway and control of the Alexandropol-Tiflis Railway, up to and including Saman.

On the 10th November the Armenian Government received from Mustapha Kemal a telegram dated Angora, the 5th November, giving (a) the basis, (b) the terms, upon which peace could be concluded. The main points of (a) were —

1. Frontiers to be decided according to statistics and a plebiscite
2. In disputed areas the population to self-determine whether to belong to Turkey or Armenia
3. A mixed Turco-Armenian gendarmerie to be formed in the disputed areas in order to ensure complete liberty of voting
4. In the interests of all, a peace conference to take place as soon as possible

Mustapha Kemal expressed his fear that, in order to please the Western capitalists, and especially England, the Armenian Government would object to these proposals.

The main points of (b) were:—

1. Turkey agrees to allow her neighbour States to develop in complete security and liberty
2. Turkey will, as far as she can, assist in supplying Armenia, and in re-establishing the latter's normal economic situation.
3. Turkey and Armenia agree mutually to afford complete liberty of passage on their railways and other means of communication of persons and goods.
4. Turkey agrees to repatriate all Armenians who emigrated from Turkey during the World War to their homes, and to grant them the same rights as are enjoyed in the most civilised countries by ethnographical minorities.
5. Turkey demands from Armenia effective guarantees for the security of Turkey

The effective guarantees were not specified, and it is difficult to say what form such guarantees could take. Mustapha Kemal's message concluded by stating that the Turkish delegates would await the Armenian delegates at Alexandropol.

Captain Court's telegram giving the gist of Mustapha Kemal's message reached

me in so mutilated a condition as to be undecipherable, and I have had to await Captain Court's arrival at Tiflis in order to ascertain its contents.

The Armenian Government replied to the Kemalist ultimatum of the 9th November by proposing a conference to discuss the basis. Karabekir replied that he would respect the armistice which he had on the 11th November. By the 1st November, the Armenian troops had been driven out of Ani on the railway to Erivan and back to Annamli on that to Karaklis, and a fresh armistice was signed. A peace conference is to take place at Alexandropol.

During the past few days the British Government has offered to mediate between the Armenians and Turks, but the Armenian Government has so far rejected these offers, in the hope that His Majesty's Government would see their way to act as mediators.

The failure of the Armenian army to offer any but a most feeble resistance is to be attributed, in my opinion, to the following factors:—

1. War weariness
2. Small number of troops and inferior fighting equipment, a large untrained and therefore inefficient majority of recruits produced by a general mobilisation.
3. Lack of efficient leaders.
4. Lack of adequate supplies.
5. Winter conditions.

I consider it but just to the Armenian Government to place on record my conviction that it did its utmost in difficult circumstances to save its country and that in the face of disaster it has remained faithful to its tradition with the Allies. If it now accepts Bolshevik assistance to overthrow the terms imposed by its Turkish victors it will undoubtedly only do so as a last resort.

I am sure I can assure you that I have noticed the excellent work done during the period with which I was connected by Captain H. D. H. Court R.E. attached to the mission, who has been acting as British representative at Erivan. He has sent me full and useful reports on the situation throughout and remained at Erivan to the last possible moment—indeed, some days longer than was really intended by the instructions which I sent him.

I have, &c

C. B. STOKES

CHAPTER II.—TURKEY.

[E 7568 1729 44]

No. 37

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon. — (11)

(No. 915.)

My Lord

Constantinople, June 24, 1920.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 822 of the 11th June, 1920, I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of a letter which I have received from the Milne in response to my request for any observations with regard to the replies of the French and Italian High Commissioners (copies of which accompanied my despatch referred to above) particularly with reference to cypher telegrams.

In forwarding this reply for your Lordship's consideration, I venture to offer the following remarks with regard to the contentions put forward by my colleagues.

Movements of French troops have taken place in the city of Constantinople conveyed to myself by the French High Commissioner. While these movements have been engaged in, events have occurred which have produced a feeling of the native Christian population, and finally an armistice has been concluded by the French authorities with Mustapha Kemal, who is in open rebellion against the Constantinople Government and in direct conflict with the forces of the Allies. All this has taken place without any direct communication being conveyed to me by my French colleague.

Similarly no communication has been received from my Italian colleague. I am sorry to say that I am not aware of their movements.

I suggest for your Lordship's consideration that it would appear that my colleagues wish in these matters to have one law for themselves and another for us.

I have &c

J. M. DE ROBECK

High Commissioner

Enclosure of No. 37

General Sir G. F. Milne to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck

Your Excellency,

Constantinople, June 24, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated the 23rd inst. forwarding letters received from their Excellencies the French and Italian High Commissioners on the subject of the supreme control of the Inter-Allied Committee of Control of the Ottoman Empire.

I have to remind your Excellency that I received orders from His Majesty's Government to carry out the military occupation of Constantinople and to assume control of the War Office. This is therefore a purely military question, and so long as the representatives of the Allies do not recognise my authority, I am unable to discuss any of the points in question.

As regards the question of the telegrams, I have issued instructions, as I am in no way responsible for operations in Thrace, that all messages be shown to the commandant of the Allied forces in Asia Minor, I must reserve to myself the liberty of taking such action as I consider right in this case.

G. F. MILNE

Commanding-in-chief, Army of Black Sea

[E 7738/757/44]

No. 38.

Baron Moncheur to Earl Curzon. — (Received July 5.)

My Lord,

Ambassade de Belgique, Londres, le 2 juillet 1920.

J'AI eu l'occasion à plusieurs reprises déjà de faire part à votre Seigneurie du vif intérêt de mon Gouvernement d'obtenir l'appui du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique. Le Gouvernement belge est appelé à siéger dans le Conseil

de la Dette publique ottomane.

De la création de cet organisme, la Belgique a fait valoir ses droits à être représentée dans le Conseil international. Les titres tout particuliers à être représentés dans ce Conseil international.

Je vous prie de vouloir bien transmettre à votre Seigneurie l'ordre du jour voté par l'Assemblée générale des porteurs de fonds turcs réunis à Anvers le 15 mai 1920, sous le titre : "Association pour la Défense des Détenteurs de Fonds publics".

Je vous prie de vouloir bien transmettre à votre Seigneurie l'ordre du jour voté par l'Assemblée générale des porteurs de fonds turcs réunis à Anvers le 15 mai 1920, sous le titre : "Association pour la Défense des Détenteurs de Fonds publics".

Je vous prie de vouloir bien transmettre à votre Seigneurie l'ordre du jour voté par l'Assemblée générale des porteurs de fonds turcs réunis à Anvers le 15 mai 1920, sous le titre : "Association pour la Défense des Détenteurs de Fonds publics".

Je suis, &c.

CH. MANKENS

E 7748 3 44

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon. — (Received July 5.)

(No. 785.)

Constantinople, July 5, 1920.

General Bridges has just arrived from Greek General Headquarters at Bulkeser. He has just arrived from Greek General Headquarters at Bulkeser.

He has just arrived from Greek General Headquarters at Bulkeser. He has just arrived from Greek General Headquarters at Bulkeser. He has just arrived from Greek General Headquarters at Bulkeser.

He has just arrived from Greek General Headquarters at Bulkeser. He has just arrived from Greek General Headquarters at Bulkeser.

He has just arrived from Greek General Headquarters at Bulkeser. He has just arrived from Greek General Headquarters at Bulkeser.

He has just arrived from Greek General Headquarters at Bulkeser. He has just arrived from Greek General Headquarters at Bulkeser.

E 7898 3 44.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon. — (Received July 8.)

(No. 916.)

Constantinople, June 26, 1920.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information copy of a report, dated the 17th June, which I have received from my representative at Samosoun relative to a conversation held with the Governor-General of the province regarding the conditions of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

I am, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,

High Commissioner

Captain Perring to Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb

Dear Sir

Samsun, June 17, 1920

I should like to report the result and a résumé of a conversation I had with the General (Ahmed Nafiz Bey) yesterday the 16th instant.

This man is an extreme Nationalist, direct from Angora; he originates from Salonica, and has a great hatred of the Greeks and everything Greek.

He stated that he had received a copy of the proposed Peace Treaty, and that, unless the clauses referring to Smyrna and Thrace were modified, the Turks had no intention of accepting these terms. I told him that I could not possibly discuss the terms with him. He said the loss of Syria, Palestine, Yemen, &c., was nothing and was recognised as being the inevitable consequences of their having a large Arab predominance.

He informed me that Turkey had not lost the war, and that, if the present terms are insisted upon, it means another two years' fighting, as they mean to turn the Greeks out of Smyrna and Adrianople.

He also informed me that the Turks had been a free nation for 1,000 years, and that they had no intention of accepting slavery or any form of control such as existed formerly in Egypt.

Apart from the general excitement caused by the end of Ramazan and the Buram Sira, there have been no incidents. The security of the town itself is good, the villages depend on themselves entirely for protection.

I have &c

J. S. PERRING, Captain

E 8098 1435 44.

No. 41.

Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan Home.

Dear Sir

Foreign Office, July 10, 1920

DURING the Conference at Spa I had more than one conversation with the Italian Foreign Minister. He was in a very independent, and in some cases scarcely loyal, attitude pursued by Italian officials, military officers and agents in almost every part of the Near and Middle East. From every quarter, I said, information reached me of Italian intrigues with the Turkish Nationalists, Italian disloyalty to the Allies, Italian attempts to make things difficult for Allied and, in particular, British forces, representatives and actions. From a confidential report which had recently come into my hands from Constantinople I extracted a number of specific incidents, of which I undertook to furnish Count Sforza with a more detailed résumé. But from my own knowledge and recollection I was able to refer him to examples of the sort of conduct of which I thought I had good reason to complain in the Caucasus, at Constantinople and more particularly in Egypt.

On two separate occasions, in London and at San Remo, the Italian Prime Minister had promised to send an Italian battalion to reinforce the British garrison at Batoum, which at that date it was an object of interallied policy to hold, at any rate provisionally. The French had carried out a similar undertaking, but the Italians had twice failed to redeem their pledge. At Baku the different treatment meted out to the Italian representative by the Bolsheviks as compared with the British and French, and more particularly the British, was an indication of the separate relations which the Italians were known for some time to have established with the revolutionary party. At Constantinople the independent attitude of the Italians was so notorious that it was a matter of common belief that the Alliance no longer existed, and the British Commander-in-Chief was reluctant to make use of Italian troops in the military crisis that had recently arisen because of his uncertainty as to their inclinations. Everywhere the Italians were reported as assuring the Turks that they were behind them in resisting the Turkish Peace Treaty while in Anatolia we were credibly informed that Italian agents were in close touch with the partisans of Mustafa Kemal.

I said to Count Sforza that I could understand a policy of this description, which might or might not be inspired by a regard for Italian interests, provided it was pursued by an independent Italian, or a hostile Power. But I could not understand it, so long as it was pursued by a member of the Alliance which had fought and won the

war, which had continued since the war to meet the other Allies in friendly conference, and which had only a few weeks ago on Italian soil drawn up the Peace Treaty with Turkey, against which the majority of these manoeuvres appeared to be directed. As long as the Alliance continued—and I was not aware that the Italians either desired or proposed its rupture—it seemed to me that the Allies were bound by the obligations and principals in Europe, but of their agents in all parts of the East.

Peace Treaty? Many reports had reached me to that effect, both at London and later at San Remo; and when we went to the latter place the British Delegation had been led to expect that a serious attempt would be made by Italy to modify its conditions in respect more especially of Smyrna and Thrace. It was true that Signor Nitti had made a brief fight, or rather had raised some doubts, about the decision concerning the Chatalja lines, and had shown no marked enthusiasm for the Smyrna solution. But the Italian attitude had not been pushed to the point of opposition, and the treaty in its present form had been finally accepted by them, not only without protest but with unqualified assent. Did the Italian Delegation, I asked, adhere to this position, or were they even now at Spa about to press for modification?

Count Sforza admitted that his Government had felt, and continued to feel, very serious doubts about the Thracian and Smyrna policy of the Allies, but he did not anticipate that it would now be possible to modify it, and he accordingly accepted the obligations of loyalty to a policy which he admitted to be equally binding upon his Government with the remaining Allied Powers.

Upon the other issues raised by me, Count Sforza was constrained to admit that, though explanations might be forthcoming in individual cases, there was probably some justification for the complaint that I had made. He explained the situation as arising from a far-sighted desire on the part of Italian representatives in the East to anticipate the situation which they contemplated would shortly arise in that part of the world. In their judgment the Nationalist forces in Turkey would be in the ascendant in the future, and it was politic therefore, with a due regard to Italian interests, to be on good terms with that Turkish community. Even now at Constantinople the Italians would welcome any action in which by some means we could persuade the Nationalist Party to join in the acceptance of the Peace Treaty. Further, the Italians were animated by a desire to secure a position in Asia Minor, and in these circumstances it was not surprising that Italian agents should sometimes in distant parts carry their feelings to a point that was not in strict accord with the policy being pursued by their superiors in Europe.

Count Sforza assured me that he did not himself in any degree countenance these proceedings, and he promised to issue instructions that would produce a more loyal atmosphere and attitude.

Upon the position in Egypt and the conduct of the Italian colony there I spoke with even greater warmth. The Italians had over and over again during the past two years promised to recognise the British protectorate over Egypt—a recognition which I believed had not yet been forthcoming. Meanwhile we had made enormous concessions to the Italian ambitions in Africa. We had ceded to them a great slice of territory in Jubaland, and had even added to the original cession. We had further accommodated them about Sollum. In these circumstances it was really intolerable that in almost every communication that came from Egypt I should find mention of Italian intrigues with the Nationalist Party and Italian hostility.

One of the chief centres of this mischievous influence in the East was the Banco di Roma, which was well known to be the financial agent of the Italian Government in the East.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KILDLESTON.

[E 8047/3 44]

No. 42

Mr. Williams to Mr. Harmsworth.—(Received July 12.)

Dear Harmsworth
CILICIA

Below is copy of letter which you asked me to send you. It was written from Aintab and dated the 16th June. It was addressed to Leronian, a very learned and reliable Armenian from Aintab, now in England. I gather it is a translation as it reaches me.

Yours sincerely,
WILLIAM WILLIAMS

Enclosure in No. 42

Translation of Letter to M. Leronian

ONE week ago we Armenians surrendered to the Turks. The French colonel called the leading Armenians and told us that our chief work was to keep reconciled with the Turks, and he ordered us to do so immediately. Our end was near because of lack of provisions. We pulled down our trenches (walls, &c.), and the Turkish Governor and the leader of the insurgents came into our church and they promised us they would not touch us any more. And then they obliged us to send a telegram to Mustafa Kemal telling him that we are his loyal subjects. The French obliged us to do so.

Aintab, June 16, 1920.

E 8100 3 44

No. 43.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 12)

(No. 78)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, July 10, 1920.

I HAVE been informed confidentially, by Italian military attaché, that Italian brigade which was under orders to proceed from Italy to Constantinople has been diverted to Albania, and that it is most unlikely that any Italian troops will now be sent for service in Turkey.

An ex-member of my staff, who has just returned from visit to ports in South-West Asia Minor, reports as follows:

(a) Italians have withdrawn their detachments from Budrum, Marmarice, Girona, Girona and Maghla.

(b) At following places only an officer's post remains: Milas, Makri, Kulluk.

(c) 350 men only remain at Adana, and garrisons of Sokin and Andlanova are being reduced.

(d) Horses and stores are being sold apparently preliminary to withdrawal 133rd Brigade, formerly numbering 4,500 men, now consists of only 30 officers and 118 men.

(e) It has been decided to transfer administration of Rhodes from military to civil authorities. Garrison there has been much reduced.

Repeated to Roum, No. 31.

[E 7738/757 44]

No. 44

Earl Curzon to the Marquis Imperiali

Foreign Office, July 13, 1920.

Your Excellency,

IT will no doubt be within the recollection of your Excellency that at the Conference of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors, which took place at this Office on the 31st March last, I had occasion to bring to the notice of the meeting a communication received from his Excellency the Belgian Ambassador, stating that his Government would view with pleasure the inclusion of a Belgian delegate in the Council of the

Ottoman Public Debt Administration, as also in the International Commission of Control of Ottoman Finance when formed.

As a result of the exchange of views which then took place, it was decided that it should be intimated to his Excellency the Belgian Ambassador that the decisions of the Conference had not been unfavourable to his request, but that, as the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration was shortly to disappear, it was perhaps hardly worth while setting in motion all the procedure necessary to obtain any transitory satisfaction for Belgium.

In replying therefore to the Belgian Ambassador on the 8th April last in answer to his communication, I reminded his Excellency that, in regard to the International Commission of Control of Ottoman Finance, it had been proposed, for obvious reasons, to confine that Commission to representatives of the three Great Powers, and that as regards the Ottoman Public Debt, the Conference of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors felt that as the Council would shortly disappear, it was hardly worth while to set in motion the procedure necessary to secure what could only be a very transient representation of Belgian interests.

The question of the admission of a Belgian representative on the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt has again been referred to in a further communication recently received from Baron Moncheur, stating that Belgian representation has been strongly advocated by the "Comité belge de Défense des Porteurs de Fonds" at a general meeting held at Antwerp on the 1st June last, under the presidency of the Belgian Ambassador. In view of the appeal, the Belgian Government once more ask the favourable support of His Majesty's Government in the matter.

In view of the decision of the Conference of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors of the 31st March last, I propose replying to his Excellency the Belgian Ambassador in the sense of my communication to him of the 8th April already referred to, but in doing so I shall be glad to be favoured with the views of the Italian Government on the subject.

I have &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[E 8237 3 44]

No. 45.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 14)

(No. 939)

My Lord,

Constantinople, July 1, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that an Armenian newspaper published at Constantinople—the "Erivan"—submitted its proposed issues to the Inter Allied Censorship Bureau on the 21st June. The majority of the articles being considered unsuited for publication under present conditions obtaining at Constantinople, the editor was so informed. The paper was, however, published in defiance of the censor's instructions, and has since been suppressed.

The articles referred to are, however, of sufficient interest to merit your Lordship's consideration, and I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the same.

I am, Sir, very respectfully, Sir, your Lordship's obedient servant, J. M. de ROBECK.

It is to be noted that the paper in question is now being published in Cilicia, and it is to be hoped that the British authorities will be able to prevent its circulation in that region.

I have &c.

J. M. de ROBECK, High Commissioner.

Passages deleted in the Armenian bi-weekly paper "Krican" of June 21 1920 and published contrary to instruction

THE ARMENIANS PROCLAIM THE INDEPENDENCE OF CILICIA

ULTIMATUM GIVEN TO THE NATIONALISTS BY THE COMMANDANT OF THE ARMENIAN FORCES

RECENT information received from Adana is really wonderful. The Armenians have understood that their only salvation was to take up arms, defend their honour and fight for the future generations, instead of waiting to fall a prey to the hope, oh! wonderful and swift event. The Armenians placed their confidence in others for years and years without any result. The Armenians were hungering for peace, and, then abandoned by their friends, fell a prey to an ambitious enemy and were thus repeatedly persecuted. In order to assure his honour and existence the Armenian has now had recourse to a desperate remedy. He is now face to face with his enemy, the enemy who, not content with having persecuted him for centuries, attempted lately to give him the coup de grace.

The Armenian never wished or proposed to begin hostilities, but the recent conduct of his friends and enemies has induced him to take up arms and undertake a terminated defence. The Armenians have been deceived by false promises. When the French came to Cilicia and hoisted their flag the Armenians never expected that the future would bring them such disastrous results. Now the French are hauling down their flag and leaving us alone in the hands of the Turks, whose sanguinary appetite has become keener. This is known not only to the Armenians, but also to the civilized world. Is it possible to remain quiet and indifferent before such a menace? No! The Armenian will fight to the death sentence with their own hand.

Then our friends, in adorning our graves with wreaths, would put up an inscription stating —

Here lie the Armenian people who did not know life and who are worthy to die.

No! Such a coward's suicide is inconceivable for us. That is why we have decided to save the present and secure the future.

No! It is with the object of preventing this that we have declared the independence of our mother country Cilicia.

The Armenians' situation is critical. You are all living under the same "Sun" and you are called upon to assist our heroes, morally, materially, and physically. You must give help to those who fight in order to save their honour and what remains of the ruins of Rospignan. They must be victorious. God is on their side.

If they are vanquished they will have the honour of being buried in the sacred ruins of their fatherland. Then shame to the others (allusion to the Allies).

After the proclamation of independence, an ultimatum was sent to the Nationalists.

As the result of a Franco-Nationalist's arrangement, the French have withdrawn their troops from Cilicia, concentrating them on the line Mersina-Adana, thus leaving the Armenians in the hands of their tyrants. The Armenians of Amantes thereupon proclaimed the independence of the country as being a province attached to Armenia.

The commandant of the Armenian national troops called Serop Rospignan alias Serop Pasha, alias Prince Chichmanoff, alias Mourad Pasha, sent an ultimatum to Mustafa Kemal calling upon him to withdraw his troops from Cilicia within forty eight hours, and stating that otherwise he would not be responsible for any subsequent events which might take place. A response was received from Mustafa Kemal stating that the Armenians of Cilicia have been proclaimed in all the other districts evacuated by the French as a result of their agreement with the Kemalists. The Armenians are master of the situation and firmly maintain their position in the whole of Cilicia.

FRIVAN

Copy of the Agreement made between Mustafa Kemal and the French

Circular from Mustafa Kemal to his Commanders

THE following are the results of my negotiations with the French

Article 1. Hostilities against the French will cease on all fronts from midnight 29th 30th May.

Art. 2. The French troops occupying Bozanti and Sis will evacuate these places, taking with them all their arms, ammunition and stores, and withdrawing on to the railway line Mersina-Adana. This evacuation must be completed within ten days.

Art. 3. Within ten days' time all French prisoners of war interned in our camps will be set at liberty. The French will reciprocate by setting free our prisoners, either civilian or military.

Art. 4. Free communication is allowed to take place between the Ottoman cities of Tarsus and Adana. The evacuation of Bozanti, Sis and Aintab will be arranged for in a special agreement as well as the arrangements for the exchange of prisoners. The evacuation of Bozanti, Sis and Aintab will be completed on the 31st May at latest. This order must be communicated to our advanced lines on the 31st May at latest.

I strictly insist on the fact that my orders in this respect must be carefully acted upon. Please let me know the exact time, day, hour and minute at which you communicate my present orders.

This order is simultaneously communicated to —

- 1 The Commander 12th Army Corps, Konya
- 2 The Commander 10th Army Corps, Diarbekir
- 3 The Commander 3rd Army Corps, Sivas
- 4 The Commander 11th Division, Eregh
- 5 The Commandant of the Nationalists, Cilicia
- 6 The Commandant of the Nationalists, Aintab

MUSTAFA KEMAL,

The President of the Great National Assembly

May 28 29 1920

KRICAN

THE following is the French official communiqué in connection with the Franco-Kemalist agreement:—

Article 1. The camps of Bozanti and Sis will be evacuated at once and our troops concentrated on the railway line between Adana and Mersina.

Art. 2. French troops will evacuate Aintab. It is agreed that no attacks what ever will be made against the Armenians there. This evacuation to be made at least fourteen days after the signature of this armistice.

Art. 3. The two parties have agreed to a mutual exchange of their prisoners of war or civilians interned in prisoners' camps for political reasons. The two parties will endeavour to arrange that this exchange be made within ten days.

Art. 4. The Governor of Adana is entitled to communicate freely with the Turkish Army Corps Commandants with regard to the prompt execution of the clauses inserted in the act of armistice signed between the two parties.

French Official Communiqué with regard to the Franco-Nationalist Agreement

I consider it desirable to publish the following clauses of the Act of Armistice:—

- 1 On the demand of Mustafa Kemal's delegates in Beyrout we have agreed to sign an armistice with the former.
- 2 This agreement is only of a military character.
- 3 Therefore the situation remains as before, and persons who try to foment disorder will be severely dealt with.

COLONEL BREMONT

Adana June 2 1920

Proclamation of General Dufieux

WHEN the proclamation of General Dufieux was published, a Turkish Delegation visited Colonel Bremond, who made the following speech -

The proclamation of General Dufieux is made in your own interests. You know perfectly well that the French came to Adana in order to ensure public order and not to take possession of your lands. You know that France has been your advocate at the Peace Conference and that, against the wishes of her Allies, she succeeded in obtaining a decision that the Turks were to remain in Constantinople. If France had kept silent you would have lost Constantinople. If you wish Constantinople to remain yours, endeavour to establish order in Cilicia by means of an extensive propaganda and I will assist you.

Declaration of General Dufieux to an Armenian Delegation

According to certain rumours it was alleged that the former Turkish Governor of Cilicia was to regain his post. I assure you that this will not happen as long as I am here, and I expect to remain for a long time. The arrangements latterly come to are of a purely military character. Please note that my last proclamation is still in force and that I shall insist upon its clauses being strictly observed. Any disorders in the city will be severely dealt with.

Official French Communication under date of May 25, 1920

The French forces advancing on Antak on the 23rd May have defeated the Kemalists forces. 1,200 Kemalists were killed on the battlefield. Thousands of prisoners were captured. Amongst the prisoners captured were one commandant and two colonels. The army corps flag was also taken. It was a decisive victory. On the 5th May we attacked and repulsed the counter-attacks of Ismet Bey, Nationalist commandant, and his forces, close to Tel Chaptin, 25 kilom distant from Ourfa. Many soldiers of the enemy were killed and captured.

Proclamation by General Dufieux

Adana, May 31, 1920

SOME of the inhabitants are giving shelter to rebels, who are, to my knowledge, lodged in various houses. On the 28th May these rebels attempted to give trouble to the French forces. The French commandant gave a limit of two hours for these rebels to be expelled from the houses where they were hiding. As these orders were not carried out, the rebels were expelled by force and punished. As a result, several must hold the rebels responsible. This will be a lesson to them. I know that for some days past rebels have been hidden in private houses in Adana. It is the duty of everyone to expel the rebels from their houses in order to avoid further unfortunate incidents. This must be understood, otherwise I shall employ very severe measures, as I did in Osmanié and the losses will be heavier. People must understand that it is in order to save you from further misfortunes that I publish the present proclamation.

Inhabitants of Adana

It depends on your own good sense to avoid disasters in this city. You must on your own initiative expel the rebels who have come here in order to foment trouble. If you do not, I shall be obliged to employ severe measures.

GENERAL DUFIEUX
Commandant of the 1st Army Corps in Cilicia

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 18.)

(No. 829.)

Constantinople, July 16, 1920.

YH'R telegr. N. 12

Ferid Pasha and Peace Delegation returned here on 14th July.

Reshid Bey is only plenipotentiary remaining in Paris.

Ferid Pasha called on me this morning, 16th July. He said he wished to represent to me results of his journey without entering into details, which I already knew. Turkey, he said, was confronted with treaty of utmost severity, only alternative to signing which must be total ruin. This was realized by reasonable people like himself, but unfortunately country was full of irresponsible madmen, who took hue that treaty was death sentence, and that Turks should not put rope round their own necks. These people clamoured against signature, and fixed their hopes on support of Islamic world and Bolsheviks.

Grand Vizier said that recent attack on British at Ismid (for which as head of Government he expressed regret) had shown what lengths rebels would go to, and had proved correctness of his often-repeated contention that they were enemies not alone of Turkish Government, but also of Great Britain.

It was not only here, he said, that wild ideas prevailed. In Paris he had been beset by all sorts of Asiatics, who spoke in same strain as opponents of signature here. He himself realised fantastic nature of hopes founded on Islamic and Bolshevik support, but people who entertained them were numerous. What then, he asked, would be the value of treaty which was going to impose all sorts of obligations on Turkey if signed by Government, whose duty it would be to discharge these obligations honestly and loyally, but who would be incapable of doing so? He did not wish to exaggerate strength of movement in the interior. He agreed with me that failure of Kemalists to put up any resistance to Greek advance showed how little hold they had, how sick and tired peasants were of war, and how ready they were to welcome peace from any quarter.

He had maintained last year that movement was bluff, and had made proposals for repressing it with small expenditure of force, failing which grave situation would arise. He had not been listened to, and grave situation which he foretold had come about. Even now, however, position was such that if Greeks were ordered to Angora, or even Divas, advance would be military promenade and trouble would not be encountered until they approached Erzerum.

While taking this unexaggerated view of movement in Asia Minor, Ferid Pasha nevertheless insisted on seriousness of situation which would arise if peace were signed without any guarantee that Government who signed it would be able to enforce their views on extremists.

If Government remained in their powerless condition they might be swept away, though it was difficult to say whether their fall would follow or precede moment fixed for signature of peace.

Grand Vizier thus led up to usual appeal for British assistance in retrieving situation in Asia Minor, and he summed up his attitude as follows:—

Reasonable men saw there was no alternative to signature except destruction. Reasonable men from Sultan downwards would plump for signature if they knew Great Britain would help Government to restore order in Turkey after signature. If, however, they were not assured of such help, even reasonable men would be against signature.

I promised to report all this to your Lordship. I urged repeatedly great importance of signing lest even worse fate would befall Turkey. I pointed out that peace itself contemplated creation of instruments, e.g., gendarmerie, which would be forged with Allied assistance and would be available for restoration of order. To this Grand Vizier retorted that these instruments could not be brought into existence until Kemal had first been repressed.

Grand Vizier said he had explained above views, though in less detail, to Lord Derby, who had telegraphed to Prime Minister and had been summoned same day to Conference with latter at Spa. He had not been able to see Lord Derby on his return to Paris, but he had himself also given Prime Minister written statement of his views as far as they could be reduced to writing in form of letter.

a period of ten days to signify definitely her acceptance of the clauses of the treaty and her intention to sign it. This period expires on the 27th day of July, at 12 midnight. If the treaty is not signed in its present form, the Allied Powers will take such action as they may consider necessary in the circumstances

MILFRAND

Enclosure 2 in No 47

ANNEX

Political Clauses

Article 40 (Amended form)

The Commission shall be composed of representatives appointed respectively by the United States of America (if and when that Government is willing to participate), the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Russia (if and when Russia becomes a member of the League of Nations), Greece, Roumania, Bulgaria and Turkey (if and when the two latter States become members of the League of Nations). Each Power shall appoint one representative. The representatives of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and Russia shall each have two votes. The representatives of Greece, Roumania, Bulgaria and Turkey shall each have one vote. Each commissioner shall be removable only by the Government which appointed him

General Provisions

Article 136, paragraph 1. (Amended form)

A Commission composed of four members, appointed by the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan respectively, shall be set up within three months of the signature of the present treaty to prepare with the assistance of technical experts representing the other Capitulatory Powers, Allied or Neutral, who with this object will each be invited to appoint an expert, a scheme of judicial reform to replace the present capitulatory system in judicial matters in Turkey. This commission may recommend, after consultation with the Turkish Government, the adoption of either a mixed or a unified judicial system.

Part V (Military, Naval and Air Clauses), and

Part VI (Prisoners of War and Graves)

Article 153 (Amended form)

Within six months from the coming into force of the present treaty, the military forces other than those provided for in article 152 shall be demobilised and

Article 164 paragraph 2. (Amended form)

The suppression of existing formations which are in excess of the authorised strength of 50 000 men (not including the Sultan's bodyguard), shall be effected progressively from the date of the signature of the present treaty, in such manner as to be completed within six months at the latest after the coming into force of the treaty, in accordance with the provisions of article 153

Article 171. (Amended form)

On the expiration of six months from the coming force of the present treaty, the armament which may be in use or held in reserve for replacement in the various formations of the Turkish armed forces shall not exceed the figures fixed per thousand men in Table III annexed to this Section

Article 173. (Amended form)

Within six months from the coming into force of the present treaty, all existing areas, munitions of the various categories, and war material in excess of the quantities authorised, shall be handed over to the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control provided for in article 200 in such places as shall be appointed by this Commission

The principal Allied Powers will decide what is to be done with this material

Article 211, paragraph 2. (Amended form)

This stipulation shall not apply to prisoners of war and interned civilians for offences committed subsequent to the 15th June, 1920

Financial Clauses

Article 253 paragraph 1. (Amended form)

(1) Turkey will deliver in a seaworthy condition and in such ports of the Allied Powers as the Governments of the said Powers may determine, all German ships transferred to the Turkish flag since the 1st April, 1914, which will be handed over to the Reparation Commission referred to in article 233 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany

Part IX (Economic Clauses)

Article 289, paragraph 1 (Amended form)

Subject to any contrary stipulations which may be provided in the present treaty, the Allied Powers reserve the right to retain and liquidate all property rights and interests of Turkish nationals, or companies controlled by them, within their territories, colonies, possessions and protectorates, excluding any territory under the Turkish sovereignty on the 17th October, 1912

Article 290 (Amended form)

Turkish nationals who acquire *ipso facto* the nationality of an Allied Power or of a new State in accordance with the provisions of the present treaty, or any further treaty regulating the disposal of territories detached from Turkey, will not be considered as Turkish nationals within the meaning of the fifth paragraph of article 211, articles 282, 284 the third paragraph of article 287, articles 289, 291, 292, 293, 301, 302 and 303

Article 291 paragraph 1. (Amended form)

All property, rights and interests of Turkish nationals within the territory of any Allied Power, excluding any territory under Turkish sovereignty on the 17th October, 1912, and the net proceeds of their sale, liquidation or other dealing therewith may be charged by that Allied Power with payment of amounts due in respect of claims by the nationals of that Allied Power under article 267 or in respect of debts owing to them by Turkish nationals

Article 293, paragraph 1 (Amended form)

The Government of an Allied Power or new State exercising authority in territory detached from Turkey in accordance with the present treaty or any other treaty concluded since the 17th October, 1912, may liquidate the property, rights and interests of Turkish companies or companies controlled by Turkish nationals in such territory the proceeds of the liquidation shall be paid direct to the company.

On their part, the Powers have considered it necessary to alter, in various points of detail, the terms of the treaty handed to the Turkish Delegation

In article 139, the last four words are transposed, and paragraph 2 will accordingly read as follows

No power shall be exercised directly or indirectly by any Turkish authority whatever in any territory detached from Turkey, or of which under the present treaty the existing status is recognised by Turkey."

In paragraph 2 of article 144, the date of the 1st January, 1914, is substituted for that of the 1st August, 1914, with regard to Turkey's obligations to facilitate to the greatest possible extent the return to their homes of the Turkish subjects of non-Turkish race who have been forcibly driven from their homes by fear of massacre or any other form of pressure. This date of the 1st January, 1914, coincides more nearly with the occurrences which took place in the first months of that year, during which a large number of Turkish subjects of non-Turkish race were without reason expelled from their homes.

Paragraph 2 of article 144 will accordingly read as follows:—

The Turkish Government solemnly undertakes to facilitate to the greatest possible extent the return to their homes and re-establishment in their possessions of the Turkish subjects of non-Turkish race who have been forcibly driven from their homes by fear of massacre or any other form of pressure since the 1st January 1914. It recognises that any immovable or movable property of the said Turkish subjects or of the communities to which they belong, which can be recovered must be restored to them as soon as possible in whatever hands it may be found. Such property shall be restored free of all charges or servitudes with which it may have been burdened and without compensation of any kind to the present owners or occupiers, subject to any action which they may be able to bring against the persons from whom they derived title.

Article 178 is modified as follows:

For the purpose of guaranteeing the freedom of the Straits, the High Contracting Parties agree to the following provisions:

(1) Within three months of the coming into force of the present treaty, all works, fortifications and batteries within the zone defined in article 179 and comprising the coast and islands of the Sea of Marmora and the coast of the Straits, also those in the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, Tenedos and shall be disarmed and demolished.

The reconstruction of these works and the construction of similar works are forbidden in the said zone and islands.

France, Great Britain and Italy shall have the right to prepare for demolition any existing roads and railways in the said zone and in the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace and Tenedos which allow of the rapid transport of mobile batteries.

The construction of such roads and railways in the said zone is forbidden. The islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace and Tenedos must not be undertaken except with the authority of the three Powers mentioned above.

(2) The measures prescribed in the first paragraph of (1) shall be executed by and at the expense of Greece and Turkey as regards their respective territories, and under control as provided in article 200.

(3) The territories of the zone and of the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, Tenedos and Mytilene shall not be used for military purposes except by the three Allied Powers referred to above, acting in concert. This

of Greek and Turkish gendarmerie, who will be under the Inter Allied command of the forces of occupation, in accordance with the provisions of article 161, nor the maintenance of a garrison of Greek troops in the island of Mytilene nor the presence in the said zone of the Sultan's bodyguard referred to in article 152.

Section 4 of article 178 begins as follows:—

The said Powers, acting in concert, shall have, &c."

In the seventh line of article 302 concerning the currency in which certain debts shall be credited the Allied Powers have had to take into consideration the claims of certain foreign officials in Turkish service before the war. A phrase providing for the payment must be added. The complete sentence will read as follows:—

Debts, other than the Ottoman Public Debt provided for in article 236 and Annex I of Part VIII (Financial Clauses) of the present treaty, between the Turkish Government or its nationals resident in Turkish territory on the coming into force of the present treaty (with the exception of Turkish companies controlled by Allied groups or nationals) on the one hand, and the Governments of the Allied Powers or their nationals who were not on the 1st August, 1914,

Turkish nationals or (except in the case of foreign officials in Turkish service in regard to their salaries, pensions or official remuneration) resident or carrying on business in Turkish territory on the other hand.

Lastly, the Allied Powers reserve, until the signature of the treaty, the right to make in the Annex of the Financial Clauses (page 93 of the text of the treaty) any rectification of the figures shown to be necessary by a verification at present in progress.

E 8545 3 44

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon — Received July 20

Constantinople, July 2, 1920
I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a report on the situation in Cilicia, which was obtained by my representative at Smyrna from a former Intelligence Agent who had recently returned from that

J. de ROBECQ
High Commissioner

Constantinople

Smyrna, June 5, 1920

THE following information has been received from a former Intelligence Agent just returned from Mersina and Adana. He was considered intelligent and reliable while employed by us and is known to me.

The French Administration is quite incapable of dealing with the situation in Cilicia. They have been driven to the coast towns, and it is considered that they will be unable to hold Tarsus. As far back as the beginning of April 1920, the French Administration officially informed Christian communities that he would be unable to defend Cilicia and advised them to procure arms and ammunition and defend themselves. As a result all the population is armed with old French, Russian and Italian rifles, and apparently the only thing which prevents the Turkish bands from entering Adana and Mersina is the threat of a massacre of the Turkish inhabitants of those towns at the hands of the Christians.

2. The French are unable to assure railway communication between Adana, Mersina and Alexandretta.

From Mersina 300 yards of the rails have been removed by bands and it is impossible to replace them. This spot is 4 kilom. out of the French trenches. Four engines have been destroyed between Alexandretta and Mersina and two armoured trains destroyed.

3. Last month the bands cut the Mersina water supply 2 or 4 miles out of the town. The French made several attempts to repair it, and on the last occasion sent a detachment 200 strong, which was cut off and only saved by the "Ernest-Rena" opening fire on the Turkish positions. Later the Turks informed the mayor of Mersina that they would allow him to repair it if the French were not sent, and in effect allowed forty of the inhabitants to make the necessary repairs.

4. A French force about 800 strong has been cut off at Bozanti and three attempts have been made to relieve it. It has been surrounded by a quantity more than half-a-dozen times from Tarsus, and its retreat was followed by a quantity of burning whistles in derision.

The French Administration is hopelessly corrupt, anti-British, anti-Armenian and anti-Syrian. Complaints are specially directed against Colonel Brémont, Filacier, chief of police at Mersina, Battiguer, custom-house inspector at Mersina, Jemil Turkmen, a Syrian. The whole of these officials are alleged to be engaged simply in feathering their own nests. (These names are phonetically spelt, as I have no means of ascertaining the exact spelling.)

6. On his journey to Smyrna by the Italian steamer "Carniola" informant obtained indirectly from a Kemalist captain the following information relative to the Adalia district.

7. The Italians supply arms and ammunition to the Kemalists, with whom they have the most friendly relations.

8. About the 18th May a French general and colonel from Adalia went in a car provided by Mustafa Kemal to confer with him at Angora. As a result presumably of these negotiations, Mustafa Kemal sent a wireless message to Adalia on the 1st June announcing that a ten days' truce had been concluded with the French, the latter to withdraw to Mersina and finally from the country. This information informant communicated with considerable reserve.

9. On the 27th May an Italian general arrived from Rhodes with Muhtar Bey, ex-Turkish Minister at Athens, and Rustem Bey, ex-Ambassador at Washington, both of whom were helped by the Italians to escape from Constantinople on its occupation by us, and proceeded up-country.

I have, &c.
L. M. DE ROBECK,
High Commissioner.

[E 8550/3.44]

No. 49

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 968.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a report, dated the 23rd June, which I have received from my representative at Samsoun relative to the situation in that district.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 49

Intelligence Officer, Samsoun, to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck

(No. 968.)

Sir,

Samsoun, June 20, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to report that a strong anti-Armenian propaganda has been circulated here, all of a threatening nature, have greatly alarmed the Christian communities, especially since the new order has been enforced that no Ottoman Christian (male or female) was to be allowed to leave for Constantinople. There are now here in Samsoun nearly fifty Armenian families, lately arrived from the Interior, all waiting to leave. Their condition will soon become desperate.

2. Reports received from Amassia, Tokat, and especially the Erbaa district, all state that there is a complete lack of security. Fighting has taken place near Erbaa owing to a band of Turks raiding a Greek mill (120 in the band). The Greeks have made reprisal raids on Turkish villages.

3. I beg to point out that the present aggressive attitude of the Turk is entirely based on promised Bolshevik support, and they admit that if this fails them they cannot possibly offer any further resistance and will have to accept the peace terms as they are.

I have, &c.

J. S. PERRING, Captain.

[E 8554 3 44]

No. 50

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 968.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, July 6, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of an account, dated the 3rd July, which I have received from Mr. Daniel T. Eby, a Canadian missionary who left Hadjin on the 13th June, relative to the siege of that town by the Nationalist forces.

I have, &c.

L. M. DE ROBECK,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 50

Account by Mr. D. T. Eby of the Siege of Hadjin.

MR. DANIEL T. EBY, a Canadian missionary, who has been working in Asia Minor, has just arrived in Constantinople from Hadjin, via Karaman, Samsoun, and Amassia.

Mr. Eby, who is married, with his wife and two children, Miss K. Eby, Miss L. Eby, Miss A. Eby, and Miss S. Eby, were in Hadjin when it was besieged at the end of March, but from the 5th April their compound, which is outside the town, was within the Turkish lines. On the 9th June the Armenians in Hadjin, feeling themselves in danger, owing to Turkish threats, made a dash for the town. These included 300 orphans in American charge and the Armenians in Hadjin under American care.

There were about 6,000 to 7,000 Armenians in Hadjin, of whom about 1,000 were armed. When Mr. Eby left Hadjin on the 15th June they had still provisions for about 10 days.

The besieging force at Hadjin was composed of the 1st and 2nd Divisions of the "Daghan" Division. But of late there have been numerous desertions and the besieging force is much reduced. They have machine guns, two 60 mm. guns and one 125 centim. gun, but this artillery fire did very little damage. A very serious attempt to storm the town was made about the beginning of May, and was beaten off with loss.

At the time Mr. Eby was in Hadjin the Turkish forces were no longer in hand. The leaders therefore decided to leave Hadjin and have their headquarters at Karaman. They left on the 15th June for Karaman.

With regard to Hadjin, the situation seemed hopeless. The Armenians still looked for help from the West, but they had been disappointed. They were determined to fight to the last. The prospect of their making terms with the Nationalists was very small, especially since the departure of the missionaries, who were completely if they take it.

Mr. Eby stated that the Nationalist system was not popular with the Turkish population. They resented having to furnish men, money and material, and Mustafa Kemal was regarded as actuated by motives of personal ambition rather than by patriotic feeling. At Karaman itself the movement had not received the support of the people, but Everek and Nigde were very Nationalist, and served as headquarters for operations against Cilicia.

[E 8557 3 44]

No. 51

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 982)

My Lord

WITH reference to your telegram of the 17th inst. regarding the withdrawal of all Allied officers and agents from your Lordship's jurisdiction, I have the honour to inform you that my representative at Samosoun, to return to Constantinople, will embark in H.M.S. "Daedalus" and visit all the islands and Baza before returning.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBEEK
High Commissioner

E 8565 3 44

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 982)

My Lord,

Constantinople, July 8, 1920

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I have received from Ottoman sources the enclosed list of persons alleged to have been recently hanged by the Nationalists in the area east of Imdid.

The list includes twenty-five names, of which all but one are of Moslems, besides thirty-nine persons not named. A list of the Entente libérale Party.

It is desirable to bring this report to the notice of your Lordship, of the Nationalists towards those who stand for law and order and for obedience to the legally constituted Central Government. Beyond doubt also, the Nationalist movement has been exacerbated by the consideration that those persons had associated themselves with a policy of loyalty to the Allies and to Great Britain in particular.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBEEK
High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 51

List of Persons recently Hanged by the Nationalists at various Towns east of Imdid

EXEMPT of Bolou, Hadji Vahan Effendi, founder of the Entente libérale Party

Hadji Zade Hadji Hamdi Effendi, president of Bolou branch of Entente libérale

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 20.)

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Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 20.)

[E 8647 4504 44]

No. 53

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 20.)

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 20.)

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 20.)

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 20.)

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 20.)

E 8688 56 44

No. 54

Mr. Vansittart to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 22)

(No. 66.)

Mr. VANSITTART presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and, with reference to his despatch No. 64 of the 17th July, has the honour to transmit the accompanying two copies of the text of the Turkish notes of the 25th June and 24th July which have now been printed by the Turkish delegation to the Peace Conference.

Copies are also enclosed of the actual text of the Turkish note of the 6th July.

As the Constantinople bag is no longer in receipt of copies of the Turkish note of the 8th July, I have sent direct from the Turkish delegation a copy of the same.

Paris, July 20, 1920

Enclosure 1 in No. 54

Turkish Delegation to the Peace Conference

M. le Président

Le 8 juillet 1920

VOTRE Excellence n'ignore pas que le délai accordé à la délégation ottomane pour présenter ses observations au projet de traité avait, par suite du retard des Alliés à Constantinople, expiré avant le retour à Paris des délégués qui s'étaient rendus à Constantinople à l'effet d'obtenir de leur Gouvernement l'approbation de l'ensemble du projet de réponse dont ils étaient porteurs. C'est devant l'expiration de ce délai que la délégation ottomane se vit dans la nécessité de présenter à la Conférence, et avant le retour des délégués, un exposé succinct contenant les observations que le Gouvernement ottoman avait à formuler.

Or, la délégation, qui se trouve à l'heure actuelle en possession de toutes les dispositions du projet de réponse, a l'honneur de porter celui-ci à la connaissance de la Conférence.

Il est certain que la Conférence faillirait au devoir qu'elle s'est imposée de ne accomplir que ce qui est juste et équitable, en s'abstenant d'entendre toute la défense de ceux au sujet desquels elle a à prononcer un verdict présentant un tel caractère de gravité.

Il est évident que les observations complémentaires qui sont soumises à la Conférence faciliteront dans une large mesure la discussion des dispositions d'un projet modifié sur ces bases.

Vous ne manquerez pas de constater dans ces documents que pour assurer une paix solide et durable, le Gouvernement ottoman est disposé à accepter les conditions qui sont proposées.

Comme un gage de succès, j'aime à croire que les intentions conciliatrices dont le Gouvernement ottoman vient de donner incontestablement la preuve, et qu'elle accorde à la délégation toute faculté de développer sa thèse et de faire valoir ses arguments, ne paraissent pas être susceptibles de modification.

Veillez agréer, &c.
A. RECHID

Et closure 2 in No. 54

PARTIE I.—PACTE DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS.

LE Gouvernement ottoman, tout en réitérant qu'il accepte les principes de droit qui forment l'essence même du Pacte de la Société des Nations, se permet d'exposer aux Puissances alliées les considérations suivantes.

D'après le projet de traité remis à la délégation ottomane, la Société des Nations serait appelée à intervenir pour le règlement de nombreuses questions concernant la Turquie. Elle serait chargée notamment

1. De procéder à la solution de toutes contestations qui viendraient à s'élever entre les Puissances relativement aux dispositions de la Section concernant les Détroits, dans le cas où la décision de la Commission à ce sujet ne serait pas acceptée par une Puissance (article 61).

De prescrire des mesures pour faciliter l'émigration volontaire des personnes qui désireraient exercer le droit d'option (article 127).

3. De nommer des Commissions arbitrales chargées de connaître des réclamations de certains ressortissants ottomans (article 144).

4. De résoudre les conflits pouvant surgir entre la Turquie et les Puissances alliées au sujet de la remise en vigueur des conventions ou traités (article 157).

De désigner une commission arbitrale chargée soit d'examiner les réclamations des ressortissants alliés relativement à leurs biens, droits et intérêts (article 287), soit de réviser les jugements rendus ou les mesures d'exécution ordonnées par une autorité judiciaire ou administrative ottomane contre ou au préjudice des intérêts des ressortissants alliés (article 307).

Le droit d'intervention reconnu à la Société des Nations en vue de statuer soit sur les matières susénumérées, soit sur d'autres questions prévues par le projet de traité, peut que justifier la présence à l'assemblée d'un représentant délégué par le Gouvernement ottoman. La présence d'un représentant turc serait surtout indispensable lors de la discussion d'une question intéressant au même degré la Turquie et un État membre de la Société des Nations, étant donné que ce dernier aura son représentant à l'assemblée.

Il y a lieu d'observer en outre que la Turquie privée de son projet de traité de paix, et de ses territoires, est bien en droit de réclamer la protection des dispositions de l'article 10 qui garantissent contre toute agression extérieure l'intégrité territoriale et l'indépendance politique des États membres les plus faibles.

En raison des considérations qui précèdent, la Turquie demande à être admise dès à présent à la Société des Nations.

PARTIE II.—FRONTIÈRES DE LA TURQUIE

Étant données que les dispositions des différentes sections du Traité de Paix concernant les cessions territoriales demandées à la Turquie soit en faveur de quelques-unes des Puissances alliées, soit en faveur de la Turquie elle-même, et que, d'après les observations spéciales, le Gouvernement ottoman a fait connaître ses vues sur la présente partie.

PARTIE III

Section IV

Compléter le paragraphe 2, de la page 24, concernant Sinyrne, de la manière suivante :

"Le Gouvernement ottoman demande en conséquence le retrait des troupes helléniques de la région de Sinyrne et le retour au droit."

Il est évident que les droits des minorités comme dans le reste du territoire ottoman. Si ces garanties venaient à être jugées insuffisantes, la Turquie a le droit de demander que la gendarmerie ottomane qui s'y trouve, tout en étant soumise à la surveillance des Puissances alliées, soit placée sous le commandement d'un officier d'un État neutre soit chargé de collaborer avec le Gouverneur général en vue d'assurer l'ordre public et la sécurité dans le vilayet. Le Gouvernement ottoman ne peut faire preuve de sa meilleure volonté admettrait comme une alternative à la garantie de l'occupation de Sinyrne pendant la même période de trois ans par les principales Puissances alliées, occupation qui, tout en constituant une garantie contre la survenance de troubles entre les éléments turcs et grecs devant disparaître les Puissances de l'occupation provisoire de quelque autre partie du territoire ottoman, ne résulterait de l'article 236, pour assurer l'exécution du Traité de Paix."

Ajouter, page 21, à la fin de la Section "Thrace," l'alinéa suivant :

"Le Gouvernement ottoman croit en outre de son devoir de faire appel aux sentiments de justice des grandes Puissances alliées pour l'octroi d'un régime de mandat sous le mandat d'une des principales Puissances à la Thrace occidentale qui est incontestablement turque."

Section VII

Ajouter le préambule suivant à la page 28 (Syrie et Mésopotamie) :

"Le Gouvernement ottoman rappelle que le principe de l'autodétermination des peuples, principe qui est reconnu unanimement par les Puissances alliées et amies, la Turquie renonce à partir de la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix à ses droits de souveraineté sur les territoires sis en dehors du Hedjaz et habités par les Arabes."

En ce qui concerne les frontières de la Syrie et de la Mésopotamie, le Gouvernement ottoman fait les observations suivantes :

Ajouter à la fin de la même page :

"Il va sans dire que les charges financières et autres de la Turquie que la Syrie, la Mésopotamie et le Hedjaz ne sauraient supporter en raison de leur indépendance seront supportées par la Turquie."

Section VIII

"Le Gouvernement ottoman demande également la modification de l'article 116 dans ce sens que les navires, marchandises et personnes ressortissants de la Turquie jouissent, au point de vue commercial, sur le territoire du Hedjaz, du même traitement que celui accordé aux navires, marchandises et personnes ressortissants des États membres de la Société des Nations."

Pour les charges financières, le Gouvernement ottoman se réfère aux observations qu'il a formulées relativement à la Section VII.

Section IX.—Égypte, Soudan, Chypre.

Le Gouvernement ottoman en se conformant au principe de la libre disposition des peuples unanimement admis par les Puissances alliées renonce à partir de la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix à ses droits et titres sur la Égypte. Il déclare qu'en conformité avec ce principe et avec l'action prise par les principales Puissances alliées, il reconnaît le protectorat établi par la Grande-Bretagne sur ce pays. Il renonce en faveur de la Grande-Bretagne aux pouvoirs conférés à Sa Majesté impériale le Sultan par la Convention de Constantinople du 30 octobre 1888 relativement à la libre navigation du Canal de Suez. Il déclare avoir pris connaissance et donner acte de la convention conclue par le Gouvernement britannique avec le Gouvernement égyptien régissant le statut et l'administration du Soudan de 1889-1899.

Pour ce qui est de l'article 104, qui stipule que l'Égypte et les ressortissants égyptiens ainsi que leurs biens et leurs navires seront traités à partir du 1^{er} août 1914, sur le même pied que les Puissances alliées et leurs ressortissants ainsi que leurs biens et leurs navires, le Gouvernement ottoman demande le remplacement de cette date par celle de la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix et la fixation d'un délai pendant lequel lesdites personnes, biens et navires jouiront de ce traitement sous condition de

Il demande aussi que le dernier membre de phrase de cet article soit amendé de façon à lui donner la liquidation des biens, droits et intérêts des sujets ottomans sur les territoires détachés de la Turquie, lesquels sont exemptés de la liquidation en vertu des dispositions du Traité de Paix.

L'article d'option prévu par l'article 105 étant insuffisant, le Gouvernement ottoman demande que les personnes qui auront acquis la nationalité égyptienne puissent pour la nationalité ottomane au moins pendant une période de deux ans à partir de la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix.

L'article 106, qui crée une situation très inférieure pour les Turcs en Égypte, doit être modifié de manière à y réserver aux sujets ottomans en matière de séjour et d'établissement un traitement conforme aux règles du droit international général sur la base de réciprocité.

L'article 108, relatif au traitement à accorder aux marchands égyptiens en Turquie, est à compléter en y spécifiant un délai ainsi que la condition de réciprocité.

Le Gouvernement ottoman demande que l'article 1, relatif au bien et propriété appartenant au Gouvernement ottoman en Égypte, soit amendé dans le sens des observations présentées à l'occasion de l'article 24.

En ce qui concerne l'article 3, le Gouvernement ottoman demande que les traités portant la signature du Gouvernement ottoman, qui se rapportent aux emprunts turcs garantis par le tribut d'Égypte soient retirés de la circulation et rendus au Gouvernement ottoman.

Le Gouvernement ottoman reconnaît à partir de la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix l'annexion de Chypre par le Gouvernement britannique. Il demande, relativement à l'article 1, que les habitants de Chypre, en vertu du traité acquièrent la nationalité britannique.

naissance et de domicile qui semble avoir été adopté pour les habitants de Chypre, tout en étant en opposition avec le principe de domicile admis par le Traité de Paix en général pour les territoires détachés de la Turquie. Il offre des inconvénients. C'est ainsi que les biens des Ottomans établis dans les territoires restant sous la souveraineté ottomane auraient acquis la nationalité britannique fait d'être né dans l'île de Chypre, ce qui donnerait lieu à la pratique

Section X.—Maroc, Tunisie.

En se référant aux observations présentées relativement à l'Égypte, le Gouvernement ottoman reconnaît le protectorat de la France sur le Maroc et la Tunisie. Il demande pourtant que la reconnaissance faisant l'objet des articles 119 et 120 prennent date de la mise en vigueur du traité et qu'un délai soit fixé pour le traitement qui sera accordé à charge de réciprocité aux marchandises marocaines et tunisiennes en Turquie.

Section XI.—Libye et Îles de la Mer Égée.

En conformité avec les mêmes observations auxquelles se réfèrent les considérations formulées relativement à la Section X, le Gouvernement ottoman renonce à tous ses

droits et privilèges sur la Libye ainsi que sur les îles de la mer Égée, savoir : Stas alia, Kios, Laka, Souda, Kasos, Psaros, Mios, Céos, Ios, Patmos, Lépante, Simi, Cos, Castellorizo et les îlots qui en dépendent.

Section XII.—Nationalité.

Le Gouvernement ottoman demande que les délais d'option prévus aux articles 124 et 125 soient portés à deux ans.

Le Gouvernement ottoman pourrait reconnaître la nouvelle nationalité qui aurait été acquise par ses ressortissants dans les conditions prévues à l'article 138 avant la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix, pourvu qu'ils transportent leur domicile dans le pays de l'État dont ils ont acquis la nationalité. Les personnes qui quitteraient ainsi le Gouvernement ottoman demandent la modification de cet article dans le sens qui

Section XIII.—Traité de Paix.

En ce qui concerne l'article 132, le Gouvernement ottoman, en se référant aux observations qu'il a présentées, relativement aux Sections VII, IX et X, renonce à ses droits sur et concernant tout territoire situé hors d'Europe et n'étant l'objet d'aucune autre attribution en vertu du Traité de Paix.

La Turquie étant résolue à prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires afin d'assurer une justice aussi parfaite que possible aux habitants de la Turquie sans distinction de race, de nationalité et de religion, il est prêt à donner à cet effet toutes les garanties compatibles avec ses droits souverains. Sous le bénéfice de cette réserve, le Gouvernement ottoman déclare admettre la constitution d'une commission composée des délégués de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France, de l'Italie ainsi que des délégués de la Turquie d'Égypte égal à celui des membres étrangers. Cette commission sera chargée de préparer un projet destiné à remplacer le régime des capitulations existant en Turquie. Le projet qui devra se réunir dans les deux mois après la signature du Traité de Paix, devra présenter son rapport dans un délai de six mois au plus tard.

Dans le cas où le projet de réforme ainsi préparé après avoir été approuvé par le Gouvernement ottoman, le serait également par les principales Puissances susmentionnées, il sera immédiatement mis en vigueur.

Les dispositions de ce projet de réforme, en ce qui concerne les points sur lesquels l'accord ne serait pas établi seront soumis à la décision d'une commission arbitrale neutre désignée par la Société des Nations.

Dès la mise en application du projet des réformes, le régime des capitulations en matière judiciaire sera définitivement aboli.

L'article 137, qui a pour objet d'assurer l'amnistie du Gouvernement ottoman et des personnes qui se seraient compromises vis-à-vis de la Turquie, ne s'applique qu'à ceux qui sont détachés ne pourra être poursuivi par les États contre lesquels il aurait commis des actes de même nature, ce qui semble d'ailleurs être admis jusqu'à un certain point par l'article 138.

Le Gouvernement ottoman demande la suppression de l'article 139, qui, ayant rapport à des questions du domaine exclusif du Chérat, n'aurait pas sa raison d'être dans un acte politique international.

PARTIE IV.—PROTECTION DES MINORITÉS

Les dispositions de cette partie du traité ont des portées tellement générales qu'elles impliquent la création d'un État dans l'État et rendent impossible toute action gouvernementale.

En ce qui concerne les privilèges accordés aux communautés non musulmanes en Turquie, il est prêt à leur reconnaître encore sur les droits prévus par les Traitements de Saint Germain ou de Neuilly à l'égard des minorités, soit ceux qui seraient adoptés par la Société des Nations ou par une autre institution juridique internationale pour les minorités en général de tous les autres pays, à condition que les mêmes droits soient appliqués en même temps en faveur des minorités musulmanes résidant sur les territoires des États balkaniques et de l'Arménie.

d'assurer qu'aucune pression ne soit exercée par les communautés religieuses sur les convertis. Aussi le Gouvernement ottoman propose-t-il que les plaintes formulées à ce sujet, tant par les musulmans que par les non-musulmans, soient aussi examinées par une commission neutre désignée par la Société des Nations. (Article 142.)

En ce qui concerne l'article 143, relatif à l'émigration des minorités, le Gouvernement ottoman propose que les mesures prises par le Gouvernement grec en 1919 entre la Grèce et la Bulgarie

soient appliquées à l'émigration que l'identité des personnes prétendant être grecs ou turcs soit établie par des commissions neutres désignées par la Société des Nations.

Les biens qui pourront être retrouvés et qui sont la propriété des Arméniens leurs biens appartenant aux Grecs émigrés de la Turquie correspondant aux biens en Grèce par le Gouvernement hellénique et au échange

Gouvernement ottoman et le Gouvernement hellénique, leur retour aux Grecs de la restitution des biens de Turcs en Grèce.

Sur les travaux de reconstruction, le Gouvernement ottoman demande la suppression de la clause relative à la restitution des biens de Turcs en Grèce.

Le Gouvernement ottoman déclare que des poursuites légales seront engagées contre toute personne qui sera reconnue avoir pris une part active à des massacres ou expulsions. Mais il demande des mesures qui ne seraient compatibles avec les lois, la disposition de biens, sont abandonnées. A cette occasion le Gouvernement ottoman a le devoir de prier instamment

de 1914 dans les Balkans

Par rapport au No. 3 de ce même article, le Gouvernement ottoman accepte que tous biens et propriétés ayant appartenu à des membres d'une communauté, décédés ou disparus sans laisser d'héritiers entre les dates du décret d'expulsion et de l'armistice dans les localités où des mesures ont été appliquées, soient vendus conformément aux règles en vigueur et les prix en soient délivrés aux communautés intéressées.

Le No. 4 devrait être modifié comme suit

Tous actes de vente ou constitution de droits sur la propriété immobilière des Arméniens, entre les dates du décret d'expulsion et de l'armistice, pourront être annulés. La Commission arbitrale pourra décréter également l'annulation de tous actes de vente et de droits conclus après la guerre mais avant l'expulsion, ou bien après l'expulsion, si elle a la conviction que ces actes sont le fruit d'une

En ce qui concerne les clauses militaires du projet de traité, le Gouvernement ottoman croit devoir soumettre à l'appréciation de la Conférence de la Paix les observations suivantes

1. Il est de toute nécessité d'appliquer sur toute l'étendue de la Turquie, y compris Constantinople, une organisation militaire uniforme.

2. L'effectif total fixé par l'article 155 pour la force armée ainsi que pour les forces destinées à maintenir l'ordre public est loin de répondre aux besoins du pays pour les raisons suivantes

(a.) Le fait, d'une part, que les populations de la Turquie sont pour la plupart disséminées dans des villages éloignés les uns des autres et une partie de ces populations vit en état nomade, et d'autre part, la rareté des moyens de communications, rendent dans toute l'étendue du pays l'application des mesures de police.

Or, le Gouvernement ottoman a assumé une grande responsabilité en ce qui concerne le maintien de l'ordre à l'intérieur de l'Empire. Notamment, l'accomplissement de son devoir qui lui incombe quant à la protection des minorités implique nécessairement l'entretien à chaque point du pays de puissantes troupes de gendarmerie.

Il est hors de doute que la présence même d'une force armée prête à agir constitue déjà en elle-même un des moyens préventifs les plus efficaces contre le désordre. Il va sans dire que le cas contraire produirait naturellement un effet opposé.

(b.) L'étendue des frontières et du littoral de la Turquie atteint à plus de 9,000 kilomètres. Une partie des populations des pays limitrophes de la Turquie, ainsi que celles des îles de l'Archipel, ont l'habitude d'exercer la contrebande. C'est par la contrebande que les munitions et tout matériel de guerre, produits d'une industrie n'existant pas dans le pays, sont introduits en Turquie.

Indépendamment de ces considérations le fait d'être voisin de tribus nomades et des pays nouvellement constitués, dont les forces régulières n'ont pas encore atteint le degré de perfectionnement voulu, met le Gouvernement impérial dans l'impossibilité presque de remplir la tâche ardue de maintenir l'ordre et la tranquillité sur le littoral et sur tous les confins de ses territoires.

(c.) Il est en outre nécessaire à la Turquie d'avoir des légions spéciales chargées de renforcer, en cas de besoin, l'action de la gendarmerie, de surveiller et de protéger les lignes de chemin de fer et des grandes entreprises industrielles telles que les mines, etc.

Pour toutes ces considérations, nous proposons à la Conférence de modifier l'article 152 dans le sens que voici

Autoriser la Turquie à avoir

Des troupes de gendarmerie destinées à assurer l'ordre et la sécurité publiques à l'intérieur.

2. Des contingents chargés de surveiller et garder les frontières et le littoral

3. Une force armée destinée à renforcer l'action de la gendarmerie en cas de troubles graves et de concourir avec la gendarmerie à assurer la sécurité publique dans le pays

Nous sollicitons, pour les raisons ci-haut indiquées, la révision du paragraphe 15.

Autoriser la Turquie à posséder

1. Une force de gendarmerie de 61,000 hommes

2. Un corps de 15,000 hommes composé de différentes armes, à l'effet de surveiller le littoral et les frontières.

3. Une force armée de 40,000 hommes composée de différentes classes militaires et pourvue de batteries lourdes et légères.

Si l'on se conformait au système adopté en Italie en ce qui concerne l'emploi d'un gendarme pour chaque 2 1/2 k.m., il faudrait dès lors que la Turquie se servit de plus de 80,000 gendarmes. Tandis que la grande distance qui sépare un village de l'autre, ainsi que l'absence de moyens de communications en Turquie sont de nature à rendre ce chiffre insuffisant pour le maintien de l'ordre sur toute l'étendue du pays.

Quant à la garde des frontières ottomanes, il ne sera pas exagéré de demander pour ce service un effectif de 15,000 gardes-frontières. On considère surtout qu'il a été accordé à la Bulgarie, dont le littoral et les frontières dépassent pas 1,200 kilomètres, un contingent de 3,000 hommes à cet effet.

Il est aussi de toute équité que la Turquie bénéficie en ce qui concerne les renforts destinés à la gendarmerie du même traitement accordé à d'autres Etats voisins. Les exigences locales sont là pour parler en faveur de ce traitement.

D'autre part, le grand quartier général de l'armée britannique de la mer Noire, qui est établi à Constantinople depuis l'armistice, a, après un examen de la situation générale du pays, admis en faveur de la gendarmerie les formations militaires chargées de maintenir l'ordre et la tranquillité publiques sur les bases suivantes

10,000	soldats d'infanterie,
4,409	de mitrailleuses.
6,000	d'artillerie.
3,033	de cavalerie
2,240	de génie
	de télégraphie.
	de transport.
	de sapeurs et de montagne.
	de calibre moyen
	lourds.

La répartition des troupes de gendarmerie sur le territoire de la Turquie, devise à cet effet en régions territoriales comme il est prévu aux articles 156, 159 et 160, portera atteinte à l'unité de service si nécessaire au bon fonctionnement et à la discipline des troupes. Les restrictions apportées au déplacement de corps ou de régiments d'une région à une autre, elles sont de nature à entraver le bon fonctionnement des troupes de gendarmerie. Les troupes de gendarmerie de la Turquie sont plus propres à servir de base pour la distribution des effectifs de gendarmerie en régions territoriales différentes, et de distribuer les officiers affectés aux services de gendarmerie en nationalités distinctes sur la base de région territoriale ainsi qu'il est prévu aux articles 159 et 160, le système suivant sera adopté :

La tâche d'organiser et d'instruire : (1) les troupes de gendarmerie, (2) les contingents de la police du littoral et des frontières, les contingents de la force armée et les forces maritimes; (3) la police, doit être dévolue respectivement à une mission engagée au service du Gouvernement ottoman et placée sous le commandement d'un général, mission qui sera désignée exclusivement par une des trois grandes Puissances étrangères qui seront au service d'une de ces trois catégories d'organisation et dont l'effectif ne devra pas dépasser les 15 pour cent de l'effectif global des officiers ottomans, et sera exclusivement par l'Etat qui se chargera de cette même organisation.

Ces missions auront les attributions suivantes :

1. La mission de chaque classe, de chaque grade et de chaque fonction, et de chaque service. Cette commission aura exclusivement la charge et les attributions relevant aux commissions de contrôle et de discipline prévues aux articles 196-205 et dont nous proposons la modification comme suit :

Depuis cette modification, il n'y aura plus lieu de grever le budget du Gouvernement ottoman par la formation de différentes commissions de contrôle.

Seulement, les attributions de contrôle de la commission de discipline, de la commission de discipline militaire et de la commission de discipline civile.

Si le système qui consistait à subdiviser les charges relatives à la sécurité publique en trois organisations distinctes et de confier le soin de chacune de ces organisations séparément à l'une de ces Puissances. Quant au système proposé dans le présent article, il est le suivant :

Le système proposé par le Gouvernement ottoman assurera, d'une part, le but visé par les Puissances alliées en ce qui concerne la réorganisation et le contrôle des troupes de gendarmerie, de renfort et de police, et il maintiendra, d'autre part, l'unité de direction et de méthode d'instruction indispensable au bon fonctionnement de chacun de ces services.

1. L'effectif total des officiers étrangers ne doit pas dépasser les 15 pour cent de l'effectif total en service pour les officiers de tous grades compris le personnel des états-majors et des services et celle d'un douzième pour les sous-officiers. Or, il n'existe pas de sous-officiers incorporés en permanence dans l'armée ottomane à l'instar des armées occidentales, mais les devoirs incombant à ceux-ci sont souvent remplis dans l'armée ottomane par des officiers du grade de sous-lieutenant. Le Gouvernement ottoman propose donc de fusionner ces deux catégories d'officiers en une seule et d'en fixer la proportion à 10 pour cent de l'effectif total en service.

Le Gouvernement ottoman propose ce qui suit pour l'engagement des officiers étrangers dont les attributions ont été fixées par l'article 159 :

1. L'effectif total des officiers étrangers ne doit pas dépasser les 15 pour cent de l'effectif global des officiers ottomans.

2. Les officiers étrangers seront mis à la disposition du Gouvernement ottoman, leurs traitements seront payés par lui et ils porteront l'uniforme turc.

3. Le Gouvernement ottoman, aussitôt après la conclusion du présent traité, devra à chacune des grandes Puissances, et aux conditions stipulées par ledit traité, fournir les officiers dont il aura besoin, et, après avoir approuvé les listes d'officiers et de fonctionnaires fournies par lesdites Puissances, il les engagera à son

service par contrat pour une durée de cinq années. Ces officiers et fonctionnaires commenceront à exercer leurs fonctions dans les trois mois qui suivront la mise en vigueur du présent traité. Et le mode de leur nomination dans les différents postes de l'organisation dont ils feront partie sera fixé par le Ministère ottoman compétent, d'accord avec les Puissances alliées.

4. Le Gouvernement ottoman aura la faculté de résilier le contrat de ceux des officiers et fonctionnaires étrangers qui s'occuperaient d'autres affaires en dehors de leurs fonctions. Il aura également la faculté de maintenir entièrement ou en partie dans leurs fonctions les officiers et fonctionnaires dont les contrats auraient expiré à l'échéance des cinq premières années, ou de les remplacer par d'autres.

La suppression de l'article 160 n'impose pour les raisons ci-haut indiquées dans l'article 164, à cause de l'insuffisance absolue du délai de trois mois prévu dans le projet du traité.

L'état du budget de l'Empire ne permet pas d'accepter les dispositions des articles 164 et 165 telles qu'elles sont.

En effet, comme il est impossible, par suite de la cherté de la vie, d'allouer une pension à chaque soldat une somme inférieure à 30 livres turques par mois, le Gouvernement ottoman sera obligé de débiter annuellement de ce chef 22,000,000 de livres turques pour les troupes de gendarmerie, 3,400,000 pour les contingents chargés de la garde des frontières et des côtes, 14,400,000 pour la force armée. Il en résulte que le Trésor ottoman aura à supporter une dépense de L.T. 41,800,000 annuellement, rien que pour les dépenses militaires. D'autre part, les troupes de gendarmerie, composées des éléments possédant une éducation adéquate, une partie de ceux-ci sont fatalement composés de volontaires. Nous proposons par conséquent à la Conférence de modifier l'article précité ainsi que l'article 164 dans le sens qui va être

proposé, ainsi que les contingents chargés de la surveillance des côtes et des frontières et les effectifs de la force armée seront recrutés par voie de conscription.

La durée de service sera sans interruption douze années pour les volontaires et du même pour des conscrits; de plus, ces conscrits ne seront soumis à aucun autre service que la réserve territoriale. Ces deux catégories de services militaires seront étendues à tous les sujets ottomans sans distinction de race ni de religion, sous la réserve que la proportion numérique soit observée. Cette extension sera également appliquée aux officiers et aux sous-officiers.

Les employés et fonctionnaires chargés d'assurer la sécurité publique et mentionnés dans l'article 170 seront placés sous la surveillance de la mission ad hoc, la question de leur recrutement, de leur éducation et de leur formation, non compris les douaniers, doit être réglée sur l'avis favorable de la mission d'organisation compétente. Ce mode de procéder étant le plus apte à assurer le bon fonctionnement du service de la sécurité publique, le Gouvernement ottoman propose à la Conférence la modification dans ce sens des dispositions de l'article précité.

Le Gouvernement ottoman propose également à la Conférence de porter à un an le délai de trois mois mentionnés dans les articles 171 et 172.

En regard aux considérations qui précèdent, il y a lieu de supprimer le tableau No. 2 et d'insérer dans le tableau No. 3 les proportions relatives aux batteries lourdes, les canons de calibre moyen et ceux de campagne.

Qu'il résulte des explications ci-haut mentionnées, les modifications proposées en ce qui concerne les choses militaires consistent en ceci : (1) De renoncer à diviser le sol de la Turquie en régions territoriales pour les services de la gendarmerie, de la police et de confier l'organisation de chacun de ces services à des officiers d'une même nationalité; (2) d'augmenter enfin les effectifs de la force armée et de ce soin en rapport avec les besoins du pays. Nous proposons donc à la Conférence de modifier (y compris les révisions complémentaires) les dispositions des articles 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 159, 160, 161, 164, 165, 166, 170, 171 et celles des articles 196 à 198 et 200 à 205.

Les autres articles se référant aux clauses militaires sont acceptés.

Le Gouvernement ottoman propose le remplacement de l'article 173 par un article et de 136 du Traité de Neuilly, et demande que les armes, munitions et autres instruments ainsi que les moyens de transport qui ont été livrés jusqu'ici ou qui seront livrés conformément au présent traité, aient leur contre-valeur portée au crédit du Gouverne-

ment ottoman. Cette somme sera destinée à l'indemnisation des dommages subis par les ressortissants des Puissances alliées et le reste servira à l'amortissement de la dette

Le Gouvernement ottoman accepte l'article 199 à condition que le montant de ces frais soit déterminé d'un commun accord avec le Gouvernement ottoman

Section II — *Hauses navales.*

La Turquie doit assurer la protection et la police de ses côtes ainsi que le service des pêcheries sur plus de 6,000 kilom

L'exercice de la contrebande par les habitants des îles voisines ainsi que les cas de piraterie qui se sont produits récemment encore sur la mer Noire augmentent les difficultés de cette protection

Pour un littoral de 200 kilom, les Puissances ont reconnu la nécessité d'autoriser la Bulgarie à avoir quatre torpilleurs et six canots automobiles

Le nombre des bâtiments fixé par l'article 181, insuffisant pour un littoral vingt fois plus étendu, doit donc être augmenté. La flotte actuelle, qui ne représente pas une force militaire proprement dite, devrait donc être renforcée

Le Gouvernement ottoman demande donc la modification des dispositions de la Section II de la Partie V dans le sens des observations ci-dessus, les articles 188 et 189 devant, en outre, être modifiés dans le sens de la proposition faite pour les forces de terre

PARTIE VI. — PRISONNIERS DE GUERRE ET SÉPULTURES

Section I.

Le Gouvernement ottoman entend que l'article 210 relatif aux frais de rapatriement se réfère qu'aux frais des prisonniers ottomans

Il entend en outre devoir demander que la date portée à l'alinéa 2 de l'article 211, à savoir le 1^{er} janvier 1920, soit reportée au 1^{er} janvier 1921, c'est-à-dire jusqu'à un mois avant la signature, tandis que le projet de traité remis au Gouvernement ottoman porte cette date à une époque particulièrement reculée

Section II

En ce qui concerne la Section II relative aux sépultures, le Gouvernement ottoman ne pouvant consentir à aucune cession territoriale en Thrace et aux zones des Détroits, il demande que les mentions faites aux articles 212, 219, 220, 221, 222 et 223 du Gouvernement hellénique soit supprimées

PARTIE VII. — SANCTIONS

En se référant aux observations formulées au préambule, le Gouvernement ottoman demande que les Puissances alliées ne voudraient pas réserver aux Turcs un traitement différent de celui qu'elles consentiront à les faire bénéficier des dispositions de la Convention de Genève relative aux prisonniers de guerre. Il demande aussi que l'article 230 prévoit que les organisateurs principaux des massacres soient jugés par un tribunal à Constantinople composé de juges appartenant à des États neutres. D'autre part, l'intérêt de la justice exigeant qu'aucune distinction de race et de religion ne soit faite dans la punition des coupables, la Turquie demande que les Arméniens et les Grecs coupables d'actes criminels contre les Turcs—qu'ils se trouvent en Arménie, en Grèce ou dans d'autres pays—soient jugés par les tribunaux similaires et punis

PARTIE VIII. — CLAUSES FINALES

Le Gouvernement ottoman admet l'institution d'une commission avec mission d'exercer en contrôle sur les finances ottomanes en vue d'assurer la loyale exécution par la Turquie des obligations qui lui incombent en vertu du traité

Les compétences de cette Commission financière, qui comptera un délégué de chaque Puissance alliée, ayant les mêmes droits et attributions que ceux de ses collègues anglais, français et italiens, ainsi étendues que cela serait nécessaire au but qui la justifie

Le Gouvernement ottoman accepte également que le budget à présenter annuellement au Parlement soit en premier lieu soumis à la Commission financière, qui l'examinera avec l'assistance du Ministre ottoman des Finances. Le Parlement aura le droit d'apporter au budget, à l'exclusion toutefois des chapitres relatifs soit aux revenus affectés aux dettes ottomanes contractées avant et après la guerre, soit à ceux qui seront affectés pour les obligations financières soulevées, telles modifications qu'il jugera opportunes. Aucune modification introduite par le Parlement et ayant trait aux crédits et dépenses militaires et de police n'aura d'effet sans l'approbation de la Commission financière

Si une contestation surgissait entre ladite commission et la Turquie, le différend serait soumis à la Société des Nations

Le Gouvernement ottoman est d'ailleurs prêt à discuter les conditions dans lesquelles il serait possible d'augmenter les ressources de la Turquie, d'entente avec la Commission financière. Mais, en matière économique, celles-ci constituant une inégalité injustifiée entre les indigènes et les étrangers, ainsi qu'une grave entrave à l'amélioration de l'état des finances publiques

En conséquence, le Gouvernement ottoman demande la modification des articles 231 et 232 dans le sens qui précède

Il demande également que l'article 233, qui concerne les moyens qui seront affectés au paiement de la dette ottomane, soit remplacé par un autre qui édictera que le papier-monnaie ottoman sera partagé entre la Turquie et les Puissances alliées pour le paiement de la dette ottomane

En ce qui concerne l'article 234, le Gouvernement ottoman accepte de ne pouvoir faire aucun emprunt extérieur ou intérieur portant préjudice aux engagements financiers qu'il aurait pris vis-à-vis des principales Puissances alliées sans le consentement de la Commission financière

Le Gouvernement ottoman propose la modification du premier alinéa de l'article 235 en ce sens que le Gouvernement ottoman sera tenu de réparer pecuniairement les dommages directs causés aux ressortissants des Puissances alliées par suite des actes contraires aux règles du droit des gens, mais que la Grèce devra aussi réparer de la même façon dommages et pertes que son action injuste a causés aux ressortissants et établissements ottomans dans la région de Smyrne. Ces dommages seront fixés par des commissions arbitrales composées d'un représentant de chaque partie intéressée et présidées par un membre neutre et remettront leurs rapports dans les six mois à partir de la signature du présent traité à une haute commission qui sera désignée à cet effet par le Conseil de la Société des Nations

Le Gouvernement ottoman demande également l'insertion à cet article d'un alinéa relatif aux dommages causés aux ressortissants et sociétés des Puissances alliées dans les territoires soumis à l'occupation de ces Puissances

Il demande, d'autre part, la suppression du second alinéa relatif aux réparations qui seront dues à la Commission du Danube

Le Gouvernement ottoman ne saurait assumer le paiement des frais d'occupation après l'armistice des territoires restant ottomans ni ceux des territoires détachés de la Turquie

Quant aux frais des forces d'occupation qui pourraient être maintenues après la conclusion de la paix le Gouvernement ottoman ne saurait émettre aucun avis avant que le nombre des troupes, les régions et la durée d'occupation soient limitativement fixés

Il propose que l'emprunt intérieur ottoman, dont l'article 237 demande l'annulation de la garantie, soit assimilé aux autres dettes de l'État, et que cet article soit modifié dans le sens de l'application de cet emprunt aux dispositions de l'article 242

Le Gouvernement ottoman ne saurait accepter l'article 239, qui porte préjudice à la dignité et aux droits souverains de l'État

Le Gouvernement ottoman propose la modification de l'article 240 dans le sens des articles correspondants des Traités de Paix conclus avec l'Allemagne, l'Autriche et la Bulgarie. Ainsi il demande que la contre-valeur des biens de l'État, de Sa Majesté l'Impératrice le Sultan, de la Ligne civile et des membres de la Famille impériale, dans tous les territoires détachés de la Turquie, soit en vertu du présent traité, soit à la suite de la guerre balkanique, de même que diverses créances de l'État, soient portées au crédit de la Turquie déduites du montant de ses dettes

Le Gouvernement ottoman demande que l'article 241, qui traite de la répartition de la dette publique ottomane, soit modifié de manière que, au lieu du système d'annuités, soit appliqué celui de capitalisation; au lieu du terme "dette publique" soit employé le terme de "dettes" comme les autres traités; que les Etats balkaniques soient obligés à payer, avec les intérêts moratoires, les parts qu'ils doivent payer en vertu des traités de Berlin et de Thessalie; que, comme conséquence de la suppression du système d'annuités, les clauses relatives aux garanties de ces annuités soient

Le traité doit aussi préciser la participation à la Dette publique ottomane de ces territoires quels qu'ils soient qui ont été détachés de la Turquie depuis le traité de Berlin et de tous ceux qui seraient détachés par le présent traité.

L'article 242, précisant les dettes à répartir, traite seulement des dettes gagées. Il doit être libellé de façon à comprendre toutes les dettes de l'Etat. Le second paragraphe doit être libellé comme suit: "Les dettes existantes le 1^{er} novembre 1914 devront être prises en considération pour la répartition entre la Turquie et les Etats de la péninsule balkanique et celles existantes à la date de la conclusion du présent traité pour la répartition entre la Turquie et les territoires nouvellement détachés de celle-ci. Il faut de plus que les parts revenant aux Etats cessionnaires soient fixées, dans un délai de trois mois à partir de la signature du traité par une commission de délégués de la France, de l'Angleterre, de l'Italie, de la Dette publique ottomane et du Gouvernement ottoman, que les parts revenant, d'après les Traités de Berlin et de Thessalie, à la Serbie, à la Grèce et au Monténégro soient fixées de la même manière,

et que les parts revenant aux territoires cédés soient calculées, à partir de la signature desdits traités, jusqu'à trois mois après la signature du présent traité, et qu'après ces trois mois la Turquie soit libérée tant du montant de ces parts que de leurs intérêts.

Pour la détermination de la quote-part à payer par chaque Etat, le Gouvernement ottoman propose le système combiné tel qu'il est défini dans le compte rendu de la Commission financière des Affaires étrangères (voir page 311 des procès-verbaux des séances des Comités, première session). Ainsi les systèmes de la proportionnalité et de spécialisation, des gages seront combinés de telle sorte que le premier servira de minimum à la contribution de la dette ottomane.

Par suite de la suppression du système des annuités, les articles 244 et 245 n'auraient plus leur raison d'être.

Le Gouvernement ottoman propose la suppression du premier alinéa de l'article 246, d'après lequel les droits conférés au Gouvernement par le décret de Mouharem sont transférés à la Commission financière, ainsi que la modification du deuxième alinéa dans le sens du maintien, comme jusqu'ici, du délégué ottoman à la Dette publique.

Les alinéas 1, 4, 5, 6 seront également supprimés.

Le Gouvernement ottoman accepte le transfert à la Commission financière de ses droits sur l'indemnité de Tripoli, à condition que celle-ci soit destinée à l'amortissement de ses dettes. Le fonds de réserve devraient être maintenus. Il demande en conséquence la modification de l'article 249.

Le Gouvernement ottoman accepte l'article 251 à la condition expresse que la révision des mesures prises par le Conseil de la Dette publique pendant la guerre ainsi que l'annulation des obligations ne puisse toucher en rien les papiers-monnaies émis pendant la guerre.

L'article 252 devrait être supprimé par suite de l'adoption du système de la capitalisation.

Le Gouvernement ottoman demande relativement à l'article 253: (1) la suppression du terme de "Commission financière" qui doit être remplacé par celui de "Dette publique"; (2) l'or destiné aux intérêts de l'emprunt intérieur visé par l'article 259, paragraphe 4, du Traité de Versailles ayant été remis à la Banque impériale ottomane, non par l'Allemagne, mais par le Gouvernement ottoman et prélevé sur ses propres ressources, la référence audit paragraphe doit être supprimée.

Le Gouvernement ottoman demande la suppression de l'article 254.

Le Gouvernement ottoman demande la modification de l'article 255 dans le sens de la restitution au Gouvernement impérial des fonds de l'Administration sanitaire et du service de sauvetage.

Le Gouvernement ottoman demande la modification de l'article 257 comme suit:

La Commission financière cessera ses fonctions dès que le Gouvernement ottoman aura exécuté ses engagements financiers résultant exclusivement du traité.

Le Gouvernement ottoman demande la suppression de l'article 256 relatif aux bateaux de plus de 1,600 tonnes et aux bateaux allemands battant pavillon ottoman depuis une date antérieure du 1^{er} août 1914.

Le Gouvernement ottoman accepte l'article 259 sous réserve des dispositions se rapportant au droit privé.

Compléter les tableaux de Dette publique, d'après le tableau ci-joint.

Quant à l'annexe concernant le service et l'organisation de la Commission financière, le Gouvernement ottoman demande qu'il soit stipulé au No. 1 que le traitement des fonctionnaires de la Commission financière sera le même que celui des Ministres d'Etat ottoman et les fonctionnaires de ses fonctionnaires dans la même proportion que ceux des fonctionnaires du même rang du Ministère des Finances.

PARTIE IX — CLAUSES ECONOMIQUES.

Vu que la Commission financière mixte aura de vastes et importantes attributions en ce qui concerne la répartition de la Dette publique ottomane, le Gouvernement ottoman demande la suppression de l'article 261 concernant le rétablissement des capitulations économiques.

Le Gouvernement ottoman propose que, pour l'administration des Postes et des Télégraphes ottomane, une commission mixte soit formée, composée des délégués britanniques, français et italiens, sous la présidence du Directeur général ottoman des Postes et Télégraphes; cette commission aura toutes les attributions nécessaires à l'effet de pouvoir remplir effectivement sa tâche, des spécialistes étrangers en Turquie pourront être engagés au service de l'administration des Postes; il demande par conséquent la suppression de l'article 262, et la fermeture des bureaux de postes étrangers.

L'article 263 précise que la Convention du 27 juillet 1855 relative à l'emprunt turc sera maintenue, tandis que l'article 111 décharge la Turquie de tout engagement à l'égard des emprunts garantis sur le tribut d'Egypte.

Par conséquent, le Gouvernement ottoman propose la suppression du point 5 de l'article 269.

Le Gouvernement ottoman accepte l'article 274 à condition qu'il ne s'applique qu'à des traités et conventions qui n'auraient pas un caractère politique et militaire et qui seraient conformes au principe du droit international général.

Le Gouvernement ottoman demande l'exception des dispositions de l'article 275 les conventions juridiques conclues avec l'Allemagne.

Biens, Droits et Intérêts.

Le Gouvernement ottoman accepte l'article 287 à la condition que les taxes perçues par l'Etat ottoman, depuis la date de la signature du traité, stipulée dans les autres traités de paix, soit prise comme date initiale postérieurement à laquelle les taxes perçues devront être restituées sans qu'il soit pris en considération que ces mesures de guerre ont été appliquées. Il propose de rajouter à cet article que les dommages à indemniser seront limités à ceux qui résultent définitivement de l'application des mesures exceptionnelles de guerre.

Le Gouvernement ottoman propose la suppression de l'article 288 à condition qu'elles s'étendent aux ressortissants ottomans se trouvant en Egypte.

Le Gouvernement ottoman propose la suppression de l'article 289 à condition qu'il ne s'applique qu'aux ressortissants ottomans, sans causer en dehors de ses frontières des dommages susceptibles de réclamation par les ressortissants des Puissances belligérantes, ne l'obligent pas à effectuer des réparations; attendu, que par le fait de même, les indemnités que le Gouvernement ottoman aura à payer aux ressortissants des Puissances alliées devront se limiter à des chefs peu nombreux; attendu que les ressortissants ottomans n'étant point sur le terrain économique, dans la situation de faire une concurrence de quelque importance dans les pays alliés aux ressortissants locaux, il ne conçoit pas qu'il y ait un intérêt économique à liquider leurs biens, droits et intérêts dans lesdits pays, lesquels y sont acquis sous la protection des lois locales ou qui n'y trouvent confis à divers établissements, sous la même protection.

Le Gouvernement ottoman propose la suppression de l'article 290 à condition qu'il ne s'applique qu'aux ressortissants ottomans, sans causer en dehors de ses frontières des dommages susceptibles de réclamation par les ressortissants des Puissances belligérantes, ne l'obligent pas à effectuer des réparations; attendu, que par le fait de même, les indemnités que le Gouvernement ottoman aura à payer aux ressortissants des Puissances alliées devront se limiter à des chefs peu nombreux; attendu que les ressortissants ottomans n'étant point sur le terrain économique, dans la situation de faire une concurrence de quelque importance dans les pays alliés aux ressortissants locaux, il ne conçoit pas qu'il y ait un intérêt économique à liquider leurs biens, droits et intérêts dans lesdits pays, lesquels y sont acquis sous la protection des lois locales ou qui n'y trouvent confis à divers établissements, sous la même protection.

pays d'origine, se fiant à la protection d'engagements contractuels intervenus entre la Turquie et les Etats cessionnaires.

Le Gouvernement ottoman demande en conséquence la modification des articles précités et le remplacement de la date du 1^{er} août 1914 par celle de septembre 1912. Comme la liquidation des biens, droits et intérêts des ressortissants ottomans n'est envisagée que pour obtenir le paiement des indemnités résultant des torts et dommages subis par les ressortissants alliés et par leurs familles, les indemnités seront payées par ceux mêmes qui sont directement responsables des torts et dommages provoquant ces indemnités : nous proposons donc que celles-ci soient réglées et payées par les ressortissants des Puissances alliées, les ressortissants de l'Autriche, de la Bulgarie, de la Grèce, de la Roumanie, de la Serbie, de la Yougoslavie, du comité Union et Progrès ou de ses membres et de ses chefs.

Le Gouvernement ottoman propose de rachat par l'Etat ottoman des chemins de fer se trouvant en Turquie et dans les territoires sous son contrôle. L'administration de ces chemins de fer devra être confiée à une comité technique composé de spécialistes européens.

Pour ce qui est de l'article 300, le Gouvernement ottoman demande l'ajout d'un paragraphe à cet article, conçu dans ces termes : l'application des dispositions du présent traité et notamment des articles 298, 300 et 417 ne pourront porter atteinte aux créances du Gouvernement ottoman chez les ressortissants ou Société des Etats alliés.

Il en sera de même dans le cas où ces créances auraient été transférées aux Etats ils relèvent par suite des mesures exceptionnelles de guerre ou des lois et règlements, les créances seront portées au crédit du Gouvernement ottoman et viendront en réduction du montant des indemnités.

Le Gouvernement ottoman propose l'affectation à la Commission financière ou à la Commission des chemins de fer, par le Gouvernement ottoman, des biens, droits et intérêts des ressortissants ottomans chez les Gouvernements alliés.

Le Gouvernement ottoman propose la suppression de cet article qui complète l'article 301, dont il a demandé l'abrogation plus haut.

Le Gouvernement ottoman propose l'article 304 à condition qu'en cas de l'annulation des traités conclus avant la guerre, les articles 304 et 305 soient considérés comme annulés à partir du moment où deux quelconques des parties sont devenues ennemies, comme cela est admis dans les Traités de Paix avec l'Allemagne, l'Autriche et la Bulgarie.

L'article 307 est accepté à condition de la modifier dans le sens des articles correspondants des Traités de Versailles, Saint-Germain et de Neuilly.

Ainsi la révision est admise seulement pour les jugements intervenus et pour les mesures d'exécution ordonnées dans les instances où des ressortissants des Puissances alliées n'ont pas pu se défendre. Toutefois, les jugements rendus par les tribunaux mixtes non mixtes ; mais avec l'assistance consulaire, est acceptée.

Le Gouvernement ottoman demande la suppression de l'article 308. Il demande également la suppression des mots "tribunaux consulaires" mentionnés dans l'article 39.

Les articles 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

Sociétés et Concessions.

Pour les contrats et concessions relatifs à des travaux publics et autres qui n'avaient pas été mis à exécution à l'ouverture des hostilités, le Gouvernement ottoman se réserve le droit de demander une modification compatible avec sa capacité économique et financière.

Pour cette catégorie de contrats et concessions, il tient à avoir la faculté d'en réduire les portées et de différer l'exécution de certains d'entre eux.

Par suite du changement politique et économique de la Turquie, le Gouvernement ottoman se réserve de demander également que les travaux publics et autres faisant l'objet des contrats et concessions mentionnés au paragraphe précédent soient adaptés conformément à la nouvelle forme géographique du pays.

L'alinéa de cet article sera modifié comme suit :

Toute disposition législative ou autres seront déclarées par le Gouvernement ottoman nulles et non avenues. Il en sera de même des concessions et contrats postérieurs au 29 octobre 1914 que les contrats et concessions prévues à l'alinéa précédent auraient exclus ou réservés au bénéficiaires de ces mêmes contrats.

Le Gouvernement ottoman propose l'article 322 à condition qu'en cas de l'annulation des traités conclus avant la guerre, les articles 322 et 323 soient considérés comme annulés à partir du moment où deux quelconques des parties sont devenues ennemies, comme cela est admis dans les Traités de Paix avec l'Allemagne, l'Autriche et la Bulgarie.

D'autre part nous demandons que la date de subrogation soit celle de l'ouverture des hostilités, c'est-à-dire le 29 octobre 1914.

L'article 323 sera modifié comme suit :

Par rapport aux articles 314-316, le Gouvernement ottoman propose de toutes les concessions, droits et intérêts des ressortissants ottomans de l'Empire ottoman, les ressortissants des Puissances alliées, les ressortissants des Puissances neutres, qu'elles reviennent à l'Etat ottoman.

Sont exceptées toutefois les concessions constituant des droits acquis avant la déclaration de la guerre et dont les formantes seules ont été acquiescées après la guerre. L'annulation prévue à l'article 315 ne donnera lieu à aucune réclamation d'indemnité.

Le Gouvernement ottoman propose l'article 316 à condition qu'en cas de l'annulation des traités conclus avant la guerre, les articles 316 et 317 soient considérés comme annulés à partir du moment où deux quelconques des parties sont devenues ennemies, comme cela est admis dans les Traités de Paix avec l'Allemagne, l'Autriche et la Bulgarie.

Le Gouvernement ottoman propose que le § 1 s'applique à tous les ressortissants ottomans au début d'octobre 1914.

Le Gouvernement ottoman propose l'article 318 à condition qu'en cas de l'annulation des traités conclus avant la guerre, les articles 318 et 319 soient considérés comme annulés à partir du moment où deux quelconques des parties sont devenues ennemies, comme cela est admis dans les Traités de Paix avec l'Allemagne, l'Autriche et la Bulgarie.

En ce qui concerne le § 2, il n'est pas nécessaire que des personnes ottomanes soient constituées d'après la loi ottomane et dont la nationalité est établie dans les constitutions, soient considérées comme étrangères. Les personnes ottomanes, d'après les règles générales, qui sont considérées comme étrangères, soit indiennes.

Le § 4 doit être limité aux établissements religieux scolaires et de bienfaisance qui ont été officiellement reconnus comme appartenant à la nationalité des Puissances alliées. Les établissements qui ne sont pas reconnus comme appartenant à la nationalité des Puissances alliées, soit indiennes.

PARTIE X

Navigation aérienne.

Le Gouvernement ottoman propose la suppression des mots "avec l'assentiment des principales Puissances alliées" et recevront l'assentiment des principales Puissances alliées.

De même, les alinéas 2 et 3 de l'article 320, qui ne figurent pas dans les Traités de Versailles, Saint-Germain et Neuilly, doivent être supprimés.

Le Gouvernement ottoman propose l'article 321 à condition qu'en cas de l'annulation des traités conclus avant la guerre, les articles 321 et 322 soient considérés comme annulés à partir du moment où deux quelconques des parties sont devenues ennemies, comme cela est admis dans les Traités de Paix avec l'Allemagne, l'Autriche et la Bulgarie.

PARTIE XI

Le Gouvernement ottoman peut accepter les dispositions de la première section de cette partie, sous condition de réciprocité pour les territoires adjoints à la Turquie au fin de la guerre balkanique et en vertu du présent traité.

L'article 322 sera modifié comme suit :

L'article 337 étant contraire au droit de souveraineté et ne se trouvant dans aucun autre traité ne saurait être accepté. Il est à remarquer en outre que comme la Commission d'arrangement a refusé de reconnaître l'existence d'un tel traité et l'absence de restrictions, l'insertion des restrictions de cet article est superflue en ce qui concerne la T-1.

Le Gouvernement ottoman propose d'ajouter à l'article 349 l'océan Indien pour que la Turquie en puisse profiter des ports du golfe Persique et de l'océan Indien. Il s'agit de transit sur les territoires se trouvant au sud de l'Asie Mineure.

Chemin de fer du Hedya

L'article 364 qui ne se trouve dans aucun autre traité doit être supprimé.

Le Gouvernement ottoman demande la suppression dans l'article 371 du mot de phrase "sous réserve des dispositions de l'article 373" au alinéa, et de l'article 373.

Il demande aussi que la valeur des câbles appartenant soit au Gouvernement turc, soit à ses ressortissants, soit aux au compte de la Turquie.

Le 25 novembre 1914, l'Assemblée a voté le rapport à l'ordre du jour dans le cas où il ne serait admis dès à présent à la Société des Nations les ressortissants, navires et marchandises ottomanes jouissent dans ces ports du même traitement accordé aux ressortissants, navires et biens des États membres de la Société des Nations.

$$v = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} & \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \\ \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} & -\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \end{pmatrix} \quad \text{and} \quad \{v_1, v_2, v_3, v_4\} = \left\{ \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & -1 \end{pmatrix}, \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & -1 \\ 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}, \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ -1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}, \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & -1 \\ -1 & -1 \end{pmatrix} \right\}.$$

h. $\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{4}$ (1 out of 4 possible outcomes will result in a sum of 2)

$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & i \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$

$$f = \frac{1}{2\pi} \int_{-\pi}^{\pi} f(\theta) d\theta = \frac{1}{2\pi} \int_{-\pi}^{\pi} \left(\frac{1}{2} (e^{i\theta} + e^{-i\theta}) \right) d\theta = \frac{1}{2\pi} \int_{-\pi}^{\pi} \cos \theta d\theta = \frac{1}{2\pi} \left[\sin \theta \right]_{-\pi}^{\pi} = \frac{1}{2\pi} (0 - 0) = 0$$

Étant donné que de vastes territoires, tels que le Hedjaz, la Syrie et la

importance d'avant guerre, le Gouvernement ottoman propose le maintien de cette administration sous forme d'une direction générale avec la collaboration d'un inspecteur général nommé par l'une des principales puissances alliées et la modification de

article 427 dans ce sens.

Aucune stipulation analogue ne figurant dans les traités conclus avec les autres Etats et les attributions de la Société des Nations étant définies dans les différents chapitres du présent traité, le Gouvernement ottoman demande la suppression de l'article 482.

(E 8739.8.44)

No. 55

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 839)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, July 10, 1901

NY telegram No. 829 of 17th Jul

Movement in favour of signature of treaty has been still further accentuated during last few days.

Ferd Pasha has kept Cabinet together by accepting certain conditions imposed by Reshid's supporters.

Minister of Justice, who is of minor importance, has had to be sacrificed to animosity against latter, but they have formally agreed to principle of accepting treaty. Two leading Ministers belonging to this faction told Mr. Ryan emphatically on 21st July that there was no alternative to signing. Grand Vizier's present idea is to accompany acceptance by final appeal for relaxations of terms, but in intimate that treaty will be signed whether this appeal is entertained or not.

Unless situation changes radically as result of some violent coup here or of developments in Thrace, acceptance of treaty may now be regarded as assured. Grand Vizier, though much disturbed by new Greek offensive in Thrace, said on 20th July that he proposed to instruct Turkish military authorities to offer no resistance but to fall back on Enos-Midia and if necessary on Chatalja line.

He expressed uncertainty as to whether all his colleagues would agree to this alteration, and intimated that if they did not there would be a Cabinet crisis after all. Instructions not to resist have been issued since this conversation and there are still no signs of any Cabinet crisis.

While Keshid's faction appear thus to have resigned themselves to signature and have remained in (? group omitted), they continue violently antagonistic to Grand Vizier.

They are probably preparing onslaught on his position as soon as treaty is signed. Sultan gives no signs of life, and is either apathetic or very canny. There appears to be diminution of sympathy between him and Ferid. Crown Council will probably be held on 22nd July.

It is unlikely now to affect decision, but they may use it to elicit criticism which will weaken Ferid's eventual position.

There is little news of Nani analysts in Asia Minor.

They are reported to be at variance amongst themselves.

More moderate section may submit inevitably after treaty is signed, especially as peasants are sick of whole business and want nothing but peace.

Extremists, however, will leave nothing undone to keep movement in being, and to retain means of waging guerrilla warfare in areas not in effective military occupation of Allies, in which they will be undoubtedly encouraged by hopes of Bolshevik assistance, now strengthened by our evacuation of Batoum and isolation of Armenia. Renewed attempts to excite popular feeling against native Christians will also have to be reckoned with.

[F 8788/3 44]

No. 56.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 845.)

(Telegraphic) R.

Constantinople, July 23, 1920.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Following is summary of note received from Grand Vizier late on evening of 22nd July:

Hadi Pasha and Riza Tewfik Bey, senators and ex-Ministers, and Reshad Halim Bey Turkish Minister at Bern, have been appointed to attend Conference as Turkish delegates for the purpose of signature of Peace Treaty.

Two first-named intended to leave by Simplon express, but recent events in Thrace have prevented this.

They will therefore leave via Constanza on 23rd July in vessel placed at their disposal by French.

In case of non-arrival in time, Supreme Council is asked to excuse delay due to force majeure.

When Turkish Government are resolved to sign treaty, they nevertheless wish to make arrangements of justice and equity of Entente Powers with the view to making a declaration of intentions and declaration being introduced:—

1. Substitution of Enos-Midia line, which had previously been fixed as Turkish frontier for Strouda-Chatalja line.

2. Exclusion (in case frontier is so thrown back) of shore of Sea of Marmora from Turkish territory and latter to Straits.

3. Autonomous régime for Smyrna similar to that of free city of Hamburg.

4. Turkish Government is anxious to declare that Caliphate, being "an point d'union islamique" and (sic) consequently religious question, can have no place in political treaty.

Note asks me to communicate above to my Government and to use my influence to

Grand Vizier hopes that, having regard to enormous sacrifices accepted by Turkey, Supreme Council will give her at least this satisfaction.

[E 9072/3 44]

N 57

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 29.)

(No. 858.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, July 28, 1920.

GENERAL MILNE informs me that Turkish troops at Adrianople laid down their arms on 26th July and that King of Greece entered the town on 27th July. He tells me that General Paraskevopoulos, Greek supreme commander, now proposes to renew Greek advance in Asia Minor against Mustapha Kemal, to advance up to Anatolian Railway, occupying Eskişehir and Afion Karahisar, and to send column up to Angora. He has submitted this plan to Supreme Council.

French who have hitherto been against giving a mandate to Greek army in Asia Minor, have veered round and are now strongly in favour of this Greek advance. Marshal Foch's liaison officer has discussed plan with General Paraskevopoulos, and is giving latter support of French military opinion.

General Milne is strongly averse on military grounds to any further Greek advance being authorised. Plan may lead to Greek troops getting compromised in interior, thus requiring us to give military assistance to extract them. With forces at his disposal and summer well advanced General Milne is definitely opposed to our becoming involved in any military operations outside area to be demilitarised under Peace Treaty.

But political objections to Greek advance are equally weighty. Nothing could be more calculated to cause general revival of Turkish nationalist movement and to give it renewed support amongst masses of population, with whom, owing to its failure to

defend the country, it has lately become considerably discredited, moreover, it is not to be supposed that Greeks will undertake advance for love of Allies, but will require very definite *quid pro quo*.

Turkish Government signs treaty on 28th July, and a further Greek advance is therefore beginning of a new war on the part of Greece. For Allies to allow such a situation to arise would alienate all moderate Turkish elements, upon whom we must now count to pacify country and with Allied guidance to restore normal conditions.

It is almost certain that present Grand Vizier would resign, and local situation would present great difficulties.

I cannot but think that a renewal of Greek advance after signature of peace would much discredit British prestige in Moslem world, and would be used against us by our enemies as a sign that we intended to make no peace with Islam.

Reason that French are supporting Greeks in this new plan is probably to deny use of Anatolian Railway to Nationalists, and thus create a more favourable situation for themselves in Cilicia, where their position is now difficult. In this they are considering only their own interests, and seemingly take no account of adverse effects which would be caused to Allied and particularly British interests by execution of Greek plans.

Object of Turkish Treaty which is now being signed is to bring about peace and settled conditions. A renewed Greek advance will perpetuate disorder and rebellion, and only sound Allied plan to my mind, now that Turks have accepted treaty, is to give them our fullest support and guidance—naval, military and political—in dealing themselves with discredited nationalist movement in Anatolia. This would, moreover, be in accordance with advice expressed in your telegram No. 408 of 5th May.

I trust His Majesty's Government will give its earnest consideration to the above remarks and veto any (group undecipherable) Greek advance in Asia Minor.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 72.)

[E 9072/3 44]

No. 58.

Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).

(No. 705.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 30, 1920.

YOUR telegram No. 858 of 28th July.

Question of renewed Greek advance in Asia Minor was discussed with M. Venizelos at Smyrna. At that time he did not favour movement if Turks decided to sign treaty, and he made it conditional upon supplies of equipment, arms, &c., by ourselves. No immediate action therefore seems to be practicable, but he is being consulted on the subject, and we will acquaint you with result.

In reply to your arguments, it should be borne in mind that Mustapha Kemal is enemy of Turkish Government no less than of the Allies, and that his defeat or disappearance, so far from being a cause of offence at Constantinople, would relieve Turks of task which they are powerless to perform themselves, and would be most effective guarantee for ratification of treaty and setting up of new conditions created therein.

E 9169/3 4 1]

No. 59

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 868.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, July 30, 1920.

MY telegram No. 859.

High Commissioners met on 29th July, at my suggestion, to consider situation after signature of treaty.

I gave my colleagues paraphrase of telegram under reference.

They agreed generally with views expressed therein.

We agreed to address to our Governments identical telegrams in the sense of my three telegrams immediately following this.

French colleague is very keen on visit to the Sultan. I concurred, as I think it would show people that the Sultan had acquired new position vis-à-vis of Allies by his decision to sign the treaty in spite of Nationalist opposition. In any case, unfortunate effect would be produced if French and Italian colleagues paid a visit and I abstained.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 869.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, July 30, 1920.

Treaty with Turkey, the French, British and Italian High Commissioners intend, failing contrary instructions from Allied Governments, to make no modification either in their attitude or in the various measures which they have taken in virtue of armistice, or in the activities and controls which they exercise either directly or through commissions set up by them.

They are, however, of opinion that necessary steps should be taken to permit of modifications of present situation as soon as treaty enters into force.

They therefore consider various commissions, whose formation is laid down in treaty, and particularly the four principal commissions, viz., Straits, Financial, Military and Naval Commissions, should be constituted without delay and at once sent to Constantinople, so as to be able to settle down, more or less, to study the conditions under which they will have to work, and to arrange their labours so as to be able to begin their activities as soon as treaty enters into force.

This immediate commencement of activity is chiefly necessary for—

1. No. 1. Commission in order to permit of zone of Straits being occupied exclusively by forces authorised to remain there, viz., British, French and Italian forces; for
2. No. 2. Commission to enable Turkish Government to command financial resources essential for working of administration and to security and re-establishment of order and power in Anatolia; for
- 3 and 4. No. 3 and 4. Commission to permit of constitution, under prescribed form and conditions, of armed force, without which Turkish Government cannot, especially in Asia, secure execution of treaty according to obligations undertaken.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 870.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, July 30, 1920.

When treaty is signed, or even when it is ratified and has entered into force, will it be possible to re-establish order and authority of Government in Anatolia, and consequently how will it be possible for treaty to be executed there?

This serious question has been examined by the French, British and Italian High Commissioners, who concur in submitting to their Governments following considerations and opinions:—

1. Turkish Government professes to be ready to execute faithfully its obligations and to secure execution of treaty. It lacks, however, means of doing so, and consequently requests Allies either to lend assistance or to permit creation of requisite means as rapidly as possible.
2. According to Government these means consist chiefly in reorganisation of armed force authorised by treaty and prescription of special units (15,000 men).
3. This organisation cannot, however, take place except under control of military mission prescribed by treaty, and will take a certain time. Further, contrary to opinion held by Government, it is doubtful whether this first force of 15,000 men will be sufficient to re-establish in Anatolia the authority of Government and forcibly to impose the execution of treaty.
4. In these conditions two solutions should be considered.
 - (a.) Re-establishment of authority and imposition of treaty by action of light forces.
 - (b.) Attempt to obtain voluntary acceptance (at least by majority of Nationalists) of treaty and decision taken by Sultan and Government to sign and execute it.

As regards (a), the Allied Governments are doubtless not desirous of sending to Anatolia sufficient forces.

Operations would thus have to be committed to Greek army more or less, but further advance of this army into Asia would be in contradiction with clauses of treaty itself, and would not improbably prove less easy for this army than operations executed hitherto. Greek Government, who perhaps would willingly undertake it, would doubtless insist on excessive recompense.

As regards (b), we possess no trustworthy information on the situation in Anatolia and Angora. It is probable Kemalist extremist chiefs are attempting to deceive the population.

Possibly if truth were known discouragement would act on the masses, and wisdom and reason would inevitably penetrate to at least the moderate Nationalists.

Consequently it would be essential to make truth known.

Granted the foregoing, the High Commissioners concur in submitting to Allied Governments following proposal: To recommend to Turkish Government formation of a mission composed of persons possessing real authority and capable of obtaining a hearing from moderate Nationalists. This mission would be sent to Anatolia to explain the situation and to communicate authentic documents and notes exchanged with Conference and to report Greek successes and Nationalists' defeats in Asia Minor, and to make it clear persistence in attitude exacted by Kemalist chiefs would make inevitable the advance of Allies, and particularly of Greek army, loss of Constantinople and disappearance of Turkey. Mission would, on the other hand, emphasise that acceptance of treaty would result in termination of war, cessation of conscription and the establishment of order, tranquillity, good administration and the prosperity of country. Mission would convey text of a declaration of Allied Governments by High Commissioners acting out the foregoing.

It would communicate it to the population and to those with whom (two groups undecipherable). If mission did not succeed entirely, it is reasonable to hope that it would at least sow seeds of discord amongst Nationalists, thus facilitating military action which would have to be undertaken. Its despatch would, in any case, gain time necessary for the organisation of Turkish forces, which would permit of taking action without having recourse to dangerous use of Greek arm.

High Commissioners urgently solicit instructions from Allied Governments whether these proposals are acceptable.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 871.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, July 30, 1920.

ALTHOUGH intending not to modify their general attitude until treaty enters into force, French, British and Italian High Commissioners, in view of particular conditions of Turkey, the long duration of their stay in Constantinople, and minor attentions bestowed on them in various circumstances by the Palace, consider it would be desirable that they should, after signature of treaty, pay a visit to the Palace. This visit, which would merely be in the nature of an act of courtesy and of a semi-official character, would nevertheless possess advantage of enhancing prestige and strengthening the authority of Sultan in the eyes of the population.

They desire to know whether Allied Governments see any objection to this.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 875.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 1, 1920.

THE Turkish Government resigned on 30th July. Ferid Pasha has again formed new Government composed as follows:—

Grand Vizier, Foreign Affairs and War, acting, Ferid Pasha; Sheykh-ul-Islam Sabri Effendi; Interior, Reshid Mumtaz Pasha; Justice, Rushdi Effendi, F.

acting, Nazir Bey; Council of State, Riza Tewfik Bey; Marine, acting, Hamdi Pasha; Public Works, General Zeki Pasha; Public Instruction, Hadi Pasha; Commerce, Reouf Pasha; Pious Foundations, General Hilmi Pasha. Reouf Pasha, formerly Turkish Commissioner in Egypt, and General Zeki Pasha will act at Council of State and at the Ministry respectively pending return of titulars from Paris. Jemal Bey will act at the Ministry pending arrival of new Minister, who is in Switzerland.

New Cabinet took office on 31st July.

E 9184 3 44]

No. 64.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 1.)

(N. 71.) R.

Constantinople, August 1, 1920.

MY telegram No. 875 of 1st August.

Crisis had its origin in circumstances mentioned in my telegram No. 839 of 2nd July. Situation came to a head rather suddenly, apparently owing to discussion between Grand Vizier and Pasha having assumed personal character. Grand Vizier was, however, attacked from many sides, and crisis was inevitable sooner or later.

Assailants are for the moment haunted with their own petard. New Cabinet is, as usual, weak, but some skill has been shown in composition of it. It includes Hadi Pasha and Riza Tewfik, who are two men most completely committed to Grand Vizier's peace policy, though the latter is not a peace man. It also includes a Minister of Finance (M. Entente libérale), but they are among the more respectable members of a rather mixed group, and inclusion of little-known men like Minister of Public Works and Pious Foundations, and Minister of Finance deprives Government of party colour. Strongest party men are Shrikh-ul-Islam and Minister of Commerce, who was Vali of Konia last year and is sworn foe of Nationalists.

New Minister of Interior has spent several years out of Turkey. He is a man of high moral character. His name is seen in reports from Switzerland last year. Grand Vizier and Entente libérale Party are hostile, but they count for little. New Government will be object of sustained attack and intrigue. If Ferid can hold on for some time in spite of this, as he is only Grand Vizier with signature, but not with authority, his popularity may handicap him and give the advantage to himself or to the opposition.

E 9317/757 44]

No. 65.

The Marquis Imperiali to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 4.)

My Lord,

Italian Embassy, London, July 29, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government, to whom I duly communicated the contents of your note of the 13th instant, has instructed me to inform you that it is in entire agreement with the views of the British Government set forth in the said note with regard to Belgium's wish to be represented on the Commission for the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt and also on the national Commission of Control of Ottoman Finances. His Majesty's Government is therefore in agreement with the reply which your Excellency communicated in the said note, and which was intended to be given to the Belgian Ambassador.

I take &c.

MEERHAU

(E 9171 3 44]

No. 66.

Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)

(N. 71.)

Foreign Office, August 4, 1920.

YOUR telegram No. 870 of 30th July.

I am replying to the Turkish Government the despatch of a Turkish mission with the powers and authority mentioned in paragraph 7 is approved, unless there is a decided change for the better in the relations of the Nationalists towards the Turkish Government. In this latter connection I should be glad to know what the Constantinople reported in a "Times"

E 9172 3 44

Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)

(N. 71.)

Foreign Office, August 4, 1920.

(N. 71.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 871 of 30th July.

I approve the proposed visit to the Sultan after signature of Treaty

E 9486 1331 44

Mr. Davis to Earl Curzon

American Embassy, London, August 1, 1920.

My Lord,

IN sundry notes which I have had the honour to address to your Lordship, I have had occasion to discuss the rights of American citizens in territories which formed a part of the Ottoman Empire, and to indicate the attitude of my Government in favour of such territories to the United States or subjects of all nations. I am now directed by my Government to apprise your Lordship that the United States makes all appropriate arrangements with reference to the proposed Treaty of Peace with the Turkish Empire, and its unwillingness to acquiesce in the application of the provisions of article 294, or of any other article of that Treaty, in a manner which may prejudice, directly or indirectly, the rights of American citizens or corporations, or which may preclude them from acquiring in the future rights or interests on terms of equality with the nationals of the Allied States.

I have, &c.

JOHN W. DAVIS

(E 9 83 39 44]

No. 69.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received August 9.)

My Lord,

Board of Trade, August 7, 1920.

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th July on the subject of the Swiss interests in railways in Turkey in Asia.

The Board have of course always been aware of the considerable magnitude of such interests, particulars of which were enclosed with their letter of the 15th April. The views advanced by Admiral de Robeck in his despatch No. 976 R of the 7th July, copy of which was enclosed with your letter under reply have as the Secretary of State will recollect, received the careful attention of the two Departments. It is not possible to say that such railways are adequately compensated, but the Board assume that the Turkish Government will associate themselves with the French and Italian Governments in requesting any claim (should such claim be put forward) that liquidation of the German railways under the armistice with Turkey shall, having regard to the Swiss interests, not be carried out.

I am, &c.

H. FOUNTAIN

[E 9630/56, 44]

No. 70

Sir G. Grahame to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 9.)

[By Telephone.]

(Unnumbered.)

(Telegraphic.)

ITALIAN Government have offered that manner of plebiscite in Rhodes be determined by League of Nations when the time comes. Venizelos has accepted and will sign Turkish Treaty.

I will therefore sign Turkish Treaty and Tripartite Agreement.

E 9651 3 44]

No. 71

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 10.)

No. 101.1.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, July 28, 1920.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 845 of the 23rd July, summarizing the decision of the Turkish Government to sign the Peace Treaty, I have the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, textual copy of the note, dated the 22nd July, 1920.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 71

Damad Ferid Pasha to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

Sublime Porte, le 22 juillet 1920

J'AI l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que Hadi Pacha et Riza Tevfik Bey, Sénateurs et anciens Ministres, ainsi que Rehid Hulus Bey, Ministre de Turquie à Berne, ont été désignés pour se présenter devant la Conférence de Paris en qualité de délégués du Gouvernement ottoman à l'effet de signer le Traité de Paix.

Hadi Pacha et Riza Tevfik Bey, qui devaient partir par l'express-Simplon, ont dû différer leur départ, vu l'impossibilité d'utiliser cette voie par suite des derniers événements en Thrace.

Le Haut-Commissariat de France ayant mis gracieusement à leur disposition un bateau de guerre français, ils ont profité pour partir le vendredi, 23 courant, via Constantinople-Bucarest.

Au cas où ils ne pourraient pas se trouver à Paris à temps voulu, le Conseil suprême de la Paix voudra bien excuser un retard dû à une force majeure.

Le Gouvernement ottoman, étant résolu à signer le traité proposé par la Conférence de la Paix, laisse, toutefois, faire un nouvel appel aux sentiments de justice et d'équité.

Puissances de l'Entente afin qu'elles veuillent bien consentir à y introduire les modifications et déclarations suivantes :

1. Faire reculer la ligne frontière Stranjia-Tchataldja jusqu'à celle d'Enos-Midia, qui avait été fixée précédemment comme frontière de la Turquie.

2. En cas d'acceptation de cette extension de frontière, exclure les rives de la Marmara de la zone neutre et restreindre celle-ci aux Dardanielles.

3. Doter Smyrne, à l'instar de la ville libre de Hambourg, d'un régime spécial autonome.

4. Le Gouvernement ottoman tient à déclarer que le Khalifat étant un point d'union islamique et constituant, par conséquent, une question religieuse, il ne pourrait trouver place dans un traité politique.

En priant votre Excellence de faire part de cette démarche à son Gouvernement je lui serais reconnaissant de vouloir bien user de son influence auprès de lui pour l'amener à y faire un accueil favorable.

En regard aux énormes sacrifices que la Turquie accepte, j'aime à espérer fermement que le Conseil suprême de la Paix lui accordera au moins cette satisfaction.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

DAMAD FERID

[E 9659 3 44]

No. 72

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 10.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, July 28, 1920.

I have the honour to enclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copies of reports received from the Armenian Patriarchate regarding the situation at Aintab, together with copies of a memorandum summarizing information received from M. Bendjian, president of the Armenian Protestant Community, which completes the reports of the Patriarchate regarding the arrangement reached between the Armenians and the Nationalists on the 12th June.

I venture particularly to draw your Lordship's attention to the paragraph in the report of the Patriarchate regarding the refusal of the Armenians to go and discuss matters with the French Commandant, and (2) the determination to resist, if necessary, to the end.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, High Commissioner

Enclosure 1 in No. 71

Report on the Situation at Aintab, communicated to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck by Armenian Patriarchate

La ville de Deirt-Yol est depuis deux semaines en état de siège. Les troupes arméniennes ont été obligées de se retirer de la ville de Deirt-Yol et de se retirer de la ville de Deirt-Yol. Grâce aux armes affectées par le Gouvernement français, la résistance de ces derniers est assurée.

Quoique Deirt-Yol soit assiégé de toutes parts, les Arméniens ont réussi à garder la ville. Elle a actuellement à peine de quoi manger encore une quinzaine de jours. C'est une situation désespérée d'où une aide efficace peut seule le tirer.

Le 9 mai.—Après la reddition de la garnison française d'Ourfa et sa retraite vers la station située à 10 km de la ville. Aussi longtemps que les troupes seraient maintenues, il était naturel que les Turcs, malgré qu'ils soient très montés contre les Arméniens, se tiendraient tranquilles. En fait, les jeunes Arméniens attendent dans les rues, les armes à la main. Les femmes et les enfants se rendent seuls au marché et assurent le ravitaillement des quartiers. La terreur est constante.

La situation matérielle et économique est pitoyable. Elle n'avait jamais été bien. Les magasins ont été pillés et les maisons détruites. Les pertes en vies humaines sont jusqu'à présent très peu considérables : 8 morts et 18 blessés.

Aintab, le 1^{er} juin.—Aintab est encerclé depuis deux mois. Une population de 15,000 âmes environ dépense son capital et les vivres s'épuisent. A raison de 100 drachmes de ration journalière par tête, les provisions suffiront à peine un mois encore. Après, c'est la famine inévitable, si des secours ne nous parviennent d'ici là. La population d'Aintab s'est habituée au danger, mais le cauchemar de la famine la préoccupe.

Il y a une quinzaine de jours, le colonel maron auprès de lui les membres de la garnison française d'Aintab, vu les difficultés de ravitaillement. Cela cause une impression

pénible et le moral de la population en souffrit, car celle-ci en deduit que la France ne propose d'évacuer Aintab. On arriva à un accord avec le colonel en décidant que les orphelins, les déportés et ceux des indigènes qui le désirent seront transférés ailleurs et, dans la nuit de lundi, 35 mai, 3,000 Arméniens quittèrent la ville sous la protection des soldats français, mais dans les conditions qui rappelaient les déportations turques, il n'était permis d'emporter avec soi qu'une couverture et de quoi se nourrir pendant quelques jours, de plus, on devait aller à pied.

Quand, le soir du départ, les Arméniens se furent réunis auprès des Français, les bandes turques lancèrent trois boulets sur la foule massée. Heureusement, les boulets tombèrent trop loin et l'on n'eut pas à déplorer les pertes.

Le départ de ces 3,000 Arméniens, le colonel ordonne que des préparatifs pour un second convoi commencent. Cette fois la population voulut partir tout ensemble. Mais, entre-temps, le Général de la Motte était arrivé à Aintab. Tout recommandant lui-même de partir, il se montra plus coulant sur le nombre de ceux qui pourraient rester. Il fixa ce nombre à un maximum de 8,000 âmes.

Le lendemain, le colonel fit connaître à la population qu'un armistice avait été conclu entre le Général Gouraud et Moustafa Kemal, dont une des clauses essentielles était le rétablissement de l'autorité turque sur les quartiers arméniens d'Aintab. Il fit appeler auprès de lui le mutessarif turc pour s'entretenir avec lui au sujet de l'armistice. Mais le fonctionnaire turc refusa de venir, disant que si le colonel désirait lui parler au sujet de l'évacuation d'Aintab, c'était à lui d'aller le trouver. Le lendemain, le Général de la Motte revint en cette ville. Le mutessarif et un fonctionnaire spécialement chargé à cet effet par M. Kemal, İrfan Bey se rendirent à l'État-Major, mais il n'y eut pas moyen d'arriver à un accord au bout de trois heures.

Le Général Gouraud, entouré ses troupes de différents points de la ville pour les cantonner dans le collège.

Les deux parties décidèrent de demander de nouvelles instructions et de fixer ensemble les conditions locales de l'armistice à Kibis. Les délégués turcs sont déjà partis pour cette localité.

Depuis deux jours, le colonel nous informe que les quartiers arméniens devront être livrés aux Turcs au plus tard le 8 juin et les Arméniens craignent que les Turcs, une fois maîtres de la ville, ne les considèrent comme des insurgés et ne les condamnent à mort sous différents prétextes, à supposer même qu'ils ne les massacrent tous sans autre forme de procès. Le colonel s'est laissé convaincre et a proposé que les notables, ainsi que les plus compromis, quittent la ville dès maintenant. Cela est impossible et serait même lâche. Ce point fait depuis deux jours l'objet de nos discussions. Il déclare que nous devons absolument démolir nos positions jusqu'au 8 courant et les livrer aux Turcs, qui n'auraient pas, sachant, les moyens de nous nuire. Enfin, ce matin nous avons décidé d'émigrer tous à la fois. Le colonel nous a répondu que les moyens de transport manquaient et qu'il pouvait à peine mettre à notre disposition 80 à 100 voitures. Le nombre des émigrants ont été de 11,000 à 12,000 personnes; tous les biens des Arméniens passeraient aux Turcs. Le colonel n'a même pas voulu se charger de la clef de l'église dans laquelle nous avions réuni une partie de nos biens, en disant qu'il ne pouvait pas y porter des fonctionnaires, ni veiller sur elle. Ce n'était là, d'ailleurs, qu'une simple manifestation, car les Arméniens ne veulent pas quitter Aintab.

Aujourd'hui, à midi, tous les Arméniens au-dessus de 20 ans se sont rassemblés dans les églises pour examiner la situation, des discours furent prononcés et les débats durèrent plus de deux heures. Une foule compacte s'était massée dans l'église protestante. Un référendum fut organisé et l'on décida, à la presque unanimité, contre deux voix, de rester à Aintab, de lutter contre les Turcs et, s'il le faut, de mourir sur la brèche.

Quand nous fûmes connus cette résolution au colonel, ce dernier en fut très surpris, car il nous avait toujours déclaré que, si nous continuions à nous battre contrairement aux dispositions de l'armistice, nous prendrions ainsi une attitude hostile aux Français, qui ne pourraient en aucun cas nous aider.

Les Turcs vont, vraisemblablement, nous sommer le 7 juin de démolir nos barrières et les Arméniens se verront forcés d'entrer dans une lutte inégale.

D'après les lettres tant officielles que privées qui sont reçues de Marache, la situation des Arméniens serait indescriptible, encore qu'il n'y ait pas procédé à des réquisitions régulières. La terreur règne. Depuis cinq mois, le nombre des Arméniens à Marache a été réduit au tiers.

Report on the Situation at Aintab, communicated to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck by Armenian Patriarchate

Aintab, le 12 juin (Vicaire N. Tavoukdjian).—Le colonel français d'Aintab manda auprès de lui les membres de l'Union nationale, dans la matinée du 8 juin courant, et leur déclara que (1) les Français ne peuvent plus avoir un rapport quelconque avec les Arméniens; (2) les autorités turques occuperont à midi les quartiers de ces derniers; (3) les lieux situés à l'ouest de la ville et occupés par les Français, entre autres, l'hôpital turc, trouvant à proximité de l'hôpital américain, seront livrés aux Turcs; (4) les Arméniens devront se rendre à 11 heures du matin auprès des Turcs pour s'entendre avec eux. Cette déclaration fut faite sur un ton sec. Elle dénotait une décision sans appel. Les Arméniens, en entendant ces mots, tombèrent dans un désarroi indescriptible. C'était parfaitement compréhensible de leur part: ils formaient le corps responsable d'une population qui avait lutté héroïquement et victorieusement pendant plusieurs heures sans discontinuer et le colonel leur disait de ne pas recommencer la lutte.

Les Arméniens restèrent isolés, &c. Le Vicaire des Arméniens, et un délégué de l'Union nationale, furent chargés d'entrer en pourparlers avec les Turcs.

Le 9 juin, l'hôpital turc fut livré aux Turcs. La nuit suivante, les Arméniens évacuèrent une de leurs positions les plus importantes, la mosquée d'Akoul. Les rues des quartiers arméniens seront rendues à la circulation. Les écoles publiques seront ouvertes demain. Les autorités turques ont promis de faire respecter la loi.

Conformément à l'une des conditions concertées avec les délégués turcs, hier soir, vers le tard, des proclamations furent affichées où il était dit que les Arméniens ne seraient poursuivis ni punis par le Gouvernement pour des faits antérieurs et que les Arméniens conserveraient leurs armes. Des conseils y étaient également donnés à la population de vivre dans une bonne harmonie mutuelle, &c.

Hier, on fit publier la nouvelle que le Gouvernement d'Adieu relâche officiellement Moustafa Kemal Pacha et trois délégués de l'Union nationale télégraphique de la nation, à ce dernier que les Arméniens d'Aintab reconnaissent son autorité et promettent de vivre en paix et de collaborer sincèrement avec leurs compatriotes.

Malgré cela, la population arménienne est très tourmentée. Un sentiment d'insécurité vis-à-vis des Turcs la préoccupe. Plus d'un Arménien voudrait quitter la ville à n'importe quel prix, mais les moyens en font défaut.

Alep, le 16 juin (Père Yemman).—Pour adoucir la situation des Arméniens d'Aintab, nous avons envoyé à Beyrouth deux représentants, qui se sont adressés par écrit au Général Gouraud. Le général a répondu qu'il ne pouvait pas ne pas respecter les clauses de l'armistice conclu avec M. Kemal et que les Arméniens devaient accepter les conditions de l'armistice. D'une seconde démarche, son conseiller fit la proposition que les Arméniens ne seront ni arrêtés, ni emprisonnés par les Turcs et ils conserveront leurs armes; (2) la vie des Arméniens sera sauve de d'une façon catégorique et, si un empiètement quelconque est commis par les Turcs, des mesures seront prises pour leur protection efficace; (3) l'alimentation des Arméniens sera assurée. Le conseiller promit de télégraphier ces instructions à Aintab, ce qu'il fit immédiatement. Depuis deux semaines, les Arméniens vieux, dans la mesure de leurs moyens, se battent, au nombre de 3,500, partent d'Aintab grâce à l'intervention de la Croix-Rouge américaine et des autorités françaises. La pénurie de vivres a rendu ces mesures nécessaires. Quant aux réfugiés de l'orphelinat américain, on les transfère depuis trois semaines à Beyrouth. Ils sont au nombre de 300 environ. La Croix-Rouge dirige enfin sur cette même ville ceux qui veulent se rendre en Amérique à leurs propres frais.

Alep, le 24 juin (Vicaire).—La situation à Marache est extrêmement dangereuse et misérable. La population sollicitée dans des lettres officielles de mettre un terme à cet état des choses, ou plutôt demande qu'on la transfère en corps en d'autres lieux. D'après le témoignage des agents de la Croix-Rouge américaine, la misère y est affreuse. Le convoi, Dr Lambert, qui vient de rentrer, pense qu'il n'est pas possible à la population arménienne de Marache de vivre plus longtemps dans cette ville.

Trebizonde, le 21 juin (Vicaire).—Le Vali Hamid Bey, appelé à Angora, vient de quitter notre ville. On dit que la "Grande Assemblée nationale" se propose de proclamer partout la dictature militaire. La population chrétienne est très préoccupée.

car elle manque de tout moyen de défense. La réalisation de la mobilisation constituerait une véritable calamité, et, si des mesures efficaces et promptes ne sont pas prises, de nouvelles catastrophes pourraient se produire. La situation à Ordou et à Kerassound est grave. Des incidents sanglants s'y produisent continuellement.

Enclosure 3 in No. 72.

Memorandum upon Information communicated by M. Bezjian.

1. M. BEZDIAN, President of the Armenian Protestant Community, called at the British Consulate at Beyrout up to the 17th June which gave the following information about the situation in the country.

2. On the 12th June the Armenians who remained in Ajntab after the French evacuated it were driven by want of provisions and under strong pressure from the French to come to an agreement with the Nationalist leaders to suspend hostilities on the following conditions:—

(a) Armenians to retain their arms and to be allowed to go out unmolested in order to obtain provisions.

3. The French informed both sides that they must keep the peace, and that whatever side broke it would be severely punished.

4. The Armenians were very anxious for the future, as they had no agreement. They were also unable to move about the country owing to the presence of the Nationalists.

5. M. Bezjian also stated that he had received information from a trustworthy source to the effect that Emir Feisal had come to Aleppo about the middle of June, where he had held communications with the leading Armenians, to whom his attitude was friendly. It appeared that they apprehended a combined movement of the French and the Turkish Nationalists against Aleppo, and wished in that eventuality to secure the neutrality, or if possible the active support, of the Armenians.

[E 9666 3/44]

No. 73

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 10.)

(N. 10741)

My Lord

RETURNED to me by the Grand Vizier paid me on the 27th July from Paris and had a long conversation with him, of which the following is a summary. I have already reported the main points in my telegram No. 860 of the 28th July.

2. The Grand Vizier said he expected the new delegation appointed to sign the Peace Treaty to arrive in Paris on the 27th July. He asked me my impression as to the effect of the treaty on the Armenians, and the consequences of attempts at resistance in Thrace, reports of which had reached me. He said that the authorities at Adrianople not to resist. He said that the whole trouble in Thrace was due to the fact that Djafer Tayyar had been allowed to return to Adrianople. He reminded me of the circumstances in which he had done so. The Grand Vizier was alluding to the fact that, when Djafer Tayyar came here in April, the French authorities regarded him as having come with a guarantee of facilities for return, and sent him back to Adrianople under the care of a French officer.

3. The Grand Vizier insisted that Djafer Tayyar, though he now held no official position, was a dangerous man. He spoke of the danger of the situation there drifting under the control of a revolutionary committee,

such as often came uppermost in times of trouble in the East. He said he read in the papers that the British Government had been sending a mission to Adrianople that he was losing his hold on the situation.

4. Ferid Pasha consulted me as to what further he could do to prevent resistance and useless bloodshed in Thrace. He had already, he said, sent instructions to the gendarmerie authorities not to associate themselves with any movement of resistance. These instructions to the gendarmerie were additional to those sent to the military authorities, and had been issued, he explained with some malice, through the French, who were always asserting a special position in gendarmerie matters. His one desire, he assured me, was to take no action in Thrace except such as might have for its object to secure the life and honour of the Moslems. He invited the co-operation of the British military authorities to this end. He suggested sending a personal mission accompanied by a British officer, to impress further on the Turkish Commander at Adrianople the instructions already issued to him.

5. I observed that there were no British military authorities in Thrace except our liaison officers with the Greeks. I said I was sure their influence would be used to prevent any excesses. For the rest, I promised to discuss with General Milne the point raised by his Highness.

6. Ferid Pasha mentioned that the French had ordered the Turkish military post at Hadimkeui to withdraw, and had taken possession of all arms and munitions in store at that place. He expressed great anxiety that these supplies should not fall into the hands of the Greeks. He urged strongly that the Greeks were advancing not in the way of warriors, but to take possession of an area assigned to them under the treaty, and that therefore all stores, both military and otherwise, not only at Hadimkeui, but everywhere this side of the Maritza, were Turkish Government property, and should be restored.

7. I promised to discuss this also with the military authorities, observing that it was, perhaps, affected by article 200 (1) (c) of the Peace Treaty.

8. The Grand Vizier turned to the more general question of the situation which would be created by the Peace Treaty. He assured me more than once that his one aim was to secure peace and order, and that every effort would be made to this end. He had already appointed a commission at the Porte to advise on the treaty, and its purpose. In signing the treaty he believed himself to be acting in the interests of the country, and also to humanity. The first task confronting the Government after signature would be the restoration of order in the country. Could they count on British help in doing so?

9. I took this opportunity to broach the question of the ratification of the treaty by Turkey, a matter which has been much in my mind, as under the Constitution a treaty as the present requires the consent of Parliament, if only because it involves the cession of territory. The Grand Vizier was slow to give me a definite answer, but, on being pressed, dismissed the matter quite lightly. He said the treaty would certainly be ratified, and ratified by the Sultan, for the very good reason, he implied, that there was no one else to do it. He explained that it was with a view to ratification in this manner that he had inserted in the record of the Cabinet's decision, which was a passage stating that, under the Constitution the Government was a power, and that the Sultan, by his decree, could not ratify a treaty.

10. I said I had dwelt on this, because the treaty would not come into force until it was ratified, but, when it did come into force, the restoration of order, which his Highness was so eager to take in hand, would have to proceed on lines defined in the treaty itself. The treaty, I pointed out, contemplated the elaboration of the means of establishing law and order with Allied assistance. I referred especially to articles 159 (f) and 200 of the treaty.

11. The Grand Vizier was somewhat evasive in his answer to the question of the ratification of the treaty. He spoke at some length of the congeries of influences, both European and Asiatic, which had been at work to prevent the signature of the treaty. He hinted, with a certain amount of sarcasm, that the British Government was not doing its duty. The general trend of what he said was, however, perfectly clear, especially in view of the language he has held in other conversations. What he was driving at was that he wanted Turkey to be set on her feet by her own efforts, and with the support and assistance of Great Britain as distinct from the other Allied Powers.

[5774]

P 2

that the late Governor of Adrianople, as well as Mueddin Bey, corps commander in the same town, have arrived there by motor.

M. Stambolisky observes that the Turks are definitely driven from I. . . have compared with the account transmitted one given by the "Probouda" . . . perhaps rather fuller, and note that the Prime Minister stated, besides de . . . other he or his colleagues had ever received Djafar Tayar or other representatives of the Turkish Nationalists, that the Bulgarian Government had refused to give material aid to support these in Thrace, as had apparently been desired by a Turkish delegation who wished to go to Paris. He laid stress on Bulgaria's intention to preserve strict neutrality. "We consider," he stated, according to the "Probouda," "that by our conduct and the loyal fulfilment of our obligations to the Entente, and by a complete understanding with our neighbours, conditions will be created which will enable us to . . . which we signed by necessity. The world still looks askance at us, and has not yet forgiven us our mistakes, and, although we have cleared the atmosphere of hate around us, we have not yet induced the world to put faith in us. Only when the Peace Treaty has been ratified shall we be able to dispel the doubt of the Great Powers."

His Excellency declared, in regard to interior politics, that the law of compulsory labour would be put into effect as soon as possible, and that the whole population between the ages of 20 and 50 years would be called up, the first class being . . . autumn. It is proposed to commence by repairing . . . and the village streets.

Mr. Prime Minister, asked whether the reports in the French press were correct to . . . that M. Take Jonescu had offered to commence discussion regarding the [Dobruja, replied that officially he knew nothing of this, but he believed that the Roumanians were ready to consider the idea of a better understanding. He knew that General Averescu was favourable, and hoped that M. Take Jonescu, as a far-seeing statesman, would not be averse thereto.

He then enquired whether it was true that M. Stambolisky contemplated . . . Bucharest and London. He replied that this would not be possible until the . . . had been ratified, but that the British Government had been asked their views as regards a visit to London.

With reference to M. Stambolisky's statements in respect to Thrace, I have had an opportunity of perusing the first report to the British Military Mission from Captain Baker, the British representative on the Allied Frontier Commission of Inspection. He confirms that 25,000 refugees are crossing into Bulgarian territory, that the Turkish troops who . . . Bulgaria have been disarmed and interned, and states that they brought a battery of four field guns and a howitzer, which are now in charge of the Bulgarian military authorities. He adds that the Bulgarian frontier guards, who have lately been reinforced, have received strict orders to disarm all troops crossing the Bulgarian frontier and, moreover, to maintain friendly connections with any Greek troops that may arrive in the neighbourhood. A number of rumours, he reports, are current as to Djafar Tayar's whereabouts, but his capture is not confirmed. Two days previously to the writing of the report he was declared to be at Bata Fak.

I have, &c.
HERBERT G. DERING

Enclosure in No. 75

Extract from the "Echo de Bulgarie" of July 28, 1920

DECLARATIONS DU PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL

A SON retour à Sofia, M. Stambolisky, qui a visité le couvent de Rilo, les localités de . . . fait des déclarations sur la politique extérieure et intérieure de la Bulgarie. Voici en substance ce que M. Stambolisky a déclaré

La Politique étrangère.

La . . . agi en mandataire de l'Entente, est facilement venue à bout de la . . . les Turcs sont définitivement chassés de l'Europe. L'occupation

de la Thrace constituait un danger pour la Bulgarie, car certains partis bulgares . . . opposé. Il voyait toujours les grandes Puissances derrière la Grèce et était fermement décidé à . . . avec Djafar Tayar. Nous n'avons ni accepté une entrevue avec lui ou ses délégués, ni . . . pour garder la frontière et empêcher le passage de bandes ou le transport de munitions, & . . . Des commissions interalliées pourraient contrôler notre conduite, mais ne . . . à Grèce et les Turcs.

Notre politique pouvait se résumer en un mot: neutralité complète. Telle serait aussi notre ligne de conduite si d'autres pays voisins entraient en guerre. Nous sommes contre toute guerre et nous espérons que grâce à cette attitude, à l'exécution loyale de nos engagements, au désir de nous entendre avec tous nos voisins, il se crée des conditions favorables en vue d'aboutir à la révision du Traité de Paix.

Le monde étranger devra, cependant, savoir qu'il se trouve aujourd'hui en présence d'une Bulgarie tout à fait nouvelle.

Je dis donc que tout n'est pas fini. Le monde est encore en évolution. Les conditions . . . à devenir plus favorables pour . . .

Si, toutefois, on s'avise de violer nos frontières nous nous défendrons. Nous exécuterons les engagements que nous avons pris par le Traité de Paix; il faut aussi que les autres en fassent autant. Je suis persuadé que nos voisins et les autres États n'ont pas intérêt à accroître le mécontentement du peuple bulgare.

La Politique intérieure

Le brigandage a presque entièrement disparu, car il ne reste qu'un petit foyer . . . avons un grand nombre de terres vacantes, sans maîtres. Nous nous proposons . . . Nous ne craignons point d'y installer aussi les réfugiés turcs qui . . . dangereux, le peuple turc est travailleur et sobre.

L'entretien de certains nombres de monastères qui n'ont été intégrés au cours de nos . . . Et d'abord, il s'agit de transférer le séminaire de Sofia au couvent de Rilo. Il y a pour le moment un inconvénient, c'est le manque de communications. Nous y remédierons en effectuant au transport, entre la dernière station et le couvent un certain nombre d'autobus. En second lieu, il y a la question de l'administration des couvents. Leur gestion est négligée. Il conviendrait de recourir à . . . coopération. Le couvent de Rilo serait la centrale de toutes les coopérations.

Il a couru au sujet de la convocation de la Chambre pour les premières . . . importantes qui ont été promulguées. Il s'agit en premier lieu de la loi sur la réglementation du travail. Ensuite viennent la loi sur l'expropriation au profit des domaines publics, l'achat par voie d'expropriation de locaux pour les administrations, la construction d'écoles, le logement des soldats, les biens sans maître, la répartition . . . le montant considérable qui en sera obtenu sera affecté au payement de nos dettes.

Le . . . ils ne sont pas encore définitifs. Nous faisons tout notre possible pour l'examen rapide des procès, nous avons obtenu jusqu'ici un résultat palpable. Nous espérons que les décisions prises seront satisfaisantes.

Le peuple bulgare est avec nous. La Bulgarie sera régénérée, parce qu'elle est entre des bras puissants. Les ennemis de la Bulgarie sont les ennemis de la France et de l'Europe, car nous n'avons pas chez nous des réactionnaires endurcis.

No. 76

So far, July 31, 1920

I will send copy in this despatch for the information of His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

HERBERT G. DERING.

No. 77.

So fig. August 4, 1920

The general tenor of this report has been commented on in my despatches under reference and in my telegram No. 89 of to-day's date, so that any further remarks here under this head would be superfluous. In reply, however, to your Lordship's despatch No. 127 of the 16th July, forwarding a communication from the Greek Minister in London on the subject of the activities of Bulgarian bands on the Thracian frontier, I trust your Lordship will agree that the ground for the Greek assertions has been completely cut away by the action of the Military Commission, which included a Greek officer, and by its report, a copy of which might be of interest to M. Caramanoglou. The

HERBERT G. DIERING.

Note forwarded by Major Neale to War Office

WITH reference to my telegram W R 316 of the 30th July, I forward herewith a copy of the report made by the Inter-Allied Military Commission which visited the Turkish-Bulgarian frontier during the Greek operations in Eastern Thrace

2 I have just seen Lieutenant Spatharis, the Greek member of the commission, on his return to Sofia.

He told me that the behaviour of the Bulgarians had been correct and that the authorities had given all facilities to the commission. He added that their attitude was much more friendly—even to the Greeks—than he had ever found previously. Colonel Humbadjief, who is mentioned in the report, hospitably entertained the commission and proposed the toast of future "bon voisinage." This is testimony from a source certainly not prejudiced in favour of Bulgaria, and may presumably be accepted. Captain Baker also reports that he is satisfied that all armed soldiers crossing the frontier were disarmed.

3. I hear also on good authority that several Turkish officers expressed great dissatisfaction at the failure of the Bulgarians to afford any assistance to their movements.

4 I saw General Nerref, Chief of the Staff, yesterday, and he expressed great satisfaction that this period—which had been looked upon as rather an anxious one—had passed without any untoward incident.

Referring, however, to a rumour which had been circulated that the Greeks intended to advance up to the 1912 frontier, he said that Bulgaria would determinedly resist such a violation of their frontier, and that the Greeks would meet a very different class of resistance from what they had met with from the Turks.

5. With regard to the disposal of the refugees, the soldiers are remaining for the time being interned at Yamboli, while arrangements are being made to colonise the vacant in the thinly-populated area near Vratsa.

General Neresoff told me that he hoped the Entente would assist Bulgaria to obtain some contribution for the maintenance of these untrained troops.

A C B. NEV[†] F

Major, G.S.,

British Military Representative

Sofia, August 2, 1920.

Enclosure 2 to No. 77

Procès-verbal des Opérations de la Commission interalliée prévue par l'ordre
No. 918.2A du Général de Fortou, Commandant les Troupes françaises
en Hongrie

La Commission interalliée s'est constituée à Yambol le 25 juillet. Elle comprend MM. le Commandant Goetzmann de l'Etat Major des Troupes françaises, *Président*

M. phaeo-

Le Capitaine Baker, de l'armée algérienne
Le Lieutenant Popovitch, de l'armée serbe
Le Lieutenant Raymond, de l'Etat-Major, T.F.B.
Le Sous-Lieutenant Spatharis, de l'armée hellénique.

Les membres italiens et roumains ne se sont pas présentés.

Partie de Yambol le 26 juillet à 10 heures 30, à destination de Golembervin, dans le but de prendre acte des mesures prises par le Gouvernement bulgare pour le désarmement des Turcs et d'avertir, le cas échéant, les troupes belges de l'opportunité de leur intervention.

Elle a constaté qu'à Goleu-Derven, sont entrés en Bulgarie environ 20,000 réfugiés turcs, y compris 3,000 soldats appartenant aux 49^e, 55^e et 60^e divisions, 150 gendarmes d'Andrinople; le commandant et 15 officiers de la gendarmerie de cette place, 300 officiers appartenant aux unités ci-dessus, parmi lesquels Mehmed Bey, Commandant le 1^{er} Corps d'Armée, et Chukri Bey, Commandant la 49^e D.I.

Pour recevoir ces réfugiés, les postes frontières bulgares n'ont pas été renforcés.

[5779]

mais trois escadrons de cavalerie et une compagnie d'infanterie ont été mis à la disposition du Colonel Hombadjeff, le Chef d'Etat-Major de la 3^e D.I.B., chargé d'assurer la police de la circulation et l'acheminement des réfugiés, celui des officiers et soldats sur Yambol, celui des habitants sur Autos, ainsi que leur ravitaillement.

Les Turcs qui se sont présentés en armes ont été désarmés à l'arrivée au poste frontière de Golem-Derven. La plupart sont arrivés sans armes et le dépôt de fusils ne compte pas sensiblement plus de 1,000 fusils de différents modèles. L'artillerie déposée à Golem-Derven comprend une batterie de quatre pièces fabrication Krupp, calibre 75, avec quatre caisses de munitions, un canon lourd. Les officiers ont été autorisés à conserver leurs armes.

Des renseignements recueillis, il résulte que c'est le débarquement des troupes qui a causé la panique. Les compagnies presque exclusivement des soldats originaires de la région de Thessalie qui en apprenant l'avance grecque du côté de Tchouri ont quitté précipitamment les rangs de l'armée pour rentrer dans leurs villages et s'enfuir avec leurs familles après avoir abandonné leur uniforme, leur équipement et leurs armes. Les officiers ne sont trouvés à peu près seuls, n'ayant plus auprès d'eux que les soldats originaires de la région de Thessalie.

Le 27 juillet au soir, la frontière était entièrement détrempée des bivouacs de réfugiés.

Dans l'après-midi du 26, le président de la commission et le Sous-secrétaire Spatharis étaient allés dans la direction du sud pour se mettre en route.

Leur automobile hors de service, ils avaient que de très peu dépassé Domkeou et se trouvaient à Domkeou.

La région qu'ils ont traversée était déserte et on n'apercevait aucun mouvement. On leur a dit que la vue pouvait s'étendre au sud de Domkeou. Un Turc rencontré en ce point a affirmé que les troupes helléniques n'avaient pas avancé au nord d'Ienchi Kouy.

Le Sous-Lieutenant Spatharis a fait remarquer qu'un petit village au nord de Domkeou ayant été pillé, ce pillage était le fait des Turcs, réfugiés ou soldats qui venaient d'entrer en Bulgarie.

En raison du long retard des troupes helléniques à occuper le territoire et de l'acheminement en cours d'exécution des Turcs dans l'intérieur de la Bulgarie, aucun incident n'est à prévoir. Le Colonel Hombadjeff s'est déclaré prêt à entreprendre l'occupation de ce secteur, en vue de la reconnaissance en commun de la frontière et de postes à occuper.

Les membres de la commission partis de Golem-Derven à 6 heures le 27 juillet.

L'Etat-Major de la 3^e D.I.B., n'ayant pas été avisé de l'arrivée d'éléments turcs, n'a rien fait. L'Etat-Major de la 3^e D.I.B., n'ayant pas été avisé de l'arrivée d'éléments turcs, n'a rien fait. L'Etat-Major de la 3^e D.I.B., n'ayant pas été avisé de l'arrivée d'éléments turcs, n'a rien fait. L'Etat-Major de la 3^e D.I.B., n'ayant pas été avisé de l'arrivée d'éléments turcs, n'a rien fait.

Le Président de la Commission,

Les membres F. BAKER, G. RAYMOND, A. SPATHARIS, F. POROVITCH

E 9486 1331 44]

No. 78

Earl Curzon to Mr. Davis.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, August 13, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note No. 472 of the 5th instant, marked Urgent, in which your Excellency was good enough to inform me that the Government of the United States make all appropriate reservations with reference to the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, and declare their unwillingness to acquiesce in the application of the provisions of article 294, and of any other article of the said Treaty, in a manner which may prejudice, directly or indirectly, the right

of American citizens or corporations, or which may preclude them from acquiring in the future rights or interests on terms of equality with nationals of Allied States. I have to thank your Excellency for the communication.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[E 10002 180 44]

N

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 17.)

My Lord,

Athens, August 5, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of notes made by a member of my staff on an interview with a deputation of the Greek refugees from that area in Asia Minor now occupied by the Italians.

I am sending a copy of these notes also to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.

GRANVILLE

Enclosure in No. 79

Notes on an Interview with a Deputation of the Refugees from the Italian Zone in Asia Minor.

A DEPUTATION of two of the signatories of a document left at the legation last night, with the president of the Unredeemed Greeks as spokesman, called this morning to make oral utterance to the substance of the document.

He outlined the oppression endured by the Greeks in the Ephesus zone, the Italians, who are persecuting the Greeks, the persecution against the Greeks. Assassinations, violations and so forth are the order of the day. The Greeks are not allowed even to leave their houses, and some die of starvation. The Italians shoot Greeks merely to try their rifles.

The speaker said that the Greeks are not even allowed to see from the sea. The Greeks are not even allowed to see from the sea.

Surveys have been undertaken with a view to settling Italians on Greek land.

The only suggestion made by the deputation was that General Malet should be empowered to act militarily. If no measures are possible, they ask that at least a Greek detachment be sent to the frontier.

I refrained from any comment or encouragement. I laid the document before His Majesty's Minister and report to him the substance of their recital.

The spokesman made an allusion to the recent Italo-Greek incident on the frontier, and said that the Greeks were the outcome of an attempt by a Greek detachment to protect some countrymen from Italian brutality.

C. E. S. D.

Athens, August 5, 1920

[E 10021/56 44]

No. 80

Sir G. Buchanan to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 620.)

Pondlipo, August 8, 1920.

My Lord,

AN account of an interview given by M. Tittoni to the Paris correspondent of the Stefani Agency appears in to-day's Italian newspapers. It is devoted entirely to the question of the Tittoni-Venizelos Agreement of July 1919, which, M. Tittoni says, was

Q 2

first and foremost intended to constitute a uniform line of action towards Greece and Italy at the Peace Conference. M. Titti... that Italy cannot now abide by the terms... circumstances which has taken... weightier argument in Italy's favour, the agreement has not really been cancelled by her, as has... stated, but has become null and void because the effect which it anticipated have actually occurred. He acknowledges that his course of action at the time the agreement was drawn up was, perhaps, not of the best, but he claims that it was opportune, and that of two evils he chose the less. His critics have, he says, only considered the advantages conferred by the agreement on Greece, and have ignored the benefits accruing to Italy. In the first the agreement assured the neutralisation of the Straits of Corfu and of the eastern shore of the Straits up to 25 kilom. inland, in accordance with the advice of the Italian military and naval experts. This, though an important advantage, was, however, secondary to the question of Asia Minor. Rightly or wrongly, he was, he says, convinced from the first that Italy could only obtain in Asia Minor compensation for what was refused her elsewhere. In September 1919 the United States, Great Britain and France... to give not only Smyrna, but also its surrounding territory, to Greece... the procès-verbal of the particular sitting of the Conference at... was discussed sufficient to prove this. Soon afterwards, when Signor Orlando went to Paris, M. Clemenceau made it clear to him that in his absence the Conference had decided to accede to Greece's demands in respect of the occupation of Smyrna. Mr. Wilson, who was present, interrupted M. Clemenceau brusquely and said that Greece had not asked for anything, but that it was the Conference which, on its own initiative, had decided that Greece should occupy Smyrna and its territory. M. Titti himself went to Paris he found that Mr. Wilson had left, but the Allies were in their resolve. He had a very difficult task therefore to maintain the occupation of Smyrna by Italian troops.

As regards Asia Minor in general, however, a quite definite programme. He held that Italy's objectives there were real commercial expansion. He... M. Clemenceau—in spite of the assurance that interests would be prejudiced, as France had never used the Hercules coal—... him obstinately, notwithstanding advice to the contrary from MM. Tardieu and Loucheur, and claimed that the settlement of the question must be put off till the terms of peace with Turkey came to be considered. M. Titti's request for its participation in oil concessions met with the more put-off reply.

The question of grain could have been very easily settled by the attribution to Italy of the rich and fertile valley of the Meander, from which Italy could have obtained a considerable amount of cereals, and Italian commercial expansion would have been secured by the possession of the port of Scalanova, which is destined some day to equal, or even excel, Smyrna in importance.

Convinced however, that he could not count on the Allies to help him to obtain what M. Titti had, he says, nothing for it but to have recourse to a direct agreement with M. Venizelos. In that agreement the attribution to Italy of the Meander valley and of Scalanova is not only expressly mentioned, but is made categorically an essential condition of the agreement, which is itself to become null and void in the event of Italy being unable to obtain the fulfilment of her aspirations in Asia Minor; and it was also added that the agreement would become null and void *ipso jure*.

It is, therefore, useless now to dwell on questionable reasons when Italy has one supreme reason in her favour. Greece, indeed, could have contended that an equal reduction of her own and of the Italian claims could not cancel the agreement, but, since Greece has been accorded in Asia Minor real and special territorial gains while Italy has only received economic preference in the Meander valley and Scalanova, which is merely of value in respect of those States that have agreed to it, it is obvious that the agreement is at an end, as it would be utterly unreasonable to claim that an obligation assumed by Italy held good without her receiving the *quid pro quo* for which she undertook it.

In the press report of this interview M. Titti makes no mention of the Dodecanese question, beyond saying that the agreement stipulated that, in the event of the cession by Great Britain of Cyprus to Greece, Italy undertook to act similarly as regards Rhodes. He adds that he must make it clear that, from the outset, he has entirely shared Count Sforza's views about the nullity of the agreement, and that it is inaccurate to say that the Italian Government have annulled it. The position is that

the agreement became null and void on the day on which the nullity for which its terms were drawn up, namely, Italy's failure to obtain what she ought to have had, and in no way Greece, as she has not obtained what she ought to have had, and in no way Greece, as she has not obtained *ultra petito*.

I am, &c.
GEORGE W. HUGHANAN.

E 9993 39 44]

No. 81

The Marquis Imperiali to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 17.)

(Translation.)

My Lord,

Italian Embassy, London, August 17, 1920.

REFERRING to the reservation contained in the note transmitted by the... which, together with the... in the formation of the company intended to manage the Anatolian railways. The group is formed of the Banca commerciale italiana, the Credito italiano and the Banca di Roma.

As it will be necessary for the representatives of all three groups to meet without delay to an agreement regarding all the questions concerning the Anatolian railways, I beg to request your... good offices in order that this meeting might take place with all speed.

With thanks in anticipation, I beg, &c.

IMPERIALI

E 10018/3 44]

No. 82.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 17.)

Sir,

War Office, August 17, 1920.

I AM... Army Council to forward herewith copies of telegrams... which the course of action therein proposed would constitute, the Army Council would have no objection, from the military point of view to permission being granted to the Ottoman Government to raise two divisions, totalling 25,000 men.

It is to be noted that the terms of the Peace Treaty could be enforced in Anatolia more easily by the Turkish Government than by an Allied force. Such an arrangement would, however, affect the Greeks very closely, and it is not known whether they will look upon it favourably.

I am, &c.

H. J. CREEDY

Enclosure 1 in No. 82

General Headquarters, Constantinople, to War Office

(Secret.)

(Telegraphic) P.

Constantinople, July 30, 1920.

INSTEAD of the 15,000 men allowed by peace terms, Ottoman Government requests permission to raise two divisions, totalling 25,000 men, as follows: one cavalry regiment; three infantry regiments, each three battalions; three companies heavy machine guns; two batteries mountain howitzers; auxiliary and supply services.

I am that I would represent his wish, but I thought it was better to discuss it with our allies, France and Italy. He then made a similar application to the French Government through the delegation here. I told him unofficially that there would be no objection to such relations, through a Chargé d'Affaires, being entered into immediately. He was expecting official confirmation of this. With regard to Italy, he had been officially informed that such relationships could be entered into immediately, and that Italy would enter into official diplomatic relationship through an Ambassador with Turkey at the earliest possible moment.

He begged me to put those three questions to your Lordship and to give me a reply as possible.

He then commenced a discussion on general subjects connected with Turkey, in the shape of a communiqué which had appeared in the "Matin" this morning from Armenia, declaring an independent State in Cilicia, and stating that they were acting in accordance with the actual communiqué as it appears in the "Matin." He thought, perhaps, that this was simply put forward by the Armenians without the knowledge or consent of the French, but he was approaching the French Government on the subject. He wished me to point out, however, that, if it were correct, it was entirely opposed to the terms of the treaty.

He then spoke in general terms of the assistance that the Sultan would require to restore internal order, and of all the difficulties they were meeting with in their restrictions on their arms.

He then said that he was sure of your Lordship's support in any matter that might make for such assistance as would enable them to crush the insurrection. He told me that he thought that it was already dying; that there was a great dissension amongst the leaders, and that many would take the opportunity of the pardon offered by the Sultan to renew their allegiance to him. On the other hand, there were a certain band who would undoubtedly resist, and, in his opinion, they were being incited to do so by certain French financial interests. These interests before the war had had many privileges in Turkey, by which they had gained through the Young Turkish Party very considerable pecuniary advantages, and they were anxious not to lose these. They were therefore supporting the Young Turkish Party in the hopes that if the latter party prevailed their old privileges would be restored.

I asked him whether he was making these communications officially or unofficially. He told me that with regard to the questions I have enumerated above, he was able to put them forward officially through me as a member of the Ambassadors' Conference. I begged him to have these words put forward officially to your Lordship through the British High Commissioner at Constantinople. At the same time, I informed him that I would write to your Lordship unofficially on the subject. He left me with many protestations of goodwill towards England, expressing again the intention of the Sultan and his Government to loyally carry out the conditions in the Treaty of Peace.

DEARLY

Enclosure in No. 87

Excerpt from the "Matin" of August 26, 1920.

LES ARMÉNIENS DE CILICIE PROCLAMENT LEUR INDÉPENDANCE

LA Délégation nationale arménienne nous communique l'information suivante

"Les Arméniens de Cilicie ont proclamé leur indépendance sous la protection de la France. Un Gouvernement provisoire a été constitué. Les forces arméniennes ont occupé plusieurs villages. Elles avancent vers Mouch."

E 10264 39 44]

No. 88

Mr. Vansittart to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 23.)

(No. 78)

MR. VANSITTART presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Ottoman Delegation dated the 5th August, 1920, respecting the Tripartite Agreement.

I am, Sir, Sir,

Enclosure in No. 88

Ottoman Delegation to M. Mullerand, President of the Peace Conference

M. le Président,

Paris, le 12 août 1920

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre que votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire parvenir le 11 courant, de même que le document qui l'accompagnait.

Comme il appartient à mon Gouvernement de se prononcer sur les accords que ce document contient, je me borne à le lui transmettre, sans que cela implique aucune espèce d'acquiescement, pas plus de la part de la délégation que du Gouvernement ottoman.

Veuillez agréer, &c
HAD.

E 10386 4504 44]

No. 89

Sir H. Dering to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 202)

My Lord,

Sofia, August 17, 1920.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 145 of the 26th July last, on the subject of M. Caclamanov's further complaint of clandestine Bulgarian assistance to Colonel Jafar Tavar, I have the honour to report that since your Lordship was good enough to leave it to my discretion as to whether any communication in the reference should be made to the Bulgarian Government or not, I have decided to take no action in the matter upon the grounds that the information forwarded is now out of date, and the accusation is fully countered by the report of the Inter-Allied Military Commission on the Thracian frontier (vide my despatches Nos. 239 and 246 of the 21st July and 3rd August).

From information available here the figure stated in the last paragraph of M. Caclamanov's note of komitaja assisting Colonel Jafar Tavar would appear to be exaggerated. A recent report from the British intelligence officer at Adrianople forwarded to the War Office by the British military representative here confirms my information. There are no doubt bands on both sides of the frontiers—Bulgarian and Greek as well—but the respective Governments give them no support, and certainly the Bulgarian Government to my knowledge do their best to suppress any on their side.

I have, &c

HERBERT G. DERING

E 10230 3 44]

No. 90

Earl Curzon to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No. 945), Rome (No. 378), and Tokyo (No. 286).

(Telegraphic.) D

Foreign Office, August 25, 1920.

GRAND VIZIER has sounded High Commissioner at Constantinople as to whether British and Allied Governments will receive Turkish representatives to act unofficially as Charges d'Affaires pending ratification of treaty.

On the whole I am disposed to agree. But in this and in larger question of permanent representation, His Majesty's Government trust that Allies will only act after consultation and in common, as they did in the case of Germany. Their own

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proposal is to send out a diplomat as High Commissioner very shortly and, on ratification, appoint him Minister.

Appointment of Ambassadors, in view of altered status of Turkey, would seem absurd. Please consult Government to which you are accredited and let me know as soon as possible whether they agree

[E 10541 10115 44] No. 91

Mr. Henderson to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 27)

(No. 1033)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Paris, August 27, 1920

Your Lordship's telegram No. 945 of 25th August.

French Government are willing to receive Turkish representative as Charge

French Government are, however, in favour of eventual appointment of a representative of Turkish Government at Constantinople, and which should properly be subordinated to respective representatives of higher rank than Minister.

Secretary-General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed me that French Government proposed to retain at Constantinople. He would, however, continue to act as High Commissioner until bringing into force of treaty and his rank as Ambassador would only become definite then.

No debate decision had been taken on this point, and Secretary-General advised

[E 11114 10115 44] No. 92

Earl Curzon to Mr. N. Henderson (Paris).

(No. 900)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 27, 1920

My telegram No. 945 of 25th August.

I am now informed by the Italian Ambassador that his Government have actually asked for and obtained the agreement of the Porte to appointment of an Ambassador. His Excellency has been informed that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, it is quite contrary to the spirit of friendly co-operation amongst the Powers that such a decision should have been taken without our knowledge and that of the French Government.

A little later the French Minister stated that M. Millerand, who had learned of the action of the Italian Government, saw some advantage in the representatives of the Powers having high rank, to enable them to exercise authority over the various commissions to be established at Constantinople, and that in these circumstances the French Government would probably appoint an Ambassador.

You should at once see M. Millerand and ascertain whether it is his view that the Allies must appoint Ambassadors forthwith, and emphasise our objection.

We support His Majesty's Government in holding out against what we regard as an absurd exaggeration of the importance of the post, we will do so, and will bring the utmost pressure to bear upon the Italians.

[E 10185 '3 44] No. 93

Earl Curzon to M. de Fleurbaey.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 27, 1920

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 20th instant to the effect (1) that the French Government propose to entrust to the

Commission of Ambassadors at Paris the execution of the Turkish Treaty. 2) that M. Millerand sees no objection to the immediate organisation of the Commission provided for in the Turkish Treaty, subject to the authorisation of the Inter-Allied Commission who should satisfy themselves that these troops will not eventually join the Nationalists. The Commission does not object to the despatch to Anatolia of the troops of the Nationalists the dangers of their attitude. The Commission states that the execution of the Allied High Commissioners.

2. As regards the first point, His Majesty's Government consider that the execution of the treaty would best be regulated by ordinary diplomatic procedure centring in the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople. This procedure seems to them likely to be more efficacious and expeditious than entrusting decisions as to the execution of the treaty to the Conference of Ambassadors, the existence of which, moreover, encourages the reference of questions to it, and thus creates unnecessary delay.

3. As regards the second and third points, I entirely share the views of M. Millerand, and, in the case of the third point, I have already signified my approval to a similar suggestion from the British High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have &c

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[E 10018 '3 44]

No. 94.

Foreign Office to War Office

Foreign Office, August 27, 1920

Sir,

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th instant, stating that the Army Council have no objection, from the military point of view, to permission being granted to the Ottoman Government to raise two divisions, totalling 25,000 men, for the repression of the Nationalist movement, though this would constitute an infringement of the peace terms.

In Lord Curzon's opinion, there can be no objection to the Turkish Government raising immediately the 15,000 men allowed by the Peace Treaty, with the authorisation of the inter-Allied military commanders, provided the latter are satisfied that these forces will not join the Nationalists, but it would be very undesirable to agree to the infringement of the treaty involved in acceding to the Turkish request to raise a force of two divisions, totalling 25,000 men.

I am, &c.

J. A. O. TILLEY

[E 10493 '9075 44]

No. 95

Minutes of Inter-Departmental Conference, August 23, 1920. Commission of Control to be set up at Constantinople.—(Received August 27.)

AN Inter-Departmental Conference was held at the Foreign Office on the 23rd August, 1920, to discuss the question of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control and Organisation to be set up in Constantinople, under the Turkish Treaty.

The following were present:—

Mr. Max Muller (in the Chair).
Major General Thwaites, War Office.
Captain G. C. Dickens, R.N., Admiralty.
Flight-Commander Wynn, Air Ministry.
Mr. Foss, Treasury.
Mr. Fitzmaurice, Foreign Office.

In regard to the Military Commission, Mr. Max Muller explained that it had dual functions, and would operate as a Commission of Control for six months at the most, while as a Commission of Organisation it would operate for five years from the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, at the end of which period the principal Allied Powers had the right to decide whether it was desirable to maintain or suppress that section of the commission.

[5773]

R 2

General Thwaites referred to the suggestions submitted by the Allied Military Committee at Versailles as to the representation of the various Allies interested on the Commissions of Control, as embodied in War Office letter of the 14th August, and pointed out that under the terms of the treaty the United States had no claim to be represented on those commissions.

Mr. Max Muller added that by article 196 these commissions were to be appointed by the principal Allied Powers, and the preamble to the treaty described the principal Allied Powers as Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, so that the last-named Power was entitled to be represented on the Commissions of Control, though there might be some doubt as to how far the Japanese were likely to carry their representation into practice, as they were not to provide any share of the occupying forces.

General Thwaites then stated that the Army Council were of opinion that the President of the Military Commission of Control and Organisation should be the senior person as the General Officer Commanding Allied forces in the demilitarised zone. This being also the view of the French Government, the committee recommended that the two posts should be united in one person.

General Thwaites now put forward the contention of the Army Council that on the grounds put forward by the War Office in their letter already referred to.

Mr. Max Muller pointed out that in this question of the presidency of the various Inter Allied Commissions to be appointed there must be a certain give and take, and that we would not expect to have it all our own way. Personally he was in favour of concentrating on obtaining the presidency of the Military Commission for the first period, as he hoped that on the Financial Commission, even if the French were to be president for the first year, Sir Adam Block, with the support of the British, would, as seemed likely, M. Nogara was chosen for the post, would be able to uphold British interests. Moreover, the life of the Military Commission, even in its functions as a Commission of Organisation, was likely to be considerably shorter than that of the Financial Commission, and it would be hard for a future president to go back on the general system of reorganisation adopted by the Military Commission at the outset of its labours.

On being asked his opinion by the Chairman, Mr. Fane informed the committee that the Treasury would not press for the appointment of the British representative as first President of the Financial Commission if by so doing they diminished the chances of obtaining for us the presidency of the Military Commission.

Mr. Max Muller expressed the opinion that, in view of the preponderant part taken by the British Empire in the defeat of Turkey, and of the fact that, whereas the Military Commissions of Control in Germany and Bulgaria were presided over by Frenchmen, and those in Austria and Hungary by Italians, hitherto Great Britain had no representation, there was a very strong case for His Majesty's Government to be represented at all events for the first period, of the Military Commission of Control and Organisation in Turkey.

This was accepted, as was also the proposition that the presidency of the Military Commission of Control and Organisation in Turkey should be held by a British officer.

The presidency of the Financial Commission, rotate among the chief representatives of the three Powers providing the forces for the occupation of the demilitarised zone. This question, however, it was felt, was one for decision by the Council of Ambassadors in Paris, and it was accordingly decided to recommend to Lord Curzon that he should instruct Lord Derby to bring this question before the Council of Ambassadors and to urge—

1. That the presidency of the Military Commission of Control should be combined with the High Command of the Allied forces in the demilitarised zone.
2. That the presidency should be rotatory on the analogy of the Financial Commission, and
3. That His Majesty's Government, for the reasons stated above, claimed that for the first period the presidency, combined with the High Command, should be entrusted to a British officer.

There was some difference of opinion as to the period for which the presidency should be held, Mr. Max Muller and Mr. Fitzmaurice favouring one year dating from the entry into force of the treaty, on the analogy of the Financial Commission, but General Thwaites contended that this period was too short to achieve much.

At Mr. Max Muller's suggestion, it was therefore decided that in the first place it would be advisable to press for a period of two years, but that, if this were found

possible, then a period of one year should be accepted. The question then arose as to the rank of the President of the Military Commission of Control and Organisation. General Thwaites expressed the opinion that it would not be under the rank of lieutenant-general, as it was in the case of General Officer Commanding, but would command the two divisions of the Inter-Allied forces of occupation.

General Thwaites stated that the French were pressing for one Commander-in-chief responsible to the Council of Ambassadors.

Mr. Max Muller suggested that the French should be responsible to the three High Commissioners or Ministers at Constantinople.

General Thwaites then stated that the French General Officer Commanding would, for reasons of military seniority have to vacate his post entirely and go home on the expiry of his period of office as General Officer Commanding and President of the Military Commission.

Mr. Max Muller expressed doubts as to the expediency of the British senior officer, but General Thwaites saw no objection to such a course, as he said there would be no objection to a British officer taking his place.

Commander Wynn enquired whether the period of office of the Commander-in-chief and President of the Military Commission was personal or national and it was decided that it must certainly be regarded as national, i.e., that, if he died or was incapacitated, the expiry of his period of office, another general of the same nationality must be appointed to serve out the balance of his term.

It was generally recognised that, as the Naval and Air Commission of Control had only to do with disarmament and disarmament, they were not of such importance as the Military Commission.

General Thwaites then stated that the Italian representative of the Naval Commission, while the representative of the Air Commission, would be a Frenchman as president of the Air Commission. In these two commissions there is no question of rotation, as their functions should cease in six months from the coming into force of the treaty.

Mr. Fane had to leave the committee while it was sitting, but before he left he stated that the Treasury would raise no objection to Sir Adam Block being appointed British representative on the Financial Commission, which was a post of great importance to British and Dutch bondholders on the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt.

W. G. MAX MULLER.

(E 10572 10115 44)

No. 26

Sir G. Buchanan to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 363)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Rome, August 27, 1920.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I have just seen, said that Italian Ambassador at London had already discussed question with Lord Hardinge. He contended that Italy was bound to consult her Allies before taking such a step, his Excellency argued that if anyone was to blame it was His Majesty's Government, who are appointing a Minister there without informing Italian Government. Had they given him notice of their intention only to send a Minister he might have perhaps given way, but that now it was too late. I contended that Allied Governments were under a tacit understanding between themselves. He replied that this understanding had only referred to Berlin, and he believed that French Government proposed to send an Ambassador to Constantinople. The fact of our appointing Ambassadors to Constantinople must necessarily involve appointment of Turkish Ambassadors in Allied countries, and Turkey was too poor to do this. He would, he added, send me written answer.

'E 10585 10115 44]

No. 97

Mr. Henderson to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 29)

(No. 1021)

(Telegraphic) D.

Paris, August 26, 1920

YOUR Lordship's telegram No. 960 of 27th August

French Government have so far received no official information as to intention of Italian Government to appoint Ambassador in Constantinople, though French High Commissioner there and French Ambassador at Rome have reported that this step was anticipated.

Latter stated Senator Garroni was personal friend of M. Giolitti, and that he would in all probability not remain more than six or eight months at Constantinople.

Secretary-General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whom I saw in absence of President of the Council at Versailles, while fully concurring in the view of the Ambassador in London, informed me that it was in fact M. Millerand that Allied representatives at Constantinople should eventually have ambassadorial rank. I emphasised objections of His Majesty's Government to this, and had stress on temporary nature of commissions of control, but M. Paleologue did not give me any indication that M. Millerand would be likely to reconsider the matter. He repeated arguments respecting financial importance of Turkey to France, and the multitude of vital questions, Straits, Greece, Bulgaria, Russia, Cilicia and Asia Minor, &c., that would have to be dealt with at Constantinople.

M. Paleologue again assured me, however (see my telegram No. 1033 of the 27th August, that French Government had no intention of appointing Ambassadors forthwith, see last paragraph of your telegram under reply), that Mr. Gregory's appointment, if finally decided upon, could not properly be made until after ratification of treaty.

It was on account of delay in this respect that it was proposed to give personal rank to M. Deffrance.

I pointed out that any announcement now of such promotion would be prejudicial to the only internal administration of Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

He undertook, subject to consent which he foresaw of M. Millerand, to join—if His Majesty's Government wished—in bringing pressure to bear at Rome against immediate appointment of Italian Ambassador, but held out no prospect of French support in resisting eventual nomination of Ambassadors.

'E 10627 106 44]

No. 98.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received August 30.)

(Also by)

Admiralty, August 28, 1920

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, extract from a report, dated the 23rd July, 1920, which has been received from the Commodore, Smyrna, relative to affairs at Smyrna and Western Anatolia.

2 A copy of the above-mentioned report has also been sent to the War Office.

I am, &c

W. BADDELEY

Enclosure 1 in No. 98

Commodore Pilemaurice to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean Station

(Confidential)

Sir,

H.M.S. "Bryony" at Smyrna, July 23, 1920.

IN continuation of my letter of the 16th July, 1920, I have the honour to forward the following report on affairs at Smyrna and in Western Anatolia:—

Political and Military.

2. In the northern area all is quiet. General Paraskevopoulos has issued a notice to the effect that claims should be sent in for all sheep, cattle and other live stock commandeered by the Greek troops during their advance to Panderma and Bruza, and

that all of these will be promptly settled. M. Sterghiadis states that only very few of the refugees are settled. He states that the refugees were mostly civilian Ottoman Greeks who had taken the opportunity to

3. In the south it is unfortunately only too true that the Nationalists at Nazilli, under the leadership of Demetrius Mehmet and Yuruf Ali, before evacuating the town, massacred a large number of Christians, for the Greek troops on entering the town found close on sixty corpses, many of them being the bodies of young girls who had been killed. It is also reported that other Greek civilians, including women and children, were driven off towards Kayudjak; their fate is unknown.

4. The Nationalists pillaged the houses and set fire to a railway station. These occurrences took place on the 2nd July. News of what was happening was conveyed to the Greek refugees who had managed to escape. The Greek refugees, who had managed to escape, were driven upon, and took place on the 3rd July. The Greek refugees (who were driven to the eastward) was also occupied; this for the present represents the limit of the Greek advance in the Meander valley.

5. The railway between Aidin and Nazilli has been restored, and trains are now running as far as Nazilli.

6. As regards the Greco-Italian situation, affairs are still at a deadlock. The Greek point of view is that they are not going to run any further risk of allowing the Italian zone to be severed. To this end they are occupying several strategic points within about a mile of the railway line in the zone. They admit that theoretically they are wrong in doing so, but as the Italians have failed to guard the railway they have no other option. They are fully prepared to evacuate the Italian zone in theory, provided that the Italians will allow them to send outposts. M. Sterghiadis told me that he had managed to convince Baron Indelli (the Italian delegate) of the necessity of the Greek request, and that a joint commission actually met out to determine the points to be temporarily occupied by the Greeks. On arrival at Aynasoluk, however, an emissary of General Porta announced that the latter was in receipt of definite information that the matter was being dealt with by M. Venizelos and the Italian Premier, and that therefore he could sanction no local arrangement. M. Sterghiadis has telegraphed to M. Venizelos for confirmation or denial of this, and, pending a reply, affairs are at a standstill, but, so far as I am aware, the Greeks are maintaining their outposts.

M. Sterghiadis states that he is fully prepared to offer reparation to the Italians for the damage done, but that he himself attributes the bulk of the blame to the Italian officer who refused to withdraw, and, on receiving a reply, he refused to instruct his men to attack.

7. On the 17th July, noting that the Turkish gunboat "Hezir Reis" had arrived up, I wrote to Captain V. Loprestis, the Greek senior naval officer, forwarding a copy of my letter to his predecessor of the 25th June, 1920, and asked for the Greek reply. At the same time I asked for an assurance that neither the "Hezir Reis" nor the motor vedette would be moved from Smyrna without my previous knowledge (copy of my letter is enclosed).

The "Hezir Reis" sailed, towing a large lighter. She was flying no colours of any sort. Captain Loprestis then came to see me, and said that the gunboat had been sent to Panderma by M. Sterghiadis's instructions, and that he was under the impression that the latter had instructed him to do so.

I pointed out to Captain Loprestis that the "Hezir Reis" was not a tug, and that the support which I was ready to give him, he ought to keep me informed of his proposed actions relative to this vessel. I then went to see M. Sterghiadis, accompanied by the representative of the High Commissioner and my secretary, and enunciated the same views to him. M. Sterghiadis said that he quite saw my point, and that the failure to inform me was an error on his part which he would only attribute to press of work. As regards the "Hezir Reis," he said that she was being used purely as a tug, and that he would not have authorised her use as such had he not received a very urgent telegram from General Paraskevopoulos asking for a tug to be sent to Panderma at once for the purpose of towing lighters from Panderma to a point on the Thracian coast, the said lighters being for the conveyance of troops and stores. On receipt of this telegram he had told Captain Loprestis to send a tug, but the latter informed him that the only tug in Smyrna was unseaworthy, and requested

permission to use the "Hexir Reis," to which proposal he accordingly consented. M. Sterghiadis at Smyrna at the same time would not be sent away again. At the same time he asked whether I had any objection to her being used for conveying stores, &c., between Smyrna and the prisoners' camp at Yourlah Scala, to which I replied that I would see none.

I have since received a letter from Captain Loprestis in which he states that neither of the Turkish vessels will be moved from Smyrna in future without my permission (copy attached—Enclosure 3).

The "Hexir Reis" has not yet arrived at Panderma. As a northerly gale has been blowing in the Aegean ever since the date of her departure, she is presumably weather-bound.

8. The Greek cruiser "Averoff" arrived at Smyrna on the 16th July and sailed again the same evening. H. M. S. "Bryony" took on board in strict incognito. Mme. Munos, his morganatic wife, is now at Smyrna, and is residing at Kraemer's Hotel.

General

9. The collier "Ida Zelok" arrived at Smyrna on the 17th July. "Bryony" took on stores and provisions from her the same day and coaled ship the following morning, achieving the creditable performance of taking in 238 tons at the rate of 35.2 tons an hour. The collier sailed for Constantinople at noon.

10. H. M. S. "Tribune" sailed for Mudros with mails and correspondence P.M. 8th July, and returned to Smyrna the following afternoon.

I have, &c.

M. FITZMAURICE, Commodore

Enclosure 2 in No. 98

Commodore Fitzmaurice to Hellenic Senior Naval Officer, Smyrna.

Sir, H. M. S. "Bryony" at Smyrna, July 17, 1920.
I HAVE the honour to forward for your information a copy of a letter which I wrote to your predecessor on the subject of the Turkish gunboat "Hexir Reis," and to request the favour of a reply.

2. I shall also be glad to receive your assurance that neither this gunboat nor vedette No. 14 will be moved from Smyrna without my previous knowledge.

I have, &c.

M. FITZMAURICE, Commodore

Enclosure 3 in No. 98

Hellenic Senior Naval Officer, Smyrna, to Commodore Fitzmaurice

Excellence, M. R. H. "Lemnos" Smyrna, le 19 juillet 1920.
D'APRÈS notre conversation d'avant-hier et en réponse à votre lettre du 17 courant, j'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance ce qui suit:

1. M. Sterghiadis de faire remorquer immédiatement quelques chalands à Panderma pour le transport des troupes sur les côtes de Thrace. Son Excellence me donna l'ordre de mettre immédiatement le remorqueur de la base navale "Saint Demetrios" à la disposition de M. Sterghiadis. Ce remorqueur, qui est en mauvais état de prendre le large à cause d'une avarie dans son condenseur, dont la réparation était impossible dans la journée.

Son Excellence chercha d'en trouver un autre remorqueur, mais, n'ayant pas réussi dans ses recherches, me donna l'ordre de préparer la canonnière turque "Hexir Reis" pour le remorquage des chalands et le transport urgent des troupes.

En procédant ainsi, Commodore, je me croyais être en règle lorsque, après avoir reçu votre lettre, je me suis aperçu de la correspondance précédente faite par mon prédécesseur, le Commandant Gonatas, et de laquelle je n'ai pas eu le temps de me rendre

compte à cause du très court intervalle du jour de mon commandant. Son Excellence le Haut-Commissaire non plus n'avait-il pris connaissance de ladite correspondance.

J'ai l'honneur de vous assurer, Commodore, que les autorités navales helléniques en prenant possession de la canonnière turque "Hexir Reis," elles agissent comme gardiens pour les forces alliées, et que dorénavant aucun mouvement de la canonnière ou de la vedette No. 14 ne sera fait sans votre autorisation.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

VINCENT LOPRESTI.

Enclosure 4 in No. 98

Commodore Fitzmaurice to Hellenic Senior Naval Officer, Smyrna

Sir, H. M. S. "Bryony" at Smyrna, June 1, 1920.
WITH reference to your communication of the 10th/23rd June, 1920, and in view of certain protests which I have received regarding the seizure of the Turkish gunboat "Hexir Reis," I should be glad to have your assurance that, in taking possession of this gunboat, the Greek naval authorities are acting as custodians for the Allied Powers, by whom the eventual disposition of the ship will be made.

I have, &c.

M. FITZMAURICE, Commodore

E 10690 10115/44

No. 99

Mr. Henderson to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 31)

(No. 1046.)

(Telegraphic.) D

I AM forwarding by bag to-night copy of note of French Government as to future Allied representation in Constantinople, following lines of those given in my telegram No. 1046, dated 28th August.

Note states French Government have authorised Turkish Delegation in Paris to entertain semi-official direct relations with Minister for Foreign Affairs pending ratification of treaty, while withholding title of Chargé d'Affaires, as implying resumption of regular diplomatic relations.

E 10780 4504 44

No. 100

Sir H. Dering to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 1.)

(No. 310.)

My Lord,

Sofia, August 23, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a report submitted by Lieutenant H. Clarke, British intelligence officer in Thrace, on the events which occurred subsequent to the occupation of Adrianople by the Greeks. This report, which was compiled at my suggestion and was addressed to the British military representative in Sofia, appears particularly interesting and unbiased in every way.

I am sending a copy of this despatch and enclosure to His Majesty's Minister in Athens, while the British military representative will forward the report to the Director of Military Intelligence.

I have, &c.

HERBERT G. DERING

Enclosure in No. 106

Report by British Intelligence Officer, Thrace, on the Situation in the Karagatch District

(a.) Military.

THE Greek occupation has continued without any difficulties or opposition.

The behaviour of the Greek troops in Thrace from the time they first occupied Xanthi on the 17th October, 1919, till now has been excellent.

It is worth recording what Turkish officers and civilians said of the first detachments of Greek troops who marched through Adrianople on the morning of the 24th July last to occupy the city. They said they would have expected Greek troops to behave like that, and that had Turkish troops been occupying a Greek town there would not have been such a complete absence of looting.

2. Gendarmerie was organised in advance, and the men were posted immediately on the occupation of Adrianople. As a result, there were no disorders at all.

3. A number of prisoners were captured. They were all well treated. Jafar was visited by his family, and the officers showed by their treatment of him that they realised that while his politics were different from theirs, Jafar had fought a clean war, small though the war was, and that he had worked hard personally to prevent disorders and looting.

(b.) Political.

1. One of the most important points of the Greek occupation of Adrianople was that the High Commission arrived several hours before the official entry of the regiment and commenced work at once. A sort of military dictatorship for Thrace under the General Officer Commanding-in-chief had been expected, but this did not occur.

2. The Greeks have two primary objects in their occupation: (a) to make Thrace a safe place where people of any nationality will be able to live without anxiety as to how they will be treated; (b) to develop the country economically and commercially and make it pay.

Regarding (a), I have seen several Bulgars whom I knew more than a year ago, and they say that they are left alone by the Greeks to carry on their work, and that they are not molested in any way.

Regarding (b), the two chief things at present are that the Greeks intend to give all possible encouragement to foreign capital, and administrative officials are receiving and tabulating offers and enquiries of capital for investment in different classes of industries, and that the Greek Government has a definite programme for encouraging agriculture, which is to start with agricultural colleges. This agricultural scheme will be assisted as much as possible with foreign capital as opportunity offers.

3. I have been informed that the Greeks are making efforts to get Bulgars in villages to sign papers declaring themselves to be Bulgars of the Greek Church. This is taking place in the villages, and, as I have no means of getting to villages, I am unable to verify it as completely as I wish.

The matter is reported from several sources, and there is undoubtedly some such move being made by the Greeks.

On my return to Thrace I hope to be in a position to give further and more definite information.

4. The Greeks are preparing to conscript all Greeks in Thrace up to 28 years old. The voluntary enlistment of recruits continues. Reports are being made about the methods adopted by the Greeks to get men to enlist voluntarily, the object of reports being to show that the Greeks were conscripting men while they were really only occupying the area in the name of the Allied Supreme Command. I investigated each case reported to me as carefully as possible, and could find no means stronger than those employed in England early in the war to obtain volunteers.

(c.) Administration

1. The Greeks commenced improving conditions in Adrianople about a week after their arrival.

The first question was butchers. Prices were fixed for each class of meat, and all butchers have to display all the prices, and in addition must display the price of each carriage on the market. They must also have metal covers to the tables and benches on which the meat is cut, and must keep the meat covered away. These regulations were enforced by gendarmes, and were still being maintained when I left Karagatch.

2. Prices are also being fixed for other things and fixed prices are being enforced.

3. Customs were re-established and duties were charged for Eastern Thrace at old Turkish rates, and for Western Thrace at Bulgar rates. In the case of goods coming from Constantinople to Adrianople the old Turkish duties were imposed.

(d.) General

The Greeks have commenced their occupation very well. The men at the head of the administration are doing their best to make the best of a bad job.

The future of Thrace depends now on how far subordinate officers can assimilate these new ideas of administration of a Balkan area situated between two of their enemies.

H. CLARKE, Lieutenant,
British Intelligence Officer, Thrace

Sofia, August 20, 1920.

E 10724 10115 44)

No. 101

Mr Henderson to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 1.)

(No. 3792.)

My Lord

Paris, August 31, 1920.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1046 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of the note which I have today received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, signed by the Under-Secretary of State, in reply to Turkish representation, pending the ratification of the treaty, in the Allied capitals, and eventual Allied representation at Constantinople after such ratification.

Your Lordship will observe that the French Government have already authorised the Turkish Peace Delegation to maintain direct semi-official relations with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs while withholding the title of Charge d'Affaires, as the French Government are not yet ready to recognise the Turkish Government as the legitimate Government of Turkey. I have the honour to inform you that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (please see my telegram No. 1033 of the 27th August) that the French Government are not yet ready to recognise the Turkish Government as the legitimate Government of Turkey.

The Turkish Delegation already to install themselves in the Turkish Embassy here. It was explained to me that this was necessary owing to the financial circumstances of these members. The use of the telephone there has also been restored to them.

The French Government, in fact, except in so far as the Embassy building is concerned, are adopting a similar proceeding to that followed in the case of German representatives in Paris. The French Government are differently placed, since no Turkish Peace Delegation is in London. The French Government would have no objection to the Turkish representative in London, pending ratification, being described as a Charge d'Affaires or as a Charge d'Affaires ad interim.

The note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs also sets forth the reasons which have led to the French decision to postpone an Ambassador in Turkey as soon as the Treaty of Peace has been ratified. The arguments put forward are those outlined in

my telegrams Nos. 1033 and 1037 of the 2nd and 3rd instant respectively, and the French Government express the hope that His Majesty's Government will be prepared to concur in it.

I have, &c.
S. M. HENDERSON

Enclosure in No. 101

M. Paleologue to Mr. Henderson.

PAR sa note du 26 de ce mois, l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique a bien voulu aviser le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, que le Gouvernement ottoman s'est adressé au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté pour lui proposer d'envoyer un représentant ottoman en qualité de Chargé d'Affaires officieux, en attendant la ratification du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a répondu par sa note du 27 courant, dans laquelle il a exprimé le vœu que le Gouvernement ottoman envoie un représentant ottoman en qualité de Chargé d'Affaires officieux, en attendant la ratification du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie.

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En communiquant ce qui précède au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, M. Millerand exprime l'espoir que le Gouvernement britannique voudra bien, de son côté, se rallier à ce point de vue et désigner également un Ambassadeur auprès de la Porte.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères,
Paris, le 31 août 1920.

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No. 101

Earl Curzon to Mr. Henderson (Paris)

(No. 2801.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, September 1, 1920.

WITH a view to giving effect, without undue delay, to certain essential provisions of the Turkish Treaty of Peace, His Majesty's Government has had under consideration the question of the formation, and more especially the presidency, of the Inter-Allied Commission to be set up under the Treaty.

An Inter-Departmental Conference to discuss the question of the presidency of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control and Organisation foreseen by Section IV was held on the 28th August. A copy of the minutes of this meeting is enclosed for your information and guidance. It will be seen that the conference made the following recommendations:—

1 The General Officer Commanding Allied Forces of Occupation, in the Demilitarised Zone and the president of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control and Organisation, should be one and the same person.

2 The two offices should be rotatory among the military representatives of the Allied Forces of Occupation in the demilitarised zone, i.e., Great Britain, France and Italy.

3 The period for which these offices are to be held by each nation in turn should be fixed, if possible, at two years, but if this is found to be impossible His Majesty's Government should accept one year.

4 The president of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control and Organisation, provided for by article 200 of the treaty, should for the first period be a British officer, who would at the same time be General Officer Commanding Inter-Allied Forces of Occupation in the Demilitarised Zone.

5 The president of the Naval Commission of Control (article 201 of the treaty) should preferably be an Italian, and that of the Air Commission (article 202 of the treaty) a Frenchman.

An argument in favour of the presidency being for two years instead of one is that the settled conditions in Anatolia would seem to render it inevitable that the enforcement of some of the clauses of the treaty should be a slower process than was at first anticipated.

The reasons for the appointment of a British officer to the presidency of the Inter-Allied Military Commission are that (1) the burden of the war with Turkey fell almost exclusively on Great Britain, and (2) up till now in no single case has a British officer been appointed president of any of the Military Commissions of Control set up under the various treaties of peace negotiated with our late enemies, the Military Commissions of Control in Germany and Bulgaria being provided over by Frenchmen and those in Austria and Hungary by Italians.

The question of leaving this and similar decisions respecting the execution of the Turkish Treaty of Peace to the Conference of Ambassadors at Paris is not a new one, but it appears to His Majesty's Government that on the whole the ordinary diplomatic channel would be the more expeditious and effective agency for dealing with these matters. The existence of such a body as the Conference of Ambassadors is calculated to encourage reference to it of the many points that must arise in connection with the putting into force of the various provisions of the Turkish Treaty, and much unnecessary delay would ensue.

of news of the Greek force which was to occupy Pandernia. I have assisted him to the best of my power by obtaining news from H.M.S. "Dublin" of the sailing of Greek transports from Mudros.

3 The advance was resumed on the 29th June. No detailed reports have been received, but it appears that serious resistance was offered by the Turks in the neighbourhood of Keresun, both sides sustaining considerable casualties. The Turkish force, strength stated to be 4,000, was, however, compelled to withdraw, and Halikesri was occupied by the Greek troops in the late afternoon of the 30th June. 1,300 prisoners were taken.

4 General Paraskevopoulos has himself assumed direct control of this northern advance, his headquarters having been removed from Smyrna to Kirkagatch on the 28th June, and thence to Bergaz. This was due to the action of General Ionannou, who, at the outset, was in command of the first and second divisions, and who had aroused the displeasure of his Commander in chief, by acting in a very independent manner.

5 Lieutenant General Sir G. T. M. Bridges, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., has accompanied General L. Paraskevopoulos, and one of his staff officers accompanies each Greek division.

6 Detailed information has been, and still is, difficult to procure, owing to lack of official reports, and no news of any kind has been received from the division operating in the Meander Valley. It appears, however, that, in the original attack, Salihli, Alachair, and Alachair were the first places to be occupied. A Greek force then advanced on and occupied Salihli, driving their Turkish opponents before them. The latter unaware that Alachair was in Greek hands, retreated on that town and were thus trapped between two Greek forces. The occupation of Alachair seems to have been a creditable piece of work, as the force from Odemish had to cross the Boz Dagh, height 3,000 feet, in order to get to its destination.

7 In addition to the main northern advance, a Greek force from Aivali has advanced on and occupied Karagach.

8 Greek reports state that their troops were received enthusiastically by the inhabitants of Kula (N.N.E. of Alachair) have requested that their town be occupied, and as an earnest of good faith, have handed over to the Greeks a gun, four machine guns and a large number of rifles belonging to some Nationalists whom the townspeople disarmed as they passed through the town.

9. Translations of two proclamations issued by General Paraskevopoulos are attached for information (enclosures Nos. 2 and 3).

10 On the 29th June, Turkish bands burnt down Jelat station and surrounded Koşpunar station, temporarily severing communication with Aidin. (These stations are about 30 miles distant from Smyrna.)

12. With reference to paragraphs 12 and 13 of my letter of the 25th June and enclosure No. 8 thereto, Captain A. Gonatas, R.H.N., the Greek senior naval officer, came to see me on the 29th June, and gave me his verbal assurance that the Greek authorities held the "Hezir Reis" at the disposition of the Allied Powers. He said, however, that as the gunboat had been captured by an armed party, his officers and men would be very disappointed if they were not allowed to hoist the Greek flag in her. Furthermore, he showed me the draft of a letter confirming the above verbal statements, which he said he would send to me the following day. I accordingly wrote to the Italian senior naval officer and informed him that I was satisfied with the action of the Greek senior naval officer in seizing the "Hezir Reis," and that the gunboat was being held by the Greeks at the disposition of the Allies. (Copy attached, enclosure No. 4.) In reply I received a letter, very different in tone from the two previous ones with which he had favoured me, in which Commander L. Miraglia stated that he too was satisfied with the assurance from the Greek senior naval officer. (Enclosure No. 5.) The following day Captain A. Gonatas, R.H.N., came again to see me and, *inter alia*, informed me that he was proceeding to Piræus that afternoon in the hospital ship "Amphitrite." This he did, and I have not yet received the letter of which he showed me the draft. The Greek flag, however, has not been hoisted in "Hezir Reis."

13 I have since heard from a Greek officer that Captain Gonatas has incurred M. Sterghiadis' displeasure, and has been summarily deprived of his command. Presumably this is in connection with the seizure of the "Hezir Reis." His sudden

departure is to be regretted, as, during the short time he has held his command, our relations have been of the most cordial description.

14 It should have been stated in my letter of the 25th June, that the Greeks had captured all Turkish motor vedette No. 14. This and the "Hezir Reis" were moved into the outer anchorage on the 29th June and anchored in close proximity to the "Lemnos."

15. How the ammunition found on board the "Hezir Reis" came there is still a mystery. Her magazines were certainly empty when inspected by Captain C. M. Sterghiadis, C.M.G., in November last. Captain A. Gonatas, R.H.N. (who, I think, knew more than he wished to be believed) hinted to me very broadly that he suspected it to have come from the "Nino Bixio." On the other hand, I think the Italian senior naval officer would confess, if pressed, to an unworthy suspicion that the ammunition accompanied the Greek boarding party under cover of the very large number of bags and hammocks which they took with them, or, rather, which were sent to them from the "Lemnos" after the capture had been effected. I have, however, asked Captain Gonatas to have the matter closely investigated, and, before his departure, he assured me that this was being done, so for the present I do not propose to take any further steps in the matter.

16 On the 25th June, I went to a very large official dinner party on board the "Lemnos" at which General Paraskevopoulos was the principal guest. Although it was not primarily intended as such, it took the form of a triumphal celebration of the success of the Greek arms. The absence of the Italian officials was very noticeable, although they had all been invited.

17 Generally speaking, the Greeks are now intensely pro-British, and they are spreading much propaganda to the effect that their national aims and rights are being eagerly championed by Great Britain, but by Great Britain alone.

General

19 Another very large fire occurred in Smyrna on the 30th June, when a block of buildings in the vicinity of the Custom House, about an acre in extent, was burnt down. Its origin is unknown.

I have, &c.

M. FITZMAURICE,

Commodore, Smyrna

Enclosure 2 in No. 107.

Proclamation issued by General Paraskevopoulos

(Translation)

TO MORROW, at last, will commence the so long awaited attack.

As soon as the signal is given, the entire Greek army of Asia Minor will lance itself against the enemy to accomplish the great work of freeing our unemancipated brethren.

I, ~~the Commander~~ to whose lot it has fallen to impose on Turkey the wishes of the Allies, have destined it for this noble mission.

Officers, non-commissioned officers and men!

Show yourselves worthy of your great mission. Prove once again to the eyes of the civilised world the courage, valiance and magnanimity of the Greek soul.

Confidently and with wills of iron direct your thoughts to victory.

Victory will be ours.

Take care whilst the operations last. We must not forget our history, the everlasting nobleness and chivalry of the Greek soul.

You will not enter the country, which you will occupy to-morrow, as conquerors.

You will enter as liberators and apostles of civilisation and justice.

The rights of our nation are being judged to-day in Europe. The dream of our race is about to be realised.

At this moment the whole of Europe has its eyes fixed on us.

The life, honour, and worldly goods of all, without distinction of race, are sacred.

Officers, non-commissioned officers and men!

Any contravention of this order is a crime of high treason.

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The conquered and all the inhabitants of the places which we shall occupy will be sacred to us

Go on to victory which will be characterised by knightly heroism and greatness of soul.

I am confident that I shall not be deceived in you

It is allowed to no person to tarnish our immaculate history

L. PARASKEVOPOULOS

Commander-in-chief

Enclosure 3 in No. 107

Proclamation issued by General Paraskeopoulos, June 24, 1920

(Translation.)

THE Greek army has been invited by the Supreme Council to advance into the interior of the country in order to break up the Nationalist organisation of Mustapha Kemal and to re-establish order and security in the interest of the entire population, without distinction of race or religion. This advance of the Greek army is with no other aim than to bring about the fulfilment of the wishes expressed by the Treaty of Peace which will be signed by the Allied Powers and the Ottoman Government.

The partisans of Mustapha Kemal, who compose the Nationalist organisation, are not only rebels who oppose the decisions of the victorious Allies, but also the enemies of their own country and Sultan. Since the armistice, they have done nothing but, illegally and forcibly, recruit and impose taxes, and terrorise the peaceful population of the vast and rich lands of Anatolia, and obstruct the resumption of industry and the normal way of living.

The Greek occupation of Smyrna and Hinterland has so far proved its respect for the rights of the inhabitants without distinction of race and religion. In spite of great difficulties, it has assured order, equality, and justice for all. The Greek army will observe the same attitude under

the administration of the police, judicial, financial, commercial, and literary will continue their functions as in the past, and the inhabitants are invited to resume their duties. Those who, through misguidance, fear, or by the order of a superior authority, have to a certain extent collaborated with the Nationalist organisation of Mustapha Kemal have nothing to fear, provided that henceforward they abstain from collaborating or communicating with this organisation, and that they respect the orders and security of the Greek army.

I make the same promise to the partisans of Mustapha Kemal who are in the hands of the Greek army, that they will be treated with the same leniency as those who have collaborated with the Nationalist organisation.

Those who, through misguidance, fear, or by the order of a superior authority, have to a certain extent collaborated with the Nationalist organisation of Mustapha Kemal have nothing to fear, provided that henceforward they abstain from collaborating or communicating with this organisation, and that they respect the orders and security of the Greek army.

Those who disobey, without distinction of race or creed, will be immediately and severely punished by martial law. The clemency which has on several occasions during the past year been shown by the Greek occupation cannot be continued to-day under the existing circumstances. In consequence, persons arrested for offences committed against the army or public safety will be tried by court martial and executed on the spot.

L. PARASKEVOPOULOS

General Officer, Commander-in-chief

June 24, 1920

Enclosure 4 in No. 107

Commodore Fitzmaurice to Senior Italian Naval Officer, Smyrna

Sir,

H.M.S. "Bryony" at Smyrna, June 28, 1920

IN continuation of my letter of the 23rd June, 1920, and with reference to your letter of the 24th June, 1920, I have the honour to inform you that the Greek forces

are acting under the orders of the Supreme Council in carrying out offensive operations against armed Turkish forces.

The Turkish gunboat "Hezir Reis" was armed and had ammunition on board, ready for immediate use.

The Greek senior naval officer has satisfied me that in seizing the "Hezir Reis" he is acting as the custodian of the Allies, with whom the eventual disposition of the gunboat will still remain.

I have, &c.

M. FITZMAURICE

Commodore

Enclosure 5 in No. 107

Senior Italian Naval Officer, Smyrna to Commodore Fitzmaurice

Sir,

"Nino Bixio," Smyrna, June 29, 1920

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated yesterday, and I am satisfied with the declarations made to you by the Greek senior naval officer about the "Hezir Reis" still remaining at disposal of the Allies—he acting as the custodian—and I wrote to my Government according to this point of view.

I have, &c.

L. MIRAGLIA

Commander

Enclosure 6 in No. 107

Commodore Fitzmaurice to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean Station

(Unofficially)

Sir,

H.M.S. "Bryony" at Smyrna, July 9, 1920

IN continuation of my letter of the 2nd July, 1920, I have the honour to forward the following report on affairs at Smyrna and in Western Anatolia—

Political and Military

2. The Greek advance northwards continues, but information as to the progress of operations is difficult to obtain. Adramyti and Susighirlik (25 miles north-east of Balikesir), have both been occupied, and it is believed that the junction of the Greek troops who landed at Panderma, took place at the latter-named town. Reports, however, tend to show that Mustapha Kemal's forces decline to commit themselves to a definite engagement with the Greeks, and are retiring towards Bursa. Therefore, as it is understood that the *raison d'être* of the Greek offensive operations is the annihilation or capture of Mustapha Kemal's forces, the Greeks cannot as yet be said to have been completely successful in their operations.

3. The true total of prisoners taken at Bafra was 850, and not 1,300 as stated in my letter of the 2nd July. These prisoners, and others captured in the neighbourhood of Alacair are accommodated in a camp at Vourlah Seala. This camp was inspected by the British Military Mission, Smyrna, on the 5th July, and the conditions under which the prisoners are living were found satisfactory.

4. In the southern area, it is stated (a) that the Turks have burnt the upper town and railway station of Nazilli, and massacred all the Christian inhabitants with the exception of seventeen, and (b) that the Greeks have occupied the town, but owing to the entire lack of reliable information from this area, I am as yet unable to state whether there is any truth in either of these reports.

5. As reported in my telegram No. 742Z, General Nider sent a Greek force to pursue the Turkish irregulars who had burnt Jelet station. As these irregulars had manifestly come from the Italian zone, the Greeks followed them back into that zone with the intention of occupying the hills round Arvalia, south of the Ephesus road, so as to cut them off. The officer in charge of the Italian troops in that neighbourhood protested to the Greek colonel in command against this invasion of the Italian zone. The Greek colonel replied that he was acting under orders. Hereupon

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the Italian officer ordered his men (number unknown) to advance in open order upon the Greeks, who remained in column until the Italians actually opened fire, whereupon they fixed bayonets and charged, wounding several Italian soldiers and taking ten prisoners, with a loss to themselves of two men wounded. They subsequently released the prisoners. The incident has not yet given rise to considerable excitement in Graeco-Italian circles, and I understand that the matter is the subject of much discussion between the Greek and Italian authorities. It is to be hoped that the Italians will take to heart the Greeks' rough and ready hint that they are at last determined to take active measures to counteract the underground tactics which the Italians have been steadily using against them for the past year or more.

6. The Greeks, by means of an attractive scheme of increased wages and bonuses, are engaged in raising a short service volunteer force, composed of men who have completed their service with the colours, and they hope that the number so raised will not be less than 40,000 men.

7. The situation as regards the "Hezir Reis" and vedette No. 14 remains unchanged. I have been informed that the "Lemnos" has assumed command of the "Lemnos" as successor to Captain A. Gonatas. He called on me the same forenoon, and I have to-day returned his call. He speaks passable English, and informs me that he is an ardent admirer of Great Britain.

8. The British Military Mission, Smyrna, ceased to exist as from the 7th July and Lieutenant-General Sir G. T. M. Bridges, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., has now become British Liaison Officer with the Hellenic General Officer Commander in Chief. A small portion of his staff, however, remains at Smyrna.

General

9. At the request of the commanding officer of the French sloop "La Snyper," all men-of-war at Smyrna dressed ship on the 4th July, on the occasion of the canonisation of St. Joan of Arc. To the request of the same officer, made through the Greek senior naval officer, that a salute of twenty-one guns might be fired, I replied that I regretted that such a salute was not authorised by my regulations.

10. At the urgent request of Lt. Lieutenant-Colonel H. R. G. Stevens, D.S.O., staff officer to Lieutenant-General Sir G. T. M. Bridges, I sent him to Pandernia in H.M.S. "Tribune" on the 7th July but only after receiving from him a written undertaking that he considered that it was essential he should join Lieutenant-General Sir G. T. M. Bridges in the least possible time.

11. H.M.S. "Centaur" arrived at Smyrna, 4.45 A.M., the 7th July and sailed for Constantinople the following afternoon. I regret that it was not possible for her to remain for a longer period.

I have, &c.

M. FITZMAURICE

Commodore, Smyrna

Enclosure 7 in No. 107

Commodore Fitzmaurice to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station

(Confidential)

Sir,

H.M.S. "Bryony" at Smyrna, July 16, 1920

IN continuation of my letter of the 9th July, 1920 I have the honour to forward the following report on affairs at Smyrna and in Western Anatolia:—

Political and Military

2. Since the Greeks advanced from Balikesir to Pandernia, and thence to Bursa, I have been able to obtain little or no information as to the progress of operations, but I understand that Bursa was occupied on the 6th July and that Mustafa Kemal's forces are now to the eastward of that town.

3. Reports from the Meander valley are still of the vaguest description, and, unfortunately the British officer who was detailed to proceed to Nazilli and to ascertain what was happening in that district, is sick in Smyrna, and unable to proceed to his destination. It appears, however, that not only are the Greeks in possession of Nazilli (or what remains of that town), but that they are also in occupation of Choban Issa, 10 miles to the eastward. There is still no confirmation or denial of the report that the Nationalists, prior to evacuating the town, burnt a

considerable portion of it and massacred the local Christians, but it would seem that they made no attempt to turn their own against the Greeks, but simply retired to the eastward. It will be remembered that the Nazilli Nationalists had in their power a number of Greek inhabitants of Aidin, whom they were holding as hostages against a Greek advance, and it would appear very doubtful whether these unfortunate folk are still alive.

4. As regards the Graeco-Italian incident reported in paragraph 5 of my letter No. 23, I now learn that the Greeks maintain that the Italian troops attacked under cover of the fire of an Italian destroyer. This is denied by the Italian delegate, who on the other hand accused the Greeks of having attacked the Italian post at Orfalu under cover of night, in which attack one Italian officer and two men were killed. In connection with this incident the Italian light cruiser, "Nino Bixio" left Smyrna unexpectedly on the 9th July, without informing me either of her destination or of her intention to leave. I understand, however, that she has gone to Scala Nuova to act as a wireless station for General Porta, who is reported to have proceeded to Scala Nuova. I have been informed that the latter is in direct communication with his Government on the subject.

5. In Smyrna itself the only really noticeable feature is the scarcity of Greek troops. Many of the military patrols and sentries have been relieved by naval ratings from the "Lemnos."

6. M. S. "Nika" left Smyrna on the 9th July, and returned again to Smyrna on the 12th July.

7. I have been informed at Smyrna to the effect that His Majesty the King has ordered the "Georgios Averoff" after the Greek T.B.D. "Nika" on the 9th July, and returned again to Smyrna on the 12th July.

8. General Paraskevopoulos has called up for military service all Greek male subjects between the age of 32 and 36, resident in the zone of Greek military occupation, who have not hitherto performed their service in the Greek army.

General

The French T.B.D. "Tonkinois" arrived on the 12th July having been sent to Smyrna to take up her berth in the inner harbour. It is reported that the "Tonkinois" accident or design the Greek T.B.D. "Nika" anchored inshore of the "Tonkinois" instead of taking up her berth in the inner harbour, thereby rather blanketing the view of "Tonkinois" from the shore. All men-of-war in harbour dressed ship on the 14th July and a salute of twenty-one guns was fired. I called on the French Consul General and exchanged the usual felicitations.

I have, &c.

M. FITZMAURICE

Commodore, Smyrna

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No. 103.

Dr. Buchanan to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 6.)

(Telegraphic.) R

Rome, September 6, 1920

MY telegram No. 363 of 27th August.

Minister for Foreign Affairs now replies that Italian Government has informed Grand Vizier that they have no objection to sending of Turkish Charge d'Affaires to

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No. 103

Sir G. Buchanan to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 6.)

(N. S.)

Rome, September 6, 1920

MY telegram No. 363 of 27th August.

Minister for Foreign Affairs now replies that Italian Government has informed Grand Vizier that they have no objection to sending of Turkish Charge d'Affaires to Rome pending ratification of treaty

As regards suppression of Embassy at Constantinople, Italian Government regret that they cannot see any advantage in such a step, and that it is necessary to maintain a certain number of representatives in the East, being attained, like England, territorial advantages from treaty, but only economic privileges which must be defended as vigorously as possible.

They further consider that, although territorial sovereignty of Sultan has been seriously compromised as a result of the war, his spiritual authority, as a Moslem Power, remains intact, and that respect and honour, which Italy as a Moslem Power cannot ignore, must be maintained.

Italian Government have therefore appointed Marquis Garroni as Ambassador at Constantinople. It is evident that the Italian Government were not at that time aware of decision of His Majesty's Government to reduce its Embassy to a Legation.

Minister for Foreign Affairs adds that Marquis Garroni was already accredited as Ambassador before the war, and that he is considered most suitable person for the post. It is evident that he could not return to Constantinople except with this rank.

[E 10957 10115/44]

No. 110.

Earl Curzon to Sir C. Eliot (Tokyo)

(No. 298.)

(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram No. 10957 of 6th September and my telegram No. 814 of 4th September. I am glad to hear that the Italian Government have decided to reduce their Embassy at Constantinople to a Legation. This is a step which will be welcomed by the British Government. It is evident that the Italian Government were not at that time aware of decision of His Majesty's Government to reduce its Embassy to a Legation. Minister for Foreign Affairs adds that Marquis Garroni was already accredited as Ambassador before the war, and that he is considered most suitable person for the post. It is evident that he could not return to Constantinople except with this rank.

[E 10985 10115/44]

No. 111.

Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome)

(No. 409.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 7, 1920

YOUR telegram of 6th September and my telegram No. 814 of 4th September. I am glad to hear that the Italian Government have decided to reduce their Embassy at Constantinople to a Legation. This is a step which will be welcomed by the British Government. It is evident that the Italian Government were not at that time aware of decision of His Majesty's Government to reduce its Embassy to a Legation. Minister for Foreign Affairs adds that Marquis Garroni was already accredited as Ambassador before the war, and that he is considered most suitable person for the post. It is evident that he could not return to Constantinople except with this rank.

As His Majesty's Government and the French Government are withholding the title of Ambassador from the Turkish Legation at Constantinople, you could urge on the Italian Government the desirability of acting similarly. Moreover, a Charge d'Affaires implies the full resumption of diplomatic relations.

[E 11069 3 44]

No. 112

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 8.)

(No. 1191.)

M

Constantinople, August 23, 1920

I am glad to hear that the audience accorded by the Sultan to my French and Italian colleagues and myself took place in one of the kiosks of Yildiz Palace late on the afternoon of the 21st August.

2. We were received by the Sultan in order of seniority as High Commissioners. The ceremony was conducted on the Turkish side with practically the same ceremonial as if they were official, except that uniform was not worn. Thus the Grand Vizier, who as you are aware is also Minister for Foreign Affairs, made a point of himself attending the Sultan.

As this is the first occasion since the 21st September, 1914, on which a British representative has been to the Palace, and the first meeting with the present Sultan, it

may be of interest if I preface the account of my interview with my personal impressions of His Majesty.

4. The Sultan, though well-dressed and generally well-groomed, presents a somewhat shrunken appearance. His hair is completely white, and he shows many signs of the strain which he has gone through since his accession. At the beginning of the audience, he brought out his words with a hesitancy which was almost painful, and which might have been due to extreme nervousness or overmastering emotion. The former is the more probable explanation. He gained confidence or composure as the interview proceeded, but he worked his lower jaw continuously both in speech and when being interpreted, on what passed outside the window. More than relieved the conversation with sallies which showed a considerable and during those passages he raised his eyes, and his face lit up with a very attractive smile.

5. In physical appearance he presents a certain resemblance to his immediate predecessor, though he is of a slighter and more refined type, and displays an intelligence which, I am told, Mehmed Reşid either completely lacked or most successfully concealed. My general impression was that of a man of no great force of character or but of considerable sincerity and amiability and of some mental grasp. In that part of the conversation in which he sought to draw me out as to the prospects of British help for Turkey in the future, he showed more than a little tenacity, and there was no lack of energy in his denunciation of the adventurers who had ruined his country. He was calm and unaffected, but his bearing was neither the least degree abject.

My audience lasted about forty minutes. The Grand Vizier interpreted for the Sultan. As he translated more freely from than into French, and as Mr. Ryan, who was present, rendered His Majesty's remarks into English, it is difficult to produce an exact record of the conversation. The following summary, however, represents with some accuracy what passed.

6. He said that Turkey had passed many black days in the course of the last ten years, but that the present occasion was a bright moment which he hoped augured a happier future. He spoke with bitterness of the ruin brought upon his country by a gang of adventurers. He alluded to the prospect of the early restoration of normal diplomatic relations. He desired, he said, to take this earliest opportunity of asking for news of the health of His Majesty the King.

7. I expressed my sense of the honour of being received by His Majesty, and my satisfaction, as an Admiral, at being the first representative to visit a monarch at the hands of whose predecessors previous admirals had received so many marks of distinguished consideration. Turkey, I said, was entering on a new era. I hoped it would be a happy and prosperous one, under the auspices of that good and wise administration which I trusted would now be inaugurated. I promised to convey the proper quarter the Sultan's enquiries for the King, my latest news of whom was good, and asked that I might be permitted at the same time to transmit to the King my good account of His Majesty's own health.

8. The Sultan, reading more than I had intended into my mention of relations between former admirals and his predecessors, said he took it that I myself drew a sharp distinction between the clique, who had brought about all of Turkey's recent disasters, and the true Turks, who had no part or lot in their misdoings. That clique consisted of men who were not Turks at all. They had trodden under foot all that was sacred in this country, and one of the things on which they had trampled was the tradition of friendship with Great Britain. The true Turks, who were the great glory in the country, prized nothing more than that tradition, which it was their duty to revive and abide by. His Majesty directed the Grand Vizier to emphasise particularly the point that the others were not real Turks, and said that, if they were scrutinised one by one, this would be found to be literally true.

9. On my saying that I was sure that the distinction drawn by the Sultan was fully appreciated in England, His Majesty expressed satisfaction. He said that, in giving orders for the signature of a treaty which was, as it were, Turkey's death sentence, he had been borne up by the hope that he could rely on British assistance in the future. Turkey was sore stricken, and her wounds were deep. She needed the helping hand of a friend if she were to survive.

10. I observed that every country in Europe was suffering from wounds of the war. Turkey, I said, given a good administration, should not be less capable of

recovery than others. As for help from outside, I referred His Majesty to your Lordship's statement in the House of Lords on the 4th August. The Sultan, however, insisted that Turkey's wounds were deeper than those of any other country. He pressed his point regarding her need for help in language which showed that what he had in mind was the need of special support from Great Britain, rather than joint assistance of the Allies. Could Turkey, he asked, perform the double task of picking herself up and striking out a new line of action without one powerful prop on which to lean?

12. I said I understood your Lordship's speech to mean that outside help would not be given to a weak Turkey, and that I was sure that as the country progressed in good administration under the wise guidance of His Majesty, she would receive in an increasing measure the help required to ensure her prosperity.

13. The Sultan said he desired to thank me on this, the first occasion which had presented itself since the Armistice. I replied that, though the circumstances had hitherto precluded personal intercourse, we had been animated by the conviction that we had facing us, in the person of His Majesty, one whose desires and objects were similar to our own. I thanked him for the expressions he had used and for the frankness with which he had spoken to me on the subjects we had discussed. I said I would not fail to report all that he had said to the British Government.

14. In dismissing me, His Majesty said he had detained me perhaps a long time. I mention this detail of the conversation as an illustration of the semi-humorous touches with which, as I have indicated above, the Sultan more than once allowed himself to illuminate the interview.

I have, &c

J. M. DE ROBECQ
High Commissioner

E 11247 3 44)

No. 113

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 10, 1920

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Political aspect of situation also deserves attention.

Effect of financial crisis may be to make Damad Ferid's already untenable position completely untenable. There is tendency in some quarters to consider this as a justification in itself as to justify postponement of relief until Ferid has been squeezed out of office.

Many persons, including some in high financial circles, take view that Ferid should be got rid of at once or else induced to ratify treaty quickly, and then made to give place to Tawfik Pasha or even Ismet Pasha. My French colleague took latter view some days ago and now takes former. He would like me to join him in positive action designed to compel Ferid's resignation. He lays great stress on necessity for composition between Central Government and Anatolia, and on fact that Ferid's personality is one of greatest obstacles to such composition.

I attach little importance to Ferid's retention of office, especially in view of obvious absence of desire on part of His Majesty's Government to acquire preponderant position here. There is widespread idea that we are keeping Ferid in office for our own sake, in order to keep the position which would be terminated by his disappearance.

(On the other hand, two things are very desirable, viz. —

1. That treaty should be ratified by act of Sultan, and

2. That we should have with sincere intention of securing adhesion of Anatolia to treaty, not of playing into the hands of Nationalists.

I find it difficult at present to foresee any combination of Ministers on which complete reliance could be placed for these two purposes. Nor is it easy to see how anyone can form Government even moderately stable without assurance of support from Allies, which Allies will not give. No Turkish Government can live on threats of further punishment alone.

For time being I am slow to fall in with French High Commission's suggestion. My future course must depend on developments. If events force Ferid to resign I shall not particularly regret it; but I have very little idea what is likely to come after. Perhaps a Grand Vizier who has French support might receive financial assistance required from Ottoman Bank under a French Government guarantee.

[E 11278 9075 44]

No. 114

Mr. Henderson to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 13.)

(N. 2884.)

Paris, September 10, 1920

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of the note which I have addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. 2957 of the 1st instant, on the subject of the formation and presidency of the Inter-Alied Commissions to be set up under the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

Your Lordship will observe that in this note I have refrained from specifying, as regards the Naval and Air Commissions, to which of those two Commissions it is proposed to assign a French or an Italian president. I trust that your Lordship may approve my action in this respect in view of the following considerations which have been brought to my notice by the British military, naval and air representatives on the Inter-Alied Committee. The Committee has for some time past had under discussion the arrangements to be made in connection with the Turkish Commissions of Control—the British representatives on the Committee having throughout acted under direct orders from the War Office, Admiralty and Air Ministry, who were represented at the Inter-Departmental Conference held at the Foreign Office on the 23rd ultimo. The Committee has succeeded, with some difficulty and after mutual concessions, in reaching complete agreement on nearly all points. Of these the most important was, of course, the attribution of a British officer of the rank of Major-General to the presidency of the Commissions of Control, the period of his presidency having been fixed by the Committee at twenty months (or, one-third of five years). At the outset the French had hoped to have the presidency for themselves; but it was subsequently agreed between the French and Italian representatives that in the event of that presidency being assigned to a British officer, a French officer should have the presidency of the Naval Commission—being the next in importance—and an Italian officer that of the Air Commission. It is clear that the French Government would be greatly hurt if the only presidency assigned to a French officer were that of the least important (Air) Commission. I shall therefore be grateful if your Lordship will, if possible, recommend, and inform me of any

recommendation of the Ministry of Control, has not been touched upon by the Committee presided over by Marshal Foch, it having been recognised by all concerned that the former question does not fall within the scope of the functions of that Committee. It appears therefore probable that the question of command will become the main subject of any correspondence resulting from the note which I have addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in accordance with your Lordship's instructions. I presume that it is this question which your Lordship desires should be settled through diplomatic channels, the matter of the Commissions of Control being already far advanced as a result of the negotiations carried out within the body of Marshal Foch's Committee. It is of course understood that Marshal Foch's Committee can submit recommendations only and not decisions, the reports of the Committee being subject to the approval of the Allied Governments.

I hope shortly to transmit the final report of Marshal Foch's Committee with regard to the Commissions of Control in Turkey. According to the normal procedure hitherto followed, all reports of Marshal Foch's Committee come before the Conference of Ambassadors.

I have, &c

S. HENDERSON

Enclosure in No. 114.

Note communicated to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting Inter-Allied Commissions to be set up under Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

WITH a view to giving effect at as early a date as possible to certain essential provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, His Majesty's Government have already had under consideration the question of the formation, and more especially of the presidency, of the Inter-Allied Commissions to be set up under that Treaty.

In this connection His Majesty's Embassy has the honour, under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to recommend to the favourable consideration of the French Government the following tentative suggestions, and to express the hope that they may be prepared to concur therein:—

1. That the General Officer Commanding the Allied Forces of Occupation in the Constantinople area, and the President of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control and Organisation (provided for by article 200 of the treaty) should be one and the same person. It is understood that the French Government are also of this opinion.

2. That the above two offices should be held in rotation by the military representatives of the three Powers providing the forces of occupation in the demilitarised zone, i.e., France, Italy and Great Britain.

3. That the above two offices should be held in rotation by the military representatives of the three Powers providing the forces of occupation in the demilitarised zone, i.e., France, Italy and Great Britain.

4. That the above two offices should be held in rotation by the military representatives of the three Powers providing the forces of occupation in the demilitarised zone, i.e., France, Italy and Great Britain.

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His Majesty's Embassy is directed to explain to the French Government that in making suggestion (4) above—that the President of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control and Organisation should be one and the same person as the General Officer Commanding the Allied Forces of Occupation in the Constantinople area—His Majesty's Government are fully aware of the fact that the French Government are also of this opinion.

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His Majesty's Embassy has the honour to add, in accordance with Earl Curzon's instructions, that his Lordship will be greatly obliged if he could be furnished with the views of the French Government on the various points raised in the present note at their early convenience.

British Embassy, Paris,
September 7, 1920.

[E 11270 9075 44]

No. 115

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 13.)

Sir,

War Office, September 11, 1920.

I AM commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated the 30th August, relative to the Inter-Allied Commissions to be set up in Turkey in accordance with the provisions of the Turkish Treaty.

I am to point out that Major-General Sir William Thwaites attended the Conference held at the Foreign Office on the 23rd August, that the French Government were pressing for one Commander-in-Chief responsible to a Council of Ambassadors, alluded to a Council of Ambassadors which he understood the French Government wished to set up in Constantinople, apparently analogous to the Council of High Commissioners in Mesopotamia.

The Army Council are not clear whether your letter under reference is intended to cover merely the naval, military and air commissions of organisation and control at Constantinople, or all the commissions which are to be set up, including the Financial Commission and the Commission of the Straits and Waterways. But I am to say that Lord Curzon will refer to a proposal that the High Commissioners of the Straits and Waterways should be placed under a High Commissioner.

The three guaranteeing Powers only, and not to ask whether the presence of representatives on the military commission will produce the same object as subordinating the military commission to the High Commissioners or Ambassadors of the guaranteeing Powers.

In his reference to the placing of the respective commissions under the ultimate authority of the British High Commissioner, the Army Council assume that only British representatives are referred to, and naturally concur in the principle that these representatives should be ultimately, through their military chief, under the authority of the British High Commissioner.

The Army Council desire me to say that they assume that Earl Curzon will desire that the Allied Commander-in-Chief should, in his capacity as commander of the Allied troops, also be responsible to the Council of High Commissioners or Ambassadors at Constantinople.

I am, &c.

B. B. CUBITT

P.S.—A copy of this and connected correspondence has been sent to the British representative, Allied Military Committee, Versailles.

B. B. C.

[E 11271 3 44]

No. 116.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 13.)

Sir,

War Office, September 11, 1920.

1.—(1.) I AM commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 27th August, relative to a proposal by the Turkish Government to raise a force of two divisions for the repression of the Nationalist movement. In his mention of the force of 15,000 men allowed by the Peace Treaty, I am to say that the Army Council presume that—

- Earl Curzon of Kedleston refers to the 15,000 "Special Elements" sanctioned by articles 152 and 157, and
- His assent to the immediate raising of this force by the Turkish Government disposes of the question of raising a special force for Brussels, which formed the subject of separate correspondence under War Office dated 30th July, and Foreign Office dated the 10th August.

Should the latter assumption be correct, the Army Council will withdraw their proposal for the employment of Allied officers, for the attachment of whom to the "Special Elements" the terms of the Peace Treaty appear to make no provision.

[5773]

U 2

thing, I am to take this opportunity to observe that the motive inspiring the proposal of the Army Council was the possibility of co-operation between Turkish Governmental and Nationalist forces rather than any consideration of military efficiency.

On the above assumption the Army Council are instructing the British commander at Constantinople, in a telegram, of which a copy is attached, to obtain the views of the other Allied commanders at Constantinople regarding this question, and I am to say that the Council assume that Earl Curzon of Kedleston is taking steps to obtain the consent of the French and Italian Governments to the proposal for the immediate raising of a force of 15,000 "Special Elements."

2. I am further to say that the whole question raised above appears to the Council to be inseparable from that of the setting up, at a very early date, of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Organisation and Control, the subject of separate correspondence under Foreign Office letter dated the 30th August, and War Office letter dated the 14th August; for, though the limitation of the "Special Elements" to the number of 15,000 does not appear, in accordance with article 153, to come into force until three months from the date of the treaty coming into force, presumably the Commission of Organisation and Control will be required to function forthwith to superintend the process of reduction of the Turkish armed forces in general, in accordance with article 164 of the treaty, and the creation of the force now proposed.

Also, although the special zone defined in article 179 will not, in accordance with article 180, commence to be delimited until fifteen days after the treaty comes into force, it appears to the Council that the decision of the Military Commission of Control may be necessary in order to modify the limitations of article 157, which otherwise permits not more than 3,000 of these "Special Elements" to be in any one of the territorial areas which have still to be defined. Presumably, in order to raise the proposed force, the Turkish Government will be required to use territory falling within the special zone round Constantinople, and though, generally speaking, the limitations of the military clause of the treaty will not operate until three months after the ratification of the treaty, it appears to the Army Council that Lord Curzon intends to adopt the principle, in which they concur, of anticipating during the interregnum, as far as possible, the actual limitations of the treaty which will eventually come into force. Should this assumption be incorrect, the Council trust that Lord Curzon will inform them at an early date.

I am, &c
B. R. CURRIE

P.S.—A copy of this and connected correspondence has been sent to the British Representative, Allied Military Committee, Versailles.)

Enclosure in No. 116.

War Office to General Headquarters, Constantinople.

(Telegraphic)

Y.O. R telegram dated 30th July.

War Office, September 1920

Proposed in the Treaty contained in proposal for formation of two Turkish divisions, but have no objection to Turkish Government raising immediately 15,000 "Special Elements" defined in articles 152 and 157 of treaty. Please obtain and telegraph views of other Allied commanders at Constantinople.

E 11296/9075 44

Sir,
WITH reference to the telegram from the Turkish Government dated 29th September 1920, and the International Commission of Organisation and Control, I am to say that my Lord's Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that, assuming that the intention is to substitute the authority of the Allied representatives

at Constantinople for that of the Council of Ambassadors in Paris, their Lordships concur, as regards the Naval Commission of Control, in the proposals of Lord Curzon.

As regards the Straits Commission, it is not clear to my Lords that the provisions of the Treaty permit of the Commission being placed under the control of the Allied representatives at Constantinople, but if this can be done it would undoubtedly facilitate the work.

I am, &c
ALEX. FLINT

[E 11338 3 44]

No. 116.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 14.)

Constantinople, September 1, 1920

1. The Grand Vizier called on me on the 28th August, and spoke of various matters arising out of the execution of the Peace Treaty.

2. Ferid Pasha referred to the Porte's request to be allowed to send officials in the Turkish army to the Straits. He said that the Turkish Government had not, he admitted, intimated any acceptance of the Turkish proposal beyond showing a benevolent disposition when it was first broached.

3. I promised to approach your Lordship further on the subject, and asked whether the Grand Vizier had anyone in view for London. He said after some apologetic circumlocution that he thought of Ali Kemal Bey, who, though of undistinguished origin, was very intelligent and had held high posts.

4. I have dealt with this subject in my telegram No. 979 of the 1st September, in which I gave you my views of the Grand Vizier's scheme.

5. Ferid Pasha spoke of gendarmerie reorganisation. He said the present force was thoroughly unsatisfactory, and that the Director-General was incompetent. Changes were required, and many officers of unimpeachable character were to replace undesirables, but the French always stood in the way. I agreed that the gendarmerie was unsatisfactory but I rather suggested that little could be done until the military commission as provided in the treaty.

6. The Grand Vizier went on to say that the Government after signing the Peace Treaty found itself as much tied as before. He referred to a recent intimation from my Lord's Commissioners of the Straits that rather too many men were being arrested and led to think that it had been last year, we accused it of slackness, yet when it was stern we accused it of being too strict. He said that the criticism of the Allied High Commissioners applied to quite different classes of cases. We had always been eager to proceed against the alleged perpetrators of the "sack of Yozgat" after the deposition of Sultan Abdul Hamid in 1909.

7. The Grand Vizier was probably really thinking of the proposal which the Allied High Commissioners favour, but to which he is strongly opposed, that a fresh attempt should be made to bring Anatolia into line with Constantinople by an appeal to loyalty. He said that the Turkish Government should dissociate itself openly and entirely from the nationalist movement.

8. The Grand Vizier also spoke of the necessity of the Government proceeding with the organisation of the armed forces to be allowed to Turkey under the treaty. He said it was essential that he should be

... and at the same time with the French Government to make preparations to support with a mixed force of five or six battalions with the necessary artillery.

4 I understand that the fertile imagination of Colonel Katherinis is responsible for the above statement. I have no doubt that it has been brought to your Lordship's notice. The language held by M. Canelloponis, however, is not to be taken as official countenance and support.

J. M. DE ROBECK, *High Commissioner*

E 11347 10115 441

No. 120.

Mr. Kennard to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 14.)

Posillipo, September 11, 1920,
Will refer to telegram No. 409 of the 11th September, 1920, from the
Royal Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, relative to the appointment of an Italian
Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have. &c

H. KENNARD

Enclosure in No. 120

Note verbale from the Royal Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

(Total station.)

IN reply to the note verbal of the 26th August, No. 576, the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honour to inform the British Embassy that the Grand Vizier has taken a similar step in asking the Italian High Commission at Constantinople for permission to send to Rome an Ottoman agent to act as *Chargé d'Affaires*, even if in an informal manner, for the period up to the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

The Grand Vizier was informed that the Royal Government see nothing to prevent

As to the suppression of Embassies at Constantinople, the Royal Government agrees at once with the proposals advanced by His Britannic Majesty's Government, since it deems it necessary to maintain the prestige of the representatives of the Great Powers in their dealings with the Sublime Porte all the more in that Italy is the Power most interested in maintaining the prestige and authority of her own representatives in the East. Italy has not only to protect her political advantages from the Peace Treaty, but only economical privileges, which she must

It must finally be considered that though the territorial sovereignty of the Sultan which he enjoys as Caliph has remained unbroken, and he is therefore entitled in that quality to the old respect and honour which Italy, as a Mussulman Power, cannot

The Royal Government accordingly appointed his Excellency, the Marquess Garron as His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and Signor Nassau made a preliminary communication to the Porte. When that Imperial Government was informed of the Royal Government's intention to transform their Embassy into a Legation, as was very lately notified by Viscount Harcourt to the Marquess Imperial, for the rest of the Marquess Garron was accredited previous to the war to the Sublime Porte in the capacity of Ambassador, it was not a surprise that at Constantinople, where he had been stationed at that post, it is evident that he could only return there with the same title.

Home, September 3, 1920.

'E 11940'3 44'

No. 119.

Admiral Sir J. de Hobeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 14.)

No. 1237

My Lord,

Constantinople, September 3, 1920.

INDICATIONS are not wanting that the unexpectedly facile success, which has attended the efforts of the Greeks at re-establishing order on both shores of the Mæmaron, have not had but at least the most salutary effects amongst those to encourage the possibility of further undertakings of the same nature on those of the Euxine. Repeated representations have been made to this High Commission as to the urgent necessity of taking measures to protect from Nationalist tyranny and oppression the Greek population of the coast towns from Samsoun to Trebizond. The Greek High Commissioner himself has more than once urged that vessels of war should be sent to those ports to encourage the Christians and overawe the Turks. To the objection that the necessary ephemeral visits of a man-of-war may in the long run do more harm than good, and can, at the best, exert but little influence outside the range of their guns, M. Canelopoulos responded that, in the case of a more permanent and intensive reaching this region might be produced by the disembarkation of troops. Should Great Britain, he added, be unable to spare the men, there were no doubt others of the Allied Powers who were in a more favourable position.

2. Somewhat wider proposals have been put forward by the Greek Orthodox Metropolitan of Trebizond, by M. Joannides, President of the Pontus Committee of Hattum, and by Colonel Kallimachos of the Greek army, who appears to hold a semi-official mission for the propagation of the Pontine idea. The professed ideal of the latter gentleman and his partisans is the incorporation of the Pontine Kingdom with Georgia and Armenia in a Christian-Caucasian confederacy under British protection, but there is little doubt that their immediate object is merely the establishment of the Pontine Republic under Hellenic influence.

3. According to these gentlemen, there are at present in the Greek army from 3,000 to 4,000 natives of Pontus, who could be formed into a special corps for operations.

[E 11457/11457 44]

No. 1.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 16.)

(Personal and Secret.)

Dear Lord Curzon,

Constantinople, September 2 1920

I AM sending you a personal telegram about Ferid Pasha's proposal to engage an English tutor for the Sultan's son. I am anxious that Max Miller should have an opportunity of considering the matter before he leaves London.

In the same conversation the Grand Vizier reverted to his idea of altering the order of succession, about which I wrote you privately. I told him that you had agreed that such a matter must stand over until after peace, but had not raised any objection to the proposal in itself. He was quick to construe this as a favourable expression of opinion, but I warned him that this was going too far.

He recognised that a change in the succession would involve a change of the Constitution, and expatiated at some length on the need for providing Turkey with an entirely new Constitution more adapted to the intellectual and political development of the people.

In reply to a question as to how so great a change could be effected, Ferid Pasha said that there were two methods, viz., either the Sultan might promulgate a new Constitution, or a new Constitution might be voted by Parliament in accordance with the provisions of that now in existence. He expressed a strong preference for the former method, and intimated that its success would depend greatly on whether it had British backing.

I was careful not to be drawn into any expression of opinion, and merely promised to think the matter over; while Ferid Pasha, on his side, promised to send me certain documents regarding the Constitution which he published in 1910, and which produced no small commotion at the time. The principal of these documents is his report to the Sultan on proposed changes in the Constitution, a translation of which report was sent to me by Embassy despatch No. 108 of the 23rd February, 1914.

It is a pity that, despite the professions of liberalism with which he accompanied the proposal, the suggestion that the Sultan should supersede the Constitution now in force by a new one is reactionary, and it would be a mistake at the present time to give him the smallest ground for claiming that it had the approval of the British Government.

It is equally obvious that the maintenance in anything but form of the present Constitution is irreconcilable with a peace treaty which deprives Turkey of so many sovereign prerogatives, and that adjustments will have to be made sooner or later, in one shape or another, if the treaty stands. It is not very likely that Ferid Pasha will have the making of such adjustments, as he is nearly worn out physically and has every appearance of being on his last legs politically. He deserves great praise for the services he has rendered to the cause of peace, and one can have nothing but admiration for the courage he has over and over again shown during the last eighteen months, but there is no doubt that he is thoroughly unpopular, that he increases his unpopularity by a growing tendency to become dictatorial in his manners and methods.

It is desirable that we should be too completely identified with him and his larger schemes, though I do not think any other Grand Vizier is likely to serve our immediate purposes as well—at any rate, until peace is ratified.

J. M. DE ROBECK

E 11573 9075 44]

No. 2.

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 2042)

My Lord,

Paris, September 19 1920

WITH reference to my despatch No. 2881 of the 10th instant, on the subject of the Inter-Ally Commissions to be set up under the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I have discussed with Mr. Sackville-West and Captain Consett the proposals contained in Sir John Tilly's letter of the 30th August to the Secretary of the Army Council in regard to the authority under whose direction the various commissions in Turkey should work.

I understand from my naval and military advisers that the British Government Departments concerned have concurred in the opinion that the authority in question should be a special council consisting of the Ambassadors of the principal Allied Powers at Constantinople. My experience of the working of the Ambassadors' Conference in Paris leads me to think that in the special case of Turkey it would be very desirable to concentrate the control of the commissions in such a special Council of Ambassadors at Constantinople. I should therefore be glad to learn whether your Lordship desires me to put forward a proposal to this effect, either to the French Government or, with a view to securing general agreement between the Allied Governments, to the Conference of Ambassadors here.

I have, &c.
DERBY

[E 11596 3 44]

No. 123

Marquis Imperiali to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 20.)

(Translation.)

Italian Embassy, London, September 17, 1920

My Lord,

ON the 30th July last the three Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople sent to their respective Governments a similar telegram in which they set forth the serious difficulties which were being met with by the Turkish Government in re-establishing its authority and order in Anatolia, and the obstacles which would therefore arise with regard to the application of the Treaty of Peace when it came into force. They stated that there were only two ways of meeting this state of affairs—i.e., that of imposing the conditions of the treaty by means of force, and that of attempting pacification and conciliation with regard to the Nationalist elements.

After having gone into the reasons which militated against the carrying out of fresh military operations, and also of entrusting the same to Greek troops, the three Allied High Commissioners proposed that their Governments should recommend that the Turkish Government should form a commission composed of authoritative persons whose advice would be listened to by moderate Nationalists, and send it to Anatolia in order to explain the full gravity of the situation, and to make the followers of Mustapha Kemal understand the advantages which would accrue to the country by the acceptance of the terms of the Treaty of Peace. They stated that if Turkey would be exposed if they persisted in maintaining an uncompromising attitude.

The Italian Government has considered these proposals with the greatest attention, and has concluded that the condition of things in Turkey, which becomes aggravated every day, may irretrievably endanger the pacification of the country and may render the application of the treaty impossible. Furthermore, the present state of affairs in Turkey not only gives rise to any kind of economic activity impossible. This represents a great loss for all, and has already been pointed out in a recent telegram sent jointly by the three High Commissioners.

The Italian Government is of the opinion that, in the interests of all, no means should be left untried in order that the present situation might not continue to become more complicated and aggravated. It is likewise of the opinion that an eventual extension of military operations in Anatolia would not tend to alter such situation favourably and therefore definitely, since, even if these operations were conducted with success, they would exasperate Turkish national feeling and aggravate the rancour already existing, thus perhaps giving rise to fresh massacres among innocent and unarmed populations.

In such circumstances the Government of His Majesty cannot but express itself as in favour of the proposal put forward by the High Commissioners at Constantinople with a view to sending a mission out to Anatolia.

The Italian Government is even of the opinion that the mutual objects in view would be more easily attained if this mission were composed of representatives of Great Britain, France and Italy, or if the mission sent out by the Government at

Constantinople were at least officially accompanied by representatives of the three Powers.

The Italian Government begs the Government of His Britannic Majesty to acquaint it with its point of view with regard to the matter.

I beg, &c
IMPERIALI

E 11643 3 44

N 111

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 21)

(No. 1247)

My Lord,

Constantinople, September 6, 1920.

WITH reference to my telegram Nos. 875 and 876 of the 1st August, I have the honour to state that the Turkish Government has now been completed as follows:—

The Grand Vizier has ceased to act as Minister of War, and a titular has been appointed to that Ministry in the person of Brigadier-General Hussein Huseini Pasha, a not particularly well-known soldier.

3. Reshid Munir Pasha, Minister of the Interior, arrived from Italy about the middle of August.

4. Nazif Bey, acting Minister of Finance, has been appointed titular of that Ministry.

5. Hamdi Pasha, Acting Minister of Marine, has been appointed titular of that Ministry. Hamdi Pasha is a Kurd, and was for some time after the armistice Secretary General of the Kurdish Club. He is in the peculiar position of having a brother, Hamit Bey, who is an officer on the French Staff here.

6. Hiza Tewfik Bey, President of the Council of State, returned from Paris on the 2nd September.

7. These arrivals of Ministers and new appointments hardly affect the general character or prospects of the Government, except that the arrival of Reshid Munir Pasha, and the consequent withdrawal of Jemal Bey from the post of Acting Minister of the Interior, perhaps reduces the danger of acute friction in the Cabinet. Jemal Bey is an extremely strong party man, and does not always see eye to eye with the Grand Vizier.

I have &c
J M DE ROBECK,
High Commissioner

E 11657 9075 44]

No. 125.

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 21)

(No. 2964.)

THE Earl of Derby presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a memorandum received from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 20th September respecting Inter-Allied Commissions of Control in Turkey.

Paris, September 20, 1920.

Enclosure in No. 125.

Memorandum respecting Inter-Allied Commissions of Control in Turkey.

PAR la note en date du 7 de ce mois, l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique a bien voulu faire connaître au Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, les vues du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté en ce qui concerne l'organisation des Commissions interalliées, dont la constitution est prévue au Traité de Paix avec la Turquie.

Les propositions de la note dont il s'agit portent principalement sur l'organisation

et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, qui avait d'abord envisagé la possibilité de soumettre la réglementation de ces questions à la Conférence des Ambassadeurs, s'est finalement rallié à l'opinion qu'il vaut mieux y procéder par la voie diplomatique ordinaire.

Le Gouvernement de la République est entièrement d'accord avec le Gouvernement britannique sur l'intérêt qui s'attache à ce que les deux Gouvernements arrivent à des conclusions communes quant à l'organisation des commissions interalliées, conclusions qu'il sera sans doute facile de faire adopter ensuite par le Conseil des Alliés et les autres Puissances intéressées. Il relève à cet égard que les commissions militaires, les commissions financières et de la Commission des Détroits. Le Gouvernement français pense qu'il importe de mettre en concordance par une entente entre les Gouvernements les dispositions du Traité de Paix qui présentent à l'égard des commissions certaines lacunes.

Il y a lieu en outre d'établir un roulement entre la Grande-Bretagne, la France et l'Italie. Quant à la présidence des trois commissions visées ci-dessus, étant entendu que chaque Puissance ne pourra exercer la présidence de plus d'une de ces commissions à la fois, ceci implique que la période de la présidence sera la même dans les trois commissions. Le Gouvernement français estime que les termes des annexes du traité concernant la Commission financière et la Commission des Détroits ne doivent pas être considérés comme limitatifs. Ces dispositions, au moins celles concernant la Commission financière, conclues en faveur de la France, de l'Angleterre et de l'Italie, à aucun degré la Turquie. A l'égard de cette dernière, l'accord des trois Puissances suffirait pour décider que la présidence de la Commission financière sera bi-annuelle au lieu d'être annuelle.

Au cas où le Gouvernement britannique se rallierait à cette manière de voir, le Gouvernement français donnerait volontiers son adhésion aux suggestions de la note de l'Ambassade britannique du 7 septembre exposant les raisons pour lesquelles le Gouvernement britannique désirerait que la présidence de la Commission militaire interalliée de Contrôle et d'Organisation fût confiée à un officier général britannique, il serait entendu que la présidence de la Commission financière serait confiée à un Français pour deux ans, tandis que l'Italie serait sans doute satisfaite de voir confier à un diplomate italien la présidence de la Commission des Détroits pour la même période.

A titre de remarque générale, il pense cependant qu'en raison de l'importance exceptionnelle du choix des personnalités appelées à exercer la présidence pendant la période initiale de ces trois commissions, les désignations devraient être officiellement acceptées par les trois Gouvernements, et il exprime l'opinion qu'à l'ère nouvelle, inaugurée par la signature du traité de Paix, doit correspondre, en vue de l'intérêt général, la désignation de personnalités nouvelles dont les tendances ne seraient pas trop connues à l'avance, et qui n'auraient pas eu l'occasion de susciter déjà des méfiances ou des dissensions sur place. C'est seulement à ce prix que l'harmonie nécessaire entre les trois Puissances sera assurée.

Le Gouvernement français se rallierait également à la suggestion du Gouvernement britannique tendant à centraliser entre les mains d'une seule et même personne les fonctions de Commandant en chef des Forces alliées d'occupation dans la zone de l'Asie Mineure, et celles de Président de la Commission militaire de Contrôle. Par conséquent, la présidence de la Commission militaire de Contrôle serait exercée pour la première période par un officier général britannique.

Les Commissions de Contrôle naval et aérien ne peuvent être comparées en importance aux trois autres, qui viennent d'être citées. Le Gouvernement français ne

voit aucune objection à ce que la présidence de la Commission navale soit confiée à un officier de marine italien, et celle de la Commission aéroplane à un officier français pour la première période.

Il resterait encore à déterminer un certain nombre de problèmes d'une importance moindre concernant les diverses commissions. Le Gouvernement français attacherait du prix à ce que les traitements fussent réglés d'une manière uniforme entre les trois pays principalement intéressés, de manière à éviter une disproportion des moyens mis à la disposition des uns et des autres. A cet égard, le Gouvernement français prie le Gouvernement britannique de bien vouloir examiner les propositions suivantes :

La solde du président de la Commission militaire étant assurée par le Gouvernement dont il relève (quoique mise finalement à la charge de la Turquie au titre des frais d'occupation), l'indemnité complémentaire de présidence serait fixée à £ T. 1,000 or.

Les membres de la Commission financière recevraient chacun £ T. 5,000 or, chiffre nécessaire pour pouvoir faire appel à des personnes d'une compétence particulière. L'indemnité de présidence serait de £ T. 1,000 or.

Les membres de la Commission des Dettes, dont le traité met les engagements à la charge des Puissances, recevraient £ T. 2,000 et une indemnité de présidence de £ T. 1,000 or.

Enfin, le Gouvernement français estime que chacun des Gouvernements doit être libre de fixer lui-même la durée des fonctions des membres qu'il désignera pour la partie des commissions ainsi que leurs rapports avec leurs Gouvernements respectifs. Toutefois, il paraîtrait dangereux au Gouvernement français que les membres de la Commission financière, dont les fonctions sont d'une importance primordiale pour la restauration des finances turques, fussent autorisés à exercer en même temps d'autres fonctions, ou surtout à s'occuper d'affaires financières, industrielles ou autres pour leur propre compte.

Le Gouvernement français uniquement animé, en matière d'organisation des commissions internationales de Constantinople, du désir de réaliser les conditions les plus libérales et les plus appropriées, tant à la situation de la Turquie qu'à l'égalité qui doit régner dans l'esprit du traité entre les trois principales Puissances intéressées, espère que les suggestions ci-dessus, dont aucune n'est en contradiction avec celles de la note britannique du 7 septembre, pourront être acceptées par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris,
le 20 septembre 1920.

(E 11658 3 44)

No. 126.

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 21)

(No. 2965.)

THE Earl of Derby presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a memorandum communicated by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 20th September, enclosing a communication from the Italian Embassy respecting the proposed despatch of a mission to Anatolia.

Paris, September 20, 1920.

Enclosure 1 in No. 126.

*Memorandum communicated by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs,
September 20, 1920*

PAR une note dont le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur d'adresser, en-joint, à l'Ambassade britannique une copie, le Gouvernement français vient d'être saisi par le Gouvernement italien de propositions tendant à hâter le rétablissement de l'ordre en Turquie et la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix signé avec cette Puissance.

Ces propositions donnent lieu de penser qu'une entente pourrait aisément intervenir entre les trois Gouvernements sur les moyens d'assurer le résultat recherché.

Sous réserve de certaines modifications et en recommandant l'adoption de mesures complémentaires qui lui paraissent nécessaires au succès de leur action, le Gouvernement français se propose de donner son adhésion aux mesures suggérées par le Gouvernement italien. Il tiendrait, cependant, à savoir si le Gouvernement britannique partage les vues exposées et à connaître les observations que le projet ci-joint de réponse au Gouvernement italien pourrait appeler de sa part.

En ce qui concerne l'organisation des principales commissions internationales, dont le prompt fonctionnement constitue un des éléments essentiels de la pacification, le Ministère des Affaires étrangères envoie aujourd'hui même à l'Ambassade britannique une note spéciale répondant aux notes de Lord Derby en date du 7 et du 17 de ce mois.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères,
Paris, le 20 septembre 1920.

Enclosure 2 in No. 126.

Memorandum addressed by the Italian Embassy to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, September 10, 1920.

30 juillet dernier, les trois Hauts-Commissaires à Constantinople ont envoyé à leurs Gouvernements un télégramme identique pour leur indiquer les graves difficultés dans lesquelles se trouve le Gouvernement ottoman pour rétablir son autorité et les obstacles qui surgissent à l'occasion de l'application du traité lorsqu'il entrera en vigueur. Ils envisageaient deux voies d'issue à cette situation : celle d'imposer l'exécution du traité par la force, ou bien de tenter une action de pacification et conciliation avec les éléments nationalistes.

Après avoir examiné les raisons qui découraient de procéder à de nouvelles opérations militaires et d'autant moins d'en confier le mandat aux troupes grecques, les trois Hauts-Commissaires proposaient à leurs Gouvernements de recommander au Gouvernement ottoman la création d'une mission composée de personnalités d'autorité reconnue, en état de se faire écouter par les nationalistes modérés. Cette mission aurait dû être envoyée en Anatolie pour y exposer la gravité de la situation et faire comprendre aux partisans de Mustapha Kemal les avantages que le pays tirerait de l'acceptation du traité—déormais inévitable—et les préjudices, par contre, auxquels la Turquie serait exposée en persistant dans une attitude d'intransigeance.

D'après la proposition des Hauts-Commissaires, cette mission aurait dû emporter avec elle une déclaration rédigée par les représentants des Puissances alliées et inspirée des principes précités.

Le Gouvernement italien, ayant examiné ces propositions avec la plus sérieuse attention et le plus grand esprit d'impartialité, a dû reconnaître qu'effectivement les conditions critiques de la Turquie, qui deviennent plus graves tous les jours, pourraient rendre la pacification du pays et rendre impossible l'application du Traité de Paix.

D'autre part, tout en faisant abstraction de tout arrangement territorial, l'état de choses actuel en Turquie ne produit pas seulement des conséquences politiques d'une gravité extrême, mais aussi des conséquences économiques et sociales qui ont abouti à un préjudice pour tous et appauvrit progressivement le pays ainsi que les finances du Gouvernement ottoman, comme l'ont signalé les trois Hauts-Commissaires dans un télégramme identique récent.

Le Gouvernement italien ne peut donc se résoudre à ne rien faire sans aucun moyen en vue d'empêcher que la situation actuelle ne continue à se compliquer et à empirer. Il juge également qu'une intensification éventuelle des opérations militaires dans l'Anatolie n'aurait pas à la modifier avantageusement et, d'autant moins, définitivement, puisque même dans le cas de succès, elle exaspérerait le sentiment national ottoman, irriterait les rancunes déjà existantes, et pourrait donner prétexte à de nouveaux massacres de populations innocentes et désarmées.

Dans ces conditions, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne peut qu'exprimer un avis favorable à la proposition faite par les Hauts-Commissaires à Constantinople d'envoyer une mission en Anatolie.

Le Gouvernement italien estime que la mission la plus efficace pour résoudre les problèmes communs si ladite mission était composée de représentants de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France et de l'Italie, ou tout au moins si la mission constituée par le Gouvernement

de Constantinople était accompagné officiellement par des représentants des trois Puissances.

Le Gouvernement du Roi a l'honneur de prier le Gouvernement de la République de vouloir bien lui faire connaître sa manière de voir à ce sujet.

Ambassade d'Italie,
le 10 septembre 1920

Enclosure 3 in No. 126.

Reply of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Memorandum of September 10, 1920

PAR une note du 10 septembre, l'Ambassade d'Italie a bien voulu faire part au Ministère des Affaires étrangères des mesures que le Gouvernement royal, après examen des propositions formulées par les Hauts-Commissaires alliés à Constantinople dans le télégramme identique du 30 juillet, considère comme nécessaires pour le rétablissement de l'ordre en Turquie et la mise en application du Traité de Paix conclu avec cette Puissance.

Le Gouvernement italien, s'inspirant des propositions des Hauts-Commissaires, se déclare favorable à l'envoi en Anatolie d'une mission tirant de sa composition une autorité suffisante pour se faire écouter des éléments modérés au parti nationaliste, leur faire comprendre l'inutilité d'une prolongation du conflit, la ruine irrémédiable à laquelle la situation actuelle conduit la Turquie, et les convaincre du désir des Puissances de les aider à la restauration économique de leur pays.

De l'avis du Gouvernement royal, cette mission devrait être composée soit de représentants de l'Italie, de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne, soit de personnalités turques désignées par le Gouvernement de Constantinople et accompagnées d'représentants des trois Puissances. La mission serait autorisée à s'appuyer d'une déclaration publique rédigée par les représentants des Puissances et s'inspirant des intérêts bien entendus de la Turquie.

Le Gouvernement français, loin d'être opposé à l'envoi d'une mission, estime avec le Gouvernement royal que cette mission peut contribuer grandement au résultat poursuivi. Toutefois, si elle est envoyée par un Gouvernement auquel les partisans de Kemal ne seraient animés d'aucun ressentiment antérieur, elle n'aurait pas à être étayée de la présence officielle de représentants alliés, présence qui, par ailleurs, comporterait de sérieux inconvénients. Dans de telles conditions, un échec de la mission, dont l'éventualité ne peut être écartée, placerait, en effet, les Puissances dans une situation plus difficile encore et rendrait désormais impossible tout accommodement. Pour les mêmes raisons, il semblerait préférable que la déclaration publique envisagée émanât officiellement du seul Gouvernement de Constantinople, la mission étant, d'ailleurs, autorisée à faire état des dispositions favorables et des intentions bien connues des Puissances.

De l'avis du Gouvernement français, les chances de succès de cette mission ne seraient, cependant, appréciables que si le Gouvernement de Constantinople, auquel les éléments nationalistes seraient invités à se rallier, n'était pas en lui-même, pour des motifs antérieurs et souvent personnels, un obstacle à toute réconciliation, même de la forme la plus limitée. Le Traité de Paix, se refuse au seul acte utile en son pouvoir et enlève aux Puissances le dernier motif de désirer son maintien. Aussi longtemps qu'elle demeurera en suspens, la ratification de ce traité constituera matière à divisions en Turquie et éloignera de Constantinople les éléments modérés prêts à reconnaître le fait s'il est accompli, mais non à y participer.

La ratification n'est pas moins urgente, si par la mise en vigueur des dispositions relatives à la police, la création des ressources financières les plus indispensables et une amélioration des conditions économiques, les Puissances entendent restaurer l'ordre en Turquie.

Les Hauts-Commissaires paraissent, d'autre part, estimer qu'il conviendrait, pour donner chance de succès à une mission en Anatolie, d'encourager au préalable la constitution d'un Ministère nouveau pouvant inspirer confiance aux éléments modérés, offrant cependant de sérieuses garanties d'indépendance à l'égard de Kemal et disposé à se prêter à la ratification du traité. C'est par ces mesures que le Gouver-

iranais et il est nécessaire de préparer les voies au succès du programme proposé par le Gouvernement italien.

De l'avis du Gouvernement français, il y aurait donc lieu d'autoriser les Hauts-Commissaires tout d'abord à se concerter pour favoriser la formation d'un Ministère nouveau dans les conditions prévues, ensuite à surveiller la constitution, sous la forme indiquée, de la Mission d'Anatolie et la rédaction de ses instructions, enfin à assurer l'organisation d'une force de police uniquement destinée au maintien de l'ordre et faite connaître les moyens qui, dans la pensée des Alliés, permettraient au Gouvernement ottoman de parer aux besoins financiers les plus pressants.

D'autre part, les trois Gouvernements examineraient d'urgence les conditions dans lesquelles devraient être constituées la Commission de Contrôle militaire et naval, la Commission financière et la Commission des Dettes, dont le prompt fonctionnement se lie étroitement à la mise à exécution des mesures proposées.

E 11271/3 44]

No. 127.

Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).

(No. 880.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, September 23, 1920.

YOUR despatch No. 1086 of 2nd August, paragraph 13 of enclosure.

His Majesty's Government have no objection to Grand Vizier's raising the forces of the Turkish Government under the auspices of the Inter Allied Commission of Control, for which the Inter Allied commanders can act provisionally.

E 11286 9075 44]

No. 128

Foreign Office to Admiralty

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 23, 1920.

WITH reference to the proposal to place the international commissions to be set up in Turkey under the general authority of the Allied representatives at Constantinople, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to state, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that the intention underlying the proposal is to obviate or minimise the delays which might be caused by the fact that the commissions, when set up, would be under the auspices of the Allied representatives, may be adjusted on the spot. The Conference of the Allied Powers will be held in the near future at the Turkish Treaty.

I am, &c.

D. G. OSBORNE

E 11833 3 44]

No. 129.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 24)

(No. 881.)

Constantinople, September 23, 1920.

Telegram No. 847 of 16th September.

Damad Ferid's physical condition has (group omitted), and, now that financial crisis has been temporarily staved off, his political position is not perceptibly weaker, despite shocks resulting from crucial incident (see my despatch No. 1318) and resignation of Sheikh-ul-Islam and Minister of Commerce on 19th September.

These Ministers belong to "Moderate Entente liberale" party, and were principal advocates in Cabinet of repression of Nationalist movement by force.

Circumstances of their resignation are rather mysterious, especially as they have carried with them Ali Kemal, who was absolutely identified with Grand Vizier until a short time ago. I hear from more than one source, but find it difficult to believe, that they have gone in with Italians under auspices of Jewish financier Carasso. French High Commissioner continues to urge me to join in positive action to bring about a change of Government. I have hitherto declined to entertain French High Commissioner's

suggestion, not because I see much positive advantage in retention of Ferid, but because there is nothing in situation to justify departure from rule constantly followed by High Commissioners during armistice of not interfering to make or break Cabinets. It is, moreover, very uncertain how far we could trust any Government which we might bring into power to uphold treaty. Tewfik would probably be the best all-round candidate, but he is very weak, and exposed to many Nationalist influences.

[E 11837 3 44]

No. 130

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon. — (Received September 24.)

(No. 1050)

(Telegraphic) D.

Constantinople, September 23, 1920

MY telegram No. 1047 of 23rd September.

Immediately after resignation of Sheikh-ul-Islam and Minister of Commerce Grand Vizier published communiqué accusing the French of attempting to restore order in Anatolia by refusing to agree to renewal of amnesty in favour of all exiles. The French High Commissioner and the Turkish Cabinet agreed to in effect to accept the French proposal. The communiqué states that amnesty in favour of all exiles is not a condition of the armistice.

At the same time Grand Vizier announced that the French High Commissioner had agreed to the following conditions:

1. 15,000 troops and 25,000 gendarmes to be recruited in small areas under effective authority of Government and areas occupied by Greek vedettes ceded to them. Arms and material held by Allies since armistice to be placed at disposal of Government.

2. Naval convoys for transports carrying Government troops.

3. Military foreign officers for gendarmerie and other services, as contemplated in armistice.

4. Loan by Allies of £ T. 25,000,000, being estimated cost of three months' operations with margin for unforeseen expenses.

Note speaks of further appeal for Allied capital for reconstruction purposes, and suggests that Turkish Government should be asked to consider the possibility of a Commission if it can be instituted in time.

Note concludes with outline of elaborate scheme for reorganisation of whole of Turkey, and suggests that the French High Commissioner should consider the possibility of a Commission if it can be instituted in time.

High Commissioners met on 21st September to consider this communication. They agreed to inform Grand Vizier that they could only refer it to their Governments, but to seize opportunity of approaching Grand Vizier with a proposal for mission of pacification to Anatolia which was approved of in your telegram No. 717 of 4th August and has since been agreed to. There was yet no agreement amongst High Commissioners to exact form or scope of action of this mission, and it was decided that French High Commissioner should broach proposal to Grand Vizier verbally and in general terms only. Grand Vizier replied that, in effect, purely Turkish mission, unsupported by force, would produce no effect, but that there might be some advantage in mission accompanied by Allied representatives. High Commissioners met again on 22nd September. I said that rather than abandon attempt at conciliation I would be disposed to agree to send Allied representatives with Turkish mission.

My French colleague demurs to idea of giving mission character of formal negotiations with Nationalist leaders. My Italian colleague was loath to commit himself on any question of detail, as he said that last news that he had from Rome was that Italian Government had informed British and French Governments that they favoured idea of mission, but thought it would be more productive of result if it were composed, or at least accompanied by, Allied delegates. After much discussion, it was agreed, at my suggestion, that each High Commissioner should put up written suggestions regarding precise mode of action, with a view to further discussion on 24th September.

I will send communiqué and note in reference to above by King's messenger.

[E 11271 3 44]

No. 131

Foreign Office to War Office

Foreign Office, September 24, 1920

Sir,

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th September, and to state, for the information of the Army Council, that the French Government are assuming that the force of 15,000 men mentioned in the letter is the force which is to be raised in accordance with the provisions sanctioned by articles 15 and 16 of the armistice.

2. As regards paragraph 1 (i) (b) of your letter, the raising of the force does not preclude the Turkish Government from employing in the force the Greek forces being withdrawn from Broussa and the neighbouring villages before the ratification of the treaty, such gendarmerie and police forces as may be at their disposal, and a further communication which is being addressed to the War Office will show that the French and Italian Governments have been asked to agree to the immediate organisation of the gendarmerie.

3. The French Government have signified their assent to the immediate raising of the 15,000 men on the conditions set forth in the letter from this Office of the 27th August, and His Majesty's Government are notifying the High Commissioner that they also have no objection, and are informing the French and Italian Governments that they have done so.

4. His Majesty's Government are endeavouring to hasten the setting up of the 15,000 men. They are not considering that the raising of the gendarmerie and "special elements" need await the installation of the commission, for which the Inter-Allied commanders can act provisionally. In accordance with the amended article 153, the reduction in the Turkish armed forces is to come into force six months after the ratification of the treaty. The "three months" mentioned in your letter is apparently a clerical oversight.

5. With reference to the last paragraph of your letter, I am to state that the assumption of the Army Council would appear to be incorrect, but the sense of the paragraph in question is not quite clear.

I am, &c.

D. G. OSBORNE.

[E 11862 3 44]

No. 132

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon. — (Received September 26.)

(No. 1055)

(Telegraphic) D.

Constantinople, September 26, 1920

MY telegram No. 1050 of 23rd September.

High Commissioners held further meeting on 24th September and exchanged concrete proposals. All were agreed that any mission to Anatolia should be sent by Sultan, but French High Commissioner considered it should address itself only to moderate Nationalists and should therefore be accompanied by a certain show of force in order to ensure its safety. I objected that this would be very slow, and urged that rapidity of action was essential as moment was now favourable but might be much less so in near future if Bolsheviks were enabled (e.g., as result of peace with Poland) to give effective support to Nationalists. I suggested rapid procedure of promoting despatch by Sultan of Turkish Mission accompanied by representatives of High Commissioners should be attempted at once, and that recourse might be had to French High Commissioner's procedure if other failed.

At the last meeting the High Commissioner stated that he would view the matter with a view to whether he will not commit himself very far pending further instructions from his Government. French High Commissioner ended by agreeing to my suggestion. He again tried to get me to agree to joint action with a view to change of Government. I met this by suggesting that we should see whether first advance of Nationalists was met by demand for Ferid's retirement, in which case opportunity might be provided for asking that Mustafa Kemal and other extremists should also withdraw from the front of the stage.

[5773]

Details such as composition of mission and place of meeting if it comes off were reserved for later consideration.

I enclose the CH. Majesty's letter with attachment contained in present report, and good and not to be modified if it can be avoided either in favour of Greeks or of Turks.

No. 193

(No. 10)
My Lord,

I HAVE to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No 2064 of the 20th September, transmitting copy of a note of the same date from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the Inter-Allied Commissions provided for by the terms of the Turkish Treaty

I can do

E 11971 3075/44)

144

No. 32 (5)

My Lord,

I am, etc.

* Also sent to Hume, Nov. 20, 1892, as per enclosure.

No. 135



YOUR telegram No. 1058 of 25th September, final paragraph

Of course His Majesty's Government desire execution of the Treaty as signed

dispatch follows.

No. 196

(No. 3257)

My Lord,

expressing the hope that they will concur therein, and will agree to the adoption of the

A similar despatch is being addressed to Rome.

I am, &c

E 11658 3 441

No. 187

(No. 326.)

My Lord,

In their draft reply to the letter of the 10th September (which is identical with a letter of the 11th September) the French Government expressed themselves in favour of a Commission they propose, not that it should be composed of, or at least accompanied by, a change of Ministry at Constantinople.

You should inform the French Government that His Majesty's Government have carefully studied their note of the 24th September and its enclosures, and they fully

[5774]

Y 2

Government to the effect that the Government in Turkey and the Grand Vizier refuse to do so, it would then be time to consider the question of finding a successor who would be more amenable. It is considered that ratification would clear the ground for the pacification of Anatolia, and should therefore precede the despatch of a mission to the Nationalists.

You should add that His Majesty's Government will reply in a similar sense to the note received from the Italian Government, and are communicating their views to the British High Commissioner at Constantinople for his guidance. At the same time they are prepared to give full consideration to any alternative policy he may advocate in agreement with his French and Italian colleagues.

I am, &c

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

E 11596 3 44]

No. 138

Earl Curzon to the Marquis Imperiali

Your Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note regarding the proposal of the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople that they should recommend to the Turkish Government the despatch of a mission to the Nationalists. The note adds that the Italian Government favour this proposal, but consider that in order to attain the end in view the mission should be composed of, or at least accompanied by, representatives of Italy, France and Great Britain.

His Majesty's Government have carefully studied the views set forth in your Excellency's note, and fully concur in the necessity of putting an end to the present situation in Turkey. They are, however, of opinion that delay in ratification of the treaty is a primary cause of continued discussion in Turkey, and that for this reason the first essential is to bring pressure to bear on the Turkish Government to repair the omission. Should the present Grand Vizier refuse to do so it might be necessary to consider the question of finding a successor who would be more amenable. In the event of the Government of the Turkish Republic being established in Anatolia, and should, therefore, precede the despatch of a mission to the Nationalists.

3. His Majesty's Government are informing the French Government of their views, and are also communicating them to the British High Commissioner at Constantinople for his guidance. At the same time they are prepared to give full consideration to any alternative he may advocate in agreement with his Italian and French colleagues.

I have, &c

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

E 12183 3 44]

No. 139

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 4)

No. 1064.)

Telegraphic.) D.

Constantinople, October 1, 1920.

My telegram No. 1058 of 25th September.

(R.) Political officers visited Grand Vizier on 25th September and communicated proposal of High Commissioners. Grand Vizier took more hostile line than was expected in view of preliminary conversations some days before. He said that, in welcoming proposal for mission accompanied by Allied representatives, he had not intended to supersede his own earlier proposal. He summed up his attitude as follows:—

1. Conciliatory methods cannot usefully be employed to produce settlement in Anatolia unless organisation of means of repression is proceeded with concurrently
2. Proposed mission should be accompanied by Allied delegates.

3. There should be no negotiation with most compromised leaders of rebel movement. (End of R.)

Grand Vizier called on me on 27th September and reaffirmed this attitude. On this I consulted further with General Wilson and my French colleague. Former is strongly of opinion that any forcible repression would take months to organise, and would not then be really efficient. French colleague, while agreeing personally with Grand Vizier's view as to invalidity of purely pacific mission, continues to urge that any conciliatory action is doomed to failure if undertaken while Ferid remains in power. He also lays stress on hostility of financial circles to Ferid, which renders financial straits of Turkish Government even more desperate than they would be under some other Grand Vizier.

Having regard to Ferid's uncompromising attitude and situation generally, I have been forced reluctantly to acquiesce in view that he had better go. High Commissioners are now agreed in principle (1) to make a written communication pressing on Turkish Government proposal to send mission; (2) to accompany presentation with verbal intimation that they consider prospects of success of mission would be destroyed by continuance in power of present Government; and (3) to follow this action immediately by communication of their views to Sultan through Tewfik Pasha, whom they consider most suitable candidate for Grand Vizierate.

My action is delayed owing to hesitation on the part of acting Italian High Commissioner to proceed without definite authority from his Government.

I am adopting this programme without enthusiasm. I see no rational alternative, Constantinople; substitution of one bankrupt Government for another is unlikely to produce much improvement until Financial Commission is a going concern.

E 12184 3 44]

No. 140.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 3.)

(Tele.graphic.)

Constantinople, October 1, 1920

(Most Secret)

Telegram No. 1064 of 1st October

Ferid has inkling of what is coming. He is concerned for personal safety of himself, Sultan, and persons identified with his policy in event of advent to power of Government of a Nationalist complexion. I trust I may be authorised to tell him that His Majesty's Government would not tolerate any action against his person or that of the Sultan in any such eventuality.

E 12215 3 44]

No. 141.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 4.)

(Most Secret and Personal.)

Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, October 4, 1920.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1065 of 1st October.

As an outcome of conferences with the Sultan, Grand Vizier stated to a member of my staff, with whom he had a very confidential conversation on 1st October, that, sooner than consent to work with a Government of Nationalist leanings, the Sultan might probably abdicate, as he was reaching the limits of his endurance.

It is Ferid's opinion that, if he resigned, the next Government would most certainly oppose acquiescence in the treaty, as the feeling prevails most strongly, even amongst moderate Nationalists in Anatolia.

Whether Ferid Pasha is consciously exaggerating the Sultan's dependence on him it is extremely difficult to say. In some quarters he is accused of representing himself to the Sultan as being the only Grand Vizier who inspires confidence in the British, and of representing to us that he is the only man whom the Sultan trusts.

There may be some foundation in fact for this accusation, but, on the other hand, the detachment of his attitude, in most recent interviews, towards several questions suggests that it is not for personal reasons that he is clinging to power; also, he seems to have a genuine concern and devotion for the Sultan.

Although I feel bound to report this matter, I am sending message to the following effect, because the prospects would be grave if the Sultan abdicated, and also because Ferid has definitely asked whether, in the event of his resignation and of [redacted] abdication, the British would help them, in order that they might make a [redacted] from the country:—

I If Ferid considered it advisable to leave the country after his resignation, I would help him in every way.

2. I will do all I can to protect the Sultan and Ferid if they are placed in position of imminent personal danger.

3. I strongly impress on the Sultan that by his abdication at the present time the opportunities of future utility to his country would be sacrificed and the situation would be complicated.

4. The question whether, in the event of the Sultan finding no alternative but to take the step of declaring a state of emergency, I should have to take any action, I have not yet decided. I am not sure of my Lordship's views. If the contingency arises, which I do not consider probable, I should have to take immediate action.

E 122.0 3 441

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon, - (Received October 5.)

(No. 1334.)

My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1030 of the 11th inst., I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the substance of a letter which I have received from the Grand Vizier formulating a scheme to raise forces to repress the Nationalist movement. I have the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, textual copy of this letter.

I have, &c

J M DE ROBECK, High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 142.

Grand Viceroy to High Commissioner.

M. le Haut-Commissaire.

[Non date]

EN signant le Traité de Sévres, la Turquie a pris des engagements de natures diverses que le Gouvernement ottoman s'est mis en devoir d'exécuter. La situation balkanique a profondément reculé les frontières de la Turquie. La partie de l'Asie Mineure qui est abandonnée à Sa Majesté Impériale est, plus, par suite de guerres étrangères et civiles, qu'un monceau de ruines. On ne peut supposer qu'une nation détruit son propre foyer ; il apparaît donc que l'Asie Mineure est entre les mains d'une équipe d'adhésée au Comité "Union et Progrès," et que la masse du peuple est le jouet d'un certain nombre d'opresseurs puisant leur force, non pas dans la collaboration de ceux qui ne sont leurs victimes, mais dans une organisation formidable, telle que l'histoire n'en connaît pas.

Le Gouvernement ottoman est en lutte avec une société secrète et révolutionnaire, laquelle, selon le cas, fait alternativement du patriotisme, du tour-
du-panachisme, du nationalisme et de l'internationalisme. Elle déploie durant d'au-
pas toute son activité à exploiter dans le pays les mauvais instincts humains, aux mépris
des lois et de la morale, mais heureusement le mass du peuple est restée réfractaire
à cette influence délétère. La victoire sur cette société peut être considérée comme
certaine, à condition cependant que les révolutionnaires ne s'alimentent pas en fureur
morales : car cette organisation doit son origine au mécontentement national provoqué
par l'occupation par les Grecs, en mai 1919, de Smyrne, partie inhabitable de la Turquie,
et où rien n'est grec, sauf peut-être la légende qui veut qu'Homère y ait vu le jour.

L'occupation de ces régions par la Grèce fut une cause puissante de l'exaspération du peuple ottoman, qui pouvait renforcer l'organisation révolutionnaire, presque déchue jusqu'à ces derniers temps, s'il la croyait sincère. Le peuple turc examine le passé et l'avenir. Il en arrive à cette conclusion que le Roi Philippe de Macédoine, et non d'autre fils Alexandre, n'avait de grec que leur culture d'esprit et n'avait comme argument que d'avoir été les conquérants du monde hellénique. Toute la Macédoine

qui contenait une population turque detenant la majorité absolue par rapport à chacune des autres communautés. Le Traité de Sèvres lui arracha aujourd'hui la presque totalité de la Thrace, y compris la ville d'Adrien, qui devint plus tard la cité de Mourad IV, et qui, avec sa forêt de mausolées, ses mausolées, son commerce actif et son industrie variée - tout ce flot de nouveautés chers au peuple turc - ne présente aucun caractère hel-

opérations de l'armée grecque en Asie Mineure, l'élargissement des frontières de la République arménienne aux dépens des provinces ottomanes, sont de nature à aggraver la situation en Anatolie. De pareilles éventualités si elle venait à provoquer le Kurdistan, jusqu'ici tranquille et demeurant en expectative, la complication serait au comble.

Je m'excuse auprès de votre Excellence de m'étendre sur ces détails, sans quoi l'épigramme de l'Asie Mineure resterait enveloppée de mystère.

La situation ainsi établie, le Gouvernement ottoman se déclare prêt à entreprendre sur son propre territoire l'œuvre de pacification qu'il s'est engagé à accomplir. Cependant, la responsabilité découlant d'un engagement ne peut être envisagée qu'avec accomplissement de cet engagement. Je me permets de vous en faire part, qu'à partir du mois de mai 1919 jusqu'à ce jour je n'ai pas

des Cabinets des grandes Puissances de l'Entente que plus on apporterait de lui dans la répression, plus le mouvement insurrectionnel s'étendrait. Ce que nous pouvions faire l'an dernier avec des forces relativement restreintes, exige aujourd'hui l'emploi de forces considérables.

Dès le lendemain de la signature du Traité de Sèvres, l'Etat-Major ottoman s'est mis au travail pour élaborer un plan de campagne et des projets d'équipement et d'autres concernant l'intendance. Pour entreprendre l'opération il nous faut recruter des troupes disponibles dans la province de Brussa, et dans la région comprise entre A la Buzar et le littoral de la mer Noire, où les hommes n'attendent qu'un signal depuis

Les 80 pour cent des officiers au Armée, tandis que des milliers d'officiers de la patrie, qui méritent l'admiration et l'honneur militaire au-dessus de leur

il serait illogique de douter de leurs sentiments de haine à l'égard des révolutionnaires

enfants. Les officiers et ceux des Prussiens qui coopérèrent à cet œuvre pacifiste
auraient peine à retrouver l'élan de ces hommes, jaloux par un sentiment de vengeance

Le Etat-Major croit indispensable de commencer l'exécution du projet qu'il suffira d'un mois pour le recrutement et d'un autre mois pour torturer de l'opération. Avec l'occupation d'Elkhabur de Kenia.

ère phase de la campagne pourrait être considérée comme terminée. Le nord de l'Asie Mineure doit suivre la destinée du sud. Votre Excellence n'ignore pas que la qualité des forces dont disposent les chefs révolutionnaires est plutôt négative positive étant donné que ces forces sont tenues par la terreur. L'apparition de l'émir du Sultan, que le peuple turc vénère, amènera la désagrégation de cette organisation, témoin les derniers événements de Brousse et de Thracie.

Pour appliquer immédiatement le projet militaire élaboré depuis deux mois le Gouvernement ottoman demande :

1. 40,000 hommes, dont 15,000 de troupes prévues par le traité, et 25 000 gendarmes sur les 35,000 que prévoit également le Traité de Sévres. Ces troupes seraient recrutées dans les provinces occupées provisoirement par les Grecs, et sur lesquelles le Traité de Sévres reconnaît la souveraineté du Sultan; dans la province de Brouse, dans la presqu'île d'Ismid et dans la région d'Ada Bazar jusqu'à la mer Noire où le peuple a déjà chassé les rebelles.

2. La livraison immédiate des canons, mitrailleuses, fusils et de tout le matériel de guerre, des munitions et des moyens de transport qui lui appartiennent, ainsi que de tous les autres objets de guerre, depuis l'armistice sous la surveillance des Puissances de l'Entente.

4. Un nombre suffisant d'officiers étrangers pour la gendarmerie et autres services.

tel qu'il est convenu dans le Traité de Sévres et ainsi que j'ai eu l'honneur de l'indiquer plus haut.

Un emprunt de £ T. 20,000,000 (les dépenses montant exactement à £ T. 5,777,440, prévues pour période d'opérations de trois mois : le reste est destiné aux fins prévues).

Cependant, pour ramener l'Asie à la vie, le rétablissement de l'ordre et de la tranquillité n'y a suffi pas. Cette contrée est ruinée de bout à l'autre. Il faut restaurer les villes et les villages détruits, et procurer des semences aux champs dévastés, des bêtes de somme et de trait, des instruments agricoles et des capitaux aux agriculteurs aux commerçants et aux industriels ruinés. Pour cette œuvre de réparation aussi nous nous adresserons aux capitaux des nations alliées. Nos dépenses peuvent être contrôlées par la Dette publique ou la Commission financière, si elle peut se réunir à temps.

Le Gouvernement sera gouverné par les lois et règlements qui jusqu'ici le régissent. Aussi, dès la signature de la Paix, il y aura lieu de réorganisation des branches de toutes les administrations. La publication en aura lieu aussitôt que Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan l'autorisera par un hatt-ı-humayun.

Cette organisation nouvelle, adaptée à la situation récente et de nature à assurer le développement du peuple ottoman, aux points de vue intellectuel et matériel, à l'élaboration de nouveaux programmes d'instruction publique des projets sur l'industrie, sur la économie du pays, sur le commerce, sur l'agriculture, à l'aide de la loi administrative, où est admis le système communal, lequel garantit pleinement les droits des minorités, du système judiciaire, permettant de distribuer la justice sans

but de restreindre le nombre des procès, à l'aide enfin de l'amélioration de l'administration de l'Evkaf par la création de communautés musulmanes lesquelles auront une large part dans cette administration. Grâce à ces réformes, la nation ottomane, quelles que soient les races, en majorité ou en minorité, qui la composent, vivra dans une liberté large et saine, et compatible avec les mœurs, le caractère et les traditions de chaque communauté. Le régime du droit et de la liberté pourra succéder à cette période de barbarie du complot révolutionnaire, qui en dix ans divisa la nation, ayant substitué à la liberté une tragique tyrannie, et fit usage de la charte de 1908, laquelle garantissait la vie et les biens des gens comme la liberté des hommes, pour massacrer, piller et persécuter ceux-ci.

Tout en espérant fermement la réponse prompte que la situation comporte, je prie, &c.

DAMAD FERID

E 12215 3 44

N 4

Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)

(No. 928)

(Telegraphic) P

Foreign Office, October 6 1919

YOUR Personal and Secret telegram of 4th October and your telegram No. 1063 of 1st October.

The assurances which, in the second of your above mentioned telegrams, suggest giving to the Grand Vizier and the terms of your message in the first are approved.

In regard to point 4, raised in first of your above-mentioned telegrams, in case of extreme necessity I do not think we could refuse, but you should most strongly impress on the Sultan that he should not abdicate.

E 12474 3 44

No. 144

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 11.)

(No. 1344)

My Lord,

Constantinople, September 28, 1919.

WITH reference to my most recent telegrams relative to the position of the Turkish Government and the Allied High Commissioners here in regard to the Nationalist

movement in Anatolia, I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum in which the 2nd Political Officer of this High Commission has essayed to present a considered view of the situation and to examine it with special reference to the question of what, if any, action can usefully be taken to deal with it.

2. I agree generally with Mr. Ryan's presentation of the situation. As regards the action to be taken, I am of opinion that, however small may be the chance of terminating the present state of affairs in Anatolia and securing acceptance of the Peace Treaty by the purely pacific expedient of sending a mission to represent the true facts of Turkey's present position to everyone concerned, an attempt to do so should be made. In forming this opinion I have been greatly influenced by the consideration that, even with the whole-hearted support of the Allies, it would be impossible for the Turkish Government to organize a force adequate to repress the Nationalist movement without months of preparation, and that any attempt to do so without the support of the Allies, including consideration of the possibility of a military intervention, would be disastrous.

3. The situation has unfortunately been presented by Mr. Ryan in a letter written, on lines unfavourable to the project of despatching such a mission. On the 24th September, as reported in my telegram No. 105 of the 25th September, I was inducing my French colleague to agree to the proposal that the High Commission should promote the despatch by the Sultan of a mission which should be accompanied by Allied representatives and which should be prepared to treat with the Nationalist leaders. The next step was to arrive at the best method of approaching the subject to the Nationalists on the one hand and on the other to bring it to a head with the Grand Vizier. It was not to be favourable to the project of despatching such a mission by Allied representatives.

4. The Grand Vizier, when the Political Officers of the High Commission called on him on the 25th September with the latter object. He said that he never contemplated the substitution of a mission for repressive measures, or the possibility of a military intervention. He said that the Turkish Government had, under strong Allied pressure, denounced as rebels and outlaws. He defined his attitude as being that a mission might serve a useful purpose subject to three conditions, viz.:

- (a.) That the organisation of repressive forces should be concurrently proceeded with;
- (b.) That the mission should be accompanied by Allied representatives; and
- (c.) That the mission should have no truck with the criminal authors of the Kemalist movement.

5. Your Lordship will not fail to perceive how much this attitude has in common with that taken up by my French colleague up to the 24th September. The subsequent situation is somewhat ludicrous, as M. De France considers it essential to drive Damad Ferid Pasha from office, as a preliminary to the execution of a programme which agrees with the Pasha in considering the only sound course of action, while I find myself in disagreement with both, yet hesitate, for reasons which I have reported, to take any action calculated to precipitate the Grand Vizier's fall.

6. I am studying the best means of emerging from this deadlock, and will continue to report developments by telegraph.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK.

High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 144

Memorandum by Mr. Ryan respecting the Nationalist Movement in Anatolia.

WE are now definitely confronted with two immediate issues, namely, whether we should take active hand in maintaining or changing the present Turkish Government, and whether we should attempt the unification of Turkey.

2. The main factors in the situation are as follows—

The Peace Treaty, which all Turks regard as harsh and unjust, but which some regard as the only alternative to complete ruin, while others think it may still be combated.

The Constantinople Government, which exercises little real authority, and which is practically bankrupt.

The Nationalists in the interior, who are reputed to be weakened by internal dissensions, and by their failure to make good in face of the Greek advance-Greeks, in shining armour, ready, militarily, to advance, but unwilling, politically, to do so except at a price;

H. His Majesty's Government, whose policy is undeclared, but who to outward appearances seem anxious only to curtail liabilities in this country

I. French, who seem to be divided into two camps, according as they desire to batten on a restored, though reduced, Turkey, or to deprive the Turks of the power to hurt them in Syria, Cilicia and Mesopotamia

J. Italians, who see both political and economic interest in upholding Turkey as a bulwark against Bolshevism, and, secondarily, so far as the two things are compatible, to the Constantinople Government, and

The Kurds

3. There are, of course, many minor factors and many remoter ones, and there are many subdivisions of those enumerated above.

4. The Constantinople Government derives what little authority it does possess from the Sultan, and from the support of the "Moderate Entente libérale" within the Sultan's Council. The Sultan, however, is a figurehead, and the "Moderate Entente libérale" is a group of supporters among the active politicians, can only retain power either by the support of the Sultan, or by the support of the "Moderate Entente libérale". The Sultan, however, is a figurehead, and the "Moderate Entente libérale" is a group of supporters among the active politicians, can only retain power either by the support of the Sultan, or by the support of the "Moderate Entente libérale".

5. The Nationalist leaders, however divided, are all equally irreconcilable to the Peace Treaty. They are at one in looking to the Bolsheviks for support to present trouble.

6. The other main factors have been sufficiently described above, except the Kurds, whose importance is apt to be underrated. Many of them are politically undistinguishable from the Nationalists, and are under Nationalist influence. The rest are in varying degrees votaries of Kurdish national aspirations, and proportionately anti-Turkish. These are, of course, disunited, but if carefully handled by His Majesty's Government they might be used as a counterpoise to Kemalism, Bolshevism and forces of sheer disorder. We have to reckon with the fact that they are just now very disgruntled, because of the limitation of the area assigned to Kurdistan by the treaty, the inclusion of the Kurds in the Armenian zone, and the fact that they are hated by the Armenians. The Kurds are hated by the Armenians, and they regard the Armenians who are to delimit the frontier as a mixture of ignorance of the East and fanatical pro-Christianism.

7. If the appreciation in paragraph 5 of the Nationalist leaders is correct, the Allies must choose between yielding to them over the treaty or fighting them in some way or other. Assuming that the treaty is to stand, or, if modified, is to be modified only to the disadvantage of the Turks, the first alternative is excluded. If the second be chosen, there are three and only three ways of fighting the Nationalist leaders. The first is by direct action; the second is by utilisation of such Turkish elements as are prepared to accept the treaty as a necessary evil.

8. Direct action by the Powers is excluded. The Italians are adverse to the object with which such action might be undertaken, viz., the destruction of the Nationalist organisation. The French are divided regarding it. His Majesty's Government are unwilling to put money or men into an adventure in Anatolia.

9. The further utilisation of the Greeks cannot be resorted to consistently with the maintenance of the treaty in its present shape. The Greeks must be rewarded for further effort, perhaps by an extended Smyrna area, perhaps by Constantinople, perhaps by a Pontine Republic. The further utilisation of the Greeks is also open to the objection that they are not prepared to accept the treaty as a necessary evil.

10. If, then, we desire the treaty to stand in its present form, the only hope, and

that a faint one, lies in utilising the Turkish elements which are ready to reorganise themselves to it. This the present Turkish Government ask us to do. They say we made them sign a treaty—the penalty for the non-execution is stated; but we stand in the way of every endeavour to render its execution possible. They submit military plans for our approval and we receive them in silence, though it needs but a little force in the background to encourage all Anatolian Nationalists. They are ready for immediate financial control, and we do not give it. In the meantime, we block every way by which Turkey might hope to raise money.

11. As a variant on this last alternative, it is suggested that the Nationalist organisation can be broken up by taking steps to bring the realities of Turkey's desperate plight to the knowledge of Anatolia generally, and isolating the leaders to such an extent as to render them impotent. This suggestion rests on the theory that the mass of people are sick and tired of Nationalists, that the active opposition to them in many localities needs only a little encouragement to become really effective, and that the class intermediate between the big Nationalist leaders and the sheep-like peasants are moderate and lukewarm enough to be easily detached from the irreconcilables in present circumstances.

12. Six weeks ago the position was that the High Commissioner had taken the view just described, and considered that useful results might be obtained by getting the Turkish Government to send a mission of pacification to Anatolia. Ferid Pasha, whom I then sounded, was dead against this. The Ministers who have just resigned have also always declared themselves dead against conciliation, unsupported by force, in any form, and their chief declared grievance against Ferid is that he takes no account of the Nationalists. The High Commissioner, however, has since changed his mind, and says that they have been got at by the Italians, with a politico-financial programme of which the notorious Salonika Jew, Carnaro, is the exponent. It is useless to try to fathom the mud in which nearly all the politicians of Constantinople are wallowing. All that is necessary is to glance at the present position in regard to the conciliation project.

13. Ferid Pasha's first moves after the resignation were to renew the offer of an amnesty to all Nationalists except the leaders, and to address a long note to the High Commissioners, in which he put forward elaborate military proposals, asked for a loan of £20,000,000, and outlined a grandiose scheme of administrative reform, which he said he would execute. It is doubtless intended to show his own people that he does stand for serious action in Anatolia, and that it is the Allies who block the way. It is also a formal call upon the Allies to support the Turkish Government in every way, if they want the Turkish Government to execute their treaty.

14. The High Commissioners have met this by informing Ferid Pasha verbally that they favour the sending of a mission to Anatolia to attempt to bring it into line with Constantinople. Ferid rejoins by saying that a purely Turkish mission without Allied support would have a good chance of success.

15. The High Commissioners are not agreed as to the nature and scope of the mission. The French want a mission which would proceed gradually with a certain force accompanying it, and would rally the people to their allegiance to the Sultan, advancing only as and when the scope of the Nationalist movement is limited. He maintains strongly, however, that for this to succeed Ferid Pasha must disappear. He does not seem to realise how much his proposal has in common with what Ferid Pasha has been urging on us, and how great the practical difficulties would be.

16. However his views may be evolving otherwise, M. DeFrance is firm on one point, viz., that the disappearance of Ferid is a first condition of any scheme for winning moderate Nationalists back to subordination. For the rest, he is lukewarm about any form of negotiations with the Nationalist leaders themselves, and equally lukewarm about using boldly the only threat which the Allies can use, viz., that of a further Greek advance. He admits that that is the Allies' only eventual weapon, but he is very reluctant that it should be used.

17. The Italian Acting High Commissioner tells us that his Government have signified to Paris and London their concurrence in the proposal that a mission should be sent to Anatolia, but have suggested that it would have a better chance of success if composed of Allied delegates, or if, at least, it were accompanied by Allied delegates.

M. Arlotta is slow to move beyond the bare suggestion that a mission should be sent, until he hears further from Rome.

18. Such is the setting in which we have to face the two issues stated in paragraph 1. Are we to drive Ferid Pasha from power? And what practical form are we to give to the project of a mission to Anatolia, which is at present too amorphous to be realisable unless the High Commissioners can agree on a detailed proposal?

19. Ferid's resignation would clear the air and end what is in many ways a false position. There is, however, no Government in sight which would appeal more to the Nationalists and of which we could be certain that it would nevertheless stand sincerely for the Peace Treaty. I am therefore averse from positive action to drive Ferid from office. If the current is favour of doing so proves too strong, or if he resigns of himself under the pressure of circumstances, I think the only hope for the future would lie in a Tewfik Government, but only if we could make sure that it would not be dominated by Nationalist influences, that Tewfik Pasha realised that no modification of the treaty favourable to Turkey was to be looked for, and that the sooner he ratified the treaty the better it would be for him. Izzet Pasha's candidature is being boomed in several quarters, but I cannot believe that he would really stand for financial inspiration.

20. A mission to Anatolia, I share the view that no Turkish mission, whether by Ferid or by another, is likely to effect anything unless it is amenable to modification of the treaty. A mission with Allied representatives might conceivably effect something if the Allied delegates were empowered to use more or less definite threats of forward Allied action in the event of continued resistance by the Nationalists. Even in this case, however, the hopes of success would be very slight.

21. The crux of the whole matter is to my mind the question whether His Majesty's Government want the support of the Nationalists. If they do not, I see no better course than to wait until the Nationalists are ready to do. This is a very serious situation for the whole of Anatolia, and the Nationalist movement must either remain being as an organised force or, in dissolving, leave behind it widespread disorder. We cannot suppose that, *pari passu* with the disintegration of the movement the Constantinople Government, weak as it is, would automatically regain its authority.

22. If however, we do want the treaty to stand, I repeat that I see no hope except in artificially strengthening the Turkish Government by giving it strong Allied support including financial help in the form of a loan.

23. As a preliminary, the mission of conciliation might be tried, but no great hope will be founded on it, and it should be realised that its failure should be followed either by what is suggested in the immediately preceding paragraph or by letting loose the Greeks.

Constantinople, September 23, 1920.

A RYAN

E 12597 3 44]

No. 145

Memorandum communicated by Marquis Imperiali October 13.

Translation

THE Italian Government has been informed as to a particular French point of view with regard to ratification of the Treaty of Peace by Turkey.

The Turkish Constitution requires ratification by the Chamber of all treaties concerning financial obligations and cessions of territory. The present Chamber has been dissolved, however, and the conditions of the country (Greek occupation, revolt of Mustafa Kemal, &c.) do not allow of fresh elections, which would in any event require three or four months. There is the further problem as to whether elections ought also to take place within territory which has been ceded.

As it is necessary that ratification by Turkey should take place as soon as possible, the Quai d'Orsay would be willing provisionally to accept ratification by an Extraordinary Crown Council similar to that which decided as to acceptance of the treaty, but which would probably be on an even wider basis. As soon as conditions

permitted, later on, regular elections would be proceeded with, and the new Parliament would finally ratify the Treaty.

The Italian Government would be glad to know the views of the British Government in the matter.

Italian Embassy, London

October 9, 1920

E 12658 3 44]

No. 146.

Memorial Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 14)

(No. 1100.)

(Telegraphic) D.

Constantinople, October 13, 1920

THERE is no prospect of ratification of treaty in the near future unless very strong pressure is used. Argument was employed in that it would still further weaken Government vis-à-vis Anatolia and that the appearance of not merely having submitted to treaty, but of having accepted it, would be a serious blow to the Government.

At meeting on the 7th October High Commissioners discussed with written communication to Porte recommending despatch of mission to Anatolia.

At my instance it was decided to drop proposed verbal intimation regarding desirability of change of Government.

Just before this meeting, new element was introduced into situation by receipt of communication from Sultan asking High Commissioners to visit him. It was decided to reply to him that audiences should be strictly limited.

At my instance it was decided to drop proposed verbal intimation regarding desirability of change of Government.

Note recommending despatch of mission as purely pacific experiment was limited to limitation as to persons with whom it should enter into relations, was handed to Grand Vizier the same day, and reply concerning audiences was conveyed simultaneously. Grand Vizier evinced disposition to give way regarding character of mission if I agreed that audiences should have strictly private character.

At my instance it was decided to drop proposed verbal intimation regarding desirability of change of Government.

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Conversation with Sultan showed him to be devoted to Ferid. He was of opinion that Ferid Pasha was regarded in some quarters as a man of high character, but that it was for His Majesty alone to decide whether or not the Government might be desirable either now or later on if Nationalists put forward removal of Ferid as condition.

Conversation with Sultan showed him to be devoted to Ferid. He was of opinion that Ferid Pasha was regarded in some quarters as a man of high character, but that it was for His Majesty alone to decide whether or not the Government might be desirable either now or later on if Nationalists put forward removal of Ferid as condition.

My French colleague continues to place removal of Ferid in forefront of his programme, but Acting Italian High Commissioner has come round entirely to my view for reasons which I do not quite understand.

Present intention of High Commissioners is to attach one civilian and one military delegate each to proposed mission.

E 12689/3 44]

No. 147.

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 3143)

THE Earl of Derby presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 12th October respecting the enforcement of the Turkish Treaty.

Paris, October 13, 1920.

Enclosure in No. 147

Note by French Minister for Foreign Affairs

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur de faire savoir à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique que le Gouvernement français considère maintenant l'envoi d'instructions aux Hauts-Commissaires à Constantinople comme la procédure la plus pratique et la plus rapide pour obtenir les résultats désirés.

Le Haut-Commissaire français à Constantinople vient de recevoir pour instructions de se concerter avec ses collègues sur les mesures à prendre et de se mettre d'accord avec eux sur le programme suivant :

1. Les trois Gouvernements sont d'accord sur la nécessité de commencer par obtenir immédiatement la ratification du Traité de Paix par la Turquie. Le Gouvernement anglais estime que c'est du Ministère de Damad Ferid qu'elle doit être obtenue par une pression concertée et énergique. Le Gouvernement français se rallie à cette opinion. Il considère qu'une ratification par le Parlement ottoman n'est pas nécessaire et qu'il suffit d'une ratification par le Sultan.

2. Aussitôt après cette ratification, la démission du Ministère Damad Ferid et son remplacement par un Ministère composé de personnes sélectionnées par les Hauts-Commissaires alliés, et qui sera capable de mener à bien les réformes nationales modérées. Le Gouvernement britannique, dont le point de vue en ce qui concerne le maintien de Damad Ferid jusqu'à la ratification a été adopté, sera certainement d'accord.

3. La lassitude des populations d'Asie Mineure et d'une partie même des éléments nationalistes se manifeste et paraît propice à un rapprochement.

4. La commission d'enquête internationale, composée de représentants des Alliés, pourrait utilement éclairer les populations d'Asie Mineure sur les dispositions prises par le Gouvernement de Constantinople et des Puissances et procurerait des résultats importants. Le Gouvernement français estime d'ailleurs que cette commission ne doit pas être accompagnée de représentants alliés, dont la présence, en cas d'échec de la mission, compromettrait les Puissances. Les dispositions favorables des Alliés étant suffisamment connues, la commission n'aurait besoin de s'appuyer que sur une déclaration du Gouvernement de Constantinople tout en étant autorisé à le laisser entendre que les Alliés sont favorables à l'accord que poursuit la mission.

5. Les Hauts-Commissaires se concerteraient en même temps sur l'appui à donner au nouveau Gouvernement de Constantinople, notamment sous les formes suivantes :

(a) Avances financières, taxes douanières, utilisations de dépôts de banque, immeubles et de matériel, etc. permettant au Gouvernement de reprendre son autorité sur les services publics actuellement sous le contrôle des nationalistes.

(b) Constitution immédiate de la force publique de 15,000 hommes prévue par le traité, toutes garanties étant prises contre une défection que la situation nouvelle et l'affaiblissement de Mustapha Kemal rend d'ailleurs plus improbable qu'il y a quelques mois.

Les Ambassadeurs de France à Londres et à Rome ont été priés de communiquer pour que les trois Hauts-Commissaires soient mis au courant du programme indiqué.

La même communication a été adressée à l'Ambassade royale d'Italie à Paris.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères, Paris, 12 octobre 1920.

E 12741/3 44]

No. 148

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 1100 D.)

Constantinople, October 14, 1920

Telegram No. 1190 of 13th October

French colleague, marked "very secret and personal," in which he said he had just received from Paris a telegram to the effect that as result of exchange of views between capitals, three Governments recognised necessity of immediate agreement in order to carry out the programme of treaty. Action was based on community of views existing between the three Governments. French colleague was instructed to concert urgently with myself and Italian colleague measures necessary to carry through the programme of which the following is summary :

1. Ratification of treaty by Sultan to be obtained without delay by Allied joint action.

2. Resignation of present Cabinet to be brought about immediately after ratification of treaty and new Ministry to be formed of persons selected by High Commissioners and adapted to bring Nationalists into line.

3. New Government to send Anatolian mission composed of persons selected by High Commissioners and presenting fullest guarantee of loyal attitude. Mission to be composed of persons of Turkish nationality, unblemished and danger of resistance to treaty, and advantages to Turkey of restored unity. Mission not to be accompanied by Allied representatives, as this would increase the difficulties surrounding any subsequent attempt at settlement in case of failure. Mission to be accompanied by a small number of Allied representatives to explain that action of Government had support of the Allies.

4. High Commissioners to demand from Government consent to new taxation and sale of Government property, and immediate formation of force of 15,000 men contemplated in treaty with the necessary precautions against desertions.

5. Allies to proceed as soon as treaty is ratified with constitution of various commissions to be appointed by the Allies.

From verbal explanation of French colleague at meeting on 13th October I gather that above represents not so much the agreed programme of Allies as French Government's view of the programme. I have been informed that the French Government has put it up to London and from which the request that the Italian Government should instruct their High Commissioners similarly, and he admits that he could not see as to joint action which would be required. I trust therefore that I may be in time to point out grave objections to proposed programme.

E 12832/3 44]

No. 149.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 1104)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 14, 1920.

MY immediately preceding telegram

French programme would involve complete departure from principle hitherto observed of not interfering directly in question of constitution of Turkish Government

Also later suggestion that we should force present Government to ratify treaty and then force Sultan to dismiss it hardly requires comment. My repugnance to conduct so far short of decent standards would make it difficult for me personally to carry this part of programme through. There are, however, serious objections of expediency as well. You know my reasons for fearing that if Sultan is tried too far I may abdicate. I have hitherto considered the

doing so, but French proposals would increase chance of success of communications which have reached me I am precluded from disclosing to my colleagues how definite are grounds for apprehension.

I have, however, told them that proposed course would place Sultan in position so impossible that he might resign rather than tolerate

If Sultan abdicated we should have in present hostile to treaty. Even if he did not repudiate ratification by unconstitutional he would leave nothing undone to infuse new life into Nationalist opposition. Even if Sultan consented to remain after indignity of being forced to dismiss only Minister in whom he has personal confidence, after that Minister had been used to force him to ratify treaty, our position would be no better than at present.

Ministry composed of puppets of High Commissioners would certainly possess no authority and unless we were prepared to take over Government ourselves outcome would be Government of extreme anti-Nationalists without Ferid's sense of responsibility or much more probable Government of definite Nationalist sympathies with whom neither we nor Sultan could work.

We should be taking leap into darker darkness than ever, and in doing so we should be assuming maximum responsibility consequently

As regards proposed mission, opinions vary widely as to chances of success, but such as they are they would certainly be much diminished by refusal to send Allied delegates. In any case High Commissioners have already committed themselves to promise to send delegates

Continuation in my telegram immediately following

E 12833 3 44]

No. 150

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 1105.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Constantinople, October 14, 1920

I CAN suggest no better alternative policy than following, in the present difficult situation

1. Proceed with mission on lines agreed between High Commissioners.
2. Continue to urge on Turkish Government immediate ratification, but refrain from exerting strong pressure, at least until Allied ratifications are definitely in sight.
3. Leave local political situation to develop on its own lines, i.e., make no attempt to keep Ferid in power or to drive him from power.

1. Dissuade Sultan, as and when opportunities offer, from regarding his personal position as bound up in that of any particular Ministry

2. Prepare quite definitely for the contingency of the failure of mission, i.e., decide at once on course of action in that event, recognising that if Nationalists have to be quelled by force, and if force to be used is Turkish, Allies must help Turkish Government financially and with officers to organise army and gendarmerie, and that such organisation must necessarily be affair of five or six months

Proceed with constitution of financial and military commissions, especially former, without further delay and without awaiting ratification of treaty even by Turkey.

E 12827/3/44]

No. 151

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 1107.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, October 15, 1920

RELIABLE information received to the effect that serious fighting broke out in sanjaks of Konia and Iabarta about 7th October. Fighting was expected between Kamalist forces and insurgents collected about 40 miles north of Konia

E 12785 3 44]

No. 15.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 1116.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, October 17, 1920

MY telegram No. 1103 of 14th October.

Damad Ferid resigned on 16th October, but no public announcement has yet been made. Sultan is understood to have consulted Tewfik Pasha

E 12597 3 44]

No. 153

Earl Curzon to the Marquis Imperial

Your Excellency.

Foreign Office, October 19, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your memorandum of the 9th inst. in which you stated that you had obtained therein to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government were of the opinion that the ratification of the Treaty of Peace by the Turkish Parliament is unnecessary, and that ratification by the Sultan is sufficient

I have, &c

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

E 13012/3/44]

No. 154.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 1120.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Constantinople, October 19, 1920

MY telegram No. 1116 of 17th October.

Ferid's resignation has now been announced officially

Reason given is ill-health. He remains to transact business until successor is appointed.

Ferid realised that his position was rapidly becoming untenable and bowed to the inevitable.

Language held by French High Commissioner to Sultan undoubtedly contributed greatly to his fall.

Sultan offered Grand Vizierate to Tewfik Pasha on 17th October. Tewfik Pasha called on French High Commissioner and myself on 18th October. He seemed to have every intention of accepting office, and said he hoped to complete his Cabinet by 21st October

Principal points raised in conversation with me were following:—

Vision to Anatolia.—He seemed to think what was contemplated was Allies' Mission, with Turkish Government as a result. I pointed out that previously we had expressed readiness to consider Mission, to which, however, High Commissioners had expressed readiness to accept. He seemed to think that participation in the Mission would increase chances of success, but I was in correspondence with you on the subject, as difference of opinion had manifested itself as to desirability of

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such participation. Tewfik Pasha declined to express opinion either way until he could consult future colleagues.

Financial and Economic.—Tewfik Pasha insisted on need for immediate assistance on finance matters. I will telegraph further after consulting Sir A. Black.

Ratification of Treaty.—I emphasized importance attached by His Majesty's Government to very early ratification by Turkey. Tewfik Pasha avoided expression of opinion. In view of this remark and of fact that it would no longer be question of using Ferid to obtain ratification and then insisting on his dismissal, I now see no objection to presentation of joint formal demand for immediate ratification.

In view of this remark and of fact that it would no longer be question of using Ferid to obtain ratification and then insisting on his dismissal, I now see no objection to presentation of joint formal demand for immediate ratification.

E 13038 3 44

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon — (Received October 14, 1918)

(No. 1408 Very Confidential)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 14, 1918

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1100 of the 13th October, I have the honor to state that my French and Italian colleagues and myself were received by the Sultan on the 11th October in consequence of a request made by His Majesty through the Grand Vizier on the 6th October.

The Sultan received us successively in order of precedence, i.e., French, British, Italian. He kept my French colleague about an hour and a quarter, myself about two hours and a quarter, and the Acting Italian High Commissioner an hour and a half. He was attended by Emin Bey, Director of the Civil List, but at my audience he requested Mr. Ryan to interpret, in order to avoid the necessity for using three languages, and during the latter part of the interview he dismissed Emin Bey.

3. The Sultan was less nervous than when he first received the High Commissioners. He conveyed the impression of having been carefully coached by Ferid Pasha, who appears to enjoy his entire confidence, and he spoke from short notes, which had probably been prepared in consultation with the Grand Vizier. He confirmed my previous impression that he is a man of little force of character, but of no mean intelligence, and he displayed the same tenacity in clinging to a point which I had remarked at my previous interview. He was somewhat discursive and at times difficult to follow, but in the main lines of what he said he was clear and consistent.

4. I had prepared for my guidance a note of what I wished to say on various points. I had also prepared a translation of this, dictated and unsigned, explaining that it was in the nature of a verbal communication reduced to writing for the sake of convenience. I enclose a copy of the English original of this note.

5. The Sultan began by intimating that the reply to the joint note presented to the Grand Vizier on the 7th October regarding the proposed mission to Anatolia would be an acceptance. He expressed gratification at the willingness of the High Commissioners to accept his full support, but observed pointedly that such support could be moral only. On my saying that his support would contribute greatly to the mission's chances of success, he observed that moral forces had lost much of their efficacy during the war, and asked whether it might not be better if moral and material influences mutually reinforced each other. By this he appeared to mean that it would have been better to adopt the plan of combining conciliation with a display of force in dealing with the Nationalists, but he did not press the point.

6. The point which he did press, and that very strongly, was that the mission should go to admonish and to call for submission, and must not brook discussion or any attempt on the other side to formulate conditions. There should, he said, be a very clear understanding as to what action should be taken if the Nationalists refused to submit,

and he asked what that action would be. I agreed that the question was important, and I promised to submit it for your Lordship's instructions.

7. His Majesty indicated not obscurely his apprehension lest the Allied delegates with the mission, whose rôle would be even more important than that of the Turkish members, might be more disposed than himself to make concessions to the Nationalists, and he was clearly anxious to establish the point that for them too the mission must have the character described in the previous paragraph.

8. He made great use of the argument that the Nationalist leaders had outraged in their persons and interests great numbers of subjects in Anatolia, and he dwelt on the difficulty of remitting the penalties entailed by such crimes. He spoke of the need for a strong Government which would inspire the victims of the outrages, and he said that he would like to see a strong Government in Anatolia.

9. I took the opportunity of mentioning to the Sultan that I had expressed my views on the subject to the French and Italian High Commissioners, and that they had agreed with me. I said that I had also expressed my views to the Grand Vizier, and that he had agreed with me. I said that I had also expressed my views to the French and Italian High Commissioners, and that they had agreed with me.

10. As to who the Turkish members should be, He said he had been a hermit in his own country and knew no one. To speak quite frankly, he considered that the only policy for his country was to stand in with Great Britain, and he needed my help and guidance in his choice. I said that I was not prepared to suggest names of Turkish members, but I said that I was not prepared to suggest names of Turkish members.

11. He said that he had been a hermit in his own country and knew no one. To speak quite frankly, he considered that the only policy for his country was to stand in with Great Britain, and he needed my help and guidance in his choice. I said that I was not prepared to suggest names of Turkish members, but I said that I was not prepared to suggest names of Turkish members. He had worked for a separate peace and failed. Then had come the armistice, thanks to the mediation of General Townsend, but peace had not followed as he hoped, and all he had sought to do since had been ineffectual. He was now threatened with the advent to power of the Nationalists, who were merely an evolution of the Committee of Union and Progress, men with whom he could not work without the sacrifice of his principles and his honour. He did not mind, he said, sacrificing his health, which was unequal to the strain imposed upon it, but he had not upheld his principles throughout a lifetime only to abandon them when he was close upon 60 years of age.

12. Throughout this part of the conversation, which was of an intimate nature, the Sultan showed that the question of his personal future was greatly pre-occupying him.

13. In the latter part of the conversation the Sultan reverted to the question of ratification of the treaty, which he had mentioned in passing earlier, and with which I had dealt in my note. He expressed the view, which is widely held, that if Turkey were to take the lead in ratifying the treaty it would add fuel to the flames in Anatolia as the Nationalists would accuse the Government of not having merely submitted to, but willed, the treaty which deprived Turkey of so much.

14. The Sultan also asked me very confidentially what I thought of the suggestion which my French colleague had just made to him, that a change of Government would conduce greatly to the success of the proposed mission. I said that I had expressed my views in the note which he had read, and I added nothing except a further non-committal observation.

15. The Sultan laid great stress on the argument that any moderate-serving Government would be a Government of a definitely nationalist complexion. "We would be going back to last year," he exclaimed. And again, "The only neutral people in this country are the people who are capable of nothing."

16. Except in those parts of the conversation which I have indicated as confidential the Sultan seems to have held very much the same language to my colleagues as to

myself, and to have spoken from the same notes. We all brought away the impression that His Majesty would be very loth to part with Ferid Pasha.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 155.

Note handed to the Sultan by High Commissioner

General Situation

(Confidential)

YOUR Majesty has doubtless been informed of the important communication made by the High Commissioners to the Sublime Porte on the 7th October. This communication was made after prolonged consideration. It has been suggested that the policy now recommended is inconsistent with the attitude taken up by your Majesty's Government at the instance of the High Commissioners six months ago. The High Commissioners do not so consider it. There are new elements in the situation which did not exist then. The Peace Treaty is now a *fait accompli*. The so-called National movement has proved its incapacity to make good the boasts in which its leaders indulged. It is now clear that the only way to bring about a settlement of the country, and to give every one who truly desires the opportunity to rally round your Majesty's throne and person on the basis of acceptance of the treaty. They hope that it may be possible by purely peaceful means to bring the great majority to this way of thinking. In recommending the use of such means they have been influenced by a desire to avoid useless civil war, and by a consideration of the difficulties from a financial and military point of view of organising effective forces of repression in any near future. They are willing to attach representatives of their own to the proposed mission in order to increase its chances of success.

Conclusion

It is therefore preferred to see the treaty ratified by Turkey before the despatch of the proposed mission. There is only one way in which the treaty can be ratified and that is by an act of your Majesty. Turkey has not, therefore, the same reasons for delay as the Allied Powers, which cannot ratify until their Parliaments have re-assembled. Ratification by Turkey would be welcomed in Europe as a proof of sincerity and good intentions in regard to the execution of the treaty, and would show people in Anatolia that the Government had not signed the treaty merely to gain time, but had done so with a serious intention and from a conviction that no other way of salvation lay open to Turkey.

Turkish Government.

It is of course a question which deserves your Majesty's careful consideration, and it is one which only your Majesty can decide. I could not presume to offer advice on the subject, because to do so would be to depart from the rule which my predecessor and I have followed since the armistice of not seeking to influence your Majesty's choice of Ministers. This rule has only once been departed from, and on that occasion only a subordinate Minister was in question. The British High Commission has on no occasion sought to bring about the fall, the advent to power or the maintenance in power of any particular Minister. My only desire is that Turkey should have the Government best suited to guide her through her difficulties, and I repeat that it is for your Majesty to decide whether the new turn of events renders desirable a change of Government either now

at a later stage, if, as is possible, the Nationalists should make such a change as to require compliance with your Majesty's orders.

Before leaving this subject I would like to say that, whatever may be the necessities of the new situation, I cannot express too strongly my sense of the services which the High Commissioners have rendered to your Majesty's Government. I know well that in this he has only carried out your Majesty's orders. I am confident that, whatever turn events may take, your Majesty will continue to exercise the wise guidance with which you have directed the course of events during the difficult period of the armistice. I look forward to a time when, after the restoration of peace, your Majesty will, as Sultan of a new Turkey, be able to assure the destinies of your country and the prosperity of your subjects in happier conditions.

Finance

My colleague and I have been much preoccupied with the grave financial situation of the country. We have had to make enormous sacrifices during and since the war, and financial difficulties exist everywhere. They are bound to consider their own interests, but I beg your Majesty to believe that they are alive to the necessity of restoring the financial position of the country. It is evident that no serious improvement can be effected until the Financial Commission is set on foot. They would like to see the commission start work in anticipation of the entry into force of the treaty as a whole. I would point out that many of the financial and economic claims have been drafted in a sense which is very disadvantageous to the country. People talk too much of the smallness of the new Turkey; even with its new limits it will be a considerable country, full of natural sources of wealth. The Financial Commission should be able to bring it to a high level of prosperity. It is evident that the sooner it makes a beginning the sooner will it be able to devise means of alleviating the present difficulties and laying the foundations of future prosperity.

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No. 156

Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).

(No. 999.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 23, 1920.

Your telegrams No. 1100 of 13th October and Nos. 1103, 1104 and 1105 of 14th October.

Instructions sent to your French colleague had already been communicated to His Majesty's Government, who generally concur in them, except that they cannot commit themselves to financial help. Renouard of Damad Ferid, reported in your telegram No. 1116 of 17th October, appears to dispose of objections submitted in your telegram No. 1104 of 14th October.

With regard to alternative policy proposed in your telegram No. 1105 of 14th October, it is clear that the only way to bring about a settlement of the country is to take a step both in order to confront the Nationalists with a *fait accompli* and so avoid bargaining regarding the treaty and also to facilitate institution and working of the commissions, in which lies the only hope of pacifying the country should the Nationalists fail. Neither we nor French, we imagine, would press for immediate ratification if it really entailed abdication of Sultan. His Majesty's Government would have preferred not to send a representative with the mission in order not to be associated in a possible rebuff, but if you are committed on this point they will leave it to the decision of yourself and your colleagues. It is hoped to ratify here early in present session, and you can use this as an argument with the Porte.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 1128, and Rome, No. 478.)

[E 12741 3/44]

N 157

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)

(No. 1120)

(Telegraphic) R.

Foreign Office, October 23, 1920.

YOUR despatch No. 3143 of 13th October, and my telegram No. 999 to Constantinople of 23rd October

Please inform French Government that His Majesty's Government are in general agreement with instructions sent to French High Commissioner at Constantinople (except as regards advance of money), and give them substance of instructions to British High Commissioner. Damad Ferid having already resigned, next step is to secure ratification of the treaty by new Ministry and Sultan

His Majesty's Government hope to ratify early in present session, and you should urge importance of early ratification by the French

E 12741 3/44]

N 158

Earl Curzon to Mr. Kennard (Rome)

(No. 479)

(Telegraphic) R.

Foreign Office, October 23, 1920.

PLEASE ascertain prospects of Italian ratification of Turkish Treaty and urge early action in this sense. His Majesty's Government hope to ratify early in present session.

[E 13152 3/44]

No. 159

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 24)

(No. 1117)

(Telegraphic) D.

Constantinople, October 24, 1920

My telegram No. 1120 of 19th October

Towfik Pasha informed Mr. Ryan on 23rd October that desire of Sultan and new Cabinet was that mission to Anatolia should be accompanied by Allied delegates abundantly showed that new Government were acting in complete accord with Allies, and would greatly increase chances of successful issue

Grand Vizier said that instructions to mission were being prepared and that intention was not to invite Nationalist leaders to state their conditions but rather to demand submission, in view of danger to country if they persisted in opposing the treaty

In view of above, I venture to urge that His Majesty's Government should make to a rapid understanding with French Government regarding question of Allied delegates. Latest instruction received by my French colleague indicated French Government's intention to send mission to Constantinople, and to start off with a mission to Anatolia, especially in view of verbal promise given to late Grand Vizier and Sultan. Allied delegates need not officially form part of mission, but their presence would show that Allies and Central Government were working on same lines, and they would be in a position to exercise considerable influence on Nationalist opinion.

I do not see force of French objection that failure of mission accompanied by Allied delegates would render subsequent action more difficult. Objection would be very cogent if intentions of Allies were to try purely Ottoman Mission first, and if that failed, make proposals of their own more acceptable to Nationalists. As, however, object of any eventual pacific action of Allies would be same as that of present mission, i.e., to secure acceptance of treaty as it stands, it appears to be desirable (a) to start off Turkish Mission in conditions most conducive to success, and (b) to be prepared with plan of subsequent action in the not improbable event of failure even in these conditions.

[E 13133 10576 44]

No. 160.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 1385.)

My Lord

Constantinople, October 7, 1920

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 1075 and 1076 of the 4th October relative to the provisory assumption of control of Ottoman finances by the Council of Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, and to other correspondence on the same subject, I have the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, a copy of the collective note to the Porte, dated the 29th September, the substance of which was communicated to you in the latter of the two telegrams above mentioned, together with one of the reply, dated the 2nd October, in which his Highness the Grand Vizier announces his acceptance of this arrangement

2. I also attach a copy of a memorandum prepared by Sir Adam Block, and containing his observations on subject

3. Sir Adam Block has now furnished me with a few supplementary particulars in regard to the financial situation of the Ottoman Empire, which are being carried out by the Council of Administration

4. There was on the 23rd September a balance of cash in hand at the Ministry of Finance amounting to £T. 108,112, in addition to which further receipts were expected during the remainder of the month, estimated at £T. 448,712, making a total of £T. 556,824

	£T.
Out of this there have to be met various expenses already decreed	281,810
And salaries for the month of September	2,078

leaving a balance of £T. 272,936, and it will not be possible to pay September salaries, at the earliest before the middle of this month.

5. The prospects up to the end of the financial year (28th February, 1921), are summed up as follows:—

September salaries—arrears	2,078
Estimated expenditure for five months—	
Constant capital	4,000,000
Provinces still under control	1,000,000
Supplementary credits	800,000
Estimated receipts from all sources	1,500,000
Deficit	4,300,000

As this estimate takes no account of extraordinary and unforeseen expenditure, such as maintenance of refugees and repatriated prisoners of war, the real deficit may be nearer £T. 13,000,000

6. Sir A. Block draws attention to the entirely disproportionate share in the expenditure assumed by the rubric "Salaries and Pensions." There are at present in Constantinople upwards of 100,000 officials or pensioners, not including the personnel of the various departments, and the monthly provision of £T. 1,700,000.

7. The condition of the interior is now such that, even if a reconciliation with the Nationalists were to be effected, the immediate result would be more likely to be an increased demand for remittances from the capital than an augmentation of its financial resources

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 160

Directive Note to the Grand Vizier

EN se référant à leurs précédentes notes à ce sujet et notamment à leur note en date du 7 septembre 1920, les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur de rappeler à la Sublime-Porte que les ventes de matériel auxquelles procède le Gouvernement ottoman et qui sont annoncées tous les jours dans les journaux ne sauraient être reconnues comme valables par les Gouvernements alliés et doivent, en conséquence, être interdites.

Cependant, prenant en considération, d'une part, les besoins urgents de ressources financières exposés à plusieurs reprises par la Sublime-Porte et, d'autre part, la proposition faite aux Hauts-Commissaires par son Altesse le Grand-Vizir de soumettre d'urgence, et en attendant que la Commission financière prévue par le traité puisse fonctionner, les recettes et les dépenses de l'Etat au contrôle de personnalités compétentes désignées par eux, les Hauts-Commissaires sont disposés à adopter les mesures suivantes.

Le Gouvernement ottoman serait autorisé à faire, au mieux des intérêts du Trésor, des ventes de matériel dont il est propriétaire, et dont l'aliénation pourrait être envisagée dès à présent sans infraction des articles du Traité de Paix relatifs au matériel de guerre; le contrôle des recettes et des dépenses de l'Etat, et par conséquent celui des ventes de matériel dont il s'agit et de l'emploi des sommes ainsi réalisées, serait exercé par les trois délégués de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie à la Dette publique, et avec les moyens dont dispose l'Administration de la Dette. Ce contrôle commencerait à fonctionner immédiatement, c'est-à-dire le 1^{er} octobre.

La première tâche des délégués serait d'examiner la question de savoir quelles ventes de matériel pourraient être autorisées sans enfreindre les articles dont il est fait mention ci-dessus.

Si, comme ils n'en doutent pas, ces propositions sont acceptées, les Hauts-Commissaires prient son Altesse le Grand-Vizir de vouloir bien donner d'extrême urgence à toutes les autorités et administrations compétentes les instructions nécessaires pour que le contrôle puisse fonctionner le 1^{er} octobre.

A. DEFRANCE.
J. M. DE RUBECK.
MAISSA

Constantinople, le 29 septembre 1920.

Enclosure 2 in No. 160

Note by the Grand Vizier.

LE Grand-Vizir, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, a eu l'honneur de recevoir la note que leurs Excellences MM. les Hauts-Commissaires de Grande-Bretagne, de France et d'Italie ont bien voulu lui adresser, en date du 29 septembre 1920, pour lui faire part des décisions qu'ils sont disposés à adopter en vue de l'exercice du contrôle, par les trois délégués de Grande-Bretagne, de France et d'Italie à la Dette publique, des ventes de matériel auxquelles procède le Gouvernement ottoman, en attendant que la Commission financière prévue par le traité puisse fonctionner.

En réponse, Damad Ferid Pacha a l'honneur d'informer leurs Excellences que, le 1^{er} octobre, le Gouvernement ottoman l'a autorisé à se conformer aux dispositions ainsi arrêtées.

Sublime-Porte, le 2 octobre 1920.

Enclosure 3 in No. 160

Sir A. Bick to High Commissioner

Constantinople, October 1, 1920.

I REG to transmit for your information translation of a letter, dated the 29th September, addressed to the Council of the Debt Administration by the Ottoman Commissary on behalf of the Ministry of Finance. In this communication the Ministry of Finance asks the Debt Council

1. To undertake the control of the sale of certain material
2. The control of the expenditure of the proceeds of such sales
3. The control of the receipts and expenditure of the Treasury in general; and
4. To take such measures as are necessary

The Debt Council, as desired by the High Commissioners, has consented provisionally pending the constitution of the Financial Commission, to assist the Ministry of Finance to the best of its ability. Measures have already been taken with regard to the first three points, in so far as the capital is concerned.

The Ministry of Finance has also furnished the Debt Council with certain figures of the receipts and expenditure in the capital.

These figures and certain other information supplied are being analysed, but a cursory examination is sufficient to make it quite clear that the Treasury is unable to make ends meet, and it is evident that the Turkish Government, in point 4, hopes or expects that the Debt Council will be able financially to assist it. The Debt Council has already indicated to the Ministry several measures that will tend to increase the revenue, but these will not produce sufficient revenue to establish any equilibrium in the Treasury.

There are then only two alternatives; either to reduce expenditure or to borrow. The reduction of expenditure means the reduction of the personnel of the Government.

There are 100,000 officials in Constantinople, including 76,279 in receipt of pensions, without the personnel of the army, and the total monthly expenditure, including pensions and the personnel at the Ministry of War, amounts to £ T. 1,796,983. This is evidently excessive, but it would take months to reduce the personnel even if the Turkish Government were willing or courageous enough to do so, which I venture to think is at present very doubtful.

It is to be noticed that extraordinary expenditure, such as the maintenance of prisoners of war, of refugees, &c., is not included.

The Turkish Government is mistaken if it thinks that the Debt Council will advance money. That is impossible. Nor is it likely that any financial establishments or groups will be willing to come forward. The Treaty in itself is an impediment to any such operation. It is clear to me, therefore, that the efforts of the Debt Council will prove to be only a palliative and not a cure.

In fact, the Government is on the verge of bankruptcy, and temporary expedients will be of no avail.

Every day the situation becomes worse, and I hold the opinion that the right course is to arrive at an arrangement between the Allies and the Turkish Government for the immediate constitution of the Financial Commission and the exercise by it of the powers entrusted to it by the Treaty, before the ratification of the Treaty by the three Powers and by the Turkish Government.

The Financial Commission has extensive powers and an authority which the Debt Council does not possess.

The stipulations of the Treaty are not confined to the protection of the interests of the three Powers. The Treaty is generous to Turkey, in that it affords to Turkey the means to establish its financial position on a sound basis, which is the *sine qua non* of a orderly government.

On the other hand, the Treaty requires Turkey not to part with any of its assets with a view to ensure that Turkey shall pay its debt and find the means to live. It is only with the consent of the Financial Commission that Turkey can dispose of itself of its present assets.

I have a strong impression that Turkey is to-day evading some of the obligations imposed by the Treaty. I venture to mention the clauses of the Treaty to which I refer to above.

Article 237 states that any hypothecation of Turkish revenues effected during the war in respect of obligations contracted by the Turkish Government during the war

annulled. The Financial Commission will only recognise the debts and obligations entered in the Annex I to Part VIII of the Treaty. In the meantime the Government is endeavouring to raise money by pledging revenue, if indeed it has not done so already.

Article 239 states that no new concession shall be granted by the Turkish Government without the consent of the Financial Commission. One of the chief objects of this clause was that Turkey should not be able to dispose of any of its property (a valuable asset) unless the terms of the concession were economically sound as far as the interests of the State are concerned. Is not Turkey to-day endeavouring to evade this obligation?

Article 242 provides for the appointment of a Director-General of Customs by the Government.

It is only in this manner that the Customs Administration and hence the revenue from this source will be radically improved.

The Annex I to Part VIII gives full powers to the Financial Commission to visit and inspect any place, public works or undertakings in Turkey, and the Government must furnish all records, documents and information which the Commission may require.

It is essential that these powers should be exercised at an early date. The Council of the Debt has not sufficient authority for this purpose, and, were such authority given, the personnel and means to enable it to exercise it would be wanting.

Paragraph 3 grants to the Financial Commission the control, management, and collection of all indirect taxes.

Article 243 of the Treaty (Economic Union) states that the Commission has the right to modify the import duties or to impose consumption duties. It is only after a period of six months that such modifications or imposition of duties can take place. Every delay in the appointment of the Commission postpones the possibility of an increase of revenue from these sources.

Article 244 gives the Financial Commission authority to apply to nationals of the Allies any taxes or duties imposed on Turkish subjects. Again the period of six months must intervene. The loss to Turkey's revenue in this respect is very considerable.

But the most important financial clause in the Treaty is Article 232. It authorises the Commission to control the Budget. In this manner only can the expenditure be restricted. It is the crucial point. It is of little use to seek for fresh resources unless at the same time the expenditure is reduced to its proper limits. The Debt Council cannot do this, the Financial Commission can.

It is of little use providing more money for Turkey by the improvement of its financial methods or by the creation of fresh resources if there is misuse of the money. Indeed, the Allies themselves suffer, since the assets on which they must draw to realise their claims are thereby diminished.

The clauses of the Treaty to which I have thus referred, none of advantage to the Allies and some of advantage to Turkey, are all in abeyance, and I am convinced that until they are in force, and the Financial Commission is constituted, any attempt to bolster up Turkish finance will end in failure.

The assistance of the Debt Council will perhaps ease the situation for a time, and good spade work will be done for the Financial Commission, but it is only the immediate constitution of the Commission and the exercise by it of the powers entrusted to it by the Treaty that the financial situation can be saved, and, in the words of article 232, that effective steps can be taken "to conserve and increase the revenues of Turkey."

ADAM BLOCK

Enclosure 4 in No. 160

Public Debt Commissioner to the Debt Council.

Commissariat Impérial de la Dette publique,
le 29 septembre, 1920.

M. le Président,

Je vous prie de me faire savoir que les trois grandes puissances sont prises au plus tôt les mesures destinées à porter dans lesquelles se trouve actuellement le Gouvernement. Il faut observer, d'autre part, qu'il faut encore du temps pour que la

Commission de Contrôle financier, prévue par le Traité de Paix, puisse être nommée et commencer à fonctionner. A la suite d'un échange de vues verbal, il a été, en conséquence, décidé, déclare le Malte, que jusqu'à ce que cette commission soit constituée et commence à fonctionner, les délégués des porteurs français, anglais et italiens au sein de votre honorable Conseil assumeront provisoirement, à partir du 1^{er} octobre 1920, le mandat de contrôler la vente des produits et objets se trouvant en la possession de la Commission des Ventes au Malte, ainsi que la manière dont sera dépensé le produit de ces ventes; de contrôler aussi les recettes et les dépenses générales de l'Etat; de prendre, enfin, les mesures nécessaires.

Le Ministère des Finances m'invite, en conséquence, à obtenir officiellement l'adhésion des personnalités précitées et à lui en faire immédiatement part.

Je vous prie, donc, de vouloir bien aviser au nécessaire et m'informer d'urgence de la suite que recevra cette question.

Veuillez agréer, &c
Le Commissaire de la Dette publique,
SAID

E 13138 3 44]

No. 161

Admiral Sir J. de Hobeek to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 25.

(No. 1391)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 9, 1920

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1389 of the 24th September, forwarding copy of a letter received from His Highness the Grand Vizier formulating a scheme to raise forces to repress the Nationalist movement, I have the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a letter dated the 28th September which I have addressed to the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Army of the Black Sea, together with a copy of the latter's reply, dated the 5th October, on this subject.

I have, &c

J M DE ROBECK,

High Commissioner

Enclosure 1 in No. 161

High Commissioner to General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Army of the Black Sea

(No. M 3025)

Sir,

Constantinople, September 28, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith, for your information, copy of an undated letter* which was received on the 20th September from His Highness the Grand Vizier.

1. This letter reviews the general situation in Turkey and the position of the Government with regard to the Nationalist movement at the present time as it appears to His Highness.

2. The letter then goes on to formulate certain definite proposals of a military and financial nature with which the Ottoman Government wishes to proceed in order to combat the Nationalist movement, and with regard to which the assistance of the Allies is required.

3. There are certain considerations respecting these proposals which have occurred to me and which are enumerated briefly below:—

(a.) Is it possible for the Turkish Government, without assistance from the Allies in money and the loan of Allied officers, to organise a military force capable of overcoming the Nationalist forces?

(b.) Assuming that the Allies approve in principle of the proposals made, is the Grand Vizier's estimate of £T 20,000,000 sufficient considering that recruits will presumably have to be obtained by voluntary enlistment and that the services of Allied officers, if lent, will be a very expensive item?

(c.) Is the Grand Vizier's estimate of only three months' operations justifiable in view of the necessity of first organising, officering, recruiting and training the 15,000 men, with the assistance of foreign officers, few of whom will have a working knowledge of Turkish, and of Turkish officers of a low level of efficiency?

* Not printed.

5. Assuming that the 15,000 men, with the due proportion of Allied officers in control, are eventually trained and equipped to take the field against the Nationalists, can the possibility be discounted of their going over whole or in part to the side of the Kemalists as a result of enemy propaganda, a change in the political situation in the capital or other causes? If such a development is considered possible, taking into consideration the relatively small numbers of the Allied forces of occupation when the contemplated reductions have been effected, will the Allied military forces be in a sufficiently strong position to deal with the new situation which will be created should the Governmental troops prove untrustworthy?

6. The above questions have occurred to me in connection with the Grand Vizier's proposals, and I should be much obliged if you would favour me with your considered opinion regarding them and such other points as may present themselves to you.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK
High Commissioner

Constantinople No. 161

Constantinople, October 5, 1920.
I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. M. 3025, dated the 26th September, and to reply as follows:

1. Reference paragraph 4 (a). I am of opinion that Allied officers would be a necessity with any Turkish force to bring it to a condition of reasonable efficiency sufficient to overcome the Nationalists.

2. Provision of a loan is beyond my province, but good and regular pay and proper equipment of all kinds would be required to attain success.

3. Reference paragraph 4 (b). Steps are being taken to make a rough estimate of the force of 40,000 men asked for.

4. Reference paragraph 4 (c). I consider that it would take at least six months to organise, equip and train the force named.

5. Reference paragraph 5. Should the new troops prove disloyal while stationed in or near Constantinople, the situation would be most serious, and if accompanied by riots in the town, as appears probable, would create a thoroughly dangerous situation. This might be minimised, however, by strongly guarding ammunition depots and by transferring all or the majority to the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus. I do not, however, consider it likely that the troops would be disloyal as long as they were well-paid and looked after and not required to fight. At any rate considerable warning should be obtainable.

When the time came to send the men to Anatolia to fight the Nationalists there would appear to be more possibility of desertion. In this case, however, the danger also would be less as they would be outside our area and desertion from allegiance and refusal to fight for the Government need not necessarily be followed by readiness to fight for the enemy.

Much would depend upon the political situation at the moment, and the chances of desertion should be decreased as much as possible by keeping the force under training until a good spirit had been infused into it.

6. Reference paragraph 6. Other points which present themselves to me are as follows:—

(a.) A force as at present represented by the division which the Turks are forming at Buyuk Dere would be quite unreliable. The officers of this force are quite incompetent and neither in spirit nor training would it be anything approaching efficient.

(b.) If regular pay and good rations be given, much improvement could be effected in a comparatively short time.

The question is also complicated by the fact that the majority of good Turkish officers seem unwilling to join the forces, either owing to Nationalist leanings or other reasons. If any political action could alter this attitude the organisation of the force would be facilitated, but even in this case little shortening of the suggested period of 12 months could be contemplated.

(c.) The question as to whether the numbers suggested would be sufficient depends mostly upon the spirit of the opposing forces and the inhabitants of the Nationalist areas.

I consider that both sides are very averse to fighting and that if one side could be made to act with anything resembling vigour, the other would give way. A properly organised Government force should, therefore, find little difficulty in defeating the Nationalist armies, provided the Bolsheviks do not give considerable active and material assistance, and I consider the numbers proposed would be sufficient for this purpose.

Should, however, the population have been moved by Nationalist propaganda to such an extent as to cause them to render armed assistance to the Nationalist forces, guerrilla warfare would supervene, which would entail the employment of much larger forces to deal with the situation. I do not think the Government would not adopt this attitude, as information to hand tends to show that all they want is peace, but this may change with circumstances.

I suggest that the attitude of the population is a matter in which political action would have great effect.

I have, &c.

H. F. M. WILSON, General
Commanding-in-chief, Army of the Black Sea

E 13177 3 44

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—Received October 26.)

(No. 1138.) Decoded.

Constantinople, October 21, 1920.

GRAND VIZIER, Tawfik Pascha
Shevki ul-Islam and Acting Minister of Pious Foundations, Nouri Effendi.

Minister of the Interior, Izzet Pascha
Minister of War, General Zia Pascha

Minister of Marine, Sami Pascha
Minister of Finance and Acting Minister of Public Works till return of Titular

from abroad, Rashid Ik
Minister of Public Works, Abdolillah Bey.

Minister of Justice, Hussein Bey
and Acting Minister of Justice, Hussein Bey

Public Instruction, Rashid Pascha
Council of State, Mustafa Arif Bey

E 13178 3 44)

No. 163

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 2)

(No. 1139)

Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, October 21, 1920

My immediately preceding telegram gives the list of new Cabinet which took office to-day, 21st October.

Cabinet is evidently intended to be one of "safe," even of moderate Nationalist leanings—Ministry of conciliation, in fact.

Most significant selection is that of ex-Grand Vizier Izzet Pascha for Minister of the Interior. He is generally credited with strong Nationalist sympathies, but he has kept very quiet for a long time past.

Imperial decree appointing new Grand Vizier is very short and entirely colourless.

E 13152 3 44)

No. 164.

Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).

(No. 1014)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 26, 1920.

YOUR telegram No. 1147 of 24th October. Mission to Anatolia.

In the event of British delegate accompanying mission, he should take up with Nationalists question of release of Colonel Hawthson and other officers and men, also the release of Messrs. Medlicott and party if they still appear to be in Nationalists' hands.

E 13152 3 44]

No. 163.

To the Earl of Derby (Paris)

(No. 1143)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 26, 1920

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 1147 of 24th October: Mission to Anatolia.

Please communicate to French Government arguments contained in telegram under reference, and urge them to instruct French High Commissioner to agree to Allied delegates accompanying the mission. If necessary, they could go unofficially without being members of the mission.

Understand quite privately from French Chargé d'Affaires that his Government are not likely to insist on their point of view.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 1013.)

E 13452 3 44]

No. 166.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 1)

(No. 1420)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 18, 1920

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1100 of the 13th October, I have the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, a copy of the joint note addressed to the Grand Visier by the Allied High Commissioners on the 7th October.

2. The Grand Visier's note to the High Commissioners of the 20th September was enclosed in my despatch of the 24th September, and the preliminary reply returned by the High Commissioners on the 2nd September was enclosed in my despatch of the 20th October.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 166

Joint Note addressed to Grand Visier

Constantinople, le 7 octobre 1920

POUR faire suite à la note en date du 22 du mois passé qu'ils ont adressée à V. E. le Grand-Visir en réponse à sa communication du 20 septembre 1920, les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur de faire savoir à son Altesse que leurs Gouvernements sont unanimes à estimer qu'il est urgent, tant dans l'intérêt de la Turquie que dans celui des Alliés, de mettre un règlement de cette situation en vigueur, dans les circonstances actuelles, pourvu que par des moyens de conciliation.

Les Gouvernements alliés sont d'avis que le seul moyen à employer est l'envoi en Anatolie d'une commission chargée d'exposer la situation exacte résultant de la signature du traité, la nécessité d'exécuter les clauses de ce traité, les dangers devant résulter pour la Turquie de la prolongation du présent état de choses et le devoir impérieux qu'ont, en conséquence, tous les sujets de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan de se rallier au Gouvernement légal.

Les Hauts-Commissaires n'ont pas manqué d'examiner, avec l'attention qu'elles méritent, les objections soulevées par le Grand-Visir contre ce projet, tel qu'ils le conçoivent, lorsqu'il a été porté verbalement à la connaissance de son Altesse, le 25 septembre. Si de leur côté ils reconnaissent le bien-fondé de quelques-unes de ces objections, ils n'en sont pas moins pénétrés de la conviction que les conditions auxquelles son Altesse a voulu subordonner son acceptation de leur proposition sont en ce moment irréalisables, vu les difficultés qui entourent le recrutement et l'équipement d'une force de répression, le manque total de moyens pécuniaires, et la situation de fait qui existe dans les nombreuses régions de l'Anatolie qui reconnaissent une autorité autre que celle du Gouvernement légal.

Les Hauts-Commissaires estiment donc qu'avant de penser à d'autres mesures, il faut entamer une action rapide, et par conséquent donner à la commission, au moins d'abord, un caractère purement pacifique, n'exclure la possibilité de pourparlers avec aucune des personnes avec lesquelles cette commission parviendra à entrer en contact, et la faire partir dans les conditions les plus aptes à contribuer au succès de ses efforts. Ils considèrent en outre que, pour aboutir aux résultats espérés, cette commission doit nécessairement être composée de personnalités choisies d'accord avec les Hauts-Commissaires, mais en outre susceptibles d'inspirer confiance à tous ceux à qui elle aura affaire dans le pays.

E 13453 1214 44]

No. 167.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 1)

(No. 1421)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 18, 1920

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1091 and 1099 of the 8th and 13th October, regarding the situation in Cilicia, I have the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a letter, dated the 15th September, which a member of my staff has received from Dr W. N. Chambers, a Canadian missionary, who is the representative of the American Board of Foreign Missions at Adana, on the subject

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK

High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 167

Dr. Chambers to British High Commissioner (Constantinople),

October 1, 1920.

THERE has been a change made in the French administrative force. Colonel Brémont took leave of the city on Sunday evening. Mr. Lee, of the Y. M. C. A., and I made our call together. Colonel Brémont was very pleasant, as he always has been in personal meetings. He is a man of considerable ability and large experience. He is said to have done fine work at Verdun. But he has failed absolutely to gain the confidence of anybody in any community. The doubt and uncertainty concerning his administration was paralyzing. Satisfaction was expressed at the thought of his leaving. Evidently much complaint has been made against him.

We called on Major Humler, who succeeds Colonel Brémont. He was very pleasant. One of his remarks was significant, to the effect that when he took over

He said that he had extended the lines of defence, and expressed the hope that the tranquility of the city would be safer. There has evidently been a good deal of friction in Administration circles, and the country has suffered, or possibly gained, I do not know which.

To-day the Armenians were thrown into consternation by the warning that they were to be expelled from the city. The threat was made that, if they do not comply, the bread ration which the French have been giving would be cut off. Veiled threats of force have been made.

There seems to be good ground for the report that the Turks replied to the French invitation to return by saying that they were unwilling to return while the Armenian refugees remained in the city. They were willing that the former Adana people should remain. The proposition to send away the Armenian refugees seemed to be based on this. That is to say, it is a concession to the Turks at the expense of the Armenians. Even if it were a proper thing to do, it is quite impossible of execution without a ghastly proportion of suffering and destruction and death.

The Armenian National Union declare that they cannot advise the people to comply. It would entail suffering and desolation and heart-break little less than that of the Turkish deportations that began over five years ago. As I write, a group of four from a not distant mountain village enter to ask advice. They expressed themselves about as follows: They were anxious not to do anything contrary to the orders of

Masson, September 22, 1929

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further representations to Turkish Government insisting on immediate ratification and asking Porte to realise what are the logical consequences of refusal to make peace. Some compromise must be devised on the constitutional question. In order not to provide an excuse for endless delay, the proposed mission to the Nationalists should be postponed until Porte agrees to ratify.

to instruct their representatives in Constantinople to join their British colleague in taking this line

E 13728 3 44]

No. 170.

Mr. Lansdown to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 1289)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Paris, November 5, 1920

REFERENCE your telegram No. 1143 of 26th October: Turkish mission to Anatolia

French reply just received, as follows —

"President of the Council still thinks there are very serious drawbacks in thus compromising the Allies and placing them in position of supplicants vis-à-vis of Nationalists. Far from facilitating result, such a decision entails risk of delay in it. Only in case of immediate ratification of treaty being obtained from Sultan Turkish Government would French High Commissioner be able to agree to participation of Allied delegates in mission to Anatolia, and solely in order to avert a collapse of negotiations with Nationalists."

Copy of note by bag to-night.

E 13758 3 44]

No. 171

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 338)

THE Earl of Derby presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the Turkish mission to Mustapha Kemal

Paris, November 5, 1920

Enclosure in No. 171.

Note by French Minister for Foreign Affairs

L'AR sa note du 27 octobre, l'Ambassade britannique a bien voulu appeler à nouveau l'attention du Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, sur l'opportunité pour les Puissances de faire accompagner par des délégués alliés la mission ottomane chargée par le Sultan de se rendre en Anatolie auprès de Moustapha Kemal, en vue de le convaincre du danger croissant pour son pays par son opposition armée au Traité de Paix.

Le Gouvernement britannique estime, comme l'Amiral de Robeck, qu'il n'y a pas d'inconvénient à autoriser l'adjonction, demandée par le Sultan et le nouveau Grand Vizir, de représentants des Puissances alliées. Ces derniers n'ont pas besoin de faire partie intégrante de la mission ottomane et se borneront à l'accompagner pour montrer l'appui des Puissances et du Gouvernement ottoman vis-à-vis de l'opinion nationaliste.

M. Leygues estime toujours qu'il y a de très sérieux inconvénients à compromettre ainsi les Alliés et à les placer en situation de demandeurs vis-à-vis des Kemalistes: loin de faciliter le résultat, une telle décision risque de le retarder. Ce n'est que dans le cas où la ratification immédiate du Traité turc serait obtenue du Sultan et du nouveau Gouvernement que le Haut-Commissaire français pourrait se rallier à la participation de délégués des Puissances à la mission d'Anatolie, et uniquement pour éviter de faire échouer les pourparlers avec les Kemalistes.

Paris, le 4 novembre 1920.

E 13761 3 44]

No. 172

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 338.)

THE Earl of Derby presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey and the despatch of a Turkish mission to Anatolia.

British Embassy, Paris, November 5, 1920.

Enclosure in No. 172

Note by French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

L'AR sa note du 24 octobre, l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté a bien voulu faire connaître au Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, le point de vue du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté touchant la ratification du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie ainsi que l'envoi d'une mission turque, accompagnée de délégués alliés en Anatolie.

M. Leygues s'empresse de faire connaître à Lord Derby qu'il partage entièrement les vues exprimées par cette note. En effet, sur la question de l'assistance financière à fournir à la Turquie, le Gouvernement français ne peut envisager de faire des avances, prélevées sur des fonds publics, à la Turquie, et il a fait connaître ce point de vue à son Haut-Commissaire à Constantinople. Il a également fait connaître, de la façon la plus ferme, que la seule mesure immédiate indispensable est la ratification du Traité de Paix par le Sultan. Il ne pense pas, d'ailleurs, que cette ratification soit de nature à faciliter la mission turque.

Le Gouvernement français ne peut pas, en effet, accepter de se voir présenter comme un simple appui financier la mission turque, qui ne serait qu'une simple mission de propagande. Le Gouvernement français ne peut pas non plus accepter de se voir présenter comme un simple appui financier la mission turque, qui ne serait qu'une simple mission de propagande. Le Gouvernement français ne peut pas non plus accepter de se voir présenter comme un simple appui financier la mission turque, qui ne serait qu'une simple mission de propagande.

En ce qui concerne l'adjonction de délégués alliés à la mission d'Anatolie, le Gouvernement français a déjà donné à Constantinople des instructions exactement conformes à celles qu'a reçues l'Amiral de Robeck, à savoir qu'il faut éviter dans toute la mesure possible de compromettre la mission turque. Ce n'est que si la mission turque n'aurait pas été ratifiée d'abord par la Haute Puissance.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris,

le 5 novembre 1920

E 13852 3 44]

No. 173

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 1450)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 22, 1920

THE fall of Damad Ferid Pasha from power marks the beginning of yet another new phase in the history of Turkey since the termination of hostilities, and provides a suitable occasion for submitting to your Lordship a connected review of the general course of events in this country since the date of my despatch No. 575 of the 22nd April. I seize the opportunity the more willingly as the departure of Damad Ferid Pasha almost coincides with the completion of the second year of the Great Armistice, and as I am myself on the point of relinquishing my duties as High Commissioner.

2. I explained in the despatch just mentioned how the logic of the situation following the occupation of Constantinople on the 16th March had necessitated the

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advent to power of a frankly anti-Nationalist Government. It may indeed be said that that was the principal consequence of the occupation, for otherwise the position here on 16th March has differed little from what it was before. I expressed doubt,

that the Nationalist Government could hope to reduce the Nationalists to submission, if the peace were made through by force of arms.

3. In one respect my previous have been fully justified by the event. The endeavour of the Central Government to use force against the Nationalists has been a failure. The experiment of employing irregular levies produced more disorder in the areas disputed between the Central Government and the Kemalists. All attempts to organise regular forces of repression have hitherto been equally sterile, and the preparations which are now being made are attended by no better prospect of success.

4. Adequate financial resources were assured, which they are not, it would be impossible to organise, equip, and train even a small effective force without the assistance of Allied officers, and with it devoting months to the task.

5. In another respect I must admit myself to have been in the wrong, in that I took an unduly gloomy view of the effects of the utilisation of Greek troops to enforce a drastic peace. Djafar Tayyar Bey returned to Thrace on the 1st May in circumstances which are still obscure, and to which it is now not worth while to recur, beyond saying that the Grand Vizier was personally violently opposed to his being allowed to go, and that the French military authorities were no longer held any official position he continued to be the leading spirit in the defence movement, but when the time came for the Greeks to occupy the new territory

assigned to them under the Peace Treaty the movement collapsed, and the Greek advance was untroubled by either difficulties or horrors. On the

provisional occupation by the Greeks of territory outside that assigned to it the treaty has produced no serious consequences. Their behaviour has been in the main exemplary, and they have been received in some places with resignation, in others with positive relief.

6. The return of Djafar Tayyar to Thrace was not followed by an open renewal of the cleavage between Thrace and the Central Government. The Grand Vizier had, as I have said, personally opposed his going, but once he was back in Adrianople there seems to have been a tacit understanding by which Djafar Tayyar was not to attack the Greeks in their then positions, but was not deterred from resisting if they entered Eastern Thrace. The position between Constantinople and Adrianople until the Greeks did advance was one of unstable equilibrium based on nominal submission to the Central Government.

7. The position has been very different. Throughout the whole of the period of the occupation the Nationalists have not established themselves on the very shores of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles it is because they are held off by British and Greek troops. They have set up a *de facto* Government at Angora. This Government exercises effective control in every part of Asia Minor not in foreign occupation. It claims to be the lawful Government of the whole of Turkey. It professes loyalty to the Sultan, but it declares him to be a prisoner in the hands of the Allies, and consequently incapable of exercising the authority normally vested in him. It has invented the theory that all power is therefore vested in the "Great National Assembly," which opened its proceedings at Angora on or about the 23rd April. Among the earliest resolutions passed by the Assembly was one formally denying the competency of any peace delegates not named by itself to enter into arrangements regulating the destinies of Turkey.

8. The Angora Government and its satellites impose almost intolerable burdens on the population, but even where they are most hated they are feared, and they have been strong enough to quell such local risings as have hitherto been attempted against them. Insurrection is rife among the leading spirits, and the military leaders of the movement have been much criticised for their failure to stay the Greek advance. There are no signs, however, of real disintegration. The movement is still in being, and the measure of its leaders' audacity is given by the recent invasion of Armenia.

9. The attitude of the *de facto* Government of Anatolia towards the Allies has been clear and consistent. For them the position is not armistice but war. Nationalist forces attacked the British at Ismid towards the middle of June, and they resisted a

French landing at Heraclea about the same time. Such of the leaders as disapproved of the former adventure deprecated it not as a crime but as a blunder. British officers have for months been held as prisoners of war in the interior. When General Gouraud sent his Chief Political Officer to Angora in May, Mustafa Kemal accorded a short-term armistice in Cilicia, but he refused to renew it when it expired. The *de facto* Government has entered into relations with our *de facto* enemies, the Bolsheviks. The Angora news bulletins advertise military operations on half a dozen anti-Allied fronts, among which Mesopotamia is very significantly included. A distinction is made, indeed, in favour of the Italians, whose presence at Adalia and elsewhere is temporarily condoned. They are no longer regarded as being solid with the Allies, but as being rather the natural supporters of Nationalist Turkey in the struggle against an Anglo-

French alliance regarded as a potential friend, but in all essentials the Nationalist attitude towards the French is that of enemies engaged in active warfare.

10. The position of the Central Government throughout the whole period has been one of constantly increasing difficulty. When Ferid Pasha returned to office early in April, he fell into two capital errors. His optimism led him to suppose that his advent to power might avail to mitigate the peace terms. His sense of logic misled him into believing that because he and the Allies were alike anti-Nationalist the Allies, and especially the British, would make common cause with him to reduce Anatolia. The last six months have shown that as regards the second of these beliefs, for any Allied action against the Nationalists independent of, though parallel with, the unfruitful efforts of the Central Government.

11. As for the former belief, the announcement of the peace terms on the 10th August dispelled the illusion that any Turkish Government, however constituted, could hope for mercy as Turks understood it, i.e., a favourable territorial settlement.

12. The political history of Constantinople during the three months which elapsed between the presentation of the peace terms and the signature of the treaty was of obscure intrigue, and need only be dealt with in its roughest outlines. In July Reshid Bey joined the Cabinet which took office on the 5th April, Ferid Pasha was a serious experiment. It broke down as was almost inevitable, on a

policy, which was accentuated as a result of the *chambre-croise* of the two Governments of Constantinople and Paris. Eventually a group formed round Reshid Bey in the Cabinet, which stood, or appeared for purposes of home politics to stand, on a platform of non-acceptance of the treaty, and which seemed to lean somewhat towards the Nationalists. A trial of strength took place towards the end of July, and Ferid won. He resigned on the 30th July and returned to power the following day with a Cabinet in which several posts were held by politicians of pronounced views belonging to the Moderate *Entente libérale* Party, i.e., the more important of the two factions into which the old anti-Committee *Entente libérale* had broken some little time before.

13. A very select Crown Council convened shortly before the change of Government had already endorsed, with only one dissentient voice, the policy of signing the treaty. Fresh delegates had been despatched to Paris for this purpose even before the change, and these delegates signed the treaty on the 10th August under instructions from a Cabinet completely committed to that policy. From the beginning, however, this Cabinet, like its predecessor, had within it discordant elements. Ferid Pasha had become increasingly difficult for any colleagues with strong views to work with owing to his desire to concentrate all authority in his own hands. The support of the Moderate *Entente libérale* was half-hearted, and eventually, on the 19th September, the two leading representatives of this group in the Cabinet presented their resignations. They were supported, to the general surprise, by Ali Kemal Bey, the most powerful writer on the anti-Committee and anti-Nationalist side, a man who up to a short time before had been Ferid Pasha's leading henchman in the press and was by many regarded as his evil genius.

14. These dissidents claimed to have abandoned Ferid Pasha because of his slackness vis-à-vis of the Nationalists in Anatolia. The alternative explanation offered by the enemies was that they had been won over to the Italian interest. It was even asserted by the scandal-mongers that the wilderness into which Ali Kemal had wandered was provisioned with manna dispensed by the Salonica Jew financier, Carasso, now become an Italian subject, and a creature of M. Giolitti. Whatever the real motives of the dissidents, their coup failed, and Ferid Pasha survived their defection with a slightly rearranged Cabinet. He had, however, sustained too many shocks to last long. Shaken by a recent illness, surrounded by abuses of which he was ignorant or

which he was not strong enough to check, unpopular with almost every element in the country, whether sympathetic or opposed to the Nationalists, beset with financial difficulties, credited with responsibility for all the extravagances of an over-zealous personal despotism to Hamidian extremes, he was left in the end with practically no support save that of the Sultan.

1. The Sultan, so far as he can be judged from a short experience, is a man of weak character, highly strung and at present over-wrought, cautious to the verge of timidity, but not without personal convictions, and certainly not devoid of mental strength. He is of long standing, and a certain community of temperament and outlook. The Grand Vizier's influence was perhaps impaired by the unfortunate episode of the Heir Apparent, which I reported in my despatch No. 1336 of the 23rd September, 1920. His critics maintain that even before that incident, and more than ever after it, Ferid Pasha maintained his hold on the Sultan only by persuading His Majesty that he was *persona grata* to the Allies as no other Grand Vizier could be. I cannot think so poorly of the Sultan's intelligence as to accept this as the sole explanation of his reluctance to part with Ferid. In any case, any illusion on the part of His Majesty as to Ferid's indispensability from the point of view of the Allies was dispelled on the 11th August, when the Allied High Commissioners were received in audience and expressed to him their view of the general situation.

2. My French colleague had for many weeks before this event displayed unflinching hostility, in a political sense, towards Ferid Pasha. His constant cry at every meeting held to consider the position in Anatolia was that no rapprochement with Constantinople was possible so long as Ferid remained in power. He lost no opportunity of urging me to join him in action at the Porte or the Palace to secure the dismissal of the Grand Vizier. Ferid Pasha's attitude at certain moments towards the High Commissioners' proposals for rapprochement gave M. DeFrance a handle which he was not slow to use. When the matter came to a head, I declined to join him, and for the Grand Vizier's dismissal. I agreed, however, when we discussed before me the general nature of the language to be held to the Sultan on the 11th August, to base myself on a formula which would make it clear that I held no brief for Ferid Pasha's maintenance in office.

3. M. DeFrance strung this formula to the utmost to suit his own views and practically told the Sultan that he regarded Ferid's departure as a necessary condition of the pacification of Anatolia. My own language was less categorical. I drew His Majesty's attention to the existence in certain quarters of a belief that Ferid Pasha's personality of itself constituted an obstacle to a reconciliation, but I disclaimed any intention to influence his choice of Ministers, which, I said, was a matter that only His Majesty could decide. The Sultan gave no sign in his conversation with me, or so far as I know with my colleagues, of any lack of confidence in Ferid Pasha, but the Grand Vizier himself realised that his position had at last become untenable and he resigned on the 16th October. He was succeeded on the 21st October by Tewfik Pasha, with a Cabinet composed of Ministers who may be described as men of moderate Nationalist sympathies, but sober minds.

4. This result must be accounted a diplomatic victory for M. DeFrance, though it is far from clear what his real object was in fighting for it, over whom he would conceive himself to have achieved it, or what eventual advantage to French interests he hoped to secure. The solution of these riddles must be sought in an obscure suspicion, of which I fear M. DeFrance has never disabused himself, that Ferid Pasha is in some sense a political protégé or even creature of the British Government, and in the fact that the French are endeavouring to combine two radically incompatible policies in their attitude towards the Nationalists. They see in the more moderate members of that party the future rulers of Turkey, with whom and they hope to carry through a policy of economic and cultural penetration, but at the same time they realise that the Nationalist movement is irreconcilable to their pretensions in Syria and the future French zone of influence.

5. For myself I see no reason to regret the disappearance of Ferid Pasha at the present juncture, except in so far as it adds to the uncertainties of the future. It is a loss to the Sultan, and yet sincerely willing to submit to the treaty, positive advantages may ensue from the change. Whatever may be the requirements of the future, however, it is only just to Ferid Pasha to say that during the last six months he has rendered manifold service to the cause of peace. He has many defects, not the least of which is

his inability to choose or to use capable subordinates, but he has shown not a few of the qualities of statesmanship, and he has acted with a rare singleness of purpose. He has not been deterred from his task by the physical danger of assassination, nor shrunk from the obloquy so readily showered on Ministers in times of national disaster.

6. Few attractions for him, and though, after accepting it, he developed violent political passions, I believe his leading motive throughout to have been to save what might be saved of his country, and to serve a sovereign who was also his friend. I believe him, moreover, to be perfectly sincere in his professions of anxiety that the policy of Turkey should have a definitely British orientation. I have said that I do not regret his departure at the present juncture, but I should be much more disposed to do so if it were the desire of His Majesty's Government to play a leading part in shaping the future destinies of Turkey.

7. During the period between the signature of the Peace Treaty and the fall of Ferid Pasha, two questions gradually thrust themselves forward almost to the exclusion of all others, and towards the end a third was added. These three questions form the heritage of the new Government. They are Conciliation, Finance and Attribution.

8. It did not take long after the signature of the treaty for every serious student of the situation, both native and foreign, to realise that things had come to a very late point. The rebel Government in the interior continued to declare itself irreconcilable. It was inconceivable that this attitude, which must of course have been maintained in London and in Paris, should induce the Allies to modify a treaty which they had solemnly decided to put into execution.

9. It was therefore a foregone conclusion that a campaign in Asia Minor. The further employment of the British and French troops for their payment for their services and numerous new complications. The Turkish Government claimed that if allowed to organise a comparatively small force at once it could itself re-establish its authority, but it was universally agreed that this would require money, and the best military opinion was that, even with money, an efficient and trustworthy force could not be organised without months of preparation under Allied auspices.

10. There remained, for the purpose of immediate action, only the alternative of conciliation. The contention of its advocates is that, having regard to the exhausted state of the population, the dissensions among the leaders, the dismemberment caused by the war, and the evident danger to Turkey of complete ruin, if the Allies were driven to use force, there is at least a hope that the situation may be represented to the bulk of the rebels in such a light as to rally them round the Central Government on the basis of acquiescence in the treaty. This proposal now holds the field. The Allied High Commissioners after an exchange of views with Ferid Pasha formerly requested the late Government on the 7th October to send a mission to the interior with the above object, and they offered verbally to let Allied delegates accompany the mission. Ferid Pasha and the Sultan reluctantly decided to acquiesce in principle, but when the former saw that his fall was inevitable he preferred to leave it to his successor to reply officially to the High Commissioners' note.

11. There is no doubt that the new Government will agree to send a mission, but it is not yet certain whether they will wish Allied delegates to accompany it. In the meantime, the High Commissioners have themselves been thrown back into uncertainty as to how far the British and French Governments are willing to go in the matter of sending Allied delegates. The French Government appear to be hostile to the idea, and I am still without your Lordship's final instructions as to what my own attitude should be. The Italian Government on the other hand show great eagerness to act as honest brokers between Constantinople and Angora, and are believed to have already broken the ground on their own account with the Nationalist leaders.

12. The financial situation of the Central Government during the last few months may be summed up in a formula almost as simple as that of Mr. Micawber: Indispensable monthly expenditure, not less than £ T. 1,400,000. Monthly revenue, less than £ T. 1,000,000, and dwindling. Credit, none. Result, misery. The age of financial miracles is not, however, past, and by one expedient or another the Government contrived to pay its way until early in September, when the Treasury ran too dry to meet the indispensable payments for Angora. Bankruptcy was only averted by an act of spoliation, i.e., the application to current expenditure of a fund held by the Government in trust for orphans. It was undesirable that such a situation should

recor and on the 1st October the Allied delegates on the Public Debt Administration were placed in provisional control of the finances, with a view more especially to regularise the sale of various stocks which had been previously dealt with in a hazy and extravagant fashion. Thanks to this measure the indispensable payments for September have been assured, and those for October, soon to fall due, can be assured in the same manner. It is hoped that a more stable position may be established before the end of November, by instituting the Financial Commission provided for in the treaty, and by arranging for the application of the financial clauses without awaiting the coming into force of the treaty as a whole. There is no other way of salvation. It is true that it will be long before the Financial Commission can establish the finances of Turkey on a sound basis, but it will be able to afford immediate relief by restoring the Government credit with financial establishments. The rights reserved to the Commission under the treaty are so extensive that the Government can obtain no credit until the Commission comes into being and begins to exercise its powers.

The Allies have more than once urged on the Constantinople Government the desirability of an immediate ratification of the treaty by Turkey. There is no doubt that according to the Constitution this requires the assent of the Turkish Parliament. It is universally agreed, except by the Nationalists, who do not recognise even the signature of the treaty, that this requirement cannot be fulfilled, and that the treaty must be ratified by an Act of the Sultan. The Sultan himself fully admits this, but he has urged that he should be allowed to wait until some at least of the Allied Parliaments have accepted the treaty, as he says that his position *vis-à-vis* of his own subjects would be gravely compromised if he were to take the initiative and ratify the treaty by an unconstitutional Act before the Allies on their side had done anything. It is certain that, whether he originally derived it from Ferid Pasha or not, the Sultan will recognise its impracticability and will consent to ratify the treaty at once, provided the High Commissioners convert the suggestions which they have hitherto made into a formal demand. It was intimated to Tewfik Pasha, while he was still engaged in the negotiations, that the Allies are disposed to apply certain parts of the treaty, beneficial to Turkey, e.g., the financial clauses, without waiting for the whole to come into force, they desire that ratification by Turkey should be the first step.

24. It is clear from the foregoing review that the crucial question to-day is whether Anatolia can be brought into line by purely pacific means. The attempt must obviously be made, but it would be rash to count confidently on a successful issue. If the proposed mission fails, the Allies must be prepared with some definite plan of action. Anatolia cannot be left to stew in its own juice. Even if the Nationalist movement should disintegrate, the process must be accompanied by widespread disorder, economic stagnation and loss of life unless the authority of a Central Government is built up simultaneously. Even now there is a good deal more actual shedding of blood than is generally realised in Europe, and it is at once just to the Nationalists and disquieting for all who are interested in the preservation from massacre of the Christian population of the interior to record the fact that the danger to non-Moslem lives is greatest where Nationalist authority is least secure. Moreover, the question is not merely an internal one. There can be no real peace or stability in the adjoining countries, especially those with strong Moslem elements, so long as the area to be included in the future Turkey continues to be a storm-centre.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBÉCK,
High Commissioner

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No. 174.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon. (Received November 8.)

(No. 1437)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 26, 1920.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 21st instant, No. 1139, relative to the new Turkish Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the "Hatt-i Humayun" appointing Tewfik Pasha Grand Vizier.

2. The most striking feature of this document is the entire absence of any reference to the line of conduct to be followed by the new Government. This is the more

significant as the Government has come into power with the definite object of effecting a rapprochement between Constantinople and the Nationalists by peaceful means. It is a pity that the Government should not commit itself personally to anything like the attitude hitherto taken up by the Nationalists.

The new Cabinet may be of interest to your Lordship. He now takes office for the fifth time. His rôle in home politics has been to serve as a transitional Prime Minister in terms of difficulty. He is, as your Lordship knows, an intelligent man, but his intelligence is unimpaired, he is without much energy. He is married, and has a family, including his sons, who have not been credited with strong Nationalist sympathies. His older son, Hakk, is married to Princess Uvia, the Sultan's daughter. She is reputed to be a Nationalist.

He was appointed Grand Vizier after the resignation of Sabri Effendi on 11th March, and may be regarded as quite colourless politically. He was at one time Kadî of Egypt.

6. The most notable personality in the new Government is undoubtedly General İzzet Pasha, the Minister of the Interior. His record is known to your Lordship. He was Grand Vizier when the armistice was signed, and is understood at that time to have incurred the displeasure of the Sultan by including in his Cabinet members of the Committee of Union and Progress and by allowing Talaat Pasha to escape from Constantinople. He is by many supposed to be a strong Nationalist, but he has been very careful not to commit himself in any way. It is

understood that he was a member of the Committee of Union and Progress in previous combinations. He was Grand Vizier shortly before the occupation of Constantinople last March, and had a short and luckless career in that office. The Government over which he presided certainly played into the hands of the Nationalists, but Salih Pasha himself appears to be a man of no force of personality.

8. The new Minister of War, Zia Pasha, is little known. He had a normal military career until seven years ago, when he shared the fate of many older officers who were retired. He was Minister of Public Works in Salih Pasha's Cabinet last spring.

9. Sefa Bey, Minister of Finance, is a well-known figure in the Turkish scene. He is undoubtedly a Nationalist, and he is violent in his opinions. He is, however, honest and not unreasonable. He was a member of the Committee of Union and Progress in previous combinations.

10. The Ministry of Justice has not been filled. It is understood that the Government will appoint Djemil Mollab Urian-Zada, a well-known political hodja, who has once or twice been a member of the Committee of Union and Progress. It is not easy to discover what his political ideals are. His name was struck off the list possibly at the instance of the Sultan, and Husein Kiazim Bey, who becomes Minister of Commerce and Agriculture, was also made Acting Minister of Justice.

11. Kiazim Bey had a respectable administrative career under the Hamidian régime. After the revolution of 1908 he was one of the founders of the famous "Tanin" newspaper, but after some little time he parted company with Djavid Bey, the leading member of the group. He subsequently occupied several official posts, and as Prefect of Constantinople he had a quarrel with Said Halim Pasha, then Mayor of Yeniköy, and was compelled to resign his post. He was subsequently twice Vali of Salonica, with an intervening spell as a deputy. He spent some time in retirement in the Lebanon during the war. After the armistice he re-entered Parliament and became Vice-President of the Chamber. He may be regarded as a moderate adherent of the Committee of Union and Progress, but he has the reputation of an honest man.

12. Said Bey, the new Minister of Finance, is an Albanian. He did well as an inspector under the Macedonian Financial Commission and was afterwards similarly employed under the Ministry of Finance. He was Food Minister after the armistice. He is reputed honest. He has been, at any rate at certain times in his recent career, anti-Committee and anti-German. There is little against him, except that he is talkative and lacks balance.

13. The Minister of Public Instructions, Mustafa Rehid Pasha, is well known to your Lordship by reputation as a former Minister of Foreign Affairs. He comes into

14. Abdullah Bey, Minister of Public Works, is the son of a former Grand Vizier, Kiamil Pasha. He is little known except as the son of his father. He is sometimes accused of having reinsured with the Committee Party. He is at present in Switzerland.

The President of the Council of State, Moustafa Arif Bey, is by profession a Pasha - first Cabinet after the armistice, and was supposed to represent the Committee interest in that Government.

I have, &c.
J. M. DE ROBERTS
High Commissioner

[illegible]

8 Sefer, 1339 (21st October, 1336).

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 8.)

My Lord,

3. The most striking passage in this document is the statement that, when the Government reaches a successful issue in the process of bringing the Bill into legal form in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution,

4. It remains to be seen whether the passage cited above means that the Government are not prepared to accept any responsibility for ratifying the treaty until a

I have, &c
J. M. DE R. BECK,
H. & C. Commissionaire

Extract from the "Journal Officiel" of October 26, 1927

Enfin, l'introduction, en conformité des exigences de la nouvelle art qui s'ouvre avec la signature du Traité de Paix, de modifications et de réformes dans toutes les branches de l'Administration, telles que les finances, l'instruction et les travaux

publics, l'agriculture, l'armée et la gendarmerie, de façon à raffermir et à augmenter la
 lité du pays et surtout la dotation de l'organisation civile d'une forme per-
 participation des minorités intéressées à l'administration, sont autant de points qui
 partie de nos principaux buts.
 Le succès dépend de Dieu."

E 13897 3 44]

No. 176

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 176)
 (Telegraphic)

Constantinople, November 8, 1920

Telegram No. 1157 of 28th October

I have lost no opportunity since 27th October of urging on Porte the importance
 of immediate ratification of treaty. My French colleague has been equally insistent,
 and Acting Italian High Commissioner appears to be supporting us loyally. We have
 driven Turkish Ministers from position that they must wait until Parliament can be
 convened to sanction ratification. Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose visit I returned
 on 2nd November, voiced the unanimous opinion of Cabinet that immediate
 would hope early compromise new Ministry in eyes of Nationalists and
 constitution must precede ratification, though he stated emphatically that
 were prepared to assume responsibility of ratification, and that they did not intend to
 make it condition of acceptance of treaty by Nationalists.

Minister for Foreign Affairs held his ground, notwithstanding every argument I
 advanced regarding the certain financial crisis and other dangers inherent on delay.

Future of all these recent conversations with Minister for Foreign Affairs, and
 emphasised the desire of Government to obtain from High Commissioner
 something with which to placate Nationalists. They have hinted at, but not suggested,
 three things, viz. —

1. Promise of "benevolent interpretation" of treaty
2. Assurance that Greeks would after ratification withdraw from territory not
 assigned to them by treaty
3. Protection against the possibility of Armenian frontier being decided in sense
 entirely adverse to Turkey

As regards (1), I have taken the line that there can be no question of interpretation
 until treaty assumes definite shape.

As regards (2), I have said that we desire nothing better than eventual withdrawal
 of Greeks, but that there can be no question of it so long as Nationalists make open
 war on Allies and the legitimate Government are not in a position to give effect to
 treaty.

Point (3) has been raised only by Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and
 I have not made any statement.

In conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs on 2nd November I insisted on
 the reply dated 4th November summarised in my immediately following telegram.
 High Commissioners have arranged to meet on 7th November with object of agreeing
 on recommendations to Governments regarding future line of action. I will telegraph
 further when meeting has taken place.

Turkish Government have in the meantime been considering question of mission
 to Anatolia. It seems to have been decided in principle to send mission in which
 leading rôle will be played by Izzet Pasha. There is some talk of placing it under
 the presidency of one of the Imperial Princes. It is uncertain to what extent
 preliminary communications have been exchanged with Nationalist leaders. Govern-
 ment deny that even preliminary contact has yet been established, but all sorts of
 rumours are afloat, and, if there is any foundation for them, attitude of Nationalist
 leaders regarding acceptance of treaty is uncompromising.

Question of Allied participation in mission has lapsed, at any rate for the time
 being, as Government refuse to fulfil necessary condition of such participation, i.e.,
 ratification of treaty before the commission starts.

E 13906 3 44]

No. 177.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 177)
 (Telegraphic)

Constantinople, November 8, 1920.

Referring to High Commissioners' collective note of 28th October, Turkish
 Government recognises that, whatever happens, treaty must be ratified, and they have
 no intention of evading this obligation.

They cannot, however, agree with High Commissioners regarding desirability of
 immediate ratification, which would give rise to misinterpretation and suspicion in
 Anatolia; weaken authority of, and confidence in, Government; and compromise chances
 of successful accomplishment of task undertaken by them.

Government therefore consider it desirable to postpone ratification until contact
 has been established with Anatolia, not with a view to discussion regarding treaty, but
 with a view to explaining situation and reasons which make ratification necessary.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has stated that Government will accept of
 of these considerations and will use their influence to obtain the consent of their
 Governments to postponement of ratification for at least one month in order that
 Government may have time to get into touch with Anatolia.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, relying on assurance of benevolent support given when
 Cabinet was being formed, trusts that High Commissioners will not refuse their help in
 securing immediately for Turkish Government financial and economic assistance which
 they require without subordinating such assistance to ratification of treaty.

E 13943 3 44]

No. 178.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 1470.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 28, 1920.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 998 of the 27th October and to
 my telegram No. 1147 of the 24th October, which crossed each other, I have the honour
 to forward herewith for your Lordship's information a copy of a joint note, dated the
 10th October, which has been addressed by the Allied High Commissioners to his
 Highness Tewfik Pasha, the new Grand Vizier, regarding the necessity for the early
 ratification of the Peace Treaty by Turkey.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 178

Joint Allied Note addressed to Grand Vizier

AU moment où son Altesse le Grand-Vizir, investi de la confiance de Sa Majesté
 impériale le Sultan, vient de constituer un nouveau Gouvernement, dont la tâche
 principale est de rétablir l'autorité légale, dans tout le territoire de l'Empire, afin
 d'assurer l'exécution intégrale et loyale du Traité de Paix signé à Sèvres le 10 août dernier, et
 d'attirer l'attention de son Altesse sur la question de la ratification du Traité de Paix par la
 Turquie.

Les trois Gouvernements alliés estiment que cette ratification, qui en tout état de
 cause doit nécessairement précéder la ratification par les autres signataires, est la mesure
 la plus urgente à prendre dans l'intérêt même de la Turquie.

En effet, toute discussion au sujet du traité ou au sujet d'une clause quelconque du
 traité n'aura plus de raison d'être lorsque ce traité sera devenu, en ce qui concerne la
 Turquie, définitif par la ratification du Gouvernement ottoman, et la tâche de la
 Commission qui doit être envoyée en Anatolie en sera grandement facilitée.

De plus, les moyens pour le Gouvernement ottoman d'obtenir les concours financiers
 action que par la Commission financière dont la création est prévue par le Traité de Paix;

use of which High Commissioners have hitherto deprecated, viz., employment of Greek army in force, it did not [sic] necessarily imply a further advance of Greek army

Of course to this advance have lost none of their cogency, but it is useless to
 for the... iterative

As the Allied contingents in Constantinople had already caused some uneasiness, and without wishing in any way to question our military position, I am bound to represent to your Lordship my appreciation of situation here as received after full discussion with General Harrington. In a few days' time our force will consist of only two British and four Indian battalions. French have an equal number of troops, and there is a Greek division at Iamit under General Harrington's orders.

I cannot but submit for your Lordship's most serious consideration whether forces so reduced can be regarded as sufficient to cope even with such local situations as may quite conceivably arise in view of fact that Turk, who only understands force and who fully appreciated our show of strength at time of occupation of Constantinople, now sees that with situation in Near East more uncertain than ever defence of our interests and enforcement of treaty are left to a few Allied battalions.

I do not, indeed, anticipate trouble in Constantinople itself under present conditions, but an anti-Ally reaction is possible should Kemalists, with Bolshevik assistance, develop an offensive movement against Greek divisions at Izmit, or should main Greek army fall back on old line which their staff declare to be only alternative to a fresh advance up to Ada Bazar-Konin railway.

E 14273 3 44]

No. 152

Sir G. Buchanan to Earl Curzon. — (Received November 16.)

(No. 894.)

My Lord,

Rome, November 12, 1880.

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 481 of the 6th instant, I spoke to Count Sforza, on the eve of his departure for Rapallo, in the sense desired by your Lordship with regard to the intrigues being carried on by Italian agents in Turkey, Asia Minor and the Caucasus, and more especially with regard to the reported presence of a French Military Mission at Angora. Count Sforza was so pressed for time that I was unable to discuss the question in any detail. His Excellency, however, denied in the most formal and categorical manner the presence of either a civil or military mission or of any Italian military agents at Angora.

Having in the meantime received your Lordship's despatch No. 995, Secret of the 3rd instant, I took advantage of a conversation which I had this morning with the Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to revert to the subject. Since my conversation with Count Sforza I had, I said, received from another reliable source confirmation not only of the presence of Italian officers at Angora, but of the fact that military supplies of various kinds were being sent by Italians into Anatolia. I was, I continued, speaking quite unofficially and without instructions, and I was not for a moment impugning Count Sforza's good faith. It seemed to me, however, to be a matter of such importance to clear up the present misunderstanding that I thought it best to speak frankly with you. Was it a fact, which I sincerely trusted was not the case, that our agents were giving both moral and material support to our enemies? If so, the mutual confidence, so necessary to a loyal collaboration between the two Governments might be impaired. Was it possible, I asked, that some of these military agents were acting independently and behind the back of the Italian Government, and were engaging in intrigues of which the latter were ignorant.

Signor Contarini replied that he could only thank me for having spoken so frankly, and that he entirely shared the views which I had expressed. The enquiries which Count Sforza had made, after the conversation which I had with him, had convinced his Excellency that there was no truth in the reports which had reached me. It was therefore very difficult to explain how those reports had arisen. There were, it was true, certain military commissions remaining over from the war, but Signor Giolitti had issued strict instructions that they were to take no action of any kind, unless authorised to do so by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He would cause searching enquiries to be made and let me know the result.

I may mention that I asked the French Ambassador yesterday whether the Italian Government had, in his opinion, cognizance of the reported activities of their agents in Asia Minor. Mr. Barriere stated that he had every reason to believe that, when Count Sforza left Rome, he was in a position to know the truth. Many of the Italian agents in the East were, however, men who had been neutrals in the war, and who were inspired by anything but friendly feelings towards the Allies.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN

[E 14285/108 44]

No. 183

Admiralty to Foreign Office, — (Received November 16.)

(1) $\frac{1}{2} \leq \frac{a}{b} \leq \frac{3}{2}$

I AM COMMISSIONED BY THE Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to sign and forward, in the name of the Secretary of State for the Admiralty, a Letter of Proceedings No. 1 of the Fourth Battle Squadron for the period the 10th September, 1920.

2. A copy has also been sent to the War Office.

I am, &c.
V. W. BADDELEY

Enclosure in No. 183.

Extract from Letter of Proceedings No. 1 of Fourth Battle Squadron

^a *Emperor of India,*
at Pamaquala, September 30, 1920.

(Confidential.)

ARRIVED at Smyrna in "Emperor of India" on Sunday, the 26th September.
Left on the 27th, for Constantinople, and arrived at 11 A.M. on the 28th.
"Emperor of India" arrived from Constantinople during the afternoon.

Calls were exchanged with the principal authorities and I called on his Excellency M. Storgiaden, the Greek High Commissioner. M. Storgiaden returned my call the following day.

My two interviews with his Excellency M. Stergiades did not bring to light any important facts which are not already known to the British High Commissioner.

This Excellency struck me as being a man of a studious and well-balanced type, and I was surprised to find him a man of a hot temper, not hesitating to strike officials who have incurred his anger. Effectively, at such times he is apt to issue orders on the spur of the moment which are wild and irrelevant, but which he is too obstinate to reverse on reflection. He has a hard and unyielding attitude upon certain questions in the past, such as port control, censorship, etc., has a great deal of experience in these matters, and I should say that Mr. Sengul is a very capable and energetic administrator. He is a very capable man, and he seems to be genuinely anxious to do his best for his country.

[illegible]

the Greek offensive. He was, however, without any definite information as to the situation at such places as Bezzant, Aintab and other doubtful spots, nor did he enthuse to any extent when I pointed out the danger which still faced the native Christians in those parts. Adverting at the end of my visit to his Excellency's admission of the excesses committed on the first day of the Greek occupation of Smyrna, I said that it was all the more satisfactory to hear from General Bridges and other British officers who had been eye-witnesses how well the Greek troops had behaved during the recent advances ending with the occupation of Brussa. This evidently gave him intense pleasure and brought the visit to a close.

It goes without saying that Greek rule is not, and never can be, popular in Smyrna. As the British residents remark, "We know the Greek too well." But none the less one and all bear testimony to the success of M. Stergiades's rule of toleration and fair play for all. Whether that toleration and fair play can be looked for in the future, when both M. Stergiades and his chief, M. Venizelos, have passed off the Greek political stage is another matter, but in any case Greek administration now appears to be firmly established at Smyrna; and if M. Stergiades and other Greek officials are to be belied, the Turks are enjoying an era of peace, safety and prosperity such as has never been known in Smyrna before.

The town is full of Greek troops who appear smart, well set-up, well fed and well equipped. They are not saluting and functioning, and it was evident that order was being well kept. The Turkish quarter was quiet and seemingly prosperous. Greeks mingled with the Turks with apparent heartiness, and trade appeared quite brisk. I did not, however, come into contact with any Turkish officials, but it certainly did not seem that any undue inconvenience was being experienced by the absence of a

E 14300 3 44]

No. 144

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon. — (Received November 17.)

(No. 144)

THE Earl of Derby presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting the ratification of the Turkish Treaty and the despatch of a Turkish mission to Anatolia.

Paris, November 16, 1920.

Enclosure in No. 184.

Note communicated by French Ministry for Foreign Affairs

PAR une note du 4 novembre, l'Ambassade d'Angleterre a bien voulu communiquer au Gouvernement français les informations qu'elle a reçues de son Haut-Commissaire à Constantinople concernant les difficultés élevées par le nouveau Gouvernement turc au sujet de la ratification du traité. Les Alliés s'opposent au départ pour l'Anatolie de la mission de conciliation envoyée par le Gouvernement ottoman auprès des nationalistes à Angora.

Le Gouvernement français a été le premier à considérer que la ratification immédiate était indispensable au succès même de la mission en Anatolie. Il l'a fait connaître à plusieurs reprises à son Haut-Commissaire à Constantinople ainsi qu'aux Gouvernements britannique et italien.

Il ressort, toutefois, des derniers renseignements arrivés de Turquie que le Gouvernement turc est décidé à ne ratifier le traité que dans un délai de quatre semaines. Tewfik Pacha s'engage à pratiquer la ratification, quel que soit le résultat obtenu par la mission.

Le Gouvernement français fait observer qu'il n'est pas possible d'interdire au Gouvernement ottoman de faire partir pour l'Anatolie une mission des hauts fonctionnaires ottomans. D'autre part, ayant notifié de la façon la plus formelle aux représentants alliés dans les Commissions internationales de Turquie et de laisser

mettre à exécution par provision les clauses financières du Traité turc, il ne pense pas qu'il soit de l'intérêt commun de pousser le Gouvernement de Tewfik Pacha à la démission.

Dans ces conditions, la seule chose pratique à faire est de laisser partir la Commission ottomane pour l'Anatolie (bien entendu sous lui adjoint des représentants français, anglais et italiens) et de prendre acte de l'engagement du Gouvernement ottoman de ratifier le Traité de Paix dans le délai de quatre semaines, quel que soit le résultat de la mission.

Pendant cette période, et quels que soient les inconvénients de la situation, aucune mesure ne sera prise par le Gouvernement français pour hâter la mise à exécution du traité ou venir en aide au Gouvernement ottoman, qui paraît se livrer à une manœuvre dangereuse et sans profit. Les perspectives d'arrangement avec Mustapha Kemal sont, en effet, des plus faibles au moment où ce dernier a déjà réussi à intimider le nouveau Gouvernement dans son désir de ratification, et où, négligeant ses échecs de l'ouest et du sud, il n'a d'yeux que pour ses faciles succès sur les Arméniens.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris,
le 15 novembre 1920.

[E 14029 3 44]

No. 185

Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).

(No. 1103.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 17, 1920

Reply proposed in your telegram No. 1189 of 10th November is approved. Statement that Nationalist attack on Armenia has produced strong anti-Turkish feeling which may result in serious demand for revision of treaty in sense unfavourable to Turkey as signed, since such delay in reality implies a continuance of state of war (Repeated to Paris, No. 1240 and Rome, No. 308.)

E 14234 3 44]

No. 186

Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).

No. 131

No.

Foreign Office, November 19, 1920

WITH reference to your telegram No. 481 of the 6th instant, relative to the attitude of the Italian Government in regard to the enforcement of the general policy of the Allied Governments, I have to inform you that on the 11th instant the Italian Ambassador at London, Sir Eyre Crowe and read out a telegram from Count Sforza recording his recent conversations with yourself respecting the alleged presence of an Italian mission with Mustapha Kemal at Angora. He reiterated in the most emphatic manner that the whole story of this mission was untrue, and was obviously due to the imagination or deliberate invention of some interested Levantine agent. He added that it was of course quite conceivable that Mustapha Kemal himself should have made remarks calculated to produce a belief in his having the active sympathy and support of Italy.

2. Marquis Imperiali said he was glad that the opportunity had been taken of putting such a story to the test. He was strongly in favour of putting an end to the distrust which he was quite aware was felt in London against the alleged misdeeds of Italian agents in the East. He had suggested to Count Sforza that before relinquishing his post in London he should be authorised to enter into a general exchange of views with Lord Curzon on the subject of the Allied policy in the Mediterranean and in Turkey. He felt sure that in this way, and in this way alone, all misunderstandings and suspicions could be disposed of, and that harmonious co-operation between the Italian and British Governments be secured which it has been his ambition during the whole term of his Embassy to place upon a sure foundation. Having received Count Sforza's cordial approval, he accordingly proposed to ask Lord Curzon for an interview at an early date in order to arrive at a clear understanding

[5773]

2 E 2

3. The Ambassador proceeded to translate from the Italian a further long message from Count Sforza, indicating in somewhat greater detail the points on which Italy was anxious to clear the situation. The Ambassador promised to let Sir Eyre Crowe have a summary of this telegram, although he explained he had no authority to furnish a copy and been directed to make a verbal communication only. A copy of this summary was attached to this despatch.

Sir Eyre Crowe asked the Ambassador whether he had in his mind any particular proposals that he would submit to Lord Curzon. So far as Sir Eyre Crowe gathered the aims of Italian policy from the statement his Excellency had just made, he did not see any difficulty in recording a common view and understanding. Sir Eyre Crowe found the Ambassador's mind quite vague as to what suggestions or measures he could put forward, but his Excellency promised to think it over, and speak to Sir Eyre Crowe again.

3. He then made an urgent personal appeal to Sir Eyre Crowe to help to crown his activities as Ambassador in London by getting His Majesty's Government to enter into an engagement as regards Cyprus, by which the island at any future date would be made dependent on the Imperial will he had received from the Emperor.

By obtaining such an engagement, Sir Eyre Crowe observed that his Excellency evidently undervalued the importance of asking His Majesty's Government to restrict their liberty in regard to a matter of purely national and imperial concern. To his argument that he had already given an identical pledge to France, Sir Eyre Crowe replied that he would not be surprised if His Majesty's Government held that this was all the more reason for not tying their hands still further. Sir Eyre Crowe said he could not conceal from his Excellency's suggestion being favourably entertained. The Ambassador said he was aware that Lord Curzon felt very strongly on this subject but he seemed to think it possible that his Lordship might be moved to a point in order to oblige so warm a friend of England as the Ambassador.

I am, &c.
(For the Secretary of State),
J. A. C. TILLEY

E. 14436 3/44

*Summary of Conversation between the Marquis Imperiali and Sir Eyre Crowe
on November 11, 1920.*

(Translation)

IN connection with the conversation between Count Sforza and Sir G. Buchanan, the Marquis Imperiali is empowered to initiate conversations with the Secretary of State for the purpose of arriving at frank and friendly explanations intended to clear the atmosphere created with regard to Italian policy in the Levant.

Confirming the statements made by Count Sforza to Sir G. Buchanan, the Marquis Imperiali pointed out that the aim towards which Italian policy tended could not be different from that pursued by the British Government, i.e., the speedy pacification of Turkey, and therefore that of Anatolia.

In order to attain this object, Italy has always considered the best course to be to attempt to arrive at an agreement with the leaders, and more especially with Nationalist leaders, in view of the danger presented by military action. The latter has not attained any positive result, since, notwithstanding the Greek advance, the Nationalist movement has not lost ground and is keeping the East in a state of ferment.

This point of view was upheld by Count Sforza at Spa, but did not prevail. Military action was, however, then decided on in which Italy could take no part, not only by reason of the trend of public opinion in that country, but also because, consistently with her policy, she did not and does not consider this to be opportune.

As it is impossible to ignore the economic relations with Asia Minor—where the privileges granted with regard thereto to the Triple Alliance are of great importance—Italy cannot completely renounce to concern herself with the consequences which might have arisen owing to the Greek military operations in those regions. On that account Italy cannot completely renounce relations of contact with the Nationalist authorities remaining in the Italian zone,

relations which it is the more expedient to maintain, as it is very desirable to avoid complications within that zone.

Italy has for that reason limited herself to mere relations as between neighbours, the scope of which has been exaggerated by the bad faith of the agents supplying such information and by the wish of the Turkish Nationalists to parade before the allies of Italy an alleged friendliness with the Italian Government. The latter is the more desirous of creating up this policy as a means of settling the political situation in Anatolia might have been settled in a manner different from that adopted by the Allies—Italy has done nothing to hinder their intentions.

The Italian Government is not of the opinion, as it was before, that Italian interests in the Mediterranean coincide with those of England, and is always desirous of being able to follow a common line of policy which it considers to be the best guarantee of such interests. It is indispensable however, that the British Government should keep Italian economic requirements in view, and should therefore guarantee to Italy the support of the economic action which Italy is pursuing in Anatolia, and that more especially concerning the support requested with regard to acceptance by Turkey of the Triple Agreement; in regard to railway questions in Anatolia; and in regard to the necessity of restraining Greek aspirations in the territory of Smyrna as delimited by the treaty.

There can be no doubt that, on the basis of a community of Anglo-Italian interests in the Mediterranean (as to which Italy is sincerely convinced, and which she wishes to see materialized in loyal and friendly collaboration) it would be peculiarly desirable to dissipate in Italy the impression that England desires to favour Greek aspirations in the East in too wide a measure, without taking into account the losses which Italy would sustain in respect of the advantages assured to her by international agreements.

(E 14436 3/44)

No. 187.

Office—(Received November 20.)

War Office

War Office, November 19, 1920

I AM commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge receipt of Foreign Office letter of the 10th November, 1920, on the subject of the relations existing between the Italian Government and the Turkish Nationalists.

In this connection I am to say that the War Office has received from the War Office that the following reports on the subject of the Italian Government's policy in Anatolia in addition to those supplied by agents:—

1. A report from G.H.Q., Constantinople, dated the 15th September, 1920, to the War Office, copy of which is attached for the purpose of easy reference.

2. Extract from G.H.Q., Constantinople, dated the 15th September, 1920, stating that on the 29th April, 1920, Colonel Chiodelli, the Italian Officer Commanding at Scalanova, handed over large stores of food to the Nationalist Committee at Scalanova, and informed the British liaison officer there that before leaving he was further handing over 7,000 blankets.

3. A telegram from G.H.Q., Constantinople, dated the 15th September, 1920, to the effect that the Italian military attaché at Constantinople had stated in conversation with a British officer that the appointment of a Governor to the island of Rhodes offered little attraction if regarded as an island governorship, but if regarded as the centre of the web of Italian political influence in Anatolia and the Mussulman world in Asia, could be regarded as being most important.

4. A report from the French War Office to G.H.Q., Egypt, through the French liaison officer, to the effect that:—

- (a.) Presence of Italian Military Mission at Angora with Mustafa Kemal, amongst whom was Lieutenant Viora, alias Zafu Bey, an Albanian.
- (b.) Numerous barrels of petrol from Italian sources have been sent from Adalia into the interior of Anatolia.
- (c.) Information from Nationalist source states that two field guns were disembarked at Adalia by the Italians for Mustafa Kemal.

5. And a confirmation of the above report from G.H.Q., Constantinople, dated the 29th October.

I am to say that the Council has caused telegrams to be despatched to G.H.Q. Constantinople asking that the telegrams be despatched to G.H.Q. As soon as the telegrams are received, a further communication on the subject will be addressed to the Council.

I am, &c
R. B. CUBITT

Enclosure to No. 187

General Headquarters, Constantinople, to War Office

(Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

June 14, 1920

My headquarters during the week with the suggestion that permission should be given to repair the destroyed railway bridges within the Nationalist lines near Lefke

E 14655/3 44]

No. 188.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 24)

(No. 1239.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Constantinople, November 23, 1920

My telegram No. 1103 of 17th November.

The substance of your telegram under reference to my French colleague.

Italian Acting High Commissioner stated that he had received a telegram from his Government approving of reply proposed in my predecessor's telegram No. 1189. My French colleague has received a telegram from his Government to the following effect:

Fact that Turkish Government will not immediately ratify treaty will give Mustafa Kemal impression that he has secured a real advantage over Constantinople. We do not think it possible to increase pressure directed to secure ratification of treaty, since such pressure might bring about fall of present Cabinet, which is well aware of consequences of delay in ratification.

French Government maintain their decision not to allow Allies to apply financial pressure. We have no reason for opposing despatch of Turkish mission to Anatolia, but this mission must be undertaken by the Turkish Government. It is essential that Tewfik's Cabinet should undertake in writing to ratify treaty by a fixed date, for instance, by 1st December.

My two colleagues and I deprecate addition, in form proposed by you, to the text of the treaty, of a clause referring to the fall of present Government, and it is difficult to see what Government would take its place.

We have also to bear in mind since despatch of Constantinople telegram No. 1189, the consequent uncertainty as to their effect on moral and temper of Greek troops in Asia.

Italian Acting High Commissioner objected to mention of a date for ratification in proposed reply to Turkish Government. He also asked that new Italian High Commissioner, who is due to arrive to-day, should have opportunity of examining proposed note before it is sent in. This will of course cause some slight delay.

My telegram No. 1189 of 10th November whilst mentioning a date for ratification, also mentioned the possibility of a date for ratification.

No. 189.

E 14765 3/44]

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 1239.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, November 24, 1920

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs called yesterday for first time.

He began by stating that police would be paid their October salaries. I should explain that delay in paying police was causing British military authorities some anxiety, and I had been pressing for their payment.

Minister for Foreign Affairs then said that messenger whom Turkish Government had despatched to Mustafa Kemal Pasha had returned, and had reported that latter would be under Izet Pasha, would start in two or three days. As I inferred that Turkish Government meant to await return of mission before ratifying treaty, I pointed out that there would be further delay of at least three weeks from now. I reminded Minister for Foreign Affairs that he had himself stated that Turkish Government would be prepared to ratify within a month or thereabouts. This month would be up about the beginning of December. I said that it was imperative that Turkish Government should put an end to present unsatisfactory state of things by ratifying treaty. They were living from hand to mouth now, but once they had ratified treaty they would know where they were.

Minister for Foreign Affairs admitted that present was most unsatisfactory, and made an appeal for financial facilities to carry on administration.

I said that, although treaty had shorn Turkey of much territory, she was still a considerable State, which would become prosperous if her economic resources developed and internal peace restored. I would do my utmost to contribute to this when once treaty had been ratified.

My impression is, however, that Turkish Government will attempt to delay ratification and return of mission.

[E 14697 3 44]

No. 190.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 1246.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, November 24, 1920

My telegram No. 1234 of 23rd November

Following is translation of telegraphic note which we are addressing to Paris:

"High Commissioners have the honour to inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that they have received from their Governments instructions as to reply to be made to his Excellency."

"These instructions are to reiterate their former demand for ratification of treaty by Turkish Government. Accomplishment of this formality by Turkish Government is more urgent as it would imply on their part an indispensable disavowal of aggression against Armenia, which constitutes a violation in anticipation of treaty, and a marked act of hostility against Allies, which has produced a great and deplorable impression on public opinion of the world and is liable to induce most serious consequences for Turkey."

"Ratification is equally necessary in the interests of Turkish Government itself for reason already mentioned that, although Allied Governments, in their desire to furnish Turkey as far as possible with means of improving her financial and economic situation, are agreed to allow Financial Commission contemplated in treaty, which is alone competent to undertake and apply these measures, to work after the manner proposed by Turkish Government, they can go no further, but maintain principle that no financial assistance can be given until ratification of treaty by Turkish Government. Fact that ratification is inevitably contingent upon ratification of treaty by Turkish Government."

"High Commissioners therefore request Turkish Government to ratify without delay, and expect that this ratification will in any case take place before expiration of period mentioned in note under reply. They would wish to receive a definite assurance in this connection."

E 14799 10115 44

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon. — (Received November 24)

No. 1248.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, November 23, 1920

YOUR telegram No. 923 of 21st October
Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to-day to ascertain whether Reshid Pasha, former Minister for Foreign Affairs and now Minister of Public Instruction, would be acceptable as unofficial Turkish representative in London. Reshid Pasha is a man of intelligence and moderate views without great strength of character, and is very presentable. I see no reason why he should not be accepted.

Question of appointing Ferid seems to have lapsed. I trust that telegram under reference does not mean that His Majesty's Government now subordinate acceptance of any representative to previous ratification of treaty by Turkey. This would not be in accordance with decision previously taken and if assumed now would expose us to reproach of going back on our word owing to change of Government. This would seem even less desirable, as Turkish representatives are functioning in Paris and Rome.

E 14848 3 44)

No. 122

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon. — (Received November 29)

No. 1250.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Constantinople, November 26, 1920.

MY telegram No. 1245 of 24th November
After receipt of identical note, of which text is given in my above-mentioned telegram, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had an interview with my French colleague. He told latter that his intention was to send a delegation to Angora, and that he would take with him a delegation of Turkish officials. He said that the Turkish Government did not think it politic to send a delegation to Angora, and that they would send their delegation.

E 14960 3 44)

No. 123.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon. — (Received November 30.)

(No. 1273)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, November 27, 1920.

IMPRESSION is general in Allied circles here that present situation must inevitably lead to considerable modification of Turkish Treaty.

Turkish Government cannot fail to entertain hopes that this will be so, but Ministers are careful not to hint at it except in form of "benevolent interpretation" without modification of text. Ministry for Foreign Affairs speaks of ratification in existing form. However, it is within bounds of possibility that Government may now find Nationalist leaders willing to acquiesce secretly in the ratification, on theory that it would make things easier for Central Government without incommencing Nationalists, whose position has grown so strong that they would count upon revision even after Central Government had ratified. It is obviously impossible to form clear estimation of probable developments in Turkey until Greek situation has matured. Nevertheless it looks as if, apart from any other developments elsewhere, defeat of Armenia must make partial revision necessary, and drastic revision will be unavoidable if Greek lapse in Smyrna area, as a result of withdrawal of Allied support consequent upon return of Constantinople, or of voluntary renunciation by Greece of her acquisitions in Anatolia. Need for entirely new policy may at any moment become so

that I venture, though with serious diffidence, to submit at once following suggestion of new conditions as viewed from Constantinople:—

1. Secure future well-being of non-Muslim minorities, notwithstanding concessions it will be necessary to make to them.
2. Secure future well-being of non-Muslim minorities, notwithstanding concessions it will be necessary to make to them.
3. Secure future well-being of non-Muslim minorities, notwithstanding concessions it will be necessary to make to them.

Unless Allies are willing themselves to undertake difficult military operations in interior, first of these objects can now only be attained by going a long way to meet Nationalists. Latter may be expected now to have more extravagant pretensions than ever, but if it is true that there is a growing tension between them and Bolsheviks, and that large section of them fear infiltration of Bolshevik principles in Turkey, it might be possible to satisfy majority by some compromise, e.g., by including in future Turkey country up to old Russian frontier. This would involve specially strict international control, and by making non-territorial dispositions some- what stringent.

Second object can, unfortunately, only be attained most imperfectly. Allies, however, need not cut quite so sorry a figure if they can give themselves appearance of coming in as "honest brokers" between parties directly concerned in territorial settlement, and if they could drive further wedge between Kemalists and Bolsheviks.

Third object is very important. It can only be secured by retaining as fully realisable repugnance which must be inspired by any idea of treaty to suit themselves. My object in foregoing analysis is not to put forward conclusions, but to suggest possible line of thought in new and complicated situation.

E 14993 3 44)

No. 124

Sir G. Buchanan to Earl Curzon. — (Received December 1)

(No. 929. Confidential)

My Lord,

Rome November 26, 1920

IN my despatch No. 894 of the 13th of this month, I had the honour to report a conversation which I had had with the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with regard to the alleged presence of an Italian Mission with Mustafa Kemal at Angora, and to the military supplies said to have been sent by Italians into Anatolia.

Signor Contarini now informs me, in a private and confidential letter, that, in reply to an enquiry which he had addressed to the Italian Embassy at Constantinople, Signor Arlotto had qualified these reports as false and scandalous. The latter had given no confirmation of the alleged facts, and had, like Count Sforza, attributed these unfounded reports to the misplaced confidence of our military authorities in the information supplied them by their Greek agents.

I have, &c

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN

*Mr. Wilson to the President of the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers.—
(Received from Lord Hardinge, December 3.)*

Mr. President

BY action of the Supreme Council, taken on the 26th April of this year, an invitation was tendered to me to arbitrate the question of the boundaries between Turkey and the new State of Armenia. Representatives of the Powers signatory on the 10th August of this year to the Treaty of Sévres have acquiesced in conferring this honour upon me and have signified their intention of accepting the frontiers which are to be determined by my decision, as well as any stipulations which I prescribe as to access for Armenia to the sea and any arrangements for the demilitarisation of Turkish territory lying along the frontier thus established.

According to the terms of the arbitral reference set forth in Part 3, section 6, article 89, of the Treaty of Sévres, the scope of the arbitral competence assigned to me is clearly limited to the determination of the frontiers of Turkey and Armenia in the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis. With full consciousness of the responsibility placed upon me by your request, I have approached this difficult task with eagerness to serve the best interests of the Armenian people as well as the peace of the stricken country attempting to exercise also the strictest possible justice towards the populations, whether Turkish, Kurdish, Greek or Armenian, living in the adjacent areas.

In approaching this problem it was obvious that the existing ethnic and religious distribution of the populations in the four vilayets could not, as in other parts of the world, be regarded as the guiding element of the decision. The ethnic consideration in the case of a population originally so complexly intermingled, is further befuddled by the terrible results of the massacres and deportations of Armenians and Greeks, and by the dreadful losses also suffered by the Moslem inhabitants through refugee movements and the scourge of typhus and other diseases. The limitation of the arbitral assignment to the four vilayets named in article 89 of the Treaty made it seem a duty and an obligation that as large an area within these vilayets be granted the Armenian State as could be done, while meeting the basic requirements of an adequate natural frontier and of geographic and economic unity for the new State. It was essential to keep in mind that the new State of Armenia, including as it will a large section of the former Armenian provinces of Trans-Caucasian Russia, will at the outset have a population about equally divided between Moslem and Christian elements and of diverse racial and tribal relationship. The citizenship of the Armenian Republic will by the tests of language and religion, be composed of the Turks, Kurds, Greeks, Kizil Bashis, Lazas and others, as well as Armenians. The conflicting territorial desires of Armenians, Turks, Kurds and Greeks along the boundaries assigned to my arbitral decision could not always be harmonised. In such cases it was my belief that consideration of a healthy economic life for the future State of Armenia should be decisive. Where, however, the requirements of a correct geographic boundary permitted, all mountain and valley districts along the border which were predominantly Kurdish or Turkish have been left to Turkish authority rather than assigned to Armenia, unless trade relations with towns threw them necessarily into the Armenian State. Wherever information upon tribal relations and seasonal migrations was obtainable, the attempt was made to respect the integrity of tribal groupings and nomad pastoral movements.

From the Persian border south-west of the town of Kotur the boundary line of Armenia is determined by a rugged natural barrier of great height, extending south of Lake Van and lying south-west of the Armenian cities of Bitlis and Mush. This boundary line leaves as a part of the Turkish State the entire sanjak of Hakkari or about one-half of the vilayet of Van and almost the entire sanjak of Sairt. The sound ethnographic reasons which seem to justify this decision were further strengthened by the ethnographic consideration that Hakkari and Sairt are predominantly Kurdish in population and economic relations. It did not seem to the best interest of the Armenian State to include in it the upper valley of the Great Zai River, largely Kurdish and Nestorian Christian in population and an essential element of the great Tigris River irrigation system of Turkish Kurdistan and Mesopotamia. The control of these head-waters should be made, wherever possible,

within the domain of the two interested States, Turkey and Mesopotamia. For these reasons, the Armenian claim upon the upper valley of the Great Zai could not be satisfied.

The boundary upon the west, from Bitlis and Mush northward to the vicinity of Erzingan, lies well within Bitlis and Erzerum vilayets. It follows a natural geographic barrier which furnishes Armenia with perfect security, and leaves to the Turkish State an area which is strongly Kurdish. Armenian villages and village nuclei in this section such as Kighi and Temran, necessarily remain Turkish because of the strong commercial and church ties which connect them with Kharput, rather than with any Armenian market and religious centres which lie within Bitlis or Erzerum vilayets. This decision seemed an unavoidable consequence of the inclusion of the city and district of Kharput in the Turkish State as determined by articles 27, 11 (4) and article 89 of the Treaty of Sévres.

From the northern border of the Dersim the nature and direction of the frontier access to the sea for the State of Armenia. Upon the correct solution of this problem depends the future of the region lying between the State of Armenia and the Turkish, Kurdish, Greek, Armenian or Yezidi, in those portions of the vilayets of Erzerum, Bitlis and Van which lie within the State of Armenia. I was not mindful of the desire of the Pontic Greeks, submitted to me in a memorandum similar, no doubt, in argument and content to that presented to the Supreme Council last March at its London conference, that the unity of the coastal area of the Black Sea inhabited by them be preserved, and that arrangements be made for an autonomous administration for the region stretching from Riza to a point west of Sinope. The arbitral jurisdiction assigned to me by article 89 of the Treaty of Sévres does not include the possibility of decision or recommendation by me upon the question of the future of the region of the Black Sea. Nor does it include the right to deal with the littoral of the independent sanjak of Djanik or at the vilayet of Kastamonu into which extends the region of the unity and autonomy desired by the Pontic Greeks.

Three possible courses lay open to me: to so delimit the boundary that the whole of Trebizond vilayet would lie within Turkey, to grant it in its entirety to Armenia, or to grant a part of it to Armenia and leave the remainder to Turkey. The majority of the population of Trebizond vilayet is incontestably Moslem, and the Armenian element, according to all pre-war estimates, was undeniably inferior numerically to the Greek portion of the Christian minority. Against a decision so clearly indicated on ethnographic grounds weighed heavily the future of Armenia. I could only regard the question in the light of the needs of a new political entity, Armenia, with mingled Moslem and Christian populations, rather than as a question of the future of the Armenians alone. It has been and is now increasingly my conviction that the arrangements providing for Armenia's access to the sea must be such as to offer every possibility for the development of this State as one capable of resuming and maintaining that useful rôle in the commerce of the world which its geographic position athwart a great historic trade route assigned to it in the past. The civilisation and the happiness of its mingled population will largely depend upon the building of railways and the increased accessibility of the hinterland of the three vilayets to European trade and cultural influences.

Eastward from the port of Trebizond, along the coast of Lazistan, no adequate natural barrier separates the region of the Black Sea from the interior of the Empire. The separating Lazistan sanjak from the vilayet of Erzerum is such as to isolate the hinterland from the coast, so far as practicable railway construction is concerned. The existing caravan route from Persia across the plains of Bayazid and Erzerum, which passes through the towns of Bairburt and Gumrich Khana and debouches upon the Black Sea at Trebizond, has behind it a long record of persistent usefulness.

These were considerations which have forced me to revert to my original conviction that the town and harbour of Trebizond must become an integral part of Armenia. Because of the still greater adaptability of the route of the Karshut valley, leading to the town of Trabzon, for a proposed railway connecting an Armenian port with the interior, I have recommended that Armenia be granted an adjoining territory lying west of it to insure its adequate protection. I am not aware of the desirability of the Armenian State's exercising authority over a Moslem territory, nor of the possibility of the Armenians' assuming authority over a territory so predominantly Moslem. I am confident that, in acquiescing in their eagerness to

do justice to the Turkish and Greeks in Trebizond, I should be doing an irreparable injury to the future of the land of Armenia and its entire population of which they will be a part.

It was upon such a basis, Mr. President, that the boundaries were so drawn as to follow mountain ridges west of the city of Erzingan to the Pontic range and thence to the Black Sea, in such a way as to include in Armenia the indentation called Zephir Bay. The decision to leave to Turkey the harbour towns and hinterland of Karsum and Ordu in Trebizond sanjak was dictated by the fact that the population of this region is strongly Moslem and Turkish and that these towns are the outlets for the easternmost section of the Turkish vilayet of Sivas. The parts of Erzerum and Trebizond vilayets which by reason of this delineation of the boundary, remain Turkish rather than become Armenian comprise approximately 12 120 square kilom.

In the matter of the demilitarisation of Turkish territory adjacent to the Armenian border, as it has been broadly described above, it seemed both impracticable and unnecessary to establish a demilitarised zone which would require elaborate prescriptions and complex agencies for their execution. Fortunately, article 168 of the Treaty of Sèvres prescribes the disarming of all existing forts throughout Turkey. Articles 159 and 196-200 provide in addition agencies entirely adequate to meet all the dangers of disorder which may arise along the borders, the former by the requirement that a proportion of the officers of the gendarmerie shall be supplied by the

Allied Commission of Control and Organisation. In these circumstances, the only additional prescriptions which seemed necessary and advisable were that the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control and Organisation should, in conformity with the powers bestowed upon it by article 200 of the treaty, select the superior officers of the gendarmerie to be stationed in the vilayets of Turkey lying contiguous to the frontiers of Armenia solely from those officers who will be detailed by the allied or neutral Powers in accordance with article 159 of the treaty and that these officers, under the supervision of the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Organisation and Control, should be especially charged with the duty of preventing military preparations directed against the Armenian frontier.

It is my confident expectation that the Armenian refugees and their leaders, in the period of their return into the territory thus assigned to them, will by refraining from any and all form of reprisals give to the world an example of that high moral courage which must always be the foundation of national strength. The world expects of them that they give every encouragement and help within their power to those Turkish refugees who may desire to return to their former homes in the districts of Trebizond, Erzerum, Van and Bitlis, remembering that these peoples, too, have suffered greatly. It is my further expectation that they will offer such considerate treatment to the Laz and the Greek inhabitants of the coastal region of the Black Sea, surpassing in the liberality of their administrative arrangements, if necessary, even the ample provisions for non-Armenian racial and religious groups embodied in the Minorities Treaty, signed by them upon the 10th August of this year, that these peoples will gladly and willingly work in completest harmony with the Armenians in laying firmly the foundation of the new Republic of Armenia.

I have the honour to submit herewith the text of my decision.

Accept, Mr. President, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

WOODROW WILSON

Enclosure in No. 1.

Decision of the President of the United States of America respecting the Frontier between Turkey and Armenia, Access for Armenia to the Sea, and the Demilitarisation of Turkish Territory adjacent to the Armenian Frontier

WOODROW WILSON, President of the United States, to whom it shall concern,
Greetings.

Whereas, on the 26th April, 1920, the Supreme Council of the Allies, in conference at San Remo, addressed to the President of the United States of America an invitation to act as arbitrator in the question of the boundary between Turkey and Armenia, to be fixed within the four vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis,

And whereas, on the 17th May, 1920, my acceptance of this invitation was telegraphed to the American Ambassador in Paris, to be conveyed to the Powers represented in the Supreme Council;

And whereas, on the 10th August, 1920, a Treaty of Peace was signed at Sèvres between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom of Armenia, Belgium, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, and Czechoslovakia of the one part, and of Turkey of the other part, which treaty contained, among other provisions, the following—

(Article 89.)

Turkey and Armenia as well as the other High Contracting Parties agree to submit to the arbitration of the President of the United States of America the question of the frontier to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia in the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, and to accept his decision thereupon, as well as any stipulations he may prescribe as to access for Armenia to the said frontier.

And whereas, on the 16th October, 1920, the Secretariat General of the Peace Conference, acting under the instructions of the Allied Powers, transmitted to me, through the Embassy of the United States of America in Paris, an authenticated copy of the above-mentioned treaty, drawing attention to the said article 89.

Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, upon whom has thus been conferred the authority of arbitrator, having examined the question in the light of the most trustworthy information available, and with a mind to the highest interests of justice, do hereby declare the following decision.—

1. The frontier between Turkey and Armenia in the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis shall be fixed as follows (see annex map on the scale of 1:1 000 000).—

It is my first decision that the frontier will be upon the former Turkish-Persian frontier referred to in article 27, II (4), of the Treaty of Sèvres, but forty miles of the said frontier, within which the initial point of the Armenian frontier is included, were left undelineated by the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission in 1914. The initial point contemplated lies about 1 kilom. southward from the village of Karahissar and approximately 25 kilom. south-westward from the village of Kars. The location of this point on the ground is to be the location as the Boundary Commission shall determine, provided it lies at the junction of the Van Hakkari sanjak boundary with the frontier of Persia—shall be decided on the ground at the junction of the Turkish-Persian frontier with the eastern termination of the administrative boundary between sanjaks of Van and Hakkari, of the vilayet of Van, as this administrative boundary appears on the Bashkala sheet of the Turkish map, scale 1:200 000 editions published in the Turkish financial years 1330 and 1331. From this initial point the boundary shall extend south-westward to the western peak of Merklizer Dag, situated about 6 kilom. westward from point 3350, about 2 kilom. south-eastward from the village of Yokaryah-Valan and approximately 76 kilom. south-eastward from the city of Van.

The sanjak boundary specified above, then the administrative boundary between the kazas of Mamuret ul Hamid and Elazack, then the same sanjak boundary specified above, all modified, where necessary, to follow the main water partings between the Zayzu (Great Zab River) and the Khoshabau, and dividing equally the summits of the passes Krdes Gedik and Chokh Gedik, thence north westward about 28 kilom. to Kleary Dag.

A line to be fixed on the ground following the main water partings between the Kleary and the Shatak, and then to pass south of the village of Yary Abvalan, and passing through Shkolans Dag (3 160 metres) and the Belereshuk pass.

Thence south-westward to the junction of an unnamed stream with the Shatak Su at a point about 10 kilom. southward from the village of Shatak.

A line to be fixed on the ground following the main water partings and passing through Koh Kiran Daghar, Sari Dag (3 150 metres), Kevmetala Tepe (3 500 metres), point 3540 in such a manner as to leave Armenia the village of Eyret and to Turkey the village of Araz, and to cross the Shatak Su at least 2 kilom. southward from the village of Thr Mouem Kilisa.

A line to be fixed on the ground following the main water partings leaving to Armenia the villages of Kachet, Sin Pass, and Özüm, passing through the Kanisurtepe (3,245 metres), an unnamed peak about 3 kilom. southward from Arnuşdagh (3,550 metres), descending to the stream of the Kanisurtepe, and then northward from the village of Sin Pass, passing through point 3000, following the boundary of the vilayets of Van and Bitlis for about 3 kilom. south westward from this point and continuing south westward on the same ridge to an unnamed peak about 2 kilom. eastward from Mokeşu, and then descending to this stream, then northward to an unnamed peak between the vilayets of Van and Bitlis about 3 kilom. westward from the village of Soruy and about 6 kilom. northward from the pass of Matadedik, Kari, vilayets of Van and Bitlis, modified south of Vankindagh (3,200 metres) to follow the main water partings thence westward to the peak Meidanchenidiani, situated on the boundary between the sanjaks of Bitlis and Sairi, about 28 kilom. south-eastward from the village of Khoros, and then westward to the peak of the Kesandere, crossing the main water partings, passing through Veherhandagh (3,110 metres) crossing the Kesandere about 2 kilom. southward from the village of Khoros, leaving to Turkey the villages of Semhay and Nevaleyn as well as the bridge or ford on the trail between them, and leaving to Armenia the village of Chopans and the trail leading to it from the north east.

July. A route to the And in the ground following the main water, springs leading up to Armenia the village of Deshtuni, passing through the eastern peak of Kalmendagh (2710 metres) and continuing in such a manner as to leave to Armenia the upland Duhna, or Basin of Interior Drainage, to traverse the pass about 3 kilom. westward to the village of Avestapast (1920 m. above sea level) (944 metres). The route was to the S. and to the N. of about 4 km. south westward from the village of Karmir Zardap, about 47 kilom. southwest from the city of Mash.

Thence north-westward to the Talarydere at a point about 2 kilom. upstream from the village of Kasser and approximately 37 kilom. north-eastward from the village of Seylavan (Farkin).

Thence north-westward to western tributary of the Talurvdere at a point about 2 kilom eastward from the village of Helin and approximately 42 kilom south-westward from the city of Mush.

A line to be fixed on the ground following the main water partings, leaving to Turkey the village of Hehn and to Armenia the village of Kehirvanik

Thence north-westward to Fratnehri (Muradn, or Euphrates) at a point to be determined on the ground about 1 kilom upstream from the village of Dorne, approximately 58 kilom. westward from the city of Mush.

Thence north-westward to the Gunikan at a point about midway between two trails, crossing this river about half way between the villages of Elmaly and Chennajky, and then to the 2nd trail at the head of the lake of Chennajky.

Thence north-westward to the boundary between the vilayets of Erzerum and Bitlis at an unnamed peak near where a straight line between the villages of Ercebk and Aghakeuz would intersect said vilayet boundary,

ence northward to an unnamed peak on said vilayet boundary about 8 kilom north westward from Kartaliktepe on the Choris Daglabana

A line to be fixed on the ground following the main water partings of the Sheitandaghlar, passing through point 2010, Sheitandagh (2906 metres), Hukatundagh and leaving to Armenia the village of Durek and the ford or bridge south west of this village.

A line to be fixed on the ground following the main water partings leaving to Artochna the villages of Sborakh and Ferhadin, passing through Shabartidagh (2 550 metres), Siandagh (2 750 metres) the 2 250-metre pass on the Palumor-Kighi Trail near Mustafa Beykonaghy, Agdeziriatepe (2 530 metres), point 2244 and point 2035.

A line to be fixed on the ground following the main water partings and passing north-westward through an unnamed peak about 2 kilom. south-westward from Palumor, through Silos (Keremod) Dagh (2 403 metres) to an unnamed peak on the southern boundary of the sanjak of Erzingan, about 8 kilom. south-westward from the Palumor-Erzingan pass, then turning south westward along said sanjak boundary for nearly 13 kilom. passing through Karajakaleh (3 100 metres).

[illegible]

ridge road north of an 11,000 ft. mountain range and only 20 kilom. south of the village of Erzingan. I am not empowered to change the administrative boundary at this point, and these 40 sq. kilom. of territory lie outside the four vilayets specified in article 89 of the Treaty of Sèvres.

However, I venture to call the attention of the Boundary Commission to the desirability of consulting the local inhabitants with a view to possible modification of the vilayet boundary at this point. In case a majority of the votes of the members of the Boundary Commission deem it wise to follow the main water parting along the ridge road north of an 11,000 ft. mountain range and only 20 kilom. south of the village of Erzingan (3,449 metres) and Katarlepe (3,300 metres), thence northward to Fratehri (Kara Su or Euphrates) at a point to be determined on the ground about 6 kilom. eastward from the village of Kemakh and approximately 33 kilom. leaving to Turkey the village of Chalghyysty, Tonia and Alamik and to Armenia the village of Erkghian and the road and village of Col south of the village of Metkut, passing through to the boundary between the vilayets of Erzerum and Trebizond at a point to be determined about 1 kilom. west of peak 2930 and about 4 kilom. southward from the village of Metkut, or approximately 39 kilom. north-westward from the city of Erzingan.

A line to be fixed on the ground following the main water partings south-westward from the city of Erzingan.

A line to be fixed on the ground following the main water partings leaving to Turkey the trail from Pehir in the Dersim to Kemakh on the Euphrates, and to Armenia the village of Konaardor.

Thence northward to the village of Kerkash (Tekketash, 2,800 metres), Kerkash Dag (or Kara Dag, 3,030 metres), dividing equitably between Armenia and Turkey the summit of the pass about 2 kilom. westward from the village of Zaker and, similarly, the summit of the pass Kral Khan Boghazy near the village of Chirishkli, passing through point 2760 on Karadagh point 2740 and a point to be determined on the ground, situated near the Iky-Sivry stream less than 2 kilom. westward from the Chimendagh Pass, and located in such a manner as to leave to Turkey the junction of the two roads leading westward to the villages of Ku-Keni and Karayayrak, and to Armenia the junction of all the two other roads leading to the village of Met Kut and Kirman. The Boundary Commission shall determine in the field the most equitable disposition of the highway between points 2760 and 2740.

Thence north-westward to the Kelkitchai (Kelkitirmak) at the point where the boundary between the vilayets of Trebizond and Sivas reaches it from the south.

The administrative boundary between the vilayets of Trebizond and Erzerum and the vilayet of Sivas shall be fixed on the ground following the main water partings south-westward from the city of Erzingan.

Thence north-westward to the Kelkitchai (Kelkitirmak) at the point where the boundary between the vilayets of Trebizond and Sivas reaches it from the south.

Thence north-eastward, northward, and westward to an unnamed peak on the boundary between the vilayets of Trebizond and Sivas situated about 7 kilom. north-westward from Yechi Tepe (2,690 metres), and approximately 47 kilom. south-south-eastward from the city of Kerasun.

The administrative boundary between the vilayets of Trebizond and Sivas shall be fixed on the ground following the main water partings south-westward from the city of Erzingan.

Thence northward, from the point last mentioned, on the crest of the Pontic range, to the Black Sea, at a point to be determined on the sea coast 1 kilom. westward from the village of Keshab, and approximately 8 kilom. eastward from the city of Kerasun.

A line to be fixed on the ground following the main water partings leaving to Turkey the fields, pastures, forests and villages within the drainage basin of the Komidere (Ak Su) and its tributaries, and to Armenia the fields, pastures, forests and villages within the drainage basin of the Yaghvdere (Esprydere) and the Venzidere (Kershaag) and their tributaries, and drawn in such a manner as to utilise the boundary between the kazas of Tripoli (Tireboli) and Kerasun in the 7 kilom. just south of Karatepe (1,985 metres) and to provide the most convenient

relationships between the new frontiers and trails along the ridges as these relationships may be determined by the Boundary Commission in the field after consultation with the local inhabitants.

(2) In the case of any discrepancies between the text of this decision and the maps on the scales of 1:1,000,000, 1:200,000 annexed the text will be final.

The limits of the four vilayets specified in article 89 of the Treaty of Sèvres are taken as of the 26th October 1914.

The frontier as described above is drawn in red on an authenticated map on the scale of 1:1,000,000, which is annexed to the present frontier decision.

The geographical names here mentioned appear upon the map accompanying this text.

The chief authorities used for the names of geographical features, and official elevation of mountains, and the location of vilayet, sanjak and karga boundaries, are the Turkish General Staff map, scale 1:200,000 and, in part, the British map, scale 1:1,000,000.

The maps on the scale of 1:200,000 are recommended to the Boundary Commission, provided in article 91 for their use in tracing on the spot the portion of the frontiers of Armenia established by this decision.

2. The frontier described above, by assigning the harbour of Trebizond and the valley of Karshut Su to Armenia, precludes the necessity of further provision for access for Armenia to the sea.

3. In addition to the general provisions for the limitation of armaments, embodied in the military, naval and air clauses, part 3 of the Treaty of Sèvres, the demilitarisation of Turkey adjacent to the frontier of Armenia as above established shall be effected as follows:—

The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control and Organisation provided for in articles 18, 28 and 30 of the Treaty of Sèvres shall have the supervision of the demilitarisation of Turkey adjacent to the frontier of Armenia as above established. The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control and Organisation shall have the supervision of the demilitarisation of Turkey adjacent to the frontier of Armenia as above established.

The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control and Organisation provided for in articles 18, 28 and 30 of the Treaty of Sèvres shall have the supervision of the demilitarisation of Turkey adjacent to the frontier of Armenia as above established. The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control and Organisation shall have the supervision of the demilitarisation of Turkey adjacent to the frontier of Armenia as above established.

WOODROW WILSON

By the President

BAIRD BRIDGE COLBY

Secretary of State

E 14799 10115 44

No. 196.

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 1144)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, December 3, 1920.

YOUR telegram No. 1248 of 26th November: Reshid Pasha.

His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept Reshid Pasha as unofficial representative before ratification.

E 15204/3,44

No. 197.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 1206)

(Telegraphic) R.

Constantinople, December 2, 1920.

MY telegram No. 1246 of 24th November.

Porte has replied to joint note that Turkish Government is willing to give satisfaction to request of Allied Powers, and has only postponed ratification owing to the conviction that it was necessary first to establish contact with Angora.

Turkish Government, when fixing a time limit of one month, had hoped that contact would have been effected earlier, but material difficulties had supervened hindering departure of delegates until 3rd December.

Turkish Government hope that these circumstances may be taken into consideration and that Allies will accept that treaty be ratified after mission has got into touch with Angora.

E 15253 1214 44]

No 198

Director of Military Intelligence to Foreign Office — (Received December 6.)

THE Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to enclose herewith a copy of a memorandum dated the 1st December 1920, signed by General Gouraud, and received in response to a letter from the General Staff from the French military attaché in London.

War Office, December 4, 1920.

Enclosure in No 198

Note by General Gouraud respecting French Policy in Armenia.

Le commandant l'armée du Levant a, non pas disloqué les armées turques, mais les armées turques ont été défaits. Les armées turques ont été défaits pour défendre leurs villages, soit pour former des contingents, soit pour former des colonnes françaises opérant en Cilicie.

Dans chaque circonstance, les Arméniens ont profité de ce qu'ils ont pu pour se conduire à l'égard des Turcs précisément comme ils se plaignent d'avoir été traités par eux, pillant et incendiant les villages, massacrant les musulmans des villages.

Quand, au contraire, on a fait appel à leur concours pour débarrasser Tarsous, sur 2,000 volontaires fournis, 17 se sont présentés pour marcher avec nos troupes. Il a fallu en conséquence désarmer les Arméniens; quant aux expulsions, elles ont été prononcées, non à la suite de la dissolution des contingents arméniens destinés à secourir Hadjin, mais à la suite d'une tentative faite le 4 août par les Arméniens d'Adana pour proclamer, à la faveur de l'exode des Turcs, la République arménienne en Cilicie. Elles se sont d'ailleurs bornées à sept agitateurs.

GOURAUD

Paris, le 25 novembre 1920.

E 15417 3 44]

No 199

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon. — (Received December 10.)

(N. 15417)

My Lord,

Will you please send me a copy of the letter from the Turkish Government to the British Government, dated the 1st December 1920, and the letter from the British Government to the Turkish Government, dated the 1st December 1920, and the letter from the British Government to the Turkish Government, dated the 1st December 1920.

HORACE RUMBOLD, High Commissioner

Enclosure in No 199

Joint Note addressed to Sublime Porte.

POUR faire suite à leur note du 12 de ce mois, les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur de faire savoir à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires étrangères qu'ils ont reçu de leurs Gouvernements les instructions

demandées en vue de la réponse à faire à la lettre de son Excellence Sefi Bey en date du 12 novembre 1920.

En conséquence à ces instructions, les Hauts-Commissaires vous adressent, en réponse à leur précédente demande tendant à la ratification du Traité de Sèvres, la lettre ci-jointe du Gouvernement ottoman.

La ratification de cette formalité est d'autant plus urgente qu'elle impliquerait de la part du Gouvernement ottoman un désaveu indispensable de l'agression contre l'Arménie, la violation antérieure du traité et un acte qui a produit une grande et déplorable impression sur l'opinion publique mondiale et qui est de nature à entraîner les conséquences les plus fâcheuses pour la Turquie.

La ratification du Traité de Paix est également nécessaire dans l'intérêt du Gouvernement ottoman lui-même pour la raison, déjà indiquée précédemment, que si les Gouvernements alliés, dans leur désir de donner le plus tôt possible à la Turquie les moyens d'améliorer sa situation financière et économique, ont bien voulu admettre que la Commission financière prévue par le Traité de Paix et dont dépend uniquement la recherche et l'emploi de ces moyens, pourrait commencer ses travaux après la ratification par le Gouvernement ottoman, ils ne sauraient aller au-delà et maintenir le principe que tout concours financier ne peut être donné que par la Commission financière, dont l'entrée en exercice est nécessairement subordonnée à la ratification du traité par la Turquie.

Les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie invitent, en conséquence, le Gouvernement ottoman à ratifier sans retard le Traité de Sèvres et comptent que cette ratification aura lieu, en tout état de cause, dans le délai indiqué par son Excellence Sefi Bey dans sa lettre du 4 novembre.

Les trois Hauts-Commissaires attacheraient du prix à recevoir une assurance précise à cet égard.

A. DEFRANCE
HORACE RUMBOLD
M. ARLON

Constantinople, le 24 novembre 1920.

E 15535 3 44]

No 200

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon. — (Received December 13.)

(No. 15535)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 6, 1920.

THE mission of the Turkish Government to Mustapha Kemal left for Angora on the 3rd instant, proceeding overland from Haidar Pasha. It is headed by Ismet Pasha, the Minister of the Interior, and comprises five other members, including Salih Pasha, Minister of Marine, and Hussein Kiazim Bey, Minister of Agriculture and Commerce. Under an agreement with the General Officer Commanding the British Forces in Constantinople, the mission was accompanied by British officers over the section of the Haidar Pasha Railway controlled by the British authorities in order to ensure that it was not interfered with by the Greek posts.

2. If all goes well, the mission should reach Angora about the 6th or 7th December. The Nationalists, however, when defining the preliminary arrangements, insisted that representatives of the Angora Government would meet it at Biledjik, and it remains to be seen whether this will involve delay at that place. According to one report, which I give for what it is worth, the leaders of the Nationalist movement have no intention of allowing the mission to proceed to Angora, and wish the negotiations to take place at Biledjik, but Ismet Pasha should, on reaching their capital, attempt some coup designed to unseat Mustapha Kemal and to bring the mission into relations with more moderate elements.

3. For the descriptions of the three members of the Cabinet included in the mission, I would refer your Lordship to my predecessor's despatch No. 1457 of the 26th October, 1920. The other members of the mission are Fatih Effendi, a khodja or member of the Ulema class, Djavad Bey, formerly Minister at Stockholm, and Munir Bey, legal adviser to the Sublime Porte. Fatih Effendi is practically unknown in European circles, but he was chosen presumably on grounds of religious influence, and he was brought to the notice of this High Commission some months ago as carrying great weight with Kiazim Karabekir Pasha, the Nationalist commander in the Erzeroum area. Djavad Bey, is well known in London, having been for some time

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Secretary at the Turkish Embassy not long before the war. He was subsequently Minister at Belgrade and Stockholm, but he has played no rôle since the war. He may be defined as a typical Turkish diplomat of rather more than average ability and Union and Progress sympathies. Munir Bey is an industrious official of particular importance.

by Sefik Bey, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, called. The former did not give me any indication of the line he was going to take with the Nationalist Party, but I took the opportunity to ask his Highness to do his utmost to secure the release of the British prisoners of war, civil and military, at present held by the Nationalist forces. I sent him a list of these prisoners in so far as their names are known to this High Commission. I informed his Highness that questions of prisoners of war greatly affected public opinion in England, and that if he could secure the release of these prisoners he would invest the Turkish Government with prestige in our eyes.

In the course of conversation attention was made to the success his Highness had obtained in pacifying the Yenien some years ago. I understand, however, that his success was due to the fact that he gave way to the demands of the rebels.

6. As I have already reported to your Lordship by telegraph, the professed intention of the Government is to give the mission time to enter into relations with the Nationalists and to explain to them the situation in Constantinople, and then to proceed with the ratification of the treaty, without awaiting the results of any mission on, much less the return of the mission to Constantinople. It would be rash to rely on the fulfilment of this intention. If the Government act on it they will do so with the sole object of obtaining financial relief, and perhaps with the idea at the back of their mind of a revision of the treaty, whether it is ratified or not.

7. The prospects of the mission achieving any success with the Nationalists on the basis of the acceptance of the treaty in its present form are almost nil. The most that can be said is that they are a little brighter now than they were a couple of weeks ago, owing to the strain to which the relations between the Bolsheviks and the Kemalists have been subjected by recent developments in Armenia. It is possible that if this strain continues to make itself felt, and if the new Greek Government carries on more or less decidedly and successfully the Venizelist policy in Asia Minor, Izzet Pasha may find the Nationalist leaders at Angora in a relatively better mood.

8. Of these two factors, the Greek alone could not possibly be conclusive, for, while the discovery that the fall of M. Venizelos did not necessarily entail the collapse of the Greeks in Asia Minor might discourage the Kemalists, it would leave them with their bitterest grievances and their strongest appeal to the masses of people. The other factor may prove to be of supreme importance if matters come to a breach between the Bolsheviks and the Kemalists. It is not difficult to see how Izzet Pasha and men of his way of thinking are sincere in anything it is in their apprehension that the infiltration of Bolshevism spells danger for Turkey, both because it is irreconcilable with Turkish ideas and traditions, and because the Bolsheviks must eventually stand for the old Russian Imperialism. This will be the strongest argument they can use in any attempt to convert or to isolate Mustafa Kemal, but it is unlikely to be successful unless the idea of collaboration with the Bolsheviks has already struck on concrete causes of quarrel such as Armenia or Batoum.

9. In the conversation which I have mentioned above Izzet Pasha himself spoke of the Bolshevik factor, and said that his information in relations with the Bolsheviks, were not committed to them.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMFOLD,

High Commissioner.

E 15587 10578-44]

No. 201

Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 13)

No. 3684,

My Lord,

Paris, December 12, 1920

With reference to my telegram No. 1346 of the 10th December informing your Lordship of the intention of the French Government to send M. Declosières as French Ambassador to Constantinople I have the honour to inform you

that I referred to the subject this morning in conversation with the President of the Council. He told me that orders had been given to M. Declosières to proceed at once to Constantinople, and that he would probably arrive there simultaneously with the Italian Commissioner, so that the Commission would be able to set to work with the least possible delay.

It is practically certain that as soon as M. Declosières arrives in Constantinople he will claim the presidency of the Financial Commission, to which we have already agreed, but in view of the refusal of the French Government to recognise General Harrington as president of the Inter-Allied Military Commission, I would recommend that we should not recognise M. Declosières as president of the Financial Commission until a similar status has been accorded to General Harrington. If your Lordship approves of the idea, the question remains whether this should be told to the French Government now or on the arrival of M. Declosières at Constantinople. I would suggest the former alternative as a step of a more friendly character.

Your Lordship's telegraphic instructions of the 8th December point to the possibility of an early ratification of the Treaty of Sèvres by the Ottoman Government, and imply that the Allies are also of opinion that advantages would accrue to them from immediate ratification. I therefore asked M. Leygues this morning what his views were on the subject. He replied with some vehemence that nothing would induce the French Government to ratify the Treaty of Sèvres as it stands. Though there might be twenty French Governments succeeding each other, not one of them would be allowed by the Chamber to ratify the treaty. He had impressed upon the Committee for Foreign Affairs and the French press that he and his Government were opposed to revision but that they favoured adaptation or modification of the treaty, and he maintained that in this view he was in agreement with His Majesty's Government, and that in two or three weeks' time he would meet members of His Majesty's Government and discuss with them such modifications as might be necessary to make in the treaty to meet the new situation created at Athens. He strongly urged the necessity of making these modifications without undue delay and before events forced the Allied Governments to take hasty and, perhaps, what might prove rash decisions. He continued that the creation of Soviets in Armenia, the appearance of Bolshevik agents at Tehran and the attempts of the Bolsheviks to make terms with Kemal, who was showing unwillingness to join with Bolshevism

allies to come speedily to terms with Kemal and thus to prevent a homogeneous Bolshevik policy in the Caucasus and Asia Minor, and that it was only by coming to terms with Mustafa Kemal in connection with Smyrna that this could be achieved.

There is no doubt that feeling in French official circles is entirely opposed to the ratification of the Treaty of Sèvres in its present form, and that to help them in their commitments in Syria and Cilicia, an agreement with Kemal on the basis of the restoration of Smyrna to Turkish sovereignty is regarded as essential to their foreign policy.

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST

E 15765 8-44

Sir H. Rumföld to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 17)

(No. 1307)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, December 16, 1920

My telegram No. 1266 of 2nd December

Turkish Government are again showing signs of determination to ratify treaty notwithstanding definite promise of Minister for Foreign Affairs that as soon as Izzet Pasha Mission reached Angora Government would merely wait a few days necessary to allow mission to explain situation to Nationalists, and would then ratify treaty whether Nationalists acquiesced or not.

EXPLANATION OF THE ABOVE TELEGRAM. The Turkish Government are again showing signs of determination to ratify the Treaty of Sèvres notwithstanding the definite promise of the Minister for Foreign Affairs that as soon as the Izzet Pasha Mission reached Angora the Government would merely wait a few days necessary to allow the mission to explain the situation to the Nationalists, and would then ratify the treaty whether the Nationalists acquiesced or not. The Turkish Government are again showing signs of determination to ratify the Treaty of Sèvres notwithstanding the definite promise of the Minister for Foreign Affairs that as soon as the Izzet Pasha Mission reached Angora the Government would merely wait a few days necessary to allow the mission to explain the situation to the Nationalists, and would then ratify the treaty whether the Nationalists acquiesced or not.

of any intention to modify treaty, but that even if there were to be modifications they can only be effected after much consideration: that chance of such modifications constitutes no valid reason for delay in fulfilment of promise mentioned above. That, on the contrary, Turkish Government should on its side proceed at once with negotiations and to pave the way for institution of Financial Commission, which can alone afford permanent relief in the now desperate financial situation.

I spoke generally on these lines to Grand Vizier on 13th December, and I caused explicit statement in same sense to be made to Minister for Foreign Affairs later on same day. Grand Vizier spoke as though he acquiesced, though he gave me no further definite promise. Minister for Foreign Affairs argued that situation had entirely changed and that French Premier's statement made it difficult to fulfil promise without exposing Government to damaging crisis. He did not deny obligation to fulfil promise previously given, but he urged that we should not press Government too hard.

My French colleague and Italian appear to be working on same lines and I do not despair of obtaining ratification.

E 15782 3 44

Sir H. Humboldt to Earl Curzon - (Received December 10)

No. 1308.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, December 17, 1920

My telegram No. 1307 of 17th December

Turkish Government attribute lack of news from mission to defective communications and seem sincerely anxious to get into touch with Angora. There are, however, reports of increasing frequency and consistency that mission have gone over to Nationalists. It is even reported from Izmir on authority of traveller from Angora that Izzet and two other members of mission have accepted posts in National Government. These stories may merely be what "group omitted" wish to be believed, but it is pretty clear that no progress is being made in direction of reconciling Nationalists to views held by Allies, and at least professed by Government, and that cannot other than defective communications are responsible for continued absence of news.

Another report which I give with even greater reserve is that Nationalists are in touch with Europe through General Gouraud, with a view to settlement of Anatolian question without reference to Constantinople. Alleged presence in Rome of Janin Bey, former Minister of the Interior in Angora Government, has also attracted attention.

E 15871 3 44

H. Humboldt to Earl Curzon - (Received December 20)

(No. 1632)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 12, 1920.

I WAS received in private audience by the Sultan on the 6th instant. Mr. Ryan, who was present with me on this occasion, interpreted, as the Sultan preferred to dispense with the presence of any of his own officials.

2. His Majesty was extremely nervous at the beginning of the audience, but this nervousness wore off as the audience proceeded until he became quite animated. His Majesty spoke very volubly and at great length, and Mr. Ryan found the interpretation of his remarks to me a matter of some difficulty.

3. The Sultan began by making some courteous reference to my arrival and to my desire to become acquainted with the situation. He then went on to explain that in dealing with Oriental peoples, like the Turks, it was important to bear in mind that moral and sentimental considerations counted for more with them than questions of material interest. I thanked His Majesty for his reference to myself, and said that it was the duty of every foreign representative to make himself acquainted with the mentality of the people amongst whom he was called to live, as only in that manner could he be of use to his own Government and to the Government to which he was accredited. I then said that I thought that the English race, more than any other race, had always respected the institutions and the religious of foreign races. It was one of their cardinal maxims not to interfere in these matters.

4. The Sultan then mentioned occasions in the past when, owing to harshness on the part of England, or her unreadiness to support a Turkish statesman like Kiamat Pasha, who relied on her entirely, Turkey had been driven into the arms of Germany. This had been very unfortunate for Turkey. I replied that the Turkish people have had every reason for appreciating the long-standing friendship which has

the Turkish people should have turned to a new and, as it had turned out, much more oppressive such as Germany. I thought that it was always a mistake, even in private life, to desert an old and well-tried friend for a new friend.

5. In reply to some remarks of the Sultan with regard to present affairs, I said that I had only so far been in contact with two of His Majesty's Ministers, namely, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Izzet Pasha, who has just gone to Angora. At this point the Sultan expressed surprise that I had not yet seen the Grand Vizier. I should explain in this connection that since the three High Commissioners began to function here regularly, it has been the settled practice that successive Grand Viziers and Ministers for Foreign Affairs should make the first call on the High Commissioners. There has been no departure from this practice since the beginning of 1912, except I believe, on the arrival of the late Italian High Commissioner, M. Maissa, who visited the Grand Vizier without waiting to be called upon. There has, however, been a tendency on the part of Cabinets of to re or less Nationalist sympathies to endeavour to change the practice. Tewfik Pasha, though he called on the High Commissioner when he was forming the present Cabinet, did not call on me, and on my own arrival even the Minister for Foreign Affairs waited several days to see whether I should make the first move. He eventually conformed to the practice described above only after it had been discreetly conveyed to him that I should await his visit.

The Sultan went on to say that he had long been convinced that the friendship of England was necessary to his country, and he had never wavered in that opinion, which he had inherited from his father. I replied that His Majesty's sentiments on that point were well known to me, and that I counted on them to make my task easier. I added that I was proud to have been selected as the first representative who would re-establish full relations with His Majesty after the Peace Treaty had been ratified. I said that I would do my utmost to endeavour to bring back the relations between our two countries to what they used to be.

7. The Sultan said that the motives of our actions were often not understood. I replied that we were used to being misinterpreted, and I reminded him of the long and bitter past with Russian influence at Constantinople. At the present moment there were many people who would only be too glad of an opportunity to fish in troubled waters, and we had to beware of propaganda, possibly German, which would attempt to poison our relations with Turkey. I said that the only way to checkmate these manoeuvres was by a policy of absolute frankness, and this was the policy I intended to pursue.

8. The Sultan then said that the Turkish Government would be in need of guidance, and he hoped that I would give them advice. I said that I would certainly give such advice as was in my power, to the best of my capacity, whenever such advice was sought.

9. His Majesty then concluded the audience by saying that he would not detain me, and that, if I had become Ambassador, he would have more opportunities of seeing me.

10. The audience lasted some forty minutes. My predecessor, in his despatch of the 23rd August, 1920, has given a very full description of the impression the Sultan produced on him. I would only add that my impression is that His Majesty appears to be a weak but well-intentioned man, and very anxious-minded. But the present situation here is so grave as to warrant great anxiety on the part of the Sovereign.

11. The sequel to this interview is not without interest, for I received on the morning of the 8th instant a message to the effect that the Grand Vizier wished to come to the Embassy. Tewfik Pasha called yesterday afternoon, obviously at the direct request of the Sultan. I presume that his Highness will now call on my French and Italian colleagues.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, High Commissioner

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 20)

No. 163a.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, Decem-

IN continuation of my immediately preceding despatch I have the honour to report that the Grand Vizier came to see me on the afternoon of the 5th instant.

Tewfik Pasha began by saying that he had known my father, and this personal touch made the interview less formal than it might otherwise have been. After a recapitulation of past events we turned to the various subjects of discussion between the Turkish Government and to this High Commission.

I enquired whether the Turkish Government had any objection to the mission to Angora as the press generally stated to be the case. The Vizier replied that they had received no word from their mission to Angora. He was afraid that the Greeks were perhaps holding up the telegrams from the mission to the Government. As such telegrams would pass over the sector over which General Harrington exercises control, I said that I would immediately make enquiries, and see that orders were given that any telegrams from the mission to the Central Government should be allowed to go through. I have since ascertained that there is no reason to believe that any telegrams are being thus held up. I am letting the Minister for Foreign Affairs know this and am adding that, in any event, fresh instructions have been sent to the Greeks not to interfere with the transmission of such messages.

His Highness then categorically repeated the assurance given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Turkish Government meant to ratify the treaty. The Grand Vizier said that they would be well advised to do so quickly, if only for the sake of putting their finances on a proper basis.

We then referred to the subject of the difficulties now being experienced in raising money with which to pay the balance of the salaries due for October. I pointed out that the High Commissioners were doing their utmost to get this money for the Turkish Government, but that they were meeting with difficulties of a material character. The High Commissioners could not force the banks to lock money up in form of a long term advance to the Turkish Government, on stocks which could only be sold slowly, and I alluded to the economic crisis which was prevailing in Constantinople and was imminent in Western Europe. Tewfik Pasha said that the Ottoman Bank had suggested to him that if a sum of £T. 250,000 in gold, now lying in the vaults of that bank (i.e., the portion of the total sum originally intended for the service of the Internal Loan, as to which the Government claim that the dispute founded on the Treaty of Versailles really arises), and on which an embargo had been placed by the High Commissioners, were released, the bank would advance a sum of about five times this amount, in paper, to the Turkish Government. I replied that this matter had been recently discussed by the High Commissioners, who were of opinion that as the embargo had been placed on this gold in consequence of the receipt of instructions from the Allied Governments, a further reference would have to be made to those Governments before anything could be done.

I took this opportunity of telling the Grand Vizier that the task of the High Commissioners in endeavouring to obtain money for the Turkish Government would be greatly facilitated if they were able to assure their Governments and the banks that the provisional control which had been established over the revenue and expenditure of the Government was operating effectively and completely, which was at present far from being the case. I sketched out the measures which the Public Debt delegates considered necessary to improve the control, and His Highness promised to speak to the Finance Minister on the subject. I left nothing unsaid which might induce them to agree to the centralisation of all receipts without exception in a single account, and to a system of control of expenditure which would make it possible for the delegates to guard against irregular and wasteful disbursements, and to secure priority for such expenditure as was most urgently necessary for the continued working of the Administration.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 21)

N. 1.
M. 1.

Constantinople, December 10 1920

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1266 of the 2nd December, summarising a note which I had received from the Sublime Porte regarding the ratification of the Peace Treaty, I have the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, textual copy of this note.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 206

Note addressed to High Commissioner

Ministère des Affaires étrangères,
le 2^e décembre 1920

M. Haut-Commissaire,

À l'honneur d'accuser réception à votre Excellence de la note collective qu'elle a voulu m'adresser le 24 novembre, conjointement avec leurs Excellences les Hauts Commissaires de France et d'Italie, pour me faire savoir que, conformément aux engagements de leurs Gouvernements respectifs, elle et ses collègues s'attachent à la ratification du Traité de Sévres par le Gouvernement turc.

Ainsi que j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de l'exposer à votre Excellence dans ma lettre du 4 de ce mois, la Sublime Porte ne se refuse pas à satisfaire au désir des trois grandes Puissances de la nécessité de n'y procéder qu'après la prise de contact avec l'Anatolie pour les motifs que j'ai eu occasion de soumettre longuement à l'appréciation de votre Excellence, tant de vive voix que par écrit.

En fixant un délai d'au moins un mois, la Sublime Porte espérait que ce contact aurait pu être établi entre-temps. Cependant, des difficultés matérielles imprévues ont fait que ses délégués n'ont pu jusqu'ici se rendre en Anatolie. Le départ de ces derniers devant avoir lieu vendredi prochain, le but visé ne tardera plus à être atteint.

Je crois donc devoir prier votre Excellence de vouloir bien prendre en considération les circonstances survenues et consentir à ce que la ratification du traité soit effectuée après que les délégués du Gouvernement auront pris contact avec l'Anatolie.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

SEFA

Earl Curzon to Sir A. Geddes (Washington).

(No. 933.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 21, 1920.

YOUR telegram No. 541 of the 16th December: Reported communication made to United States Government by French Ambassador stating his Government were glad of United States protest against the San Remo Agreement.

Do you see any objection to our telling the French Government that we have heard through an American source, which we consider reliable, that they have expressed satisfaction to the State Department at the protest made by the United States Government against the San Remo Agreement, and that we should be glad of an explanation?

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 22)

No. 1

Constantinople, December 18, 1920

My telegram No. 1308 of 17th December

Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me to-day, 18th December, that Izzet Pasha's mission reached Angora 5th December

I gather that this message reached Porte through Italians and that no other official news has been received. Minister for Foreign Affairs regards message as disposing of rumours which have been afloat to the effect that mission has either gone over to Nationalists or is held prisoner by them

These rumours do, indeed, seem fantastic, but version that members of mission had been won over and had even accepted posts in Angora Government seems to have been for some reason or other deliberately encouraged by Nationalists.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 22)

No. 2

Constantinople, December 21

My telegram No. 1309 of 21st December

My French colleague called this morning and gave me an account of an interview he had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs two days ago on the subject of the ratification of the Turkish Treaty. My French colleague reminded Minister for Foreign Affairs of the latter's note of 1st December promising ratification when once Government mission had entered into contact with Nationalists, and said that Turkish Government must now act up to their promise to ratify. He dwelt on the bad effect which would be produced if they failed to ratify, and appears generally to have spoken in very energetic terms.

I therefore wish to correct the impression I conveyed in my above-mentioned telegram that my French colleague is somewhat lukewarm in this matter.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 24)

(No. 1660.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 18, 1920.

SEFA BEY, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, called on me on the 16th instant, and I took the opportunity of his visit to speak to him again at length on the question of ratification.

His embarrassment at not being able to fulfil the undertaking he had given to the three High Commissioners, both in writing and verbally, to ratify the treaty

Government Mission had entered into contact with the Kemalists was evident. He

pleaded for still further delay to allow the Government to hear from their

Government had sent two urgent telegrams, through French

Sefa Bey freely admitted that events in Greece had altered the situation. He

explained that if the Turkish Government were to ratify the treaty now the Kemalists

would reproach them with having created a fait accompli at a moment when there was

no possibility of modification. He seemed to be proceeding on the assumption, which as far as I knew was baseless, that

there was a good chance of the provisions of the treaty being modified before that

instrument was ratified. I said that the Turkish Government were under a complete

delusion in imagining that any of the Allied statesmen had said anything which would

indicate a readiness to waive the demand for the ratification of the treaty. It was

true that there had been talk in the press of such modifications, and there had been a

pronouncement by the French President of the Council on the subject. But if any

procrastination could only produce an unfavourable impression in the minds of the

Entente Governments

4. Sefa Bey admitted the justice of these remarks, but again emphasised the

position in which the Turkish Government would be placed vis-à-vis public

in both in Constantinople and in Anatolia

5. I then dwelt on the disastrous consequences to Turkey from a financial point

of view if ratification were delayed. I pointed out that the High Commissioners

experiencing the greatest difficulty in obtaining an advance on the Turkish Government

stocks, which advance if obtained would only be sufficient to pay the balance of

October salaries and a portion of the November salaries. In fact the Government

would be faced in a few days by a still more acute financial crisis, and it was impossible

relief was to come. The only solution of the crisis lay, therefore, in the

ratification of the treaty, which would admit of the constitution of the Financial

Commission

6. Finally, I asked Sefa Bey to impress on his colleagues three points, viz. —

(1.) The fact that the Turkish Government had engaged themselves formally to

ratify the treaty as soon as their Mission had entered into contact with the Kemalists,

and there could be no doubt that the Mission had in effect done so

(2.) That the Allied Governments had

expressly agreed to wait until the Turkish Government had entered into contact with the

Kemalists before they would consider the question of ratification

(3.) That the Allied Governments had

expressly agreed to wait until the Turkish Government had entered into contact with the

Kemalists before they would consider the question of ratification

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner

E 16085 3 44]

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 1321. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic)

Constantinople, December 21, 1920.

My telegram No. 1307 of 16th December

I again spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday about ratification. I gave him translation of statement which I had noticed in English papers of 11th instant defining attitude of His Majesty's Government towards Turkish Treaty, and stating that three Allied Powers were acting together in absolute union. I also read to him note of 1st December enclosed in my despatch No. 1623 of 10th December, promising ratification after Government delegates had entered into contact with Nationalists.

I said that Mission had now been at Angora for twelve days. Time had therefore

come for Turkish Government to redeem their promise

Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that situation had changed since above-

mentioned note had been written, and he repeated arguments against acting hastily in

the matter of ratification. He instanced statement made by French Prime Minister, as

also a report he had seen that Count Sforza had stated that it would be more easy to

modify Treaty of Sèvres as that instrument had not been ratified

I observed that I knew nothing of any such statement on the part of Count Sforza.

The Minister said that if Turkish Government were to ratify now, such a

proceeding might result in irretrievable disaster and throw Nationalists into the arms

of Bolsheviks. Ratification would produce a deplorable effect. He therefore pleaded

for a still further delay to enable Government to enter into communication with their

mission, and he hinted that there was prospect of that mission coming to satisfactory

agreement with Nationalists

I said that elements who would be further estranged would be only extremist

elements who had already burnt their boats, and I told Minister for Foreign Affairs

my own impression was that Turkish Government were making ratification depend

on acquiescence of Nationalists and that Government were not serious in their decla-

rations that they would ratify. Minister for Foreign Affairs disputed this view but I

nevertheless convinced that Turks are pursuing a Micawber like policy in this matter

I cannot shift Minister for Foreign Affairs from his position with result that three

Allied Governments must consider how long they are prepared to wait for fulfilment of

definite promise by Turks to ratify after their mission had entered into contact with Nationalists.

In view of importance attached by Turkish Government to utterances of French in order to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding, I think it would be very desirable that my colleagues and I should be again definitely instructed that prompt ratification is indispensable. Such instructions appear to be all the more necessary inasmuch as French High Commissioner must naturally be somewhat embarrassed by pronouncement of French Prime Minister, and has become rather lukewarm in applying pressure to Turkish Government to ratify.

It is worth considering whether Turks should not be summoned to ratify by a certain date.

[E 16085 3 44]

No. 212.

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Humbold (Constantinople).

(No. 1190.)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, December 26, 1920

YOUR telegram No. 1321 of 21st December: Ratification of Treaty of Sèvres.

Pending the clearing of the situation in Greece, it will be better to make no further representations in favour of immediate ratification.

[E 1-327 3 44]

No. 213.

Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon. (Received December 31.)

(No. 3802.)

My Lord,

Paris, December 29, 1920

NABY BEY arrived here a few days ago and paid his official visit to me this morning. I had

asked him to call on me at 12 o'clock, but he was unable to do so on account of

the delay caused him some anxiety, and he feared that the demands of Mustapha Kemal were beyond what Izet Pasha would be able to meet.

I asked him therefore, what he considered would be the demands of Mustapha Kemal. He replied that they would apply primarily to the question of Smyrna.

He stated that this question was already settled by the Treaty of Sèvres, and the Allied Powers were now awaiting its ratification by Turkey. The Greeks were

at Smyrna, and for the time being there was no reason for any modification by the Powers of the decision at which they had arrived in connection with the régime

established there, and certainly no Power had any intention of taking forcible action to expel the Greek forces. Naby Bey replied that he had discussed with Tewfik Pasha

the concessions which the Turkish Government were anxious to obtain in regard to the Treaty of Sèvres. They are two in number. They would like very much if it were

possible to establish by a special statute an autonomous province of Smyrnia on the lines of the constitution of the Island of Samos. They are opposed to international

control, as they had daily before their eyes proofs of how badly international control was working in Constantinople. He felt that such control could have no permanent

effect, or modification which the Turkish Government would like to secure would be the withdrawal of Greece to the Euxine-Medina line.

I gave him no encouragement, and told him that I saw no prospect of any modification of the Treaty of Sèvres; but I venture to report to your Lordship this conversation, as it may be of interest to

know what is passing through the mind of the Turkish Grand Vizier.

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

CHAPTER III.—PALESTINE AND SYRIA.

[E 7909]

No. 214

(No. 81.)

My Lord,

Palazzo Borghese, Rome, June 28, 1920

IN reply to a communication made to me at the end of March last by the Cardinal Secretary of State on the subject of the Cenaculum on Mount Zion, your Lordship was good enough, in your despatch No. 82 of the 9th April, to inform me of the reply returned to a representation of Signor Nitti on the subject; the future of the Holy Places in Palestine could not be dealt with until the signature of the treaty with Turkey, but the wishes of the King of Italy would be borne in mind when the question came up for consideration.

The Consulta have now approached me unofficially and have handed to me a memorandum respecting their views. I asked Cardinal as to the views of the Vatican on the Italian claim and as to the contention that any rights of the House of Anjou were represented by the present King of Italy. The Cardinal answered that the Holy See were very anxious that the Holy Places should be restored to Christianity now that it was recognised that it was not of interest to the Moslems. They were well satisfied that this restoration should take place through the Italian or any other Government which would achieve the result desired.

I have accordingly the honour to enclose herewith a translation of the memorandum handed to me by the Consulta.

I have, &c.

I DE SALES

Enclosure in No. 214.

Memorandum on Cenacolo from the Consulta

The Sanctuary of the Cenacle on Mount Zion.

The Sanctuary of the Cenacle on Mount Zion has been known from the earliest years. At the time of the great events which followed the fall of Jerusalem, the gold mosaics, put up by the Emperor Constantine, were destroyed.

After the fall of Jerusalem the Cenacle, in the hands of Saladin, was neither destroyed nor profaned—merely left to ruin. When the Franciscan Brothers arrived, they began to restore and put it in as good a condition as they could, without however being sure of possession. And the King of Naples, Robert d'Anjou, and his queen Sancia did likewise, acquiring the property legally.

These generous sovereigns applied directly to Nasser Mohammed, the Sultan of Egypt and Damascus, and after much transaction and with great expense (32,000 ducats) obtained absolute possession of the edifice of the Cenacle and the ground adjoining. When being done they wished the custody thereof to be confided to the Franciscan Brothers. Besides this, the Royal House of Naples at its own expense restored the Sanctuary and built a convent next to it for the Franciscans officiating in the sacred spot. The ruins of this convent are still visible.

The successors to the throne of the two Sicilies paid, for about two centuries after the acquisition, 1,000 ducats, yearly, for the maintenance of the religious and of the Sanctuary of Mount Zion.

Until 1552 the Cenacle, in the custody of the Franciscans, was always recognised by the Sultans and by the other High Powers as the legitimate and absolute property of the Royal House of Naples. In that year, contrary to all law, the Franciscans were driven out of the Cenacle, and the Sanctuary was usurped by the Moslems on the pretext that they wished to venerate the spot as the Tomb of David. This pretext was founded on a pure fable, spread abroad in the 12th century, of the discovery under the Cenacle of the Tomb of King David—a fable which even the Moslems in question did not believe. Only this disbelief

in the existence of David's tomb can explain the state of disrepair in which the Muslims have left the mosque.

Furthermore, this legend and the Muslim religious interest in the Cenacle are recent. Sultan and Caliph consented in April 1919 to the preparation of an trade, by means of which the Cenacle was ceded to the Kingdom of Italy.

the Cenacle is Wakuf property and that the Sultan's trade would raise the question whether the Sultan's rights over Wakuf property in territory occupied by the *hittites* are to be recognised, it must be observed that Wakuf property is exclusively under Muslim religious administration, in fact, in Egypt it depends on a special Ministry, autonomous, and placed under the direction of the Sultan.

Any objection, therefore, based on Muslim religious considerations is thus overruled, since the Sultan has accepted the declaration that there is no foundation to the legend of the Tomb of David and since the Sultan himself has merely reserved his definite consent till the British Government have given theirs with regard to the point raised touching Wakuf property.

All this is shown by the numerous communications made by the Royal Italian Embassy to the Foreign Office.

The difficulties brought forward by England, therefore, would, at the present stage of the proceedings, only result in reviving under cover of England the difficulties formerly raised by the Turks in order to prevent Christianity regaining possession of the most sacred of all Sanctuaries, the Sanctuary in which His Majesty the King of Italy takes a personal interest for the reasons of inheritance put forward at the beginning of this memorandum.

E 7910 4184 44]

No 215

Count de Salis to Earl Curzon — (Received July 8)

(No 82)

My Lord,

Palazzo Borghese, Rome, July 3, 1920

IN your despatch No. 105 of the 4th June your Lordship referred to an understanding arrived at between the British, French and Italian Governments at San Remo, to the effect that with the assumption of a mandate over Palestine by Great Britain, all French claims to a protectorate over Catholics would be definitely abandoned and withdrawn. The Italian Chargé d'Affaires has informed the Foreign Office that France's traditional privileged position in the matter of certain liturgical ceremonial and precedence, although their agreement to abandon these rights was definitely stated in the *procès-verbaux* of the San Remo Conference of the 24th April, 1920.

On my asking him, Mgr. Corretti pointed out that at the time in question discussed the French position in the matter of precedence. Sir Herbert Samuel reported the interview to your Lordship in his despatch of the 26th June. For convenience of reference I enclose copy of this paper which was kindly communicated to me.

A memorandum has now been given to me, recording the Cardinal's conversation with Sir Herbert Samuel's report, but the arguments employed by the Cardinal are related in a little more detail. After alluding to the procedure which took place on solemn occasions, the Cardinal mentioned that at the Conference of San Remo these honours were declared to be no longer in force (*discuti*), since there was an end of the protectorate of which they were an accessory. This is in accordance with the language always held to me on the subject for the past three years at the Vatican, to the effect that the relation between the honours and the protectorate was that of accessory and principal, and that if the principal were to cease, the accessory should equally cease with it. The Cardinal went on to enquire what would be the view of the British Government should the French, in memory of their former services to the Church, ask that these honours should nevertheless be continued. On Sir Herbert Samuel replying that this was a question to be decided between France and the Holy See, the Cardinal, wishing to pose the question with a little more precision, said that should

the Holy See continue to grant these honours to France, and perhaps to any other Catholic nation which asked for it. England, not being a Catholic nation, would not be entitled to such honours for her representative in Palestine. But what

the Cardinal, if her representative were a Catholic? In that event how would England regard the situation? Sir Herbert Samuel answered there would, in his opinion, be a difficulty ("che a suo avviso così non potrebbe andare"), and that in any case he would have referred the point to his Government.

This morning, in the course of conversation, the Cardinal went over the same ground carefully and said that he was anxious to learn the views of His Majesty's Government, and I promised that no time should be lost in putting the matter before your Lordship.

Nothing has so far been said to me here respecting another point mentioned in Sir Herbert Samuel's despatch, the suggestion that Catholic interests in relation to the Holy Places should be represented through the good offices of France. Discussions are at present going on with regard to the resumption of diplomatic relations between the Holy See and France, and from the foregoing it would seem clear that the Quai d'Orsay are bringing a good deal of pressure to bear on the Vatican in order to recover indirectly as many as possible of the advantages of the lost

active campaign to which a paper like the "Temps" has not been entirely a stranger, while the same object is pursued by an article signed by Roger Lambelin in the "Correspondant" of the 25th May, to which a certain prominence has been given here.

Count de Salis

Pro Memoria from Mgr. Corretti

(Translation)

His Eminence the Cardinal Secretary of State, in a recent conversation with Sir Herbert Samuel, spoke also on the question of the liturgical precedence enjoyed until now by the French representative in Palestine as Protector of the Catholic Church in the Orient.

After explaining the nature of these honours (namely, on occasions of liturgical solemnity the French consul, notified in advance, goes to the church, where he is formally received and given a special seat), his Eminence pointed out that in the San Remo Conference such precedence was declared at an end, the protectorate, of which it was an accessory, having ceased to exist. He pointed out, however, the possibility of requesting that the procedure should be considered permanent as recognition of her former benefits to the Catholic Church. Supposing

the British Government in regard to it? On Sir Herbert Samuel's replying that this was a question to be resolved between France and the Holy See, his Eminence wishing to emphasise the question, remarked: "If the Holy See continued to accord such precedence to France (and possibly to England, not being a Catholic nation, would not be entitled to such honours for her representative in Palestine. But perhaps, added the Cardinal, her representative might be a Catholic. In that case, how would England view the situation?" Sir Herbert Samuel then said that in his opinion the situation would then be impossible, and that in any case he would have to refer the matter to his Government.

The Holy See is now anxious to know the views of the British Government in this regard.

E 7911

No 216

Count de Salis to Earl Curzon — (Received July 8)

(No 83)

My Lord,

Palazzo Borghese, Rome, July 3, 1920

AFTER speaking to me, as reported in my preceding despatch of his conversation with Sir Herbert Samuel on the subject of the position of the French in Palestine in connection with the abolition of the French Protectorate of Catholic interests, Cardinal

Gasparrini went on to speak in general terms of the visit of Sir Herbert Samuel to the Vatican. The Pope, he said, had used none but the most conciliatory terms, but he had allowed himself, as he thought it better to do so, to admit that the appointment caused the Holy See much preoccupation. Sir Herbert Samuel's replies had been frank and practical. In reply to a question, the Cardinal at once answered to the effect that the duty of the High Commissioner was a difficult one, and the future alone would show how it could be discharged; he was very glad to have been in contact with Sir Herbert Samuel, and the impression left by the visit gave great satisfaction.

I have, &c.

J. DE SALIN

E 8032]

No. 217

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 10.)

(No. 602)

(Telegraphic.)

Ramleh, July 10, 1920.

COLONEL EASTON, liaison officer at Damascus, has arrived here with message for Prime Minister which I am sending in immediately following telegram.

Faisal has asked Colonel Easton whether I would assist with facilities for his journey in the event of French being unable or unwilling to provide them.

French authorities in Syria are now opposing visit on the ground that invitation is no longer open and that question of Syria is settled.

I presume, however, that, notwithstanding opposition of French local authorities, it is still wish of His Majesty's Government that Faisal should proceed.

Please reply urgently. Colonel Easton is waiting here to take back reply.

(Confidential.)

Faisal is particularly anxious to leave for Europe at earliest possible moment, as he is certain that French are about to attack, since they have massed large body of troops at Zahle and have taken up a very threatening attitude.

(Jerusalem.)

E 8033]

No. 218

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 10.)

(No. 603)

(Telegraphic.)

Ramleh, July 10, 1920.

PRIME MINISTER, London.

"Allow me to inform your Excellency that, in consideration of your friendly invitations, I have decided to proceed to Europe with some of my State officials to resume discussion of our case, which was discussed in principle at San Remo."

"I hope your Excellency will assure me that, during my absence, no changes whatever will take place in military situation at frontiers—changes that may hamper peaceful negotiations which are our object for final solution of our problem."

(Repeated to Jerusalem.)

No. 219

Nil.

[E 8205 2/44]

No. 220.

Note by General Hadlad, Syrian Diplomatic Agent in London.—(Received July 14.)

(Confidential.)

WHEN King Faisal was in London last September he warned the British Government that unless satisfaction was given to the aspirations of the Arab people British influence

would be lost. I have been told that political and economic, would suffer. I have been told that the British Government, and during the several months I have been in the East, I have seen the opportunity of bringing the same point before the British Government. I have seen, however, that our representations have been underestimated, and I doubt whether the gravity of the situation is fully appreciated. I have seen the situation in Mesopotamia which minimise the excited state of the country, ignore the causes and overlook the fatal results of such disturbances. I am more than ever convinced that the situation is growing worse. My country is suffering terribly, and it is my duty, as an Arab, to try and bring its plight before the British people. And as one who has held a commission in His Britannic Majesty's forces, and has sworn allegiance to His Majesty King George V, I consider it also my duty to press my cause, for the additional reason that Great Britain, and Great Britain alone of the European Allied Powers, will be vitally affected by trouble in the Middle East. For to put the matter in another way, what are our Allies risking in that part of the world? The British have garrisons on the Syrian coast, and will never be able, as far as I am concerned, to penetrate into the interior. The Italians are unwilling to enter the Syrian desert, and the French are unwilling to enter the Syrian desert, or even from the Sudan to India.

The Turks are now showing particular animosity towards the British. They have, as a result of this animosity, been driven so far out of their orbit as to throw themselves into the arms of their traditional enemies, the Russians. (We Arabs consider that, as far as their Middle Eastern policy is concerned, the Soviet Government is indistinguishable from the old Tsarist régime, since Russian ambitions, whatever the form of their Government, are still turned towards the same ends.) I have been an enemy of the Turk. I fought against him in the last war, my ancestors have fought for centuries against him. I cannot, therefore, be suspected of being a friend to the Turk if I now say that it is in the interests, both of the Arabs and of Great Britain, if they could form a friendly barrier against the Bolsheviks, rather than remain our joint enemy. For now that we have achieved our object in throwing off the Turkish yoke, we would prefer to have as warlike a people, who must always be our neighbours, as friends rather than enemies. This question, however, is beyond my present scope.

The unrest among the Arabs to-day is due to their dissatisfaction at the peace settlement. We have been the loyal allies of Great Britain, have helped to overthrow the Turk, and have repeatedly, while hostilities lasted, been promised that our aspirations would be realised. The danger is to-day that the Allies will come to be regarded by the Arabs as having broken their word. I need not insist upon the strength of the sentiment, the inheritance of a great past, which is the basis of the Arab cause. But it is also based on economic necessities. There is a cause of hastening on the crisis. For instance, in Syria commerce and trade is at a standstill. There is no outlet to the sea. The British occupy the ports; the French and British authorities are taking what they like; there are; the population from Damascus to Aleppo, which is the zone ruled over by King Faisal, is in desperate straits. The allowance allotted in compensation for the customs has been stopped, and the Syrian Government is left with insufficient resources to meet its expenditure. On the other hand, the administration in Mesopotamia, which is purely British and based on the lines of India and the Sudan, is unpopular, and while it is costly to the British Treasury there is much unrest in the North, causing embarrassment to King Faisal and further worsening the economic situation. The life of Syria depends on its freedom of communication with the sea and the Euphrates on the other. The present situation opens the door to Turkish and Bolshevik propaganda. The people of the country, traditional enemies as they have been to the Turks and instinctively hostile to the principles of Bolshevism, may be driven into the arms of these hostile powers.

As a remedy to this state of affairs in the Arab provinces the only course, in my opinion, is the following. It is a well known fact that the Sherifian family, with King Hussein at their head, were really instrumental in raising the Arabs against the Turks. King Hussein signed the agreement with Great Britain regarding the future of the Arab provinces, and the different pledges which were made were given to him. He and his sons have been very loyal to the British throughout the war, and every British officer, who has had anything to do with that part of the world, can certify that they are thoroughly trustworthy allies. They are the only family which can find support from every party throughout the Arab provinces. The family continues to be very friendly to the British, and it is my duty to say that they have

agreements through the non-fulfilment of the promises made them at the head of the Arab national movement, have been particularly liable to criticism by the Arab people and the Moslems in general every time the Allies have failed to fulfil their promises to the Arabs. They are the best instruments that can now be found to settle the affairs of the Middle East; just as they were the best instruments during the war to lead the Arabs against the common enemy.

than the French occupation of the coast of Syria, is the administration which has been established in Mesopotamia. This has destroyed all hopes of a national Arab Government. At the same time this policy, which is viewed with suspicion in many quarters both official and non-official, in Great Britain, is costing the British Exchequer a very large amount annually. I also see from the press that the mineral resources of the country are being disposed of to many interests, a great number not even British, through companies or direct to other foreign Governments. The Peace Conference at San Remo has declared Mesopotamia independent provisionally, and the obvious course is to maintain and enforce that declaration by inviting Emir Abdulla, King Hussein's second son to become head of the Government. It is not true that he will be unpopular amongst the natives. By far the greater number will be in his favour. Irresponsible authorities, who base their objection to Abdulla on the ground that the majority of the Moslems of Mesopotamia are Shi'as, forget that Abdulla is the direct descendant of Hussein, for whom the Shi'as reserve their greatest veneration, and his family are the only descendants of the Prophet whose genealogy is uncontested. At the same time the Sheressian family is the only great Moslem family whom the Christians respect for their liberal and progressive ideals. If the Emir Abdulla

England he will at once announce the news of the establishment of an independent Government of Mesopotamia, which will look to Great Britain for guidance, protection and assistance. He will make it clear that it is thanks to Great Britain that this consummation has been achieved and Great Britain will thus regain its prestige which has been gradually losing since the armistice. Abdulla will organise an Arab Government, assisted by British expert advice, and a national Arab army under the guidance of British officers, which will in no long period allow the British troops to be withdrawn, leaving at least one British regiment permanently in Bagdad as long as the mandate remains. The new Government will require a loan, the resources of this fertile country will easily redeem, and the British Exchequer will be freed from the constant drain that Mesopotamia promises to be, if a large British army is kept there, and continual friction occurs to hinder economic development. The resources of the country, mineral and otherwise, belong to the country, and will be exploited for the benefit of the country. The British will have no special interest in Mesopotamia given to the national interests of Mesopotamia. As I understand it British interests are purely political interests. These, in my opinion, will be secured far more effectively by the project I have outlined than by the establishment of a bureaucratic régime which has proved to be unpopular in other oriental countries where it prevails. Great Britain will have the benefit of the cotton and other agricultural products of Mesopotamia and the country, as it grows wealthier, will become connected by even closer ties with Great Britain, rather than, growing hostile, as its wealth increases, with a Government which is not indigenous.

In my opinion, the only way to secure the interests of the British in Mesopotamia is by the establishment of a national Arab Government, assisted by British expert advice, and a national Arab army under the guidance of British officers, which will in no long period allow the British troops to be withdrawn, leaving at least one British regiment permanently in Bagdad as long as the mandate remains. The new Government will require a loan, the resources of this fertile country will easily redeem, and the British Exchequer will be freed from the constant drain that Mesopotamia promises to be, if a large British army is kept there, and continual friction occurs to hinder economic development. The resources of the country, mineral and otherwise, belong to the country, and will be exploited for the benefit of the country. The British will have no special interest in Mesopotamia given to the national interests of Mesopotamia. As I understand it British interests are purely political interests. These, in my opinion, will be secured far more effectively by the project I have outlined than by the establishment of a bureaucratic régime which has proved to be unpopular in other oriental countries where it prevails. Great Britain will have the benefit of the cotton and other agricultural products of Mesopotamia and the country, as it grows wealthier, will become connected by even closer ties with Great Britain, rather than, growing hostile, as its wealth increases, with a Government which is not indigenous.

The Department of Public Health will labour for the improvement of the health of the population and particularly for the extirpation of malaria.

As the revenues of the country expand with its increasing prosperity, the Department of Education will be able to accomplish more for the education of the people, the first condition in every country of a high standard of civilisation.

The historic buildings which help to render Jerusalem an object of profound interest of visitors from all parts of the world will be reverently preserved, and measures will be taken to improve the aspect of the ancient city. Archaeological research will be promoted. Steps will be taken to secure the proper planning of the city.

Unpleasant advertisements will be prohibited. Every effort will be made to encourage the visits of pilgrims and travellers to the Holy Land.

The development of the country will not only promote the well being of its present population, but will furnish a livelihood to a large additional number. Indeed, it cannot be carried out without the introduction of additional man power. The ports and frontiers will shortly be opened to a limited immigration, its numbers proportioned to the employment and housing accommodation available in the country.

An ordinance will be issued almost immediately establishing a Government control over immigration and defining the conditions under which immigrants will be admitted.

In the hope that the feelings that gave rise to the unhappy disturbances in Jerusalem three months ago are now allayed, and that there is a prospect of greater harmony among all elements of the population, I hereby declare an amnesty to those who are now in confinement as a result of those disturbances, and to all political prisoners in Palestine. Their civil and political rights will be restored in full. This amnesty does not include the two men who, having given bail, nevertheless did not surrender to justice, nor the two men who took advantage of the disturbance to commit an abominable crime.

It will not be supposed that this amnesty implies that such disturbances are lightly regarded. Should they recur, they will be suppressed with all the resources at my command, and a similar forbearance would not be shown on another occasion.

To celebrate the inauguration of the new administration, I shall extend the hand of clemency also to a number of persons now imprisoned for offences against the law, whose cases are those most deserving of merciful consideration.

As to myself, I prefer that my future actions, rather than my words, should declare to the people my devotion to the interests of this historic and venerable country, and the spirit of impartiality in which I undertake the high task entrusted to my hands.

I pray that the blessing of the Almighty God, before whom Mohammedan, Christian and Jew bow in equal reverence, may rest upon this Assembly and upon all the people of this land.

Lecture 2 in No. 222

Announcement in the "Official Gazette" with regard to the establishment of a Civil Administration in Palestine.

THE Right Honourable Sir Herbert Samuel, P.C., G.B.E., assumed office as and from the 1st instant as His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine, with the charge of establishing a Civil Government in the place of the Military Administration.

Certain changes of designation will consequently take place. The High Commissioner will have his headquarters at Jerusalem, and his Headquarters, Government House, Jerusalem.

Military Governors are entitled District Governors. The High Commissioner has made the following appointments—

Civil Secretary, Mr. Wyndham Deedes, G.M.G., D.S.O.
Legal Secretary, Mr. Norman Bentwich, M.C.
District Governor of Jerusalem, Mr. Ronald Storrs, C.M.G., C.B.E.

As Mr. Wyndham Deedes is at present on leave, the post of Civil Secretary will be temporarily occupied by Mr. Ronald Storrs.

Government House, Jerusalem,
July 5, 1920

No. 2.

F W DUKE

I will now turn to the question of the future form of government to be established in this country; that is a matter upon which it is our intention, as soon as we can do so, to consult public opinion, and for weeks past, as most of you are aware, I have been in consultation with His Majesty's Government and with the principal officers of the

June 1920

2021

Beirut, July 16, 1920

MAY I be instructed in principle whether it is desirable to support claims of
 Egyptians and Cypriots for exemption from taxation under Capitulations?
 In case of Egypt there are few recognized as such under new Egyptian
 nationality law

No. 1111

Sir H. Samuel to Lord Curzon.—(Received July 21.)

(No. 1)
My Lord

Jerusalem, July 12, 1920

I BEG to report that I arrived at Jaffa on H.M.S. "Centaur" in the morning of the 30th June, and at Jerusalem in the afternoon of that day. The municipality of each of those towns presented an address of welcome. The military authorities had taken very full precautions, in view of the possibility of disturbances, but there was no untoward incident of any kind. The population was not demonstrative, but such expressions of feeling as there were, from the crowds that had assembled in the streets, were cordial and friendly. Major-General Bols, the retiring Chief Administrator, received me at his office, and I was able to discuss the present situation with him. He left the same evening.

I had arranged from London that the Military Governors of the various districts should be summoned to Jerusalem on the 1st July, and on that morning I held a conference with them and with the heads of the departments of Administration. I communicated to those present your Lordship's letter of appointment, and went through ~~some of the~~ ^{the} ~~business~~ ^{business} of policy which I intended to make at assemblies of notables at Jerusalem and Haifa a few days later. On the following morning Lieutenant-General Congreve, the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, and Major-General Shea, the senior Divisional General in Palestine, both of whom had been good enough to meet me on my arrival at Jaffa, came to Jerusalem for the discussion of a number of matters in which the civil and military authorities were jointly concerned.

The assemblies took place at Jerusalem on the 7th July and at Haifa on the 8th July. There had been many reports that the Moslem leaders would refuse to attend as a protest against the appointment of H. M. G. Government and particularly against my own appointment and it is certain that in many places the active members of the opposition did their utmost to organise a boycott. Those efforts were quite unsuccessful. Although for a few days, and in certain districts, some of the leading men were wavering as to the course they would pursue, in the end, with exceedingly few exceptions, they all attended.

The assemblies proved to be fully representative of all creeds and of all sections of opinion, with the exception of a very small group of extremists. The result showed that it was right not to have been deterred by the somewhat alarmist accounts of the state of opinion in Palestine, which had been transmitted from time to time, but to have put the situation to the test at once.

The assemblies at Jerusalem consisted of about 250 persons, and at Haifa the invitations having been distributed rather more freely, of a somewhat larger number. At both I read in English the message to the people of Palestine which His Majesty the King had been pleased to send. The message was then translated into Arabic and into Hebrew, the audience standing meanwhile. I then delivered the speech of which a copy is enclosed in this despatch. (Enclosure 1) Arabic and Hebrew translations were read. The proceedings concluded with the reading in the three languages of a letter from Lord Allenby, who would have been present at one or other of the gatherings, but for an unfortunate accident which prevented him from attending.

The reports which have so far been received are unanimous that the pronouncements at these assemblies have had an excellent effect. The Jewish population is very satisfied, while the Moslems, who had expected the declaration of a drastic policy, are relieved and reassured. The Governor, in the course of conversation of the reception which followed the ceremony, "To-day, for the first time for many weeks, I feel that I may smile." Although the extremists will no doubt continue their criticisms, and show signs already of putting false interpretations on some of the points there is every reason to believe that the pronouncement has greatly relaxed the tension which has existed for so long.

Without attempting to forecast the future for the time being, at least the political situation in Palestine may be regarded as more favourable.

I am now engaged in preparing the measures that are necessary to put into effect the provisions of the Mandate. I shall report upon those measures in due course.

As a consequence of the establishment of a civil administration several of the official designations previously in use have been changed.

I enclose a copy of an announcement which has been made on this subject (Enclosure 2).

I have made no reference in any public statement to the fact that my own functions include those of Commander in Chief of the forces in Palestine. Without an explanation of the meaning to be attached to that title—and even with such an explanation—the public mind would be likely to be confused by its use, and the military authorities embarrassed.

I shall bring into effect very shortly the reduction in the number of District Governorates from ten to six, which was contemplated in the budget submitted by the late Chief Administrator last April. The political branch of the military administration will become a part of the new civil secretariat. These and other adjustments will involve a number of staff changes, which will soon be carried into effect. Mr. Wendham Deedes, C.M.G., D.S.O., whom I have appointed as civil secretary, will not take up his duties until the end of August. Meanwhile Colonel Storrs, C.M.G., C.B.E., the Governor of the Jerusalem District, is acting in that capacity. I am receiving from him invaluable assistance.

The condition of the country is at present quite tranquil. There is no sign of any renewal of the raids which took place earlier in the year.

There has arrived in Palestine within the last few days, Rufeisan Pasha, a leading Arab sheikh from Kerak. He controls the tribes of Trans-Jordan throughout a large stretch of country to the east of the Dead Sea. He adopts an independent attitude towards Faisal, who, however, has recently appointed him a major-general. In a conversation which I have had with Rufeisan Pasha, he gave satisfactory assurances of friendliness towards the British administration. His goodwill is of importance, and he is being shown every attention during his visit.

I have &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL

High Commissioner for Palestine

Enclosure 1 in N

Speech delivered by the Right Hon. Sir H. Samuel to Assemblies of Notables at Jerusalem and Haifa

I AM commanded by His Most Excellent Majesty King George the Fifth to communicate to you the following message—

I tell you that I have been appointed by His Majesty to be the representative of the British Government in Palestine, and to watch over the interests of Palestine and to ensure to you a peaceful and prosperous development which has so long been denied to

I recall with pride the large part played by my troops under the command of Field Marshal Lord Allenby in freeing your country from Turkish rule, and I shall indeed rejoice if I and my people can also be the instruments of bringing within your reach the blessings of a wise and liberal administration.

I shall ensure that the administration will be carried out with impartiality, and of the determination of my Government to respect the rights of every race and every creed represented among you, both for the period which has still to elapse before the terms of the mandate can be finally approved by the League of Nations, and in the future when the mandate has become an accomplished fact.

You are well aware that the Allied and Associated Powers have decided that measures shall be adopted to secure the gradual establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people. These measures will not in any way effect the religious rights or diminish the prosperity of the general population of Palestine.

The High Commissioner whom I have appointed to carry out these principles will be confident, do so wholeheartedly and effectively, and will endeavour to secure in every possible way the welfare and unity of all classes and sections among you.

I shall ensure that the administration of the trust involved in the government of a country which is sacred alike to Christian, Mohammedan and Jew, and I shall watch with deep interest and warm sympathy the future progress and development of a State whose history has been of such tremendous import to the world.

GEORGE R. AND I

His Majesty has been pleased to confer upon me the appointment as his High Commissioner to preside over the Civil Administration which is now established.

I have been deeply impressed by the gracious message which I have read to you. In whatever part of the world British rule prevails, there is there a complete freedom of religion, and the people are free to follow their own faith. In Palestine, regardless of his station, his race or his creed, order is maintained with a firm hand, and the economic development of the country is promoted, and the prosperity of the inhabitants is increased. Great Britain asks for no privileges for herself. No tribute is drawn to swell her own revenues. The taxes paid by the people are spent for the benefit of the people. These are the sound principles of government. They are the foundation of the greatness of the British Empire. Under the mandate conferred on me by the League of Nations, I shall ensure that these principles shall be the basis of the rules which will direct the Administration of Palestine.

The boundaries of the country to the north and the east have not yet been determined. I trust that a satisfactory settlement may be reached without undue delay.

Palestine will constitute a separate Administration, in direct communication with His Majesty's Ministers in London.

When the mandate has been passed through its final stages, the civil service of the country will be established on a permanent footing, with security of employment, subject to efficiency and good behaviour, and with pension rights for certain classes of its officers. The higher ranks will consist in the main of British officials, until

Civil Administration with the object of devising a Provisional Civil Government which can function until we have had time in consultation with you to devise a permanent scheme

have been in print for some weeks past, but His Majesty's Government have found themselves unable to do so. I am sorry to say that the Government have not yet been able to come to an understanding with Turkey, or, at all events, some progress made to that end, but I may tell you that, broadly speaking, the lines on which we have been proceeding are as follows: We desire to establish Council of State under an Arab president, to hold office until the formation of the final constitution of Mesopotamia has been submitted to the Legislative Assembly which we propose to call. The public will thus be given the opportunity of forming a considered judgment and of making their views known through the Legislative Assembly when formed. There is no advantage to be gained by hasty action.

Finally, I would remind you that Mesopotamia is one of the very few countries of the world which has been a field of battle and which is not suffering from the result. From Syria, Turkey, the Caucasus, parts of Persia, reports reach me of high incrimination, and in Turkey and Syria of extreme want and acute popular distress. We should be false to our trust if we allowed ourselves to relax the point on to hand them over to the National Civil Government which we propose to set up in the future. Do not be misled by appearances. Mesopotamia has been under an alien Government for 200 years, and with the best will in the world an indigenous National Government cannot be set up at once. The process must be gradual or disaster is certain. I ask you to believe that I and all my officers are animated with a common wish to give effect to the declaration that I have read to you, but we cannot do impossibilities. Our interests are yours.

I must thank you for having listened so patiently to what I have had to say. I shall be glad now to hear any representations you may wish to make. I shall not fail to transmit them to His Majesty's Government, who I know are giving the most anxious attention to the whole question of the future of Mesopotamia.

(E 8528/2.44)

No. 224

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris)

(No. 2538).

My Lord,

Foreign Office, July 24, 1920.

1. I HAVE to inform your Excellency that the French Ambassador called on Lord Hardinge on the afternoon of the 19th July.

2. Lord Hardinge showed M. Cambou Lord Allenby's telegram, containing a translation of the French ultimatum to the Arab Government, which so far he had not seen. After he had studied it attentively, Lord Hardinge told him that a question had been asked in the House of Commons that afternoon, to which a very careful and non-committal reply had been given, avoiding all possible offence to the French Government. Nevertheless, he had been asked by Lord Curzon to point out to the French Ambassador that the ultimatum contained one or two points of a very doubtful character: for instance, although it was quite understood that the French had need of the use of the railways for the provisioning of Aleppo, Damascus and Hama would be difficult to explain, and hardly so much warranted by the circumstances of the case. The occupation of Aleppo was definitely stated as one of the conditions of the ultimatum, and we had reason to believe that the occupation of the other towns was also intended. Lord Hardinge remarked that the recognition and acceptance of the French mandate by Faisal was strongly advocated by His Majesty's Government, and the description of its purport, as contained in paragraph 3 of the ultimatum, appeared to be fairly reasonable, but the acceptance of Syrian money, that is to say of French money or notes in Syria, seemed more difficult to defend and might even be proved to be a measure of a provocative nature.

2. Lord Hardinge assured M. Cambon that, in putting forward these views, Lord Curzon was actuated by the most friendly motives, and with an honest desire to see the establishment of peace in the territories of the French mandate; and that His Majesty's Government had no desire in any way to interfere between the French and the French Government. He added that so far we were quite ignorant of the nature of the French mandate, and if extreme measures were made conditions of its acceptance, it might prove that they would not receive the approval and recognition of the League of Nations.

Consequently, my Lordship felt that extreme caution was desirable, and in assurance that they were made in the most friendly spirit and solely with the desire to avoid difficulties in the future.

M. Cambon, in reply, thanked Lord Hardinge for the friendly nature of the observations, which he would not fail to transmit to his Government, but he remarked that proofs undoubtedly existed of intrigues by the Emir Faisal against the French,

Damascus, but also in the Lebanon, and it was difficult for him to see what measures General Gouraud could possibly take except those already prescribed, such as the occupation of the railway and of the towns with which it is connected. He could

and he did not see what other measures were possible to put an end to the intrigues.

As soon as the mandate had been accepted and order had been restored, the troops would be withdrawn. It was necessary that these results should be obtained in the first instance. He remarked that the situation would be precisely the same in Palestine or in Mesopotamia, and added that he believed from what he heard that the situation in Mesopotamia was almost analogous to that in Syria, and that a very strong force of troops was being despatched to re-establish order and keep open the lines of communication.

I am, &c
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

E 8481 289 44

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Earl Curzon to Consul-General, Beirut

No 30.)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office, July 26, 1920

YUK R telegram No. 75 of 16th July

As treaty will be signed on 28th July and Capitulations will lapse on coming into force of treaty, no action appears

E 9106 2 44,

N

Earl Curzon to Sir U. Grahame, Paris

No 2615)

Foreign Office, July 28, 1920

With M. Berthelot about the French intentions with regard to Syria.

I pointed out that the position was that the French had taken place between the French and the Emir Faisal, and easily and even reasonably as we might have approached the French Government with interrogations, if not with protestations, we had - from a consciousness of the difficulties with which they were confronted, and in pursuance of the absolute loyalty which had characterized our entire

Damascus. I said, however, that we could not disinterest ourselves altogether from these proceedings; and that, although Syria had been placed under the mandate of France with our consent, and we should adhere as faithfully to that engagement as I was convinced the French Government would to the corresponding settlement in Mesopotamia. The Emir Faisal was brought into connection with the pledges we had given to his father as to the independence of the Arab countries, and also because of his connection with the areas for which we had accepted a mandate. We therefore could not view his possible disappearance from the scene without some concern, and we felt that no step in this direction, if it were contemplated, should be taken without consultation with us. Rumours had appeared in the newspapers that Faisal had fled from Damascus, and I had no clear idea at the moment of who was in occupation of the city, or who was governing the State.

In reply, M. Berthelot gave me a summary of the recent course of events. According to him, the acceptance by the Emir of the French ultimatum, although he had been acting under duress, had been accepted. The French Government had

armistice had been arranged, and the French troops had, M. Berthelot alleged, no intention of occupying the city, had it not been that they were suddenly and violently attacked by the Arab forces. A prolonged battle, with considerable losses, had ensued and at the end of it the French had been compelled to march into Damascus. As he knew, the Emir Faisal was still there, and had not fled; but M. Berthelot did not say what his relations were with the French authorities at Damascus. M. Berthelot then described to me, in great detail, the circumstances of the provocation which, he said, the Emir had given to the French Government by his pledges into which he had entered in Paris, his opposition and hostility to the French troops, and the intolerable conduct by which he had brought matters to the present state. Though M. Berthelot assured me, the French had had, and still had, no desire to break with the Emir Faisal, he scarcely concealed from me the probability that, in the last resort, they would find it necessary to dispense with his services altogether, and to substitute some other ruler in his place.

I rather gathered from him that, following upon the lines of our own draft mandate for Mesopotamia, which prescribed the promulgation of an organic law within two years,

person who could fill the Emir Faisal's place. M. Berthelot pointed out to me with some force that the engagements into which we had both entered required us, if a ruler was set up, to see that he was one who was acceptable to the people. He added altogether that the Emir Faisal possessed this qualification, and as the Emir Faisal were replaced, his successor would have to be a man whom the Syrians themselves desired.

I expressed to M. Berthelot the hope that the French might not be so unwise as to suggest at any moment the elevation of the pretender Mohammed Said, the son of Abdul Kader, who had recently been released from France, and had himself suggested proceeding, I assured M. Berthelot, could not be regarded with any equanimity by His Majesty's Government.

He assured me, in reply, that such an idea had never entered the heads of the French Government. He acknowledged with warmth the correctness and loyalty of the attitude which His Majesty's Government had maintained.

Since placing the above on record, I find my suspicions more than confirmed by the announcement in the press (29th July) that the French have deposed Faisal and set up a puppet Syrian Ministry in his place.

I am, &c
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

E 8884 2 44]

No. 227

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris).

(No. 2535.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, July 29, 1920

M. CAMBON called on Lord Hardinge on the morning of the 27th July, and in accordance with my instructions, Lord Hardinge spoke to him of the Emir Faisal.

Lord Hardinge told M. Cambon that, according to news in the press, Emir Faisal was in flight, but that this Department did not know in which direction he had gone. After what had passed it was probable that the French Government might wish to place some other Mahomedan notable on the throne of Syria. This, Lord Hardinge pointed out, would be a serious step in view of all that had passed and of His Majesty's Government's mutual relations with and engagements to Faisal. But if and when another chief was set up in his place it should clearly be only with the assent

ment, in view of this country's interests in Palestine and elsewhere. Lord Hardinge said that it had occurred to me that the French might contemplate putting the Emir Mohammed Said in the place of Faisal. This would be a very unfortunate selection, and one which His Majesty's Government could not regard with equanimity. Lord Hardinge sketched out the recent career of the Emir and showed his hostile attitude towards His Majesty's Government both before and after the French occupation of Syria, and he expressed the hope that in the event of a change at Damascus his candidature would not be put forward by the French Government.

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Figueroa, J. M.

... that on the termination of the Emir Fouad's visit to Paris
... need in the press here that a provisional agreement had been
... Government and the Emir, whereby the latter agreed
to accept a French mandate for the whole of Syria, France in return consenting to the
formation of an Arab state to include the four towns of Damascus, Hama, Hama and
Aleppo, and to be administered by the Emir with the assistance of F...
and sons.

It soon became clear that the Emir would be unable to persuade his subjects to accept the agreement. Early in March last, in fact, a Syrian army, led by the Emir's son, the Emir's brother, and public opinion in Syria, had forced him to the extent to which France might and herself could.

The press, however, issued reassuring statements to the public. The experiences by the French were being grossly exaggerated by false reports on Syria, which were engendering a regular campaign of calumny against Gouraud. At the same time the reports which reached France as to the French accord to the Roman Catholic mission of Cardinal Dubouix spoke of the cordial which he received on all sides, and of the extent of pro-French feeling and French culture in those districts. Cardinal Dubouix report feeling against the Jewish immigration into Palestine, and a desire that Palestine should not be separated from Syria. He was of the opinion that the population were in favour of the maintenance of the French protectorate over Syria. In spite of these various statements, it was recognized as time went on that the French were encountering serious difficulties in the management of the country. Although it was denied that the French, which had elected Emir Faisal as King was really representative of Syrian feeling it was evident that the Syrians were not prepared to accept the French control with a good grace.

The Emir Faisal was summoned in March to proceed to Europe to state his case. He stated in reply that owing to local feeling in the country, he was unable himself to leave it until the Allies had acknowledged the independence of Syria. He was, however, represented at the San Rемо Conference by an envoy, General Nuri Pasha. The decision of that conference to award the mandate for Syria to France (those for Mesopotamia, including Mosul and Palestine being awarded to Great Britain) provoked strong protests from Damascus and the Syrian Unionist Party.

Since that date the relations between France and Faisal have been strained and have not improved, as soon as the San Remo decisions became known that as long as Syria he could not recognise any mandate placing a portion of Syria under French control. At this time the French forces in Northern Syria and Cilicia were gravely hampered by the attacks of the Turkish Nationalists. After the disasters at Maysun and Marjayoun, the French Government decided on 10 May to sign a twenty days' armistice with Mustapha Kemal. These attacks, especially at Maysun and Marjayoun, were the cause of the French Government's decision and for a time General Gouraud was obliged to hold his hand pending the receipt of French reinforcements. These were, however, sent to him until his force was increased to some 80,000 men.

General Gouraud then proceeded to strike. Early in July he addressed his ultimatum to the Emir, demanding the recognition of the French mandate over Syria, liberty to use the Rayuk Aleppo railway, immediate abandonment of the forced recruiting, the reduction of the Sheressian army to the same proportions as on the 1st July 1918, and the withdrawal of the Sheressian army from the French zone of the authors of the Syrian attacks on the French forces.

which prevented reinforcements being sent up to China.

_____ did not reach General Gourmand within the stipulated time. _____ entered Kaysk, thereby accepting the terms of the armistice. _____ and protested against the French action, declaring that the delay in the delivery of his reply was due to fortuitous circumstances over which he had no control. _____ Gourmand accepted this excuse, and announced to the Emir that he would take no further action, provided no attack were made on the French troops. On the 22nd July, however, such attacks were made on the French at Tel Kulah where the French outposts were pushed back by some 400 Sheressian horsemen, while it was announced by the French that a further attack was being prepared on their troops.

... ylot, after driving back the enemy at Tel Kalah, accordingly took the
... ig the devil, B kal

M... .. rection army
... .. scible material. The Emir's Minister for War,
Y... A... was also killed during the battle. The losses of the French troops, which
consisted of infantry of the line, Algerian rifle men, chasseurs d'Afrique and Senegambians
... .. tated to have been comparatively slight. At the close of the day a
journalistarian was despatched by Ferial to say that no further resistance would be
offered, and that the town of Damascus would undertake the revictualing of the
French troops.

Since the announcement that an ultimatum had been sent to the Emir Faisal the situation in Syria has been somewhat fully discussed in the French press. Though it was suggested in one paper (the "Petit Journal") that the British agents, misunderstanding the intentions of their Government, had been in communication with the Emir Faisal, the press has been, singularly free from any anti-British comments.

...welcomed the despatch of the ultimatum, giving a hint of ... Ensur was responsible, while the large number of troops which ... mutinying under the command of General Gouraud was regarded as justifying the hope that he would, if necessary, be able to make France respected in the Near East.

which appeared in the press on the subject of the debate in the House of Commons on the 10th instant were, in general, favourable towards His Majesty's Government. Both the "Times" and the "Herald," though expressing their disapproval of the course pursued on behalf of His Majesty's Government by Mr. Bismarck, criticised the taste of those gentlemen who caused the debate. The "Times" enquired how Lord Robert Cecil could possibly, in his references to Article 23, misconstrue the treaty which he had helped to draw up, and Mr. Ormsby Gore and Lord Winterton were reproached for showing scant courtesy towards France in putting the French Government and the "Arab Government" on the same footing in their references to the "Arab Government." Papers, in fact, took the view that England would have been disgraced if a similar debate had been held in the French Chamber of Deputies.

A \mathbb{Z}_2 -action on X is defined by $\sigma(x) = x + 1$ for $x \in \mathbb{Z}_2$. The quotient space X/\mathbb{Z}_2 is homeomorphic to \mathbb{Z}_2 . The map $\pi: X \rightarrow X/\mathbb{Z}_2$ is a covering map. The fundamental group $\pi_1(X/\mathbb{Z}_2)$ is isomorphic to \mathbb{Z}_2 . The map π induces an isomorphism $\pi_1(X/\mathbb{Z}_2) \cong \pi_1(X)$. The map π is a universal covering map. The map π is a universal covering map.

France had never been clearly explained to the populations, who, on some of M. Clemenceau's notes and to their faith in the infallibility of President Wilson's principles, were under the impression that complete autonomy was to be granted to them. These ideas had never been cleared, and the British had added fuel to the flame.

of discontent by stating that France intended to make of Syria a second Algeria. The object of Feisal was to play off England and France against each other with the object of getting as much for himself as possible. The Emir was, however, he said, perfectly ready to come to an understanding with France. It was rather to his entourage that France owed the difficulties she had experienced. M. d'Estadieu insisted on the necessity of defining the French policy in Syria and Lebanon as soon as possible. He added, incidentally, that the Turkish Nationalists who hated the English even more than the French, would be perfectly willing to recognise French economic rights over Cilicia and elsewhere.

I have, &c
DERBY

E 9277 2 44]

N. 111

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 3.)

(No. 804)

My Lord,

Ramleh, July 17, 1920

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship a translation of the message from Emir Feisal, which was sent in pursuance to the Foreign Office in my telegram No. 703 of the 12th July.

A copy of this despatch and enclosure is being sent to the High Commissioner, Jerusalem.

I have, &c
ALLENBY, F V

Enclosure in No. 229.

Emir Feisal to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby

(No. 805)

His Excellency Field-Marshal Allenby,

Damascus, July 11, 1920

I BEG you to inform your illustrious Government that the situation in Syria has become one of certain danger. It can be summed up as follows:—

All recent information, the authenticity of which we have proved, consistently shows that General Gouraud has actually begun concentrating his troops in Jarablus with the intention of despatching them by train to Musallamiyeh in order to make a surprise attack on Aleppo. A messenger I sent to Beirut to see General Gouraud obtained more information from him, and learnt that military preparations are very actively proceeding on the Syrian coast, and that considerable French troops are arriving on the whole frontier line of the eastern zone. They include field-guns, tanks, aeroplanes, and all necessaries for a regular fighting army. They have actually started moving. My messenger was surprised to find that General Gouraud, in spite of his being an officer on an official mission. He returned to-day carrying the following verbal terms, which he states are to be sent to me officially in writing without delay:—

1. The military occupation of the railway stations from Rayak to Aleppo.
2. The acceptance of the French mandate without conditions.
3. The acceptance of Syrian bank-notes issued by General Gouraud in the western zone.
4. To give up my visit to Europe unless I accept the terms of General Gouraud, who declared that if I proceed by some other route he will be free to take such action as he may decide upon.

It is very strange that I should receive such unlawful terms from General Gouraud at a time when I have prepared myself to leave for Europe in compliance with the invitation of the Conference, and after I had made arrangements to prevent people at the coast from interfering with the transport of French materials. I had allowed the transport of French materials on the railway lines without the slightest delay and issued strict instructions accordingly to the departments concerned.

I promptly asked General Gouraud to stop any hostile action, and invited him to form an arbitration committee to look into the matter in conformity with the agreements concluded in Paris on the 23rd November last between me and the French Government, and in accordance with all our political communications in Paris and London.

As the British Government is the greatest factor in the alliance and the most interested in the maintenance of peace in the East, particularly the Moslem parts of it, and as it was that Government who made us agree with the French, and as we obeyed their invitation and regarded the difficulties with sincerity and goodwill, I consider it my duty to lay before His Majesty's Government, unhesitatingly, the present situation, and to show that developments are proceeding rapidly, without even waiting until we receive the promised written terms, which will doubtless be followed by immediate and severe action.

I am, however, deeply conscious of her interests and of her alliance, and I am sure that the rashness of General Gouraud may kindle the fire in the peaceful zone, in disregard of the results that may follow this new war, upon the threshold of which he is now standing.

The whole world is witness to the sincerity of the Arabs, and to what they have done and are still doing to preserve peace, to restrain their tempers, and to look upon events wisely and patiently.

In this awful hour and before the opportunity passes like a flash I appeal to the British Government to prevent General Gouraud from drawing the sword, and to convince him that the final decision with regard to the future of Syria is in the hands of the Conference only, in accordance with whose request I am proceeding to discuss the question.

I also beg to invite your Excellency personally to support unfortunate Syria with your own influence. France has opposed and delayed. She expects you, in your quality of a nobleman and a generous friend, to protect humanity and friendship against a criminal aggressor.

I am awaiting your early reply, and please accept my respects and compliments.
FEISAL.

E 9284 2 44]

N. 112

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 3.)

(No. 817)

My Lord,

Ramleh, July 20, 1920

I HAVE the honour to forward a copy of the text of the letter from the Emir Feisal referred to in my telegram No. 711.

I have, &c
ALLENBY, F V

Enclosure in No. 230.

Emir Feisal to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby.

Dear Lord Allenby,

Damascus, July 2, 1920

I should be greatly obliged if you would kindly communicate to His Britannic Majesty's Government what follows:—

I am, however, deeply conscious of her interests and of her alliance, and I am sure that the rashness of General Gouraud may kindle the fire in the peaceful zone, in disregard of the results that may follow this new war, upon the threshold of which he is now standing.

The whole world is witness to the sincerity of the Arabs, and to what they have done and are still doing to preserve peace, to restrain their tempers, and to look upon events wisely and patiently.

In this awful hour and before the opportunity passes like a flash I appeal to the British Government to prevent General Gouraud from drawing the sword, and to convince him that the final decision with regard to the future of Syria is in the hands of the Conference only, in accordance with whose request I am proceeding to discuss the question.

terior, and the Lebanese people world with their cities for French occupying the country, are now bitterly against this unbearable protection. The responsibility for all that has may happen in the future lies only upon the French. I beg for the fulfilment of your promise and of every Ally under the sun, given to me as a guarantee of my safety and of the safety of my family and of my country, and of my certain dangers.

In conclusion, I beg, &c.

FEISAL

Enclosure 2 in N 20

Emir Feisal to Italian Consul-General, Damascus.

M. le Consul général, Damas, le 11 juillet 1920.
J'ai l'honneur de vous prier de bien vouloir transmettre la dépêche ci-jointe à Sa Majesté le Roi, mon auguste Souverain, au Congrès de la Paix, à la Ligue des Nations et à MM. les consuls de notre ville, à l'effet d'être communiquée à leurs

Sa Majesté vous prie de bien vouloir intervenir, dans le fait exposé dans sa lettre, votre qualité de représentant d'une grande Puissance ayant combattu pour la terre pour la défense des peuples opprimés et la sauvegarde du droit et de la justice.

Veuillez agréer &c.

Enclosure 1 in N 20

Emir Feisal to Peace Conference, League of Nations and Foreign Governments

Damas, le 11 juillet 1920.
Après avoir concentré des troupes sur les frontières qui séparent les deux zones est et ouest de la Syrie, le Général Gouraud, en vue de la guerre, M. le Général Gouraud prétend à m'imposer, conditions qui constituent une violation flagrante de notre souveraineté nationale et de notre indépendance. Il déclare, entre autres, que si je ne pars pas pour Paris, dans le cas où des demandes ne seraient pas satisfaites, que, si je prenais pour mon voyage une autre route que celle de la zone française, le Gouvernement français refuserait tout pour moi.

Je tiens à porter le fait à l'attention des Puissances alliées et de la Ligue des Nations, les priant d'y intervenir et d'empêcher que la nation syrienne ne succombe devant la force et ne soit ainsi la proie du militarisme dont la suppression était le but principal de la grande guerre.

Je m'adresse donc à la justice des Alliés afin d'éviter l'effusion de sang et la destruction totale de ce pays qui a déjà subi tant de sacrifices pour la cause alliée, les priant d'instituer une commission d'arbitrage à laquelle les conditions en question soient soumises.

FAISSAL

Enclosure 4 in N 20

Emir Feisal to Italian Consul-General, Damascus.

M. le Consul général, Damas, le 12 juillet 1920.
J'ai l'honneur de vous prier de bien vouloir transmettre la dépêche ci-jointe à Sa Majesté le Roi, mon auguste Souverain, au Congrès de la Paix, à la Ligue des Nations et à MM. les consuls de notre ville, à l'effet d'être communiquée à leurs

J'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance ce qui suit

1. Dans la nuit des 11-12 courant, les forces françaises se trouvant à Djerablous sont venues camper à Djer Sadjour.

Une compagnie française avec mitrailleuses, est venue à Riak renforcer les quelques soldats français qui, par accord spécial, avaient le droit d'y séjourner pour la garde du dépôt des autorités de la zone française.

2. M. le Gouverneur militaire de Zahle, est arrivé à Riak et a communiqué à nos autorités l'occupation de Riak par les troupes françaises.

3. Ces événements se sont produits à l'improviste, sans notre avis préalable. Au contraire, nous avons été assurés que nous n'aurions pas de troupes françaises dans la zone française.

Dans mon devoir de sauver la paix et de tenir, jusqu'au bout, aux engagements d'humanité, je n'ai répondu jusqu'à cette heure, par aucune mesure, à ces faits hostiles.

Mais il m'appert, de plus en plus clairement, que la situation créée en nos Alliés les Français aboutit à l'occupation de la zone française par les troupes françaises, ce qui est une violation flagrante de notre indépendance et de notre souveraineté nationale.

En conséquence, j'ai le regret de vous annoncer que tout mouvement de l'armée française à l'intérieur de notre zone sera considéré par moi comme un acte d'hostilité dont toute la responsabilité retombera sur celui qui l'aura provoqué.—Faissal.

Je vous prie de vouloir bien communiquer la présente dépêche à MM. les consuls de notre ville à l'effet d'être transmise à leurs Gouvernements.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

Secrétaire particulier de Sa Majesté le Roi Feisal I^{er}

Enclosure 1 in N 31

Emir Feisal to Italian Consul-General, Damascus.

M. le Consul général, Damas, le 12 juillet 1920.
J'ai l'honneur de vous présenter, ci-joint, une note de Sa Majesté le Roi, mon auguste Souverain, à l'adresse des Gouvernements alliés, vous priant de vouloir bien la leur transmettre et en envoyer copie à MM. les consuls de notre ville.

"Extrait"

"En ma qualité de Chef du peuple syrien allié à votre pays, et qui a combattu pour la cause commune, je m'empresse de vous tracer la situation en Syrie, où la situation est devenue de plus en plus grave. Les grandes Puissances alliées ayant pris part au Congrès de la Paix, qui a pour mission de rétablir la paix dans le monde entier et qui a reconnu, à la Conférence de Paris, l'indépendance de mon pays et m'a invité à venir entrer en pourparlers avec lui, comme chef de ce pays indépendant.

Je tiens à déclarer, que, précisément au moment où je me préparais à partir pour l'Europe, répondant ainsi à l'invitation qui m'est parvenue, j'ai reçu des nouvelles inquiétantes sur le mouvement des troupes françaises de M. le Général Gouraud, nouvelles qui ont éveillé mes doutes quant à ses intentions pacifiques. Précisément, M. le Général m'a néanmoins assuré à plusieurs reprises que ses intentions étaient pacifiques. Mais les événements de ces derniers jours, la concentration des troupes françaises le long des frontières et l'attitude des autorités d'occupation, me font penser que les paroles du général ne s'accordaient pas avec ses intentions.

De plus, je viens d'être informé officiellement que le Général Gouraud a quitté mon pays pour Paris à des conditions qui, si elles n'étaient pas remplies, les troupes françaises ne sauraient entrer en pourparlers avec moi sur la question de la Syrie.

Ces conditions du Général Gouraud sont comme il suit

1. Occupation par les troupes françaises des stations de la ligne du Chemin de Fer Rayak-Alep.

2. Reconnaissance, sans conditions ni limites, du mandat français sur la Syrie.

3. Autorisation de circulation, dans la zone est, du papier-monnaie émis par le Gouvernement français.

M. le Général Gouraud a parfaitement compris que ce service n'a été établi que pour l'ordre et de la sécurité)

Devant ces exigences, absolument incompatibles avec les principes proclamés par les Puissances alliées, j'ai proposé à M. le Général Gouraud d'instituer une Commission mixte, en vue de trancher tous différends entre nous, comme le prévoient les accords du 25 novembre 1919 conclus entre le Gouvernement français

Mais, à cette proposition, M. le Général Gouraud a répondu par le renforcement de ses forces et leur concentration sur les frontières et par l'occupation de Rayak. En outre, les forces françaises de Djersablou ont occupé Djar Sadjour sur le chemin d'Alep.

Il en résulte que le Général Gouraud, ayant de m'avoir adressé aucun avis officiel, a commencé par exécuter en fait les demandes dont il est question plus haut.

Dans l'intention de prévenir tout acte d'hostilité et d'épargner l'effusion sang à ce pays musulman, qui a l'avantage, contrairement à tant d'autres, de vivre dans la paix et la tranquillité, et, confiant en la justice de la cause que je défends, j'ai l'honneur de vous prier de bien vouloir user de votre influence en vue d'éviter la guerre, qui ne réserve à ce pays que la destruction et la ruine.

Agnez, &c

Le Secrétaire particulier de Sa Majesté
le Roi Faisal I^{er}.

Enclosure 6 in No. 2

Depêches communiquées à M. le Doyen du Corps consulaire pour être transmises aux Gouvernements étrangers

Damas, le 12 juillet 1920

M. le Général Gouraud me prie de faire connaître à votre Excellence l'importance de l'occupation de Mejel Andjar par un détachement français, et d'insister sur l'obligation de faire occuper Mejel Andjar.

Je prie votre Altesse royale d'agréer, &c

Officier de liaison française.

(Expédiée par l'entremise de M. le Colonel Coussé.)

Général Gouraud, Beyrouth.

Damas, le 13 juillet 1920.

SITUÉ à l'entrée de Wadi-el-Harir, entre la plaine de Damas et Damas d'une part, et celle de Bekaa de l'autre, Mejel Andjar est, par sa position géographique, un de ces points qui depuis l'occupation alliée ont servi de base de concentration des troupes, pour le maintien de l'ordre dans toute cette région. Mejel Andjar est, en même temps, le passage naturel des tribus de l'est à l'ouest et vice versa. Il est donc tout indiqué pour être gardé par les autorités.

Quant au renforcement du contingent y existant, ceci n'a été fait qu'à la suite des nouvelles inquiétantes de ces jours derniers sur le revirement survenu dans la zone d'occupation française.

Par conséquent, ce renforcement ne peut être considéré que comme une mesure défensive que le Gouvernement syrien a cru devoir prendre pour parer à toute éventualité.

Néanmoins, pour dissiper tout malentendu, et, étant donné que vous justifiez l'occupation de Moullaka et Rayak par le fait du renforcement précité, je suis prêt à ramener à son effectif normal le poste de Mejel Andjar, si toutefois vous faites preuve des mêmes sentiments de conciliation en faisant évacuer, de votre côté, les points musulmans que vos troupes viennent d'occuper.

FAISSAL.

Général Gouraud, Beyrouth.

Damas, le 12 juillet 1920.

1. L'OCCUPATION de Rayak est contraire aux accords conclus. Proteste contre cet acte inusité et demande le retrait de ce détachement français.

2. Je suis informé que vos troupes ont évacué Djersablou et sont venues camper à Djar Sadjour. J'ignore raisons de mouvement. Demande éclaircissements.

FAISSAL.

Général Gouraud, Beyrouth.

Damas, le 12 juillet 1920.

Je vous ai rapporté votre conversation avec lui au sujet de la lettre que vous m'auriez adressée par l'intermédiaire de M. le Colonel Coussé, et qui ne m'est pas encore parvenue.

L'occupation de la ligne Rayak Alep, c'est-à-dire celle de la zone est, est absolument contraire aux accords conclus. Les troupes britanniques, ainsi qu'aux accords qui sont intervenus entre M. Clemenceau et moi, lors de mon séjour à Paris.

Dans le cas où vous souscriviez à cet aide-mémoire, je suis prêt à agir dans ses

Pour éviter tout malentendu à ce sujet, j'accepte de vous donner la garantie nécessaire pour la sécurité de vos transports sur la ligne Rayak Alep.

FAISSAL.

E 9262 2 14)

No 2

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 3.)

(No. 2410.)

My Lord

WITH reference to my despatch No. 2394 of the 27th July, I have the honor to inform your Lordship that M. Millerand confirmed yesterday in the Senate that the Emir Faisal had been deposed and that a new Arab Government had been established. He had accepted the conditions imposed by General Gouraud in his despatch of the 27th July. These conditions include an acknowledgment of the deposition of Faisal, the payment of an indemnity of 10,000,000 fr. as compensation for the damage caused by warlike bands in the western zone, the immediate disarmament of the army and its reduction to the status of a police force, the surrender of all war material, and the punishment of the chief offenders, who will be tried before military tribunals.

The debate in the Senate arose out of a motion supported by M. Victor Bérard, M. Gaston Doumergue, and other members of the Democratic Left, to reduce to 155,000,000 fr. the credit of 185,000,000 fr. demanded by the Government to supply General Gouraud with the means to carry out his operations in Syria. The supporters of the motion made it clear that they had no intention of criticising General Gouraud. They had put forward the motion only because they did not consider that the Government had adequately informed the country of the extent of French responsibilities in Syria. They also pointed out that the sacrifices made in Syria were enormous, and that the Government should be more generous in its estimates.

M. Millerand, in replying on behalf of the Government, accused M. Bérard of exhibiting a pessimism which almost appeared to demand the evacuation of Syria. The Government, he said, had no intention of abandoning Syria. He then referred to General Gouraud's plans. France, he said, had in 1913 over 100 hospitals in Syria, and eighty schools in which 40,000 children were taught. She must support her nationals just as England, and it was time that a stop should be put to that hypocritical criticism which consisted in reproaching the French Government for not supporting its subjects while at the same time blaming it for doing so.

Speaking of the instructions given to General Gouraud, he said that he had been ordered to co-operate loyally with the Emir Faisal on condition that the Emir observed an equal loyalty, and showed himself able to control the Arabs. He then sketched the history of the events which, as reported in my above-mentioned despatch, have led

In conclusion, M. Millerand appended to the Senate to associate itself in the congratulations which the Government had expressed to the troops and their commander in Syria. France, he stated, was not contemplating a policy of 10
as was feared by the authors of the amendment
credits demanded would have regrettable results.

"Martin" this morning takes the opportunity to criticize sarcastically the role played by Colonel Lawrence in the rise and fall of the Emir Feisal. The colonel is

architect, leapt to the rank of colonel, and who will ever remain famous in Anna Munro for his facility in imagining religions and in overthrowing and setting up thrones and altars. In private conversation this young man could not even contain his mirth continues the "Matin," when he thought of the trick he had played the Peace

... A COMPANY TO TRUST

$\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{2} \right) = \frac{1}{4}$

Sir H. Simons to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 4

My Lord, Jerusalem, July 16, 1920.

1. The memorandum gives no information as to the membership of the Agudas
Israel Organization.

A large body of orthodox Jews, the Miznachi, is affiliated to the Zionist Organization.

3. It is most desirable that the relations of the Government of Palestine...

The draft mandate contemplates the constitution of such an agency. It is for the Zionist Organization to take the initiative in its formation, and to submit proposals to

In the circumstances it would probably be sufficient that the memorialists should inform that their representations will receive consideration.

HERBERT SASTEL

Earl Curzon to Count de Salis (Vatican)

of the French Government to retain

By their recognition of the obligation owed by Christendom and civilization to

His Majesty's Government have

3. I would, therefore, request you to state for the _____ State that His Majesty's Government hold the Fro _____

11. They cannot consent to recognize any claim on the part of France to retain any ecclesiastical precedence or other privileges whatsoever in Palestine. The

a Turkish Sultan. It was

His Majesty's Government would view unfavourably any suggestion that Catholicism should be the sole religion of the Holy Place should be recommended through the Holy See.

secured by their many good works, and a memorial of the ancient relation of France to the Catholic peoples of Palestine will be found in the great sanctuaries which shall give

1. $\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{4}$

Sir G. Buchanan to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 10.)

THE Roman press reports that Mohammed Ali, the heavyweight champion of the world, is on a visit to Rome, and has been received by the President of the Council.

interviews with Signor Ghitto and Count Sforza, but the Pope is reported to have referred to Muhammad Ali's conversion of India's conversion to Christianity.

! an interview with the press, Mohammed Ali, who claimed to speak in the name of the 70,000,000 of Muslims in India, but of the whole population of

of religion from the peace treaties, as also from the war itself," she had announced that

the holy places would not be interfered with, but had broken the promise, inasmuch as the proposed treaty with Turkey abolishes the Khalfate, while the holy places remain.

directly or indirectly under British domination. India, he said, cannot tolerate French influence over places which Mahomedans consider subject to the rule of the East but her protests have been of no avail, since France requires assistance in the execution of the Treaty of Versailles, and thus the whole of the East "has fallen into the hands of Mr. Lloyd George." India has hitherto deserved her fate, as she has been too weak, but from now onwards she intends to follow a line of her own and to show her fixed determination of severing her connection with the British Government. Her programme will be carried out in various stages.

all British honours. If that has no effect, those who occupy Government posts will send in their resignations. The third step would be for all native troops and police to resign and leave the army and police force en masse, then it will be seen whether Great Britain still finds it possible to occupy Mesopotamia and Palestine, to support the Greeks in Thrace and Asia Minor and to continue to dominate India itself. The Government would be a refusal to pay taxes. If none of these moves succeed, the Mahomedans, "or rather the Indians," reserve to themselves the right to declare a holy war.

Mohammed Ali finally expressed the hope that Italy would not range herself on the side of injustice. On being reminded by the interviewer that the last two Italian Governments had done their best to mitigate the terms of peace with Turkey, he replied "Of course we know it. What more could we want? Here, at Rome, the Government, the Socialists and the Vatican have all expressed their sympathy with us."

A further report states that during a visit to the Italian Chamber Mohammed Ali had a long conversation with Signor Turati, the Moderate Socialist deputy, by means of a French interpreter, and the reporter adds "We imagine that England was none too well spoken of, especially as the interpreter was a Frenchman."

I have, &c

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN

[E 9999 139 44]

No. 236

Sir G. Buchanan to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 10)

Sir,

Posillipo, August 8, 1920

With reference to my despatch No. 594 of the 3rd instant, reporting the views given by Mohammed Ali, the head of the Indian Khalifate delegation, to the press, I have the honour to state that I yesterday asked whether Mohammed Ali had been correct in stating that the Italian Government expressed their sympathy with him.

His Excellency replied that, in order to prevent any possible misconception being made, he had written to inform your Lordship of the language which he had held on that occasion. He had, in the course of the conversation, remarked to Mohammed Ali that it was but natural that, after having spent some time in an official capacity at Constantinople, he should have sympathies for the Turks, and that he had acted as their true friend in their own interests to sign the Peace Treaty. He had also warned Mohammed Ali not by threats, but by encouraging a policy of evolution and by settling all social and other questions in a friendly spirit that he could hope to attain his ends.

I have, &c

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN

[E 9879 131 44]

No. 2

Zionist Organisation to Foreign Office.—(Received August 13.)

Sir, 77, Great Russell Street, London, August 12, 1920.
SIR HERBERT SAMUEL has for some time past been in communication with the Executive of the Zionist Organisation with reference to a loan of the Palestinian Government which Sir Herbert Samuel intends to place in the near future. I am

directed by the Executive to state that they are anxious to assist as far as possible in the flotation of this loan.

Informal discussions with parties likely to be interested have already taken place, and a large amount of information relating to the proposed loan. In accordance with a suggestion from Mr. Herbert Samuel, I am sending you a list of the various aspects of the proposed loan on which information is needed.

1. It is assumed that the Government of Palestine will be the debtor, and will be responsible for the service of the loan. Information is desired, however, as to whether the bonds of the Government of Palestine will be acceptable to the holders of the loan.

2. What are the details of the security offered for this loan? It has been suggested by Sir Herbert Samuel that the loan service would be a first charge upon the revenues of Palestine, including the railway revenue. A detailed statement of the actual items of receipts and expenditure, classified under the headings of the budget estimates of the O.E.T.A., South, would probably give most of the information required. In view of the fact that the future Government of Palestine will include a larger territory than the O.E.T.A., South, it is suggested that the statement should include a larger territory than the O.E.T.A., South, and should also include a statement of the estimated revenue and expenditure for that territory.

3. Information will further be required with regard to the liabilities which will have to be taken over by Palestine under the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. Will the revenues assigned to the Ottoman Public Debt by the decree of Muharran continue to be assigned to those liabilities? Will the revenues set aside to meet liabilities under the head and under the head of special loans (the revenues of the O.E.T.A., South, and the revenues of the O.E.T.A., North, and the revenues of the O.E.T.A., East) be available for the service of the proposed loan?

4. A clear statement of policy relating to what are called "excluded funds" in the O.E.T.A., South, is required. A copy of this letter is being sent directly to Sir Herbert Samuel. I am, &c
J. A. SINGER, Financial Secretary

[E 10384 1136 44]

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem).

(No. 174)

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 26, 1920

With reference to my letter No. 174 of the 17th inst., I am sending you a copy of the scale of pay and allowances for the Palestine Administration which, subject to certain reservations, have been sanctioned by the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury. The amounts stated are not liable to contribution to a pension fund.

In sanctioning this scale, the Lords Commissioners state that they understand that no house or ration allowance is to be given in addition, and that there will be no representation allowance; that there will be no question of free passage being in addition to the leave allowance and that the amounts are pounds sterling and not pounds Egyptian.

They consider that the Class I posts should be limited to five Governors and one Deputy Governor.

They suggest that Class II should be composed of the six minor or assistant Governors and one Deputy Assistant Governor.

trust that the number of these latter will be kept as low as

Class III is to be composed of inspectors and senior inspectors, and Class IV of sub-inspectors and assistant inspectors, who, it is understood, will be Palestinians. The salaries for Class IV are thought to be rather high, but they have, nevertheless, been sanctioned by the Lords Commissioners.

The 20 per cent. increase for cost of living is of course to be susceptible of revision if the cost of living falls.

Should you have any observations to make I shall be glad to receive them, but I do not consider it probable that the Lords Commissioners will make any material alteration in the terms now sanctioned.

URZON OF KEDLESTON

Enclosure in No. 235

Scale of Pay and Allowances for Palestine Administration

	Class I.	Class II.	Class III.	Class IV.
Rate of pay	£1,200—£1,400	£850—£1,050	£600—£800	£400—£600
Plus 20 per cent. cost of living				
Plus house allowance				

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Report by Mr. Landman on his Mission to Palestine.—(Received September 7)

Object of Mission.

EARLY in June alarming reports from Palestine reached the Executive of the Zionist Organisation in regard to the attitude of the Jewish population, and in particular to the attitude of M. Jabotinsky and his followers. It was thought desirable to send me to Palestine in order to communicate with M. Jabotinsky and convince him that his cause had not been lost sight of, and to give the Jewish population generally an idea of the proper attitude which they should adopt on the arrival of the High Commissioner. The Executive particularly desired me to impress upon them that special Jewish manifestations and demonstrations on his arrival were impolitic.

Jabotinsky.

I left London on the 19th June and arrived in Jerusalem on the 18th. After consultation with the members of the Zionist Commission, I visited the prison at Acre on the 22nd June and had a long conversation with M. Jabotinsky. I found him very friendly. He had been asked to organise the Jewish Self-Defence, and he thought it was the plain duty of the commission to have resigned as a protest against the sentence which had been unjustly pronounced against him. He was most bitter against M. Ussulkin, and to a less extent against Dr. Weizmann, whose policy of moderation and forbearance during the military regime was, in Jabotinsky's opinion, a great political error. All his fellow-prisoners except one (E. N. Epstein) shared Jabotinsky's views. After listening to my statement and after reading the letter from Mr. Churchill to Dr. Weizmann (which stated that Lord Allenby could not make any further change in the terms of the offer), I reported to the High Commissioner. When I reported to the High Commissioner would take steps to secure his release, he expressed his willingness to wait a few weeks until the High Commissioner had had an opportunity of entering upon his work and dealing with the matter. I had been led to believe,

from conversations in Jerusalem, that Jabotinsky's state of mind was bordering on megalomania. This I found to be exaggerated. In view of the adverse circumstances and the feeling that he was unjustly imprisoned, his state of mind was perfectly normal.

Attitude of Yishuv.

I addressed meetings of representative Jews in Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv, Haifa and Haifa, and conversed with the Jewish colonists and settlers in several other places. I also wrote to the Hebrew dailies "Haaretz" and "Doar Hayom." On each occasion I tried to make clear the great importance of the new regime and the desirability of letting bygones be bygones. In general this view was accepted, but there remained a feeling of suspicion against the individual members of the Administration who had behaved badly and also, in a few cases, doubt as to the sincerity of British policy. Without exception, however, they understood that it would be very unwise to trouble the High Commissioner with petty requests, and also that it was their duty to behave properly so as to avoid putting the High Commissioner in the position of having to punish Jewish inhabitants of Palestine.

Intelligence Service.

I had opportunities of seeing the working of the Jewish Intelligence Service, which is a valuable, particularly during the time preceding the arrival of the High Commissioner and in the ten days following my departure (I left on the 10th July). The C.I.D., under Colonel Bramley, found the reports most useful, and it enabled them to arrest all the plotters against the life of the High Commissioner. In Jaffa, particularly the information supplied by the Jewish Intelligence Service enabled special arrangements to be made at the landing of the High Commissioner. The new Administration should take over the best of our Intelligence Service. This would mean a great relief to the Zionist Commission budget, as in the nature of things the Intelligence Service is expensive.

Antagonistic Attitude of Former Administration.

Although it was not part of my mission, I could not help being interested in this problem, feeling convinced as I am of the absolute sincerity of the pro-Zionist policy among the officials with whom I have come into contact in the Foreign Office in London. One of the causes which is usually given is the difficulty of understanding the Jewish mind. An additional explanation might be found in the attitude of the former administration in Palestine and the difficulty which a non-Jewish official, however fortunate in his guide, may have in noticing the Jewish mind. It would not strike the average Englishman as being a Jewish city, although the Jews are said to form more than half the population. It is only a visit in the company of one who understands Hebrew and enjoys the confidence of the people which could give a visitor or the English Administrator any idea of the essentially Jewish life in these places. A system of conducted tours would be very useful to remedy this defect, and also the establishment in Jerusalem of an Anglo-Jewish Club, where officials and visitors could come into contact with the better-class Jewish inhabitants.

Arab Problems.

Two incidents seemed to me to throw light on this question.

(a.) One of the first effects of the arrival of the High Commissioner was that the proprietor of "Eud-el-Sharif"—the strongly anti-Zionist weekly published in Jerusalem—sent messengers to the Zionist Commission offering to sell the paper for a hundred pounds. The same information came to hand in regard to an anti-Zionist British periodical. The conclusions which I am inclined to draw are: (1) that these papers had been receiving financial reward for their circulation, and (2) that the sources of this revenue had dried up.

(b.) Every plot hatched against the life of the High Commissioner was immediately reported to the plotters. I found that these betrayals were purchased by the Intelligence Service for paltry sums. The conclusions I am inclined to draw from this are (1) that the standard of honesty of these opponents is very low, and (2) that their opposition can be considered as of very little value.

Halutzim.

I was very favourably impressed by the more recent arrivals from Galicia and Czechoslovakia. They were mostly graduates of high schools or universities, had served in the army, and had subsequently been on the land for periods of not less than six months. There were a small number of women among them. All but a small number were able to speak Hebrew; the remainder were busy acquiring this knowledge. About 100 were working on land (bought, I believe, by the Jewish National Fund) about two hours' walk from Jerusalem on the Jaffa road. They were clearing the soil of stones and planting pine-trees and acacias. They were not happy, in spite of the rather monotonous character of the work, on the frugal meal cooked by the women pioneers and eaten *al fresco*. This was followed by a most cheerful singing of Hebrew songs of Zionist sentiment. The work was arranged and the new-comers inducted into it by several agricultural workers of experience. These leaders, however, did not impose their leadership, but were regarded as colleagues with more experience. They received the same rate of pay as the new-comers and appeared satisfied that this was not unjust. No doubt this contributed to the smooth relations which obtained between the virtual leaders of the group and the rest of the workers.

Hebrew.

Knowledge of Hebrew is the door to the Jewish heart in Palestine. It occurred to me that the sympathy of the Yishub may have been estranged by the inability of the majority of members of the Zionist Commission to make themselves understood directly through Hebrew. If possible, Hebrew-speaking personnel should fill Zionist posts in Palestine.

The Hebrew I heard seemed to be suffering from the influence of Yiddish. Yiddish idiom constantly jarred on my ears. A few trained Yemenite or other Sephardi teachers, whose Hebrew is more genuinely Eastern, would, I think, help to remedy this grave defect.

Jewish Regiment

I visited the Jewish Regiment at Jericho and addressed them. Over 90 per cent. are Palestinians either by birth or long residence. They were a splendid set of fellows, keenly interested in the continuance of the Jewish unit. In this they reflect the general view of all the Yishub.

The greatest interest was manifested in whether there was to be a larger Jewish unit or units, and in the possibility of organising a volunteer force. I gathered that large numbers of volunteers would certainly be forthcoming for such a force.

Missionaries

Much opposition is to be expected from missionary circles in Jerusalem. They appear to be full of anti-Jewish prejudice, and are ready to believe any story, however absurd, derogatory to Jews. Apparently the American missionaries are most conspicuous in this opposition, in spite of the friendly sympathy of Dr Glazebrook.

A notable exception among the British clergy is the Rev. H. Danby, of the Church, who has a remarkably clear understanding of Zionism.

The High Commissioner

I attended several official receptions, and also had a personal interview with his Excellency. There is no doubt that his whole heart is in his work. It is no exaggeration to state that he is undertaking his responsibilities, which are usually associated with a deep religious spirit.

His obvious sincerity and desire to improve the lot of the population made an immediate impression, which I believe will increase as time goes on. Of course, the Jewish population is overjoyed, but even the non-Jewish, and in some cases the anti-Jewish, population has begun to feel the influence which a strong and honest ruler can exert.

I had the impression that the Arab leaders of anti-Zionist agitation were completely nonplussed by his frank and open demeanour. I am quite confident that

the atmosphere which the High Commissioner will create round him will be one in which intrigue and corruption will find it difficult, if not impossible, to continue to exist.

S. LANDMAN.

August 1920

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No. 240

Dr. H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 23.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, August 28, 1920

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of the Antiquities Ordinance for Palestine.

I have, &c.
(For High Commissioner)
R. STORRS

Enclosure in No. 24

Antiquities Ordinance for Palestine

Whereas—The reference "Cyprus" indicates "The Cyprus Law of Antiquities, 1905."

WHEREAS, in an annex to article 421 of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and Turkey, the principles are laid down which are to serve as a basis for a law to replace the existing Ottoman Law of Antiquities;

And whereas these principles serve as a reasonable basis for the law

And whereas, by Proclamation No. 10, dated the 1st December, 1918, by the High Commissioner for Palestine (South), provision was made for the protection of antiquities during the military occupation of the territory;

And whereas it is desirable to replace the Ottoman Law of Antiquities and to supersede the said Proclamation by a law based on the principles contained in the said Annex,

Be it therefore enacted—

Chapter I.—Of the Department of Antiquities.

1. There shall be established a Department of Antiquities for the Department of Antiquities, protection of the historical monuments and antiquities of Palestine and the administration of the law relating thereto. All historical monuments and antiquities which are the property of the Government shall be under the care of the Department.

2. The Department of Antiquities shall be under the control and direction of the Director of Antiquities, who shall be an archaeologist of recognised standing and experience. He shall be appointed by the High Commissioner for a period not exceeding five years, renewable for such further period or periods as the High Commissioner may direct.

3. The Palestine Museum of Antiquities shall form part of the Department of Antiquities.

4. Inspectors and other officers of the Department of Antiquities shall be appointed by the High Commissioner with the advice of the Director of Antiquities.

5. All official publications of the Department of Antiquities shall be under the control of the Director of Antiquities.

Chapter II—Of the Advisory Board

Advisory Board

- There shall be established an Archaeological Advisory Board consisting
 - (1) The Director of Antiquities, who shall be *ex officio* chairman thereof.
 - (2) Three persons nominated annually, one each by the British, the French, and the Italian Schools of Archaeology in Jerusalem respectively.
 - (3) One person nominated annually by the Italian School of Archaeology in Jerusalem, and until that event by the Italian School of Archaeology in Jerusalem.
 - (4) Not more than four persons nominated annually by the High Commissioner, of whom two shall be selected from the Christian and Jewish communities.

Advisory Board

- (1) All applications for permits to excavate and the qualifications of the excavator.
- (2) All reports upon, and regulations for excavations in the city and in the country.
- (3) Projects of conservation involving restoration of historical buildings.
- (4) Proposed amendments and alterations of the law dealing with antiquities.
- (5) All archaeological questions in which differing international or other conflicting interests might be involved.
- (6) Questions of legal title, or involving religious and political considerations, shall be outside the purview of the board.
- (7) The Advisory Board, or any part thereof, may at any time be dissolved at the discretion of the High Commissioner.

Chapter III.—Of Antiquities

Meaning of term antiquity

- 8—(1) The term "antiquity" in this Ordinance shall include any object or construction made by human agency earlier than A.D. 1700.
- (2) Provided nevertheless—

1. That movable objects in the possession of any religious or ecclesiastical body at the date at which this Ordinance comes into force shall not be deemed to be antiquities within the meaning of this Ordinance so long as they continue to be so used.
2. That the Director of Antiquities may, with the approval of the High Commissioner and the consent of the Advisory Board, by notice exempt any class or classes of antiquities from the operation of this Ordinance or any part thereof, and may, with the like approval and consent from time to time vary or repeal such exemptions.

The question as to whether a particular object or construction is or is not an antiquity within the meaning of this Ordinance shall be determined finally by the Director of Antiquities.

Antiquities to be the property of the Government

- 9—All antiquities whether of a movable character or fixed in the soil which shall be hereafter discovered shall be deemed to be the property of the Government.

Antiquities

- 10—(1) Where any person discovers any antiquity otherwise than in the course of excavations undertaken by the Department of Antiquities or authorised under the provisions of this Ordinance he shall within five days after finding it give notice of the discovery and deliver the antiquity, if movable, to the nearest officer of the Department of Antiquities, or if there is no such officer in the neighbourhood, to the mukhtar of the village or other officer of the Civil Administration and shall at the same time indicate the precise spot where he found it. If notice is given to the mukhtar or other

civil officer the officer in question shall forthwith inform the nearest officer of the Department of Antiquities.

- (2) The officer receiving delivery of the antiquity shall give an acknowledgment of receipt in which the antiquity shall be described with as much detail as possible.

(3) Any officer of the Department of Antiquities upon information received of the discovery of an antiquity which has not been reported by the finder may obtain from a magistrate a search warrant authorising him to search the premises of the alleged finder or of any other person with whom such antiquity is alleged to be concealed and to seize such antiquity if found.

(4) In the case of any antiquity of a movable character the discovery of which is reported as above mentioned, the Director of Antiquities may—(1) exercise the right of property of the Government over such antiquity, in which case the finder of the antiquity shall receive a generous reward; (2) relinquish the antiquity to the finder as his property in which case the finder shall receive a generous reward.

Finder to be rewarded if antiquity appropriated by Government

- (5) In the case of a discovery of an antiquity of an immovable character the finder shall receive a gratuity upon reporting the discovery.

(6) If the finder of an antiquity fails to report the discovery within the period mentioned in article 10, any other person first reporting the discovery shall be entitled to a gratuity for so doing.

11—(1) Every person who at the date at which this Ordinance comes into force is in possession of any movable things which are antiquities shall within twelve months of that date present to the Department a list in duplicate thereof describing them to the best of his ability and stating their place of origin and the circumstances of their discovery as far as he is able within his knowledge, and the Department of Antiquities shall thereupon be satisfied of the accuracy of the list, furnish the owner with a certificate of possession of the antiquities described therein.

Antiquities in private possession to be declared.

In any case in which the owner satisfies the Department that the antiquity was imported into Palestine as an antiquity, the fact that the antiquity was so imported shall be recorded in the certificate.

(2) Any person who after the date at which this Ordinance comes into force imports an antiquity into Palestine, shall forthwith upon importation furnish to the Department of Antiquities through the Customs Authorities a description of the same, and shall thereupon be entitled to receive a certificate of possession thereof, in which the fact that the antiquity has been imported shall be recorded.

- (3) Any number of antiquities may be included in one certificate of possession.

(4) Any antiquity of a movable character found in the possession of a person shall be furnished with a valid certificate of possession thereof, and by an officer of the Department of Antiquities be recorded in the list of antiquities.

Declaration of antiquities.

(5) The Director of Antiquities may, with the approval of the High Commissioner and the consent of the Advisory Board, by notice exempt any class or classes of antiquities from the operation of this Ordinance or any part thereof, and may, with the like approval and consent from time to time vary or repeal such exemptions.

Right of inspection of antiquities.

(6) Any person who is in possession of an antiquity shall be entitled to demand a certificate of possession thereof from the Director of Antiquities.

(7) Notwithstanding anything in this Ordinance contained to the contrary, the property of any foreign State, British or foreign religious community or archaeological institution shall be assured to such State community or institution, provided that a list thereof be registered with the Department of Antiquities.

Saving as regards foreign States and see article 4 of French "Loi sur les Antiquités."

16. Any religious or ecclesiastical body, any State, or archaeological institution intending to sell, transfer, or export any antiquity in their possession which may be wholly or in part excluded from the operation of

this Ordinance by the effect of the first paragraph of article 8 or of article 15 shall obtain a certificate of possession thereof or licence to export the same from the Department of Antiquities, and shall otherwise comply with the provisions of this Ordinance with reference to the sale, transfer, and exportation of antiquities.

Chapter IV.—Of Historical Sites

17. The Department of Antiquities shall, as soon as practicable after the enactment of this Ordinance, prepare and publish a schedule of all sites which are believed to contain antiquities, and may from time to time add additions to or alterations in such schedule. The schedule shall include which of such sites were registered as private property prior to the British occupation of the country. All sites mentioned in the schedule shall be deemed to be "historical" sites within the meaning of this Ord.

The schedule shall be published by publication in the official gazette and by exhibition to the public at the office of the Governor of the district in which the site is situated.

18. In the case of any site included in the schedule of historical sites and not registered as private property, any person alleging himself to be the owner must procure the registration thereof within six months of the publication of that part of the schedule in which such site is included. Failing registration within such period of six months no claim to registration shall be thereafter entertained.

19. In the case of any historical site registered as private property the Director of Antiquities may—

- (1) Make arrangements with the owner of the site for the preservation, inspection and maintenance of the antiquities thereon upon such terms as may be agreed; or
- (2) Purchase the site by private treaty; or
- (3) Expropriate the site; or
- (4) Remove any antiquity or antiquities, making good any damage done to the site or buildings thereon by such removal or paying compensation therefor. The amount of such compensation shall be fixed by agreement or in case of dispute by a single arbitrator appointed by the Director of the Department of Public Works. The value of the antiquity shall not be taken into account in assessing such compensation.

20. The expropriation of historical sites shall be conducted at the instance of the Director of Antiquities in accordance with the procedure laid down in the law of expropriation then in force. The amount of indemnity for expropriation shall not exceed the value of neighbouring land of similar character.

Provided that if the owner of an historical site sells the site to the Government by private treaty he may be paid for the same a price exceeding the value of neighbouring land by a sum not more than 25 per cent. in excess of that value.

21.—(1) The Director of Antiquities may, with the consent of the Advisory Board agree with any approved society or institution that it will undertake the maintenance or conservation of the site.

(2) The Director of Antiquities may, with the consent of the Advisory Board, grant a permit to any person or persons to enter upon the site and to inspect and study the antiquities, to make drawings, photographs, or reproductions thereof, and to carry out any necessary work for the maintenance or conservation thereof.

The private owner of an historical site shall at all reasonable times permit any officer of the Department of Antiquities or any representative of an approved society or institution by whom the maintenance or conservation of the antiquities has been undertaken, and any other person authorised by

the Director of Antiquities, to enter upon the site and to inspect and study the antiquities, to make drawings, photographs, or reproductions thereof, and to carry out any necessary work for the maintenance or conservation thereof.

The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to sites, buildings or constructions which at the date at which this ordinance comes into force were in the possession of a religious or ecclesiastical body and in actual use for religious purposes.

Provided that—

- (1) In any case in which such building or construction or any part thereof is an antiquity within the meaning of this Ordinance, it shall not be altered, reconstructed or restored without the consent of the Director of Antiquities.
- (2) Any person being an official of the Department of Antiquities may, authorised by the Director of Antiquities, at all convenient times enter such buildings and constructions and inspect the state and condition thereof.
- (3) If any such building or construction shall in the opinion of the Director of Antiquities be in an unsafe condition or require repair, the Director of Antiquities may enter into agreement with the religious body for the carrying out of the work, or failing such agreement and in case of need may enter upon such building or construction with workmen and others and cause such work to be executed by the Department of Antiquities and recover the cost thereof as a civil debt from the religious body.

Chapter V.—Of Excavation.

24. No excavations or soundings for antiquities (even on ground belonging to the excavator himself) may be undertaken unless permit to excavate or to sound has first been granted by the Department of Antiquities. Permits shall be granted only to learned societies or institutions or to individuals of proved scientific competence guaranteed by such bodies.

25. Applications for permits to excavate shall set forth the qualifications of the proposed excavator. They shall define precisely the area for which the permit is requested. The applicant must satisfy the Department of Antiquities that such area is compatible with the labour which he proposes to employ upon the excavation.

26. Permits to excavate shall be available only for the persons to whom they are granted, and for the period and within the area stated in the permit.

Every permit to excavate shall contain the following conditions—

- (i.) That the work of excavation shall be under the supervision of a competent archaeologist approved by the Director of Antiquities, and that he be furnished to the satisfaction of the director with adequate equipment for the making of photographic and other records and architectural plans of the remains.
- (ii.) That the operations on the site or on each of the sites or for which a permit is granted shall continue during a period of two months at least unless the excavation be completed within a shorter period.
- (iii.) The excavator shall furnish to the Department of Antiquities as soon as possible after discovery a detailed list of all antiquities found.
- (iv.) That all objects discovered in the course of the excavation be open to the inspection of the Department of Antiquities.
- (v.) That the excavations shall at all times be open to the inspection of the officers of the Department of Antiquities.
- (vi.) That any person or persons specifically authorised by the Director of Antiquities may at such hours as may be arranged enter upon and view the excavations.
- (vii.) That the person to whom the permit is granted shall be responsible for the care of all objects found during the excavation, and shall if required maintain a guard at the excavations.

- x. That the excavator shall within four months of the conclusion of the season's digging supply in a form suitable for publication either by the Department or in one of the recognised archaeological periodicals a summary report of the main results of his work
- (x.) That the society, institution or individual to whom the permit is granted shall produce within a period of two years after the conclusion of the excavation (unless this period be extended by the Director of Antiquities) an adequate scientific publication of the results of excavation. If the proceeds of the excavation have been dispersed a record of the allocation of the various objects shall be included therein.
- x. That three copies of all printed publications relating to the excavations issued by the excavator or by the body which he represents shall be deposited in the archives of the Palestine Museum.
- xii.) Any technical condition for the regulation of the excavations which the Director of Antiquities may direct.

(2.) The acceptance of a permit shall be deemed to constitute a contract between the Government and the person to whom the permit is given in accordance with the conditions laid down therein.

(3.) In case of breach of any condition of the permit, the Director of Antiquities may forthwith require the suspension of the work of excavation or withdraw the permit.

28. The Director of Antiquities may grant permits to conduct soundings within a certain area and during a definite period upon such conditions as he thinks fit. The results of all soundings and all objects found shall be forthwith reported to the Department of Antiquities, and the Director of Antiquities may at any time suspend the work or withdraw the permit if he considers the results unsatisfactory or pending an application for a permit to excavate.

29.—(1.) If the area within which a permit to excavate is sought be private property, the applicant shall arrange with the owner as to the terms upon which he shall be allowed to excavate.

(2.) If, in the opinion of the Director of Antiquities, negotiations for an arrangement upon reasonable terms have failed, the area in question may be expropriated by the Department of Antiquities, in whole or in part, or may be taken on lease compulsorily by the Department for a period not exceeding two years at a rent and subject to conditions to be determined by an arbitrator appointed by the Director of Public Works.

30. The Director of Antiquities shall, after the close of the excavations, choose such objects from among those found as are in his opinion needed for the scientific completeness of the Palestine Museum. He shall then make a fair division of the objects found among the excavator, the Government, and the Palestine Museum. The objects chosen for the Government shall be deposited in the Palestine Museum, and the objects chosen for the excavator shall be deposited in the excavator's collection. The objects chosen for the Palestine Museum shall be deposited in the Palestine Museum.

31. The Director of Antiquities shall, after the close of the excavations, choose such objects from among those found as are in his opinion needed for the scientific completeness of the Palestine Museum. He shall then make a fair division of the objects found among the excavator, the Government, and the Palestine Museum. The objects chosen for the Government shall be deposited in the Palestine Museum, and the objects chosen for the excavator shall be deposited in the excavator's collection. The objects chosen for the Palestine Museum shall be deposited in the Palestine Museum.

Until the division is made all antiquities found shall be deemed to be the property of the Government.

31. The person to whom antiquities are allotted under the last preceding article shall be issued by the Director of Antiquities a certificate of possession.

32. The provisions of articles 43 and 44, with reference to the exportation of antiquities, shall not apply to antiquities allotted under the provisions of the last preceding article. The Director of Antiquities shall grant a licence to export such antiquities upon being satisfied that the conditions of the permit have been fulfilled.

33. Excavation upon private property may be undertaken by the Department of Antiquities upon terms arranged with the proprietor. Such terms may include a concession to the owner of a site of a part of the antiquities found, provided that no antiquities shall be allotted to such owner which are required

for the scientific completeness of the Palestine Museum, and that, pending such allotment, all antiquities shall be deemed to be the property of the Government.

Chapter VI.—Of the Trade of Antiquities

34. No person shall make a trade of selling, or keep for sale, any antiquities unless he is in possession of a licence to trade in antiquities granted by the Department of Antiquities.

35. Applications for licences to trade in antiquities shall be made in such form and shall set forth such particulars as the Director of Antiquities may from time to time direct.

36.—(1.) A licence to trade in antiquities shall not be granted for a period exceeding one month from the date of the death of the licensee. (2.) A licence to trade shall be available only for the person to whom it was granted, provided that upon notification to the Department of Antiquities of the death of the licensee and of the names of his heirs or representatives, such heirs or representatives may continue to act under the licence for a period not exceeding one month from the date of the death of the licensee.

(3.) A licence to trade shall be revocable at the discretion of the Director of Antiquities upon proof that the licensee has failed to comply with the terms of the licence or has otherwise shown himself to be unfit to be a holder of such licence.

37.—(1.) A licence to trade shall authorise the sale of antiquities only at the place specified in the licence.

(2.) The holder of a licence to trade shall keep a register of all antiquities kept by him for sale. The antiquities shall be serially numbered on the register which shall contain the name of the antiquity, (ii) a statement of the date of acquisition, (iii) the date of sale, (iv) the name of the purchaser, (v) the price paid therefor.

(3.) Any officer of the Department of Antiquities may at all reasonable times inspect the premises with reference to which a licence to trade has been granted, and the register of antiquities and the licensee shall give him all necessary information for the purpose of identifying the antiquities kept for sale with those mentioned in the register.

(4.) At each inspection the officer shall sign the register at the end thereof.

(5.) The licensee shall not sell any antiquity which has not been described and numbered in such part of the register as has been signed by the officer.

(6.) A copy of the register and of all additions thereto shall be handed to the officer at his inspection for transmission to the Department of Antiquities.

(7.) The Director of Antiquities shall be entitled to purchase on behalf of his Government any antiquity kept for sale by the licensee on paying the value fixed by appraisement made in accordance with any provisions contained in article 54, provided that such right of purchase shall not extend to objects imported as antiquities, nor to antiquities found of which the property was relinquished to the finder under the provisions of article 11 of this Ordinance.

(8.) The licensee shall at all times upon demand produce his licence to trade and the certificate of possession of antiquities in his stock to any officer of the Department of Antiquities.

38.—(1.) No person shall sell an antiquity except through a person holding a licence to trade unless he be furnished with a permit to sell such antiquity granted by the Department of Antiquities.

(2.) An applicant for a permit to sell shall if required by the Department (i) produce the certificate of possession thereof; (3) declare the value of the antiquity.

He shall also furnish such other particulars as the Director of Antiquities may require.

(3.) Within fourteen days from the date at which the application for a permit to sell is made, the applicant shall produce to the Director of Antiquities a statement of the value of the antiquity.

Permits to make soundings.

Excavation upon private property.

Division of results of excavations.

Certificate of possession.

Exportation of antiquities.

Excavation upon private property.

Licences to trade in antiquities.

Applications for licences to trade.

Duration of licence to trade.

Conditions of licence to trade.

to sell has been received by the Department the Department shall either (1) notify to the applicant the intention of the Department to acquire the antiquity for the Government at the declared value, whereupon such antiquity shall upon payment of the declared value become the property of the Government; or (2) dispute the declared value, and require the value to be determined in accordance with the provisions of Article 54; or (3)

the provisions of Article 54 shall not apply to the sale (1) of objects impounded by the Department of Antiquities found of which the property was relinquished to the Government in accordance with the provisions of Article 54; or (2)

Save as provided in the next following article no person shall buy, sell, exchange or otherwise transfer inter vivos the property in an antiquity unless such antiquity be accompanied by a certificate of possession granted by the Department of Antiquities.

10.—(1) Any person who at the date at which this ordinance comes into force is carrying on a trade in antiquities, and who shall obtain a licence to trade within one month of that date, shall be deemed to be a person forming part of his stock at the date at which the licence to trade is granted without having obtained a certificate of possession thereof, provided that such antiquities are included in his register of antiquities, and that upon sale thereof he furnishes to the purchaser a memorandum of the purchase signed by him, and containing a statement as to the origin of the antiquity, the reference number of the antiquity in the register and the statement of the price paid.

(2) Any holder of a licence to trade who offers for sale a number of antiquities which are included in one certificate of possession may sell separately any of such antiquities which are not valued in his register at a price exceeding £ E. 5, provided that he complies with the terms of the last preceding paragraph.

(3) A memorandum of purchase under this article shall be available as a certificate of possession for a period of seven days from the date of the purchase.

(4) Upon presentation of such memorandum by the purchaser the Department of Antiquities shall if otherwise satisfied of the truth thereof furnish to the purchaser a certificate of possession. If the antiquity was imported into Palestine as an antiquity this fact shall be recorded in the register.

41.—(1) The sale of antiquities belonging to the Government is prohibited, and no title shall be acquired under a pretended transfer of such antiquities.

(2) Nevertheless the Director of Antiquities may authorise the sale of Government antiquities which are in his opinion not required for the Palestine Museum, and the purchase of such antiquities shall give a good title provided that

- (1) The purchase is made at the sale room of the Palestine Museum.
- (2) A certificate of possession issued by the Department of Antiquities is received by the purchaser.

Chapter VII.—Of the Exportation of Antiquities

42. No person shall take any antiquity out of Palestine unless he is furnished with a licence to export such antiquity granted by the Department of Antiquities.

43. An applicant for a licence to export shall, if required by the Department (1) deposit the antiquity with the Department for the purpose of inspection; (2) produce a certificate of possession thereof or the memorandum of purchase under Article 40; (3) declare the value of the antiquity. He shall also furnish such other particulars as the Director of Antiquities may require.

44.—(1) Within a period not exceeding one month from the date at which the application for licence to export was received by the Department of Antiquities, the Department shall either (1) notify to the applicant the intention of the Department to acquire the antiquity for the Government

or (2) dispute the declared value, and require the value to be determined in accordance with the provisions of Article 54; or (3) the provisions of Article 54 shall not apply to the sale (1) of objects impounded by the Department of Antiquities found of which the property was relinquished to the Government in accordance with the provisions of Article 54; or (2)

shall during the same period be available as a certificate of possession of the antiquity or antiquities to which it refers, or the boxes containing

A person who obtains a licence to export shall not be entitled to receive a refund of the duty paid to the Department of Antiquities if he has paid to the Department of Antiquities a duty at the rate of 10 per cent. on the declared value or at such other rate as may from time to time be fixed by the Government of Palestine. Payment of such duty shall exempt the exporter from payment of any other export duty chargeable under the customs laws upon the object included in the licence.

45.—(1) Every person exporting antiquities shall upon demand produce to the customs authorities at the port or place of exit the licence to export the antiquity or antiquities to which it refers, or the boxes containing the antiquity or antiquities, or the Department of Antiquities.

Every person who exports antiquities shall make the like declarations, and shall have the like powers of export, as are by any law or regulation conferred upon them with reference to other articles dutiable on export.

Chapter VII.—Of Penalties

46. Any person who—

- (1) Discovers an antiquity and fails to give notice of such discovery in compliance with the terms of article 10 hereof;
- (2) Makes a trade of selling or keeps for sale antiquities without being furnished with a licence to trade under the terms of this Ordinance;
- (3) Sells an antiquity without being furnished with a permit to sell in any case in which such permit is required under the terms of this Ordinance;
- (4) Exports or attempts to export an antiquity without being furnished with a licence to export under the terms of this Ordinance;

shall be punishable with a fine not exceeding (£ E. 100) or with imprisonment not exceeding (six months), or with both of these penalties.

- (1) Any person who sells, transfers, or accepts the transfer of any antiquity which is not accompanied by a certificate of possession or memorandum of purchase as provided in this Ordinance;
- (2) Being required by law to state the circumstances of discovery of an antiquity knowingly states falsely such circumstances or origin;

shall be punishable with a fine not exceeding £ E. 50.

48. In case of a conviction for an offence under any of the two last preceding articles, the antiquity or antiquities to which the offence was committed may be confiscated.

49. Any person who excavates for or makes soundings preliminary to the discovery of antiquities, even upon grounds of which he is the owner, without being furnished with a permit to excavate or make soundings under the terms of this Ordinance, shall be punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six months, or with a fine not exceeding £ E. 50.

If the excavation or soundings are made upon an historical site the penalty may be imprisonment not exceeding one year or fine not exceeding £ E. 100, or both of these penalties.

50.—(1.) Any person who wilfully—

(i) Destroys, injures, defaces or disfigures any antiquity in the soil or

(ii) Without authorisation removes or displaces any antiquity fixed in the soil or any part thereof

shall be guilty of an offence whether he is or is not the owner of the antiquity, and shall be punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six months or with fine not exceeding £ E. 50, or with both of these penalties.

(2.) Any person who negligently destroys, injures or defaces or disfigures any such antiquity, shall be punishable with fine not exceeding £ E.

51. Any person who wilfully destroys, mutilates, defaces or disfigures any antiquity in any museum or other place open for the admission of the public shall be punishable with imprisonment not exceeding one year or with fine not exceeding £ E. 100, or with both of these penalties.

52. Any person who—

(1.) Fraudulently manufactures, imports or sells or attempts to manufacture, import or sell any object imitating the appearance of an

(2.) Wilfully deceives a purchaser by any description, statement, or other indication as to the genuineness or antiquity of any object of

shall be punishable with imprisonment not exceeding three months, or with fine not exceeding £ E. 50.

Chapter IX.—General Provisions.

53. The Director of Antiquities, the keeper of the Palestine Museum (Judicial) Police for the purpose of any offence relating to antiquities.

54.—(1.) In any case in which the Department of Antiquities proposes to acquire any antiquity, the value thereof, the Department shall forthwith refer the dispute to the Advisory Board for the appointment by the Board of an independent appraiser.

(2.) The appraiser shall make his appraisement within fourteen days of the date of his appointment. If he declines to do so, the Department shall be bound to purchase the antiquity at the price fixed by him.

(3.) If the appraiser shall appraise the value of the antiquity at a sum 10 per cent. less than the declared value, the vendor shall pay the cost of the

have as provided in the last preceding article, all amendments of compensation or rewards under this Ordinance shall, unless the contrary appears to be the case, be made by an officer of the Department of Antiquities. In case of dispute, the matter may be referred to the Director of Antiquities, whose decision shall be final.

56.—(1.) The burden of proof that any object was imported as an antiquity

(2.) Nevertheless, the statement in a certificate of possession that an antiquity is an imported antiquity or is an antiquity of which the property has been relinquished to the finder shall be conclusive evidence of this fact.

57. If a certificate of possession be lost, the Department of Antiquities may furnish the possessor of the antiquity with a new certificate upon being satisfied that he is the owner, or his legal representative or assign.

58. The Director of Antiquities may make loans of any antiquities belonging to the Government to learned societies or museums, and may authorise the export of such antiquities for such purpose. The agreement for such loans must contain adequate provisions to ensure the preservation, assurance and return of the antiquities lent.

59. Where it appears that adequate provision is made by the Government of any neighbouring territory to prevent the importation therein of antiquities from Palestine otherwise than under licence of the Department of Antiquities in Palestine, the Director of Antiquities may, with the approval of the High Commissioner and in conjunction with the Director of Customs, make rules authorising search for and confiscation of all antiquities imported from any such territories otherwise than under authority granted by the Government of such territory. Antiquities so confiscated shall be returned to the Government of the territory from which the importation has been attempted.

60. The Director of Antiquities may, with the approval of the High Commissioner, make rules to regulate—

- (1.) Forms to be used and procedure to be followed as regards applications for and grant of permits, licences and certificates of possession under this Ordinance.
- (2.) Fees to be paid in respect of such permits, licences or certificates.
- (3.) Conditions upon which students or other members of the public may visit historical sites and excavations, and the fees to be paid in connection therewith.
- (4.) The management of the Palestine Museum of Antiquities and the admission thereto of students or other members of the public.
- (5.) Any other matter arising under this Ordinance.

61. All rules and public notices made in pursuance of any power conferred by this Ordinance shall come into force until they have been so published.

62. The Director of Antiquities may, with the approval of the High Commissioner, delegate the exercise of any powers possessed by him under this Ordinance to any other officer of the Department of Antiquities.

Property in all antiquities which has vested in the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (South) by the effect of the Military Proclamation of the 1st December, 1918, shall vest in the Government of Palestine, and the said proclamation shall cease to be applicable.

[E 11363 3880 44]

No. 241.

Mr. Scott to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 996.)

My Lord,

Humble, September 5, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship extracts from a report submitted by Major W. Batten, Acting British Agent, Jeddah, for the ten-days' period ending the 14th August, 1920.

The spread of Ikhwanism, which the King mentioned in the message he sent through Emir Abdullah, has been observed for some time. It was referred to in "Notes on the Middle East," p. 122, whilst the latest advance of Ikhwan troops was reported to your Lordship in my telegram No. 830 of the 14th August.

After the murder of Ibn Rashid in April last it seemed as if the Ikhwan were also to be subjugated by Ibn Saud, but the latest information indicates that they are allying themselves with King Hussein rather than the leader of the Ikhwan.

The growth of Ikhwanism is a matter of great concern to King Hussein, but I venture to think that if an alliance is possible between the Idri and Ibn Saud, as appears now to be the case, an agreement between the latter and King Hussein should be possible.

The only other point in the enclosed report that I wish to touch upon is Major Batten's reference to living conditions at Jeddah. Previous British agents have drawn attention to these, and I submit that, if His Majesty's Government intends to maintain a superior official at Jeddah with an adequate staff, it will be necessary to improve the accommodation and comforts of the British personnel stationed at that

I have, &c.

ERNEST SCOTT, Acting High Commissioner.

Emir Abdullah arrived from Mecca on the 17th to meet Emir Ali. The visits were exchanged. Both expressed great concern as to the future of the intentions of France. The French consul general informed me he was very cordially received on paying his respects.

The Emir Abdullah again visited the agency on the 19th to transmit a personal message from the King. The message was a two-fold one, concerning, firstly, the Syrian question and, secondly, the Saud and the Akhwan movement.

As regards the first, he recapitulated the usual statements as to the sacrifices of the Arabs, the motives and hopes of the revolt, the subsequent events, terminating it a failure. For his ejecting Faisal from Syria and occupying the country without any protest from Great Britain.

The King had received no replies to his protests and representations, and pressed that His Majesty's Government would favour him with a statement as to its intentions *vis-à-vis* the French occupation of Syria.

In the course of the interview I reminded his Highness of events in Syria, not only in the eastern but in the western zone, from December last onwards. I referred also to General Gouraud's statements that it was not intended to occupy Damascus or Aleppo with troops, once order was restored, and to Mr Bonar Law's statement that His Majesty's Government was in communication with the French Government, both published in the "Times." I said that his father's messages had been forwarded, and replies could not be expected immediately, and that affairs concerning another Power could not properly be discussed by me.

As regards the Saud and the Akhwan—to whom Abdullah cheerfully referred as "that worthless man," "a mere Hedy" and "sons of dogs"—the gist of the King's message was that they were a danger to the peace and stability of the Arabian Peninsula. He M. S. Government the general dangers of the spread of Wahabism in Arabia. The Akhwan were like the Bolsheviks, and if they were not checked in their career it would mean that in the end we would see British troops being landed in Arabia to combat a movement which would end in setting the peninsula aflame and wipe out all progress for years. I am in favor for war up to the point where it is necessary for His M. S. desired was a definite settlement of the question by His Majesty's Government, on whose shoulders he laid the responsibility and whose orders he awaited.

He had been asked to keep the peace, and he had done so, hoping the dispute would be settled. He himself could do no more, and again drew attention to repeated acts of aggression by Ibn Saud. I confined myself to drawing his Highness's attention to the fact that his father, the King, did not understand our treating Ibn Saud and the Idrisi, for instance, on a par with himself, a King and an ally of Great Britain, as the Queen would. I said I had experience of British officers, and knew their integrity and the straightforwardness and honesty of Great Britain—of playing off one part of the country against the other and of double-dealing amongst friends. But His Majesty trusted and relied on Great Britain, and did not deal with the rest of the world except through her.

Nevertheless, his situation in regard to Syria, the independence of "Great-Arab," and the designs of Ibn Saud and his intrigues with the Idrisi and elsewhere, had become such that he was forced to leave it to His Majesty's Government to decide. It was of no use talking of our good intentions to promote peace in Arabia without interference, when there was no peace, but rather an imminent explosion.

If any trouble occurred with the Wahabias, His Majesty and his sons would leave Mecca and come here, asking His Majesty's Government to arrange for their conveyance to some other country.

His Highness averred that he had "stolen" the letter addressed to the King (Enclosure "C"),* and would hardly dare show any of them to his father, for fear of his rage. This is as it may be. The letter from the Ghumad was probably produced for the purpose of the interview as similar letters have been before.

the purpose of the interview as similar letters have been before. I did not expect the interview would close without a reference to the subsidy His Highness reserved this for the end, and said that His Majesty did not mind delays such matters, and that the question of money itself was of no importance but that speaking of it was necessary. I said that I was sure that the Government of the Sultan might not represent any objection as to the subsidy and then with the possible exception

There is nothing new in the interview reported above, with the possible exception of His Majesty now laying stress on the more general dangers of Wahabism as a fanatical and destructive force. I have elsewhere reported the interview fairly fully, as his Highness was at pains to impress on me the importance of the subject. His Majesty's Government to resolve those questions, which have so repeatedly asked for decisions. The King had chosen the Emir, who held no official position, in order that the message might be frankly given without reservations, and to make the appeal a personal one to His Majesty's Government.

more than once to be dutifully repeating the King's words without being in entire agreement with them. He is generally credited here with being furious at the obstinacy of the King and the way he has handled matters lately.

Indian Hospital.—Although he first accepted it, the King refused to have anything to do with the Indian hospital when it arrived. It is not understood what useful purpose was intended to be served by sending a Christian lady doctor to this country. She will be returned by the first available steamer.

Deputation from Sha Sand. I telegraphed to His Majesty immediately on receipt of the intimation from Bagdad that the deputation from Bishk had started. I am glad to be able to inform you His Majesty replied that an official has been appointed to meet the party. He does not mention an escort, but I presume this is intended. I informed the Emir Abdullah, who said he had never heard of Ahmed-bin-Tharaya, and pretended to be little interested in the matter.

The success of the deputation will naturally largely depend on the contents of the letter. It is to be sent to the King and to the Emperor and presents as a form of tribute or homage.

Emir Ali.—The steamship "Jeddah" was chartered for the conveyance of the Emir Ali from Yembo for some \$800. From the vast quantity of luggage, including landau, the size of the retinue and number of camels brought with him, it would appear his stay will be a long if not permanent one.

The escort of wild Belouin was responsible for a shortage of water, vegetables and food, everything being commandeered for them. The agency was provided with one barrel of water only, and the Indian hospital could get none until energetic protests were made. The transport of pilgrims and the personnel of the hospital was held up owing to all animals, conveyances and camels being diverted for the Emir.

Shortage of Sambuks.—In this connection the shortage of sambuks is noted, and the steamers are held up for days for lack of facilities. There are only about eighty serviceable. Incidentally, some 700 Indian pilgrims were detained forty-eight hours or the island in consequence. Everybody admits the bad effect of this shortage for trade and loss of valuable time by steamers, but nothing is done to improve matters. The same sail serves two or three sambuks in turn, and the whole business of the port is run on the most haphazard lines.

run on the most haphazard lines.

The date before which the King promised the High Commissioner that both Ruknuddin would leave the country was the 17th. Khalid is reported to be very sorry for misreading and signing at everybody's bidding. He will leave for Egypt after performing the Hajj. He evidently was fit to alter his attitude, and has been helpful to Major Marston, the agent of the British Consulate, dealing with the agency. He is taking Captain Ahmed, Officer Commanding Indian Hospital, up to Mecca in his car.

... wet bulb recorded 85 per cent. moisture. On the ... the temperature in office 95° in the afternoon and ... Handbook of Arabia," shows 84 ... month.) I only draw attention to the above in the interests of the agency ... whichever it may be, next year. The condenser has several times nearly broken down the ice machine attached to it has functioned fitfully for a few days only and is again broken, and the electric plant completely broke down in June. So long as these vital necessities are under local charge there is no prospect of any efficiency. A small plant for ice and electric power is a necessity for the agency, more especially as its position only enables breezes from west to north-east to reach it. Such a plant would cost initially not more than 300*l*. One has been privately imported by a firm (not ... I consider it should be placed on record ... provided in time for next ... by medical officer most strongly concurs. Ice is ... illness or heatstroke would probably mean the difference between ...

It is exceedingly difficult to perform efficient work and keep in reasonable health ... heatstroke are reported by Major Marshall to have occurred in the last twenty-four hours. Sadik Pasha reports from Mecca four deaths among the Mahmal party and twenty pilgrims at Bahra on the 17th from heatstroke, and about 150 pilgrims to date from the same cause.

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No 242

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem).

(No. 216.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 16, 1920

WITH reference to my despatch No. 174 of the 26th ultimo, I have to inform you that the following are the reservations which, as stated in my above-mentioned despatch, were to accompany the formal sanction of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury of the scales of pay for Palestine officials.

The question generally, as well as others that may arise, is covered by the decision of His Majesty's Government that no charges in respect of Palestine are to fall on the ...

... out in the schedule, no allowance for ration ... of *franc de représentation* is given.

There is no free passage home and out, but a leave allowance is granted instead ... in pounds Egyptian, but in pounds sterling.

When the cost of living falls, the 20 per cent. temporary addition to the scale is susceptible of revision.

... view of the last-named condition, not to give a total of salary and allowances, as detailed in the schedule. These totals (1,545*l*, 50*l*, 1,755*l*, &c.) should therefore be omitted.

The Lords Commissioners presume that the High Commissioner will decide which Governorships and which departments are, in his opinion, of most importance, but they consider that appointments in class I of the scale should be limited to five Governors and the heads of five major departments. Class II should normally comprise the remainder of the Governors and heads of departments, and the Lords Commissioners wish to point out the necessity for restricting, so far as possible, the creation of districts and Government departments. They presume that the senior inspectors and inspectors (referred to in former correspondence) will become one class, and that they will be covered by class III of the schedule. Similarly, they presume that the sub-inspectors and assistant inspectors will be covered by class IV. The number of classes proposed at first will thus be reduced, but their Lordships are not quite satisfied with the rates proposed for Palestine (class IV), which appear to them to be fixed at too high a rate.

While understanding that the Treasury views as to the pensions of transferred pensionable officers, contained in Treasury letter of the 14th August last, have been communicated to you, and that members of the permanent Palestine service will be eligible for pension from Palestine revenues without deduction for pension purposes

from the scheduled salaries, their Lordships presume that you will consult them, through this Department, before issuing the pension regulations for the Palestine service.

I am &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

E 11567 476 44

No. 243.

to Earl Curzon. — (Received September 20)

Jerusalem, August 31, 1920
N 103 of the 24th August, 1920, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that ... Immigration Ordinance, and I transmit herewith a full text of the Ordinance.

I have, &c.
(For High Commissioner).
R. STUBBS

No. 243

Immigration Ordinance (Palestine)

WHEREAS it is necessary to make provision for regulating the entry into Palestine of persons desiring to reside there permanently or temporarily. It is hereby ordered as follows:

High Commissioner may appoint a Director of Immigration and other Immigration Officers to control the entry of all persons into Palestine. The Director and the officers so appointed shall have the power to enter or board any vessel or railway train, to detain or examine any person desiring to enter Palestine, and to require the production from such person of any letters, written messages or memoranda or any written or printed matter, including plans, photographs and other pictorial representations.

3. Every person who desires to enter Palestine, whether by sea or land or air, must be in possession of a passport or other permit or papers of identity. The photograph of the holder, save in the case of Moslem women, shall be attached to the passport or permit or papers.

4. Every person resident in Palestine at the date of this Ordinance who leaves the country and intends to return shall obtain, in accordance with the Palestine passport regulations, a passport or *laissez-passer*, which he shall produce on demand to the Immigration Officer.

5. No person shall enter Palestine except with the leave of the Director of Immigration, or an Immigration Officer duly authorised by him, unless he has been permanently resident in Palestine since the British occupation or was so resident within a year of the outbreak of war. The Director of Immigration shall refuse leave, unless the person satisfies the following conditions:

a.) That he is in possession of a passport or permit endorsed or *visé* at a British passport office or by a British consul or other official authorised to grant visas or permits on behalf of His Majesty's Government.

b.) That he has in his possession or is in a position to obtain the means of supporting himself and any dependants who desire to enter with him.

c.) That he has not been sentenced in a foreign country for any crime for which, on medical grounds, to be specified by order from time to time, he should not be permitted to land.

(e.) That he has not been sentenced in a foreign country for any crime for which extradition may be granted.

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(f) That he has not been prohibited from entering the country by the High Commissioner.

He shall fulfil such other requirements as may be prescribed by the Director of Immigration or special instructions of the Director of Immigration.

A fee payable by an immigrant on admission as may be determined by the High Commissioner by regulation.

6. (a.) An Immigration Officer or a Medical Inspector may inspect any person coming to enter Palestine, and may detain him provisionally.

(b.) Where leave to enter is refused, the person may be temporarily detained in such manner as the High Commissioner may direct at some place, and while so detained shall be deemed to be in legal custody.

(c.) The Director of Immigration or an Immigration Officer duly authorised by him may order that a person arriving on a ship to whom leave to enter is refused shall be removed from Palestine by the master of the ship on which he arrived, or by the agents of that ship, to the country of which he is a national, or to the country of which he is an agent.

(d.) If a person to whom leave to enter Palestine has been refused is subsequently found anywhere in Palestine, the Director of Immigration or an official authorised by him may take necessary measures to return such person to the country of which he is a national or from which he is an agent.

7. A person who enters Palestine shall, within five days of his arrival in Palestine, report to the headquarters of the district in which he resides, the particulars of his arrival.

This provision shall not apply to persons certified by the consular visa to be travellers, or persons in transit to another country, whose stay in Palestine will not exceed three months from the date of entry. In case any person so certified exceeds the period, he shall register immediately at the place in which he is resident and shall apply to the Director of Immigration for a permit to stay for a further period in Palestine.

8. The High Commissioner may make an order in any of the following cases for the deportation, within five years of his entry into Palestine, of any person who has not become a citizen of Palestine, and may by such order require such person to leave and remain thereafter out of Palestine:—

(a.) Any Court certifies that he has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding one month for an offence under this Ordinance or otherwise, and recommends deportation should be made in his case.

(b.) Any Court certifies within one year of his last entry into Palestine that he has been found wandering without ostensible means of subsistence or has been sentenced in a foreign country for a crime for which he is liable to be extradited.

(c.) If the High Commissioner deems it to be conducive to the public good to make such an order.

A person against whom such an order is made may be expelled from Palestine and sent to the country of which he is a national. The order may extend to the dependants of such person.

The High Commissioner may apply any money or property of such person in payment of the expenses of his journey and the maintenance, until his departure, of himself and his dependants.

9. A person who is subject to any conditions which the High Commissioner may think proper. A person with respect to whom a deportation order has been made shall, so long as the order is in force, remain out of Palestine.

10. If any person acts in contravention of or fails to comply with any of the provisions of this Ordinance or any order or rule made thereunder, or aids or abets in such contravention, or harbours any person whom he knows or has reasonable cause for believing to have acted in contravention of this Ordinance, he shall be guilty of an offence against this Ordinance. Any person shall be guilty of an offence if he—

(a.) Refuses to answer any question reasonably put to him by the Director of Immigration or any official acting under his orders or to produce any document in his possession.

(b.) Makes any false return or false statement.

(c.) Alters any certificate or copy of a certificate or any entry made in pursuance of this Ordinance.

(d.) Obstructs or impedes an official in the exercise of his duties.

(e.) Without lawful authority uses or has in his possession any forged, altered or irregular passport or permit or other document, or any passport or document on which a visa has been placed.

(f.) Remains in Palestine after the expiration of the period for which he is permitted to stay.

Any person found guilty of a contravention will be liable to a fine not exceeding £100 or to imprisonment not exceeding six months, or to both, and may be prosecuted to which he may be liable under any other law.

11. The High Commissioner may direct that any person or class of persons shall be exempted wholly or in part, and either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as he may impose, from the provisions of this Ordinance.

Nothing in this Ordinance shall apply to—

(a.) Any duly accredited head of a foreign diplomatic mission or any member of such mission.

(b.) Any member of the British military, naval and air forces in uniform, and any member of the civil Government entering or leaving Palestine on duty.

12. The Director of Immigration may, with the approval of the High Commissioner, from time to time make any orders or regulations for the better control of immigration into Palestine.

13. This Ordinance shall be known as "The Immigration Ordinance, 1920," and shall come into force from the 1st September.

HERBERT SAMUEL,
High Commissioner for Palestine.

Appendix to Enclosure in No. 243

Schedule of Particulars to be Registered

1. Surname or family name (in block letters)

2. Name (in block letters)

3. Age

4. Name of parents

5. Languages which immigrant can (1) speak, (2) read, (3) write

6. Place of birth

7. Usual place of residence

8. Occupation (a) past, (b) intended

9. Proposed duration of stay in Palestine

10. Proposed place of residence

11. Nature of business

12. Date of entry

13. Authority for entry

14. Whether previously resident in Palestine

(a.) Place of such residence.

(b.) Date of such residence.

15. Whether owner of property in Palestine.

(a.) Nature of title to such property.

(b.) Detailed description and situation of such property.

16. Two photographs of applicant. (This shall not be required in the case of Moslem women.)

Consul Fontana to Earl Curzon. — (Received September 21.)

I have the honour to transmit the following notes, received from reliable sources, upon the situation at Aleppo:

Before the arrival of the French troops, the Vali of Aleppo, Naji Bey Sawaidi, the Chief of Police, Raouf Bey, and the Colonel of Gendarmes were Arabs from Mesopotamia. According to the testimony of Mr. R—, of the Near Eastern Relief, made to Mr. Vice-Consul Mackereth, the Vali applied to that society for two cars to patrol the streets, and these were supplied with two machine-guns on each car. The Madonin were loose in the town, and when the French railway officials were set upon at the station, the arrival of the cars put the mob to flight. Raouf Bey did excellent work, and was solely responsible for the good order which was maintained under difficult circumstances. Mr. Alexander Akra, the British dragoman at Aleppo, confirms this.

Mr. R— also informed Mr. Mackereth that up to some eight weeks ago the French were confined to the American college outside Aintab, and that the town maintained a strict neutrality, and had not been touched. A clever man named Lorianian, who arranged with the French for the protection of the Armenian population. Mr. R— also stated that the French had then about 4,000 troops in Aleppo, nearly all Senegalese or Algerians, that he met at Aleppo a French officer, Netheroute, who was engaged in the Arab army as a volunteer, and that Shukri Bey, from Constantinople, arrived in Aleppo and asked the Vali for a staff to take him to Urfa, but they refused. Mr. R— imparted to Vice-Consul Mackereth the information with regard to Coonswaller reported in my telegram No. 91; and he brought the sad news that the British cemetery at Aleppo had been violated by the Arabs, all the crosses having been removed, including that of General MacAndrews, so that it is now difficult to distinguish the original site of the cemetery.

Mr. Akra states, in a report dated the 28th August, that news has been received to the effect that Mustafa Kemal's troops, under experienced officers, have surrounded the French troops besieging Aintab, where the people are suffering terribly. The passerelle or footway across the railway bridge at Jerablus has been destroyed and it is said that a mine has been laid to blow up the bridge itself in certain emergencies. The Turks have deported various people from Jerablus to Bired, a suspicious move on the French spies. Forty carriages and carts from Der-Zor were plundered recently at some distance out of the hands of Ramadan Slah, and arrived at Aleppo in a deplorable state. The value of the merchandise and cash thus plundered is calculated at upwards of 200,000l.

The Arabs of Hama Bey are pillaging the country and murdering between Jerablus, Munkiy and Bah, eastwards of Aleppo, and traffic has ceased in that region, no caravans plying between Aleppo, Jerablus and Urfa.

The French appear to refrain from interfering directly in the Aleppo administration, but in reality everything is done at their order, and any person seeking office must be sincerely pro-French. The authorities have definitely decided to refuse to act upon orders from Damascus, and the Minister of the Interior has protested, throwing upon the Vali of Aleppo all responsibility for what may happen in view of their refusal.

It transpired that a "cheta," or Turkish band, barracks at Sabil, outside Aleppo. It transpired that a "cheta," or Turkish band,

had approached the French camp to reconnoitre, and to steal any horses or ammunition they could lay hands on. At 2 o'clock on the following morning gun-fire was heard in the distance on the Alexandretta road. The Aleppo people were considerably perturbed.

I have, &c.

R. A. FONTANA.

E 11680 166 44

No. 21

Earl Curzon. — (Received September 21.)

(No. 102)

My Lord,

Ramleh, September 13, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of a report by Lieutenant G. Wyman-Bury, R.N.V.R., on the political situation and possible military operations in the Aden Protectorate.

A copy of this report was sent to the Political Resident, Aden, for his remarks, and copy of his reply and of the enclosure which accompanied it are also forwarded herewith.

I have, &c.

ERNEST SCOTT,

Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in N.

Lieutenant Wyman-Bury's Report on the Political Situation and Military Measures in the Aden Protectorate.

Operations on Frontier Rectification under alternative Political Conditions, and some Operations between Aden and Dhala.

TURNING to the Aden Protectorate map (which should show the frontier line of 1902-3) the district under discussion will be seen to consist of the littoral desert with the two great oases of Lahij and Abian in the Tiban and Bana basins respectively, next a fringe of low, barren foot hills rising inland to stony uplands sparsely cultivated and girt with hills—typical steppe country—which merges further inland into a jumbled array of tall mounds or mountain blocks, such as Jibat, Ain Annah, Dhuhay, Harir Radfan, &c., all of which have a regular rainfall and are fairly fertile. Between such heights lie cultivated plateaux, one of the most important being that of Dhala, which extends geographically (though not politically) inland to the foot of the wall-like scarp of Mount Marcus, which is part of the great main watershed of the Arabian Peninsula. No frontier line could be drawn to satisfy political or tactical requirements.

If the main people are faced with anything like solid or sincere opposition from the interior, the only possible line of defence would be the coast, and the menace of actual impact of an expedition from Aden.

In that case our original frontier stands, and we should be perfectly justified—as the main has repudiated the Anglo-Turkish frontier—in altering that frontier to suit ourselves, so long as we did not interfere with local grazing and agricultural rights; very little advance should be made, or we would find ourselves involved in difficulties. I would merely mention that the Subharbi are partly across the Yaman border, but those pastors of the Am Annah range.

The Subharbi are partly across the Yaman border, but those pastors of the Am Annah range. The Subharbi are partly across the Yaman border, but those pastors of the Am Annah range.

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alter existing treaties which forbid trafficking with outsiders, and closing their trade-routes, while we do not commit ourselves to actual protection in the case of Upper Yafa at the expressed wish of the chiefs concerned.

At the same time we might be more liberal on our side of the bargain. The bigger chiefs and sultans in the remoter hinterland, some of whom can put 10,000 men into the field.

Of course they laugh at such utterances, but what they really do is to be entertained at reasonable intervals on a scale in accordance with their rank and position. Durbar with the resident or first assistant (as the chief's position indicates), at which requests or complaints are made and dealt with, and many dignified compliments exchanged.

With their punctilious tribal etiquette, and

I would suggest enhanced stimulus and much more careful

is turned down altogether

man, an expedition to turn his people out

With such support a brigade with plenty of guns should suffice, without

with effect without appalling wastage, and the gorges through which are the only approaches to Dhala are perfect death-traps for any troops unless sniping can be kept

Presuming that the policy is to contract the Aden Protectorate, no half measures are possible, we must withdraw to the inland edge of the littoral plain and safeguard the Abdali.

South Yemen and protectorate trade will come to Aden whatever rule is established

The really big trade of Aden is in skins, hides and gums, which come chiefly from the Somali coast.

By safeguarding the Abdali, and more especially the Tiban delta, Aden's duty

such a withdrawal would involve the loss of our political prestige

against spasmodic raids, but any organised attempt to sack Lahaj itself and get away with the loot.

Turning to the map, it should be noted that all the desert area north-east of Lahaj and bounded by the foothills West Bilh, Seilat Sahebiya (the lower reaches of the Haradai) and the Lahaj-Bir Ali and easterly route to Ayan, is impassable to any serious striking force, or even to raiders if encumbered with livestock.

The same may be said of the desert area of Lahaj except for the routes from Am

I suggest Anad, the Abdali's actual frontier post, a rectangular

Nubat and Anad are some 5 miles apart across the bare, stony upland known

sunfire from a pair of archaic field-pieces at Nubat has caused casual

Nubat Dakim is no

If Anad is chosen it should be used for stores, quarters, &c., and a strong entrenched

Whichever post is selected, Abdali troops cannot be trusted to hold it. As soon

Behind the frontier post, however, the Abdali could and should do their share.

Sadan west of Lahaj should hold a strong Cossack post of camelry to dominate

South of the Rija Lahaj road only spasmodic Subahi raids need be provided for,

There is little worth raiding west of it, and organised invasions

infantry and field guns (if available) to be transported to Nubat Dakim by rail; urgent munitions and stores also. Mounted troops with mule and camel batteries by road running east of Lahaj outside the delta; this used to be our regular road for troops to Dhala, the oases being too intricate for large bodies of men, especially in the time (July and August).

Apparently direct route due north from Lahaj across the desert to the Haridala should be avoided. The route traverses huge undulations of heavy sand, some 200 feet from trough to crest, and the general gradient rises markedly inland. It is feasible to a well-mounted horseman (barring the up-hill journey during hot weather by day), and to up-country caravans by night, but they prefer to return, if laden, via Shaka. The Shaka route skirts the foot-hill spurs; it is shorter and less severe, the sand being not quite so heavy. Indian infantry can use it by night, but British infantry would do well to avoid the up-hill journey. I suggest it for mounted troops and the camel battery, infantry, the mule battery, and field-guns (if available) should take the Nubat-Bir-al-Hanash route. Both routes converge just below Jumil in the stony bed of Wadi Haridala. At this point and onward the tribal pledges of the Alawi and Kotaibi will be tested.

Beyond Jumil the road crosses Saluk plain—a broad, level tract, sparsely dotted with cactus bush and straggling mounds, round which the Haridala curves. There is plenty of room here for the entire force to encamp, material for a zareba readily available if required, water from a well in the middle of the Saluk plain, another at Saluk itself in the bed of the Haridala, and a well for animals.

Next is the final stage before contact with the enemy, and should be considered. The road leads off Saluk down into the bed of the Haridala again, and continues up that ravine, which soon becomes a canyon-like gorge with timber or jungle on either side of the broad shingly tract. A few more on are Haridala springs, where there is running water on the surface; a suitable site for a rest camp, but absolutely commanded from the towering heights above it.

Some seven miles from the point where the road re-enters the Haridala from Saluk plain the Wadi bifurcates, just below the village of Roda, which stands on high ground; mounted troops, the camel battery and field-guns should take the right-hand fork to the foot of Khurba Nakil (or pass) the road to the foot of the Wadi Haridala pass—generally known as the Big Nakil—this being the caravan route to Dhala. There is a third approach to the plateau up the Aden-Nakil west of the other two, but it is a difficult one, and so guarded by precipitous heights that stone slides (which these Arabs know how to handle) could inflict heavy casualties. It leads from Houahabi country, and a feat by that tribe might be useful. Both forces should advance at the foot of the Nakil until dawn, and then commence the ascent simultaneously.

If they have not left Saluk plain before dusk, they will not have been observed. Do not ascend the plateau or any upper heights where the imam's people are like to be posted.

Artillery should co-operate from Aden as soon as it is light enough to see, and be valuable to co-ordinate the two attacks, besides aiding the guns to keep the enemy's position.

The rest would depend on developments. I need only mention that once on Dhala plateau, i.e., void country with short tough herbage and occasional patches of light cultivation. Across this terrain the enemy would have to retire; the shock tactics of trained cavalry are unknown to him, and he knows just enough of aeroplanes to appreciate their moral effect.

Permanent buildings would be unpopular, but the loyal folk quite accept the cantonment system, by which an adequate area is put under military law, and they have no objection to huts, sheds, &c., of timber or mud and stone composite, within that area.

A strong detachment of infantry and a mountain battery must be kept up here if a mobile column of required—guns are essential to all operations in these hills and the Arabs know it.

Dhala plateau is 5,000 feet above sea level. If higher altitude is required for stubborn malaria cases from Aden, it may be found on Mount Jibat at 7,000 feet; there used to be a good road up, which can easily be remade.

Good water and vegetables. Firewood should not be cut on the plateau, which is a very fertile soil. At Aden for the same reason. (See my report on Yemen trade.)

I know all this sounds drastic, one way or the other, compared to the time-honoured Aden tradition of leaving the protectorate to run itself, and only taking action when compelled by force of circumstances and returning to the *status quo*, but I maintain that with the abolition of Turkish rule in Yemen conditions are entirely altered.

As by we could deal with the central Government at Stamboul; we could deal with the imam, who is not only inaccessible, but unamenable. Unpleasant surprises could materialise in the protectorate at any moment with no chance of redress by diplomatic methods.

A protectorate which we cannot protect is an anomaly and a blight on our prestige. The payment of a subsidy to secure peace without the menace of force close at hand is mere blackmail, and only leads to enhanced demands or repudiation of responsibility.

G W BURY.

July 12, 1920

Enclosure 2 in No. 245

Political Resident, Aden, to High Commissioner, Cairo.

Secret)

Aden, August 21, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th July, 1920, transmitting a copy of a report by Lieutenant G. Wymann-Bury, R.N.V.R., on the subject of the enclosed comments on the document.

I have

F. SCOTT, Major-General,
Political Resident, Aden.

Enclosure 3 in No. 245

Comments by Major-General Scott on Lieutenant Wymann-Bury's Report.

THE considerations dealt with by Lieutenant Wymann-Bury in his interesting report appear to come under three main headings—

- (a.) The restoration of the original Aden Protectorate frontier
- (b.) The contraction of the Aden Protectorate to the inland edge of the lit oral plain, where the Abdali could be safeguarded
- (c.) The military measures required in support of these contingencies.

(a.) Perhaps might be regarded more as confirming the original frontier than as restoring it. It has not been relinquished, although it has not been possible to make a show of force in holding it, and the result has been the imam's penetration to Dhala. It has also been impossible actively to support the allied tribes.

I agree that the Zaidis would have to withdraw from Dhala if faced with such opposition from our protectorate tribes and an expedition from Aden, but I do not think the tribes could be expected to undertake any operations without active military support. In the absence of any advance of force on our part they cannot be blamed for sitting on the fence. Our information at present indicates that a British expedition could rely on tribal co-operation.

Active support of the tribes in the restoration of the original boundaries should include permanent occupation of Dhala to bring about the effect which our prestige demands. I am not in favour of a temporary occupation of Dhala with a view to restoring our prestige, as our withdrawal from there would result in its re-occupation by the Zaidis, whose position would be stronger than before in the eyes of the tribes. Retirement would probably be followed up by a few men whose action would be interpreted as a victory, and the position of the friendly tribes would be more difficult than ever, with the possible result that they would have to come to terms with the enemy.

The protectorate still exists up to the old frontier, and, although our prestige is not enhanced by the inactive policy at present pursued, we are not just now in a position to take any other course except withdrawal, which I do not advocate.

for the opportunity should be considered.

He possesses money, guns, rifles, and has the assistance of a part of his needs. Reports are reckoned as a powerful and the position of his

completely change the situation as regards the Imam. The progress of events further north should give some early indication of need be regarded as a great hostile power in the future.

Any question regarding minor changes in the actual frontier line would be a matter for consideration, if, and when, Dhala is occupied, or the Imam's policy undergoes a change.

The alternative (b) might have the advantage of freeing us from many liabilities which are difficult wholly to fulfil, but it would entail others of a distinctly troublesome nature, while treaty obligations appear to rule it out of consideration.

It is within reason to hope that all its aspects will require a

I am not prepared at present to offer any remarks on the portion of Mr. Bury's

be remembered that the proposed post-war garrison would not be strong enough for military operations in the interior or the occupation of Dhala.

Mr. Bury has commented on certain other points—

The amount of the subsidies paid to Arab chiefs are undoubtedly small—in some cases ridiculously so—but it is open to some doubt whether the recipients view them altogether from the actual money value point of view. I feel sure they would welcome increased subsidies, but the existing ones, small as they are, place the recipients in a privileged position, entitling them, not only to be received formally as Government guests, but also to recommend their chief followers for Government favour.

Increased rates to be effective would have to be on a scale far beyond our resources at the present time.

The tribes are looking to us for support against the Imam, who is a foreign power. They shall be strong enough to prove our intentions by action, and I do not hold at the present time is one for plain speech.

The development of events outside the protectorate should play its part in shaping the Imam's future, and although little may have been done since the protectorate, still there should be no idea of leaving it to run itself.

The abolition of Turkish rule has certainly altered conditions in the Yemen, in that the Imam has to be dealt with instead of the Turk, but I do not think the question of paying a subsidy to him should be entertained. It would certainly be blackmail, and the situation in no way justifies it.

T. E. SCOTT, U.

Aden Residency, August 21, 1920.

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No. 246

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 46.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, September 13, 1920

I HAVE duly received your letter No. 161 of the 17th August, enclosing a letter from the Zionist Organisation relating to the proposed Palestine Government. I received at the same time a letter from the Zionist Organisation addressed to myself of which I enclose a copy. I attach also a copy of my reply to the Organisation. No doubt you will concur that questions of detail should be dealt with through one channel rather than two, and you would probably agree that it is better that such matters should be dealt with through the Foreign Office than directly between the Zionist Organisation and myself.

With respect to the questions in the letter of the Zionist Organisation to the Foreign Office, I would offer the following observations:—

1. The Government of Palestine will be the debtor and will issue bonds in the form of trustee securities. The question whether the bonds will be trustee securities is one that can be best answered after reference to the Treasury.

2. I enclose a statement (vide Schedules (A) to (F)) prepared by the Finance Department as to the present revenue of Palestine, which will give the information asked for, so far as it is available.

It is not practicable to take into account the possibility of the frontiers of Palestine being extended to include additional territory. The receipts of the Government at £ E. 1,000,000, and the expenditure at £ E. 752,000. These estimates, however, are not based upon sufficiently accurate data to be regarded as reliable. They do not include any figures relating to the Kantarah Bala section, as the question of this Government taking over its control is now forming the subject of discussion with the Government of Egypt.

Specific revenues will no longer be assigned to the service of such part of the Ottoman Public Debt as may be charged upon Palestine. It is a question for the Foreign Office and the Treasury whether the service of such debt will have priority before the service of the new loan. In making that the interest and sinking fund of the Government loan would be a first charge upon the revenue of Palestine, I was referring to the present revenue now included in the budget of Palestine, which excludes the revenues assigned to the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, which are being carried to a suspense account.

A small portion of the proposed loan will be needed for advances to municipalities for capital expenditure, but this will not in any way qualify the direct liability of the Government of Palestine to pay the interest and sinking fund on the loan. The Government would, in point of fact, recover from municipal revenues the proportionate amounts.

It is intended that all the "excluded revenues" shall fall into the general receipts of the Palestine Treasury, with the exception of those of municipalities and of the Regie des Tabacs, and that the annuity payable in respect of the pre-war Ottoman Debt should be paid as a lump sum annually by that Treasury. The position of the Regie des Tabacs as a virtual trading monopoly excludes its receipts from being included among the revenues of Palestine so long as that monopoly continues.

Similarly, I have not included the revenues of the Wakf Administration, as these funds are assigned to the maintenance of an institution controlled but not administered by the Government, which may be considered to be in a position analogous to other ecclesiastical endowments in Palestine.

With respect to the questions in the letter of the Zionist Commission addressed to myself, I submit the following observations:—

1. It may be that the total sum required will amount to somewhat more or less than 2½ millions. This depends mainly upon the sum that will be needed for rolling-stock for the railways. This matter is about to be examined by

technical committee of three principal officers of the Egyptian State Railways, in conjunction with the general manager of the Palestine railways.

The nature and programme of public works are also not definitely decided. The prospects are, however, that the loan would be for a lower rather than a higher sum. It is not desired to raise the whole amount at once, and the most convenient form would probably be the payment of the total in four half-yearly instalments.

The amount that would be borrowed in any year would depend upon the margin of permanent revenue available for the payment of interest and sinking fund. A sufficient margin has been allowed in the current financial year to cover a loan of £ E. 300,000. It is anticipated that next year a considerably larger amount will be available for this purpose.

2. The question of the rate of interest depends upon whether considerations will enter other than those of a purely financial character. If not then the rate of interest must follow the market price of money, on which the Treasury would no doubt advise. But if Jewish financiers would be prepared to assist in the foundation of a Jewish national home by advancing the funds needed by the Government of Palestine on exceptionally favourable terms, the moral effect upon the non-Jewish population of Palestine and upon public opinion in Great Britain, and indeed throughout the world, would be very considerable.

Whether such a course is practicable it is not for me to say, and I would submit that, should it be practicable, the Government of Palestine would, naturally, prefer to leave the fixing of the precise rate of interest to those who would be providing the funds on such exceptional terms than to propose a figure now.

3. The questions in this paragraph are all such as are proper for determination by the Treasury. I have contemplated a term of forty years as the period of repayment, but this also is a matter for Treasury consideration. If arrangements could be made for repayment of the first loan at any time should that course be financially advantageous to the Government of Palestine, it would clearly be advisable to embody in the conditions a provision to that effect.

4. No doubt reforms in the system of taxation will be desirable in Palestine, but it is not possible at the present stage to specify what they will be, nor does it seem necessary to do so in connection with the contract for a loan.

The Government of Palestine will necessarily be responsible for providing the revenues needed for the conduct of the Administration, the railway service, and as the total of those revenues will be, at the lowest, eight times the amount required for the service of the loan, this should be ample security.

5. It is most desirable that all the preliminary arrangements should be made during the present interval before the mandate is finally confirmed, so that the loan may be issued and the proceeds begin to be made available for the Government immediately upon its promulgation.

Meantime, such capital expenditures as are proceeding—chiefly upon urgent railway works—are being defrayed from reserves in the hands of the Government. Should these reserves be exhausted before the proceeds of the loan become available, I would communicate with you accordingly.

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL,
High Commissioner.

Annexure 1 to No. 246

SCHEDULE (A)

Budget, 1920-21: Summary of Estimated Receipts and Expenditure

Item No.	Division	Receipts	Expenditure
		£	£
1	General Administration	5,000	11,000
2	Public Security	12,000	11,200
3	Ports and Harbours	84,107	82,000
4	Posts and Telegraphs	11,945	136,284
5	Public Health		
	Total	111,052	340,484

Note 1.—The balance of revenue over expenditure for the current year 1920-21 is estimated at £ E. 70,107, of which £ E. 40,000 has been reserved for the issue of a loan for the purpose of meeting the requirements of the mandate, and £ E. 30,000 to meet contingent and debt charges.

Note 2.—Minor changes have been effected both in the revenue and on the expenditure side.

Summary of Receipts under Item No. 3 of Schedule (A): Revenue and Customs

Revenue—	Receipts
(a.) Tithes (excluding assigned tithes)	8,000
(b.) House and land tax	11,000
(c.) Stamp duty	1,100
(d.) Amusement tax	12,000
(e.) State domains	1,000
Customs	70,000
Total	£ E. 103,000

SCHEDULE (C)

Summary of Estimated Receipts and Expenditure of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration in Palestine for the Financial Year 1920-21

Revenues under Decree of Mouharrem	Disbursement
	£ E
Salaries, purchase and transport of salt, &c.	20,000
Proportional share of collection of tithes	17,000
Grand total	£ E. 37,000

Estimates of Receipts and Expenditure of Municipalities in Palestine for the Financial Year 1921-22

$\frac{1}{2} \log \frac{1}{2}$

$$\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \right) = \frac{1}{2}$$

SCHEDULE F3

Estimates of Receipts and Expenditure of the Regie des Tabacs in Palestine for the
F. and Year 1921-22

Receipts.
£ £. 214.879.

£ £ 76.000

Note.—The expenditure excludes the fixed charge payable to the Ottoman Public Debt Administration for the concession of the *Monopole des Tabacs* of the 1st August, 1913, and such overhead charges as are payable to the Ottoman Public Debt Administration.

SANDLER (F)

Summary of Estimated Revenue and Expenditure for the Financial Year 1920-21,
including "excluded funds."

$\frac{1}{\sqrt{\pi}} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(x) e^{-x^2} dx = \frac{1}{\sqrt{\pi}}$

[illegible]

Enclosure 2 in No. 246

The Zionist Organisation to the High Commissioner for Palestine

Sir,
 I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12th inst. in relation to the above matter. I am sorry to hear that you are not satisfied with the results of the investigation. I am, however, confident that the facts are as stated in the report. I am, Sir, very respectfully,
 Yours,
 J. M. Smith

1 It is assumed that the total of the loan will be 2,500,000L, an amount which will be raised as soon as the mandate for Palestine has formally been accepted by the British Government. We understand, however, that it is not yet possible to give any definite figures for information as to the date when the loan will be raised.

3. Would you consent, in principle, to a repayment of the loan above par? What would be, in your opinion, a suitable price of issue and of redemption? What would be the due date or due dates of the loan or of each portion of the loan? What are the suggested arrangements for the amortisation service by way of a sinking fund?

It might be in the interest of the Palestinian Government to include a clause defining the dates, circumstances and conditions under which the loan could, in case of need, be refunded before its due date, as you intend to make the loan service the first charge upon the revenue of Palestine, this might interfere with the flotation of loans at a later date, when the revenue is sufficiently large to provide for a much larger loan. In this case, your Government ought to have the right to redeem the first loan and incorporate it in any larger loan which could then be floated.

+ The Palestinian Government will no doubt desire to modify the present system of raising revenue, and is not, perhaps, in a position to state the nature of the intended changes as yet. A statement might, therefore, perhaps be made defining the position, especially as regards the land taxes, and possibly binding the Palestinian Government that the taxation falling upon the land should yield annually not less than a certain minimum, which would be included in the loan.

It is understood that you intend to request a mandate to grant, and before, in consequence, the loan can be granted. We should be obliged for an intimation of the amount needed, and of the security which would be offered to the lenders.

It would very materially assist us in our negotiations if you could address to the executive of the Organisation here a letter signed by yourself, containing all the details of the suggestion that the issue of such a loan is desirable. On the subject of the terms of the loan, some terms on the lines suggested in this letter. On the subject of the interest, Mr. Fleming, who is here, would also continue his conversations there.

We would endeavour to let you have a reply within a few weeks of our obtaining the full details. Every effort will be made here and in America to secure support for the loan and the preliminary advance from non-Zionist sources as well as from Zionist sources. We are hopeful, as soon as the details are available and the holiday season is over, that it will be possible to meet your requirements.

PAUL SINGER, Financial Secretary

enclosure 3 in No. 246

The High Commissioner for Palestine to the Zionist Organisation

Sir,

Jerusalem, September 13, 1941.

IN answer to your letter of the 12th August, on the subject of the proposed Palestine Government loan, I am of opinion that it is desirable that all questions relating to the terms of the loan should be dealt with through a single channel, and it would be convenient that that channel should be the Foreign Office. I have therefore sent to the Secretary of State a copy of your letter to me of the 12th August, and have sent to him observations on the specific points raised in that letter, as well as on those raised in your letter to the Foreign Office of the same date. You will no doubt receive a reply from that Department in due course.

I would add that the speedy provision of funds for the capital expenditure which will devolve upon the Government of Palestine is essential to the execution of the measures necessary for the foundation of the Jewish National Home. The extent of Jewish immigration into Palestine obviously depends upon the general economic development of the country. For that development a proper equipment of railways, roads, and telegraphic and telephonic communication is indispensable, together with a complete cadastral survey, the provision of proper administrative buildings, and a number of urgent measures for municipal and sanitary improvements. These are the chief purposes for which the present capital expenditure is contemplated. I have not mentioned the important question of harbour improvements, as the plans are not yet

present programme; nor have
re-electric stations, which it is contemplated may be a
but it will be obvious that a successful development of
benefit of all classes of its population cannot be secured, unless the funds needed by
the Administration for the purposes I have mentioned are forthcoming. His Majesty's
Government, in view of the political and military measures they have taken, which have
done so much to advance the possibility of founding in Palestine the Jewish national
home, not unnaturally look to the Jewish community itself to furnish on the financial
side the resources that are needed.

I feel sure that an adequate response will not be lacking.

Yours very truly

HERBERT SAMUEL.

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N 2.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 26)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, September 18, 1920

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your Lordship's despatch No. 174 of the
26th August, 1920.

The terms proposed for the salaries of the Civil Service of Palestine are not greatly
at variance with those submitted by the Military Administration, and I do not demur
at the present suggestions, although there are several minor points for which I would
ask a favourable consideration.

It is assumed that the salaries of £ E. 2,000 for the Civil, Financial and Legal
Secretaries are approved. I am strongly of the opinion that it is not practicable to
effect any reduction in these sums.

With respect to the paragraph in which it is suggested that class 1 posts should
be carried into effect. The railways have not yet been transferred from the army to the
Government of Palestine, and when this takes effect an addition of one more to the
list in this class will be essential.

With regard to the proposals of their Lordships for class 2, which take the place
of classes 3 and 3, as previously submitted, I venture to point out that the existence of
only one class between a small group of eleven officers in the highest grade of British officer is likely to give rise to inequities.

I submit therefore that it may be necessary in particular cases to allot a special allowance
to one or two heads of minor departments, as, for example, the head of the Public
Works Department, the question of whose appointment is now under consideration in
connection with certain suggestions made by the War Office.

With reference to the number of officers to be included in class 2, I would point
out that this class now covers, in effect, all the officers who were intended to be
included in classes 2 and 3 of the previous proposals.

A number of officers have already been appointed to positions in the Administration
on salaries at or above the minimum of the proposed class 3, their salaries being in
any cases a reduction upon the pay they had previously received in the army. In
these circumstances it is not practicable to keep the numbers of the new class 2 at a
proportion so small as suggested in the letter under reply.

In addition I would point out that the British personnel must necessarily include a
considerable portion of officers with high qualifications, as they have to superintend all
the different departments of a modern Administration, containing considerable numbers
of Palestinian personnel.

The proposal to add an extra 10 per cent. to the cost of living allowance will in
many cases involve an additional charge upon the financial resources of the
Government and will increase the expenditure under the heading "Personal
Emoluments."

It is not practicable to reduce the salaries of officers to meet this increase in those
cases where it would involve reducing the salary below the proposed minimum of the
grade, as this would seriously affect their seniority and status.

It is therefore proposed to retain the total of the personal emoluments in each case
as they now are, until such a time as the annual increment has brought the individual

salary up to the scale when a 20 per cent. allowance is granted. As a case in point it may be noted that an officer on £ E. 810l. would under the new proposals receive a total emolument in place of 971l.

With respect to their Lordships' proposals for class 4, which would take the place of
classes 5 and 6 as previously submitted, I would strongly urge that it would be a
mistake to have only one class for all Palestinian officers, who constitute the majority of
the Civil Service of Palestine. The Treasury letter apparently does not take into
account that this category includes doctors, judges, magistrates and others with very
considerable technical qualifications to whom it is not necessary indeed to pay so high
a salary as is suggested for the British officials who will be included in class 3, but to
whom it is, in my opinion, essential that facilities should be given to rise to a higher
grade. The great difference in qualifications possessed between the
most experienced Palestinian officers in the district governorates or in the police force on the one hand and young
officers represented within the scale in the proposed single grade of class 4. In view of local
conditions, I would therefore very strongly urge the creation of classes 4 and 5, as
shown in the table attached hereto.

I do not disagree to the proposal of their Lordships of the inclusion of a cost of living
allowance at 20 per cent. in lieu of one at 10 per cent. with a concurrent modification
of salaries.

With regard to the entertainment allowances for district governors, I cannot too
strongly emphasize the necessity for hospitality in this country, where it is the custom
and unwritten law of the Arab, and especially of the Bedouin sheikhs, generously to
entertain all visitors. Your Lordship will, I feel sure, appreciate the necessity of
returning such hospitality. Moreover, in districts which are frequented by tourists and
where few hotels exist, it is found to be incumbent upon officers to offer hospitality to
representative people who visit their districts. The entertainment allowances proposed
are very moderate and amount to a total of no more than £ E. 900 for the whole
country.

In connection I venture to remind your Lordship that I have received no
reply as to the entertainment allowance for the High Commissioner.

In view of the extreme shortage of houses, with consequent excessive rates, I am
requisitioning certain German houses and private property for a term of years and
allotting them to certain officials of my staff, who, in return, will pay a maintenance
charge of such amount as would be equitable if normal conditions of housing in this
country.

The use of the Egyptian currency is impracticable. The use of the former currency is unknown in this
country and all payments since the British occupation have been made in pounds
sterling. It would cause the greatest dissatisfaction if the salaries were subject to a
fluctuation of 2½ per cent. on account of currency. I need hardly point out the
impracticability of paying clerks and Palestinian officials of the Government in pounds
sterling. A suggestion has ever been made in the neighbouring territories of Egypt and the Sudan,
and I submit that the salaries met from the revenues of a country cannot properly be
paid in any other currency than the legal tender of that country.

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL, High Commissioner.

... sure in N.

Class IV
Plus 20 per cent. cost of living allowance
Class V	250	20
Plus 20 per cent. cost of living allowance	50	80
				10	20
					48

E 11947 85 44

Sir H. Samuel to Lord Curzon. (Received September 28)

(No. 49)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, September 13, 1920

It is now two months since the civil administration in Palestine was established, and you may desire to be informed of the progress that has so far been made in the execution of the policy entrusted to its hands.

Political Situation

In my first despatch, dated the 12th July, I was able to report that the condition of the country was tranquil. That tranquillity has continued unbroken. There have been no internal disturbances and no external raids. There has been no outbreak of popular excitement. All sections of the people have been glad to settle down to await the developments which had been promised in my inaugural address. The reports from all the districts indicate that, for the time being at least, the political atmosphere is wholly disappeared, and that the political atmosphere is

The occupation of Damascus by the French and the expulsion of the Emir Faisal might have been expected to lead, in Palestine, to one or other of two results. It might have caused a strong resentment among Arab nationalists, throwing them into an attitude of active antagonism against British rule, on the ground that Great Britain had not prevented the overthrow of an independent Arab ruler, and was, indeed, a leading partner in the European movement which was undermining the power of Moslem States. Or it might have led to a feeling of pessimism with regard to the prospects of Arab nationalism generally, to a consciousness of isolation, of deprivation of any political centre to which their cause might be attached, and to a recognition that, however far removed the existing status of Palestine might be from that required for the realisation of Arab ambitions, the presence of the British in Palestine was much to be preferred to the possible alternative. It was at least better than French rule, on the lines of which they now had evidence in Syria. So far as can be ascertained it is the second result only that has followed. Arab nationalism in Palestine was an offshoot of Arab nationalism in Damascus. Its goal was the union of Palestine with Syria to form, with the Hedjaz, a single great Arab State. The nationalist centre at Damascus has now disappeared. With the French in Syria by force of arms, the union of Palestine to Syria is the last thing that is now desired.

That Faisal himself should have found a refuge here, and should have been received hospitably and with ceremony, and that many political refugees from Damascus should have found safety in Palestine, have contributed not a little to the favourable trend of opinion among the Moslem population.

In these circumstances it has been possible for me to abolish the censorship of the press, and to pardon the two men who were convicted as instigators of the riots in Jerusalem in April last, and who had been excluded from the general amnesty on the ground that they had absconded from their bail. Hardly had the censorship been abolished when the two newspapers in Jerusalem, which had kept up the most active anti-British agitation, decided to cease publication. The editor of the former informed me that he had summoned a meeting of 150 of the former subscribers to his newspaper in order to obtain renewed support, and that only three persons attended. The editor of the other came to tell me that he had changed his views completely, and asked for a post in the administration.

The Jewish population is greatly relieved at the change in the menacing attitude towards them that had previously been adopted by a large section of the Mohammedans. It is satisfied with the preliminary steps that are being taken in the direction of the establishment of the Jewish national home.

The position of the Catholic community is clearly expressed in the extracts from the pastoral letter of the Latin Patriarch appended to this despatch. Mgr. Barlassina has lately returned to Jerusalem. His attitude is personally friendly, and politically he is neutral.

The Greek community is torn by domestic dissension. But both sides express confidence in the British administration, and both invoke its intervention. I have sent to your Lordship a separate despatch upon this matter.

Trans-Jordan

Following upon the fighting between the Arabs of Syria and the French, and the establishment in Damascus of effective French control, there was a strong and general movement among the population of the districts to the east of the present frontier of Palestine in favour of British rule. This was due partly to a belief in the benefits that might be derived from British rule, and partly to the belief that the alternative would be the adoption of further north, or else the relapse of the whole region into anarchy.

I have been in constant communication with your Lordship upon this matter, and after a visit to the town of Salt, and meeting there a large number of the leaders of the town populations and of the sheikhs of the tribes, I have established, with your approval, a system of local administration, and have charged with the duty of forming self-governing institutions and of guiding them with their advice.

Local Councils are being constituted, under whose general authority the government will be conducted. An efficient gendarmerie will at once be organised. Steps are being taken to improve communications. The local revenue will be collected and will be devoted to such local purposes as the population of the districts may desire. So far as can be foreseen, this step will have good results.

The Administration

The administrative establishment of Palestine has now been almost completed. Mr. Deedes, C.M.G., D.S.O., the civil secretary, has arrived, and has taken over from Mr. Storrs, who has been acting in that capacity with great efficiency. A financial

Mr. Smallwood, of the Colonial Service, has been appointed, but has not yet arrived. The districts have been reorganised on lines prepared by my predecessor, and have permitted an economy of about 25 per cent. in the number of British staff employed there, and a larger employment of Palestinian officers. A commission has been dealing with the difficult question of finding accommodation for Government Departments and for the members of their staffs. A co-operative society of officials of the administration has been formed to secure supplies at not unreasonable rates. It would be a very great advantage if the conditions of service of officers of the Palestine Administration, and their position as regards pension when transferred from other services, could be definitely settled as soon as possible.

A separate agency of the Government of Palestine in Cairo has been suppressed, and the Sudan Government has been good enough to consent to its agent in Cairo acting on behalf of Palestine, as he already acts on behalf of Mesopotamia. A considerable saving to the finances of this administration has resulted.

In my general address it was announced that an Advisory Council would be

constituted. Its composition has been a matter of some difficulty in order to secure, without too large a membership, a proper representation of districts, of religions and of interests. It is now complete, and the first meeting will be held very shortly.

Finance

It is too early in the financial year to form an estimate of the situation; but the harvest is good, the revenue is coming in well, expenditure is being very carefully watched, and there is no reason for anxiety. The least satisfactory feature in the existing budget is the very inadequate expenditure upon education. For the greater part of the population there are no educational facilities at all, and it is alleged that there are fewer schools now than under the Turkish regime. This is a matter which is now engaging the close attention of the Government with a view to the preparation of a scheme of educational development.

The cost of living remains very high, and it has been necessary to prohibit the exportation of foodstuffs. The fishing industry, which ought to provide a cheap food for the people, has been almost killed by the Turkish tax of 20 per cent. on all fish sold, accompanied as it was by various restrictions. A small proportion has the industry been continued, that the net yield of this heavy tax is only 7,000l. a year. I have therefore abolished the tax altogether, and with it all the regulations and hindrances to industry which attached to it. In course of time the beneficial effect of this reform cannot fail to be felt.

Like the rest of the world, is suffering from a severe shortage of housing. Building is very costly, and but little is being undertaken. In order to assist the industry, the activity of which is essential to immigration, which is to be promoted, I have reduced the customs duty on building materials for a period of two years.

A Jewish company, with a large capital, proposes to erect a factory, to employ a hundred people for the manufacture of vegetable oils and food products. It draws its raw material partly from local production and partly from abroad. The company is unwilling to begin its operations, however, unless the raw material imported as is used in the manufacture of products afterwards exported is freed from customs duty. I am arranging for a drawback in all such cases. It is to be regretted that the requirements of finance do not permit at present the abolition of all import duties upon raw materials.

Economic Development

A Department of Commerce and Industry has been established and is operating with useful results.

With a view to the preparation of measures that are likely to be necessary in the near future, I have appointed commissions of enquiry upon the following subjects:—

1. The establishment of one or more banks for granting long-term loans for agriculture and industry.

2. The practicability of a special tax upon the rising value of land.

3. The unification of weights and measures.

In addition, a standing Land Commission has been appointed to ascertain the area of land available for close settlement, to examine schemes of colonisation, with special reference to the protection of the interests of existing cultivators; and to report upon the extent and proper management of the Government lands.

Each of these commissions is presided over by an officer of the Government, and is representative of the various elements of the population.

I have also appointed a commission to report upon the measures that are necessary to combat malaria, and another to frame schemes for the proper planning of the new quarters of the chief towns.

Communications

The railways will be taken over from the military authorities by this administration on the 1st October, and a joint committee has settled a number of matters arising out of the transfer. With a view to preventing the frequent interruptions of the lines which took place during the last rainy season, extensive works are being carried out. The railway from Jaffa to Ludd Junction is still narrow gauge, although all the lines

with which it communicates, towards Egypt, Haifa and Jerusalem, are broad gauge. This involves heavy expense in the transshipment at Ludd of all goods loaded on the railway at the port of Jaffa. The line is now being widened, and it is expected that the work will be completed by the 1st October. The cost of these improvements is being defrayed by the Government of Palestine in anticipation of the transfer.

The harbour at Haifa is silting, and, as dredging is very costly, the existing small harbour is being extended as a temporary remedy, pending the adoption of a scheme for a proper harbour.

Extensive schemes of road construction and repair is being carried out. Some improvement has been effected in telegraphic and telephonic communication.

Public Security

If the police force is being strengthened. A plan has been prepared for the employment of special constables in case of disturbances. Compensation is now being paid to the victims of the riots in Jerusalem of April last. A recent police report states that "Serious crime in Palestine is now non-existent."

Jewish Questions

The following measures have been adopted as the first steps in the execution of the policy of constituting in Palestine the Jewish national home.

(a.) An Immigration Ordinance has been enacted, and an Immigration Department has been constituted. It has been arranged that persons authorised by the Zionist Organisation, or by other bodies, to bring immigrants into Palestine, shall be responsible throughout the world, for admission into Palestine. The Organisation accepts responsibility for their accommodation, and for their maintenance should they fail to find employment. Some hundreds of Jewish immigrants are now arriving monthly. They are finding employment in the existing Jewish colonies, in land reclamation and road construction.

(b.) The Hebrew language has been recognised as an official language, equally with English and Arabic, in all the central Government Departments, and in all towns and districts containing a considerable Jewish population.

(c.) The Jewish Sabbath and Holy-days have been recognised as days of rest for Jewish employees of the Government.

(d.) The representatives of the Zionist Commission have direct access to the High Commissioner, and at a weekly interview many questions affecting Jewish interests are discussed.

Antiquities

An Antiquities Department has been constituted. Professor Garstang, of Liverpool University, who was already in Jerusalem as the director of the newly founded British School of Archaeology, has accepted concurrently the position of director of the department, and his principal assistant that of keeper of the Government Museum. As these are part-time appointments, the salaries paid are considerably less than would be the case if they were full-time positions, and a corresponding saving results to public funds. A council has been formed consisting of representatives of all the archaeological institutions at work in Palestine on behalf of various nationalities, and all matters of importance will be submitted to that council. By this means the interest and co-operation of non-official agencies in the work of exploration in Palestine is secured. The antiquities of Jerusalem are placed in the care of the Pro-Jerusalem Society, over which the District Governor presides, and which is very fully representative of all sections of the population.

Legislation

Ordinances have been drafted and issued on the following subjects:—

- Land Transfer
- Immigration
- Antiquities
- Protection of Forests
- Regulation of Advertisements
- Co-operative Societies
- Copyright
- Official Secrets

Copies are appended of those which have not already been sent to the Foreign Office. Ordinances have also been drafted on the following subjects, but have not yet been promulgated pending consideration by the Foreign Office:

Foreign Enlistment
Regulation
Movement of British Subjects

Several other ordinances are in course of preparation

Miscellaneous

The question of the German and Austrian subjects interned in Egypt has been dealt with, and all of them, with a very small number of exceptions, have been authorised to come back to Palestine. A few have preferred, however, to return to Europe.

A number of inhabitants suffer a serious grievance owing to the non-payment of rent or compensation for property occupied by the army or by the military administration. The matter has been dealt with satisfactorily as far as the administration is concerned, and I have made representations to your Lordship in the hope that you may be able to secure that the other part of the case shall receive equitable treatment at the hands of the War Office and the Treasury.

The state of public health shows improvement. Special quarantine stations have been established with a view to preventing the introduction of disease across the eastern border after the Mecca pilgrimage.

The Director of the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries has lately arrived, and a beginning has been made of that Department in many directions.

Messengers have been sent out to deal with a plague of locusts, should such occur.

I have paid visits to Lord Allenby in Egypt, and have attended the meeting at Salt (Transjordan) of the Palestine Commission. I have also visited Jerusalem, Hebron, Nablus, Tulkaram, Gaza, Mejdil, and several villages in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem, as well as to a number of institutions in Jerusalem itself. Visits during the present month are also arranged for Nazareth, Tiberias, Safed, Haifa and Acre.

Admiral le Bon, the commander of the French squadron in the Eastern Mediterranean, accompanied by fifteen officers and a number of sailors, was suitably received and entertained. He conveyed the most friendly greetings from the French High Commissioner in Syria.

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL, High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 1.

Extracts from Pastoral Letter of the Latin Patriarch, Palestine.

AS soon as we had set foot on the blessed soil of Palestine what emotion did we not feel in receiving the testimonials of goodwill which were lavished on us at Lydda, in a first greeting by the representative of the English Government, by the representative of the High Commissioner of France, coming expressly from Jerusalem to meet us, and by the Notables of Jaffa. Later on, on our arrival in Jerusalem, we were met by the sympathetic and spontaneous homage of the representative of the British High Commissioner in Palestine, of the Governor of the town, of the consuls,

The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been received by the High Commissioner in Palestine during the month of August 1920:

1. Mr. J. H. ...
2. Mr. ...
3. Mr. ...
4. Mr. ...
5. Mr. ...
6. Mr. ...
7. Mr. ...
8. Mr. ...
9. Mr. ...
10. Mr. ...
11. Mr. ...
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98. Mr. ...
99. Mr. ...
100. Mr. ...

which has just been delivered from a former yoke, could not endure a new servitude worse than the first, and of which the aim would be, according to some of those interested in it, to eliminate all that is not Jewish in order to erect a Zionist autocratic domination. Once more, preoccupied by the gravity of the problem, after having made the most explicit declarations at London, while, at the same time exposing the

visit to the British High Commissioner in Palestine. And this in the interests, not only of Catholics, but also of all those who are not Israelites, for, it should be repeated before the whole world, the charity of Christ knows how to take care, without distinction, of all those who suffer. His Excellency the British High Commissioner received us with great courtesy and consideration. Several times he made the most explicit declarations, assuring us that all the rights of all the religious creeds would be maintained and that no injury would be made to the welfare of all in general and of each one in particular.

These declarations which, doubtless, will be put in practice, will not fail to reassure 300,000,000 Catholics, in whose name we speak, and of whom many are the subjects of His Majesty the King of England, for, if the Faith is common to all, the interests also are in common. If (which may God prevent), by the changing of persons, by the arrival of new events, we should find ourselves face to face with grave difficulties occasioned by the non-realisation of the declarations we have just mentioned, we recommend calm to you above all else, because violence is always unworthy of a civilised people of Jesus Christ, our action ought not to be

our rights alone. Be assured, however, that your

will be those of your chief pastor, and that your preoccupations will preoccupy more deeply still than they do yourselves. The words of our Divine Saviour: *Nolite timere, pusillus grex*, should be the whole reason of your confidence, and the certainty that your brethren throughout the whole world are with you in

to encourage you. In conclusion, let nobody act on his own, but let everybody follow the suggestions of moderate persons, you have a pastor, draw close to him, as he himself draws close to the See of Peter, and God will be with us.

E 11698 4184 44]

No. 249

Karl Curzon to Mr. Vassiloff (Paris)

(No. 157.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 30, 1920.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 70 of the 27th July, and previous correspondence with Major Young, I have to inform you that the text of the Anglo-French "projet de convention" and the question of the frontier between the French and British mandatory areas have been considered by an Inter-Departmental Committee at the Foreign Office, and I now transmit to you the following instructions for the resumption of your negotiations with the French Foreign Office.

Beginning with the northern frontier of Palestine, where your principal difficulty will probably arise, the Committee laid special emphasis on the importance of safeguarding the water supply of Palestine, and pointed out that the frontier as defined in

2nd August) left the control of the Litani river and of the head-waters of the Jordan entirely within the French mandated area. It was realised that the French would not discuss any alteration of the frontier affecting their control of the waters of the Litani, and it was, therefore, considered all the more essential to press for a readjustment which would give to Palestine a fuller control over the head-waters of the Jordan, and especially of the Yarmouk, which is its principal feeder.

You should, therefore, do your best to secure as the frontier of Palestine the following line, which is based on the suggestions originally submitted by Colonel Meinertzhagen, modified to exclude the Litani river, for which it is considered useless to press:

"A line running east of Ras-el Nakura on the coast to the hills about 5 miles west of Lake Hule, thence north along the divide between the Litani and the Nahr Hasbani to El Bire, thence along the 'Meinertzhagen line' to the Yarmouk river (map reference, Palestine 1/250,000)."

In the event of the French proving uncompromising, and refusing to admit of such a readjustment of the frontier proposed in their draft mandate for Syria (enclosure 2 in your despatch No. 71 of the 2nd August), you should insist on

- (a) The insertion in the Anglo-French "projet de convention," enclosed in your despatch No. 70 of the 27th July, of some clause, by which the waters of the Yarmouk and Litani (see below) are secured for the use of Palestine.
- (b) An area on the southern shore of the Lake of Galilee at Semakh of sufficient extent to permit of the construction of a railway station with unimpeded access to the waters of the lake.
- (c) An amendment of the last paragraph of article 6 of the Anglo-French "projet de convention," in the sense of the enclosed memorandum by Sir H. Llewellyn Smith and General Maunce.
- (d) A variation from the French description of the frontier of any dependence of the tract on the position of particular tribes, such as is suggested in the last sentence of the penultimate paragraph of article 1 of the French draft mandate for Syria.
- (e) The retention of our railway rights in the polygon provided for in the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

The arrangements of future railway and pipe-line communication between Palestine and Mesopotamia are not fully provided for by either of the arrangements set forth in article 6 of the "projet de convention." It is probable that the solution lies in the construction of a railway further south up the Wadi Zerka, but in the meantime we should hold to our rights as accorded in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, unless the French are ready to meet us on the question of the Palestine water supply, by conceding the frontier desired by His Majesty's Government.

The frontier between Syria and Mesopotamia as laid down in the French draft mandate for Syria can be accepted.

A further despatch will follow at an early date containing instructions regarding the draft declarations constituting the mandates for Palestine, Mesopotamia and Syria. The amended drafts of these declarations in the case of Palestine and Mesopotamia are now before the Cabinet. The description of the frontiers, when agreed upon, will be included in the despatch. I am, Sir, very respectfully,
regarding the frontiers of Mesopotamia and Palestine, to which I think it well now to call your attention.

The mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia as originally drafted assumed that the two areas were coterminous, but, although it was no doubt contemplated that the whole of the country between Palestine and Mesopotamia should come under British mandate, serious inconvenience might follow from defining either of the areas as the desert. This intervening territory forms area B, as defined in the

Sykes-Picot Agreement, which was to form a part of an Arab State to be set up under Anglo-French auspices, but which does not now appear likely to materialise. In fact, His Majesty's Government are already treating "Trans-Jordan" as separate from the Damascus State, while at the same time avoiding any definite connection between it and Palestine, thus leaving the way open for the establishment there, should it become advisable, of some form of independent Arab Government, perhaps by arrangement with King Hussein or other Arab chiefs concerned.

A possible course would be to define the boundaries of Palestine proper and of Mesopotamia proper in the mandates, leaving the intervening territory for future arrangement, but this would at once raise the question of the status of the intervening territory, and might deprive us of the power to safeguard British political predominance in that area.

For the present, therefore, it is considered that we should define the boundaries of—

1. Palestine, only so far as they march with Syria and Egypt.
2. Mesopotamia, only so far as they march with Syria, Persia and the Persian Gulf, leaving the eastern boundary of Palestine and the south western boundary of Mesopotamia for subsequent definition when the situation as regards Arabia has developed further.

I would add that a fresh article has now been proposed by the French Embassy here for insertion in the Anglo-French "projet de convention," dealing with existing British and French schools. A copy of this article is enclosed herein, and on this an amendment is indicated which will bring the article into conformity with the

mandates. You can hardly take the question of this article up, however, until you receive copies of the mandates in the

French Government to the insertion in the "projet de convention" of the clause, regarding the utilisation of the Litani waters by Palestine, enclosed in your letter of the 29th June to Major Young, or of any clause similar to this and acceptable to the French Government. This clause might be expanded to include the waters of the Yarmouk also.

For a fuller explanation of the reasons underlying the above instructions you should refer to the minutes of the discussions of the Inter-Departmental Committee at

Enclosure 1 in No. 249

Vinth Article to be added to the "Projet de Convention," as suggested by
M. de Fleurbaey

"Article 9. Les Gouvernements français et britannique s'engagent à laisser librement fonctionner les écoles que les ressortissants français et britanniques possèdent et dirigent actuellement dans les territoires soumis au mandat de l'une et de l'autre partie; l'enseignement de la langue française et anglaise sera libre dans ces écoles."

"Le présent article n'implique en aucune manière pour les ressortissants de chacune des deux parties le droit d'ouvrir des écoles nouvelles dans les territoires soumis au mandat de l'autre."

This article cannot be accepted by His Majesty's Government unless the French Government accept the insertion at the beginning of the article of the words:—

"Subject to the provisions of articles 17 and 18 of the Mandate for Palestine, of articles 11 and 13 of the Mandate for Mesopotamia and of articles . . . of the Mandate for Syria, and subject to the recognition of the general educational control of the local administrations, . . ."

Enclosure 2 in No. 249

AMENDMENT

Proposed Amendment to the Draft Anglo-French Agreement, as suggested by
Sir H. Llewellyn Smith.

Article 6.—Omit the last paragraph down to and including "jusqu'à Dera," and substitute the following:—

"The French Government also undertakes to facilitate by a liberal arrangement the common use of the section of the existing railway between Lake Tiberias and Dera. This arrangement, which shall be the subject of a special agreement between the railway administrations in the British and French zones, shall ensure (inter alia) the right of the administration in the British zone to run their own trains, with their own traction and train crews, over the above section of the railway in both directions for purposes other than local traffic, and shall determine the technical, financial and administrative conditions under which these running powers shall be exercised."

"This agreement shall take effect not later than (three months) after the coming into force of the French and British mandates. If the administrations are unable to come to a complete agreement before that date, the points of difference shall be settled on the application of either side by an umpire appointed by the Council of the League of Nations, and meanwhile effect shall be given to such part of the agreement as can be put into force provisionally while awaiting the umpire's decision. The agreement shall remain permanently in force subject to revision from time to time by mutual consent."

Continue as in French text (omitting words "En ce cas"): "Le Gouvernement britannique . . . sous mandat français."

(No. 133L)

Constantinople, September 21, 1920

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 819 of the 8th September calling for the compilation of a complete list of Turkish concessions affecting Palestine, I have the honour to enclose a copy of a despatch which I have to-day addressed to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine.

I have, &c

J. M. DE ROBECK,

High Correlation

உருவம் 1 in No. 250

Vincent Sir J. de Robeck to Sir H. Samuel

Sir,

Constantinople, September . 3 1891

Sir, I HAVE the honour to enclose, for your Excellency's information, the concessions granted by the Turkish Government in Palestine, which I have had compiled on instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

2 This information is derived from Turkish official sources, for accuracy & completeness of which I am not in a position to vouch. Many of the concessions included in this list may since have been transferred to other parties. It is understood also that by the terms of a law passed in the year 1329 municipalities were given the right of granting local concessions. It should be noted that in the list of 100 concessions all but one appear to be prospecting licenses only.

The boundary taken for the purpose of compiling the list is that drawn from Lake Sakura to the lake of El Houle.

I have, I,

J. M. DE ROBECK

High Commissioner

Enclosure 2 in No. 250

List of Concessions granted by the Turkish Government in Palestine

1 CONCESSION relative à la construction et l'exploitation d'un chemin de fer entre Jaffa et Jérusalem (accordée à Yousseof Nabou Effendi). Contrat et cahier des charges signés le 4 octobre 1304 (1888).

Concession relative à la construction et l'exploitation d'un chemin de fer entre Akko (Akkon) et Dama (accordée à Youssef Elias Effendi et plus tard à la "Syria Ottoman Railway Company"). Contrat et cahier des charges signé le 13 septembre 1907 (1901).

3. Concession relative à la construction d'une fabrique de glace aux villes de Dama, Jérusalem et Alep (accordée à Noman Ebon Chir). Contrat et cahier des charges signés le 13 juin 1312 (1896).

4. Concession relative à la distribution de l'eau dans la ville de Jérusalem (accordée par la municipalité de Jérusalem à la Banque Perrier), vers l'année 1329
1913

6. Concession relative à la construction et l'exploitation d'un tramway à traction électrique dans la ville de Jérusalem (accordée par la municipalité de Jérusalem à la Banque Péner), vers l'année 1329 (1911).

6. Concession relative à l'éclairage par électricité de la ville de Jerusalem (accordée par la municipalité de Jerusalem à la Banque Perier), vers l'année 1912-1913

of Mining Concessions in Palestine.

[illegible]

[E 12318 '8 44]

No. 251

King Hussein to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 3.)

(Translation.)
(Telegraphic)

Meena, October 5, 1920.

IN confirmation of previous correspondence with the Prime Minister and the invitation to Faisal to visit London at an early date, our confirmation to your Excellency is necessary of his appointment as head of the delegation to act as your Excellency's condition that no modification of our fundamental and well-known shall be made without our being consulted.

Usual compliance.

E 12391 9 44]

No. 252.

Mr. Huddad to Mr. Cornwallis.—(Received October 8.)

*Cavalry Club, 127, Piccadilly, London,
October 6, 1929*

ANSWERS to my letter of the 1st instant, I have just received another letter from Mr. [redacted] dated the 29th September, in which he writes:

*1. I understand that orders have been sent to those persons you refer to in your letter (the delegates of King Hussein) that they are not to communicate in any way with the authorities before my arrival in England. You can affirm this fact to the Foreign Office.

"2. I have received twelve telegrams from my father, in which he insists on my going to England. I have been trying to calm him down by saying that the reasons for my not proceeding at once is that the date for the reception of the delegation of which I am the head by His Majesty the King has not yet been fixed, besides giving other telling reasons. I am afraid if I tell him the British Government is hesitating to receive me he will be offended. I am now between

two fires. On one side I have to urge my case, and on the other I have to quiet my father. I want you to do your utmost to get me out of this place, because I am here after the 10th.

There are three French spies in this hotel. One of them is a lady. Their object is to watch me and discredit my reputation.

4. I have this day received the following telegram from my father

"I have wired Mr. Lloyd George, No. 821, saying you are my representative. I want you to proceed to London to head the delegation. Your interview with the allies in war will be basis of our action. If you think there is anything derogatory to your dignity, please return at once to your country, because my only object is to prove my loyalty and continue my friendship to Great Britain. At same time I want to show we are a nation that adhere to its rights, as do Western nations."

London. If the Government do not wish at the moment to open the Arab question I can take him to Scotland or any part of the country you might advise.

Yours sincerely,
G. HADDAD

E 12403 4164 44]

Mr. Viscount to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 8.)

My dear Lord,

Paris, October 7, 1922.

I HAVE received and acted on the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 157 of the 30th September. It was, however, with some surprise that I found myself instructed to do my utmost to secure for the northern frontier of Palestine a line that should include Haalmya and Rasheya. Such a line has never at any time been possible, and, in view of the wholly and strongly Arab character of the inhabitants, this area was the first which we recognised as unnecessary to jettison when we were considering last year how best we might come to terms with the French. To revive such a proposal now seemed less like making a boundary than trying to hit over the pavilion. It was therefore with some misgiving that I recommenced negotiation on these lines, foreseeing a fruitless and somewhat acrimonious tussle which might prejudice the alternative points on which I was instructed to insist.

It has, indeed, proved impossible to obtain a further extension of the Palestine frontier, on which the French consider that they have said their final word. Their attitude is briefly that they have already made three important concessions on the Sykes-Picot agreement without receiving any counter consideration, and they will not and dare not go further. I venture to remind your Lordship that I pointed out last year that the Zionist desiderata would only be obtainable as part of a more comprehensive deal with the French. In Foreign Office telegram No. 171 of the 4th October to Sir H. Samuel it is recognised that "we are in a weak bargaining position in these negotiations"; but the fact is that we are in no "bargaining" position at all. We are in the constant position of asking, and the number of tricks that can be taken is limited.

I accordingly had to fall back upon the alternative course indicated in your Lordship's mentioned despatch.

Of the points therein specified I have carried (b) and (d), and the text of the "Projet de Convention" has been modified accordingly as shown in the text herewith.

Discussions upon (a) have been acute and protracted. I put forward the formula enclosed in my letter to Major Young of the 29th July, extended however to cover the waters of the Yarmuk. The French declined to accept any part of it and, in particular, any allusion whatever to the Litani. The point that M. Kammerer would contemplate was a formula, for the Yarmuk only, analogous to that concerning the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates in article 4. Even this, however, was rejected by M. Berthelot, who remarked that he was always being met by some new "try-on" and that he was tired. I may add that the same attitude was adopted toward the obtaining of

the whole shore of Lake Tiberias, which I was instructed to endeavour to secure in your Lordship's despatch No. 159 of the 5th October received just before the meeting of yesterday. The French refused point blank to sever themselves from access to its waters. I have reminded them that, at our meetings at the end of last and beginning of this year, they had contemplated some division of the waters of the Litani, and that M. Berthelot himself had even alluded to the figure of 33 per cent. They decline, however to admit this now or to discuss the matter further. I asked them to find out if they were trying to use their position as a lever, but it was made plain to me that they did not even wish to bargain. "We want to hear no more about it."

I warned them that such economic unreason would make a very bad impression on my Government, and until our last meeting I had hoped that it might yet be possible to swing them by a strong despatch from your Lordship coupled with the Zionist engineers to urge their case.

But the prospects of success are not great.

M. Sokolov was to see M. Millerand yesterday evening, and I sent him a message through Mr. Cohen, advising him to concentrate his powers of persuasion upon the water question, since I was convinced that he would obtain no extension of frontier. Your Lordship will recollect that I had warned the Zionists this summer that they must be face facts, and they asked for time to try their own pressure, but, so far as

the question of the water I therefore await their response.

Considerable time has also been spent upon the negotiation of points (c) and (e).

If the French are not wholly satisfied with the goodwill, and if their response to our demands is not wholly satisfactory, I

confess that I do not myself quite follow them. If I rightly understand the position, we contemplate a railway up the Wadi Zarka, of which the French know nothing; but we also ask within a small compass for three other strings to our bow, two of which are already described in the Projet de Convention, viz., the construction of another

the Yarmuk Valley—almost certainly impracticable—or, failing that in the

the "accord" of 1917.

I have also to mention that the French have been very anxious to see the

Sykes-Picot polygon.

The French at present insist on regarding these proposals as alternatives, and will not accord more than two of them. They kick in particular at reviving the right to construct in their sphere, which they say they particularly wish, and accepted the two other alternatives in order to avoid. If I am to continue to press this point with respect of success, I should be glad of further information on the following points.

Was the polygon between these obscure points ever surveyed before or since the war, or was it picked off a small scale map in the same arbitrary and amateurish fashion as the rest of the Sykes-Picot agreement? I have always believed that the construction of a railway in that portion of the French zone was really as impracticable as a second line in the Yarmuk valley. It would certainly be valuable in case of conflict with the French, so long as we work with them, joint exploitation of the Tiberias-Deraa section seems the only practical project beyond our own line in the Wadi Zarka. I should also be glad to be informed whether it has been precisely considered what would be the

the alignment has not been seriously studied since the Sykes-Picot agreement. I ask these questions, because I foresee that it may not be possible to obtain from the French, in their present mood more than one alternative to joint exploitation of the Derna line. The revival of the polygon project will be resisted, and I should be in possession of any real estimate of its value that may have been formed. We must, in fact, make up our minds which we want and go for it. So many alternatives in so small a space create an impression that we are not practical.

I annex a revised draft of paragraph 4 of article 6 which has resulted from your Lordship's despatch No. 157. I should be glad to learn whether this is considered acceptable. It is a point on which further negotiations would be possible on instructions from your Lordship.

The French are pressing strongly for the acceptance of their 9th article to the convention. I have evaded discussion of it, pending the receipt of your Lordship's promised despatch with the final text of the mandates. I should be grateful if I might have this as soon as possible, as I should prefer to deal with a matter of easier understanding before passing to the Arabian chapter, to which the discussions on the convention would be an unfavourable prelude.

lab, qui restera en territoire palestinien. Le détail de cette partie de la frontière sera fixé de manière à assurer au territoire sous mandat français une communication facile, entièrement sur le territoire du mandat français avec les régions de Sidon, ainsi que la continuité de la route à l'ouest et à l'est de Banias.

E 12403 4164 44]

No. 254

Carl Curzon to Mr. Vansittart.

No. 169]

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 16, 1920.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 91 of the 7th October, reporting the progress of your negotiations with the French Foreign Office regarding the northern frontier of Palestine and certain water and railway matters.

The first alternative frontier which you were instructed to endeavour to put forward partly because it does in fact represent in the eyes of our local experts the only natural frontier of Palestine from an economic, geographical and strategic point of view, but chiefly because it was thought desirable, as a move in the negotiations, to accept the frontier proposed by the French in their draft mandate for Syria. Not much hope was entertained here as to the French Government agreeing to negotiate on this line, and your action in falling back on the second alternative is therefore approved.

With regard to the conditions (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) attached to His Majesty's Government to their acceptance of the French line, (b) and (d) are now satisfactorily

With regard to (a), the attitude of the French Government appears to His Majesty's Government to be unreasonably. It is unnecessary here to recapitulate the arguments which you regarding the immense importance to the future development of Palestine of an increased and controlled water supply in connection with water power and irrigation schemes. In fact, the foundation of a National Home for the Jews in Palestine, which is one of the obligations undertaken by His Majesty's Government in accepting the mandate, and in favour of which the French Government have declared themselves both before the end of the war, and implicitly in the terms of the Turkish Treaty, largely depend for its success on the future utilisation of the waters of the Litani and Yarmuk. These water schemes are only likely to be carried out by Jewish capital, and in neither case can they be other than beneficial to the population and industries of the French mandatory area. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government feel entitled to appeal once again to their French allies for the insertion of some clause in the draft Anglo-French Convention regarding the utilisation of the waters of the Litani and Yarmuk.

It is at the same time realised both that the terms of the draft enclosed in your letter to Major Young of the 29th June may involve too detailed an obligation on the French, and that, as you urge forcibly in your despatch, His Majesty's Government cannot expect to move the French from their present attitude without meeting them in some way in another direction.

In thus appealing to the French Government, you should therefore say that His Majesty's Government are disposed favourably to consider the further modification of the French frontier in the neighbourhood of Metullah and Banias referred to in the postscript to your despatch under reply and also the question of free transit through Banias east and west and north (a new proposal on our part) if, in the first instance, the French Foreign Office would submit, for the consideration of His Majesty's Government, a further draft clause which they would regard as acceptable permitting some future agreement regarding the diversion of a part of the Litani waters for Palestine's use and the utilisation by Palestine of the Yarmuk waters, and conserving the latter waters for Palestine.

M. Kammerer's proposed clause regarding the Yarmuk is not enclosed in your despatch, but it is assumed that it is similar to the clause already in the draft Anglo-French Convention regarding the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates. A similar wording would not be quite satisfactory in the case of the Yarmuk and the Litani because, as you are aware, the water schemes in both cases contemplate some construction in the French territory, and the mere promise that the French would not themselves draw off the waters without an agreement with His Majesty's Government

would not suffice. On the other hand, His Majesty's Government would not insist on any such detailed clause as that previously submitted in the case of the Litani.

His Majesty's Government feel justified in thus linking up the latest French proposal with that of the waters of the Litani and Yarmuk, because, as will be clear from a casual of this area as marked on the Damascus-Jaffa sheet of the 1:350,000 topographical Section, General Staff map, the present French proposal would effectively cut off both Banias and Metullah from any existing road communication with each other or with the rest of Palestine, and it could therefore hardly be regarded as anything but a grudging acceptance of the Prime Minister's appeal for a Palestine with frontiers so drawn as to include the country between Dan (Banias) and Beersheba, an appeal which the French representatives in principle accepted at the Supreme Council meetings at San Remo.

With regard to conditions (c) and (e), the position is that no part of the western desert area east of the Jordan and south of Damascus has been surveyed for a railway, at any rate for a long period, but there is reason to believe that a railway can be built out of the Jordan valley up the Wadi-es-Zerka, whether or how it could be subsequently carried across the desert is not known.

In these uncertain conditions, and seeing that (1) the boundaries were originally drawn by Sir M. Sykes and M. Picot very roughly on a small-scale map, at a time when a British mandate for Palestine was not contemplated, and (2) that the Semakh-Derna railway is of vital importance to Palestine, and may well be essential to the communications between the two British mandatory areas, His Majesty's Government maintain the clause in the Sykes-Picot agreement regarding the polygon, but also His Majesty's Government to build a railway there on their own territory, and, failing the possibility of such construction, to have common running rights with the existing railway.

It now appears, according to the latest information of His Majesty's Government, that the French Government are determined not to accept all the three courses proposed by His Majesty's Government regarding the railway. His Majesty's Government, for their part, are now prepared to drop altogether the clause regarding the retention of their rights in the polygon if the French Foreign Office will, for their part, accept a modified form of their latest draft of clause 6. A copy of this modification is enclosed herewith, and its purpose is to enable His Majesty's Government to have joint running rights over the Semakh-Derna railway as soon as possible after the entry into force of the mandate and not only when the possibility of a second railway in the valley has been proved impracticable or too expensive. These rights will continue until the second railway is built, or indefinitely failing its construction. The clause also takes into account suggestions (a) and (b) made by General Maunier, and reported in your despatch No. 98 of the 12th October. Unless the clause in this modified form is accepted, His Majesty's Government will expose themselves to the risk of being informed, when they desire to secure the common running rights, that they have insufficiently examined the technical possibilities of a second railway, or that their views of what is too costly do not coincide with those of the French Government.

You should resume your negotiations on these lines, and report to me again in due time.

I would add that, if it would facilitate your negotiations now to take up also clause 9 of the draft convention regarding schools, you may inform the French Government that His Majesty's Government accept it, subject to the amendment shown in the enclosure in my despatch No. 157 of the 30th September. The clauses of the mandate quoted in that amendment are those relating to schools and missionaries in the mandates, and the precise numbering of the clauses depends upon the final form of the mandates themselves, and cannot therefore at present be fixed.

I am, &c

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

Text of Article 6 of the "Projet de Convention" as amended by Mr. Hutchinson and Mr. Forbes Adam, October 11, 1920

1. Le Gouvernement français s'engage à faciliter par un arrangement libéral et Deraa. Cet arrangement devra être conclu entre les administrations des chemins de fer des zones sous mandats français et britannique aussitôt que possible après l'entrée en vigueur des mandats pour la Palestine et la Syrie. L'accord devra permettre à l'administration de la zone anglaise, de faire circuler des trains britanniques sur propre traction et leur personnel sur la section précitée du chemin de fer existant dans les deux sens à toutes fins autres que le trafic local des territoires sous mandat français. L'accord fixera en même temps les conditions financières, administratives et techniques de la circulation des trains britanniques. Au cas où les deux administrations ne parviennent pas à conclure un accord, un arbitre sera nommé par le Conseil de la Ligue des Nations pour régler les points restés en désaccord et l'on mettra en application immédiate, dans la mesure du possible, les parties de cet accord sur lesquelles l'entente serait faite.

Ledit accord, conclu pour une durée indéterminée, serait sujet à des révisions périodiques, selon les besoins.

2. Le Gouvernement britannique pourra faire passer une canalisation le long de la voie existante, et aura à perpétuité et à tous moments le droit de faire passer ses troupes par le chemin de fer.

3. Les deux Gouvernements français et britannique ont agréé la nomination d'une commission spéciale, qui, après avoir étudié le terrain, pourra réajuster la ligne frontière en-dessous de la zone dans la vallée du Yarmouk jusqu'à Deraa, de manière à permettre la construction d'un chemin de fer et d'une canalisation britannique reliant la zone avec le chemin de fer du Hedjaz et la vallée de l'Euphrate et passant entièrement dans les limites des zones sous mandats britanniques. Il est entendu toutefois que le chemin de fer actuel du Yarmouk reste intégralement sur le territoire du mandat français.

4. La commission prévue ci-dessus sera composée d'un représentant du Gouvernement français et d'un représentant du Gouvernement britannique, auxquels pourront être adjoints des représentants des Gouvernements légaux et des experts à titre de conseillers techniques, dans la mesure où les Gouvernements français et britannique le jugeront nécessaire.

5. Au cas où les tracés de ces deux chemins de fer viendraient à se croiser ou se superposer à certains endroits, le Gouvernement français reconnaîtrait la pleine et entière liberté de circulation des trains britanniques sur les portions de chemins de fer français et donnerait au Gouvernement britannique ou à ses agents techniques large et facile accès pour toutes les questions de chemin de fer.

6. Au cas où le Gouvernement britannique décide de construire le chemin de fer de Deraa à Bagdad, le Gouvernement français s'engage à faciliter la construction de ce chemin de fer par tous les moyens possibles et raisonnables, y compris la fourniture de matériel et de personnel technique.

7. Les dispositions ci-dessus sont stipulées au profit du Gouvernement britannique par les Gouvernements français et britannique.

[E 12415/4184 44]

No. 255.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 8.)

Jerusalem, October 7, 1920.

THE FRANCE Inter-Departmental Committee Minutes, 3rd September, p. 3, article 1.

Suggest further consideration whether Palestinians should not be entitled to diplomatic and consular protection of mandatory.

They lose Turkish protection or that of other European States if accepted as their protected subjects. Would appear entitled as to protection of mandatory as alternative.

E 12455 2 44

U. de Fleurbaey to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 11.)

Une note en date du 5 de ce mois, son Excellence le Principal Secrétaire des Affaires étrangères a bien voulu faire savoir à M. Paul C. Sa Majesté désirerait autoriser l'Emir Feysal à se rendre en France au cours de cet hiver.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères ne doute pas que le Gouvernement britannique soit disposé à prendre toutes mesures utiles pour voler l'Emir Feysal et empêcher qu'il ne soit victime de intrigues aussi préjudiciables à l'Angleterre qu'à la France se nouant autour de lui. L'orientation par l'autorisation donnée à Feysal de se rendre en Grande-Bretagne serait de nature à créer un grave malentendu et risquerait d'être exploitée par nos ennemis comme la marque d'un désaccord entre nos deux Gouvernements.

D'autre part, le Gouvernement de la République craint que l'admission sur le sol britannique de l'Emir arabe ne soit pour lui un encouragement dangereux, de même que l'attention portée à un personnage qui a mené contre les troupes françaises et les mandats internationaux en Syrie une campagne hostile.

Le Chargé d'Affaires de France a reçu pour instruction de rappeler à son Excellence le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires étrangères que cette question a déjà été soulevée à la dernière conférence de Lympne, où M. Millerand a exposé avec une grande lucidité les objections que soulevait l'éventualité de la venue de Feysal à Londres. Le Gouvernement français ne peut que maintenir son point de vue à ce sujet.

M. de Fleurbaey

Ambassadeur de France
Le 11 octobre

E 12520/8 44]

to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 1116)

My Lord,

Ramat, September 30, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I consider that it is now clear that King Hussein's attitude towards His Majesty's Government has become one of studied obstruction.

The decisions announced after the San Remo Conference, although they could not have come as a complete surprise to the King, were a keen disappointment to him and led him to give open expression to the mistrust of the good intentions of His Majesty's Government, which he had been harbouring since the time of the peace discussions in Paris. I believe, however, that, in spite of those decisions, it would still have been unable to appease him had the French coup de force at Damascus not taken place. It is incident, or rather our tacit approval of it, him, I am afraid, rendered the continuance of friendly relations with King Hussein impossible.

The King's outstanding act of disrespect towards His Majesty's Government was his blunt refusal in June last to allow Major Marshall to control the Quarantine Administration at Jeddah. This was followed by other acts of disloyalty and betrayal, such as his refusal to give guarantees for the safety of the Nejd pilgrims, his hostile treatment of our Political Officer at Mecca, his neglect of the comfort of the Indian soldier pilgrims who were his guests during the Hajj, his general disregard for the welfare and health of Indian civil pilgrims, his refusal to allow the despatch to Mecca of the Indian field hospital which had been obtained specially from India with

the bacteriologist, on the very trivial ground that the doctor had placed sick Indian civil pilgrims in the Indian field hospital instead of in the unsanitary Hejaz Government hospital, and, finally, his refusal to sign the Peace Treaty.

Some of these incidents in themselves are not important, but taken collectively they show an evident intention to run counter to our wishes and requests, and they denote a decided departure from his previous friendly attitude towards us.

Although the desire to preserve his sovereign prerogative is an important factor in determining his attitude, our support of the French is the chief one, and this

support he has of course detected in our silence since the
page of his subsidy, and in the alleged refusal of the Prince

It is not surprising, therefore, that he has been tempted to listen to the plea
of Musapha Kemal and that he is endeavouring to give support to tribesmen of the
efforts to eject the French troops. In this connection it is noted
that he has several times lately announced that it was the Committee of Union and
Progress and not the Turkish Government that was responsible for the

The change in King Hussein's feelings has found expression in his threats to
adversity, which have become more frequent of late, and I believe it cannot be long
before he will assist on ear

It can only be concluded from his recent behaviour that he is endeavouring to
His Majesty's Government into deposing him, a proceeding which, although it
subless give satisfaction to Muslims in most parts of the world, not excluding
it, would certainly bring criticism on us as an interference with the much
needed independence of the newly created Hejaz S

If he could manage to secure our approval of his abdication, he would no doubt
use the fact afterwards to prove to the world that the independence of the Hejaz was
in reality a myth

At the same time I would add that I think that if King Hussein
fast accomplish and apply for a passage from the Hejaz, His Majesty's
would be well advised to grant him the facility

The question of a successor is, however, still one of difficulty. Should Emir Ali
at the present unsatisfactory
ed, in fact, they might
his father, lacks his force of character his
monetary demands of sycophants

It would be much more desirable from
ment for either Emir Faisal or Emir Abdullah to succeed to the throne, but it is not
easy to see how this could be brought about. It is not, however, impossible that local
public opinion would express itself in favour

The question of the King's subsidy requires consideration in the light of his
Reports show that he is hard pressed for money, but he continues to
requirements by forced loans (which are never repaid) from the merchants
many of whom it must be pointed out, are Indian subjects. It appears that he is still
all
chiefs outside his territory (such as Ibn Aidi), and to pay French troops for employment
outside the Hejaz.

I think, however, that the complete stoppage of the subsidy would in itself
a vital result in his downfall, but that with his successor, who I consider could not
carry on without financial assistance, His Majesty's Government might be able to fix
rigid conditions for its issue and employment

A copy of this despatch is being sent to Jerusalem, Bagdad, Aden and Jeddah.
I have, &c

ERNEST SCOTT
Acting High Commissioner

E 12563 9 44

High Commissioner, Mesopotamia, to Secretary of State for India.—(Communicated
to Foreign Office, October 12)

(Telegraphic) P

Amara, October 6, 1920.

IBN SAUD, in reply to my remark that further support and financial help could
not be expected from His Majesty's Government except on condition that he refrained from
aggressive policy towards or action against Sherref, stated earnestly that neither against
Sherref or Syria or Mesopotamia had he any ambitions or aggressive intentions. He
pointed out that so far as concerned Sherref, the Nejd deputations reports made it clear
that Sherref was now anxious to make peace, and that preliminaries of a settlement had
been effected. He declared that he also was ready in principle to make peace, more
especially as that is desire of His Majesty's Government, but he thought he ought to
say that he was doubtful whether British interests would best be served by peace
between himself and Hussein. He explained this warning by saying that latter was
now openly accusing Great Britain of having failed to fulfil her solemn promises to

himself and his sons, and of having let him down, and was undauntedly talking
against her. From this it might be assumed that it was in hope of drawing Ibn Saud
combination with himself for anti-British policy, that King Hussein was now
ly to sink his differences with Ibn Saud. Ibn Saud gave his opinion that with this
he entered into
His Majesty's Government fully
to accusations from Sherref of breach of confidence
inform me of nature of Sherref's proposals as soon as his deputation
before replying, to seek advice of His Majesty's Government. Turning to question of
occupation of Ebha, Ibn Saud said that the Idri, with whom he had long been on very
friendly terms, had complained bitterly of Ibn Aidi's behaviour and solicited his help,
a request with which he thought it his duty to comply; he denied that the occupation
was part of any preconceived scheme or wide-reaching plan; he gave the impression,
in my opinion, that he did not think the occurrence of much importance
(Repeated to Bagdad, Bushire and Viceroy.)

E 12582 4164 44

No. 259

Mr. Vansittart to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 13.)

Paris, October 12, 1920
GENERAL MANCO, who has been in Paris, I have discussed with him the draft
despatch No. 91 of the 7th October.
the draft could be made satisfactory by the following
alterations—

(a.) Omission of the first part of the first sentence of paragraph 4. "An cas
phrase "selon les besoins" a clause stipulating that in the event of His Majesty's
Government constructing the second railway in the Yarmouk valley provided for in
paragraph 1 of article 6, the agreement for the joint working of the existing section
would cease to operate

This will meet the French stand point that they will not grant us both joint
working and the separate line—an arrangement which would in any case seem
somewhat superfluous. At the same time it would ensure to us the means of commerce
the time when the possibility of constructing the second line was being
considered

(b.) General Manco would also wish paragraph 1 of article 6 amended by the
insertion after the words "relant la Palestine" of the words "avec le chemin de fer du
Hedjaz et la vallée de l'Euphrate," &c. He desires this alteration to prevent the French
from eventually claiming that the agreement for joint working of the existing line or
the construction of the second line was only for the purpose of communication with
the Wadi Zarka.

to the Hedjaz Railway in such a manner and I feel confident that I could negotiate these
alterations with them, if your Lordship so desires. I should also be glad to learn whether
such changes would then make the draft article acceptable to His Majesty's Government
I have, &c.

ROBERT VANSITTART

E 12874 85 44

No. 260

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 317)
(Telegraphic.)

Jerusalem, October 17, 1920.

M. CAIX complained yesterday of absence of British control over Ajlun district,
as evidenced by appointment by people, as kaimakam, of one of the principal
French leaders condemned to death by them for raids prior to occupation of Damascus

Extracts from Report from Major W. Batten for the period September 10 to 20, 1920.

Signature of Peace Treaty and Payment of Subsidy

SADIK PASHA, on his arrival in Mecca on the 11th, found King Hussein in an angry mood over the matter of Indian pilgrims being taken to their own hospital. He himself explained matters in their true light as regards the hospital and the dismissal of Dr. Shousha for sending the sick to the Indian hospital.

He told me that it was his own officials who had angered him, and that I should not trouble about the matter. He did nothing, nevertheless, in the way of reinstating Dr. Shousha.

He had a long interview with Emir Abdullah, and gave him my private letter. His Highness fell in with the view expressed, and said he quite

had adopted let nowhere and left matters in an impasse. He suggested Sadik Pasha should again visit the King after he had himself approached him. Emir Abdullah also showed Sadik Pasha his reply to Ibn Saud's letter of greeting which Sadik Pasha stated to be most friendly and conciliatory.

On the 13th Emir Abdullah informed Sadik Pasha that he had had a prolonged argument with the King, who had finally consented to instruct Lotfallah Bey to sign the treaty, provided that Great Britain fulfilled the promises also had previously given, and that His Majesty's Government would let him have a statement to that effect.

Sadik Pasha was very kind and friendly, and I was able to get a great deal of information from him. He was very busy, and I was unable to see him for some time. He was very kind and friendly, and I was able to get a great deal of information from him. He was very busy, and I was unable to see him for some time.

He reminded him of what he had asked Colonel Vickery in his presence in May, viz. "To which question he received no reply."

As regards the matter of minor importance, he opened my letter, but said he would read it later. He asked Sadik Pasha to defer the rest of the interview until the next day.

On the 14th the King had with him in the room, and I was unable to see him for some time. He was very kind and friendly, and I was able to get a great deal of information from him. He was very busy, and I was unable to see him for some time.

Sadik Pasha saw that it was useless to risk angering the King by persisting, so took his leave and called on Amir Ali. The latter said he understood the difficulties in which the Hejaz would be placed by withholding its signature to the treaty, and the advantages of signing. Though he said he would use any influence he had, Ali gave Sadik Pasha the impression that his attitude was the same as the King's.

On the 15th the King talked to Sadik Pasha on the subject of the forthcoming change in the agency, of which he had just heard from Egypt. He refused to be drawn into any continuation of their first conversation, stating he had put his views in writing and would send the letter to Sadik Pasha later.

King Hussein took particular care that Emir Abdullah should not see his letter. When the latter was copying the letter, Emir Abdullah entered the room, whereupon everything was stopped until he went out.

Sadik Pasha was not well during his visit, and suffered great pain during the last two days, and I consider credit is due to him for his efforts.

He has given me a most unfavourable report on the present attitude of the King, confirming my previous reports to you on the subject.

I might be so worked that it would afford some opportunity of our meeting him here.

and now alleged to be organising attacks on French zone. I explained that our authority at Ajlun was limited. I would endeavour to secure change of kaimekams, but could not enforce it. M. Caix, on instructions from Gouraud, said that the situation was likely to cause serious difficulties. They scrupulously respected line between zones because southern districts regarded as under British authority, but if there was no effective authority and attacks on them were organised from within, British zone position became impossible. When raids were made upon Morocco from across Tripoli boundary they sent punitive columns. He would not suggest this with regard to a district in British sphere, but this was first time French had found themselves bordering on territory allocated to Great Britain in which there was no real control. If it was to be regarded as no-man's-land, they would take their own measures; but if they were asked to respect boundary, they would beg British troops be sent to prevent district becoming base for attacks against them. I am instructing Gouraud to use influence to secure change of kaimekams, but doubt his ability to do so.

Incident strengthens case pressed upon me strongly and continuously by all our officers in trans-Jordan and by sheikhs of nomad tribes and settled population in presence in district of small force of British or Indian troops. Experience up to date

illustration with self-sufficing possibility propounded by the absence of any force behind local

to maintain prestige of British and local officials and give necessary

to embryo institutions pending formation of local gendarmerie now proposed. Competent and locally experienced ex-Arab Government official, now acting

M. Caix of Salt, in a letter to me pertinently remarks on futility of attempt to leave an area of low social morality and educational status bereft of troops in initial stages

of self-government, while more advanced Syrian and Palestine neighbourhood given dignity of moral backing which troops undoubtedly supply. He adds this policy

of small force there to meet an actual attack, otherwise larger force here required to meet potential one.

E 12954 3880 44,

No. 261

Mr. Scott to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 21)

(No. 1132.)

My Lord,

Ramleh, October 6, 1920

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith extracts from a report by a W. Batten, acting British agent, Jeddah, for the period ending the 20th September.

Your Lordship will observe that King Hussein repeated his refusal to sign the Peace Treaty with Turkey until His Majesty's Government has given an undertaking to fulfil what he calls their "agreements" with

With regard to the discussions between the Nejd deputation and King Hussein, I have already fully reported to your Lordship. It has previously been found impossible to obtain from Constantinople, or any other source, details of the old Turkish boundaries alluded to in Major Batten's report.

The "El Falah," also mentioned in the report, was a Damascus newspaper, but on the occupation of that place by the French the editor fled to Mecca, where he has restarted it. The paper is composed of reports of fictitious Arab victories in Syria and articles vilifying the French generally.

In the report by Captain Nasiruddin, which Major Batten forwards, some further details are given of the alleged negotiations between King Hussein and Mustapha Kemal.

Copies of this despatch and enclosure are being sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem and Jeddah (the last named without enclosure).

I have, &c.

ERNEST SCOTT, Acting High Commissioner.

but it will be seen that he has reopened the whole question on the original basis, with certain additions.

It is submitted that it is now quite clear that there is little use in attempting to negotiate with him here without some declaration from His Majesty's Government in answer to his many appeals and protests.

He quite understands that we are not prepared to make him any payment unless he signs the treaty, but, with the characteristic cunning of his tortuous diplomatic methods, he considers he has now shifted the onus of responsibility on to his Majesty's Government by laying down conditions for Great Britain to accept or reject.

It is suggested that it might be possible to devise some formula as to the agreements which he is so careful not to specify, but this hope is a slender one. It is more probable any further dealings with him on this question by diplomatic means will only result in a continuation of the same vicious circle of argument.

As regards Emir Faisal, I have tried to persuade the King not to believe everything he sees in the papers and to be patient, but once he has an idea fixed in his mind it is difficult to disabuse him of it.

There is always one aspect of the situation which must not be forgotten.

During the last few days there have been indications that the King may be coming to realise he has been going too far. Possibly he has had leisure to reflect on the hopelessness of kicking against the pricks, and our obstinacy in the matter of the subsidy may be having its effect. His avoidance of discussion on this subject, where ordinarily he might have been expected to fly into one of his rages on its being again broached, and more especially his marked change of attitude towards the Khedivial Company, coupled with his cordiality in certain small matters, may indicate a change of front.

His attitude towards the Khedivial Company had been most uncompromising, but after a strong protest in regard to several from the Government to them which I had to address to the kaimakam, and which he forwarded to Mecca, he somewhat unexpectedly changed his tone, and has been markedly conciliatory, especially over the question of the Wagh and Yotba pilgrims.

I only indicate the above as a possibility, and it may be merely due to the King being in a good temper for the time being, or because, since he has heard of the proposed change here, he wishes to be conciliatory in the hope of being more successful in blunting the subsidy later.

In spite of the attitude he has taken up regarding the latter, the fact remains he is very short of funds, and that he may have realised any further bluff in the matter is now useless.

Emir Abdullah has written me a very courteous and friendly reply in which is that, while the present situation is quite well known to him, he is powerless.

Emir Abdullah and Iraq

The Emir recently stated that Faisal appears to be "our man now," referring to the current reports that the latter is to be offered the Kingship of Iraq. He is obviously uneasy and inclined to be somewhat hurt, and has referred more than once to his being the only one of the three elder brothers with no prospects, in spite of the part he played in the war and subsequently.

Nepi Deputation

I was promised a copy of King Hussein's reply to Ibn Saud, but he put off writing it.

Ahmed bin Thanayan on the latter's departure.

As regards the mention of old Turkish boundaries already reported, the matter was not pursued owing to Ahmed bin Thanayan not being provided with the necessary authority and to King Hussein getting angry at any argument on the question. The King produced an old Arab map, but this had no boundary line traced on it, Khurra and Tarabiah being merely marked as in the Hedjaz.

Nothing further was done, officially or unofficially, to substantiate the claim beyond the production of the account books by Emir Ali.

It seems certain the references to old Turkish boundaries are merely a device.

Would it not perhaps be possible to obtain any information on the subject from the archives in Constantinople?

Al Fida

This paper has been restarted in Mecca with its original editor, Omar Shakir, who was one of those sentenced by the court-martial in Beirut. It is suspected that King Hussein is using this paper for airing views which he could not expose in his own official paper without risking protests from the French consul-general.

"Quibla."

No. 414 contains an article comparing the treatment of Germany, the former common enemy since the armistice and that meted out to the Arabs. No. 415 contains part of the "open letter" sent you with my last report, with comments. No. 416 gives in detail the numbers who came for the pilgrimage between the end of February and the 20th August.

It is generally believed that the Emir is not returning to Medina, in view of King Hussein's approaching abdication, when he will succeed.

It is reported that before his departure he despatched 500 camels, with munitions from the Turkish dumps, to the north.

Mecca Report

A copy of the Mecca representative's report ending the 19th September is enclosed. I do not think paragraph 2 need be considered.

With regard to the King husbanding resources, he took yesterday a consignment of 3,000 bags of rice from the customs for despatch to Mecca, as well as "borrowing" 10,000 from certain merchants.

The Medina caravan left here in the course of the last three days. Sherif Abio Rahim informed me the number of camels exceeded 3,000, and I have estimated the number seen at about 4,000, so it appears the first report of the Medina pilgrimage was underestimated.

Major Marshall is submitting a report to you.

Dr. Shousha.

In confirmation of my idea that something has occurred suddenly to change the King's attitude, he has to-day (21st) unexpectedly agreed to Dr. Shousha's proposal of assistant being paid their money up till their return to Egypt.

The French Consul General received a letter from the King challenging the validity of the Capitulations, and wished to ascertain the views of the other representatives.

At a meeting with him and the consul for the Netherlands, I informed them that, as far as I was concerned, until the new conventions foreshadowed in the draft Treaty of Peace with Turkey were concluded the old Capitulations still legally held good.

Emigration from Hedjaz

The King has issued stringent regulations concerning Hedjaz subjects leaving the country. He has possibly heard of the rumours of intended emigration on the part of merchants and others.

Dr. Thabit.

Dr. Thabit has put every obstacle in Major Marshall's way. He forcibly removed a stretcher belonging to the agency which was being used to take Indians to our hospital. He also prevented the agency from sending a doctor to the hospital. Thabit Bey's actions. The latter is in constant dread of dismissal by the King and of Dr. Mohammed taking his place, hence his attitude to us.

Institute Pilgrims

Relief work is still necessary. Many lives have been saved, but the money collected is now exhausted, having afforded relief for nine days. On Major Marshall's recommendation, I am continuing the relief. I trust the Government of India will have sanctioned the money for which I asked. The cost is about 100 rupees per day. I do not now anticipate an expenditure of more than 1,200 rupees being necessary.

I have, &c

W BATTEN, Major,
Acting British Agent.

Report by Captain Mian Naur-ud-din Ahmad for the period ending September 10, 1920

RUMOURS about an understanding between the King and Mustapha Kemal have been very persistent, and I am inclined to think there is some truth in this news. It has been reported that Mustapha Kemal sent his agents through Ibn Rashid's emissaries to the King, and according to some actually sworn, allegiance to King Hussein as Khalifa, on the condition that he breaks all relations with the British Government. As a preliminary to this step the King is said to have called a conference of trustworthy Meccan leaders and instructed them to husband their present resources and not to waste their food supplies, as Mecca may stand in need of this precautionary measure later on. This apparently hinted at a probable blockade of the Hejaz by us if news leaked out. I have reported before this that the King allows very little grain to the Bedouins, and he refused permission to grant more than one or two bags of wheat to the Bedouins who came to ask for it during my presence at the palace.

Instead of Mustapha Kemal swearing allegiance to the King, it is the latter who has taken the oath in favour of Mustapha Kemal. Colour is given to this story by the King's utterance that he was prepared to submit to any Khalifa the Moslems chose. And since Mustapha Kemal is considered to be the only natural

3. The King received a telegram from Syria to the effect that a free fight took place between the Hawranis and Kurds at Danas-gum, wherein 600 men were killed in the "Maidan" alone. Such French troops as were present in the city looked on the scene with amusement and did not interfere. Noon Shahan has been killed by

Church declared that the only hope of the Syrians, both Moslems and Christians, lay with Sherif Hussein. The King is afraid that such actions and utterances of the response in Syria will be misinterpreted by the diplomats of Europe, and he will be accused of all the outwary and secret intrigues.

4. The King is also said to have initiated some Persian pilgrims with his way of thinking, and they have promised to do their best on their return to clear his name. Some of the pilgrims openly denounced the British Government for the Anglo-Persian Agreement, which they said proved its designs on the Persian independence. The King is also trying to find means of communication with Muhammad Ali and Shaukat Ali, and I am almost certain that he has taken up a very conciliatory attitude towards them. He has written a letter a couple of days ago. All these reports lead to the conclusion, that slowly but surely the King is trying to reconcile all shades of opinion, and climbing from his high pedestal which he held in the belief that his revolt would bring all the world round his feet. It must be sorrowfully admitted that his trust in the British Government is very much shaken, if not entirely shattered, which is not at all strange when he sees all sorts of opinions in the press in his favour, which gives him an exaggerated idea of his position.

5. An Indian named Ismail Khan, who had been residing at Mecca for the last 5 or 6 years, and was subject to occasional fits of insanity, had a fit again on the 10th September, and made remarks derogatory to the Arab ulema. The matter was reported to the King, who put him in gaol. The marks of which were seen on his body.

6. The general belief is that poison was administered to him at the King's orders. His relatives found him quite fit on the morning of the 10th and were appalled of his death in the afternoon.

7. The primitive method of applying red-hot iron to the tongue to identify a thief is still in vogue. The Government is freely blamed for this change from the comparatively humane methods of the Turks to the present day brutal measures of the King, and in the present age of advanced civilisation. A case has recently come to my notice where this has been done, but there are many others that occur daily.

8. The caravans for Medina left Mecca during the period under report. The majority consisted of the Persians, while there is a certain number of Indians also, who number about 1,200. One Indian, S. Murtaza Hussain, who has been in Mecca for

some years, and is a great favourite of the King, asked the latter's permission to proceed to Medina. The caravans having already left a day previously, the King refused the request, and, pointing towards me, said that, "If I let you go now, this person will catch me by the throat if anything happened to you."

9. It is a common sight in Mecca to see officers of the Arab Government in uniform and carrying umbrellas, even on horseback. The daily parade of the officer cadets consists of about 10 minutes of marching with their rifles, after which their arms are collected at one place and they clear stones from the open space opposite the barracks. Their uniform was certainly obtained from our stores, but as we could not apparently supply the head dress the cadets have to find their own, and they are therefore seen parading in all colours of the rainbow. One cadet is about 2 feet in height and 11 years of age.

The King has by his constant "snubbings" estranged some of the experts on the Agricultural Mission. One of them, Sayyid Ahmed Danoq, exchanged some very stiff telegrams with the King, and refused to stay at Taif, in spite of the King's orders. He with some others is shortly leaving for Syria, and for this reason

therefore do not put their hearts into their work and had better go. All their suggestions for improvement have been systematical.

King, and they have never been given a chance to do anything. They say that the King considers his personal knowledge of the country in matters of mechanism. 'Arif Bey, who is a great Outfitter and also a nationalist, is staying on, and may be appointed as Minister of Public Works. He is afraid of returning to Beirut, and although dissatisfied even here, would prefer to wait for awhile, as he has all his family here. He is also thinking of proceeding to Iraq with a view to influence the Moslem opinion there in favour of the King Hussein.

Mecca, September 18, 1920

[E 13008 85 44]

No. 262

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon — (Received October 21)

(No. 63)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, October 10, 1920

I BEG to report that the first meeting of the Advisory Council of Palestine took place on the 6th October. I attach a transcription of the speech I delivered on that occasion, and a précis of the remainder of the proceedings. The council consisted of ten unofficial members—four Moslems, three Jews, and three Christians, the last belonging respectively to the Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Protestant communities. They are drawn from the various districts of the country as follows: two each from Jerusalem, Jaffa, Nablus, one each from Haifa, Galilee, Hebron, and Beersheba.

The official members consist of the ten heads of the principal departments. Of the four Moslem members, one is Ismail Bey Hussein, belonging to a leading Palestinian family representing the land-owning and ex-Turkish official class; another is a Bedouin sheikh, and speaks for the Bedouin population; the two others are representative of other interests. Of the Christian members, one has large land and commercial interests in northern Palestine, the next is a doctor, and the third a merchant from Jaffa. Of the Jewish members, one is an educationalist and President of the Council of Jews of Jerusalem—he is also one of the two vice-presidents of that city; the second member is one of the principal representatives of the Jewish Colonisation Association in Palestine, which manages Baron Edmund de Rothschild colonies; the third is one of the leaders of the moderate sections of the Jewish labour organisations. It will be seen that the unofficial members of the council have been chosen so as to make it as representative as possible of various creeds, districts, and interests. All the members were present, excepting M. Kalvarisky, of the Jewish Colonisation Association, who is temporarily absent in Europe.

It was most satisfactory to find that the members of the council expressed themselves with freedom, and that, as will be seen from the précis of the proceedings, criticism was not absent. This is a healthy sign, as there was a danger that the members of the council, being nominated, might regard themselves as being summoned not to advise the Administration but merely to endorse its decisions. The

adoption by the members of an independent attitude will render it more probable that the council will hold the confidence of those sections of the population which are interested in political affairs. It will, of course, also render the council far more valuable to the Administration by providing an index of the trend of public opinion.

A number of practical suggestions on points of comparative detail emanated from the discussions that took place. The unofficial members of the council, on their side, expressed themselves in conversation as much gratified at the fact that their criticisms and suggestions had not only not been resented, but had been cordially welcomed, and at a dinner which I gave to them after the meetings, the principal critic, Dr. Habib Salem, made a speech in which he expressed these sentiments in the most cordial terms. The council sat for seven hours and adjourned till the 9th November. It is anticipated that the next sitting will last for two days. Meanwhile, meetings will be held of the sub-committee appointed as the outcome of the deliberations at the first meeting.

I consider that that meeting indicated the probability that the Advisory Council will prove to be a useful and effective body.

I have &c

HERBERT SAMUEL, High Commissioner

Enclosure 1 in No. 262

Notes on First Meeting of Advisory Council of Palestine

THE first meeting of the Advisory Council took place at Government House this morning under the presidency of his Excellency the High Commissioner. The following were present —

Mr J. B. Barron, Mr N. de M. Bentwich, Mr. Ben Zwi, Michel Effendi Beyrouthi, Mr. L. Campigli, Mr W. H. Deedes, Mr H. Harari, Colonel G. Horan, Ismail Bey Hassouni, Abdul Hadj Effendi El Khatib, Mr R. J. Legge, Sheikh Fathi Abu Mideen, Suliman Bey Nasuf, Mr E. R. Suwer, Dr Habib Salim, Mr H. A. Smallwood, Colonel W. F. Stirling, Mr R. Storrs, Suliman Effendi Abdul Razzak Toukan, Mr D. Yellin.

Owing to his unavoidable absence in England, M. M. Kalvarisky was unable to attend, whilst the place of Col. Holmes was taken by M. Campigli.

One of the district governors is co-opted as a temporary member of the council, election being in order of seniority of appointment. Colonel Postlethwaite, who was the first to be selected, at the last moment was unable to attend owing to indisposition and his place was therefore taken by Col. Stirling, who was available at the moment.

R. R. BADCOCK, Secretary to Council

Government House, Jerusalem,
October 8, 1920

Enclosure 2 in No. 262

Speech delivered by Sir H. Samuel at First Meeting of Advisory Council

I BEG to offer to the members of the Advisory Council a cordial welcome on the occasion of their first meeting.

The council meets at a time when the country is happily in a state of tranquillity. The Military Administration, which had been established in Palestine since the occupation by the British army, was faced by many difficulties, against which it strove with single-minded zeal. Upon the foundations that were then laid the Civil Administration has been able to build.

Public security is, on the whole, well safeguarded and the amount of crime compares favourably with that which exists in other countries in similar conditions. The Administration is well aware, however, that there is room for improvement in regard to the security of the country. It confidently relies upon the co-operation of all sections of the community.

It is with this object in view that the Council is convened, to discuss the situation in Jerusalem and Haifa and of outlining the policy which the Government intended to pursue. It would, I think, serve a useful purpose if to-day I were to recall, point

by point, the declarations then made, and were to inform you of the progress that has been effected during the interval that has elapsed.

With reference to the northern frontier of Palestine, negotiations have continued with the French Government, but are not yet completed. From the towns of the north, I have received during the last few months a great deal of information for British assistance in the conduct of the local administration, and I proceeded to Es Salt on the 20th August, where, at a representative meeting, I announced the results of the discussions with the French Government. Subsequently, British officers have been stationed in Ajlun, Salt, Amman, and Kerak, who have promoted the formation of self-governing bodies and the establishment of an efficient gendarmerie for the maintenance of public security. These measures have been taken with the concurrence of the French Government and of the Damascus Administration. I trust that the outcome may be the establishment of a greater degree of law and order and the protection of trade and industry, which will not only benefit the population of Trans-Jordan, but will also be of service to the people of Palestine. It will be more easy to stop at their source raids from the east, and the development of peaceful trade cannot fail to be of advantage in the increase of the food supplies of Palestine and in furnishing a market for certain of its products.

I announced in my inaugural speech that an Advisory Council would be established. It meets to-day, in fulfilment of that promise. It should be clearly understood that this is to be regarded only as a first step in the development of self-governing institutions. In course of time, as the political situation becomes more settled, it is hoped to proceed further along that path. I would desire to explain also that this council has not been formed on the basis of the representation of areas. The members are selected for their personal qualifications, though due regard has been paid to the proper representation of districts, religious communities, and economic interests.

The staff of the Administration has been reconstituted, and a number of changes have been made. Three new departments have been created dealing with immigration, labour, and agriculture. The cost of these departments, it is estimated, will be about £100,000 per annum. In the department of agriculture, which contains thirteen British officers, it has been found possible to reduce, in accordance mainly with plans made by my predecessor, the number of British officers in the higher ranks in the Palestine Civil Administration by twenty-seven compared with the numbers under the Military Administration. On the other hand, the number of Palestinian officers has been increased by eighteen. Of the officials of the junior services, which consist of the clerical staff of the departments, including cashiers and accountants, 91 per cent are Palestinians. In the technical junior services, excluding casual labour, 97 per cent are Palestinian. As some misunderstanding has arisen on the subject, I desire to state that a knowledge of English is not a condition of employment for Palestinian officers of the Administration. On the other hand, a knowledge of Arabic is insisted upon for all British officers employed in the districts.

In my inaugural speech reference was made to the reopening of the land register. There has been some delay, which I greatly regret, due to the importance of the provisions of the new Land Ordinance and the necessity for their examination by the experts of the British Government in London. The registers have, however, been put into the hands of the local authorities, and the work of the register is now in progress. A Land Commission has been established, and is actively at work examining proposals for the better use of areas of Government and other lands, due regard being paid to the protection of the interests of the existing cultivators. A Land Survey Department is being constituted, and will, I trust, begin its work in the immediate future.

Among the measures of chief importance to the development of the country is the establishment of banks for lending money for long terms on the security of real property. The Turkish laws were not such as to favour the establishment of such banks. I appointed, therefore, a commission of a representative character to examine the situation in this respect, and on receipt of their report an ordinance for the amendment of the law has been issued. I am in communication with financial interests in other countries in the hope that effective steps may be taken for the establishment of such banks. The situation is made more difficult, however, by the high rates of interest upon capital which now prevail throughout the world.

The railways of Palestine were taken over by this Administration from the military authorities on the 1st October. By arrangements with the Egyptian Government and with the army authorities, the Palestine Railway Department will operate—without owning—the line between Kantara and Rafa. A considerable sum of money has been allocated by this Government for the works necessary to protect the railways of Palestine against interruptions by wash-outs, such as occurred last winter, and for the widening of the line from Ludd to Jaffa. The protective works are now actively proceeding, the widening has been completed and I had the pleasure of opening yesterday the broad gauge connection with Jaffa.

A large programme of road construction and repair is in progress. Among the more important works which have been undertaken are the following—

The sections between Beersheba and Bethlehem, Bethlehem and Jerusalem, Jerusalem and Bethany, Bethany and Jericho, Jerusalem and Bab-el Wad, Bab-el Wad and Jaffa, Jerusalem and Nablus, Tulkeram and Anabta, Nablus and Anabta, Anabta and Mesudieh, Mesudieh and Jenin, Jenin and Nazareth, Nazareth and Haifa, Nazareth and Tiberias, Tiberias and Semakh, Tiberias and Resh Pina.

In addition, work is now proceeding for the restoration of the road from Ghoranieh Bridge to Salt, and measures are under consideration for the improvement of communication between Jerusalem and Kerak. Work is actively in progress upon a considerable extension of the jetty at Haifa which is likely to prove of service to the commerce of that port, pending the construction of a suitable harbour.

In relation to public health, I have appointed an expert commission to prepare plans for an extended campaign against malaria, by the draining of marshes, and other measures. Free malaria treatment is now being given fortnightly in all villages of Palestine. I desire to mention that no Government hospitals or dispensaries for the civilian population were maintained in Palestine prior to the British occupation. At the present time the Government maintains fifteen hospitals with a total of 203 beds, it also maintains twenty-one dispensaries, eight clinics, and five epidemic posts. These measures, in conjunction with the generous provision made by non-official bodies, cannot fail to be of great advantage to the health of the population.

A veterinary service has been established, and measures have been taken to protect the herds and flocks of Palestine against the introduction of cattle plague and other diseases.

I rejoice to find a widespread demand throughout the country for the improvement of facilities for education. Proposals under this head will be laid before you to-day for your consideration. There is urgent need for an increase in the facilities for elementary, secondary, and higher education. The first steps are being taken for the establishment of a law school, at which Palestinian students may receive instruction without leaving the country, and measures are being adopted to give professional training to the young. It is my earnest desire to provide opportunities for education in the professions to young Palestinians belonging to the educated classes.

The establishment of a Department of Antiquities will promote archaeological research and protect the antiquities of the country. This is a sphere in which Palestine should be pre-eminent, and in which it engages the interest of the whole world. An Archaeological Council has been formed representing both local and international interests, which will be consulted on all questions of importance. Excavations have been begun by the Palestine Exploration Fund at Ascalon, and are in contemplation by the British Museum. Plans have been prepared for the suitable development of the towns of Jerusalem, Haifa, and Tiberias, and others are under consideration. A Town Planning Ordinance has been drafted and is being presented for your consideration. In order that building shall not be avoidably delayed, pending the enactment of the ordinance and the final establishment of the commissions that are necessary, I am taking provisional measures to enable permits to be given for the construction of buildings that are not likely to be affected by the new plans.

An ordinance has been promulgated to prevent the disfigurement of the country by the abuses of advertisement, which will come into operation on the 1st November.

Restrictions upon travel have been reduced to a minimum. Military permits for entry into Palestine have been abolished, and civil permits have been introduced. The immigration of tourists. An Immigration Department has been established to organise the control of permanent settlers, with special reference to the capacity of the country to provide employment. A certain number of

immigrants, mostly Jews, are now arriving at the ports, and they are finding employment in the building of roads and in the redemption of land previously derelict. Their presence is thus not only no detriment to the interests of the existing population but of direct advantage to them, by increasing the resources and prosperity of the country. It is one illustration of the fact that the process of the establishment of the Jewish national home will benefit and not injure the non-Jewish population.

An Afforestation Ordinance has been enacted for the protection of forests, the planting of which is an urgent necessity. The Government has established nurseries from which many hundreds of thousands of seedlings will be planted annually, but I trust that private landowners and the agricultural colonies, which have been established in recent years, will play a very large part in promoting the growth of timber, for which Palestine is eminently suited, but in which at present it is sadly lacking.

The fish tax has been abolished, and the import duty on building materials has been reduced from 11 to 3 per cent.

I have had the pleasure of paying official visits to eleven of the principal towns and to twenty-four villages and colonies, and have everywhere received from the people a welcome marked by cordial friendliness and good-will. I would desire to take this opportunity of expressing my grateful thanks for the kindness which has been shown to me on the occasion of these visits throughout the country. I think I may claim that the spirit of impartiality between races and creeds, which I undertook should be the paramount principle in the conduct of the Administration, has been faithfully preserved.

The amnesty to political offenders announced in my inaugural speech has had a useful effect. It has met with a response in the same spirit in which it was offered. I have been able to abolish the censorship of the press. It has, fortunately, not been necessary hitherto to take any special measures for the maintenance of the political tranquillity of the country, and a greater spirit of harmony among all sections and creeds is at present happily prevailing than previously existed. I earnestly hope it may long continue for the well-being of the country and of all its inhabitants.

Enclosure 3 in No. 16.

Proceedings of the First Meeting of the Advisory Council of Palestine. (Held at Haifa, 11th November 1920. Presided over by His Excellency the High Commissioner.)

HIS Excellency, having delivered his opening speech, Mr. Beyrouti rose and thanked the High Commissioner for the admirable and kind speech which he had delivered. He felt sure that all the members of the council realised that the present meeting was an historical occasion in the annals of Palestine, on which posterity would record its verdict.

He felt sure that the whole population of Palestine was convinced of the sincerity of His Majesty's Government and confident of the benefits which would accrue from British administration.

Abdel Hay Effendi el Khatib (Hebron) thanked his Excellency and, through him Great Britain, for what had already been accomplished by the Administration. He prayed God, in the name of the Holy Prophet, that his Excellency's actions might be directed towards the maintenance of peace and prosperity in the country and especially commended to his Excellency's notice the care of the agricultural population.

Mr. David Yellin remarked that this was the day to which the people of Palestine had been looking forward through many weary years—the day of emancipation and self-government. His Excellency had remarked in his address that only three months had elapsed since he came to Palestine as High Commissioner. The Prophet Isaiah on his return to Zion said that the land could not be restored in one day—but the High Commissioner had shown that much could be accomplished in a very short time. His Excellency in his address referred to the numerous works that had been undertaken by the Government of Palestine. One could see in those actions, complete and comprehensive schemes for the welfare and prosperity of the country. He realised that this was only a beginning and that much yet remained to be done.

This meeting was the first step towards the scheme which would enable the people to elect their own representatives to take part in the actual government of the country. He declared that the present peaceful state of affairs was due to the personality of his Excellency.

With regard to the development of the country he hoped that those who wished to help in the rebuilding of Palestine would be allowed to do so.

Dr Habib Yatoon Salim referred to the good effects already shown by the British Government in an increase of prosperity. He was glad to hear that England desired self-government for Palestine. A positive definition of the meaning of the word "mandate" had not been given, and it would be necessary to wait and see what was actually implied and what the results would be. At present there was only a slight change between the Military and Civil Administrations. True, a very large percentage of the positions in the junior service were occupied by Palestinians, but as regards the senior service this was not the case.

He did not agree. There were a number of Palestinians whose education and experience warranted entry into the senior service. He contended that District Governors should be Palestinians with British advisors. He asked if the members of the Advisory Council had the right to propose amendments to the ordinances recently issued and other laws. It was expected that intended immigrants should be rich but those already here were poor and were a drain on the country. The inhabitants of the country were looking forward to the help these immigrants would bring but the reverse was the case.

His Excellency the High Commissioner expressed his gratitude for the kind words extended to him and loyalty towards the Government and he was most thankful to Dr Habib Salim for his suggestions. He trusted that members would not hesitate freely to express their opinions on matters relating to the welfare of the country in which they all in common were deeply interested. He pointed out that Palestine was in the first stages of development after the trials and tribulations of war and after the change from the Turkish régime. Before he came and when he came he saw that the country was hungering for many necessary changes. Everything was being done to expedite these changes. There had been some little delay in forming this council on account of the difficulty in ensuring proper representation of all classes and creeds, and rather than that the machinery of the Government should have remained at a standstill in the interim, certain ordinances which were considered necessary were carefully thought out and promulgated but he answered Dr Salim's question by saying that the council was certainly free to propose amendments to these ordinances and other laws. With regard to British officers in the Administration, members of the council would remember, that in his inaugural speech he stated that in the first stages of the country's development it was desirable

much to be done requiring technical knowledge and experience and he was of opinion that Palestine would be well advised in retaining the services of those officers whose knowledge and experience and service had already been put to the test. He hoped that the maximum number of British officers was now employed and that in the future, they might be gradually replaced by Palestinians. Many of the latter had already been appointed to senior posts both in districts and departments—the process would continue. He had given figures in his speech that day showing that the number of British officers had already been reduced and that of the Palestinians increased.

Dr Habib Yatoon Salim thanked his Excellency for his trouble in replying to the various points and for his having invited the council to speak freely on matters which affected the country. He would like to see British District Governors and Palestinian Assistant Governors.

Mr. D. Yellin disagreed. He thought it essential to have the guidance of approved British officials. It would take time for the people of Palestine to acquire the necessary technical knowledge and he considered that the surest way to effect this was to undergo a course of instruction under experienced officials. The public were anxiously looking forward to the time when Transjordan would be attached to Palestine and would reap the benefits of good government. Palestine would help Transjordan to trade. Transjordan was of vital importance to Palestine by reason of its cereals. As to languages, Mr. Yellin pointed out that English was not necessary for Palestinians but that Arabic should be a *sine qua non* for British district officials.

He urged that the question of the Hebrew language might receive more consideration.

Mr. Ben Zvi remarked that this council was representative of various classes and this was a good augury. He was glad to hear of the works which were being undertaken for the development of the country.

He disagreed with Dr Salim on the immigration question as he felt sure that the immigrants would be most helpful—in fact, many were already working on road construction and land reclamation. Such countries as Canada, Australia and America showed that it was not so much the wealth brought into the country, by the immigrant, that mattered as much as the production of a virile race able to develop the natural resources in the country, and he felt sure that the selected and superior Palestinian immigrant would build up the Palestine of the future.

He pleaded, on behalf of the working men of this country, that the laws relating to labour might be altered. Under the old régime, no responsibility was accepted, or compensation paid by the employer in the case of a workman being injured or killed at his work and he hoped this matter would be speedily dealt with. He urged to speak for everyone in Palestine in offering to his Excellency expressions of affection and loyalty in his great task of restoring Palestine to its former glory.

His Excellency the High Commissioner stated that he felt sure that all the members of the council were of the opinion that this matter should receive sympathetic consideration, but it might be as well to give notice of such matters so that they could be fully discussed at the next council meeting.

Suleiman Bey Nassif considered that the qualifications of many Palestinians were such as to enable them to take an active and prominent part in the administration of the country. He admitted that they might be inexperienced in administration.

He suggested that they should be given training in the District Governor's office so that they might get the necessary training, and at the same time be able to take part in the administration of the country.

He trusted that his Excellency would give the matter his consideration.

The members of the council received with applause a congratulatory telegram (Enclosure 4) from the Mayor of Jerusalem which his Excellency read out to the Assembly. A suitable reply was sent.

Dr. Salim supported Suleiman Bey Nassif regarding the appointment of Palestinians as understudies to District Governors and hoped that this might be practicable.

His Excellency promised that the matter should have his close attention.

Mr. Harari having made his statement on food control (Enclosure 5), a general discussion followed.

In reply to Mr. Beyrouth, Mr. Harari stated that there were no restrictions whatever imposed by the Government of Palestine upon the import into Palestine of goods from abroad. He was glad to assist traders in respect to the importation of any commodities.

In reply to Abdel Hay Effendi el Khatib he stated that the export of barley to Trans-Jordan was permissible provided that such export did not unduly deplete stocks in Palestine.

Sheikh Feresh Abu Mideen stated that some of their brethren in Trans-Jordan were in need of barley and the Government prevented them sending it.

In reply, His Excellency the High Commissioner stated that the District Governor of Beersheba was arriving at Government House shortly and the matter would be fully investigated.

Suliman Abdul Effendi Tounkan, referring to Mr. Harari's speech, stated that the price of barley was low, which indicated a plentiful supply. Mr. Harari agreed, but pointed out that, in view of the world shortage of cereals, they should be reserved for emergencies, and should therefore husband their supplies, which hardly appeared adequate to meet local requirements.

Sheikh Feresh Abu Mideen stated that he understood there were large quantities of barley at Gaza which the people wished to sell, and urged that permission be given to export.

The question of tithes was then fully discussed. The desirability of receiving them in kind was debated at length, and it was clear that the collection of tithes in kind was open to grave objection.

His Excellency, replying to Sheikh Feresh Abu Mideen, stated that, if permission were given for the export of barley, it would certainly be a heavy burden on the price of wheat and make the cost of living a heavy burden on the poor of the

towns this winter. He considered that the title question should be examined more closely and that a statement should be circulated to members before the next meeting.

Dr. Salim spoke on the supply of sugar and rice. As regards the former commodity, the price was so high that the poor could only afford to buy it once or twice a year. He suggested that the Government should consider the possibility of importing sugar from Egypt.

In reply, Mr. Hurari stated that, with reference to Palestine, sugar and rice could not be regarded as essential food stuffs to the same extent as cereals, legumes, meat &c., and that the export of locally-grown rice and Egyptian sugar from Egypt was prohibited. He added that the Government had been disappointed, the Government having sustained loss on the rice sold in the Government food shops. The price of sugar for export from Egypt was £E 13, and here £E 132 per ton. Rice was obtainable at Port Said at £E 41 per ton. He pointed out that it was the duty of the Government to assist traders, but he was of opinion, and he was sure the members of the council would agree with him that it was not the business of the Government to interfere with private enterprise beyond what was absolutely necessary.

Mr. Ben Zvi referred to the promotion of co-operative societies as one means of combating the high cost of living and suggested that preferential treatment should be given to such societies.

His Excellency said that an ordinance had just been issued for the encouragement of co-operative societies. The railway rates must be fixed on commercial lines.

EDUCATION. The Assistant Director of Education (Mr. Legge) then read a statement, copy of which is attached (Enclosure 6).

Imail Bey el Husseini suggested that schools should be formed in each village. The money for them to be collected from each village. He considered that these schools should embody technical and agricultural courses.

Mr. Beyrouti stated that it was the bounden duty of the inhabitants of the country freely to contribute for this purpose. Taking as a basis 400,000 males in the country, if, out of this number, one-third would be eligible to pay a tax of 50 piastres per annum, it would be a great help.

Dr. Salim disagreed. If they levied a round sum of, say, £E 5 on each village it would only mean a small contribution from each house in the village and would not operate harshly.

Mr. Yellin stated that they were all agreed as to the vital importance of this subject. It was only a question of the ways and means which they should adopt to get the money for that purpose. He pointed out that, in the case of Jewish and Christian schools, the Government did not contribute anything towards the cost.

Sheikh Ferrik Abu Mudein asked that the funds of the Wakfs be handed back to the Moslems. If this were done, they would not ask for Government assistance.

His Excellency the High Commissioner remarked that although the question presented many difficulties, he was sure they would overcome them. He considered that the subject of education was of such paramount importance that it should be taken in hand at once, and, if the council agreed, he would appoint a sub-committee to go fully into the matter and render a report as soon as possible. This was agreed to.

Mr. Bentwich read a note on the Land Transfer Ordinance.

Sheikh Mudein and Dr. Salim were of opinion that the proposed tax of 5 piastres per donum for surveying would be a hardship on the people. They did not see the necessity of this survey as the Mukhtars knew the boundaries of the land.

His Excellency pointed out that, in the case of large tracts of land, the cost would only be 2 piastres, and that this was very little compared with the work performed and benefits to be derived. People's land would be registered, boundaries marked, and any possibility of friction or dispute avoided.

It was decided that a committee of the council should consider the recent ordinances affecting land, including the question of survey fees.

Mr. Bentwich read a note on the old form of land mortgage (Enclosure 7). This was discussed at considerable length, and it was decided that the various points raised by members of the council should be considered by the same committee.

TOBACCO MONOPOLY (see Enclosure 10). This was mentioned and the members of the Advisory Council agreed that it was desirable that it should be abolished.

Dr. Salim stated that the people of Palestine would be very glad to see it abolished forthwith. If this was not at once practicable, he hoped the Government would encourage the growing of the tobacco plant.

His Excellency said that he was awaiting information as to the legal position of the Tobacco Regie under the terms of the Turkish Peace Treaty.

Mr. Yellin said that he had been requested by the Municipality of Jerusalem, of which he was a member, to bring to notice a subject affecting the welfare of the city. The municipality wanted to see Jerusalem renovated and repaired. This could not be done by the taxes the municipality levied. The only solution to the problem was for the municipality to issue a loan, the interest of which could be paid by the monies at present being spent in making ineffectual repairs. He would be glad if the question could be considered.

His Excellency the High Commissioner, in reply, said that there were funds which could be put at the disposal of the municipality provided that they were prepared to pay the interest on the loan and sinking fund. In this way the money required could be obtained at a cheaper rate than elsewhere. The system of municipal revenues needed examination. He therefore proposed that an enquiry be made into the finances of each town, and a commission would be appointed which would have three permanent members with other local members added for the purpose of its enquiring into each loan, beginning with Jerusalem. He entirely agreed with the municipality's proposal to borrow money for purposes of permanent improvement.

Mr. Salim pointed out that 60 to 80 per cent. of the deaths at Nablus were due to malaria brought about by the bad drainage and water supply. Malaria was also very prevalent.

In reply, Colonel Heron (Director Public Health) said that a new water supply and drainage scheme for Nablus would soon begin to function. Malaria, which had long been a scourge in Palestine, was receiving the closest attention. An Anti-malaria Commission had already been appointed, and he hoped this scourge would eventually be eradicated.

Several members of the council commented upon the amount of good that would accrue from such meetings, and the great advantages of free discussion and interchange of opinions. It was decided that the council should sit two days in each month. The next meeting would be on Tuesday, the 9th November.

His Excellency expressed his regret that he should have asked them to work so hard that day. He thanked the members for the lively interest they had taken and the assistance they had rendered.

The meeting then adjourned after a sitting of over seven hours.

Enclosure 4 in No. 262

Exchange of Compliments between Mayor of Jerusalem and Sir H. Samuel

THE following is a copy of telegram received by his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine from the Mayor of Jerusalem —

"On the occasion of the opening of the Advisory Council, who, it is hoped, will realise the anticipations of the communities in issuing ordinances which will ensure the prosperity of the Holy City, I, on behalf of the inhabitants of this Holy City, congratulate you, your Excellency and the members of the council all success and prosperity. — RAHMAN EL NACHICHAWY, Mayor of Jerusalem

The following reply has been sent —

"The members of the Advisory Council desire me to express their cordial thanks for the telegram received on the occasion of their first meeting which you have been good enough to send on behalf of yourself and the inhabitants of Jerusalem. They share your hopes that their deliberations may promote the welfare of Palestine and of its revered capital. — HERBERT SAMUEL

Enclosure 5 in No. 261

Note on the Food Supply of Palestine

THE question of securing the essential food supplies of Palestine during the coming winter has been a matter of grave concern to the Government. It was

naturally desired to allow the fullest possible liberty for the sale of agricultural produce in the most advantageous markets, but, after the assessment of the winter tithes, there could be little doubt that the situation was likely to become serious should the policy of *laissez-faire* be adopted.

2. Supplies were short and the temporary benefit accruing from sales for export at tempting quotations would be dearly bought at the price of subsequent scarcity, increased cost of living, and probable import at still more inflated rates to tide over the lean months preceding the next harvest.

In this respect it should be remembered that, speaking at the Grocers' Exhibition in London, Mr. McCurdy, the Food Controller, declared that, apart from a possible coal strike, food prices by Christmas would have risen to such an extent as to make a working class family's weekly food bills 8s. 6d. more than last Christmas. He added that the crucial time as regards food prices had not yet come. It would come when the peoples of Central Europe became competitors in the world's markets with themselves.

3. As regards Palestine the military authorities were asked, and consented to forgo purchases of cereals, legumes (beans, peas, chick peas, lentils, &c.) and sheep, as such purchases seriously depleted local stocks of foodstuffs, thus raising prices to the detriment of other consumers, but palliative measures of this sort although necessary, could not be regarded as sufficient, and the solution of the problem required further action.

4. The following brief notes summarise the position as regards the principal foodstuffs, and the action taken —

(1) *Meat* is scarce and costly. Measures are being initiated to foster the export of sheep and cattle from Transjordan and of chilled meat from Australia. Further, the Governments of Egypt and the Sudan have been induced to consent to release for export to Palestine a monthly supply of 400-500 heads of Sudan cattle. The prices quoted have so far, however, been too high to tempt local traders.

(2) *Olive and Olive Oil* — In view of the excellent prospects of the new crop, the export of olive oil is being restricted. The price of olive oil is expected to be largely determined by the actual yield, but it is hoped that no restrictions will be necessary.

(3) *Cereals and Legumes* — A plentiful supply of these commodities is essential, as they form the staple food of the population and furnish the grain ration for the animals. The supply of these commodities is expected to be available both from home-grown crops and foreign sources.

(4) Neglecting for the moment the question of import, the total visible supplies amount to —

	Tons
Winter crops (wheat, barley, legumes) (based on tithe estimates)	140 000
Durra (estimated)	25 000
	165 000
Additional 15 per cent. to allow for underestimation and non-titheable areas	25 000
	190 000
(b) As against this, the requirements stand at —	Tons
Population (estimated 700,000) at a rate of 150 kilos per head per annum	105 000
Animals (based on a minimum ration, allowing for grazing and census figures, obtained during the last two months, giving a total of some 134 000 heads)	77 000
Seed grain (10 per cent. of this year's crops)	19 000
	201 000

Showing an apparent deficit of 8,000 tons of cereals and legumes of all sorts.

(c) There is reason to believe that this will be made good by imports of wheat &c. from Transjordan, and flour from Egypt (the world prices of cereals, foreign export restrictions, and the level of freights rendering it unlikely that important

consignments from other sources would be available), but, even then, equilibrium can be reached only by carefully husbanding local supplies. The Government has, therefore, been reluctantly compelled to consider export restrictions, with regard to which it has taken the following decisions:

(i) The export of wheat, barley and durra is prohibited until after the winter, when the situation will again be reviewed.

(ii) No restrictions will be placed upon the export of legumes (beans, peas, chick peas, lentils, &c.).

(iii) Cereals and legumes in transit from Transjordan will be dealt with on the same general lines as Palestinian crops.

5. Additional measures are under consideration to ensure adequate supplies for such of the larger towns as are apt to suffer in the winter through lack of transport facilities and uneven distribution. These measures may involve the holding and retailing of stocks of wheat or flour by the Government or its agents. The policy of the Administration in this respect will be notified in due course, it will be guided by the desire to prevent an undue rise in the cost of living, without interfering beyond what is absolutely necessary, with the course of legitimate trade.

Enclosure 6 in No.

Statement by Mr. Legge on Educational Policy

It is not, I am sure, necessary in such an assembly as this to speak of the great need of education of all types in Palestine at the present time, as I feel sure that the members are as alive as I am to the vital importance of education in the future of this country.

Before, however, suggesting the lines of future educational policy in Palestine, may I state the present position and something of what has already been done.

When the British army occupied Palestine and was responsible for the administration of the country, the educational policy was governed by international precedent, and consequently the Turkish regime was continued, and an endeavour was made to make their system more efficient, and, as under the Ottoman Government though Jews and Christians had equal educational rights according to the law, all the Government schools were Moslem.

We have at present 123 schools entirely financed from central funds and controlled directly by inspectors resident in the districts, in consultation with district governors. Weekly reports are sent in by these officials to headquarters and headquarters have to be consulted in all matters of importance. The pay rolls are made out at headquarters and all teachers paid by cheque from the Treasury. In addition to these 123 schools, there are 53 grant-in-aid schools, which obtain a subvention of £E. 30 a year on condition that the village contributes a like sum.

The total Budget for education is £E. 54,000 approximately, and £E. 24,000 of this is spent on the 123 schools. There are two training colleges, one for men and one for women, in Jerusalem, chiefly residential and entirely free. Both of these colleges possess hostels in which the majority of the students live. Vacancies are made known to the district governor some time before the entrance examination is held, and all candidates must pass a medical examination before entering the college. The students show great keenness in their work, and it is hoped that the physical training side of college life may be developed this year especially in the men's college.

In the country districts it has been found very difficult to remove the long standing prejudice against girls' education, but in all the towns girls' schools are now in running order.

There are certain problems which it may be wise to consider at the present time. The Department of Education is educating about 9,000 children in the Government schools and 2,000 attend the grant-in-aid schools. Thus, if we take the Moslem population at 606,000 and one in every six as a child of school age we get 111,000 children. Almost all Jewish and most of the Christian children attend schools other than Government schools. Thus there are, at a rough estimate, from 90,000 to 95,000 children not attending school at all.

Enquiries have been made by the Department of Education as to the

of grouping villages together and thus making one school do for two or even three villages. It is estimated that rather over 300 new schools would have to be started in the districts in order to render education accessible to the whole population. Further, in very few of the villages is it possible to find a building which could be made into a hygienic school, and consequently a very large building programme would have to be evolved.

A village school will cost from £E. 400 to £E. 700 to build and £E. 125 to equip. Thus an initial expenditure of £E. 137,000 would be necessary in order to open a school for all children, but as 50 per cent. of the children would be girls (presumably), a less sum would cover the cost for initial outlay for boys' schools in the villages. Further, the average yearly expenses per school would be about £E. 250 and thus a large increase in current expenditure must be considered. However, a great desire for education is being evinced in the country districts and the means money must also receive our attention. Any substantial increase in the number of schools, would, however, require an increase in the training of teachers and teachers are impossible to obtain and must, therefore, be trained.

There is another point which might, perhaps, be considered by this Council—whether it would be well to make the localities, town as well as country, pay a percentage of the up-keep of the schools in their areas. The present system would appear to be hardly fair to the rural districts as only a small percentage of the funds goes to the up-keep of village schools, and the grant-in-aid schools pay 50 per cent. of their own up-keep. It is a matter for discussion whether it would not be wise to abolish all purely State-supported schools. Further, technical education is deserving of the ordinary curriculum of all elementary schools.

Instruction in agriculture would appear quite feasible in the country districts and good craftsmen might be obtained to instruct older pupils in the various trades, such as carpentering, weaving, bootmaking, etc.

Government secondary education is one of the problems which perhaps

secondary schools exist in various towns but none of them teach in the Arabic language. In the Government schools in Jerusalem, Nablus and Acre, secondary classes are attached to the large boys' schools, but the need for secondary schools would seem to be growing rapidly.

Perhaps the most important problem of all those which confront us is that of the health of the children of school age. The whole of the matter, however, is in the hands of the Department of Public Health, and a scheme is now being brought into operation which should do much to alleviate the sufferings of the children.

An inspection of every school child will take place at regular intervals, and nurses are being trained who will attend the schools regularly in order to treat such children as they may be found.

A further and somewhat intricate question is that of the relation of the Government to the private and religious schools, and the extent to which financial aid should be given to them. If no grants are made to these schools it would appear to be questionable whether they can be expected to pay the same proportion of taxation as that part of the community which benefits educationally.

It would appear then that the following are among the most important points which present themselves for discussion—

- 1 The increase of village schools
- 2 Payment of a proportion of the expenses of schools by the municipality or district or village
- 3 Technical education
- 4 Government secondary schools
- 5 Grant-in-aid to private and religious schools

Enclosure 7 in No. 292

Note on the Law of Mortgage

THE Land Transfer Ordinance provides that a mortgage shall not be registered unless it complies with the terms of the provisional law of 1331 concerning mortgages. The law provides that a mortgage may be registered and is security for a Bai Bil Wafa (sale with right of repurchase).

The system introduced by the later Turkish law is undoubtedly a great improvement on the old and is in accordance with European laws as to mortgage. Under the old provision the borrower parted with the legal property and also sometimes with the possession of the land to the lender. That system allowed the lender to make extortionate terms for his advance, and if the borrower failed to pay the loan at the time fixed for repurchase, he was deprived of his interest altogether and the lender became the owner.

Under the later law the mortgagor has the use and enjoyment of the land, and can sell it subject to the mortgagee's rights. In case he fails to repay the loan the lender can only put up the property for auction but does not become the owner himself. The new system of mortgage will help to prevent the extension of large areas of land in the hands of money-lenders which took place under the old system and will also help to prevent extortionate loans to small cultivators.

Enclosure 8 in No. 292

Note on a Town Planning Scheme

IN England and America and most European countries the Government has found it necessary to introduce town planning legislation, with the object of securing the orderly and convenient development of new quarters, the laying-out of open spaces and gardens, and the gradual reconstruction of such parts of existing towns as are congested and insanitary. It is most important that legislation of this kind should be immediately introduced into Palestine. Outside the old walls of the city of Jerusalem a number of quarters have grown up in recent years which are generally ill-planned and ill-constructed. It is especially the case in Jaffa, Haifa and Tiberias where there is certain to be great extension of the city, and indeed in every town where new quarters grow up, there must be public control of the building, so as to secure healthy and regular development.

This may be accomplished by the promulgation of a scheme prepared by the Government, which will regulate the direction of new roads, the sites of important buildings, the areas to be devoted to parks and gardens, and so on. The scheme when approved by the Government becomes binding upon the landowners of the district, who must conform with it in all future building operations.

The legislation which is proposed here adopts these principles. Two authorities will be set up to control town development and reconstruction, a central commission charged mainly with the duty of preparation of plans and general supervision over the execution of the scheme, and a local commission for each district. The central commission will sit, and the Governor and the municipal engineer and the public health officer will sit. The local commission will direct and control on the spot the execution of the scheme. The plans prepared by the central commission will be submitted to the High Commissioner and opportunity will be given to any landowner to criticize and suggest modifications of the scheme.

Plans will immediately be prepared for Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa and Tiberias, and will extend to land in the neighbourhood of the present cities. The scheme among other things may include provisions as to the direction and construction of roads, the character and height of the buildings, the space to be left about buildings, the definition of zones within which special trades and industries may be carried on, or which are to be reserved for residential and other purposes, and the creation of gardens and open spaces.

The scheme may also contain proposals for the rearrangement of plots of land, and the expropriation of land for public purposes. The scheme when approved by the Government becomes binding upon the landowners of the district, who must conform with it in all future building operations.

After a period of not less than two months from the date of the publication of the notice that the scheme has been deposited, the central commission may apply to the High Commissioner for authority to put the scheme in force. Any objections that may be lodged against the scheme and the answers furnished thereto will accompany the application. If the High Commissioner approves of the scheme it will be published in the "Gazette," and will come into operation in a time to be fixed.

As regards expropriation it is necessary not to place too heavy a burden on the [5773] 2 X 2

community in carrying out the improvement scheme. Rules have therefore been made for limiting the compensation that will have to be paid where land is taken for general purposes. It is proposed that in default of agreement the price shall be fixed at its estimated market value immediately prior to the outbreak of war plus 50 per cent which is allowed to make up for the fall in the value of money. The landowner is to be paid in exchange for what is taken, and may also make arrangements for redistributing land between different owners. Where an undeveloped area is included in the town plan, the land for the construction of roads can be expropriated without compensation, provided the former owner is left with sufficient land for building. The landowner is to be paid for the building on the road which will meet his reasonable requirements. There must be a certain partnership between the land-owner and the whole community if the cities of Palestine are to develop according to a good plan. Provision is also made for the payment of compensation for land expropriated being spread over a period not exceeding ten years. The local commission will be empowered to leave the property that has been expropriated but is not immediately required for development in the possession of its former owners, and when the land is required later to pay the owner 4 per cent. per annum on the amount of the compensation as interest. If at the end of the period of ten years the local commission does not complete the expropriation, because it is found that the land is not wanted, it will pay to the owner 8 per cent. of the price determined for each year during which the land has been held up. In order to safeguard the housing of people in quarters which are to be reconstructed, it is provided that dwelling houses shall not be demolished until suitable accommodation for all the residents has been made available within the municipal area.

The cost of the town planning scheme will be met wholly or in part by a contribution to be levied by the local commission on all owners of property which is increased in value by reason of the scheme. It may be possible to meet part of the cost in certain cases by loans, but for the most part the scheme will have to pay for itself. What is paid to owners of land expropriated or of property injured by the scheme, in the way of compensation, will be recovered from the owners of land improved by the scheme in the way of increment tax. Claims for compensation on the ground of injury were limited by provisions that there shall be no right to compensation on account of any regulations in the scheme which prescribe the space about buildings, or the height or character of buildings, or limit the number of buildings to be erected on a particular area. In the scheme it is provided that the landowner should be controlled in the use of his property. It is further provided that where a prohibition against building at all on any land is made by the scheme, compensation shall not be payable to the landowner unless he can prove actual loss in one of three ways (a) that he began building operations on the land prior to the coming into force of the scheme, (b) that he has entered into a contract made other preparations for building, and (c) that he bought the land with the intention of building on it within ten years prior to the publication of the scheme. The scheme prevents from building by circumstances beyond his control. The preparation of town plans may take some time, but as soon as an order is issued constituting a town planning area a certain control will be exercised over all new buildings and streets within the area, thus in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa and Tiberias, pending the definite approval of the town plan, no person will be able to lay out or construct any street, or to erect, pull down, or reconstruct any building without obtaining a permit from the local commission. If the refusal of the local commission to grant a permit to the owner seems to be unreasonable he will have the right to appeal to the central commission, whose decision shall be final. A breach of these regulations will make the person in contravention liable to a fine up to £E 200 and he may further be required to demolish the work.

Enclosure 9 in N. 100

The Administration of Palestine Anqaf

THE administration of the Wakfs in Palestine is under the control and direction of the Central Wakf Council, which is composed of a president nominated by the High Commissioner and delegates from all parts of Palestine where Mahomedan Wakfs exist. The functions of the council are to administer the internal affairs and

to control the financial arrangements of the Anqaf. They draw up the annual estimates of receipts and expenditure, which are submitted for the approval of the High Commissioner by the delegate of the Government sitting upon the council.

The Government delegate is styled 'Director of Anqaf,' and advises the High Commissioner on all matters relating to Mahomedan charities and pious foundations. He is a salaried official receiving the sum of £E 45 per mensem. The present holder of this position is Aref Eff. Hikmet Naahashibi.

The district affairs are under the supervision of three local directors, who in turn are advised by their committees sitting at —

- (a) Jerusalem—representing Jerusalem, Gaza, Hebron, Jaffa and Beersheba
- (b) Nablus—representing Nablus, Tulkeram and Jenin
- (c) Acre—representing Acre, Haifa and Galilee

The local bodies have absolute control of the internal affairs of the Wakfs in their districts, subject to the general supervision of the central council.

The revenues derived in part from rents of houses or lands, but mostly from tithes upon the village lands which have been bequeathed to the Anqaf:

Land tax 62 per cent of the revenue
 Tithe tax 26 per cent of the revenue
 Hake form 2 per cent of the revenue
 Grants from State form 10 per cent of the revenue

100 per cent

The estimated revenue under all items is £E. 35,000 for the current financial year.

The collection of tithes is undertaken by the Government, who prefer an annual charge of £E 850 to cover the cost of collection.

Jerusalem contributes 85 per cent. of the total revenues, Jaffa 12 per cent. and Acre 3 per cent., from which it will be observed that by the amalgamation of the revenues into one central fund, the less wealthy districts of Nablus and Acre, may, in case of need, receive financial assistance from Jerusalem.

List showing Grants made by the Government in Support of Moslem Wakf Endowments

Wakf Name	Grants	Total
Nablus Wakf and other Wakfs	£E 100	£E 100
(a) Nablus Wakf and other Wakfs	£E 100	£E 100
(b) E. Akhraf-el-Moslem	£E 100	£E 100
(c) E. Akhraf-el-Moslem	£E 100	£E 100
(d) E. Akhraf-el-Moslem	£E 100	£E 100
(e) E. Akhraf-el-Moslem	£E 100	£E 100
(f) E. Akhraf-el-Moslem	£E 100	£E 100
(g) E. Akhraf-el-Moslem	£E 100	£E 100
(h) E. Akhraf-el-Moslem	£E 100	£E 100
(i) E. Akhraf-el-Moslem	£E 100	£E 100
(j) E. Akhraf-el-Moslem	£E 100	£E 100
(k) E. Akhraf-el-Moslem	£E 100	£E 100
(l) E. Akhraf-el-Moslem	£E 100	£E 100
(m) E. Akhraf-el-Moslem	£E 100	£E 100
(n) E. Akhraf-el-Moslem	£E 100	£E 100
(o) E. Akhraf-el-Moslem	£E 100	£E 100
(p) E. Akhraf-el-Moslem	£E 100	£E 100
(q) E. Akhraf-el-Moslem	£E 100	£E 100
(r) E. Akhraf-el-Moslem	£E 100	£E 100
(s) E. Akhraf-el-Moslem	£E 100	£E 100
(t) E. Akhraf-el-Moslem	£E 100	£E 100
(u) E. Akhraf-el-Moslem	£E 100	£E 100
(v) E. Akhraf-el-Moslem	£E 100	£E 100
(w) E. Akhraf-el-Moslem	£E 100	£E 100
(x) E. Akhraf-el-Moslem	£E 100	£E 100
(y) E. Akhraf-el-Moslem	£E 100	£E 100
(z) E. Akhraf-el-Moslem	£E 100	£E 100

The sum of £E 6, 100, 000 was granted to the Wakfs in the year 1921, showing an increase of £E 2,896 on that of the previous year.

Note on Tobacco Monopoly

THE Régie des Tabacs was formed in 1884 and worked as a monopoly by a company registered under Ottoman law and styled "La Régie Impériale Cointéressée des Tabacs ottomans." This concession was renewed in 1913-1914 by the Ottoman Government.

A public notice issued by the Chief Administrator of Occupied Enemy Territory on the 11th June, 1918, declared that the convention between the Ottoman Government and the Régie, and the provisional law and regulations defining the rights of the Régie, were reinstated.

The concession was ceded to the society by the Ottoman Government for a period of fifteen years, as from the 15th April, 1914, and is in force through the dominions of the former Ottoman Empire, excepting in the vilayets of Baghdad, Basorah, Mossoul, the vilayet of Moudjahid, the vilayet of the Taurus, the vilayet of Chirak, and the Isle of Samos.

Under Annexe I of the Law of the Monopoly, the former Ottoman sanjaks, comprising Palestine, Transjordan, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt, are to be grown.

The privileges ceded to the company include—

1. The absolute monopoly of the manufacture, sale, and purchase of tobacco.
2. The imposition and proceeds of a prohibitive tax on imported tobacco, cigars, and snuff.
3. The right to grow tobacco only in the country only be grown under permit—and the purchase from cultivators of such supplies as the Régie may require. Tobacco may be exported under license, but may not be sold or used in the country for private consumption.
4. The right to the receipts of the title on home-grown tobacco, and the imposition of an additional tax of 4 piastres per kilo. on this product.
5. The levying of a special tax upon exported tobacco to Persia, Tunis, Morocco, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt.

The Régie Convention dated the 4th August, 1913, enumerates the financial provisions as follows—

1. The society will pay to the O.P.D.A. an annual contribution of LT.800,000 (Article 4).
2. After the payment of a dividend of 8 per cent. to its shareholders, and certain other deductions, it has to share its profits with the Government and the shareholders of the debt according to a sliding scale agreed upon by the three parties and enumerated in article 6 of the convention.

[E 12958 3880 44]

No. 263

Mr. Scott to Earl Curzon. — (Received October 21.)

(No. 1144)

My Lord,

Ramleh, October 13, 1920

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of a report (with enclosures) by Major W. Batten, acting British agent, Jeddah for the ten-day period ending the 30th September, 1920.

The person Omer Shakir mentioned in the report is the editor of the new Mecca newspaper "Al Falah," whilst Arif Bey is King Hussein's Syrian agricultural expert.

As Major Batten points out, the tone of Emir Abdullah's letter to Captain Nasiruddin does not preclude the possibility of an advance towards Syria after his arrival at Medina, but I think the Emir may be relied upon to forgo the honour of leading such an unpromising undertaking.

Copies of this despatch and enclosures have been sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem and Aden.

I have, &c

ERNEST SCOTT,

Acting High Commissioner

Report by Major Batten for the period September 20 to 30, 1920

(Secret.)

King Hussein and Mustapha Kemal.

RUMOURS that Mustapha Kemal was in communication with King Hussein were reported to me about 4th September.

On 12th September, I was informed by Captain Nasiruddin, that official news had been received from King Hussein, but that it was not yet official news.

Arif Bey, the editor of the "Al Falah," the King Hussein's Syrian agricultural expert, was the most decisive, speaking as if he had seen the documents, and assumed that it existed, in his discussions as to his possible propaganda in favour of King Hussein in Iraq. Omer Shakir was equally definite, but being wary, talked of the assertion of it in "Al Falah" as if it had been copied from another paper. The heading of the first reference in "Al Falah" was, "Mustapha Kemal swears allegiance to King Hussein." After the denial in the "Qibla," "Al Falah," on the 22nd September, acknowledging the denial, stated that "it appears that the King has no official news about the matter." The stress lies on "official," and the wording seems to convey more than appears on the surface.

Omer Shakir himself said, in conversation with Captain Nasiruddin, that official news had not prevent the parties concerned being aware of the matter.

None of the reports and information received here prove actually that communications have been exchanged, or that an understanding exists, but the reports, prior to the statement in "Al Falah," coupled with that statement and its denial, the assured manner in which Arif Bey referred to the understanding, when discussing the subject, and finally the fact of a newspaper being named as the source of the information, together with the fact that the "Al Falah" is a newspaper, all point to some such understanding being in existence.

I reported that Omer Shakir was leaving for the north. This was after news of the alleged sweeping successes against the French. He received orders at the last moment to return to his post, and was not able to leave.

It does not appear he was the actual bearer of any communications from Mustapha Kemal, though he knew of them.

Hedjaz and Syria

I have been informed that the Emir Abdullah has left for Syria, and that he has been accompanied by a large number of Bedouin, and that he has been accompanied by a large number of Bedouin.

I give below such items of information as bear on the subject.

Emir Abdullah.

The "Qibla" announces that Emir Abdullah has left for Medina to replace his brother who is not well enough to return. He was absent from Mecca three days recently, being reported to have gone secretly to the vicinity of Taif to meet his cousin, Sherif Ahmed of the Beni Shabir (ash-Sham), from whom he obtained a large number of recruits.

His escort numbered between 500 and 1,000 Hedjaz Bedouin, Beni Thaqif, Beni Shabir, Bisha and Subei. He was accompanied by Sheikh Yusuf Khushera, in command of the Northern Hedjaz Army) and Sherif Ali-bin-Hussein, "hero of Azaq." King Hussein saw him off as far as the barracks outside Mecca, and Emir Ali and many notables accompanied him on the first stage.

It is generally accepted that the Emir has left en route for Syria. The tone of his letter to me, through Captain Nasiruddin, certainly lends colour to this belief. I do not, however, anticipate from his military character that he will move further than Medina for some time, whatever may be his ultimate intention or the orders of King Hussein.

Recruiting and Armaments

Mecca have large orders for presentation clothing for Bedouin. The Bedouin are very dissatisfied at the Bedouin being engaged at 5L per month, and only 10 men per horse.

Reports, both here and at Mecca, are to the effect that the King is very ill; but it is more of more promises than men.

The 600 men who left Jeddah by dhow on the 30th appeared to be unarmed. I also noticed no arms among the parties encamped round Jeddah. Arms will presumably be supplied at Yenbo or Medina.

King Hussein was at pains to impress on me that the soldiers for whom he could not obtain sea transport were for local operations round Wejh and Unmuleh.

I have so far not heard of any leaving overland as he informed me. Presumably these were the contingent sent eventually by dhow.

The captain of the "Asmara" was offered a bribe of 50l. to transport some of the party.

Current Rumours and Unconfirmed Reports

King Hussein stated to certain notables that he would be obliged to leave the Hedjaz and go to the mountains of the Arabian peninsula and of Syria and Mesopotamia especially.

He is arranging to transfer his headquarters to the mountains, where supplies are more plentiful as a reserve and as a precautionary measure.

Emir Abdullah, after making preparations at Medina and organizing the reinforcements, will proceed via Hail to Mesopotamia.

The King has given it to be understood that all true believers should not hold back from volunteering, as large forces must be raised to prevent the English from taking Mecca.

While giving all such information, I do not wish it to be understood that I endorse it, but it may be useful as a link with information received by you from other sources.

I commented in the report ending the 31st August on the trend which King Hussein's actions appeared to indicate. It was suggested that he was possibly due to his having finally made up his mind as to active measures.

No measures as regards recruiting have been taken officially, and the present movement is explained as in connection with tribal troubles further north. The recruits, however, state that they are bound for Syria.

Captain Nasiruddin reports the following as having been arranged for the anniversary of King Hussein's coronation:—

The sheikhs of the surrounding tribes were to come to Mecca with large parties of volunteers (for whom a feast was actually prepared) and make speeches on the anniversary before the King to the effect that the present condition of this land could not be bettered unless King Hussein led them to the rescue of their dishonoured brethren in Syria. The King would then counsel moderation, and state that, though he would not object to their going, he would not consent to any independent action they cared to take, without consulting himself.

The gathering did not, however, materialize.

The following enclosures are sent herewith:—

1. Copy of letter (translation) from King Hussein complaining of Ikhwan attack near Taif.
2. Copy of letter (translation) from Emir Abdullah to Captain Nasiruddin.

W. BATTEN, Major,
Acting British Agent

Enclosure 2 in No. 263.

King Hussein to Captain Nasiruddin.

(Translation.)

Your Honour,

September 24, 1920

AFTER expressing my dutiful respects. Your Excellency knows that one of the agreements made with the Saudian Mission is that transgressions should be stopped. An important part of the mission and their chief left ten days ago by land.

Soon after they left, the officials of Khurma and Taraba took aggressive action on the 30th July against the tribe of Qureish, who are not more than 20 miles from Taif. The result was that nine people were killed and twenty-one camels were taken.

I do not know what is intended regarding this, except that it is contrary to the true intention, as clear as day, of the mission and the intentions which are entirely out of the question.

I am awaiting every hour and minute to hear of the appointment of the person who will take over the mission, and I have sent Habib Intfallah and Abul Huda to Taif only for this purpose, which is necessary and should be carried out in any manner.

We are suffering sufficiently from difficulties, &c., which we need not mention, and nothing minimizes these sorrows except the knowledge that we have fulfilled our dutiful promises.

With best respects.

HUSSEIN

Enclosure 3 in No. 263

Emir Abdullah to Captain Nasiruddin

(Translation.)

His Excellency my dear friend Nasiruddin Ahmed Khan

(After respects.)

I HAVE received your favour. I am very sorry I could not see you before I left to say goodbye. In writing this letter to thank you for your kindness and courtesy I am in any place your friend. Please convey my respects to the British agent and all his staff. I say farewell to him like a friend who has commanded the Arabs and led them to the friendship of Great Britain in the time in which Great Britain was in need of their friendship; like a friend who does not forget the precious time which necessitated making the essential agreement; and like a friend who holds the leadership of a nation which never departs from its friends, even if they have dispensed with her after obtaining what they wish. I am that friend who is leaving and standing by all that is said. Please convey the same to him (the British agent) on my behalf. I am very sorry that I cannot see you in person on my vacation and my Syria and in the time I see strange things becoming apparent from friends and others. You know that the British will be always as they used to be.

With best greetings to you, my dear friend.

Yours sincerely,

ABDULLAH

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No. 264

Mr. Vansittart to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 22.)

No. 96. Turkey.)

Paris, October 21, 1920.

My Lord.

I HAVE the honour to report that I have resumed negotiations with the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs as instructed in your Lordship's despatch No. 163 of the 16th October. The following are the results obtained:—

1. I have induced the French to accept the redraft of article 6 there enclosed. A few modifications with respect to the railway clauses. We shall clearly have decided within ten years whether we mean to begin to build a second line in the Yarmuk Valley. The railway clauses may therefore be considered settled to our satisfaction.
2. The French accept the amendment to article 9 shown in the enclosure of your Lordship's despatch No. 157 of the 30th September. I have received no answer to my telegram No. 1517 of the 19th October, but presume the numbering of the articles referred to in the amendment needs no change as fore-shadowed in the last paragraph of your Lordship's despatch under reply.

Of the points enumerated in your Lordship's despatch No. 157 there remains, therefore, only one in regard to which I am unable to reach a decision. The French at first declined further discussion. Finally, in return for the modification described in the postscript and enclosure of my despatch No. 91 of the 7th October they have

"Printed in italics."

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time properly to study either the necessities or the possibilities of the case. They have

he come to between Palestine and Syria in regard to any surplus of water in the French mandated area. On the contrary, such an arrangement may well prove to the advantage of both parties, and the French would give instructions for the reasonable and sympathetic local consideration of any proposals shown to be compatible with Syrian interests. "It comes to this," M. Krummholz said frankly, "if Syria has Syrian water surplus Syria will sell it."

new clause, even equipped with these assurances, is far from being what we would wish for the Zionists. I am, however, equally aware that no more can be obtained for the moment. During my negotiations in the summer M. Kasower was inclined to be more uncompromising than M. Berthelot. The positions are now reversed, and M. Berthelot is, of course, the influential and decisive factor. His attitude has been one of some annoyance at my insistence. I have been told fairly plainly in the latter stages of this negotiation that any further push might increase annoyance but not the results. The matter can therefore be taken no further, in my opinion, for the present.

At the same time the French assurances are of some value. If they will leave matter to, or encourage, a local deal, there are signs, judging from the attitude of M. de Caux, as described in Sir R. Samuel's telegram No. 595 of the 1.10 October that it may be quite possible to come to an agreement on the spot.

had indeed at one time thought of suggesting that this part at least of the Latakia might be transferred to Jerusalem or Damascus on the off chance of better success, but he had, however, to abandon the idea. M de Caix was present during the negotiations in the summer, and was clearly dominated by M. Berthelot. If the latter was determined to include no mention of the Litani in the convention the latter would never have had the courage, nor indeed the inclination, to suggest it from his post. Indeed, if he had done so, he would have met with an answer that would have destroyed his possible utility in the future as a sequel to the present negotiations, and the assurances that have resulted. In point of fact the inclination to oppose any mention of the Litani waters in the convention came originally from M de Caix this summer. It was his main contribution to the discussion. M. Berthelot had spoken of 33 per cent. in London last year, but he adopted M. de Caix's view on this point, and

and therefore to the conclusion that it would only be possible to profit by any French reasonableness after some impulse had come from Paris. If indeed M. de Curi is evolving it may now be possible to lead him on the spot to some practical agreement to which the Quai d'Orsay would not have committed itself, and which he would not have contemplated before the note on which the discussion here have

After the A₂ → A₁ transition, the system is in a state with energy E₁ and angular momentum L₁. The system then undergoes a transition to a state with energy E₂ and angular momentum L₂. The transition is characterized by the transition probability P₁₂ and the transition time τ₁₂. The transition probability is given by the square of the transition matrix element, and the transition time is the inverse of the transition probability. The transition matrix element is given by the overlap integral of the initial and final wave functions, and the transition time is the inverse of the transition probability.

extreme difficulty of the circumstances here, I am convinced that we can do no better (it has looked at moments as if we might do worse), except possibly as part of some general deal.

If your Lordship shares this view, I should be grateful for authority to conclude the convention as now modified. A copy of the full text is herewith transmitted, the last alterations being italicized. Unless any further changes are desired, I venture to suggest that the necessary assent may be conveyed to me as soon as convenient (a) because, as shown in my immediately preceding despatch, the matter is linked with the presentation

moment, if any, for my fresh attempt to negotiate the important Arabian chapter, a matter whose success is anyhow so problematical.

I have, &c.
ROBERT VANSITTART

Les Gouvernements de l'Empire britannique et de la France, desireux de régler les problèmes soulevés par l'attribution à la Grande-Bretagne des territoires de Palestine et de Mésopotamie et par l'attribution à la France du mandat sur la Syrie et le Liban, conférés tous trois par le Conseil suprême à San-Remo le 24 mai 1919, ont convenu des dispositions ci-dessous :

Les limites entre les territoires sous mandat français et britannique de Syrie, Liban d'une part, et de Mésopotamie et de Palestine de l'autre, sont fixées comme suit :

1'est, le Tigre depuis Djézireh ben Omar jusqu'à la limite des anciens vilayets de Diarbekir et de Mossoul.

du sud-est et au sud, toutes limites des anciens états vers le sud jusqu'à Rumelian Kessui; de là, une ligne passant au mandat français l'intégralité du bassin du Kalour occidental et se dirigeant en ligne droite vers l'Euphrate, qu'elle franchit à Abou Kemal, puis une ligne droite aboutissant à Istar au sud du Djebel Druse, puis une ligne aboutissant au sud de Namb sur le Chemin de Fer du Hedjaz, puis une ligne aboutissant à Soukhi sur le lac de Tibérade, tracée au sud de la voie ferrée descendant au lac, et parallèle au chemin de fer. La localité de Derna restera un territoire sous mandat français; la frontière laissera en principe la voie ferrée à la Turquie. Mais la Turquie, au lieu de permettre la construction par la vallée du Yarmouk d'un chemin de fer entièrement situé sur le territoire sous mandat britannique. A Soukhi, la frontière sera fixée de manière à permettre aux deux hautes parties contractantes la construction et l'établissement d'un port et d'une station de chemin de fer donnant libre accès au lac de

A l'est, la frontière passera de Souakh à travers le lac de Titériale jusqu'à l'embouchure du Wadi Musadiryâ. Elle continuera ensuite cette rivière, puis le Wadi Jeraba jusqu'à sa source. De là, elle atteindra la piste allant de El Kunitra à Banias, au point marqué Skok, ensuite elle suivra ladite piste qui restera en territoire français jusqu'à Banias. De là, la frontière se dirigera vers l'est jusqu'à Muttrah, en territoire palestinien. Le détail de cette partie de la frontière sera fixé ultérieurement à assurer aux territoires sous mandat français une communication facile entièrement sur ce territoire avec la région de Tyr et de Sidon, ainsi que la continuité de la route à l'ouest et à l'est de Banias.

De Muttallah la frontière suivra la ligne de partage des eaux de la vallée du Jourdain et du bassin du Litani. Elle suivra ensuite vers le sud-est les crêtes de Wad el-Farah-Houroun et de Wad el-Zakariya jusqu'à la limite du Liban français).

Les Gouvernements français et britannique s'entendront pour la nomination d'une commission chargée d'examiner préalablement tout projet d'irrigation formé par le Gouvernement du mandat français, dont la réalisation serait de nature à donner notablement les eaux du Tigre et de l'Euphrate à leur arrivée dans la zone du mandat britannique en Mésopotamie.

En raison de la situation géographique et stratégique de l'île de Chypre au large de l'Asie Mineure, le Gouvernement français ne saurait accepter aucune négociation pour la cession ou l'annexion de ladite île de Chypre sans le consentement préalable du Gouvernement français.

ARTICLE 4

1. Le Gouvernement français s'engage à faciliter par un arrangement d'exploitation en commun du tronçon du chemin de fer existant entre le lac de Hama et Deraa. Cet arrangement devra être conclu entre les administrations des chemins de fer des zones sous mandats français et britannique aussitôt que possible après l'entrée en vigueur du mandat français. L'accord fixera en même temps les conditions financières, administratives et techniques de l'exploitation. Au cas où les deux administrations n'arriveraient pas à se mettre d'accord dans un délai de trois mois après la mise en vigueur des deux mandats précités, un arbitre serait nommé par le Conseil de la Ligue des Nations pour régler les points restés en désaccord, et l'on mettrait en application immédiate, dans la mesure du possible, les parties de cet accord sur lesquelles l'entente aurait fait.

Ledit accord, conclu pour une durée indéterminée, serait sujet à des révisions périodiques selon les besoins.

2. Le Gouvernement britannique pourra faire passer une canalisation le long de la route de Hama à Deraa et à tous moments le droit de faire passer ses troupes par le chemin de fer.

3. Le Gouvernement français agréé la nomination d'une commission spéciale, composée de représentants des deux Gouvernements, pour étudier la possibilité de construire dans la vallée du Yarmouk jusqu'à Deraa, de manière à rendre possible la construction d'un chemin de fer et d'une canalisation britannique reliant la Palestine avec le Chemin de Fer du Hedjaz et la vallée de l'Euphrate et passant entièrement dans les limites des zones sous mandat britannique. Il est entendu, toutefois, que le tronçon de fer actuel du Yarmouk reste intégralement sur le territoire du mandat français. Le droit prévu au présent alinéa au profit du Gouvernement britannique devra être utilisé dans un délai maximum de dix ans.

La commission prévue ci-dessus sera composée d'un représentant du Gouvernement français et d'un représentant du Gouvernement britannique, auxquels pourront être adjoints des représentants des Gouvernements locaux et des experts à titre de conseillers techniques dans la mesure que les Gouvernements français et britannique le jugeront nécessaire.

4. Au cas où les traces de ces deux chemins de fer viendraient à se croiser ou se joindre, les deux Gouvernements s'entendent pour toutes les questions relatives à l'exploitation.

5. Au cas où le Gouvernement britannique ferait usage de la faculté prévue à l'alinéa 3 de construire un chemin de fer dans la vallée du Yarmouk, les obligations contractées par le Gouvernement français aux termes des alinéas 1 et 2 du présent article prendraient fin trois mois après l'achèvement de la construction de ce chemin de fer.

6. Le Gouvernement français s'engage à faire reconnaître les droits stipulés ci-dessus au profit du Gouvernement britannique par les Gouvernements locaux sous mandat français.

ARTICLE 5

Il est expressément stipulé que les facilités accordées à la Grande-Bretagne par les articles précédents impliquent le maintien au profit de la France des stipulations des accords franco-britanniques sur les pétroles.

ARTICLE 6

Les Gouvernements français et britannique ne feront aucun obstacle dans leur zone respective de mandat au recrutement du personnel du chemin de fer destiné à une section quelconque du Chemin de Fer du Hedjaz.

Toute facilité sera accordée pour le passage des employés du Chemin de Fer du Hedjaz sur les zones de mandat français et anglais de manière à ne gêner aucunement le fonctionnement du chemin de fer.

Les Gouvernements français et britannique s'engagent si c'est nécessaire, d'accord éventuellement avec les Gouvernements locaux, à conclure un arrangement par lequel les

approvisionnements et le matériel de chemin de fer passant d'une zone sous mandat à une autre, destinés à être employés sur le Chemin de Fer du Hedjaz, ne seront pas soumis de ce fait à des droits de douane additionnels et seront exceptés autant que possible des formalités douanières.

ARTICLE 7

Les Gouvernements de Syrie et de Palestine s'entendront pour la nomination d'une Commission chargée, aux frais de la Palestine, d'examiner préalablement tout projet d'irrigation qui pourrait avoir pour effet de diminuer notablement les eaux du Yarmouk à leur arrivée dans la zone du mandat britannique de Palestine.

ARTICLE 8

Sous réserve des dispositions prévues aux articles 17 et 18 du mandat pour la Palestine, des articles 11 et 13 du mandat pour la Mésopotamie, ainsi que de l'article du mandat pour la Syrie et le Liban, et sous réserve aussi du droit général de contrôle des administrations locales en matière d'éducation et d'instruction publique, les Gouvernements français et britannique s'engagent à laisser librement fonctionner les écoles que les ressortissants français et britanniques possèdent et dirigent actuellement dans les territoires soumis au mandat de l'une et l'autre partie; l'enseignement des langues française et anglaise sera libre dans ces écoles.

Le présent article n'implique en aucune manière pour les ressortissants de chacune des deux parties le droit d'ouvrir des écoles nouvelles dans les territoires soumis au mandat de l'autre.

Paris, le 21 octobre 1920

[E 12874 85 44]

No. 265.

Foreign Office to War Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 25, 1920.

1. AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter from the Ministry of the Interior, Damascus, to the Ministry of the Interior at Jerusalem on the subject of the possible occupation of Trans-Jordania by British troops.

2. It will be within the recollection of the Army Council that at a time when the Government of Trans-Jordania on the pretext that as mandatory for Syria they would automatically assume control over all areas which had been formerly under the control of the Damascus Government, his Lordship was inclined to support a similar proposal made by the Government, and a reassuring reply received, which induced his Lordship to concur in the War Office view that the occupation of Trans-Jordania was undesirable.

3. The present proposal is based on entirely different considerations, and brings up the whole question of the possible action which the French Government may feel called upon to take in the event of hostilities being directed against the natives or their protectors from areas in the British sphere not actually in the British sphere.

4. His Lordship is doubtful whether the administrative advantages of such a proposal would be sufficient to justify the military risks. But before arriving at a final judgment on the matter he would be glad of the views of the Army Council, both upon the exact military applications of the specific proposal made by Sir Herbert Samuel as to which he is not clear, and also on the general question of the military responsibility incurred by His Majesty's Government in respect of such areas under the British mandate as may not actually be occupied by British troops. It appears to his Lordship that the Government should be prepared to repudiate such responsibility, and that the French Government might in such a case find an excuse for demanding that military action should be taken by His Majesty's Government. I am, however, to suggest independently of the decision

that may be arrived at on these major points, that the Army Council should consider the possibility of improving communications, and possibly the possibility of air-craft across the Jordan.

J. A. C. TILLEY

E 12970 11944 44

N 20

Foreign Office to Zionist Organisation

Sir, WITH reference to the letter from this Department of the 20th September and directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to state that, after consultation with His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine, no answer to offer the following observations on the numbered questions asked in your letter of the 12th August, regarding the proposed loan to the Administration of Palestine—

1. The Government of Palestine will be the debtor and will issue bonds in the form of a loan. The loan will be guaranteed by the Government of Palestine and will not be regarded as falling within the provisions of "The Colonial Stock Act, 1900". The loan will be invested under the powers of "The Trustees Act, 1908".

Schedule A-F, prepared by the Finance Department of the Palestine Administration, for so far as it is available, are enclosed. It is not practicable to take into account the possibility of the frontiers of Palestine being extended to include additional territory. No sufficiently reliable figures can be given as to railway revenue and

3. The specific revenues formerly assigned to the services of the Ottoman Public Debt will now, of course, necessarily be assigned to the services of the Ottoman Public Debt. The amount of which is determined by the Financial Commission to be set up under the Treaty of Peace with Turkey) to be paid by the Government of Palestine in respect of the Ottoman Public Debt. The Public Debt is a liability of the Ottoman Empire, but the annuity will necessarily be a first charge

The service of loans for railways in other parts of Turkey is covered by the Ottoman Public Debt.

In stating that the interest and sinking fund of the Government loan would be a first charge upon the revenues of Palestine, Sir H. Samuel was referring to the present revenue now included in the budget of Palestine, which excludes the revenues assigned to the Ottoman Public Debt administration, which are being carried to a separate account.

A small portion of the proposed loan will be needed for advances to municipalities. The Government would, in point of fact, recover from municipal revenues the proportionate

I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Yours faithfully,
J. A. C. TILLEY

Enclosed for the Zionist Organisation are the following documents:—
1. A copy of the letter from the Foreign Office to the Zionist Organisation of the 12th August, and I am to offer the following observations:—

1. The total sum required may amount to somewhat more or less than two and a half millions. This depends mainly upon the sum that will be needed for rolling stock for the

railways. This matter is about to be examined by a technical committee of three principal officers of the Egyptian State railways, in conjunction with the general manager of the Palestine railways. The nature and programme of public works is also not definitely decided. The prospects are, however, that the loan would be for a lower rather than a higher sum. It is not desired to raise the whole amount at once, and the most convenient form would probably be the payment of the total in four half-yearly instalments.

The amount that would be borrowed in any year would depend upon the margin of the loan. A sufficient margin has been allowed in the current financial year. It is anticipated that next year a considerably larger sum will be available for this purpose.

2. The question of the rate of interest depends upon whether considerations will enter other than those of a purely financial character. If not, then the rate of interest must follow the market price of money. But if Jewish financiers would be prepared to assist in the foundation of a Jewish National Home by advancing the funds needed by the Government of Palestine on exceptionally favourable terms, it may be anticipated that the moral effect upon the non-Jewish population of Palestine and upon public opinion in Great Britain, and, indeed, throughout the world, would be very considerable.

In the event of such an advance, the Government of Palestine would naturally prefer to leave the fixing of the precise rate of interest to those who would be providing the funds on such exceptional terms than to propose a figure itself.

3. It is understood that Sir H. Samuel has contemplated a term of forty years as the period for repayment of the loan at any time, and that it would be advisable to embody in the conditions a provision to that effect.

4. No doubt reforms in the system of taxation will be desirable in Palestine, but it is not possible at the present stage to specify what they will be, nor does it seem necessary to do so in connection with the contract for a loan.

The Government of Palestine will necessarily be responsible for providing the revenues needed for the payment of the annuity for the service of the Ottoman Public Debt and for the conduct of the administration, including the railway service, and as the total of these revenues will be many times the amount required for the service of the loan, this should be ample security.

5. It appears desirable that all the preliminary arrangements should be expedited so that the loan may be issued and the proceeds available for the Government as soon as possible after the entry into force of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey and the mandate for Palestine.

Lord Curzon understands that Sir H. Samuel has already informed your organisation that this and similar questions should be dealt with through the Foreign Office and direct with His Majesty's High Commissioner, and I am to endorse Sir H. Samuel's attitude in the matter.

I am, Sir,
Yours faithfully,
J. A. C. TILLEY

E 13506 85 44

No. 267.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 1.)

Jerusalem, October 12, 1920.
Monsieur le Comte JOURAUD informed me recently that he desired to send his secretary general, M. Robert de Caix, to see me in order to "prendre contact" and discuss matters of mutual interest. M. de Caix had a conversation with me to-day. He expressed the great desire of the French Syrian Arab and central co-operation with this Administration, and, after my responding in a similar sense, a number of points of mutual interest were discussed:

1. M. de Caix made a complaint as to the attitude of some of our officers encouraging anti-French movements among the native population, particularly in the Transjordan. In answer to my request for specific instances he mentioned a document which he had seen in Damascus, in which Major Somerset, now acting as British representative in Ajlun, was alleged to have written reports from the sheikhs of the district, some of them of an anti-French tendency. I was able to show

[E 13608/1136 44]

No. 268

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 96.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, October 15, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the lists called for under your Lordship's telegram of the 10th September 1920.

The lists have been prepared under the headings enumerated in your Lordship's telegram, and I have submitted them to the various departments for which no offer has been made.

I have also submitted to the various departments the suggestion that, for example, in the office of my civil secretary there will now be only three assistant civil secretaries in place of the four for whom budgetary provision had been made, and that I will submit a proposal to the Government for the reduction of the number of personnel employed in the Administration.

In the Department of Antiquities, with one exception all the posts are filled by part-time officers who are members of the British School of Archaeology, and who do not draw salaries from the Government. A considerable saving has been effected in the organisation of the Palestine Agency (Cairo), which is now commencing work under the terms of the Convention, the saving being an economy of one officer and a number of junior personnel, as also a saving in the cost of rental and provision of office furniture.

New sources of revenue will be forthcoming by the creation of the Department of Antiquities and Survey, and it is anticipated that the receipts may yield more than was originally expected.

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL,

High Commissioner

M. de Caix a copy of the requests of the sheikhs, which corresponded with the paper which he had seen and signed. I was specially referred to the acceptance of those to which he specially referred.

I pointed out that the control of our officers in Trans-Jordan was very limited. We had no troops there, and were proceeding on lines of self-government. They had, however, actively deterred the people of Trans-Jordan from joining in the armed movement in the Hauran against the French, as I myself had done in answer to the sheikhs at that time as to the course that they ought to pursue. I pointed out that, in fact, hardly anyone from Trans-Jordan had joined in that movement. M. de Caix recognised that that was so, and said that they similarly had issued instructions to their officers that they were to take no action which would be inconvenient to the British administration.

2. He suggested that if any fresh constitution were established in Trans-Jordan the French authorities in Syria might be consulted informally. I pointed out that he quite recognised that they had no right to ask to be committed on matters within the British sphere, he thought it would be useful in order to prevent contradictory policies in the two zones. I said I should be glad to consider this suggestion when the occasion arose.

With respect to British troops in Trans-Jordan, they would much prefer that we should send troops there as it would be a more definite zone arising from across the border. In answer to my question whether I might report that to the Foreign Office as the view of the French authorities, he said that I might certainly do so, and that indeed General Gouraud had already sent a communication in that sense which he understood had been transmitted to the Foreign Office.

3. With respect to the Hedjaz Railway, it was his view that it should be run under British control from Deraa southwards, while they would undertake the running of the northern section, due regard being paid to Moslem susceptibilities arising from the fact that the railway was W.K.F.

He said that the railway from Deraa southwards must depend upon our having free use of the railway from Haifa to Deraa for the transport of coal. He said that there would be no difficulty whatever about that, and with respect to the Haifa-Deraa railway generally, he thought that there would be no difficulty in arriving at an understanding. His view was that the railway was to be run from Haifa to Deraa, and that the railway from Deraa southwards must depend upon our having free use of the railway from Haifa to Deraa for the transport of coal.

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4. He had had some conversation this morning with some of the French residents of Jerusalem. He thought that they were all quite ready to accept British administration, but were nervous as to the attitude that might be adopted if a country came fully under Zionist influence. They were afraid of Zionist intolerance. There seemed to be some nervousness also whether the present Administration might not adopt an attitude unfavourable to the French schools, and particularly whether they might not be subjected to heavy taxation. I assured M. de Caix that such a suggestion had never even been considered, and that all schools would certainly receive equal treatment at our hands in such matters as taxation. It was, however, more likely that voluntary schools would receive subsidies from the Government than be subjected to special taxation. I said that the policy of subsidy had not yet been sanctioned.

A number of points of detail were discussed during the course of the interview, which was of a most friendly character. M. de Caix informed me that General Gouraud was proceeding within a few days to France for some weeks, during which period he would act on General Gouraud's behalf.

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL,

High Commissioner

Government of Palestine: Senior Service Officials

Posts actually Created and Filled.

		Name		£ R. p. a.	£ R. p. a.	Remarks	
1	High Commissioner	4,000	Allowances and entertainment allowance not yet settled	
1	A.D.C. and Military Secretary	Paid from army funds	
1	Private Secretary	400-40-800	650	10 per cent. on lowest salary of grade	
1	Assistant Private Secretary	450-30-350	480		
SECRETARIAT							
1	Civil Secretary	2,000	Ditto	
1	First Assistant Civil Secretary	1,000-4-100	1,050	Plus £ R. 100, plus £ F	
1	Second Assistant Civil Secretary	1,000-4-100	1,000	Plus £ R. 100.	
1	Third Assistant Civil Secretary	600-40-400	600	10 per cent. on lowest salary of grade	
1	Sub-Controller of Housing	450-20-350	300	Ditto	On 2 years' contract
1	Officer	
1	Director Works and Municipalities	350	340	Ditto	This post will probably be abolished at the end of October 1920
JERUSALEM DISTRICT							
1	District Governor	1,400-40-1,600	1,400	Ditto	
1	Assistant District Governor	800-40-800	800	Ditto	
1	Sub-District Governor, Hebron	600-10-400	600	Ditto	
1	Sub-District Governor, Ramallah	600-10-400	600	Ditto	
1	Inspector	600-40-800	600	Ditto	
1	Inspector	600-40-800	600	Ditto	
HAIFA DISTRICT							
1	Assistant Inspector, Finance	450-20-350	450	Ditto	On 1 year's probation
1	Assistant Inspector, General Administration	450-20-350	450	Ditto	
1	Assistant Inspector, Hebron	450-20-350	450	Ditto	
1	Sub-Inspector, General Administration, Haifa	300-20-400	300	Ditto	
1	Sub-Inspector, General Administration, Haifa	300-20-400	300	Ditto	
NABLUH DISTRICT							
1	District Governor	1,400-40-1,600	1,400	Ditto	
1	Assistant District Governor	1,100-40-1,300	1,100	Ditto	
1	Sub-District Governor, Nablus	800-40-800	800	Ditto	
1	Assistant Inspector, Finance	600-40-800	600	Ditto	
1	Assistant Inspector, General Administration, Nablus	450-20-350	450	Ditto	
1	Assistant Inspector, General Administration, Nablus	450-20-350	450	Ditto	
1	Assistant Inspector, General Administration, Tiberias	450-20-350	450	Ditto	
1	Sub-Inspector, Nazareth	300-20-400	300	Ditto	
BEIRUT DISTRICT							
1	District Governor	1,400-40-1,600	1,400	Ditto	
1	Assistant District Governor	1,100-40-1,300	1,100	Ditto	
1	Sub-District Governor, Haifa	800-40-800	800	Ditto	
1	Sub-District Governor, Tulkarm	800-40-800	800	Ditto	
1	Assistant Inspector, Finance	450-20-350	450	Ditto	
1	Assistant Inspector, General Administration, Jaffa	450-20-350	450	Ditto	
1	Assistant Inspector, General Administration, Jaffa	450-20-350	450	Ditto	
1	Sub-Inspector, General Administration, Tulkarm	300-20-400	300	Ditto	
HAZAZIA DISTRICT							
1	District Governor	1,400-40-1,600	1,400	Ditto	
1	Assistant District Governor	1,100-40-1,300	1,100	Ditto	
1	Sub-District Governor, Haifa	800-40-800	800	Ditto	
1	Sub-District Governor, Tulkarm	800-40-800	800	Ditto	
1	Assistant Inspector, Finance	450-20-350	450	Ditto	
1	Assistant Inspector, General Administration, Jaffa	450-20-350	450	Ditto	
1	Assistant Inspector, General Administration, Jaffa	450-20-350	450	Ditto	
1	Sub-Inspector, General Administration, Tulkarm	300-20-400	300	Ditto	
HAIFA DISTRICT							
1	District Governor	1,400-40-1,600	1,400	Ditto	
1	Assistant District Governor	1,100-40-1,300	1,100	Ditto	
1	Sub-District Governor, Haifa	800-40-800	800	Ditto	
1	Sub-District Governor, Tulkarm	800-40-800	800	Ditto	
1	Assistant Inspector, Finance	450-20-350	450	Ditto	
1	Assistant Inspector, General Administration, Jaffa	450-20-350	450	Ditto	
1	Assistant Inspector, General Administration, Jaffa	450-20-350	450	Ditto	
1	Sub-Inspector, General Administration, Tulkarm	300-20-400	300	Ditto	

Post	Name	Grade	Salary	Remarks
1 Public Health Officer	Dr. A. Abdel Al	450-20-400	10 per cent on lowest salary of grade	
1 Public Health Officer	Dr. O. Rink	300-20-40		
1 Public Health Officer	Dr. R. Khattar	300-20-40		
1 Medical Officer, Hospital	Dr. H. Nasser	300-20-40		
1 Medical Officer, Epidemics	Dr. B. Khatib	300-20-40		
1 Public Health Officer, Ramallah Sub-District	Dr. J. S. Dala	450-20-350		
1 Public Health Officer, Bethlehem Sub-District	Dr. K. Keshelesan	300-20-40		
1 Public Health Officer, Hebron Sub-District	Dr. M. Mahallany	300-20-400		
1 Medical Officer, Hebron Hospital	Dr. T. Dabbourah	300-20-400		
Jerusalem District.				
1 Public Health Officer	Dr. M. Malouf	450-20-350	450	Diso.
Jaffa District.				
1 Public Health Officer	Mr. H. S. Haddad			
1 Public Health Officer	Dr. M. Haddad			
1 Public Health Officer	Dr. N. Abu Jouda			
1 Medical Officer, Quarantine	Dr. M. Haddad	300-20-40		
1 Public Health Officer, Ramleh Sub-District	Dr. P. Shukri	300-20-40		
1 Medical Officer, Ramleh Hospital	Dr. K. Khatib	300-20-40		
1 Public Health Officer, Tulkarm Sub-District	Dr. F. I. Haddad	300-20-40		
Lydda District.				
1 Public Health Officer	Dr. J. Hajar	300-20-40		
1 Public Health Officer, Majdal Sub-District	Dr. S. Samir	300-20-40		
Nablus District.				
1 Medical Officer, Quarantine	Mr. W. P. H. Lightbody	450-40-1,050		
1 Public Health Officer	Dr. B. Abud	300-20-40		
1 Public Health Officer	Dr. R. D. Sikkani	300-20-40		

1 Medical Officer, Quarantine	Dr. Kamal K.			
1 Medical Officer	Dr. D. Haddad			
1 Public Health Officer, Nablus Sub-District	Dr. P. Haddad			
1 Public Health Officer, Nablus Sub-District	Dr. M. Haddad			
Nablus District.				
1 Municipal Medical Officer	Mr. A. Haddad			
1 Public Health Officer	Dr. J. Tuckey	400-20-300		
1 Public Health Officer	Dr. H. Khaldi	300-20-40		
1 Medical Officer, Epidemics	Dr. P. Haddad	300-20-40		
1 Public Health Officer, Jenin	Dr. G. Juri	300-20-400		
Qana District.				
1 Municipal Medical Officer	Mr. W. K. Hager	450-40-1,050		
1 Public Health Officer	Dr. H. M. Toman	300-20-40		
1 Medical Officer, Epidemics	Dr. K. Haddad			
1 Public Health Officer, Hebron Sub-District	Dr. T. Haddad			
1 Public Health Officer, Tulkarm Sub-District	Dr. Z. Haddad			
1 Public Health Officer, Safed Sub-District	Dr. H. Abo Rahmad			
Qana District.				
1 Medical Officer, Quarantine	Dr. W. Thompson	450-20-540	450	Diso.
Law and Justice				
1 Legal Secretary	Mr. N. de M. Bentwich			
1 Assistant Legal Secretary	Mr. J. L. Rafter			
1 Assistant Legal Secretary	Mr. R. H. Drayton			
1 Judicial Inspector	N. Alcarine Bey			
1 Vice-President, Court of Appeal	Mr. O. K. Corne			
1 Member, Court of Appeal	Ab. H. Jarallah	450-40-1,050		
1 Member, Court of Appeal	George H. Haddad	450-40-1,050		
1 Member, Court of Appeal	Michael H. Haddad	450-40-1,050		
1 Member, Court of Appeal	Mustapha H. Khaldi	400-40-30		
1 Member, Court of Appeal	Mr. G. Frank	400-40-30		
1 Member, Court of Appeal	Mustapha H. Haddad	450-40-1,050		
1 Member, Court of Appeal	Mr. O. S. Kermack	450-40-1,050		

(See List No. 2)

Post	Name	Salary	Gratuity	Allowance	Remarks
Jerusalem					
1 Magistrate	Mohd. Barudi	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	
1 Kadi Sheriah	Tawfik Eff. Tili	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	
Nablus and Tulkarm District Courts					
1 President	Mr. R. G. Tate	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	
1 Member	Mr. E. H. Dardas	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	
1 Member	Mr. E. H. Dardas	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	
1 Member	Mr. E. H. Dardas	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	
Haifa District					
1 Magistrate	Fahmy Eff. Humeni	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	
1 Kadi	Shoukh Moh'd. Ramez	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	
Gaza District					
1 Magistrate	Taher Eff. Almaghrabi	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	
1 Kadi	Taher Eff. Almaghrabi	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	
Beersheva District					
1 Magistrate	Thar Eff. Nasser	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION					
1 Superintendent	Mr. R. J. Langer	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	
1 Sub-Superintendent	Mr. R. J. Langer	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS					
1 Sub-Inspector	Mr. H. H. H. H.	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	
1 Principal, Men's Training College, Jerusalem	Mr. H. H. H. H.	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	
1 Principal, Women's Training College, Jerusalem	Mr. H. H. H. H.	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	
1 Vice-Principal, Women's Training College, Jerusalem	Mr. H. H. H. H.	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SECURITY					
1 Director Public Security	Mr. P. R. Bramley O.B.E.	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	
1 Assistant Director of Police	Mr. J. W. Mackenzie	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	
1 Assistant Director, C.I.D.	Mr. R. P. Quigley, M.C.	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	
1 Quartermaster	Mr. A. V. Holdridge	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	
Jerusalem District					
1 Assistant District Commandant	Mr. A. N. Nasser	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	
Haifa District					
1 District Commandant, Police	Mr. W. F. Wainwright	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	
Beersheva District					
1 Assistant District Commandant, Police	Mr. O. Krutshinsky	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	
Gaza District					
1 District Commandant, Police	Mr. P. A. Partridge	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	
Beersheva District					
1 Assistant District Commandant	Mr. O. E. Montmore	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	£ 1,200	

Enlilur, id N. 262

Government of Palestine, N. 1, 7 Service Officials

... (reals), for filling of which (offers have been made but not yet accepted)

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$\frac{d}{dt} \left(\frac{\partial L}{\partial \dot{x}} \right) = \frac{\partial L}{\partial x}$

Enclosure 3 in No. 208

List No. 3.

Government of Palestine: Senior Service Officials

Poets of which Creation is Contemplated

POSITION		CLASS	GRADE	ANNUAL SALARY	MONTHLY PAY
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE					
1	Assistant Financial Secretary	1-40-1,100	1,100*	10 per cent. on lowest salary of grade plus 10 ab	
1	Assistant Financial Secretary..	1-40-1,100			
DEPARTMENT OF PORTS AND TELEGRAPHS					
1	Chief Storekeeper	1-40-600	600		Little
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE					
1	Entomologist				
1	Plantation				
1	Director, K.				
1 Experimental Farm				
1 Experimental Plantation				
1	Nursery Fruit Rajm and				
1				
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE					
1	Controller of Vaccines and Serum Inst.				

* 10 per cent. on lowest salary of grade plus 10 ab

.. .. position he will come on to the establishment at his present salary.

Enclosure 4 in No. 268

List No. 4

Government of Palestine. Senior Service Officials

Posts Created, Vacant, and no Offer Made.

	Growing with Incentives	Salary.	Allowance
1 Sub-Inspector, Kanish, General Ad-	800-90-400	400	10 per cent on lowest salary of grade plus £ K 36
1 Sub-Inspector, Jenin, General Administra-	800-90-400	500	Ditto.
1 Assistant District Officer, Amman, District	1,000-100-500	500	10 per cent on lowest salary of grade plus £ K 36
1 Magistrate, Civil Court, Beirut Sub-District	1,000-100-500	700	Plus

		Monthly Salary	Annual Salary	Notes
JERUSALEM				
President, District Court	£ 500-40-1,050	550	10 per cent. on lowest salary of grade plus £ 36.	
Magistrate, Civil Court	£ 300-20-400	300	Idem.	
Modern Religious Court of Appeal				
Jerusalem				
Member	£ 300-20-400			
Tiberias				
Magistrate	£ 300-20-400	300	Idem.	
Land Settlement				
Judge	£ 450-30-550	450	Idem.	
Judge	£ 450-30-550	450	Idem.	
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION				
Assistant Director	£ 1,100-40-1,300			
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS				
Director	£ 1,000-40-1,200			
DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND TRAVEL				
Assistant Director	£ 450-30-550			
Immigration Officer, Derna	£ 450-30-550			
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SECURITY				
District Commandant, Police, Ploesti District	£ 550-40-1,040	550	Idem.	
FINANCIAL DEPARTMENT				
Inspector	£ 500-40-600	500		
Inspector	£ 500-40-600	500		
Chief Cashier	£ 500-40-600	500		
DEPARTMENT OF PORTS AND LEVIES				
Assistant Harbour-Master, Jaffa	£ 450-30-550	450	Idem.	

*See List No. 2 re Mr. Goodby

(E 13514/4164,44) No. 269.

Zionist Organisation to Foreign Office.---(Received November 1.)

My Lord,

77, Great Russell Street, London, October 30, 1920.

I WANT to thank you for your kind private letter of the 18th instant in answer to the official letter of the 11th instant which I wrote you regarding our anxiety about the northern frontier of Palestine. I want you to know how deeply I appreciate the personal interest you are taking in our affairs, and how reassuring the knowledge of this is.

I should like very much to have the pleasure of an interview with your Lordship some time in the near future, but I think it may be also helpful if I write you briefly about these matters.

Mr. Vauvart has told me of the latest development at Paris regarding the frontier, and I do not see how the settlement now proposed by France can possibly be so far as we can discover, no substantial interests to be served by depriving Palestine of those resources in the north and east which are essential to her economic life, and it would be a great pity from every point of view, even from that of France, if a settlement were now to be precipitated which would permanently imperil the future of the Holy Land. The atmosphere in Paris at present, I know, is surcharged with anti-British feeling which is reacting to the detriment of the national home; but things are so much in flux these days that I feel sure a satisfactory settlement will yet be obtained if only a definite agreement is not now concluded while the passions of the French are momentarily aroused. A fair settlement seemed within our reach at San Remo, and it can hardly be that events since then have irreparably prejudiced the interests of the national home. In view of the protracted delays which have already occurred and the disastrous settlement which is now proffered, it is difficult to see that there is any prospect of a further deferment. Certainly British public opinion is united against a wanton mutilation of the Palestinian frontier. And I am hopeful that further help will come from America as soon as the Peace Conference there is over. Mr. Vauvart thought that an appeal from the American Government.

The settlement now suggested by the French would not only cut off Palestine from all access to the Litany, but would deprive her of the headwaters of the Jordan, the eastern shore of the Sea of Galilee and the whole Yarmuk valley north of the Sykes-Picot line. I am sure that your Lordship is fully aware how disastrous to the future of the country and the project of the national home such a settlement would be.

I thought from your Lordship's letter, however, that I may not have clearly pointed out the impossibility of safeguarding adequately our rights to utilise the waters of the Upper Jordan and the Yarmuk by any provision which does not contemplate the inclusion of these waters in the territorial bounds of Palestine. This settlement involves not only extensive engineering works, but afforestation. It is impossible for any scheme of development to be physically secure or economically practical if the regions where the works are to be laid are unsettled and beyond the jurisdiction of Palestine.

The drainage and subsequent irrigation of the whole district about Lake Huleh, for example, depends upon the regulation of the waters of the Upper Jordan. This involves the construction of storage reservoirs and the afforestation of large areas in the valley of the Hachani, the Leddan and the Bauna. The maintenance of works of this character on foreign soil could hardly be contemplated. Neither capital nor labour could be secured for the undertaking.

In the case of the Yarmuk valley it is equally clear that no security would exist for the projection of works beyond the police power of Palestine. Security here could come only with the permanent settlement of a peaceful population. And upon the settlement of the Yarmuk valley depends the future of the whole of the Jordan valley by the natural force of gravitation is possible only if the water is derived from the higher levels of the Yarmuk valley. Otherwise, the water must be obtained from Lake Tiberias. But the water from Lake Tiberias would have to be pumped up to the necessary level, and that would involve an enormous expenditure of energy which might render the entire project of irrigation economically unfeasible. In the Yarmuk valley, in a natural storage reservoir at Iqbalah must be constructed as far east as Lake Mezzeib, which affords a suitable site for a large dam which will have to be erected at the eastern terminus of the works. Afforestation necessary to regulate the flow of the Yarmuk and its tributaries must also be carried out throughout the valley.

It is clear, also, that Lake Tiberias forms a natural storage reservoir and must be utilised for this purpose in almost any scheme of development which may be undertaken. The eastern shore must consequently be included in Palestine if its waters are to be used for the benefit of the national home. The project of Mr. Rutenberg, which is now being discussed with the High Commissioner and for which large sums have already been subscribed, would be seriously compromised.

Your Lordship, I am sure, realises the enormous importance of the Litany to Palestine. Even if the whole of the Jordan and the Yarmuk are included in Palestine, it has insufficient water for its needs. The summer in Palestine is extremely dry, and

CH. WEIZMANN

Letter from Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem)

Foreign Office, November 1, 1920

...nals, as on a lower plane of civilisation
...generally speaking, at the present time the statement
...be only logical basis for the existence of a special
...Capitulations is that the Courts set up by the local Sovereign
...are not ... provide justice for a certain category of individuals in the

1841. OF KEDLESTON.

No. 100

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem)

Sir,

£ E. 75 per annum lease allowance

Agriculture.
Public Security.
Chief Justice.

4. Objection is raised to the scale of pay for Category II, and to the proposed for inclusion in this category, viz, six governors of smaller districts. The Department is of the opinion that the scale of pay for Category II is not excessive, and that the six governors of smaller districts are not of a higher grade than the other governors of the same category. It is suggested that the Department should be asked to consider the case of one or two heads of Departments when they receive your views as to the

[5778]

3 B 2

2. His Majesty's Government are not prepared to conclude any arrangement which does not contain due provision for the future of the economic life of the country. It is explained in my despatch No. 10 of 1937 that the Government's attitude is based on correspondence with Dr Weizsäcker. The Ministry Government's attitude is based on a very unreason makes argument impossible.

3. It happens that the French Chargé d'Affaires informed me that the French Government were anxious to lay their mandate and also the Anglo-French Convention before the Council of the League of Nations, and were now ready to do so. M de Fleurbaey was informed, in reply, that His Majesty's Government were practically ready to lay the Palestine and Mesopotamian mandates, but that the Anglo-French Convention at the same time was still outstanding. M de Fleurbaey had believed that this point had been settled, but was told that this was by no means the case.

4. The French Government are probably therefore conscious of the present situation, but you should inform the Foreign Office of the position taken up by His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[E 14193 4164 44]

No. 274

Mr. Vandellart to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 108.)

My Lord,

Paris, November 13, 1921

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the despatch No. 107 which reached me yesterday, and to submit the following considerations on the position which it appears to create.

2. I would with great deference point out that we cannot well leave the question in its present state. To do so would be to the disadvantage of all concerned.

3. If no convention is concluded, we are confronted with possibilities which appear both undesirable and dangerous. There will be no northern or north-eastern frontier of Palestine at all. Even the extension of the Sykes-Picot line hitherto offered by the French can only become effective in virtue of a new convention. General Gouraud is now in Paris, and as I had the honour to indicate in my despatch No. 91 of the 7th October it is more than possible that he will use his undoubted influence in the sense that France should get out of a concession which he considers excessive and which indeed comprises a large extent of land of real value to Palestine. Such a concession cannot be in the interests of Zionism.

4. On the other hand, in the absence of any new convention, the legal position is that the only valid boundary is the Sykes-Picot line. There seems nothing else that can be acted upon. Even if the French keep open their offer to extend the line, of which I am doubtful, the Zionists could not now take up territory beyond the Sykes-Picot line, and we should, in addition, lose our railway agreement, which is admittedly more satisfactory than anything provided for in the Sykes-Picot agreement. There will thus be loss all round and gain to no one, least of all to the Zionists. I fully appreciate the reasons given by your Lordship for not signing the convention. No one realises more clearly than I do how far it falls short of the maximum, which is perhaps also minimum Zionist requirement. The result is that we are left with nothing, plus the consequences of nothing, and I venture to think we should be justified in not signing it if it is not a step towards something better, but in other words. My despatches will have made it clear that the provision and initiation of these matters come from our side. There is no real prospect of American representations, even if they are forthcoming, producing more result than ours. Dr. Weizmann says in his letter of the 30th Oct. that if a satisfactory arrangement will yet be obtained if only a definite agreement is not now concluded. This hope also reposes on no viable

basis, and amounts to "waiting for something to turn up," which is what we have now been doing for many months.

5. It seems clear that we cannot obtain more without offering some inducement, which we have not yet done, and this being the situation that I anticipated last year, I would ask permission to revert to the considerations that I then advanced.

6. There is the possibility of a general deal, such, for instance, as the one I then mentioned, involving settlements and loges in India, plus our Arabian desiderata and the Palestine frontier.

Failing the possibility of anything of this nature, financial or military inducements or levers could, I think, be found. I do not develop these points at greater length because I do not know whether your Lordship would contemplate the principle.

7. A bargain might be made as a defensible business proposition with a minimum of concession on our part; but some concession would now seem necessary if we are to go forward, and, as indicated above, it is difficult for us either to go back or stand still without undesirable consequences. I therefore feel justified in resubmitting my last year's view, if His Majesty's Government believe in Zionism and the solidarity of the British Empire.

8. I have ventured to deal with this subject at some length, because wider issues are involved in it. A continuance of the present impasse can hardly fail to react on Anglo-French relations.

I had written the foregoing when sending my telegram No. 1320 of the 11th instant to your Lordship. I decided, however, to suspend this despatch until to-day, in order to include in it an account of my meeting at the French Foreign Office this morning with M. Berthelot.

I had written the foregoing when sending my telegram No. 1320 of the 11th instant to your Lordship. I decided, however, to suspend this despatch until to-day, in order to include in it an account of my meeting at the French Foreign Office this morning with M. Berthelot. The earlier part of the despatch, I repeat it at some length, since it explains more outspokenly than before the fundamentally different point from which the French Government judge the issue, and how therefore all reasoning has been vain with it. Further comment seems superfluous. M. Kammerer, speaking for M. Berthelot, said that M. Fleurbaey had not given them such a clear indication of the attitude of His Majesty's Government as your Lordship agreed to think.

M. Berthelot had, however, suggested that the convention was going ill, and was therefore ready to reply to me at once. If there had been any question of reiterated demands on our part, he would have met them. He said that in No. 107 of the 8th Nov. we had asked for a convention which would give us the whole of the Yarmuk valley.

That France would not give us the whole of the Yarmuk valley, as your Lordship's despatch did not, however, renew demands, but left the convention in the air. It remained there the French would consider themselves liberated from the obligations imposed upon them in it, and if the matter was reopened it would have to be done over. General Gouraud had been that morning to the Foreign Office to ask the French Government urgently if they could not get out of the convention. The answer had been "No, unless the English refuse it." The French Government considered that the advantages of the convention were all on our side, whether looked upon from the point of the cession of the potential cotton lands of the Huleh, or from that of the railway clauses, or from that of the Yarmuk clause, on which M. Berthelot already regretted having agreed to any stipulation. The French Government had no interest in it.

They would be material gainers, for they would be free to, and would, simply revert to the Sykes-Picot line, up to which they were already in practical occupation. It was added that the French refused to go beyond their present offers was perhaps more fundamental than we understood, and that it was useless for us to put forward again the economic arguments to which they had often listened. The French Government could not view the matter in that light, for in their view it went much deeper. They had agreed to a Jewish National Home, not to a Jewish State. They considered we were steering straight upon the latter, and the very last thing they could do was to make representations to us on this point as the policy was full of dangers for them too. For the present they contented themselves with

saying, "Vous barboterez si vous le voulez, mais vous ne barboterez pas à nos frais." M. Kammerer here produced a memorandum and map left by Mr. Rutenberg, M. Millerand, and quoted from it to prove that the Zionists were already openly beyond the idea of a National Home. (The memorandum might perhaps have been better worded. I had not seen it before, and only got a fugitive glance at it.) As I explained that the territory claimed as economically indispensable went far beyond the limits of the Jewish settlement, he repeated again most categorically that the French Government would never lend an ear to what he characterized as "extravagances." Nor would they consent to the Zionists carrying out works *chez nous*. They would listen to any reasonable proposal for an equitable distribution of water, but they would do their own work in their own house.

11. The claims of the Zionists, he said, now went far beyond the ground on which the British Prime Minister had always placed himself, and on which the French Government considers they had met him—the historic formula, Dan to Beersheba. To make the bigger Jewish State, of which the French disapproved, the Zionists continued to claim territory to which the historic argument did not apply. If the British Prime Minister were now to say that he did not consider a moral agreement had been reached on this point, the French Government would follow suit without hesitation, though the French Foreign Office would regret the disappearance of the *bon voisinage*, as they considered it conducive to terms of *bon voisinage*.

12. In the discussion to which I endeavoured to divert this outpouring, I could achieve no modification of the French attitude in regard to frontiers and water. M. Camille Dreyfus was ready to sign the convention, in spite of contrary pressure, but that pressure would continue, and for other reasons as well. The French Government trusted that His Majesty's Government would realize that the offer could not be kept open indefinitely.

13. The foregoing would tend to show that a further move on our part would shortly be inadvisable.

I have, &c.

ROBERT VANSITTART

E 14274 478 44)

No. 27

Mr. Lindley to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 703)

My Lord,

Vienna, November 11, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I was lately approached by a Dr. W. Pappenheim, a Jewish doctor, who asked me to assist him in the granting of visas to Jews desirous of returning to Palestine.

The "Agudah Israel" organisation is a non-political Jewish orthodox religious society, the main object of which is to preserve the ancient customs and strict observances of the Jewish faith as laid down in the Biblical "Books of the Law" and the Talmud. The organisation of the society is not centralised, each locality having an independent committee. The "Agudah" centres have no official connection with the Whitechapel Road. The "Agudah" centres have no official connection with the Zionist movement, which I have several times written to your Lordship, particularly in my despatch No. 207 of the 19th May.

It does occur from time to time that they assist orthodox Jews to reach Palestine, by providing transport, clothing, funds, &c. But only the Zionist Organisation is officially recognised as controlling the immigration of Jews into Palestine.

The object of the deputation headed by Dr. Pappenheim was to obtain for the "Agudah Israel" the same recognition in regard to the granting of visas on the recommendation of the society as is extended to the Palastina Amter. Dr. Pappenheim said that in Czechoslovakia and Poland visas were so granted, but I understand that the "Agudah Israel" has never been officially recognised in those two countries in the same way as the Palastina Amter.

I told Dr. Pappenheim that I would enquire into the matter.

I venture to request therefore that I should be instructed as to what measure of

I have, &c.

F. O. LINDLEY

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No. 27

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris).

(No. 3724)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 16, 1920.

THE French Ambassador, M. Cambon, called on me on the 11th November in order to announce his impending retirement, and to ask me to give the requisite agreement to his contemplated successor, Comte de Saint-Aulaire.

I expressed on behalf of the British Government my regret at the departure of a man whose diplomatic career, marked as it had been by a personal distinction which it would be hard for any successor to emulate, but by a consistent friendliness to Great Britain and a sympathetic understanding of our national character and institutions, which had been one of the principal agents in building up the cordial alliance between our two countries, culminating in the glorious co-operation of the recent war.

I viewed, I said, with some apprehension the loss of M. Cambon's calm judgment and restraining hand, because, as I had told M. de Fleurbaey only a few days before, I was sure that the French press, known in some cases to have been directly inspired, and in many cases to have been indirectly inspired, by the French Government, would be likely to take advantage of the opportunity to attack the British Government. I therefore more asked M. Cambon in the last moments of his stay in London to urge the French Government to stop this malicious campaign, which was already doing great injury, and would, unless stopped, do more.

Neither now nor on previous occasions did M. Cambon attempt any denial of my accusations. Indeed, the only explanation that he could offer was the psychological idiosyncrasy which compelled a Frenchman, when he distrusted or disliked a policy, to attack a person. The French journalist, he said, always associated a policy with an individual, and could not be brought to understand that, in attacking the latter, he might not merely be doing a personal injustice, but injuring the former.

I dare say there was truth in this analysis; but it did not leave me with any great hope either that any exertions of M. Cambon or any words of mine could effect so intractable a factor as the mentality of the Frenchman.

Before parting, I seized the occasion to make an explanation to M. Cambon, which I begged him to transmit to his Government, so as to remove in advance any misapprehension which they might otherwise be tempted to entertain. I told him that it was the British Government's policy to defer the visit as long as possible, out of regard for the French, and because we did not wish in the smallest degree to offend their susceptibilities, acting, as we had done throughout the recent Syrian developments, with perfect loyalty to them, and with an unquestioning acceptance of their action, whether it had or had not met with our complete approval. In the same spirit we had hitherto kept Feisal away from England, and encouraged his sojourn in Italy, where he still remained.

But his father, King Hussein, had some time ago definitely appointed Feisal as head of a mission to make certain return presents to our King, and was exceedingly vexed at our apparent reluctance to receive him in this honorary capacity. We could find no excuse for further postponement, and the King had agreed to receive the Emir early in December.

I thought that there would be one great advantage in this arrangement, viz., that Feisal would thereby be deterred from going to Geneva, as representative of the Hejaz, and that there might be the reverse of convenient to the French Government, and they should, I thought, welcome any prior engagement that would keep him away.

I further told M. Cambon that, though the Emir would be coming here on a complimentary mission, I had no doubt that he would wish to discuss with us, and equally we with him, certain aspects of the Arabian question. We had given definite promises to the Emir, and both Hussein and Feisal had a perfect right to discuss with us the manner in which they were still capable of being redeemed. Further there remained a large block of Arab territory between or adjoining the spheres of

French and British influence in Syria. M. Cambon said that the discussion might take place and arrive at a conclusion.

I told M. Cambon that we were not prepared to give him one assurance for communication to his Government. I intend to discuss with Feisal the position, past or present, in Syria with the French mandate. That we regarded as a *chance jugée* after the San Remo Conference.

M. Cambon listened to these explanations with unmoved tranquillity, but offered neither remark nor reply.

I am, &c,
CURZON OF KIDLESTON

E 14317 4164 44] No 277

Mr. Vansittart to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 17)

(No. 109)

My Lord,

Paris, November 16, 1920

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 108 of the 11th November. These minutes seem to show that there still exists some misconception of the Palestine question between His Majesty's Government and the French Government, and I venture, therefore, to add somewhat to my despatch No. 108 of the 11th November.

I am it stated in those minutes that the convention have been proved that the advantage of it has been most helpful to me in my negotiations. As it is, they have always been a hindrance to their detriment—and that we are always the askers. I think it is to point to any advantage we have so far offered them from this misconception, as I venture to think it, flows the second, with which the French Government "are more anxious than His Majesty's Government to sign the agreement." I trust my above-mentioned remarks have made it clear that this was not the case. The French will not be long in coming to a conclusion on our part, but they will not come from a bargain in which they so far cut to themselves.

I have also the honour to add the following comments. In case it might be deemed possible that the matter should become easier by delay. It will certainly become worse. We cannot hope that by holding our hand the French will come to eat out of it when there is nothing in it. Apart from that, the matter is not a matter of delay.

Your Lordship's meeting the French Government on the 11th November, and I have had the opportunity of discussing the matter with Sir John Tilley of the Foreign Office.

On the 11th November, M. Cambon said that he had been in communication with Sir John Tilley of the Foreign Office, and I have had the opportunity of discussing the matter with Sir John Tilley of the Foreign Office.

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waters, that has lain at the root of their attitude throughout the negotiations and now emerges clearly. It will not, therefore, be easy to remove even by the bargain, but I think it can be done. It can assuredly only be done that way, and I therefore trust that the review contained in my immediately preceding despatch will receive consideration.

I have, &c,
ROBERT VANSITTART

E 14274 476 44]

No. 278.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Lindley (Vienna)

(No. 724)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 18, 1920

WITH reference to your despatch No. 793 of the 11th instant, I transmit herewith a copy of despatch No. 2 from His Majesty's High Commissioner, Jerusalem, relative to the status of the Agudas Israel organisation. In the circumstances I am not prepared to extend to them the measure of recognition granted to the Zionist organisation, but the latter have already been impressed with the necessity for dealing fairly with all sects and branches of Jewry as regards immigration.

I am, &c,
CURZON OF KIDLESTON

E 14393 2465 44]

No. 279.

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris).

(No. 3767.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 18, 1920

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that the French Ambassador called upon Sir Eyre Crowe on the 16th instant, and two matters were referred to in the conversation. M. Cambon said that after his recent conversation with me (of which a record was transmitted to you in my despatch No. 3724 of the 16th November), he had telegraphed to Paris to ascertain their views on the proposed visit of Feisal to London. The French Government had decided to refuse him a visit. He mentioned that Feisal was regarded in Syria as the man who would bring the French to the door. If he were received officially in England it would be likely to have a dangerous effect on the mind of the Syrian people, who were at present quite content to live in a city with the French authorities. M. Cambon was therefore instructed to express the earnest hope that Feisal would not be invited to London, but encouraged to remain in Italy, where he was.

Sir Eyre Crowe observed that M. Cambon did not appear to have properly considered that they were in a position to refuse to let Feisal come to London in the discharge of the mission which had been entrusted to him by King Hussein, his father. M. Cambon would remember how clearly I had repudiated any idea of our utilising our relations with Feisal in any manner likely to effect the French position in Syria, with which we were determined not to interfere, but His Majesty's Government had to consider their own very important interests in the Arab countries. It was mainly through their efforts that King Hussein and Feisal had joined the Allies in the war. We had in return promised the Arabs local independence, and there was already a feeling among them that this promise was not fully kept, and it would not do for us to refuse to listen to the representations which King Hussein wished to make to us as regards the present and future position of the Arab countries outside the French zone in Syria. It was in these circumstances that we had agreed to receive Feisal in London, and Sir Eyre Crowe did not see how this decision could now be modified.

M. Cambon asked whether Sir Eyre Crowe was correct in saying that Feisal came as an emissary of his father; this seemed to be quite new to him. Sir Eyre Crowe

replied that he thought I had particularly mentioned this as, indeed, it was an important aspect of the whole case. M. Cambon made no further remarks, but said he would report again to his Government.

M. Cambon made a somewhat confused statement about Danzig, himself saying in excuse that he was not familiar with the subject, and that he did not quite understand the purport of the instructions given to him. He gathered that it had been agreed between our two Governments at Paris to instruct our representatives at Danzig to allow the defence of the free city to be undertaken by Polish troops in case they were threatened, but that the British representative on being approached by his French colleague has refused his co-operation in any such arrangements.

Sir Eyre Crowe told M. Cambon that clearly there was a misunderstanding. What had happened was this:—The Polish Government had at the last moment refused to sign at Paris the treaty between Poland and Danzig prepared by the Ambassadors' Conference. They desired to make their signature dependent upon the receipt of an assurance that Poland would receive a mandate for the defence of Danzig against external attack. This was a matter which could be decided only by the League of Nations, under whose guarantee the free city was placed. The Polish Government, therefore, proposed to raise this question at the meeting of the Council of the League at Geneva, and hoped to complete the signature of the treaty on that day. At the meeting of the Ambassadors' Conference, at which the matter was discussed, it was expressed, and found favour both with the French and British representatives, that in Poland to defend Danzig, provided this right were sufficiently circumscribed to prevent its becoming a means of encouraging Polish military intervention on occasions when no real danger was threatening the free city. The British representative, however, was not in favour of this course, but there was no occasion to give any instructions to the British representative at Danzig, as the matter was entirely one for the League of Nations.

I am, &c

CURZON OF KEDLETON

[E 14493 476 44]

No 280

Consul General Vozas to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 22)

(No 144)

My Lord,

Zurich, November 17, 1920

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copy of a letter which has been received at this consulate general from Dr T. Lewenstein, President of the "Agudas Jisroel," also a copy of certain resolutions passed at the conference of this organisation in Zurich in February 1919.

I am sending you the enclosed for all applicants to first have the approval of the local Zionist organisation before they can be given a safe conduct. Furthermore, the number of emigrants from any one particular district is to be fixed by the Zionist organisation.

Some days ago I received a visit from the secretary of the "Agudas Jisroel" for the purpose of calling my attention to this question. It appears that members of the "Agudas Jisroel" have a strong objection to asking permission from the Zionist organisation to go to Palestine, and they think that equal power could be vested in their own organisation. With a view to putting the matter clearly before you I asked the representative of the "Agudas Jisroel" to write to me. The enclosed letter is the result of my request. I think that their point of view is fully explained in the enclosed letter, which I now submit for your consideration.

I have, &c

ERNEST G. B. MAXWELL

Enclosure 1 in No 280.

"Agudas Jisroel" to Mr. Maxwell.

November 11, 1920

Sir,

I AM instructed by my committee to submit the following matter to you for your kind consideration—

The "Agudas Jisroel," the world organisation of orthodox Jews, with a membership of over one million in all countries of Europe and in America, has, since its establishment in 1912, taken the greatest interest in the colonisation of Palestine. Indeed one of the points on its program is the colonisation of Palestine on a large scale on a Jewish traditional basis, i.e., in such a manner that due consideration be paid to the special interests of the Jewish people in Palestine, and raising the standard of living of the Jewish population in Palestine, for the support of intending immigrants as well as for the proposed establishment of garden colonies there.

The "Agudas Jisroel" is a non-Zionist organisation.

Many Jews in Eastern Europe are anxious to go out to Palestine with a view of becoming Palestinian subjects. A considerable number of them are in possession of sufficient means for their upkeep. They are mostly small traders, skilled labourers and agricultural labourers.

We understand, however, that intending immigrants to Palestine are required to apply to the local Zionist organisation for a letter of recommendation before the granting of the visa is considered by the British Passport Office.

My committee feels very strongly on this point, inasmuch as the Balfour Declaration concerning the establishment of a Jewish national home was given to the Jewish people, and obviously did not contemplate the setting up of a Zionist control over the Jewish people.

My committee is anxious to support with all its power the British Government in its policy in Palestine. It is, however, of the opinion that the British Government has no intention of handing over Palestine to one section of the Jewish people; my committee would be most grateful if you, Sir, would inform the British Government that the Jewish people would be most grateful if the Jewish people would be recognised as equally effective with the recommendations by the Zionist organisation.

I beg to append, herewith, a copy of the Palestine resolutions passed at our Zurich Conference in 1919.

I beg to remain &c

DR. LEWENSTEIN.

Enclosure 2 in No 280

Resolutions concerning Palestine passed at the Conference of the "Agudas Jisroel" World Organisation in Zurich (February 1919).

1. THE Jewish people trust that the Peace Congress will recognise, on principle, Palestine as the country of Israel where they are called upon to realise their national tasks in accordance with the teaching of the Torah (Jewish Tradition).

2. The Jewish people whose religious duty during the time of their dispersal has always been the colonisation of Palestine, claims the right to establish on a large scale a Jewish community in the Holy Land by systematic immigration and colonisation under the protection of the League of Nations, or its mandatories, and this under such conditions that would allow an independent development of their religious culture based on a sound economical and social foundation, and also an amicable understanding with the non-Jewish population of Palestine.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 23)

Sir,

War Office, November 22, 1920.

1 AM commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 25th October, 1920, regarding the possible occupation of Transjordan by British troops.

2 Regarding Sir H. Samuel's telegram No. 317 dated the 17th October, I am to say in the first place that the attention of Earl Curzon of Kedleston has doubtless been drawn to telegram No. 12922 from the High Commissioner, Mesopotamia, showing that a converse situation exists at Jezireh Ibn Omar to that complained of by M. Cux as regards the Ajlun, and that Lord Curzon will be the best judge of how this coincidence may be used to relieve and adjust any tendency on the part of the French to encroach upon the British sphere.

3. Regarding the case for the presence in Transjordan of a small force of British or Indian troops, I am to say that, as Lord Curzon is aware the Army Council are consistently opposed to the dispersal of force in whatever form it may be advocated and that this objection is strengthened by recent lessons acquired in Mesopotamia and Persia where dispersal of force in political interests led to considerable embarrassment on the outbreak of the Arab revolt.

4 Whilst fully recognising the political advantages of an effective occupation of Transjordan, I am to say that the Army Council take a more serious view than the local authorities of the military commitments which might thereby be involved. They could not for an instant contemplate the placing of small detachments of troops separated from any support by the formidable obstacle, which the Jordan valley

present. In the event of trouble arising, the extrication of these detachments might involve a military effort beyond the power of the garrison which it is possible to maintain normally in Palestine, and the keeping open of the line of communications to these detached posts would certainly eat up a considerable number of troops, as the history of the north-west frontier of India has proved. Even under peaceful conditions the physical difficulties involved in the maintenance and supply of garrisons in the hills east of the Jordan would entail prohibitive expense. They fully admit that the maintenance of troops along the present frontier, the Jordan valley is open to grave objections owing to climatic conditions, and for this reason they consider that with the limited number of troops available the best defence can be secured by concentrating them in suitable positions west of the Jordan, and organising mobile columns ready to strike instantly and effectively at any hostile incursion, leaving to the enemy the difficulties of crossing the Ghor. A useful deterrent effect might also be obtained by the periodical march of columns through the frontier region at suitable seasons of the year in order to show the flag beyond the zone of permanent occupation. In the event of punitive expeditions on a larger scale into Transjordan becoming unavoidable either alone or in co-operation with the French these should be carried out in the first instance by aeroplanes, to be temporarily have to be increased with troops drawn from elsewhere.

5. In conclusion I am to attach copies of telegrams Nos. 86622 of the 22nd October to the G.O.C., Egypt and 1203, parts 1 and 2 of the 4th November from the G.O.C., Egypt, from which it will be seen that Lieutenant-General Sir W. N. Congreve recognises the fact that additional troops will be required to carry out the policy advocated by the High Commissioner, and further that he does not consider in any case that it should be attempted until after the winter, owing presumably, to

I am, &c
H. J. CREEDY

War Office to General Officer Commanding, Egypt

(Telegraphic.) P.

October 22, 1920

Part 1.—Please see telegram No. 317 from Samuel to Foreign Office, in which he still advocates that Transjordan should be garrisoned with British forces, and argues that no increase of the Palestine garrison would be necessitated by this.

In this connection please see my telegram No. 86528 of the 14th October, 1920, suggesting that the garrison of Palestine for 1921 consist of two cavalry brigades and one infantry brigade.

As the Palestine State becomes more self-supporting and capable of self-protection there will be further reductions. The view of the War Office is, that the garrisoning of Transjordan would involve a larger British garrison and greater

Part 2.—That British troops in the Ajlun would probably prevent Arab raids across the Jordan is true, but on the other hand such dispositions would bring us into contact with turbulent tribes further east, and we should come up against a north-west frontier of India situation, always necessitating further commitments in an easterly direction. The present boundaries are considered to necessitate the least military force. For although we cannot, situated as we are, prevent Arab raids from Transjordan, a small active mobile reserve should be sufficient to repel them and inflict deterrent punishment. The attack on Semakh in May of this year illustrated this.

Bearing in mind that true economy of troops and the undesirability of further commitments are the controlling factors, please wire your views.

Enclosure 2 in No. 281

General Headquarters, Egypt, to War Office

(Secret)

(Telegraphic.) P.

November 4, 1920

YOUR 86622 M.O.2. of 22nd October

Part 1.—Proper strategic frontiers of Palestine are highlands east of Jordan. Jordan valley is too close to our vitals and moreover very unhealthy. Have seen Samuel. He urges occupation of Kerak and [? Irthid es Salt] [?] by posts of 400 soldiers and says that for their supply adequate roads exist and shall be maintained. His reasons are that he finds it impossible to keep order by local gendarmerie that people themselves wish [? it], that French demand it, that area is and must be an integral part of Palestine, that anarchy will spread [? to O.E.T.] if not checked in Transjordan. He hopes to raise defence force which will take over [?] districts of army eventually but [?] equally sure we cannot look to this at the earliest for two years and he cannot improve or [?] increase his gendarmerie sufficiently to relieve us.

Part 2 and last.—I agree with all he says [?] except as regards [?] (one group undecipherable) finding posts in Transjordan if garrison is to be reduced to one infantry brigade as my infantry reserve will vanish. I cannot debate [?] your contention [?] that extension of territory might involve us in trouble though this is in my opinion unlikely. Until civilian government can do so itself, we have committed ourselves to safeguarding Palestine, and I think we should [?] carry out the whole [?] [?] and occupy Transjordan, which, provided that we have two [?] infantry [?] [?] beyond one brigade proposed as ultimate garrison, we can do with little risk. Accommodation classification and means [?] [?] which are at above mentioned places not reconnoitred yet, but I am having this done. If occupation is decided on I think it should be deferred until after the winter in any case.

[Note by C.2.—Message received very corrupt.]

[E 14803 9492 44]

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon — (Received November 29)

(No. 118.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, November 1, 1920

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th October 1920, and in reply to inform you that the draft ordinance follows closely the English Companies Act of 1908, and I venture to point out that the Mesopotamian Administration introduced last year an ordinance adopting the Indian Companies Law which is likewise based on the English legislation. I have the honour to request that the draft may be examined as soon as possible in order that the ordinance may be placed before the Advisory Council.

I have, &c
HERBERT SAMUEL
High Commissioner

Enclosure 1 in No. 282

Note on the Draft Companies Ordinance

TWO principles have been kept in view in the drafting of this ordinance —

1. To adopt as far as possible the methods which English law has found most conducive to the development of commerce by joint stock enterprise and the restraint of fraudulent dealing
2. To preserve certain principles which are inherent in the Turkish law on the subject and to give persons forming or joining companies the means of adopting the ideas with which they are presumably most familiar

With the second object in view, a considerable part of the *pro forma* for articles of association, which is practically the whole of the Turkish legislation on the subject, has been retained, and companies are therefore presumed to adopt the rules therein contained.

The general order of arrangement of "The Companies Act, 1908," has, however, been followed in the ordinance. The principles have been adopted from the act rather than the actual phraseology, because the adoption of details would have involved the creation of an amount of machinery which does not exist in Palestine. Most of the methods of safeguarding the rights of shareholders and creditors have been incorporated, e.g., provisions with regard to the prospectus, commissions and discounts, allotment of shares for a consideration other than cash, &c. In some cases particular provisions have been strengthened. The issue of debentures to the public on a floating security has been provided for, and the registrar is empowered to examine and approve the issue of debentures. The winding-up provisions of the English act have been adopted in their entirety.

The provisions with regard to the payment of fees and the restrictions of the law shall not be allowed to exploit the inhabitants of this country, while no restriction is placed on a registration of *bona fide* foreign companies extending their operations to Palestine which will bring benefit to the country. The law is not to be subject to the formation of new companies here.

The treatment of fees is more or less tentative and will need to be examined carefully. It seems desirable that a fairly high initial fee should be paid rather than that the system of stamp duty on transfer of shares contained in the Turkish law should be adopted. Special provisions of the Turkish law, though less elaborate, are made to protect persons dealing with banking and insurance companies.

Enclosure 2 in No. 282.

The Companies Ordinance

PART I—Constitution and Incorporation

THIS ordinance shall be known as "The Companies Ordinance, 1920."

2. No company or association and no partnership consisting of more than ten members shall be formed in Palestine for the purpose of carrying on therein any business which has for its object the acquisition of gain by such body or its members unless it is registered as a company under this ordinance.

Nevertheless—

- (i.) Companies registered under Ordinance No. 115 issued by the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration and dated the 29th May, 1919, shall be deemed to be registered under this ordinance.
- (ii.) Associations registered under the Co-operative Societies Ordinance need not be registered under this ordinance nor shall the provisions thereof apply to such Associations.

3. A partnership consisting of more than ten members, whether or not it is a limited partnership, shall be registered as a partnership ("société en commandite") shall be registered as a partnership.

(2) Any such partnerships which are at present so registered shall immediately on the coming into force of this ordinance be removed from the registry of partnerships and to be registered as companies under this ordinance.

4. Any seven or more persons associated for any lawful purpose may, by subscribing their names to a memorandum of association and otherwise complying with the requirements of this ordinance in respect of registration, form an incorporated company with or without limited liability.

5. A company registered under this ordinance may be either—

- (i.) A company having the liability of its members limited by its memorandum to the amount, if any, unpaid on the shares respectively held by them, or
- (ii.) A company having the liability of its members limited by the memorandum to such amount as the members may respectively thereby undertake to contribute to the assets of the company in the event of its being wound up, or
- (iii.) A company not having any limit on the liability of its members.

Companies constituted in accordance with the provisions of sub-sections (i), (ii) and (iii) of this section shall be known as companies limited by shares, companies limited by guarantee or unlimited companies respectively.

6. The High Commissioner may appoint a registrar under this ordinance, who shall have an office in Jerusalem.

7. The registrar shall register on application—

- (i.) All associations which must or may in accordance with the provisions of this ordinance be registered hereunder.
- (ii.) All foreign companies formed outside Palestine which desire to carry on business in Palestine, provided they fulfil the conditions hereinafter laid down.

8. The registrar shall not register any company formed for the purpose of land development in Palestine or which has among its objects any involving power to hold more land than is needed for its enterprise, plant and works, unless it produces

a certificate under the hand of the High Commissioner that it is recognised as serving some purpose of public utility

Memorandum of Association

9.—(1) The memorandum of association shall define the constitution of the company and its powers and objects with reference to the general public. It shall in all cases state the following particulars:—

- (i) The name of the company. In the case of a company limited by shares or by guarantee the word "Limited" shall form the last word of such name.
- (ii) The place in Palestine in which the registered office of the company is to be situated.
- (iii) The objects of the company.
- (iv) In the case of companies limited by shares or by guarantee it shall further be stated that the liability of the members is limited.
- (v) In the case of a company limited by either shares or guarantee, if such company has a share capital, the memorandum shall further state the amount of share capital with which the company proposes to be registered and the division thereof into shares of a fixed amount.
- (vi) In the case of a company limited by guarantee only that each member undertakes to contribute to the assets of the company in the event of its being wound up which he is a member, or within one year afterwards, for payment of the debts and liabilities of the company contracted before he ceases to become a member and of the costs, charges and expenses of winding up, and for the adjustment of the rights of the contributories among themselves, such amount as may be required not exceeding a specified amount.

(2) If the company has a share capital—

- (i) No subscriber of the memorandum may take less than one share.
- (ii) Each subscriber must write opposite to his name the number of shares he takes. The memorandum shall be drawn up in the form of Schedule (A).

10.—(1) There shall in the case of all companies limited by shares registered under this Ordinance be a memorandum of association and articles of association which shall have the effect of binding the members of the company as if they were contracts.

(2) Such articles of association may be in the form prescribed in Schedule B.

Under this Ordinance the company shall be deemed to have adopted the terms of Schedule B without variation or modification as its articles of association.

3) In any case where the provisions of Schedule (B) are not adopted as the articles of association such articles shall make provision for the following matters:—

- (1) Whether the company has power to increase its capital.
- (2) What proportion of the capital must be subscribed and what amount paid up before any shares can be allotted. Whether any shares can be issued for a consideration other than cash, and, if so, to what amount. In what languages share certificates shall be written.
- (3) What proportion of the value of a share must be paid up before it can be transferred.
- (4) Whether shares can be held in the name of more than one person. Whether the person or persons named in the certificate are to be deemed to be the persons entitled to present their author in the administration.
- (5) The rate of interest due on arrears of instalments.
- (6) Whether the company has powers of sale of shares for failure to pay instalments, and, if so, by what procedure.
- (7) The minimum and maximum number of directors necessary and the mode of appointment, suspension, and removal of the same.
- (8) The period of office of directors and the mode of replacement.
- (9) The minimum interval between directors meeting and the quorum necessary for such meetings.
- (10) The method of certifying the minute book of directors' meetings.

- (11) The minimum number of shares to be held by a director.
- (12) The method of filling temporary vacancies on the board of directors.
- (13) The method of appointment of a president of the board of directors.
- (14) Whether an absent director can be represented by another director.
- (15) Whether the board of directors have any powers additional to the ordinary powers of administration.
- (16) Whether the board of directors may delegate any, and, if so, what powers to a committee.
- (17) Whether the directors are entitled to any remuneration, and, if so, what, and how such remuneration is to be ascertained.
- (18) The time of the holding of the annual general meeting of the company.
- (19) Whether any qualifications in respect of number of shares held are necessary to entitle shareholders to notice of meetings. Whether proxies are allowed. Whether any qualifications in respect of shares held are necessary to entitle shareholders to vote. The number of votes in proportion to shares.
- (20) The length of notice necessary for the convening of a meeting and the manner of notification thereof.
- (21) The minimum representation necessary to constitute a meeting, and how such representation shall be ascertained.
- (22) The method of determining who shall preside, who shall act as secretary, and who shall collect the votes.
- (23) How the agenda is prepared, who may submit proposals to be contained in it, and during what period.
- (24) The method of selection of auditors.
- (25) What matters will normally be dealt with at the annual general meeting.
- (26) The method of certifying the report of the general meeting in the minute book. Whether a list of the members present will be made and, if so, in what form.
- (27) How copies and extracts of the minutes are to be certified.
- (28) The commencement and termination of the company's financial year. The termination of the first financial year. What statements will be submitted to the general meeting, and which of them are to be submitted to the members of the company. Whether a statement of the company's affairs is to be submitted to the members.
- (29) How the profits are divided, and whether any amount is to be put to reserve, and, if so, what proportion.
- (30) Whether profits may be used for the redemption or conversion into jouissance shares of any, and, if so, what classes of shares and what proportion of the profits may be used for this purpose.
- (31) Whether a maximum is fixed for the reserve fund, and, if so, what. For what purpose it may be used and how the amount used is to be replaced.
- (32) Whether the reserve may be used to make up a deficiency in dividend, and, if so, to what amount of dividend.
- (33) Disposal of the reserve fund on winding up of the company.
- (34) Steps necessary to authorise prolongation, dissolution, and amalgamation. With regard to what changes in these matters or others the shareholders are protected by the necessity of obtaining the Government's consent.
- (35) On the loss of what proportion of capital the directors are bound to call a general meeting to decide about the liquidation of the company.
- (36) Whether a winding up of the company may be transferred to a liquidator, and, if so, by whom and under what conditions.
- (37) Whether any minimum representation of the shareholders is necessary to decide on the prolongation of the period, the liquidation or amalgamation of the company, the issue of debentures, if authorised by the articles, or alteration of the articles, or any of them.
- (38) In what papers publication is to be made and of what documents.
- (39) On what terms the company will distribute copies of its articles and to whom.
- (40) What statistics of its transactions the company will issue.

(4) In any case where the terms of Schedule (B) are not adopted, the registrar may settle with the promoters of the company the form of the articles, and may refuse to allow the registration in cases where in his opinion the provisions of the articles are not just and equitable as between members of the company.

11. The articles of a company limited by guarantee and of an unlimited company shall contain all the particulars set forth in section 10 save that—

- (a.) Where they have no share capital such companies may omit sub-articles (1) to (6) (11), (19) (except as to whether proxies are allowed), and (30)
- (b.) They shall contain in the following order at the commencement of the articles of association provisions with regard to the following matters.—
 - (1.) The number of members the company must have for the purpose of registration
 - (2.) What conditions are required for membership of the company

12. Any company formed for the purpose of carrying on business in Palestine and applying for registration under this ordinance shall on such application lodge with the registrar

- (1.) Three copies of its memorandum as above defined
- (2.) On a separate paper one copy of its articles of association, subject to the provisions of section 10
- (3.) On a separate paper or papers one copy of any contract entered into by the company or by anyone on its behalf

13. On approval by the registrar of the memorandum and articles (if any) the High Commissioner may authorise the company in writing and it shall then be entitled to commence business.

14. On the authorisation of any company the memorandum of association shall be published in the "Official Gazette" and shall be posted in the District Court of the district in which the company has its head office

15. The memorandum and articles shall each be stamped with stamps to the value of P.T. 50

16. On registration the company shall pay fees in accordance with Schedule (C), but no company formed solely for the purpose of providing for the amalgamation of existing companies shall be liable to pay fees

17. A company may not alter the conditions contained in its memorandum except in the cases and in the mode and to the extent for which express provision is made in this ordinance

18. —(1.) A company may not register by a name identical with that of a company already registered or so nearly resembling it as in the opinion of the registrar to be likely to deceive

(2.) Any partnership registered in Palestine may apply to the registrar of companies to have the name of any company changed on the ground that it is identical with or so nearly resembling the name of such partnership that it is likely to deceive and to make such publication of the change as he considers necessary

(3.) Where the registrar is of opinion that a proposed company has adopted a name for an improper or fraudulent purpose he may refuse to register such company

(4.) A company may apply to the court to restrain any person or society which has adopted a name identical with or so nearly resembling its own name as to be likely to deceive and the court may thereupon restrain such person or society from using such name provided that it shall not do so if the person or society proves that he or it has a prior right to such name

19. —(1.) Subject to the provisions of this section a company may, by special resolution, alter the provisions of its memorandum with respect to the objects of the company, so far as may be required to enable it—

- (a.) To carry on its business more economically or more efficiently, or
- (b.) To attain its main purpose by new or improved means, or
- (c.) To enlarge or change the local area of its operations, or
- (d.) To carry on some business which under existing circumstances may conveniently or advantageously be combined with the business of the company, or
- (e.) To restrict or abandon any of the objects specified in the memorandum

(2.) The alteration shall not take effect until and except in so far as it is confirmed on petition by the registrar

(3.) Before confirming the alteration the registrar must be satisfied—

- (a.) That sufficient notice has been given to every holder of debentures of the company and to any persons or class of persons whose interests will, in the opinion of the registrar, be affected by the alteration, and
- (b.) That, with respect to every creditor who in the opinion of the registrar is entitled to object, and who signifies his objection in manner directed by the registrar either his consent to the alteration has been obtained or his debt or claim has been discharged or has determined, or has been secured to the satisfaction of the registrar

Provided that the registrar may, in the case of any person or class, for special reasons, dispense with the notice required by this section

(4.) The registrar may make an order confirming the alteration either wholly or in part, and on such terms and conditions as he thinks fit, and may make such order as to costs as he thinks proper

(5.) The registrar shall in exercising his discretion under this section, have regard to the rights and interests of the members of the company or of any class of them, as well as to the rights and interests of the creditors, and may, if he thinks fit adjourn the proceedings in order that an arrangement may be made to the satisfaction of the registrar for the purchase of the interests of dissentient members, and may give such directions and make such orders as he may think expedient for facilitating or carrying into effect any such arrangement. Provided that no part of the capital of the company may be expended on any such purchase

(6.) The registrar of companies shall register the alteration, and shall certify the registration under his hand and the certificate shall be conclusive evidence that all the requirements of this ordinance with respect to the alteration and the confirmation thereof have been complied with and thenceforth the memorandum so altered shall be the memorandum of the company.

If a company makes default in delivering to the registrar of companies the document required by this section to be delivered to him, the company shall be liable to a fine not exceeding ten pounds for every day during which it is in default

20. The articles of association of a company may at any time be altered by special resolution subject to the approval of the registrar.

21. Registration shall be *prima facie* evidence that the company is an incorporated body and has the powers of such a body

22. Every company shall send each member on his request and on the payment of 5 piasres a copy of the memorandum and articles

PART II—Share Capital List of Members and unlimited liability of Directors.

23. A company may if it take power to do so in its articles by special resolution and with the consent of the registrar, alter its memorandum as follows—

(1.) It may—

- (a.) Increase its share capital by the issue of new shares of such amount as it thinks expedient.
- (b.) Consolidate and divide all or any of its share capital into shares of larger amount than its existing shares.
- (c.) Convert all or any of its paid-up shares into stock, and reconvert that stock into paid-up shares of any denomination
- (d.) Sub-divide its shares, or any of them, into shares of smaller amount than is fixed by the memorandum, so, however, that in the sub-division the proportion between the amount paid and the amount, if any, unpaid on each reduced share shall be the same as it was in the case of the share from which the reduced share is derived.
- (e.) Cancel shares which, at the date of the passing of the resolution in that behalf made, are not taken up or agreed to be taken up by any person, and diminish the amount of its share capital by the amount of the shares so cancelled

(2.) Where any alteration has been made under this section in the memorandum every copy of the memorandum issued after the date of the alteration shall be in accordance with the alteration

If a company make default in complying with this provision it shall be liable to a fine not exceeding one pound for each copy in respect of which default is made.

(b) Either with or without extinguishing or reducing liability on any of its shares, cancel any paid up share capital which is lost or unrepresented by available assets, or

(c) Either with or without extinguishing or reducing liability on any of its shares, pay off any paid up share capital which is in excess of the wants of the company.

and may, if and so far as is necessary, alter its memorandum by reducing the amount of its share capital and of its shares accordingly

30. The approval of the registrar in such regard may be given if he is satisfied that such reduction would be for the benefit of the shareholders and not prejudicial to the interests of the creditors and provided that—

- (a) Such reduction shall be proportionate as between all classes of shareholders
- (b) The company complies with such terms as regards advertisement as the registrar directs
- (c) All the creditors of the company consent, or failing consent, the company gives them such security as appears reasonable to the registrar, after hearing the objections of the creditors thereon
- (d) The company adds to the end of its name the words "and reduced" for such period as the registrar shall at the time or in his opinion at any subsequent time direct

31 In a limited company the liability of the directors may, if so provided in the memorandum, be unlimited

12. A hunted company may by special resolution and subject to the approval of the shareholders already called up shall not be capable of being called up, except in the event and for the purpose of the company being wound up and thereupon that portion of its share capital shall not be capable of being called up except in the event and for the purpose aforesaid.

Management and Administration

33.—(1) Every company shall have a registered office in Palestine to which all communications and notices may be addressed, and it shall intimate the situation of such office and any change thereof to the registrar.

(2) Every limited company shall have and keep its full name legibly written, painted, engraved or printed on—

(a) Every office where it carries on business

(b) 14 sent

(c) All its notices, advertisements and official publications

(d) All letter, paper and mercantile and business documents issuing from or purporting to be signed by or on behalf of the company

[illegible]

(4) Every company which commits a breach of sub-article (1) of this article shall be liable to a fine not exceeding £E. 25, and every company which commits a breach of sub-article (2) shall be liable to a fine not exceeding £E. 10.

34. A general meeting of every company shall be held at least once in every calendar year and not more than fifteen months after the holding of the last preceding general meeting, and every company which commits a breach of this article shall be liable to a fine not exceeding £E 25.

35 Every company limited by shares and registered under this ordinance shall within a period of not less than one nor more than three months from the date at which the company is entitled to commence business hold a general meeting of its members, which shall be called the statutory meeting. At such meeting any shareholder shall be entitled to discuss any matter affecting the company or its business, although no notice of such matter is contained in the agenda.

36 Seven days prior to such statutory meeting the company shall forward to every shareholder a report called the statutory report, stating—

(b) The fact and the date of any person ceasing to be a member

(a) The total number of shares allotted and the amounts paid up thereon and the consideration given for any shares allotted otherwise than for cash.

(c) The amount of the calls still outstanding on his shares

∴ The \vec{r} and \vec{r}' are not perpendicular. Hence, \vec{r} and \vec{r}' will not be orthogonal.

(2) Such register of members shall be open to inspection by any member of the public at all reasonable business hours on payment of a fee not exceeding five pence.

29. A company may—

(a) Forfeit shares for non payment of calls

(b) By a resolution pay off paid-up capital out of accumulated profits on condition that they are liable to be called up again

(c) By a resolution cancel shares which have not been subscribed

29. Subject to the approval of the registrar, a company limited by shares, if so authorised by its articles, may, if special resolution is passed in that behalf by the company, and in particular may

(ix) Extinguish or reduce the liability on any of its shares in respect of share capital not paid up, or,

- (b) The amount of cash received for all shares allotted
- (c) An account or estimate of preliminary expenses
- (d) The names, addresses and descriptions of directors, auditors (if any), manager (if any) and secretary
- (e) Particulars of any contracts entered into by the company or by anyone on behalf of the company.

37. At the statutory meeting the company shall consider and not later than a second meeting being adjourned, shall either approve, modify or repudiate—

- (a) The allotment of any shares for any consideration other than cash.

Any transfer or proposed transfer of any business or other obligation to the company provided that if the company modifies any of these, the other party thereto may within two weeks of receiving notice of such modification repudiate the allotment or the contract altogether.

And provided that if a contract is repudiated the parties shall be at as nearly as possible in the same condition as if the contract had not been made, and no loss falling on the party repudiating.

38. The directors of a company shall on the requisition of the shareholders representing one-tenth of the share capital of the company call a general meeting.

39. (1) Unless otherwise provided in the articles—

- (a) A meeting of the company shall be called by seven days notice and such notice may be in writing and shall be published in two newspapers published in Palestine.
- (b) The president or in his absence the senior director present, and failing him any member elected by the meeting, shall preside.
- (c) Every member shall have one vote.
- (d) Voting by proxy is allowed, but no member shall exercise more than ten proxies.
- (e) A meeting shall be constituted when one-quarter of the share capital is represented.

(2) All general meetings shall be held in the place in which the head office of the company is situated.

40. Notice of any alteration of the articles by a general meeting shall be published in two newspapers published in Palestine.

41. Every company shall cause minutes of all proceedings of general meetings to be kept.

42. No resolution other than an ordinary resolution or an extraordinary resolution or a special resolution as defined in this ordinance shall be proposed to or passed at a general meeting.

43. (1) A copy of every special and extraordinary resolution shall within fifteen days of its passing be printed or typewritten, or from the passing of the extraordinary resolution, as the case may be, be printed and forwarded to the registrar of companies who shall retain the same.

(2) Where articles have been registered a copy of every special resolution or extraordinary resolution shall be annexed to or appended to every copy of the articles issued after the confirmation of the resolution.

(3) Where a company has not registered its articles a copy of every special resolution or extraordinary resolution shall be annexed to or appended to every copy of the articles issued after the confirmation of the resolution.

44. A company shall cause a copy of every special resolution or extraordinary resolution to be printed or typewritten, or from the passing of the extraordinary resolution, as the case may be, be printed and forwarded to the registrar of companies who shall retain the same.

45. A company shall cause a copy of every special resolution or extraordinary resolution to be printed or typewritten, or from the passing of the extraordinary resolution, as the case may be, be printed and forwarded to the registrar of companies who shall retain the same.

46. A company shall cause a copy of every special resolution or extraordinary resolution to be printed or typewritten, or from the passing of the extraordinary resolution, as the case may be, be printed and forwarded to the registrar of companies who shall retain the same.

45. Directors shall not hold office for a longer period than five years without re-election.

46. No director shall act in his capacity as director by proxy or agent except that a director temporarily absent may by the articles be entitled to appoint any other director to act for him.

47. The signature of a director or manager of a company along with the seal of the company on a contract, bill of exchange, or promissory note shall be *prima facie* evidence that the person so signing or sealing has authority to bind the company.

48. Every director shall take and hold not less than the minimum number of shares laid down in the articles.

Prospectus

49. (1.) Every company before offering shares for public subscription and every company which does not restrict the transfer of its shares shall issue a prospectus.

(2.) Every company which commits a breach of this article shall be liable to a fine not exceeding £E 200.

50. (1.) Every prospectus issued by or on behalf of a company, or by or on behalf of any person who is or has been engaged or interested in the formation of the company, must state—

(a) The contents of the memorandum, with the names, descriptions, and addresses of the signatories, and the number of shares subscribed for by them respectively, and the number of founders or managers, and the number of deferred shares, if any, and the nature and extent of the interest of the holders in the property and profits of the company, and

(b) The number of shares, if any, fixed by the articles as the qualification of a director, and any provision in the articles as to the remuneration of the directors, and

(c) The names, descriptions, and addresses of the directors or proposed directors, and

(d) The minimum subscription on which the directors may proceed to allotment, and the amount payable on application and allotment on each share, and in the case of a second or subsequent offer of shares, the amount offered for subscription on each previous allotment made within the two preceding years, and the amount actually allotted, and the amount, if any, paid on the shares so allotted, and

(e) The number and amount of shares and debentures which within the two preceding years have been issued, or agreed to be issued, as fully or partly paid up otherwise than in cash, and, in the latter case, the extent to which they are so paid up, and in either case the consideration for which those shares or debentures have been issued or are proposed or intended to be issued, and

(f) The names and addresses of the vendors of any property purchased or acquired by the company, or proposed so to be purchased or acquired, which is to be paid for wholly or partly out of the proceeds of the issue of shares or debentures, and the amount payable in cash, shares, or debentures, to the vendor, and where there is more than one separate vendor or the company is a sub-purchaser, the amount so payable to each vendor: provided that where the vendors or any of them are a firm the members of the firm shall not be treated as separate vendors, and

(g) The amount, if any, paid or payable as purchase-money in cash, shares, or debentures, for any property purchased or acquired by the company, or proposed so to be purchased or acquired, which is to be paid for wholly or partly out of the proceeds of the issue of shares or debentures, and

(h) The amount, if any, paid within the two preceding years, or payable as commission for subscribing or agreeing to subscribe, or procuring or agreeing to procure subscriptions, for any shares in, or debentures of the company, or the rate of any such commission: provided that it shall not be necessary to state the commission payable to sub-underwriters, and the amount or estimated amount of preliminary expenses, and

(i) The amount paid within the two preceding years or intended to be paid to any promoter, and the consideration for any such payment, and

- (k.) The dates of and parties to every material contract, and a reasonable time and place at which any material contract or a copy thereof may be inspected: provided that this requirement shall not apply to a contract entered into in the ordinary course of the business carried on or intended to be carried on by the company, or to any contract entered into more than two years before the date of issue of the prospectus, and
- (l.) The names and addresses of the auditors, if any, of the company; and
- (m.) Full particulars of the nature and extent of the interest, if any, of every director in the promotion of, or in the property proposed to be acquired by, the company, or where the interest of such a director consists in being a partner in a firm, the nature and extent of the interest of the firm, with a statement of all sums paid or agreed to be paid to him or to the firm in cash or shares or otherwise by any person either to induce him to become, or to qualify him as, a director, or otherwise for services rendered by him or by the firm in connection with the promotion or formation of the company, and
- (n.) Where the company is a company having shares of more than one class, the right of voting at meetings of the company conferred by the several classes of shares respectively.

2. For the purpose of this section, every person shall be deemed to be a vendor who has entered into any contract, absolute or conditional, for the sale or purchase, or for any option of purchase, of any property to be acquired by the company, in any case where—

- (a.) The purchase-money is not fully paid at the date of issue of the prospectus
- (b.) The purchase-money is to be paid or satisfied wholly or in part out of the proceeds of the issue offered for subscription by the prospectus or
- (c.) The contract depends for its validity or fulfilment on the result of that

3. Where any of the property to be acquired by the company is to be taken on lease, the expression "purchase-money" included the consideration for the lease, and the expression "sub-purchaser" included as sub-lessee

(4.) Every company which commits a breach of this article shall be liable to a fine not exceeding £E. 50 for each such omission

(5.) Where any such prospectus as is mentioned in this section is published as a newspaper advertisement it shall not be necessary in the advertisement to specify the contents of the memorandum or the signatures thereto, and the number of shares subscribed for by the

(6.) In the event of non-compliance with any of the requirements of this section, a director or other person responsible for the prospectus shall not incur any liability by reason of the non-compliance, if he proves that—

- (a.) As regards any matter not disclosed he was not cognisant thereof, or
- (b.) The non-compliance arose from an honest mistake of fact on his part

Provided that in the event of non-compliance with the requirements contained in paragraph (m) of sub-section (1) of this section no director or other person shall incur any liability in respect of the non-compliance unless it be proved that he had knowledge of the matters not disclosed

(7.) This section shall not apply to a circular or notice inviting existing members or debenture holders of a company to subscribe either for shares or for debentures of the company, whether with or without the right to renounce in favour of the person to whom the circular or notice is addressed, or to any prospectus, whether issued on or with reference to the formation of a company or subsequently

(8.) The requirements of this section as to the memorandum and the qualification remuneration and interest of directors, the names, descriptions, and addresses of directors or proposed directors and the amount or estimated amount of preliminary expenses, shall not apply in the case of a prospectus issued more than one year after the date at which the company is entitled to commence business.

(9.) Nothing in this section shall limit or diminish any liability which any person may incur under the general law or this ordinance apart from this section.

51. In addition to any criminal penalty imposed under Article 50—

- (1.) Any contract to take shares induced by a statement in the prospectus which is false and material may be set aside by the courts on application of the party injured
- (2.) Any person signing such a prospectus shall be liable to the party injured or to the company for any loss incurred by the making or setting aside of the contract unless he proves that the statement was—
- (a.) Not made on his representations
- (b.) Believed by him to be true
- (c.) Accepted by him after such proof and investigation as he might reasonably be expected to demand

3. It shall not be a ground for the courts refusing to set aside a contract to take shares merely that the company is in liquidation, but a court may so refuse if the shareholder unreasonably delays to take such steps after he knew or might have known of the falsity of the statement

52. (1.) No allotment shall be made of any share capital of a company offered with namely —

- (a.) The amount (if any) fixed by the memorandum or articles and named in the prospectus as the minimum subscription upon which the directors may proceed to allotment or
- (b.) If no amount is so fixed and named, then the whole amount of the share capital so offered for subscription

has been subscribed and the sum payable on application for the amount so fixed and named or for the whole amount offered for subscription, has been paid to and received by the company

(2.) The amount so fixed and named and the whole amount aforesaid shall be reckoned exclusively of any amount payable otherwise than in cash, and is in this ordinance referred to as the minimum subscription

(3.) The amount payable on application on each share shall not be less than 5 per cent of the nominal amount of the share.

(4.) If the conditions aforesaid have not been complied with on the expiration of the time specified in the prospectus, the money paid by the applicants for shares shall be forthwith repaid to them without interest, and, if any such money is not so repaid within forty-eight days after the issue of the prospectus, the directors of the company shall be jointly and severally liable to repay that money with interest at the rate of 5 per cent per annum from expiration of the forty-eighth day. Provided that a director shall not be liable if he proves that the loss of the money was not due to any misconduct or negligence on his part

(5.) Any condition requiring or binding any applicant for shares to waive compliance with any requirement of this section shall be void

(6.) This section, except sub-section (3) thereof, shall not apply to any allotment of shares subsequent to the first allotment of shares offered to the public for subscription.

53. (1.) An allotment by a company to an applicant in contravention of the provisions of the last foregoing section shall be voidable at the instance of the applicant within one month after the holding of the statutory meeting of the company and not later, and shall be so voidable notwithstanding that the company is in course of being wound up.

(2.) If any director of a company knowingly contravenes or permits or authorises the contravention of any of the provisions of the last foregoing section with respect to allotment he shall be liable to compensate the company and the allottee respectively for any loss, damages or costs which the company or the allottee may have sustained or incurred thereby. Provided that proceedings to recover any such loss, damage or costs shall not be commenced after the expiration of two years from the date of the allotment

54. (1.) A company shall not commence any business or exercise any borrowing powers unless—

- (a.) Shares held subject to the payment of the whole amount thereof in cash have been allotted to an amount not less in the whole than the minimum subscription, and

- (b) Every director of the company has paid to the company on each of the shares taken or contracted to be taken by him, and for which he is liable to pay in cash, a proportion equal to the proportion payable on application and allotment on the shares offered for public subscription, or in the case of a company which does not issue a prospectus inviting the public to subscribe for its shares, on the shares payable in cash, and
- (c) There has been filed with the registrar of companies a statutory declaration by the secretary or one of the Directors, in the prescribed form, that the aforesaid conditions have been complied with and
- (d) In the case of a company which does not issue a prospectus inviting the public to subscribe for its shares, there has been filed with the registrar of companies a statement in lieu of prospectus

(2) The registrar of companies shall, on the filing of this statutory declaration, certify that the company is entitled to commence business, and that certificate shall be conclusive evidence that the company is so entitled. Provided that in the case of a company which does not issue a prospectus inviting the public to subscribe for its shares the registrar shall not give such a certificate unless a statement in lieu of prospectus has been filed with him

(3) Any contract made by a company before the date at which it is entitled to commence business shall be provisional only and shall not be binding on the company until that date, and on that date it shall become binding

(4) Nothing in this section shall prevent the simultaneous offer for subscription or allotment of any shares and debentures or the receipt of any money payable on application for debentures

(5) If any company commences business or exercises borrowing powers in contravention of this section every person who is responsible for the contravention shall, without prejudice to any other liability, be liable to a fine not exceeding 500/- for every day during which the contravention continues

35-(1) Whenever a company limited by shares makes any allotment of its shares the company shall within one month thereafter file with the registrar of companies—

(a) A return of the allotments, stating the number and nominal amount of the shares comprised in the allotment, the names, addresses and descriptions of the allottees, and the amount (if any) paid or due and payable on each share, and,

(b) In the case of shares allotted as fully or partly paid up otherwise than in cash, a contract in writing constituting the title of the allottee to the allotment together with any contract of sale, or for services or other consideration in respect of which that allotment was made, such contract being duly stamped, and a return stating the number and nominal amount of shares so allotted, the extent to which they are to be treated as paid up, and the consideration for which they have been allotted

36 No contract made by anyone purporting to act as an agent of the company or as its authorised agent is valid unless and until confirmed by the company, although it is provided otherwise in the articles

37-(1) No shares shall be issued except for a legal consideration

(2) Except as fixed in the memorandum no shares shall be issued wholly or partly paid up for any other consideration than cash

(3) No allotment of such shares shall be valid unless confirmed by the first general meeting

(4) No shares shall be issued or sold by the company at a discount except that a company may if so provided in its articles sell by auction and after advertisement any shares which have been forfeited for failure to pay instalments in due time

38-(1) No sum shall be paid to any promoter except for a legal consideration

(2) No shares allotted to a promoter or person who underwrites shares of the company for a consideration other than cash, or for a cash consideration less than that provided for another class of shares, shall be transferable for a period of two years after allotment

(3) The conditions of transfer of shares issued under sub-article (2) shall be clearly stated in the memorandum and articles of the company

(4) No company shall pay any commission or discount to any person in connection with the issue of shares, whether absolutely or conditionally, or for the services of the company or promoting or agreeing to procure

subscriptions, whether absolute or conditional, for any shares in the company whether the commission or discount is added to the purchase money of any property acquired by the company or to the contract price of any work to be executed for the company, or the money be paid out of the nominal purchase money or contract price or otherwise unless—

- (1) The payment of such commission, discount, or allowance and the mode of payment are specified by the articles
- (2) The articles state what percentage is allowed, such percentage never to exceed 5 per cent
- (3) It is stated in the prospectus issued in connection with the particular issue of shares to which it refers that amount has been arranged to be paid or is proposed to be paid

Provided always that ordinary and reasonable brokerage on the market shall not need to be mentioned in the articles or prospectus

Borrowing Powers of Companies.

40. (1) Every trading company shall have power to borrow money of its members and of the public

(2) Subject as hereinafter appears, for the purpose of securing any money so borrowed a company may mortgage or charge, whether by way of a floating charge or otherwise, all or any part of its undertaking, property, and assets, and the whole of its undertaking and property by way of the issue of debentures in respect of the sum so borrowed

(3) No debentures shall in any event be issued by a company unless such are secured by a mortgage or charge of all or any part of its undertaking, property, and assets, or of more than one series of debentures in respect of the same property.

(4) No debentures shall be issued by a company unless the title to the debentures shall be transferred to, or charged in, the hands of trustees on behalf of the debenture holders

(5) No debentures shall be issued by a company unless the title to the debentures shall be transferred to, or charged in, the hands of trustees on behalf of the debenture holders, and also a general charge by way of floating security on the whole of the assets of the company, and shall further contain provisions regarding the events and contingencies

(6) Nothing in any such trust deed shall prevent a company from dealing with any of its assets thereby charged (other than its immovable property) in any way necessitated, or allowed by, or usual in the ordinary course of business and the existing powers of the company

61-(1) No debentures shall in any event be issued by any company save with the consent and approval of the registrar of companies.

(2) The registrar of companies may, if he is of opinion that the interests of the public demand all such information as seems to him proper in respect of the affairs of the company, require the company to furnish him with such information as he may require for the purpose of the protection of the debenture holders and the creditors of the company, and may make his consent and approval to the issue of the debentures conditional on the company's compliance with such requirements

(3) The registrar may make all such rules and regulations as may seem to him just and proper with regard to notice to creditors and the reception of objections by them in any case of a proposed issue of debentures

62 Every company which issues debentures shall keep a register of debentures which shall be open to the inspection of all creditors or intending creditors of the company and which shall show—

- (1) The amount of debentures created
- (2) The names of all trustees for debenture holders
- (3) The property mortgaged in their favour
- (4) The certified value of such properties
- (5) The dates on which such mortgages are created and released

63. No debentures shall be issued at a discount.

64. Every mortgage or charge created under the provisions of this ordinance by a company registered in Palestine and being either—

(a.) A mortgage or charge for the purpose of securing any issue of debentures,

(b.) A mortgage or charge on uncalled share capital of the company, or

(c.) A mortgage or charge on any land, wherever situate, or any interest therein or on any movable property, or

(d.) A mortgage or charge on any book debts of the company, or

(e.) A floating charge on the undertaking or property of the company,

shall so far as any security on the company's property or undertaking is therefor conferred, be void against the liquidator and any creditor of the company, unless the prescribed particulars of the mortgage or charge together with the instrument by which the mortgage or charge is created or evidenced are delivered to the registrar of companies for registration in manner required by this ordinance within twenty-one days after the date of its creation, but without prejudice to any contract or obligation for repayment of the money thereby secured, and when a mortgage or charge becomes void under this section the money secured thereby shall immediately become payable.

65.—(1) The registrar shall keep with respect to each company a register in the prescribed form of all mortgages and charges created by the company under this ordinance and requiring registration under this ordinance and shall on payment of the prescribed fee enter in the register with respect to every such mortgage or charge the date of creation, the amount secured by it, short particulars of the property mortgaged or charged and the names of the mortgagees and persons entitled to the charge.

(2) The registrar shall give a certificate under his hand of the registration of any mortgage or charge registered in pursuance of this section, stating the amount thereby secured, and the certificate shall be conclusive evidence that the requirements of this section as to registration have been complied with.

(3) The company shall cause a copy of every certificate of registration given under this section to be endorsed on every debenture which is issued by the company and the payment of which is secured by the mortgage or charge so registered.

66. Nothing in these sections contained shall prevent a company from issuing promissory notes on bills in the ordinary course of trade, although such promissory notes or bills may be transferable generally.

67.—(1) Every company being a limited banking company, insurance company, provident or benefit society shall on the date of its annual meeting and six months thereafter make a statement in the form of Schedule (D),

(2) A copy of this statement shall be posted up in a conspicuous place in every office of the company.

(3) Every member and every creditor shall be entitled to a copy of this statement on payment of 2 piastres.

68.—(1) Every company carrying on the business of an insurance company in Palestine shall deposit with the Government of Palestine a sum to be fixed by the registrar for each of the following classes of insurance it carries on in Palestine viz., life, fire, accident, employees liability.

(2) Such sums shall be kept deposited as long as the company carries on business.

(3) The Government shall invest such sums as seems to it best and shall pay the interest gained thereon to the company subject to the charges of management.

69.—(1) Every insurance company shall lodge with the Government before it brings them into use tables of premiums and it shall not enter into any contracts of insurance except on such tables.

(2) The Government shall have power at any time to cause the company to amend or withdraw such tables.

Auditors

70. Every company shall appoint within a month of commencing business one or more auditors. All auditors shall be elected at such annual meetings, but unless otherwise provided in the articles shall be eligible for re-election.

71. A copy of the last annual balance sheet shall be kept at every office of the company and shall there be open to inspection by the members of the public at all reasonable business hours on the payment of a fee not exceeding 5 piastres.

A copy of every such balance sheet shall be sent to the registrar of companies.

72. No person shall be appointed an auditor of a company—

(1) If he is a director or officer of the company;

(2) Unless he is properly qualified by certificate from some university or other institution or by membership of some society of accounts or auditors or he has obtained a certificate from the Government entitling him to practise in Palestine as an auditor.

73. Every auditor shall have a right of access at all times to the books and accounts and vouchers of the company and shall be entitled to require from the directors and officers of the company such information and explanation as may be necessary for the performance of the duties of the auditors.

74.—(1) The auditors shall make a report to the shareholders on the accounts examined by them and on every balance sheet laid before the company, and the report shall state—

(a) Whether they have obtained all the information and explanations they required;

(b) Whether the balance sheet referred to in the report exhibits a true and correct view of the state of the company's affairs.

(2) All reports made by the auditors shall be sold to any shareholder at a price not exceeding 2 piastres for each report.

(3) A copy of every auditor's report shall be sent to the Government.

75. A document may be served on a company by leaving it or sending it by post to the registered office of the company.

A document or proceeding requiring authentication by a company may be signed by a director, secretary or other authorised officer of the company.

PART IV—Winding up

The provisions will follow the articles of the English law in their entirety.

PART V.—Companies already registered and Foreign Companies

1.—(1) This ordinance shall apply to all companies already registered as companies incorporated in Palestine and under the Registration of Companies and Partnerships Ordinance numbered 118 and dated the 29th May, 1910.

(2) Every provision made illegal by this ordinance shall be illegal in respect of companies previously registered, any provision in their articles of association notwithstanding, and the company shall alter its articles accordingly.

(3) Anything required by this ordinance to be done shall be done by companies previously registered, except that they shall not need to comply with provisions solely relating to authorisation or registration.

(4) Every company previously registered, except foreign companies, shall make and forward to the registrar a memorandum in the form prescribed.

(5) All companies registered in any district other than Jerusalem shall be held to be registered in Palestine.

2. Every company, whether formed for gain or not and incorporated outside Palestine, which establishes a place of business within Palestine shall obtain registration under this ordinance before commencing business there unless it has already obtained registration under the Registration of Companies and Partnerships Ordinance numbered 118 and dated the 29th May, 1910.

3.—(1) Every company falling under the preceding article on applying for registration shall lodge with the registrar—

(a) A certified copy of the charter, statutes, or memorandum and articles of association, or other instrument constituting or defining the constitution of the company, and, if the instrument is not written in the English language, a certified translation thereof.

(b) A list of the directors of the company.

(c) The names and addresses of one or more persons resident in Palestine authorised to accept notices and act on behalf of the company with regard to its affairs in Palestine.

(2.) Shall pay a fee of £ E. 25

4 Every company incorporated outside Palestine which establishes a place of business within Palestine shall keep the registrar informed of the names and addresses of some one or more persons resident in Palestine authorised to accept notices and act on behalf of the company with regard to its affairs in Palestine

5 No company incorporated outside Palestine which has for its object, or as one of its leading objects, the carrying on of business in Palestine shall be registered unless it pays such fees on its capital as it would have been liable to pay had it been a company applying for incorporation in Palestine

6 Every company incorporated outside Palestine which establishes a branch in Palestine shall

(1.) Comply with article 33 of this ordinance

(2.) If it holds meetings in Palestine, issue a prospectus or shares in Palestine comply with the regulations in this ordinance relating to this particular matter

(3.) If it is a banking or insurance company comply with the provisions of articles 61, 62 and 63 of this ordinance

PART VI - *Offences, Interpretation, and Repeat*

(1.) Where any company-

(a.) Fails to give any notice, to send any return or document, or to do or allow to be done an act or thing which is required by the ordinance or regulations made by the registrar thereunder,

(b.) Wilfully refuses or omits to do any act or to furnish any information required for the purpose of this ordinance or the said regulations

(c.) Does anything forbidden by this ordinance,

(d.) Wilfully furnishes false or insufficient returns or information

the company and every promoter, director, or officer who is bound by the articles or otherwise to fulfill the duty whereof the offence is a breach, and where there is no such person, every member of the board of directors, unless such member is proved to have been ignorant of or to have attempted to prevent the commission of the offence, shall be guilty of an offence under this ordinance, and shall, alternatively to any other punishment to which it or he may be liable under any law or ordinance, be

liable to pay a fine not exceeding £ E. 10, and every such offence if continued shall constitute a new offence in every week during which the default continues

(2.) A company shall be liable to conviction under this ordinance notwithstanding any provision in any other previous law to the contrary, and any fine passed upon a company may be recovered by civil execution

(3.) The conviction of a company shall not be a bar to the conviction of any other person liable under this ordinance, nor shall the conviction of such persons to that of a company

In this ordinance—

"Company" includes association, society or similar body

"Gain" includes mutual indemnity for loss and mutual accommodation by loan

"Ordinary resolution" is a resolution passed at a general meeting by a majority of those present or represented and entitled to vote

(1.) A resolution shall be an extraordinary resolution when it has been passed by a majority of not less than three fourths of such members entitled to vote as are present in person or by proxy (where proxies are allowed) at a general meeting of which notice specifying the intention to propose the resolution as an extraordinary resolution has been duly given.

(2.) A resolution shall be a special resolution when it has been—

(a.) Passed in manner required for the passing of an extraordinary resolution and

(b.) Confirmed by a majority of such members entitled to vote as are present in person or by proxy (where proxies are allowed) at a subsequent general meeting, of which notice has been duly given, and held after an interval of not less than fourteen days, nor more than one month, from the date of the first meeting

3 At a meeting at which an extraordinary resolution is submitted to be passed or a special resolution is submitted to be passed or confirmed, a declaration of the chairman that the resolution is carried shall, unless a poll is demanded, be conclusive evidence of the fact without proof of the number or proportion of the votes recorded in favour of or against the resolution

(4.) At any meeting at which an extraordinary resolution is submitted to be passed or a special resolution is submitted to be passed or confirmed, a poll may be ordered, if demanded by three persons for the time being entitled according to the articles to vote, unless the articles of the company require a demand by such number of such persons, not in any case exceeding five, as may be specified in the articles

(5.) When a poll is demanded in accordance with this section in computing the majority on the poll, reference shall be had to the number of votes to which each member is entitled by the articles of the company

(6.) For the purposes of this section notice of a meeting shall be deemed to be duly given and the meeting to be duly held when the notice is given and the meeting held in manner provided by the articles

"Dividend on shares" shall include interest on shares

"Promoter" means one who undertakes to form a company with reference to a given project, and to set it going, and who takes the necessary steps to accomplish that purpose

"Consent of the Government" means the consent of such Departments of the Government as are concerned intimated under the hand of the registrar.

"Publication" means publication in the "Official Gazette" and such other newspapers as are required by the articles of association

"Publication by the registrar" means publication in the "Gazette"

"Member of a company" includes all such persons as subscribe the memorandum and any person who agrees to become a member of the company and whose name is entered on its register of members

"A share" is a right of a member of a company, for which some consideration has been given, and which—

(1.) Carries a right to a share in the profits of the company

(2.) Is postponed to the rights of the creditors in a winding-up

(3.) Does not give a right to act for the company except by taking part in a general meeting

"Share capital" is a capital made up of amounts paid or due for shares issued or issuable by a company

"Nominal capital" includes capital which has not yet been subscribed

"Issued capital" includes capital the whole amount of which has not yet been paid up.

"Company limited by guarantee" means a company the members of which undertake to pay a fixed sum on a winding up, if required

The ordinance and laws mentioned in Schedule (E) to this ordinance are hereby repealed to the extent specified in the second column of the schedule

SCHEDULE (A)

Form of Memorandum of Association

1. The name of the company is " Limited "

2. The registered office of the company will be situated at Palestine

3. The objects for which the company is established are—

N.B.—Great particularity is required in setting out the objects of the company as a company possesses no powers which are not expressed or inherent in the memorandum

4. The liability of the members is limited

In the case of Company Limited by Shares

5. The share capital of the company is £ E divided into shares of £ E each

We, the several persons whose names and addresses are subscribed, are desirous of being formed into a company in pursuance of this memorandum of association, and we respectively agree to take the number of shares in the capital of the company set opposite our respective names, or

In case of a Company Limited by Guarantee and not having a share capital

5. Every member of the company undertakes to contribute to the assets of the company in the event of its being wound up while he is a member, or within one year after he ceases to be a member, and the costs, charges and expenses of winding-up, and for the adjustment of the rights of the contributories among themselves, such amount as may be required not exceeding £ E

We, the several persons whose names and addresses are subscribed, are desirous of being formed into a company, in pursuance of this memorandum of association

Names, addresses and descriptions

Number of shares taken by each subscriber
in case of a company limited by shares only

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Dated the day of
Witness to the above signatures
A B, &c

SCHEDULE (B)

Articles of Association

Part I.—Capital and Shares

Article 1. The company by special resolution of a general meeting, shall have power to increase the capital with the approval of the registrar

Art. 2. The company shall be legally constituted when the total capital is subscribed, and 20 per cent thereof paid up. No shares can be issued for any other consideration than cash. Provisional certificates will be issued to shareholders showing instalments paid. After the total nominal value of shares has been paid, the provisional certificates will be replaced by permanent certificates. The share-certificates must be written in English and either Hebrew or Arabic. The payment of the amount remaining due after payment of the first instalment of the capital of the company shall be applied for as the board of directors deem necessary by advertisement published in two newspapers in Palestine at least thirty days in advance

Art. 3. Provisional share-certificates shall be made out in the name of the shareholder until the nominal value is fully paid up, and shares cannot be sold or transferred until 20 per cent of their value is paid up. The sale or transfer of shares will be registered in the company's register, and a transfer form signed by the seller, the buyer and one of the directors. A new certificate bearing the old number will then be issued in the name of the purchaser in exchange for the old certificate, which will be destroyed. When the total nominal value of the share is paid up, the share-certificate shall be made out to bearer

Art. 4. A share-certificate will be considered by the company as indivisible, and can only be registered in the name of one person. Heirs or debtors of a shareholder have no right to effect seizure on the property of the company, nor shall they have the right to interfere with the administration of the company. To obtain their rights they must accept the accounts and books of the company and the decisions of the general meeting

Art. 5. If the instalments due on a share are not paid in due time, interest at the rate of 9 per cent, per annum will be payable on the arrears from the day of maturity, there shall be no necessity to notify the shareholder for non-payment

Art. 6. The company shall have power to borrow money for the purpose of its business or to issue debentures secured by mortgage or charge of its property in trust for the debenture holders

Part II.—Board of Directors

Art. 7. The company will be administered by a board of directors composed of not less than five directors elected at the general meeting, who will hold office for a period of three years

Art. 8. At the expiration of the term of office fixed for the first board of directors a third of the board, and in any case not less than two of the members, will retire annually. The order of retiring will be decided in the first place by lot and thereafter by rotation. Retiring directors are eligible for re-election

Art. 9. The board of directors will meet at the head office as often as is necessary in the interests of the company, but shall hold meetings at least once a month. The presence in person of more than half of the board of directors is required to form a quorum. Decisions are valid if decided by a majority of votes of the directors present. If votes are equal, the president will have a casting vote

Art. 10. The minutes of the meeting of the board of directors will be recorded in a special minute book, and will be signed by the president and the directors present. A copy of extracts of the minutes of the meetings will be considered as valid only if signed by the president or his representative

Art. 11. Each director shall possess twenty five shares of the company which shall be kept by the company and shall not be sold during his term of office. They will bear a special seal to indicate that they cannot be sold

Art. 12. If a vacancy occurs on the board of Directors by death or resignation or any other reason, the board will appoint a temporary member who will hold office until the next general meeting at which a definite appointment will be made

Art. 13. The board will elect annually from its members a president and a vice-president, and in their absence a director will be appointed to act as president

Art. 14. Any director residing in a foreign country or being temporarily absent, will be entitled to appoint another director to act for him during the meetings, but the latter shall not be entitled to exercise more than two votes including his own

Art. 15. The board of directors shall have full power of administration and power to compromise claims and appoint arbitrators. The board will prepare the accounts to be submitted to the general meeting and propose the amount of dividends to be distributed. The president of the board of directors may appear in courts on behalf of the company either as plaintiff or as defendant and either personally or through a representative

Art. 16. The board of directors may delegate, by a special power of attorney, its powers to one or more persons for a fixed period or for a special purpose. It may also delegate one or more persons outside the company to deal with pending affairs

Art. 17. The members of the board of directors will be entitled to a fee, to be fixed by the general meeting of the shareholders, for each day during which they attend the meetings of the board of directors

Part III.—General Meeting of Shareholders

Art. 18. The general meeting will be held at the head office of the company every year in the month of January, but the board of directors may in case of necessity call an extraordinary meeting

Art. 19. The general meeting will be composed of shareholders possessing at least one share. The shareholders may be present either personally or by proxy. A shareholder present either in person or by proxy at the general meeting will be entitled to one vote for each share, but a shareholder shall on no account be entitled to have more than twenty votes

Art. 20. The announcement of the general meeting shall be published in two newspapers as prescribed in art. 2 at least one month before the meeting

Art. 21. The general meeting will be presided over by the president of the board of directors and in his absence by any member of the board elected for that purpose

by the board. The secretary of the general meeting and those commissioned to collect the votes will be nominated by the president.

Art. 22. All matters discussed at the general meeting other than an extraordinary or a special resolution will be decided by a majority of votes. The agenda will be prepared by the board of directors. The matter contained in the agenda will consist of the proposals of the Board and of those shareholders who possess shares the value of which amount to 10 per cent. of the capital of company. The proposals must be submitted at least ten days before the general meeting to the board of directors. Subjects not contained in the agenda will not be discussed at the general meeting.

Art. 23. In every year one or more auditors who shall be properly qualified persons for the examination of all the accounts.

Art. 24. The ordinary general meeting will (1) receive the annual report of the board of directors, regarding the affairs of the company, (2) receive the report of the auditors, (3) accept or reject the accounts after due consideration, (4) decide upon the amount of dividends, (5) appoint new directors in place of those retiring, (6) give final decisions on all matters relating to the company, (7) if necessary increase the power of the board of directors.

Art. 25. The minutes of the general meeting will be kept in a special book. The minutes will be signed by the president and the secretary of the meeting. The minutes will be open to the inspection of all shareholders. The minutes will be kept in a special book. The minutes will be signed by the president and the secretary of the meeting. The minutes will be open to the inspection of all shareholders.

Part IV—The Annual Accounts

Art. 26. The financial year of the company begins on the first day of January and expires on the last day of December. But the first financial year will extend from the date of the definite constitution of the company until the last day of December of the year following its constitution. The board of directors will prepare at the end of each financial year a statement of accounts showing the assets and liabilities of the company. The statement together with a profit and loss account will be delivered to the auditors forty days before the general meeting and will be submitted to the general meeting. Every shareholder has the right to see the annual balance sheet and profit and loss account of the company.

Part V—Distribution of Profits

Art. 27. The annual profits of the company will be allotted as follows—

- (a) 10 per cent. of the net profits will be set aside for the reserve capital.
- (b) The remainder to the shareholders in proportion to their paid up capital.

Part VI.—Reserve Fund

Art. 28. The reserve fund will consist of the cumulative amounts set aside from the annual profits according to article 27 and will be used only to cover any extraordinary and unexpected expenses. When it reaches an amount equal to the capital of the company no further reserve fund will be set aside. But if a portion of the reserve fund is used for any purpose, the amount so used will be set aside from the amount until the reserve again equals the amount of the capital.

Art. 29. On the winding up of the company, the reserve fund remaining, after the settlement of all liabilities of the company, will be distributed among the shareholders.

Part VII—Prolongation, Dissolution and Liquidation

Art. 30. The board of directors may at any time, and for any reason, call a general meeting, to propose the prolongation of the activity of the company, or its dissolution, and to propose its amalgamation with another company. The prolongation of the company, its amalgamation with another company, the issue of debentures,

and alterations of articles of association require the authorisation of the Government.

Art. 31. In case of loss of three-quarters of the capital of the company, the board of directors shall call a general meeting to decide on the liquidation or continuance of the company.

Art. 32. When the period fixed for the duration of the company terminates, or the company dissolves before the expiration of such period, the general meeting will decide the mode of liquidation of the company, and will appoint one or more liquidators. The general meeting will continue to exercise authority during the liquidation of the company in the same manner as during the existence of the company. The liquidators of the company may transfer the rights, shares and liabilities of the company in liquidation meeting to another company or person, with the authority of the general meeting, and the consent of the Government.

Art. 33. The decisions of an extraordinary meeting called to deal with matters relating to the liquidation of the company, shall be valid if more than half of the shares of the company are present.

Part VIII—Miscellaneous

Art. 34. When the constitution of the company is sanctioned by the Government a copy of these articles in full or in a summary must be published in the official gazette of Palestine. The company has a branch. All amendments to these articles executed with the permission of the Government and the copies of the annual decisions of the general meeting will be sent to the Government of Palestine.

Art. 35. The company will print these articles and distribute them to those who ask for them, and will also send ten copies to the Government of Palestine.

Art. 36. The company will draw up statistics of its annual transactions, according to the form to be sent to it by the Statistics Department, and forward them every year to the Government of Palestine.

SCHEDULE (C)

Table of Fees to be paid to the Registrar

I—By a Company having a Share Capital.

- On registration
One-half per cent. on the nominal capital of the company
- On increase of capital
One-eighth per cent. on the increase

Provided that no company shall be liable to pay a greater sum than £ E. 400 in respect of its share capital, taking into account the fee paid on the registration of the company.

II—By a Company not having a Share Capital

- On registration
- When the number of members as stated in the articles does not exceed 50 £ E. 5
- Do. exceeds 20 but does not exceed 100 10
- Do. exceeds 100 20
- On increase of capital above the number stated in the articles for every 50 or lesser number 5

Provided that no company shall be liable to pay a greater sum than £ E. 50 in respect of its number of members taking into account the fee paid on the registration of the company.

SCHEDELE (D)

Form of Statement to be published by Banking and Insurance Companies

*The share capital of the company is divided into
shares of each.
The number of shares issued is
*Calls to the amount of pounds per share have been made under
which the sum of pounds has been received.
The liabilities of the Company on the day of
were (Specify the different classes with their amounts)
The assets of the company on that day were
(Specify the different classes with their amounts)

* If the company has no share capital, these particulars must be omitted

SCHEDULE (E)

Ordinances and Laws Repealed

Title of Law or Ordinance.	Extent of Repeal
Regulation of Ottoman Limited Companies of 17 Moharram, 1300	The whole
Registration of Companies and Partnerships Ordinance No. 118, dated the 28th May, 1919	The ordinance so far as it relates to companies.
The Ottoman Commercial Code	Articles 20, 21, 23, 25, 27, 28, 31 and 34
Ottoman Law concerning Limited Companies, dated 1st July 1914	The whole law
Ottoman Provisional Law concerning Foreign Limited Companies, dated the 30th October, 1930	The whole law
Ottoman Stamp Law, 6th-19th February, 1921	Articles 21 to 26 inclusive

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Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 119.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the Report of the Wages and Measures Commission.

Exemple 11

Department of Agriculture and Fisheries to High Commissioner

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Jerusalem

WE have the honour to submit our report with reference to —

1. The official weights and measures to be used in Palestine, and
2. Their Arabic and Hebrew equivalents and nomenclature.

2. A preliminary meeting of the Commission was called _____ attended by Messrs. Barron, Abramson, and Sawyer, as official members. Mr. _____ and Mr. _____ were present as representatives of the _____ and Jewish communities respectively. Captain Rose acting as secretary, except at the final meeting.

Procedure and a form of questionnaire were determined, and it was decided to call round-table conferences of representatives of the various communities and interests at Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa, and to refer the questionnaire, with replies obtained at Jerusalem, to the traders' associations at Hebron, Nablus, and Nazareth.

3. A second meeting of the Commission was called at Jerusalem on the 5th August. The following gentlemen were invited and took part in the proceedings:—

Dr. L. Levy (representing the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce), Mr. Eliahar, Shukri Effendi Deeb, Mr. Z. Blum, Omar Effendi Dakak, Mr. Marache, and Mr. Gordon. The managers of the Imperial Ottoman and Anglo-Palestine Banks and H. Y. S. P. were also invited, but were unable to attend. The last-named gave evidence at a later date.

4. In support of the procedure adopted, it may be claimed that initial discrepancies and divergences of opinion were resolved, and unanimity obtained, after the discussion of a given question from different points of view.

3. Mr. Salanech furnished the meeting with the weights of certain monetary units, but, after discussion, it was unanimously agreed that the weights and measures for currency purposes should be left to the determination of a Currency Commission.

6. Notification was received from the Assistant Director of Medical Supplies, in reply to its request, that the "British Standard" had been officially adopted in Great Britain for pharmaceutical purposes, and also that it was to be made available to all doctors and pharmaceutical chemists, and was recommended for official recognition.

A third meeting was held at Haifa on the 24th August, when Mr. [redacted] presided. The following gentlemen of Haifa and district were present:—The Commission. The following gentlemen of Haifa and district were present:—Messrs. T. S. Bontagy (representing the Chamber of Commerce, Haifa), Saïd Salim, and Pignatelli. The representations of the trade with the Hauran and Damascus received very full consideration on this occasion.

8. A fourth meeting was held at Jaffa on the 26th August, when the following

2. A \mathbb{Z} -module M is called *free* if it is isomorphic to a direct sum of copies of \mathbb{Z} . We will consider the following theorem:

10. The question of the various returns to various returns

Appendix (A)."

11. The Commission were unable to find a single advocate for the current system of weights and measures, which apparently stands universally condemned.

12. A very representative meeting at Jaipur requested unanimously that the Government of India should adopt a standard metric system for all purposes, without retention, modification or adaptation of any feature of the current system.

13. At other centres opinion was overwhelmingly in favour of a standard metric system, but certain suggestions were received for the retention of local units of weight measurement after adaptation or adjustment to a metric basis.

14. While it was universally held that even the rural population in the outlying districts were rapidly becoming acquainted with metric units, and were acquiring the

[illegible]

objection was raised that the land was too dry and that it would be necessary in that district to increase the value of the akich to the tenth instead of the twelfth of a roth.

15. At the final meeting these suggestions were fully discussed, and it was pointed out that :—

(n) It was probable that none of these suggested weights would be obtainable from the manufacturers of the standard metric units who employ special machinery for the purpose.

(b.) Fractions such as quarters vitiated the principle of metric multiplication.

* Not printed.

and 2 kilog. weights at Jerusalem, of 2 kilog. and a $\frac{1}{2}$ kilog. weights at Haifa, as the conventional equivalent of a rotl could be left to the option of the cultivators and merchants.

The Commission are consequently unable to recommend the adoption of these suggestions, or to recognise that any practical modification thereof is either feasible or necessary.

16. Certain attention was given to the requirements of the grain trade with the Transjordan and other districts east of the Jordan, and it was accepted as a principle that the Government should not attempt to dictate to the trade the use of either weight or capacity unit, but to standardise as the equivalent of 10 litres or 10 "measures" of 10 litres each.

17. With reference to the first suggestion, it was objected that 24 kilog. were not metric and that cultivators and merchants in the Transjordan could not sell alternatively to Haifa in terms of this unit.

On the other hand, measures of 100 and 10 litres respectively, as recommended,

The Commission finally decided that 10-litre measures of capacity should be adopted.

18. For vegetable oils, again, it was ascertained that different units were used at the ports. Jaffa voted solidly for the metric system, and Haifa for a standardised "kieleh" of 10 litres, corresponding to the "measures" of grain. The issue of 10-litre measures for oil, without legal or official recognition of any such terms as "jarra" and "kieleh," is again recommended by the Commission.

The only objection raised to the adoption of the litre as the unit of capacity for liquids was concerned with the possibility of adulteration, which would be more easily detected if the unit were the "measures" of grain.

The Commission does not consider that any special provision for this possible contingency is called for, the optional employment of weight or capacity units meeting the case satisfactorily.

19. The use of the metre as unit for all linear measurements was universally advocated.

The retention of the term "douna" as a land measurement unit, standardised to 1,000 square metres, was advocated at Haifa, Jerusalem and Nablu, while Jaffa and Nazareth were of the opinion that the term was superfluous.

At the final meeting Mr. Harari objected that 1,000 square metres was an unsatisfactory unit for land measurement.

The Commission finally decided to recommend the square metre for land measurement, from which would be derived the "douna" as a unit of land measurement, to be employed legally or officially, but would probably be retained in practice as a unit of land measurement.

21. The Commission was of unanimous opinion that drugs and medicines should be measured in metric units.

22. It has been reported to the Commission by M. Tolkowsky that just before the war the carat was standardised as one-fifth of a gramme or 200 milligrams for both rough and polished stones. Great Britain, United States, France, Germany, Belgium and Holland have now all accepted this unit, which is recommended for local adoption.

23. Advice had been taken at all meetings with a view to limiting disturbance to

trade at the time of the introduction of any new approved system of weights and measures, on which the Commission have based the following recommendations—

- (a) The Government should provide new weights and measures.
- (b) District governments should be asked to provide the number of metric units required, and to recommend standard sets or series most likely to meet the needs of local trade.
- (c) Adequate notice of the introduction of the new system should be given.
- (d) Merchants should be under obligation to obtain from the Government, within a stated period, a full set of the weights and measures necessary for their trading operations.
- (e) The Government should provide new weights and measures at cost price.
- (f) A system of weights and measures should be enabled to have these checked and stamped.
- (g) All old Ottoman stamped weights and measures other than metric to be surrendered to the Government, and to be accepted in exchange for new, irrespective of composition, weight for weight, and measure for measure.

24. The machinery of administration and inspection was also discussed, and though it was generally recognised that such were properly municipal functions, representatives at all centres were unanimous in the opinion that, for the present, the Government should undertake supervision of weights and measures through the agency of revenue collectors. The Financial Adviser agreed to endorse this recommendation. The Commission further recommend that—

- a. No fees for inspection of weights and measures should be imposed.
- b. Heavy penalties should be provided for violation of the terms of any approved Weights and Measures Act, which should be applied to a reduction of the cost of administration.
- (c) It is recognised that inspection by revenue collectors may not be adequate for prevention of fraud, and that special measures may be periodically necessary. The costs of such special examinations should be borne by the Government.

In conclusion, the Commission wish to record their appreciation of the valuable counsel and assistance furnished by the gentlemen who have participated in its meetings or have contributed information by letter or report.

J. B. BARRON,
R. A. HARARI,
V. A. VAN VRIESLAND,
E. R. SAWER
ABRAMSON.

Weights and Measures Commission.

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No. 264

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 29)

(No. 120)
My Lord,

Jerusalem, November 8, 1920

I BEG to report that in the earlier part of this year the Jewish population of Palestine decided to establish an elected Assembly for dealing with the matters affecting their community. The elections took place, except in Jerusalem, on the 19th April, and in Jerusalem on the 3rd May. About 20,000 voters took part in the elections, and the results are set out in the table which is appended. In view of the strained political situation at that time, the chief administrator thought it inadvisable for the meetings of the Assembly to be held. After my arrival, however, representations were made to me on the part of the Jewish community that they wished the Assembly to meet in the month of October, and the recent World Congress of the Zionist Organisation passed a resolution in the same sense. Under present conditions, I saw no reason why the Jewish community should be deprived of the opportunity which they desired of establishing a representative organisation to deal with the internal affairs of that community and to speak to the Government on its behalf. Permission was, therefore, granted, and the Assembly met on the

It will be observed that in my reply I have made the recognition of the Assembly and its committee conditional upon no resolutions being adopted or submitted which will be contrary to the terms of the mandate. I took this course, not because I thought it in any way probable that such resolutions would be submitted by this Assembly, but because there is a possibility that Moslem or Christian communities might wish to establish assemblies of their own, perhaps on somewhat similar lines. The point is reserved to a statement adopted by His Majesty's Government and its allies. The clause in my letter was inserted in order to establish a precedent that could be applied in such an eventuality. It is also stated in my letter that recognition of the Assembly does not prevent access to the Government through other channels in certain cases. There are some sections of the Jewish community particularly the extreme Orthodox, who have not co-operated in its establishment and do not recognise its authority. Although they are a small minority, they should not be allowed to feel themselves cut off by the existence of the elected Assembly, from communication with the Government and this paragraph was inserted in my reply in order that they might feel reassured on this point.

I have &c
HERBERT SAMUEL
High Commissioner

Enclosure 1 in No. 242

TABLE of Election Statistics (Extract)

[illegible]

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*Resolutions passed by Elected Assembly of the Jews of Palestine.
October 7-11, 1920*

1 — Re Orthodox Ballot

The Assembly confirms the elections of the (extreme) Orthodox in accordance with the report of the Assembly, declares that now is the moment to open the open door.

II—Rules of Elected Assembly

The meeting resolves to refer the drafting of the rules of the elected Assembly to the standing committee, proceeding meantime according to the proposition of the provisional committee as outlined by Dr. Thon.

III.—*Election of Presidium, Secretariat and Sub-Committees*

1 The meeting resolves that the meetings be conducted by a presidium comprised of representatives of the various parties enjoying equal rights, leaving room for a representative of Orthodox section

2 Rabbi Jacob Meir was elected Honorary President of the first elected Assembly.

3. The following are the presidium Messrs. A. Blumenfeld (Achduth Avodah)

A. Zarum (Yemenite community), J. Sprintzak (Hapoel Hazair), Rabbi Ziron (Extreme Orthodox), was added at the fourth sitting. L. Fishman (Mizrachi) was added at the sixth sitting.

4. The following were elected on the secretariat: Mrs. Osarkowsky Messrs Gimo, M. Miller, Frankel (Hofsch), N and M Shartok, Mr Kuck (Orthodox) was added at the fourth sitting

5. A standing committee was elected composed of one for every group of fifteen delegates, while parties numbering not less than eight delegates were permitted to be represented by one delegate.

The following were elected on the standing committees: Messrs. J. Ettinger, J. Ben-Zvi, A. Golomb, D. Remez (Achduth Avodah); Abravaja, Busaglus, Levy Behor, J. Panisel (Sephardim), N. Twersky, Dr. Thon, Turkenitz (Pool Hazair); S. Mador, H. Iraki (Yemenites), A. Berlin, Zimmerman (Progressives and Independents), D. Skibin (Colonists) Haft (Employees), Markowsky and Zwebner (Orthodox) were added.

Dr. Thon was elected by the members of the standing committee chairman Ben-Zvi, secretary.

6. The following were elected on the credentials committee: Messrs. D. Auster, Sababa, J. Lifschitz, Motro, Osery, Feldman, Rahab, D. Remes, J. Nahmani.

7 The financial sub-committee was made up as follows: Messrs. A. Eisenberg, Eljovitch, Berlin Dizengoff, Twersky Yellin, Dr Levy Segal Pachter and . . .

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1 The Assembly resolved to assemble on Friday at 4 p.m. at the Western Temple Wall for prayer and for the purpose of holding a memorial service for the victims.

2. For the drafting of the protest the following delegates were elected Messrs. J. Ahronovitch, A. Eisenberg, Yarnesha, Rabbi Ben Zion Osniel and Rabbi Feldman (Dr J. Klausner, a visitor, was added).

V—Participation of the Members of the Executive

1 The Assembly resolved to grant the members of the executive of the Zionist Organisation the right of participation in the sittings of the Assembly with a consulting vote.

2 The Assembly adopted a resolution to congratulate Mr M. Ussachkin who laid the foundation for the organisation of the Jewish population seventeen years ago.

VI—*Expression of Confidence and Thanks to the Provisional Committee and the Central Elections Committee were voted*

A unanimous vote of confidence and thanks was passed to the provisional committee and executive, especially to Dr. Thon, for their work in the course of the last three years, as well as to the central election committee and its chairman, Dr. A. Zifroni.

VII—Organisation of the Jewish Population of Palestine

The Assembly unanimously resolved with tremendous exultation the following resolutions with reference to the organisation of the Jewish population in Palestine:

1 *The Elected Assembly and its Authority.*

(a.) The elected Assembly is the superior institution for the organisation of the social and national interests of the Jewish people in Palestine, and its sole representative

(b.) The elected Assembly lays at its first session the foundation for the creation of the national autonomy of the Jewish people in Palestine.

2. The Term of the Elected Assembly and its Sitting

(a) The elected Assembly shall meet for its second conference not later than May 1921.

(b) The term of office of this elected Assembly will be determined at the second conference.

3. The National Committee and its Functions

(a) The elected Assembly elects out of its members the National Committee of Palestine Jewry to be composed of one for every ten of delegates.

(b) The National Committee conducts in accordance with the resolutions of the elected Assembly all the affairs of Palestine Jewry, it being its interior as well as exterior representative.

(c) The National Committee endeavours to obtain the sanction of the Government for the elected Assembly and its institutions.

4. The Budget and Taxes

(a) The elected Assembly will fix immediately a budget for the needs of the elected Assembly, the National Committee and its sub-committees, and authorises the National Committee to collect this budget.

(b) The elected Assembly authorises the National Committee to determine upon a scale of general taxation for the needs of the Jewish population which is to be submitted to the second conference of the elected Assembly.

5. Election and Rules of Procedure

(a) The National Committee is instructed to draft rules of election for the elected Assembly, for communities and colonies, and submit them to the elected Assembly at its second session.

(b) The National Committee is instructed to draft laws governing the communities and submit them before the second session of the elected Assembly.

(c) The propositions and statutes to be drafted by the National Committee for the second session will be published in the press by the National Committee one month previous to the second session of the elected Assembly.

VIII.—The Relation between the Jewish Population of Palestine and the Zionist Organisation

(a) The meeting resolved that the Jewish population of Palestine accepts the higher authority of the World Zionist Organisation in all questions relating to the establishment of the National Home.

(b) The Zionist Executive shall give to the Jewish population of Palestine—through its elected representatives—a share in the control of the affairs of Palestine, and of the institutions appertaining thereto.

IX.—Jewish Law Courts

The meeting delegates to the National Council the determination of the canon for Jewish law, in co-operation with Rabbis and expert lawyers. This canon is to be presented at the second meeting of the elected Assembly.

X.—Election to the Zionist Executive, Education Committee, Zionist Commission and Higher Jewish Peace Tribunal

The meeting delegates to the National Committee the election of representatives to the Zionist Executive, Education Committee, Zionist Commission, and Higher Jewish Peace Tribunal.

XI.—Jewish Battalion

The meeting perceives the need in the maintenance of the Jewish battalion, and imposes upon the National Committee the obligation of safeguarding the maintenance of the Jewish Battalion First Judeans, and of supporting its extension and its development.

XII.—Budget

The meeting resolved that the budget of the National Committee shall amount to 3,000/ for the period of its activity from the six months previous to the second meeting.

XIII.—Election to the National Committee

(a.) The Assembly resolves to elect one for every group of ten to the National Committee, and as an exception it grants the right to the Colonists to elect two out of its delegates, to the Yemenites, two for eighteen delegates, and to the employees, one for nine delegates.

(b.) As the Orthodox have notified that by leaving the Assembly they had not waived their right as delegates, the Assembly agrees to continue this right—to send such number of delegates as they are entitled to.

(c) The following have been elected on the National Committee

Achduth Avodah—

- | | |
|----------------------|------------------|
| 1 Mr D. Katzenelson. | 6 Mr D. Remes |
| 2 Mr A. Blumenfeld. | 6 Mr J. Tabenkin |
| 3 Mr J. Ettinger | 7 Mr J. Shochat |
| 4 Mr J. Ben-Zvi | |

Sephardim—

- | | |
|------------------------|---------------------|
| 8 Rabbi Benzion Ounel. | 11 Mr S. Lige |
| 9 Rabbi B. Alkazar. | 12 Mr J. Mejdachas |
| 10 Dr L. Levy. | 13 Mr J. H. Pansiel |

Hapoel Hazair—

- | | |
|-----------------------|------------------|
| 14 Mr J. Ahronovitch. | 17 Mr S. Shiller |
| 15 Mr L. Sprintzak. | 18 Mr N. Twersky |
| 16 Dr J. Thon | |

Progressives—

- | | |
|------------------|-----------------|
| 19 Mr E. Berlin. | 21 Mr M. Glukin |
| 20 Mr B. Joffe | |

Colonies—

- | | |
|----------------------|--------------------|
| 22 Mr M. Meerovitch. | 23 Mr A. Eisenberg |
|----------------------|--------------------|

Yemenites—

- | | |
|-----------------|----------------------|
| 24 Mr A. Zarum. | 25 Mr Radler Feldman |
|-----------------|----------------------|

Mizrachi—

- | | |
|------------------------|--|
| 26 Rabbi J. L. Fishman | |
|------------------------|--|

Employees—

- | | |
|------------|--|
| 27 Mr Haft | |
|------------|--|

(d) The Assembly adopted a resolution to add to the above the following members—

- | | |
|------------------------------|--|
| 28 Mr M. Dizengoff | |
| 29 Mr D. Yelin | |
| 30 Mr H. Margolis-Kalvarisky | |
| 31 Mr Z. Jabotinsky | |

Enclosure 3 in No. 284

Sir H. Samuel to President of the Elected Assembly.

Sir,

Jerusalem, October 24, 1920.

I HAVE had the pleasure of receiving the representatives of the committee of the elected Assembly of the Jews of Palestine, who conveyed to me the resolutions passed by that Assembly at its first meeting. I was glad to observe among those resolutions an expression of gratitude to the British Government for its policy in relation to Palestine, and an expression of friendship and goodwill towards the Arab population and of desire for co-operation between the Jewish and Arab peoples for the advantage of both. The former I have transmitted by telegraph to the

British Government. The latter, I have no doubt, will be read with pleasure by the

With respect to the resolutions relating to the organisation of the Jewish population of Palestine and particularly those numbered VII (1) and (3) I beg to

The Administration is prepared to recognise the elected Assembly and its committee as the representative of the Jewish population of Palestine, subject to the following conditions:—

1. That the authority of any mandate for the government of Palestine endorsed
2. That in the future the Assembly is found to retain its representative character by continuing to elicit at subsequent elections as at its first election, the suffrages of a clear majority of the adult Jewish population

It is understood that it is not the object of the Assembly to deal with questions affecting Palestine as a whole, but only with the internal affairs of the Jewish community

It will be understood, also, that the recognition of the Assembly does not affect the

Yours very truly,
HERBERT SAMUEL

E 14900/85 44

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon — (Received December 20)

My Lord, Jerusalem November 8, 1920

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a monthly report on political

Political

The political situation in Palestine is, on the whole, satisfactory. There is a small section of political busybodies professing attachment to such

It is not believed, however, that they represent anyone but themselves. Their own condition in Palestine is their main concern, and as far as can be ascertained they are not fond of it and wish the Government that is responsible for it, as they have faith that the improvements they desire will be effected

The press, considering that it has complete liberty

is recent visit of M. Robert de Caix and the mutual exchange of conversation between him and the High Commissioner

trouble in the affairs of the Greek Patriarchate still continues

The Jewish community has, generally speaking, given its whole-hearted support

passed off without untoward incident or consequences. Resolutions

The settlement of the future of Transjordan continues to be a cause of much discussion and speculation

A settlement of a nature to satisfy the various interests concerned would be a contributory factor to the promotion of political harmony amongst all sections of the population

The connection between Palestine and Transjordan is a close one politically and economically. In very many cases there is also a personal connection in that many residents in Palestine own land and property in Transjordan

The question of public security in the districts of Palestine on the west side of the Jordan River

Economic

Food.—To ensure adequate supplies of food, animal rations, and seed grain, the export of cereals (wheat, barley and millet) has been temporarily prohibited, but the export of legumes (beans, peas, lentils, &c), olives and olive oil, is now unrestricted

This policy has met with a certain amount of criticism, but chiefly on the part of Chambers of Commerce whose members are mostly of the merchant class

Otherwise, the policy has received general approval, and as a consequence of it the price of foodstuffs is not unduly high

Endeavours are being made to encourage the import of live stock from the Sudan, there being a very serious shortage in Palestine

As a result of the abolition of the fish tax there are signs of a revival in the industry and prices are falling

Fuel.—Local resources consisting solely of wood are known to be insufficient

Every encouragement has therefore been given to the import of wood from Transjordan where large quantities are available, but the difficulties of transport have so far proved insuperable

The Vacuum Oil Company and the Asiatic Petroleum Company have been approached with a view to ensuring a plentiful supply of mineral oils, and they are planning the erection of reservoirs at Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa, and the distribution of bulk oil, which should greatly reduce present prices

Transport.—In conjunction with the railway administration and the shipping

export trade

Labour.—Considerable success has met the efforts made to replace the Egyptian

There will shortly be some 3,000 such employed on road-making, and steps have been taken to ensure an efficient organisation in respect of their working, accommodation and living conditions

Prison Labour.—Measures are in hand to utilise a certain number of able bodied prisoners as labour units, and an experimental gang of 150 prisoners is ready to take the field

co operation between the Chambers of Commerce and the Administration has been borne in mind, and a system of close intercourse and personal visits by the Director of the Department of Trade and Commerce to the various Chambers has been instituted and have given very satisfactory results

It is further proposed to hold quarterly joint meetings between representatives of all Chambers of Commerce and the Department above mentioned

Trade between Palestine and Transjordan, and merchants from the latter place have been given facilities to do business in Egypt

The volume of this trade has undoubtedly been increased, but the lack of public security and adequate communications are still a hindrance to its being greater

Financial

Customs.—Imports for the month of September were £ E. 303,512, an increase of £ E. 50,491 over the corresponding month of last year

Exports amounted to £ E. 42,264 as against £ E. 46,071 for the same month of last year

This falling off in the case of exports is due to the restriction of certain agricultural products, and the stoppage of transit trade to Damascus owing to Bedouin raids round Deraa.

Agricultural Loans.—Loans authorised up to the 21st October, 1920, amount to £ E. 212,000.

There is a general demand for agricultural loans throughout the country, and it is obvious that the further extension and improvement of agricultural operations is largely dependent on the possibility of granting them.

There is a very great shortage of draft animals in the country, and great difficulty, owing to shortage and high prices, in obtaining the same outside it.

Municipalities.—A commission is now sitting to examine the existing sources of revenue for the municipalities of Palestine and the present methods of collection. It is confidently expected that this commission will give important and valuable results.

It is, nevertheless, evident that with the many town improvements which it is desirable to effect it will be necessary for municipalities to contract loans to provide for capital expenditure.

Miscellaneous.—An examination into the excise and other duties levied upon the wine industry is in progress, and the question of affording partial relief to orange growers and exporters is also under consideration.

Exemption from tithes has been granted to viticulturists for a period of ten years from the date of planting when American stock is to be utilised. This is an application of a Turkish law on the subject.

This measure will afford relief and encouragement to an important industry.

Administration

Advisory Council.—As already reported, the Advisory Council met on the 6th October, and it is confidently anticipated that useful results will be obtained from the co-operation of its members.

The fact that members were nominated instead of elected has met with a certain amount of not very serious criticism.

Sub-committees, to consider amongst other questions that of education, have been set up, but it is noticed that there is no very great keenness on the part of members to expend much time or energy in work on these committees. There is little doubt, however, that the opportunity that will be afforded by the monthly meetings of the Advisory Council, of placing before it, and in this manner before the country, administrative and other important questions, will be both popular and beneficial.

District Councils.—Partly owing to there being a general feeling in that direction, and partly from a desire that participation in the administration should become more general, proposals are under consideration for the formation of district councils.

It is not, however, in present circumstances considered advisable that these councils should have more than advisory functions.

The question of the mode of election of members of district councils is at present under consideration.

Apart from the advantage to district governors of obtaining advice on local measures, it is proposed that when the necessary financial arrangements have been made, such district councils should be given the opportunity of expressing an opinion regarding, and even of deciding, the manner in which certain sums especially allotted to localities should be expended.

Municipal Councils.—Mayors and members of municipalities are at present nominated but proposals are under consideration for the holding of elections. Since, however, the question of nationality arises, it is not considered that it will be possible to give effect to these proposals until after the issue of the Mandate.

The municipalities in Palestine show a considerable amount of enterprise and energy.

Public Security.—The state of public security in the country is still unsatisfactory. The more general reasons for this are the inexperience of police officers and men, their lack of training and knowledge of technical police duties, and the fact that the present organisation of the force does not adequately correspond to the needs of the country.

With regard to the last point a reorganisation is in process of being made in each district, having as its primary object the creation of a larger number of police posts in the country side and a corresponding reduction of police in the larger towns.

Particular reasons for the lack of public security are (and this applies mainly

to the districts of Galilee and Phoenicia) that raids continue to be carried out from across Jordan, no satisfactory solution for which has as yet been found.

And secondly, there is still a certain number of brigand bands at large, the members of which have so far escaped conviction. Special and temporary measures are now under consideration to cope with this evil, for the abatement of which the public at large is earnestly desirous.

Education.—The whole question of the Government's future educational policy is at present under consideration, and the matter was discussed at the first meeting of the Advisory Council. A sub-committee of its members was appointed to report to the council at its second meeting. There is an evident desire on the part of the community as a whole that educational facilities should be extended, and not a little money has been raised by localities for the erection of buildings and the provision of the necessary equipment.

A further report will be submitted on this question.

Agriculture.—Comparative field experiments have been organised on a co-operative basis at ten centres, and acclimatisation stations established at others.

An agricultural show was held at Jaffa on the 20th October, and a selection of exhibits forwarded to the International Advertising Exhibition in London.

Forest Service.—A "Woods and Forests" Ordinance has been promulgated, forest rangers and guards posted.

Veterinary Service.—An "Animal Import and Export" Ordinance has been approved and various quarantine stations established.

Fishery Service.—Fishery inspectors have been appointed and various necessary measures established in the interests of the fishing industry.

Immigration and Travel.—The number of immigrants that arrived in Palestine during the last three months is approximately 3,000, most of them hailing from Russia and Galicia. The measures taken for their temporary employment have been indicated above.

There is still an exodus of Christians and Moslems to Central and South America for the purpose of trading and improving their condition.

Arrivals have been few, mainly owing to the difficulty of securing berths, and possibly also to the, as yet, unsatisfactory arrangements for travel and accommodation.

The majority of commercial travellers from overseas visiting Palestine are American.

Public Health.—A travelling Dispensary, H.S. 1, reported a list of 1,000 subscriptions, opened at Mejdal on the 1st July, and up to the 15th October there were 9,420 attendances and 303 operations performed.

Anti-malarial measures have been carried out throughout Palestine.

An extension has been given to the Health and Hospital Services.

No epidemic or contagious diseases have occurred during the summer.

Public Works.—Work on the draining of the Bisan swamp continues.

A scheme for improving the water supply of Jerusalem is under consideration, and as a preliminary step thereto certain repairs are being carried out at "S. S. Pools."

A town supply is under construction at Tiberias and experimental boring is going on at Haifa, Nazareth and Kafr Kanna.

The construction of Government buildings and buildings for Government officials is shortly to commence.

The work done on roads has already been reported in the High Commissioner's statement at the first meeting of the Advisory Council.

Railways.—The railway line from Ludd to Jaffa has been widened and the broad gauge was opened to the public by his Excellency the High Commissioner on the 5th October.

An unfortunate accident occurred the following day at Jaffa, resulting in the death of four people and some other casualties.

The General Manager of the railways has been in communication with the French authorities with regard to the working, &c., of the Deraa Haifa section of the Hedjaz railway.

Approval has been given for the construction of overhead protection to the platform at Ludd station.

Housing Accommodation.—The shortage of houses continues to cause great difficulties, and the necessity imposed on the Government of requisitioning from private individuals a certain number of buildings for Government officials has met

with a good deal of criticism and unpopularity. Every endeavour, however, has been made to study the convenience of, and find alternative accommodation for, the individuals so displaced.

I have, &c

(For High Commissioner)

W. H. DEEDES, Civil Secretary

[E 14814 85 44]

No. 287

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon. — (Received November 29)
(No. 128)

THE High Commissioner for Palestine presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and transmits herewith a copy of the minutes of the second meeting of the Advisory Council of Palestine.

Government House Jerusalem

November 15, 1920

Enclosure in No. 287

Minutes of Second Meeting of Advisory Council of Palestine

THE second meeting of the Advisory Council took place on Tuesday, the 6th November, under the presidency of his Excellency the High Commissioner.

The following were present —

Mr. J. B. Barron, Mr. N. de R. Bentwich, Mr. Ben Zwi, Mr. Michel Ed. Bayrou, Mr. H. E. Bowman, Mr. H. H. Deedes, Mr. B. Harari, Colonel G. Heron, Colonel R. Helms, Ismail Bey Husseini, Abdul Hadj Eff. El Khatib, Mr. R. J. Lagge, Mr. H. C. Luke, Sheikh Fredh Abu Midein, Suliman Bey Nassif, Colonel F. J. M. Postlethwaite, Dr. Habib Salim, Mr. H. A. Smallwood, Suliman Abdul Razzak Toukan, Mr. D. Yellin. Mr. Kalvarisky was absent in Europe.

On the meeting being opened, Ismail Bey Husseini rose and conveyed to his Excellency the High Commissioner an expression of condolence on his bereavement. Mr. Yellin expressed a similar sentiment. His Excellency made a suitable acknowledgment.

Mr. B. Harari stated that the orange growers of Jaffa district. His Excellency said that the question was engaging the close attention of the Government.

Town Planning Ordinance

Dr. Salim said that he had carefully read the provisions of the draft Town Planning Ordinance, and he wished to thank the High Commissioner for the very thorough way in which the matter was undertaken. The ordinance was in every way suitable and desirable but he would wish the scheme extended beyond Jerusalem, Haifa and Jaffa.

His Excellency, in reply to a further request from Dr. Salim that Nablus might be incorporated in the scheme, expressed the hope that this would be practicable.

Mr. Ben Zwi was also of opinion that the ordinance was very acceptable, but he would like to see representatives of the people on the Provisional Council for Palestine. His Excellency said that the views of the people on this subject might be valuable.

Mr. Yellin also expressed the hope that various well known engineers might not be deterred from joining in the deliberations of the Central Commission.

His Excellency, in reply, stated that the formation of the commission could be made more elastic. He was anxious to see equitable representation, and, if necessary, additional members might be appointed. He agreed that the membership at present appeared rather restricted. A general discussion then took place in connection with the expropriation under the scheme and the manner in which the value of the land should be assessed in cases of expropriation.

Dr. Salim pointed out that as land required under this ordinance was for the most of the time for public use, the value of the land should be assessed by a committee.

Dr. Salim suggested an addition of 50 per cent. on pre-war valuation and no more.

Mr. Yellin agreed with Dr. Salim. He was of opinion that the matters would require very careful handling. There were many lands the value of which had not been assessed at all. The cost of land was dear where there were many purchasers, and a register of land registers were open there appeared to be no indication that people were overpaying. He considered a 50 per cent. increase ample. Further discussion followed, and his Excellency asked the council if a 50 per cent. addition to the pre-war price should be the rule, with an increase up to a maximum of 100 per cent. where a special case could be established. This was agreed upon, and the legal secretary was asked to draft an amendment accordingly.

Tobacco

Sheikh Abu Midein expressed himself strongly in opposition to the tobacco monopoly. He stated that in the Beersheba district it was very difficult to get tobacco on account of the absence of shops. Prior to the war and in fact up to the British occupation, they were able to grow a little tobacco, but immediately upon the British occupation the District Governor prohibited the growing because it was contrary to the law. He considered it a grievous injustice for the people to have a monopoly which meant such a grievous injustice for the people.

A general discussion followed, and there was a unanimity of opinion that the monopoly should be abolished forthwith.

His Excellency assured the members that he was fully alive to the objections. Indeed all monopolies were bad. The present difficulties arose on account of the provisions of the Peace Treaty with Turkey. Certain concessions, of which the Régie appeared to be one, were granted in the time of the Turks, and it was alleged that they could only be abolished by the payment of compensation. He was going thoroughly into the matter and was already in communication with the Government in London and hoped soon to be able to make a definite statement on the subject.

Mr. Bayrou urged that authority be given now in special cases to villagers to cultivate tobacco.

His Excellency replied that it might be as well to wait until a definite ruling could be given.

Ismaïl Bey Husseini stated that from his experience he doubted very much whether the existing concession was legal as only the Ministers had signed it, and it had not been approved by the Turkish Parliament. The allegation of excessive prices charged by the Régie, which was made by several members, was referred to the Director of Commerce and Industry for investigation.

Mr. Yellin pointed out that tobacco cultivation commenced in the spring, and some definite action should be taken before then.

Land Transfer Ordinance

Mr. Yellin argued that the fees for land registration were too high, and suggested militated against a faithful declaration of land value. This equivocation was one of the reasons for the slowness of transactions in land at the moment.

Dr. Salim suggested that in order to facilitate matters the Land Settlement Court and the Land Survey should work hand in hand.

His Excellency said that this was intended.

Loans and Credit Banks

His Excellency stated that he was in communication with persons in Egypt, England and America in the hope of securing assistance for the formation of such banks. He could, however, make no definite statement on the subject yet.

Mr. Bayrou stated that he felt sure the country keenly appreciated the deep personal interest of his Excellency.

His Excellency pointed out that the Government were still making loans, obtainable by application to District Governors, under the heading of "Agricultural Loans," and that a further sum of money would in all likelihood be immediately available.

Commerce

His Excellency stated that he was very anxious to get more in touch with the commercial members of the community. Palestine was fortunate in possessing several Chambers of Commerce and the assistance technical advice and experience of the

members of these chambers and the Government of the country. He therefore proposed to hold a conference with representatives of all the Chambers of Commerce every three months and himself to be present. In the first instance the conference would be held in the District of Jerusalem.

It was generally agreed by the members of the council that the scheme was an excellent one and would help to foster the trade and commerce of the country.

Tithes in Kind

Sheikh Abu Midein urged that the Beersheba loans of seed barley might be repaid in kind. Mr. Barron pointed out the objections to that course and said that the Government would not be able to accept it. The Council decided to refer the matter to a committee of three members.

Passports

Several members complained of the delay that takes place in the issue of passports.

Mr. Deedes stated that this was often due to the very severe restrictions imposed by Syria and Egypt, but that steps would be at once taken to obviate as much of the delay as possible.

His Excellency said that he would very much like to encourage travel. It would be useless issuing passports on the spot which did not conform to the requirements of other countries. It would only result in the holders of such passports being refused admission.

He suggested that the Government should appoint a representative to the Council where no passport office existed, with more power, and he with the Civil Secretary would have a conference with the Director of Travel with a view to improving the position as a whole in this regard.

Boundaries of Palestine

This question was raised by Ismail Bey Hussein and the members of the Council unanimously agreed that in defining the northern boundary the greatest care must be taken to ensure that Palestine should enjoy an adequate water supply for irrigation and provision of electric power. They urged upon His Excellency the necessity of his using all efforts to this end.

His Excellency stated that he had not expected this matter to be raised. He was giving close attention, and he would certainly convey their expression of opinion to the proper quarters.

The meeting adjourned at 6.15 P.M. and was resumed on Wednesday morning at 9.45 A.M. Mr. Bayrouhi not attending. The Director of Public Security was present.

Education

His Excellency stated that the Government was giving this matter close consideration. All agreed that there should be greater facilities for education in Palestine. The Government regarded it as its duty to see that within a few years there should be a school within the reach of every child in Palestine with the exception of the very remote districts and the nomadic tribes. The Government would be glad to see the result of the efforts of the Government and the people to improve the educational system in Palestine. He suggested that the Government should appoint a representative to the Council where no school existed, with more power, and he with the Civil Secretary would have a conference with the Director of Education with a view to improving the position as a whole in this regard. He suggested that the Government should appoint a representative to the Council where no school existed, with more power, and he with the Civil Secretary would have a conference with the Director of Education with a view to improving the position as a whole in this regard. He suggested that the Government should appoint a representative to the Council where no school existed, with more power, and he with the Civil Secretary would have a conference with the Director of Education with a view to improving the position as a whole in this regard.

Dr. Salim wished to thank his Excellency for the energetic way in which the matter of education was taken up by him. He considered that education was very important and the question of funds would have to be solved. His Excellency had suggested at the last meeting of the council that a levy should be made on the population for the purpose would be divided into four categories according to means. The levy to be 50, 30, 10 and 5 piastres respectively. This would bring in about 17,000,000 and he felt sure that this could be increased by insisting on a larger quota from the wealthier classes.

His Excellency stated that he considered the cost of education should be one of the first charges on the Government. The people are not paying considerable taxes and they ask for several things. The most important are public security, education and roads, and these should be provided, so far as possible, from the general taxation of the country. He considered that an effort should be made to defray the cost of education from existing funds, and if the villages and towns are prepared to find the buildings the Government would be prepared at the outset to make suitable grants for their annual maintenance. There will be a system later of district revenues, from which grants would be made towards local schools. In the meantime grants under that head will be made from the general revenues of the country. There was every reason to hope that the country would become more prosperous, and as revenues would thus automatically increase it might be hoped that it would be unnecessary to impose additional taxation for education. He suggested that the council should consider the minimum number of schools that they wish to see established and the Government would consider how to provide the necessary funds.

Mr. Bowman (Director of Education) said that as a new-comer to Palestine he would prefer to wait for the observations of other members of the council, but with regard to the actual suggestion made by Dr. Salim, he considered it would be very difficult for the Government to discriminate between the four categories. He was inclined to recommend that for the present the buildings, and if possible the equipment, which in village schools is not a very expensive nature, should be provided by the village communities, and that the annual expenditure and upkeep of these schools should be borne by the Central Administration for the next two or three years. Afterwards there might be a measure of decentralisation, both of finance and control. In Egypt the Government schools are entirely maintained by the Central Administration, but there are a growing number of schools which are financed and administered by provincial councils. The tendency in Egypt is to encourage the growth of schools under the provincial councils and, as an educationalist, he would be glad to see the same tendency developed in Palestine. He felt sure that the members of the council would agree with him that the more education was decentralised the more likely it is to succeed and the greater the interest the inhabitants will take in it.

Dr. Salim wished to point out that whereas some years ago Nablus district possessed over thirty schools there were now only fifteen.

Mr. Yellin pointed out that very few villages or towns possessed any buildings which might be converted to schools without considerable expense. He thought that those villages which showed their keenness and desire for educational facilities by putting up suitable premises should be given preferential treatment by the Government.

Mr. Ben Zwi expressed his satisfaction with his Excellency's statement that the Government would render assistance in the case where the villages co-operated.

His Excellency stated that, as regards the buildings which the villages might offer for the purpose, these would have to be approved by the Directors of Health and Education, but it was not possible to insist upon a very high standard at the outset. He wished to see the scheme operating with the least possible delay. His Excellency further stated that where educational Wakfs existed they might assist to defray the cost of the schools. Regarding grants, this matter would have to be gone into in detail and a definite scheme would be proposed at the next meeting of the council.

The question of Government support of Jewish schools was also discussed. Mr. Yellin pointed out that as regards Jewish schools, these had never received any aid whatsoever from the Government, yet they had a distinct claim on educational funds, for the parents of children paid taxes with the rest of the population, and it would be a distinct injustice to the Jewish community if their schools were debarred from Government support. He cited cases of Jewish colonies, villages of a comparatively large size, where neighbouring village schools would receive grants while the Jewish village schools would not.

H. Samuel to Earl Curzon — (Received November 29)

No. 15
My Lord

Jerusalem, November 14, 1920

THE question of the control by the Administration of Palestine over Moslem Wakf funds has lately come under discussion. The administration of the Wakfs is entrusted to a Moslem council of which the president is nominated by the Government, and which is attended by the Director-General of Wakfs, who is also appointed by the Government, and who carries on the current administration of the funds. The estimates of Wakf expenditure are also submitted to the Finance Department annually, and are subject to its review.

On the occasion of a visit which I paid to Nablus some time ago, representations were made to me by two of the notables, that the control exercised by the Government over the administration of Moslem Wakfs was resented by Moslem opinion. It was stated that no such control was exercised over Christian or Jewish endowments and that the Moslems wished to be free to manage their own funds in their own way. Since that date, there have been a number of articles in the Moslem press in the same sense culminating in some cases in an attack upon the Government for diverting Wakf funds from their proper purposes through the exercise of this control. As Moslem opinion is everywhere very sensitive upon this subject and as there was a

took up the question at once and summoned a conference to be held at Government House, consisting of all the muftis and ulemas of Palestine, the mayors, who are all Moslems, of the principal towns, and of other representatives of Moslem opinion.

At the same time I thought it advisable to bring up the question of the method of appointment to the Moslem religious courts, with regard to which some expressions of discontent had been heard and certain cognate questions of minor importance.

This conference took place on the 9th November, and I enclose a full report of the proceedings.

In my opening speech I stated that the Government regarded the administration of the Wakfs as a matter to be decided entirely in accordance with the desires of the Moslem community. If that community wished the Government to continue its assistance it would be happy to do so. If, on the contrary, it desired the entire separation of the Wakf administration from the Government, we should be glad also to conform to that desire. After indicating the other points on which I sought an expression of opinion I withdrew from the conference with the officers who had accompanied me, and left the Moslem members to discuss these questions among themselves.

On receiving an intimation that their discussions were concluded, I returned to the meeting and heard with much gratification that the conference was of the opinion that it was unnecessary to effect any change in the present connection between the Government and the Wakf administration. The secondary points were also dealt with in a very amicable spirit, and a complete understanding was reached on all the questions of principle, some points of detail being left to be settled in communication with a committee which the Moslem representatives undertook to appoint for the purpose.

I regard these proceedings as of great political importance and value. That the members of the conference fully represented Moslem opinion is unquestionable. They were given the fullest opportunity to express their desires, and their deliberations resulted in a conclusion which was in effect an expression of their confidence in the administration in its relations with Moslem religious interests. The proceedings indicated that the agitation, which a small number of journalists had begun to conduct, and the representations made by the two notables of Nablus, to which I have referred, were not in accordance with the general opinion of the Mohammedans of Palestine.

I am sending copies of the proceedings to the press, and I have no doubt that their publication will have a very beneficial effect throughout the country.

I have &c

HERBERT SAMUEL, High Commissioner

Report of Meeting of the Awkaf Council at Government House, November 9, 1920

ON the occasion of the first meeting of the Advisory Council on the 8th October, his Excellency the High Commissioner informed the four Moslem members of the council that he desired to ascertain the wishes of the Moslem community of Palestine in respect of the control and administration of Awkaf, and other questions of a similar nature.

Invitations were accordingly issued to the persons whose names are mentioned below and a meeting was held at 10 a.m. on the 9th November at Government House under the presidency of his Excellency the High Commissioner.

The following were present:—

Jerusalem—
Khalid Eff. H. S. C. M. M.
M. Eff. S. S. C.
R. Eff. N. S. C.
A. Eff. D. S. C. (Director-General of Awkaf).

Ismail Bey Hussein.
Abdel Rahman El Alami.
Mohamed Saleh Hussein.
Aref Pasha Dejam.
Souad Eff. El Ouri.

Haifa—
Tewfik Bey El Kalil.
R. Eff. S. S. C.
Haji Nima Hamad.
Mahmud Eff. Murad Mufti.

Jaffa—
A. Eff. S. S. C.
Haji Said Eff. Shawa.
Abdalla Eff. Sawi.
Abdel Kader Eff. Bedas.

Nablus—
Sheikh Mumb Eff. Mufti.
Omar Eff. Zetter.
Sulman Abdel Razak Tokan.

Hebron—
Aadel Hay Eff. El Khatib.
S. Eff. I. wfk Tahboob.
S. Eff. M. I. S. Hamur.
H. Eff. A. M.

Tiberias—
Mahmud Eff. Tahir.

Acre—
Sheikh Abdalla Eff. Jazar, Mufti.
Kasim Eff. Shkeir.

Nazareth—
Kasim Eff. Tahoun.

R. Eff. S. S. C.
Mustafa Eff. El Kery.
Sulman Eff. El Tagi.

Safed—
Saleh El Din Eff. Mufti.

B. Eff. S. S. C.
Sheikh Farah Abu Midein.

Tulkaram—
Sheikh Said Eff. Kazmi.

G. Eff. S. S. C.
Sheikh Abdel Shafi Eff.
Mahmoud Sorani Eff.

Speech by the High Commissioner

When I was at Nablus in the month of September representations were made to me that the Moslem community in Palestine might desire some changes made in the control of the Awkaf. I obtained information upon the subject and consulted the four Moslem members of the Advisory Council on the occasion of the meeting of the 8th October. It was agreed that the best course would be to summon a conference fully representative of the Moslem opinion of Palestine, in order to ascertain what the wishes of the Moslem community really are. This conference has been summoned accordingly.

I should like to declare with emphasis that there is no desire on the part of the Palestine Administration to take part in the control of Moslem Wakfs to any degree not desired by the Moslem community of Palestine.

If the Moslems of Palestine desire the Government of Palestine to assist in the administration of the Wakfs we should be happy to do so. If, on the other hand, the Moslems of Palestine desire the Wakfs to be entirely separate from the Administration we shall be happy to fall in with your wishes.

The British Government, which is in close touch with Moslem communities in India and in many other parts of the world, always recognises that the Wakfs are a purely Moslem matter to be controlled by the desires of the Moslem community, and

the purpose of this meeting is to invite you to express what your wishes are with regard to the Wakfs of Palestine, and the Government desires to meet your wishes as they may be expressed.

At present the Wakfs are controlled by a council. The president of that council is nominated by the Government, and a representative of the Government attends its meetings. It prepares the estimates of the year, and the Government examines these estimates in order to ensure that the revenues are fairly distributed for the advantage of the different districts of the country. Some districts are richer in Wakfs, other districts are poorer in Wakfs, and the Central Wakf Council endeavours to meet the needs of the country as a whole.

You are of course aware, but the public outside may not be fully aware, that all the revenues allotted to the Wakf Council are spent for Wakf purposes, and the Government does not withdraw any of these Wakf revenues for Government purposes.

The Government collects the tithes, which are Wakf, on behalf of the Wakf Council, and I think you will agree that in so far as the Wakf revenues are derived from tithes they must always be collected by the Government. Even if the Wakfs are otherwise entirely separate from the Government, the Government must act as tithe collector for the Wakfs, because you cannot have two systems of collection of tithes running side by side.

There is also the question to be considered of the Mударисса Wakf, on which I should be very glad to have your opinions.

There is further the special case of the Khasgi Sultan Wakf. This is a very rich Wakf, which was bequeathed, as you know, many centuries ago. Eighty years ago the Turkish Government diverted the revenues of that Wakf to the Public Treasury. The British Government since the occupation have continued the practice of the last eighty years. The only difference they have made is that they have increased the grant to the Wakf Council in respect of that Wakf from 2,000/ a year to 4,200/ a year.

I am advised that, from the point of view of law, there is no doubt but that the Government is entitled to continue the previous practice. The practice of eighty years ago is a precedent. If the law were brought before a court of law they could not do otherwise than support that view. But I do not wish to take my stand upon strict law, and I desire to meet as far as possible the wishes of the Moslem community.

The matter, therefore, can be further examined.

On the one hand, the Government is receiving the revenues of the Khasgi Sultan Wakf, which amount to about 14,000/ a year, and it is paying over 4,000/ a year to the Wakf Council out of that revenue. On the other hand, the Government is paying considerable sums for purposes which might properly be paid for by the Moslem Wakfs. For instance, there is the maintenance of Moslem orphans. Orphanages for Moslem children at Jaffa and Bethlehem now cost 5,000/ a year, which is provided almost entirely out of the funds of the Administration, only a very small proportion being paid by foreign charitable funds, but we have reason to believe that the Government could do this out of the revenues of the Wakfs. In addition, the Government is spending over 2,000/ a year in Jerusalem in relief of poor people of the Moslem community.

Further, the Government is paying the salary and allowances of the Director General of Awkaf. There is also the cost of collection of the revenues of the Khasgi Sultan Wakf, which amounts to 425/ a year. The Government is also paying the salaries of a number of the Mудариссен employed in the mosques, amounting to 400/ a year.

We are proposing to take considerable grants to village schools throughout Palestine from the revenues of Palestine, among others to the villages, the tithes of which are paid into the Khasgi Sultan Fund.

The point that I wish you to consider is this—

With respect to the Khasgi Sultan Wakf, the Government is to pay over to the Wakf Council the whole of the revenues of that Wakf, would the Wakf Council be willing, on its part, to undertake the care of the Moslem orphans, Moslem relief in Jerusalem and the other matters I have mentioned? That is to say, the Wakf Council would have entire control of all those revenues to spend as it likes. On the other hand, the Government would be relieved of the expenditures which would properly be regarded as falling to the Wakf Council. The Wakf Council would maintain its own orphanages in its own way, it would give its own relief as it chooses to the Moslem people in Jerusalem, it would pay the Mудариссен in the mosques,

and it would give grants to schools in the villages from which it received the tithes as the Government would give in other villages in which the Government receives the tithes.

There are two small points which would follow if the Wakfs were entirely separate from the Government. At present the Awkaf Council pays for its postage and telegrams, but it receives the money back, and it has, in effect, free telegraph and postal facilities as if it were a Government department. If there were complete separation of the Awkaf from the Government those privileges would naturally cease. But that, of course, is a very small financial item.

A further point which I would invite you to consider is this. Do you think that any reform is needed with regard to the exchange of Wakf properties—that is to say, if the Wakfs own a piece of land which is needed for some public purpose and it is desirable to exchange that piece of land for another piece of land of equal or greater value, is the present procedure for effecting that exchange satisfactory to you, or would you desire some change?

The next point relates to the method of making appointments to the Sharia Courts. The Sharia Courts must be closely connected with the Government, because the judgments of those courts are enforced by the State, but as you are gathered here to-day on the question of Wakfs I should be glad if you would take the opportunity of informing me if there are any changes which you desire should be made in the matter of making appointments in the Sharia Courts.

Those are the main points which I would lay before you for your consideration.

First, whether you wish any change in the present system of controlling the Wakfs, and if so, what change?

Secondly, whether you wish to take over all the ancient revenues of the Khasgi Sultan Wakf, and, if so, would you be prepared to relieve the Government of certain charges which it now bears but which might more properly be defrayed from Wakf funds?

Next, whether you desire any changes in the present methods of effecting the exchange of one piece of Wakf land for another piece of land.

Further, whether you desire any changes in the present methods of appointments to the Sharia Courts.

If there are any other matters affecting the relations between the Moslem community and the Government I hope you will take this opportunity of raising them. For in all these matters the Government has no desire other than to meet to the utmost extent in its power the Moslem opinion of Palestine.

In order that these matters may be freely considered by you, I would propose, with your permission, now to withdraw with the officers of the Administration, so that you may discuss the matter in this room in private by yourselves, and when you may indicate that you are ready to come to a conclusion, so we would return and resume this conference.

Or if you would wish to appoint a committee among yourselves, that committee could go into greater details in these matters and consult with the members of the Government subsequently.

The question of the procedure to be adopted is entirely for you to decide and I merely throw out these suggestions for your consideration.

We should be glad to know now whether the suggestion which I have made meets with your approval.

The conference continued up to 11.15 when the High Commissioner and the members of the Government present thereupon withdrew.

On the 21st of the month of the 1334th year, the Grand Mufti, at the invitation of his Excellency the High Commissioner, made the following statement—

Grand Mufti—In the name of the notables and representatives of the Moslem communities in general, I beg to present the best thanks to your Excellency for your interest in the general matters and especially in the Moslem Wakfs.

May it please God that all the actions of the Government may be successful, as well as the actions of the Wakf committees.

With regard to the points that your Excellency has raised it has been agreed that—

With regard to the Moslem Wakfs in general, whether these Wakfs are Mударисса or Khasgi Sultan Wakfs—that is, all Wakfs that are under the control

of the Government since long ago, the members of the council consider that these Wakfs should come under Moslem control and they ask that the Wakfs be put under the control of the Wakf committee. The Wakf Administration will be responsible for the administration of these Wakfs and all the other matters that they will undertake to do, as well as for the expenses that will be incurred in the Wakfs. This is the first point.

The second point is the following:—

It has been decided to request the Government to continue its control of the Wakfs and to keep in close connection with the Wakfs, as previously. That the decisions of the Wakf Council may be enforced and controlled by the Government.

The third point is—

The exchange of lands which your Excellency has alluded to.

With regard to this question of the exchange of a piece of Wakf land for another piece of land, this will be decided according to the laws of the Sharia Court.

The fourth point is—

The election to the appointment of judges to the Sharia Courts. The Moslems have not raised any objections with regard to the administration up to the present. It is a religious matter altogether. The appointment of such a Moslem by a Moslem committee will mean that he has been appointed by the Moslems. The president will say to the person: I have appointed you a judge to the Sharia Court that you should judge between the people in accordance with the Sharia Laws. The Moslems will not raise any objection to the control of the Government, but what they want is that this person be appointed by themselves. This question is based on the Sharia Law, that is, if the decisions of the members of the Sharia Court are to be enforced, and executed, then the Sharia Court is to deal always with questions referring to Sharia Law with regard to Moslem marriages and with regard to divorce, therefore the election of these judges to the Sharia Court should be decided by the Moslem community. This committee will be composed of ulema of the Moslem community and will be presided over by a president.

With regard to the fees and expenses of this Sharia Court the Moslem committee will have nothing to do with this. These will be referred to the Government as previously.

His Excellency—Perhaps I may be allowed to thank the Grand Mufti for the very clear and full explanation which he has been good enough to give.

There is one point, by way of an explanation, which I would like to ask him.

If the Wakf Council takes over the whole of the revenues of the Khazgi Sultan Wakf may I assume that it will also take over the financial obligations which I mentioned in my opening address?

Grand Mufti—Yes, your Excellency. So far as the Wakf Council will administer and be credited with the tithes and revenues of the Khazgi Sultan Wakf so will the Wakf Council undertake the Wakf obligations.

His Excellency—In the meantime we are spending and may have to spend larger sums of money for Moslem orphans. We are also spending a considerable sum of money in relief among Moslems in Jerusalem. We are spending 400/ a year for the Mudariseen in the different mosques. All these charges would properly devolve upon the Wakf Council. If the Government sacrifices the large revenue which the Government of Palestine has had for the last 80 years, would it also be relieved of the obligation to maintain the Moslem Orphanage, and the Mudariseen, and also the relief of the poor?

Grand Mufti—In spite of the fact that eighty years have passed since the Khazgi Sultan Wakf revenues were used by the Government then in power, it is right that it should now be given to its former possessors.

For a long time the Moslem community have been thinking of establishing an

orphanage for the Moslems in Palestine and to use part of the revenues of the Khazgi Sultan for that orphanage.

There are two kinds of Mudariseen. The first kind of Mudaris is a Mudaris who is appointed by the Wakfs and who receive their salaries from Wakfs. The other kind of Mudaris receive their allowances and salaries from the Treasury like the Muftis. I therefore submit to your Excellency that the Mudariseen who are being paid by the Treasury should continue to be so paid.

His Excellency—The only ones in question are those who receive their salary from the Treasury. If they teach in Government schools they receive salaries from the Government. But if they act as muezzins in the mosques and as teachers in the mosques is it not more proper that they should be paid from mosque funds?

I am only suggesting that if we were turning over to you these large revenues which the Government has had for eighty years you might take over this obligation for these men.

Grand Mufti—It is quite agreed that as the Wakf Administration would administer and would receive the revenues of this Wakf that the council should continue to pay the salaries of those Mudariseen which it now pays. The Mudariseen, who receive the sum of 400/ a year from the Treasury, are not by law under the control of the Wakfs.

I request your Excellency to continue these allowances of 400/ a year now in force until the present recipients die or retire then the Wakf Council would appoint others in their place whom it would pay.

His Excellency—If that is the desire of this conference the Government will be very glad to agree to that.

If you wish in the future to appoint any new Mudariseen they would be appointed from the Wakf Council. I would submit that if you wish to do this, then the Wakf Council should be empowered to do so.

(The conference agreed.)

The only point that is left is the question of the relief of the Moslem poor. I understand that when the question was discussed before, it was said that if only the Government would give back to the Wakfs the money that rightly belonged to them, then the Wakfs would be prepared to undertake the care of the Moslem poor.

Wakfs were founded partly in order to give relief to poor people in distress, and this sum of 2000/ seems to be a proper charge against the Wakfs assuming always that the Wakf Council will undertake the entire management of the matter.

I do not suggest that the Government should distribute relief to whom it wishes and that then the Wakfs should repay the amount to the Government, but I suggest that the Wakf Council should consider the needs of their own poor, select the recipients of the relief and give the relief.

Grand Mufti—It is not understood where this 2000/ comes from. How is it spent?

His Excellency—It is the District Governor of Jerusalem who distributes this relief.

Grand Mufti—From what source do these revenues come?

His Excellency—They come from the general taxes and revenues of Palestine.

Grand Mufti—Is it a fact that the District Governor of Jerusalem has paid for the last two or three years the sum of 2000/ per annum to the Moslem poor of Jerusalem?

His Excellency—Yes.

Grand Mufti—And is this the same as the 2000/ that you wish the Wakf Council to pay?

His Excellency—Yes.

Grand Mufti—What is the number of the Khazgi Sultan Wakf is regarded it is possible that there will be only fifty poor instead of one hundred.

His Excellency—I do not say that it will be necessary to spend as much as 2000/.

Grand Mufti—I was about to draw your attention to the same subject. It may not be necessary to spend 2000/, it may only be necessary to spend 200/.

His Excellency—I only mentioned the sum of 2000/ as that is the sum which the Government is at present spending.

But I would suggest that just as the Jews give relief to the Jewish poor, and the Christians give relief to the Christian poor, so the Moslem Awkaf should give relief to those to whom it is considered necessary. The amount would be whatever they thought necessary.

Grand Mufti—This is true, but there is a difference between the Moslem Wakfs and the Jewish or Christian Wakfs. The latter are supported by grants from outside that can be freely allotted. Each Moslem Wakf is allotted to a particular purpose and bound to the conditions of the giver of the Wakf. But I hope that, when these Wakfs are better organised, a special amount can be put aside for the poor Moslems.

His Excellency—Is it agreed between us that if the whole Khazgi Sultan Wakf is transferred to the Wakf Council that the Moslems will be responsible for the Moslem poor?

(The conference concurred.)

Before we leave the question of the relief, I did not quite understand what his Eminence the Grand Mufti said with regard to what I said as to 2,000*l* being too much.

Perhaps I did not make myself quite clear. What I said was, that 2,000*l* is what we are now spending, but that the Moslem Committee might not find it necessary to spend so much if they could manage things in a more economical way.

Grand Mufti—When the Khazgi Sultan Wakf is properly organised it will not be necessary for the Government to spend 2,000*l* a year.

Mr. Barron—The 2,000*l* is a vote from the general revenues of Palestine. The Governor of Jerusalem draws this sum and spends it among the Moslem poor. This 2,000*l* is not a vote from the Khazgi Sultan Wakf.

His Excellency—I have heard that there is a great desire to have a new Kadi school either at Jerusalem or Akka, and I hope that the Wakf Council will give that their attention. From the point of view of the Government of Palestine it is very important that the Kadi school should be at Jerusalem, and there is no reason why Palestine should not in the future become a great centre of Moslem learning just as El Akka is a great centre of Moslem reverence and will always so remain.

Grand Mufti—The fund which your Excellency has promised to give to the Wakfs is divided into two classes, the first class is the Khazgi Sultan Wakf and the second is the Madaris Wakf. By the Madaris Wakf is meant schools where the Madaris are educated, and when this Wakf is given back to the Wakf Council, the Wakf Council will undertake the necessary expenses.

His Excellency—This is a rather different matter. The other Wakf I referred to was the Mundarissa Wakfs. Mundarissa Wakfs are Wakfs which have reverted to the State for want of heirs. They are private Wakfs which have come back to the State because there are no heirs to inherit them.

I think we had better examine this question of the Madaris Wakf a little more closely. We have not quite acquainted ourselves with it, and if you will be good enough to give us the facts that you speak of we will go into it more carefully and communicate with the Wakf Council.

Grand Mufti—It refers to what your Excellency said about the Madaris Wakfs.

Mr. Barron—I think it is possible that the Grand Mufti is referring to the grant made to Zwayzaba and Tekina, which are included in the Khazgi Sultan Wakf grant.

Grand Mufti—Tekina have no revenues which can be taken back from the Government.

His Excellency—The matter is not quite clear. I think it would be better if Mr. Barron were to go into it with a representative of the Wakf Council.

Grand Mufti—I want to understand what kind of Wakf it is that the Wakf Council is going to take from the Government.

Mr. Hentze—It is the Mundarissa Wakfs which are now taken and applied to a Government Department. I think it is suggested that the High Commissioner should give these back to the Wakf Council, which should administer them for educational purposes, giving the revenue to village schools.

Grand Mufti—If the Mundarissa is the subject, the expenses are other than those mentioned already.

There has been some misunderstanding between Madaris and Mundarissa.

His Excellency—I do not intend to raise the question of the Wakfs which have lapsed in the past.

Ismael Bey Hussein—I wish to draw attention to the Madaris, which is the Education Wakf for the schools round the Haram-el-Sherif.

His Excellency—We will go into the details of this question, and perhaps the

Grand Mufti and Mr. Barron will discuss it together. Our general principle is that an injustice should not be committed against the Wakfs because the Turks committed an injustice, and what we want to do is to let the Moslems of Palestine feel that they are being treated by the present Government on a footing of absolute justice. In return we want the Wakfs to undertake such matters as Moslem religious education, the relief of Moslem orphans and the relief of Moslem poor, which rightly belongs to the Moslem Wakfs.

I think that on that basis it will be quite easy to arrive at a decision. The details had better be worked out between the officers of the Government and the Grand Mufti.

There is another point with regard to the appointments to the Sharia Courts. I quite agree with what has been said here by the Grand Mufti on behalf of this Council, that the judges of Moslem religious courts ought to be selected by Moslems, at the same time I think that the Government ought to have the right to say if they think that the person proposed is not really fitted for the post, because the Government is responsible, through its police, if necessary, for enforcing decisions of the Moslem Courts. Therefore, although I do not think that the case is likely to arise of an unsuitable person being proposed, I think that the person proposed by the Moslem Council for those posts should be subject to the approval of the Government before being appointed.

Grand Mufti—It is desired to know how the Government would approve of the candidate of the Council.

His Excellency—The name would be submitted to the Government for its approval, and if there were any objections on the part of the Government they would say so to the selecting authority.

Grand Mufti—In this case the Kadi will not be appointed by the Moslem Committee for the Sharia Court but he will be appointed by the Government.

His Excellency—He would be appointed by the Government, but the Government would not appoint anyone who was not recommended for appointment by the Moslem Committee. That is to say that the Moslem Committee would select a person to be appointed. The Government would merely reserve to itself the right of veto in special cases. The Government would not itself select the person to be appointed. The point to which the Moslems attach importance is that the appointment should be made by the Moslems and not by the Government.

I would like to say that the Government is anxious to meet in every way Moslem religious susceptibilities. All that it desires is that as it is necessary for it to enforce the decisions of the Moslem Courts, it should be assured that the persons are really fit persons. It does not wish itself to appoint the judges. It only wishes its approval to be obtained before the judge is actually appointed. The procedure would be this. The special Council of Ulama or others, who would be appointed by the Moslems, whenever there was a vacancy, would select a person to fill it. They would present the name of that person to the Government and if, as would almost invariably be the case, the Government had no objection, the committee would then proceed to appoint him. If there was objection in the particular case the matter could be again referred to the committee for their consideration. But it will be clearly understood that in every case it will be the Moslem Committee which will first select the person to be appointed and which will afterwards give him his formal appointment.

Grand Mufti—Then in this case the Government will give the veto before the appointment of such a person.

His Excellency—It will give either its approval or disapproval before the person is appointed.

Grand Mufti—This is agreed to.

Suleiman Eff. El Taji asks that the Administration of Wakfs be informed what kind of duty this council will have to perform.

His Excellency—I understand that with regard to the Wakf Council the idea is to continue as at present.

In the Grand Mufti's statement he did not suggest any alteration in the constitution of the council.

Is it desired to make any suggestion in regard to any change in the Wakf Council?

Members of the Conference—Yes. Some changes will have to take place with regard to the constitution of this council.

His Excellency—We have had a very long sitting this morning, and I do not think that we can go into this now. Perhaps the Wakf Council itself will consider

Members of the Conference.—Yes, your Excellency

The Mayor of Jerusalem.—It would be advisable that the council should be

is not necessary for them to appoint this committee now, the committee can

If you will be kind enough to permit me to do so, I should like to send a com-

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It was no doubt occurred to you that the original representations of M. de ... are of far more than local importance, raising as they do the whole ... possible conflict between the French and British ideas of a mandate, not only in the Palestine area but also in Mesopotamia, where it is anticipated that similar representations may be made by the French in the future. His Majesty's Government are anxious to reduce their military commitments in both areas, and while fully recognising that their claim to political control over the regions in which they have accepted a mandate is inseparable from the responsibility for preventing that region from becoming a trouble to the peace of neighbouring areas, they are no ... framing their own policy in conformity ...

Government. The original decision of His Majesty's Government to send a force across the Jordan, and to limit British penetration to the ap-
pointment of a small number of specially selected political officers, was dictated not only, or even mainly, by the consideration that the presence of troops in that area would be regarded as provocative, and that some action on the part of officers or men of the garrison who could not be expected in every case to possess special discretion, might result in local disturbances, and, consequently, might commit His Majesty's Government to a much more extended occupation.

3. I fully appreciate the difficulties outlined in your telegram No. 317, especially in the area of the economy. It is my belief that the only way to achieve a successful and lasting settlement in Transjordan is through the support of the Arab community, provided that they do not attempt to move too fast.

4. In the event of M. de Caux or the local French representatives raising the question again you should point out that His Majesty's Government are not prepared to consider the transference of troops to this area unless it is clearly shown which they see no reason to anticipate. In any future conversations or correspondence

... pt responsibility for Transjordan to the extent of advising and assisting the
elements, and, if necessary, taking military action in special cases to obviate the
... lity of justifiable complaints on the part of neighbouring countries, His Majesty's
... ent neither wish nor intend to take so direct a responsibility for its
administration and internal security as the French Government appear to contemplate
in the corresponding area of their mandatory territory in Syria

5. You should communicate the general tenor of this despatch to the political authorities in the Taurus, Euphrates and Tigris regions, and if you would consider at the same time the advisability of centralising the administration in

1 am. 5c

CURZON OF REDLESTON

No. 224.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to refer to your letter of the 5th November, in which was enclosed copy of a letter addressed to the War Office on the subject of proposals to bomb Jeziret-ibn-Omar and to your letter of the 11th November on the subject of contemplated trial or social action against Qara Chokh Dagh.

- Mr. Secretary Montagu will no doubt appreciate that these proposals raise a question of policy of considerable importance. Any action taken by the British military authorities, or by tribes inhabiting the area within the British mandate area, at the present time would be a precedent for the French Government as a precedent for similar action being taken by themselves or by the tribes under their control against places or tribes within the British sphere.

3. The contention urged by the French authorities in Syria in the analogous case of anticipated action against French interests by the inhabitants of the Ajlun district of Trans-Jordan was that by accepting responsibility for this area His Majesty's Government had implicitly accepted responsibility for prohibiting anti-French activities on the part of its inhabitants; and that in the event of His Majesty's Government failing to enforce their authority, whether by military or political measures, the French Government would be constrained to take such steps as they might consider necessary.

4. This contention is, in Lord Curzon's opinion, not without force, though he is inclined to consider it undesirable as a general principle that action should be taken in the French sphere by the British authorities or vice versa. At the same time, his Lordship realises that the circumstances leading up to the proposal made in Mr. Montagu's letter of the 11th November, in which the Army Council and the Air Council have expressed their concurrence, are exceptional. Not only is Qarn Chokh Dagh in the closest possible proximity to the provisional boundary between the French and British spheres, but the hostile activities of the local Arabs are openly supported and encouraged by the common enemy of the French and British Governments. This being so, his Lordship is prepared to concur in Sir Percy Cox being authorised to take such steps as are, in his opinion and that of the General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia, desirable and feasible, on the clear understanding that no further action of a similar nature be undertaken without the previous concurrence of this Department.

3. His Lordship observes from the Air Ministry's letter of the 12th November of which a copy has been communicated to this Department, that in the opinion of the Air Council aerial action should not be undertaken unless sufficient force can be held in reserve to maintain a vigorous and sustained attack. Mr. Montagu will no doubt bear in mind the political objections to a sustained attack, possibly continuing for a considerable time, being made against a village in the French zone, and I am to suggest for his consideration that tribal action, supported by aerial co-operation, should be resorted to rather than the measures which appear to be contemplated by the Air Council.

6. Lord Curzon would be glad to know in due course what decision had been arrived at by the High Commissioner in Mesopotamia, in order that he may be in a position to inform the French Government what action has been taken.

I am, &c.

J. A. C. TILLEY.

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No. 291

Foreign Office to Consul-General Mazze (Zürich)

(No. 100.)

Sir

Jerusalem, November 2, 1920.

I AM directed by Earl Curzon to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 144 of the 17th November regarding a claim for recognition in the name of the Agudat Israel in the name of the Agudat Israel. His Majesty's Government as at present advised are not prepared to extend to the Agudat Israel the recognition which is being offered to the Agudat Israel. I am to point out for your own guidance that the declaration of the 2nd November, 1917, was primarily framed to meet, as far as was considered practicable and desirable by His Majesty's Government, the aspirations of Zionists. At the same time, from the tone of the enclosed letter* it would appear that the Agudat Israel are under some misapprehension as to the conditions governing immigration into Palestine.

3. The Zionist certificate is only necessary for those Jews who desire to go to Palestine and are not self-supporting. The grant of such a certificate implies, in accordance with an understanding between His Majesty's Government and the Zionist Organisation, the arrival of the holder in Palestine employment and maintenance within a period of one year. The number of such certificates is limited at present, owing to the cost involved to the Zionist Organisation, to 1,000. The allocation of this number among the various Zionist bodies will form the subject of circular instructions about to be issued.

4. On the other hand, Jews who can satisfy you that they will be self-supporting may obtain a certificate from the local Zionist representative in the name of the Agudat Israel. Such certificates are issued in accordance with the instructions contained in the enclosed letter.

5. It is understood that, in the case of Zionists other than the local Zionist representative as to the authenticity of the certificate, the local Zionist representative will be responsible. The local Zionist representative will be responsible for the authenticity of the certificate. The local Zionist representative will be responsible for the authenticity of the certificate. The local Zionist representative will be responsible for the authenticity of the certificate.

6. The Zionist Organisation are being requested to endeavour to arrange for the issue of certificates to a larger number of Jews to whom they issue certificates is expected to include a fair proportion of non-Zionists.

You may at the same time point out to the Agudat Israel that the matter of the Agudat Israel is being considered by the Government, and that the Agudat Israel are being requested to endeavour to dissipate the misapprehension under which they appear to be labouring.

I am, &c

A. C. TILLEY

E 15146/131 44]

No. 292

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon. (Received December 3.)

(No. 138.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, November 14, 1920.

WITH reference to your letter No. 138 of the 14th November I have the honour to report that the question of maintaining in Palestine the old Ottoman form of mortgage, viz., a sale by the borrower with a right of repurchase, has been submitted to the Advisory Council, and that body agreed that the form was open to grave abuse by the lenders of money and should not be continued. The council was of opinion that the form of mortgage instituted by Ottoman legislation passed during the war,

* Not printed.

which is more in accord with European systems of mortgage, answered the needs of the country. Accordingly, that more recent law is being applied in the land registries, with some slight modifications, which are contained in the ordinance that has been sent to you.

I shall report on the working of the Land Transfer Ordinance as a whole after it has been in operation for six months. At present there is considerable activity in nearly all the land registries.

I have, &c

HERBERT SAMUEL,

High Commissioner.

[E 15152/1136 44]

No. 293

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon. (Received December 3.)

(No. 145.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, November 22, 1920.

WITH reference to your letter No. 145 of the 24th November regarding the pay of officials of the Palestine Government, I desire to offer the following observations.

2. (Your paragraph 2) The suggested salaries for the three secretaries do not conform with their respective positions and functions. The civil secretary is the principal officer of the Administration. All political and administrative matters and the general superintendence of the technical departments are in his hands. He is in addition concerned with the department of the Treasury. It was contemplated that the title of this officer should be chief secretary, but although the title of civil secretary was finally adopted, the functions he performs would have been more accurately described by the other. It is not practicable to place him in an inferior position to any other officer. Moreover, the Treasury letter dated the 22nd June, 1920, agreed that the salaries for the civil and financial secretaries should be upon an equal footing. Nor could a legal secretary, with the qualifications that are necessary be secured for a less remuneration. For the considerable salaries of £E 2,000 a year, however, I consider that the cost of living allowance at the maximum figure of £175 originally proposed by me without any additional leave allowance should suffice. These proposals would involve total emoluments for the three officers of £E 6,525, as compared with a total of £6,585 at the rates suggested in the paragraph under reply. I trust that these proposals, in view of the further considerations adduced, will be acceded to. Otherwise the whole work of this Administration may be seriously affected.

3. (Your paragraph 3) A third report on the railways of Palestine are in a very unsatisfactory state. During the next few years an efficient system will have to be constructed almost from the beginning. I had hoped to be able to arrange for the appointment of a person of high administrative and organising qualities that are needed, at the salary of Grade I. But I find that it will be necessary to place this officer upon the same scale as the three secretaries. In view of the high salaries which efficient men are able to command in the engineering world, I do not think that this salary is excessive, and I am informed that it compares not unfavourably, from the point of view of economy, with the salaries attached to corresponding posts elsewhere.

4. The head of the Public Health Department is not only supervising the ordinary activities of this part of the Government, but is chairman of a commission which is preparing a report on the Public Health of the country. It will fall to him to execute. I may mention that the present director was in the Egyptian service, where, in a subordinate position, he would now be receiving, had he remained there, larger emoluments than he obtains in Grade I. Similarly the Director of Education will be called upon to initiate an entirely new system of national education.

The Treasury letter of the 22nd June already quoted, authorised salaries in Grade I for four departments. Accordingly I have offered such salaries to the Directors of Education, Public Health, Agriculture and Public Security, and they have accepted their posts on that understanding. The Chief Justice is not the head of a department. His appointment was not referred to in that connection, and the salaries of judges necessarily stand on a separate footing. The railways were not

[5773]

3 K 2

transferred to the Civil Administration until the 1st October, and the salary of the general manager was also not under consideration at that time.

I can assure your Lordship that it is not practicable to combine the direction of the Departments of Railways and Public Works under one officer or to effect such a combination of the Departments of Public Health and Education. So far from amalgamation being possible now and expansion and separation follow later, as suggested in the paragraph under reply, it is just at the present time, when the departments of public health and education are being made good when the lines of fresh policies are being laid down, and when a new and strange Government has to justify itself in the eyes of the people by its success, that all the energies of first-rate men are needed at the head of the several departments of the Administration. It is rather after the new system has been established, and has been in operation for two or three years, that it may be possible to reduce the number of senior officials. The desirability of that course will certainly be borne in mind, and I have economies of that nature in view. But for the time being I feel sure that the senior staff proposed is not excessive.

5. (Your paragraph 4.) In my telegram No. 176 I pointed out that the budget proposals drawn up in March last under my general supervision when acting as adviser on financial matters to the Military Administration suggested the following scales, viz.

1. £ E 1 400-1 600
2. £ E 1 100-1 300
3. £ E 850-1 050
4. £ E 600-800
5. £ E 400-500
6. £ E 250-350

plus a cost of living allowance of 10 per cent. on the minimum of the grade plus a constant figure of £ E 36 per annum. The first four grades to receive an annual increment of £ E 40, the two latter to receive £ E 20 per annum. The question of a leave allowance was under consideration.

In your Lordship's despatch No. 174 of the 26th August the grades were reduced to four viz. —

1. £ E 1 200-1 400
2. £ E 850-1 050
3. £ E 550-750
4. £ E 250-450

plus a cost of living allowance of 20 per cent. with an annual increment of £ E 30 in the first two classes, £ E 25 in the third, and £ E 20 in the fourth, with a leave allowance of £ E 75 per annum in addition for the first two grades and £ E 50 for the third.

In the despatch under reply, paragraph 7, you state that His Majesty's Government is prepared to sanction the division of Class 4 into two classes, viz. —

4. £ E 300-400
5. £ E 250-350

plus a cost of living allowance of 20 per cent. and with an annual increment of £ E 20 and £ E 15 respectively.

The cancelling of the grades submitted by me, viz.

1. £ E 1,100-1,300
2. £ E 850-1,050

and substituting one grade has the effect of putting the heads of minor departments and their principal subordinates in the same grade. For example it has been impossible to secure the services of an efficient deputy head of the Treasury able to take control when the Treasurer is away at a less salary than that of the new Class II which is that of the Treasurer himself.

There is under the proposed scale only one grade for all officers between British junior officials newly taken on in the service and the four heads of major departments.

In these circumstances the question of the number of grades might perhaps receive further consideration.

6. (Your paragraph 6.) This paragraph appears to have been written under a misapprehension. It is not the case that the pay of officers who have left the army on transfer to the Civil Administration has been fixed at a figure equivalent to the military pay they were receiving, but the reference to the matter in my despatch No. 47 of the 13th September was only to illustrate the fact that salaries in general had not been fixed at unduly high figures, since in many cases there were reductions upon the sums previously received by the same officers performing the same or similar functions under the Military Administration.

7. I note that in specially important cases appointments of officers may be made above the minimum of the grade, but the new grading would give such officers very little opportunity to advance in the service, as in a year or two they will be receiving the maximum of the grade.

8. (Your paragraph 7.) I am grateful to His Majesty's Government for suggesting the creation of two classes in place of the proposed Class IV. I would ask, however, whether it would not be better to leave an interval between the two classes, and the minimum of the higher, so that the value of the lower class would be clearly defined. Methods will be adopted for enabling the minimum of the lower class to be raised to the minimum of the higher class.

9. (Your paragraph 8.) I am grateful to His Majesty's Government for suggesting the creation of two classes in place of the proposed Class IV. I would ask, however, whether it would not be better to leave an interval between the two classes, and the minimum of the higher, so that the value of the lower class would be clearly defined. Methods will be adopted for enabling the minimum of the lower class to be raised to the minimum of the higher class.

10. (Your paragraph 9.) The sanction for an entertainment allowance of £ E 1000 for the High Commissioner is noted.

11. (Your paragraph 10.) The suggested deduction of 15 per cent. from the officials' salary as rent for the official residences appears excessive and would be in a number of cases beyond the actual cost of the houses. I would point out to your Lordship that the maximum amount payable by the officials of the Government of the Sudan for residence is £ E 4 per month, lesser sums being paid for the smaller houses occupied by the lower paid categories of the British service. I am taking steps to secure that the requirement in your Lordship's despatch, with respect to officers paying a fair rent for their houses, is fully observed.

12. (Your paragraphs 11 and 12.) Your Lordship's instructions will be carried into effect but I trust that before any change such as is contemplated is executed I may be given an opportunity of expressing my views on the method to be applied.

13. In view of the necessarily detailed character of these observations it has not been practicable to send them by telegraph, although I fully concur in your Lordship's desire that these matters should be settled with the minimum of delay.

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL,
High Commissioner

E 14806 85 44)

No. 294

(Circulation to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem).)

No. 419.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 3, 1920.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 120 of the 8th November regarding the elected Assembly of the Jewish population of Palestine.

I am sorry to hear that the Assembly has not yet been able to meet.

Committee, but I would, at the same time, draw your attention to No. VIII (b) of the resolutions, which states that the Zionist Executive is to ensure the Jewish population a share in the control of the affairs of Palestine and of Palestinian institutions. I am not clear as to the precise intention of this paragraph or of the meaning of the words "share of the control." The phrase appears *prima facie*, however, to have been unfortunately worded, and I should be glad to be furnished with your observations on the matter.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[E 14493 476, 44

Foreign Office to Zionist Org.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 3, 1920.

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to transmit herewith a copy of a letter from the central bureau of the "Agudas Israel," which has been forwarded by His Majesty's representative at Zürich regarding immigration into Palestine.

The complaint made by this body appears to be based on the erroneous impression that self-supporting non-Zionist Jews must obtain from the local Zionist representative a recommendation in support of their application for a visa.

His Majesty's Government has been instructed to remove this misapprehension, and to point out that His Majesty's Government, as at present advised, are not prepared to extend to the "Agudas Israel" the measure of recognition accorded to the Zionist organization. I am to state at the same time that Lord Curzon trusts that a fair proportion of non-Zionist Jews will be included among the 1,000 non-self-supporting immigrants to whom the Zionist organization is issuing certificates to enable them to obtain visas for Palestine, and for whom the Zionist organization is guaranteeing maintenance and support for the first year after their arrival in that country.

With the removal of the above-mentioned misapprehension, Lord Curzon hopes that closer and more harmonious co-operation between the representatives of the Zionist organization and the "Agudas Israel" may be secured.

I am, &c.

J. A. C. TILLEY

E 15-17 4164 44,

No. 296.

French Draft Mandate for Syria, communicated by French Delegation at Geneva, December 1, 1920. (Received December 5.)

Proposition tendant à l'Approbation du Mandat pour la Syrie et le Liban

CONSIDÉRANT que par l'article 132 du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie signé à 10 août 1920 la Turquie a renoncé, en faveur des principales Puissances alliées, à tous ses droits et titres sur les territoires de l'ancien Empire ottoman situés au sud de la frontière meridionale de la Turquie telle qu'elle est fixée audit traité.

Considérant que par l'article 94 dudit traité, les hautes parties contractantes ont agréé que la partie desdits territoires dénommée Syrie soit, selon les termes de l'article 22 alinéa 4, du Pacte de la Société des Nations, constituée en Etat indépendant devant être guidée dans son administration par les conseils et l'aide d'une Puissance mandataire jusqu'au moment où cet Etat sera en mesure de se gouverner lui-même.

Considérant que les principales Puissances alliées ont décidé que le mandat sur les territoires visés ci-dessus comprenant la Syrie et le Liban serait conféré au Gouvernement de la République française, qui l'a accepté.

Considérant que les termes de ce mandat, également formulés dans les articles ci-dessous, ont été agréés par le Gouvernement de la République française.

Que le Gouvernement de la République française s'engage à exercer ledit mandat au nom de la Société des Nations en conformité avec lesdits articles.

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations approuve les termes ci-dessous du mandat sur la Syrie et le Liban.

Article 1^{er}

Le mandataire élaborera dans un délai de trois ans, à dater de l'entrée en application du présent mandat, un statut organique pour la Syrie et le Liban. Ce statut organique sera préparé d'accord avec les autorités indigènes et tiendra compte des droits, intérêts et vœux de toutes populations habitant le territoire sous mandat. Il édictera les mesures propres à faciliter le développement progressif de la Syrie et du Liban comme Etats indépendants. En attendant la mise en vigueur du statut organique, l'administration de la Syrie et du Liban sera conduite en accord avec l'esprit du présent mandat.

Le mandataire favorisera les autonomies locales dans toute la mesure où les circonstances s'y prêteront.

ARTICLE 2

Le mandataire pourra maintenir ses troupes dans les territoires sous mandat, en vue de la défense du territoire. Il pourra, jusqu'à la mise en vigueur du statut organique et du rétablissement de la sécurité publique, organiser les milices locales nécessaires à la défense du territoire et les employer à cette défense ainsi qu'au maintien de l'ordre. Ces forces locales ne seront recrutées que parmi les habitants du territoire sous mandat.

Lesdites milices relèveront ensuite des pouvoirs locaux, sous réserve de l'autorité et du contrôle que le mandataire devra conserver sur ces forces. Le mandataire empêchera qu'elles servent à d'autres fins que celles énoncées ci-dessus. Rien n'empêchera la Syrie et le Liban de participer aux frais d'entretien des forces du mandataire stationnées sur leur territoire.

Le mandataire disposera en tous temps du droit d'utiliser les ports, voies ferrées et moyens de communication de la Syrie et du Liban pour le passage de ses troupes, et de tous matériel, approvisionnements et combustibles.

ARTICLE 3

Les relations extérieures de la Syrie et du Liban, ainsi que la délivrance des exequaturs aux consuls des Puissances étrangères seront du ressort exclusif du mandataire. Les ressortissants de la Syrie et du Liban se trouvant hors des limites de ces territoires relèveront de la protection diplomatique et consulaire du mandataire.

ARTICLE 4

Le mandataire garantit la Syrie et le Liban contre toute perte ou prise à bail de tout ou partie du territoire et contre l'établissement de tout contrôle d'une Puissance étrangère.

ARTICLE 5

Sont expressément abolis en Syrie et au Liban les privilèges et immunités des étrangers, y compris la juridiction consulaire et la protection, tels qu'ils étaient autrefois pratiqués dans l'Empire ottoman, en vertu des Capitulations et des usages.

La mise en application de la nouvelle organisation judiciaire prévue à l'article 6.

ARTICLE 6

Le mandataire instituera en Syrie et au Liban un système judiciaire assurant tant aux indigènes qu'aux étrangers la garantie complète de leurs droits.

Le respect du statut personnel des diverses populations et de leurs intérêts d'ordre religieux sera entièrement garanti. En particulier, le mandataire exercera la surveillance des lieux de culte, des monastères, des écoles, des hôpitaux, des bibliothèques, des musées, des monuments historiques et la volonté des fondateurs.

ARTICLE 7

En attendant la conclusion de conventions spéciales d'extradition, les traités d'extradition en vigueur entre les Puissances étrangères et le mandataire seront appliqués sur les territoires de la Syrie et du Liban.

ARTICLE 8

Le mandataire garantira à toutes personnes la plus complète liberté de conscience ainsi que le libre exercice de toutes les formes de culte compatibles avec l'ordre public.

de l'article 421 du Traité de Paix conclu entre les Puissances alliées et la Turquie. Cette loi assurera aux nationaux de tous les Etats membres de la Société des Nations l'égalité de traitement en matière de fouilles et recherches archéologiques.

271 11 15

Des l'entrée en vigueur du statut organique visé à l'article 1^{er}, le mandataire s'entendra avec les Gouvernements locaux relativement au remboursement par ces derniers de toutes dépenses encourues par le mandataire pour l'organisation de l'administration, le développement des ressources locales et l'exécution de travaux publics d'un caractère permanent, dont le bénéfice restera acquis au pays. Cette entente sera communiquée au Conseil de la Société des Nations.

ARTICLE 16

L'arabe et le français seront les langues officielles de la Syrie et du Liban

ARTICLE 17th

Le mandataire adressera au Conseil de la Société des Nations un rapport annuel sur les mesures prises pendant l'année pour l'application du présent mandat.

Le texte de toutes les lois et règlements promulgués pendant l'année annexés au rapport.

ARTICLE 15

Le consentement du Conseil de la Société des Nations sera nécessaire pour toutes modifications proposées par le mandataire, de l'approbation par la majorité du Conseil de la Société des Nations.

ARTICLE 19

An cas où un dissentiment viendrait à s'élever entre les membres de la Société des Nations quant à l'interprétation ou à l'application des articles du présent mandat, la question serait soumise à la Cour permanente de Justice internationale prévue par l'article 14 du Pacte de la Société des Nations.

Fait à Genève le _____, en un seul original, qui restera déposé dans les archives du Secrétariat général de la Société des Nations. Des copies certifiées seront remises par le Secrétaire général de la Société des Nations à toutes les Puissances signataires du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie.

No. 207.

Sir C. Hunt to Foreign Office,—(Received December 6.)

British Delegation, Geneva, December 2, 1920

British Delegation, Geneva, December 2, 1920

Sir

Mr. BALFOUR thinks that it may be of interest to Earl Curzon of Kedleston to know that the French delegation were unwilling to delay the presentation of their draft mandate for Syria and the Lebanon any longer, and therefore submitted it to the Council of the League of Nations yesterday

A copy of the draft mandate⁶ as handed to the Secretary-General in enclosed, as also a copy of the covering note.

the Secretary General of the League, the legal adviser of the French delegation asked me to come and see him, and told me that he was anxious to show me the text of the covering letter with which the draft mandate was to be forwarded, as the French hoped that when the British delegation handed in the draft mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia the same wording would be employed. I therefore went through the text of the letter with him, and said that I saw no objection to its terms. He also showed me the text of the draft mandate for Syria; this appeared to conform to the text which had been sent from Paris by Mr Vansittart to the Foreign Office, with the addition of certain modifications suggested by His Majesty's Government.

In the course of the conversation with M. Fromageot and M. Gout it transpired that the French *procès-verbal* of the Conference of San Remo contained no mention of the reserve made by Signor Nitti on behalf of the Italian Government at the time of the decision of the Supreme Council allocating the mandates under the Turkish Treaty. The preamble of the draft Syrian mandate when shown to me contained a mention of the precise date of the decision of the Supreme Council; as the Italian reserve had never, so far as I was aware, been withdrawn, I suggested it might be better to omit the date and make the statement a little less precise. M. Fromageot agreed and modified the passage accordingly.

1000. 4c

C'ECIL J. B. HURST

Enclosure 1 in No. 297

French Delegation to Council of League of Nations

M. le Secrétaire général.

Genève, le 1^{er} décembre 1920.

SUIVANT les instructions de mon Gouvernement, j'ai l'honneur de vous remettre ci-joint, en vous priant de le déposer sur le bureau du Conseil de la Société des Nations, le texte du mandat que la République française a accepté pour la Syrie et le Liban.

Le Comité formant à l'esprit de l'article 21 du Pacte de la Société des Nations le 1. Comité de la République française a pu en cette rédaction après échanges de vues et en parfait accord avec le Gouvernement de sa Majesté britannique. Il veut espérer qu'après en avoir pris connaissance le Conseil voudra bien considérer qu'il est établi en conformité des principes énoncés à l'article 22 du Pacte, et en conséquence lui en faire haute approbation.

Enfin, que dans l'intérêt même des populations de Syrie et du Liban, et d'un régime inspiré par les principes de la République prend la liberté d'appeler sur le Conseil sur l'avantage qu'il y a à mettre fin au régime transjordanien.

AUSTIN, TX

Enclosure 2 in No. 297

Extract from the Decision of the Supreme Council at San Remo, April 25, 1920.

LES mandataires choisis par les principales Puissances : l'Allemagne pour la Syrie, et la Grande-Bretagne pour la Mésopotamie et la Palestine.

Preparation by M. A. H.

La délégation italienne, en considération des grands intérêts économiques que l'Italie en tant que Puissance exclusivement méditerranéenne possède en Asie Mineure réserve son approbation à la présente résolution, jusqu'au règlement des intérêts italiens en Turquie d'Asie.

E 15390 4164 441

No 29H.

Sir C. Hurst to Foreign Office.—(Received December 9.)

British Delegation, Geneva, December 7, 1920.

Sir, *British Delegation, Geneva, December 7, 1920.*
ON the 6th December I received from Mr. Malkin a copy of the draft mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia, as approved by the Cabinet, with certain verbal and punctuation corrections made by him in manuscript.

The drafts were immediately shown by me to the legal adviser of the French Delegation, M. Fromageot, who took note of the divergences between them and the text of the Syrian mandate, particularly article 2 of the Mesopotamian mandate, which is in accordance with Foreign Office telegram No. 1113 of the 18th October to Lord

Derby, whereas the corresponding provision of the Syrian mandate is in the original form.

The covering letter in which the draft mandates were to be communicated to the Council was also shown to M. Fromageot. Its terms follow those of the covering letter in which the French submitted the Syrian mandate.

Mr. Balfour has now forwarded these draft mandates to the Secretary-General.

The only changes which were made in the text as the result of my discussion with M. Fromageot were the substitution of the formula: "The mandatory shall" or "The mandatory will" or some similar formula, instead of the original "The mandatory shall" and the substitution of the word "shall" for "will" in the declaration to be signed by the Powers. M. Fromageot therefore

I enclose two copies of the mandates* as communicated to the Council of the League and one copy of Mr Balfour's covering letter.

1. \mathcal{L} is a linear space over \mathbb{R} with dimension n .

Enclosure in No. 298

Mr. Balfour to Secretary to League of Nations

Sir,

British Delegation, Geneva, December 9, 1920.

IN accordance with instructions received from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of the texts of the mandates for Mesopotamia and Palestine as drawn up by His Majesty's Government,* and to request that you will be so good as to lay them before the Council of the League of Nations.

His Majesty's Government have prepared the terms of these mandates in conformity with the spirit of article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and have throughout been in consultation with the French Government, with whom they are in complete agreement on the subject.

His Majesty's Government venture to hope that an examination of these documents will satisfy the Council that they are in compliance with article 22 of the Pact, and that the Council will be prepared to approve them.

I should add that, in the interest of the native inhabitants of Mesopotamia and Palestine and with the object of conferring upon them with the least possible delay the benefits of a system based on the stipulations of the Pact His Majesty's Government desire to draw the attention of the Council to the advisability of bringing to an early close the temporary arrangements at present in force.

I have, &c

A. J. HALFOUR

E 15390 4164 441

No. 209

Draft of the Mandate for Mesopotamia as submitted by Mr. Balfour on December 7, 1920, to the Secretariat-General of the League of Nations for the approval of the Council of the League of Nations.—(Received at Foreign Office December 10)

THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

WHEREAS by Article 132 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Sévres on the tenth day of August 1920 Turkey renounced in favour of the Principal Allied Powers all rights and title over Mesopotamia, and whereas by Article 94 of the said treaty the High Contracting Parties agreed that Mesopotamia should, in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 22 of Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations) be provisionally regarded as an independent State, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as it is able to stand alone, and that the determination of the frontiers of

^a See Vol. 249 and 250.

Mesopotamia, other than those laid down in the said treaty, and the selection of the Mandatory would be made by the Principal Allied Powers, and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as Mandatory for Mesopotamia, and

Whereas the terms of the Mandate in respect of Mesopotamia have been formulated in the following terms and submitted to the Council of the League for approval, and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the Mandate in respect of the said territories and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in conformity with the following provisions,

Hereby approves the terms of the said Mandate as follows:—

ARTICLE 1

The Mandatory will frame within the shortest possible time, not exceeding three years from the date of the coming into force of this Mandate, an Organic Law for Mesopotamia. This Organic Law shall be framed in consultation with the native authorities, and shall take account of the rights, interests and wishes of all the populations inhabiting the mandated territory. It shall contain provisions designed to facilitate the progressive development of Mesopotamia as an independent State. Pending the coming into effect of the organic law, the administration of Mesopotamia shall be conducted in accordance with the spirit of this Mandate.

ARTICLE 2

The Mandatory may maintain troops in the territories under his Mandate for the defence of these territories. Until the entry into force of the Organic Law and the re-establishment of public security he may organise and employ local forces necessary for the maintenance of order and for the defence of these territories. Such forces may only be recruited from the inhabitants of the territories under the Mandate.

The said local forces shall thereafter be responsible to the local authorities subject always to the control to be exercised over these forces by the Mandatory who shall not employ them for other than the above-mentioned purposes, except with the consent of the Mesopotamian Government.

Nothing in this article shall preclude the Mesopotamian Government from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of any forces maintained by the Mandatory in Mesopotamia.

The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times to use the roads, railways, and ports of Mesopotamia for the movement of troops and the carriage of fuel and supplies.

ARTICLE 3

The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the control of the foreign relations of Mesopotamia, and the right to issue exequaturs to consuls appointed by foreign Powers. It shall also be entitled to afford diplomatic and consular protection to citizens of Mesopotamia when outside its territorial limits.

ARTICLE 4

The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Mesopotamian territory shall be ceded or leased to or in any way placed under the control of the Government of any foreign Power.

ARTICLE 5

The immunities and privileges of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are definitely abrogated in Mesopotamia.

ARTICLE 6

The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicial system established in Mesopotamia shall safeguard (a) the interests of foreigners, (b) the law, and (to the extent deemed expedient) the jurisdiction now existing in Mesopotamia with

regard to questions arising out of the religious beliefs of certain communities (such as the laws of Wakf and personal status). In particular the Mandatory agrees that the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

ARTICLE 7

Pending the making of special extradition agreements with foreign Powers relating to Mesopotamia, the extradition treaties in force between foreign Powers and the Mandatory shall apply to Mesopotamia.

ARTICLE 8

The Mandatory will ensure to all complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the religions of Mesopotamia. Instruction in and through the medium of the native languages of Mesopotamia shall be promoted by the Mandatory.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language (while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose) shall not be denied or impaired.

ARTICLE 9

Nothing in this Mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric or the management of the sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed.

ARTICLE 10

The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over missionary enterprise in Mesopotamia as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such supervision no measures shall be taken in Mesopotamia to obstruct or interfere with such enterprise or to discriminate against any missionary on the ground of his religion or nationality.

ARTICLE 11

The Mandatory must see that there is no discrimination in Mesopotamia against the nationals of any State member of the League of Nations (including companies incorporated under the laws of such State) as compared with the nationals of the Mandatory or of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of ships or aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Mesopotamia against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States, and there shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across the mandated area.

Subject as aforesaid the Mesopotamian Government may on the advice of the Mandatory impose such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary and ~~the said taxes shall not be levied in such a manner as to impede the development of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the interests of the population.~~

Nothing in this Article shall prevent the Mesopotamian Government on the advice of the Mandatory from concluding special arrangements with any State the territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.

ARTICLE 12

The Mandatory will adhere on behalf of Mesopotamia to any general international conventions already existing or that may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations respecting the slave traffic, the traffic in arms and ammunition, and the traffic in drugs, or relating to commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, laws of aerial navigation, railways and postal, telegraphic and wireless communication, or artistic, literary or industrial property.

ARTICLE 13

The Mandatory will secure the co-operation of the Mesopotamian Government so far as social, religious and other conditions may permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.

ARTICLE 14

The Mandatory will secure the enactment within twelve months from the coming into force of this Mandate, and will ensure the execution of a Law of Antiquities, based on the contents of Article 421 of Part XIII of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. This law shall replace the former Ottoman Law of Antiquities, and shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of archaeological research to the nationals of all States, members of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 15

Upon the coming into force of the Organic Law an arrangement shall be made between the Mandatory and the Mesopotamian Government for settling the terms on which the latter will take over Public Works and other services of a permanent character the benefit of which will pass to the Mesopotamian Government. Such arrangement shall be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 16

The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the Mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall be communicated with the report.

ARTICLE 17

The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of the present Mandate, provided that in the case of any modification proposed by the Mandatory such consent may be given by a majority of the Council.

If any dispute whatever should arise between the members of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of these provisions which cannot be settled by negotiation, this dispute shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The present copy shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations. Certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all Powers Signatories of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

Made at _____ the _____ day of _____

E 15390 4164 44.

No. 300

Draft of the Mandate for Palestine as submitted by Mr. Balfour on December 7, 1920, to the Secretariat-General of the League of Nations for the approval of the Council of the League of Nations.—(Received at Foreign Office December 10)

THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

WHEREAS by Article 132 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Sèvres on the tenth day of August, 1920, Turkey renounced in favour of the Principal Allied Powers all rights and title over Palestine; and

Whereas Article 22 of the said Treaty the High Contracting Parties agreed to entrust, by application of the provisions of Article 22, the Administration of

Palestine, within such boundaries as might be determined by the Principal Allied Powers, to a Mandatory to be selected by the said Powers, and

Whereas by the same article the High Contracting Parties further agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the other Allied Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country, and

Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their National Home in that country, and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as the Mandatory for Palestine, and

Whereas the terms of the Mandate in respect of Palestine have been formulated in the following terms and submitted to the Council of the League for approval, and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the Mandate in respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in conformity with the following provisions

Hereby approves the terms of the said mandate as follows:—

ARTICLE 1

His Britannic Majesty shall have the right to exercise as Mandatory all the powers inherent in the Government of a sovereign State, save as they may be limited by the terms of the present Mandate.

ARTICLE 2

The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

ARTICLE 3

The Mandatory shall encourage the widest measure of self-government for localities consistent with the prevailing conditions.

ARTICLE 4

An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.

The Zionist organisation, so long as its organisation and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognised as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.

ARTICLE 5

The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of the Government of any foreign Power.

ARTICLE 6

The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration on condition of adequate labour and shall encourage co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, and settlement by Jews on the land, and in towns, villages and waste lands not required for public purposes.

ARTICLE 7

The Administration of Palestine will be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.

ARTICLE 8

The immunities and privileges of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are definitely abrogated in Palestine.

ARTICLE 9

The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicial system established in Palestine shall safeguard (a) the interests of foreigners, (b) the law, and (to the extent deemed expedient) the jurisdiction now existing in Palestine with regard to questions arising out of the religious beliefs of certain communities (such as the laws of Wakf and personal status). In particular the Mandatory agrees that the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

ARTICLE 10

Nothing shall prevent the Mandatory from making or special extradition agreements relating to Palestine the extradition treaties in force between the Mandatory and other foreign Powers shall apply to Palestine.

ARTICLE 11

The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country and, subject to Article 811 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land.

The Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned in Article 4 to construct, on a fair and equitable basis, public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. Any such arrangements shall provide that no profits distributed by such agency, directly or indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any further profits shall be utilised by it for the benefit of the country in a manner approved by the Administration.

ARTICLE 12

The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the control of the foreign relations of Palestine, and the right to issue exequaturs to consuls appointed by foreign Powers. It shall also be entitled to afford diplomatic and consular protection to citizens of Palestine when outside its territorial limits.

ARTICLE 13

All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights, of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum, is assumed by the Mandatory, who will be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters connected therewith, provided that nothing in this Article shall prevent the Mandatory from entering into such arrangement as he may deem reasonable with the Administration for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this Article into effect, and provided also that nothing in this Mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric or the management of purely Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed.

ARTICLE 14

In accordance with Article 95 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, the Mandatory undertakes to appoint as soon as possible a special Commission to study and regulate all questions and claims relating to the different religious communities. In the composition of this Commission the religious interests concerned will be taken into account. The chairman of the Commission will be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations. It will be the duty of this Commission to ensure that the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites of special veneration by the adherents of one particular religion, are entrusted to the permanent control of suitable bodies representing the adherents of the religion concerned. The selection of the Holy Places, religious buildings or sites so to be entrusted, shall be made by the Commission subject to the approval of the Mandatory.

In all cases dealt with under this Article, however, the right and duty of the Mandatory to maintain order and decorum in the place concerned shall not be affected, and the buildings and sites will be subject to the provisions of such laws relating to public monuments as may be enacted in Palestine with the approval of the Mandatory.

The rights of control conferred under this Article will be guaranteed by the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 15

The Mandatory will see that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, is ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from any place of worship or from any place of public assembly.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language (while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose) shall not be denied or impaired.

ARTICLE 16

The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over missionary enterprise in Palestine as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such supervision, no measures shall be taken in Palestine to obstruct or interfere with such enterprise or to discriminate against any missionary on the ground of his religion or nationality.

ARTICLE 17

The Administration of Palestine may organize on a voluntary basis the forces necessary for the preservation of peace and order, and also for the defence of the country, subject however to the approval of the Mandatory, who shall not use them for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the Administration of Palestine, and except for such purposes no military, naval or air forces shall be raised or maintained by the Administration of Palestine.

Nothing in this Article shall preclude the Administration of Palestine from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of forces maintained by the Mandatory in Palestine.

The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times to use the roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of troops and the carriage of fuel and supplies.

ARTICLE 18

The Mandatory must see that there is no discrimination in Palestine against the nationals of any of the States members of the League of Nations (including companies incorporated under their laws) as compared with those of the Mandatory or of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce, or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of ships or aircraft. Similarly there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against persons originating in or destined for any of the said States, and there shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across the mandated area.

Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of this Mandate the Administration of Palestine may on the advice of the Mandatory impose such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think best to promote the development of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the interests of the population.

Nothing in this Article shall prevent the Government of Palestine on the advice of the Mandatory from concluding a special customs agreement with any State, the territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.

ARTICLE 19

The Mandatory will adhere on behalf of the Administration to any general international conventions already existing or that may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations respecting the slave traffic, the traffic in arms and ammunition, or the traffic in drugs, or relating to commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation and postal, telegraphic and wireless communication or literary, artistic or industrial property.

ARTICLE 20

The Mandatory will co-operate on behalf of the Administration of Palestine, so far as religious, social and other conditions may permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.

ARTICLE 21

The Mandatory will secure, within twelve months from the date of the coming into force of this Mandate, the enactment, and will ensure the execution of a Law of Antiquities based on the provisions of Article 421 of Part XIII of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. This law shall replace the former Ottoman Law of Antiquities. It shall provide for the preservation in the matter of archaeological research to the nationals of all States, members of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 22

Every Arab or Jew shall be free to use the language of Palestine. Any statement or inscriptions in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew and any statements or inscriptions in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic.

ARTICLE 23

The Administration of Palestine shall recognise the holy days of the respective communities in Palestine as legal days of rest for the members of such communities.

ARTICLE 24

The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the Mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall be communicated with the report.

ARTICLE 25

If any dispute whatever should arise between the members of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of these provisions which cannot be settled by negotiation, this dispute shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 26

The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of the present Mandate, provided that in the case of any modification proposed by the Mandatory, such consent may be given by a majority of the Council.

ARTICLE 27

In the event of the termination of the Mandate conferred upon the Mandatory by the League of Nations, the Mandatory shall make such arrangements as may be deemed necessary for the liquidation of the financial obligations of the League, that the Government of Palestine will fully honour the financial obligations incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of the Mandate.

The present copy shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations and certified copies shall be sent to the Secretary General of the League of Nations to all Powers Signatories of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

Made at _____ the _____ day of _____

E 15410/476 44]

No. 301

Zionist Organisation to Foreign Office.—(Received December 10.)

Sir, 77, Great Russell Street, London, December 9, 1920.

I AM directed by the executive of the Zionist Organisation to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 3rd instant enclosing copy of a letter from the Central Bureau of the "Agudas Israel."

2. I am to state that the executive reaffirm the assurance given in their letter of the 30th September, in reply to your letter of the 23rd September, which referred, like your letter under notice, to an application addressed to His Majesty's Government by the "Agudas Israel."

The local representatives of the Zionist Organisation, who have been entrusted with the issue of recommendations for visas, in accordance with paragraph 3 of the Official Instructions on the subject, dated the 20th August, 1920, have been expressly enjoined to perform their duties with strict impartiality as unbiased and unconnected persons, and in particular to accord no preferential treatment to members of the Zionist Organisation. This is made clear in the instructions and is repeated in Zionist federations throughout the world under dates the 10th and 28th October respectively, extracts from which I am directed to transmit to you herewith.

3. I am to add that, while refraining from any comment on Dr. Lewenstein's letter of the 11th November, the executive deems that they should not be taken as admitting the accuracy of the statements it contains.

I am, Sir,

Acting Political Secretary

Enclosure 1 in No. 301.

Extract from Emigration Instruction No. 1, dated October 10, 1920.

Re ARTICLE V

It is obvious that no distinction should be made in the treatment of prospective emigrants because of their membership in any party or group, and that therefore organised Zionists are to be treated like other applicants and unorthodox emigrants like the orthodox. Our representatives must make it their duty to be strictly impartial.

Extract from Circular Letter, dated October 20, 1920

PHL executive is particularly anxious that persons should be nominated who are suited in every respect to represent the Zionist Organisation worthily with the authorities and the Jewish public, and who, in regard to character, trustworthiness and zeal, are fitted for this responsible position. It is desirable also to secure persons who can be entrusted to exercise their official functions impartially in respect to all persons.

E 15478 2 44

No 302

Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon — (Recd — October 11)

(No 3078)

My Lord,

Paris, December 10, 1920

THE Senate Commission of Finance and Foreign Affairs, sitting together, have discussed the affairs of Syria and Cilicia. The following is an account of what passed, taken from newspaper reports —

General Gouraud said that the difficulties in Cilicia had been caused firstly by the insufficient number of troops employed there at first, after the withdrawal of the British forces, and secondly by the unfortunate policy followed of opposing Armenians to the Turks. This had, he said, largely caused the Kemalist movement. The situation there was now very serious. In Syria he said was quite calm, though there was still a certain amount of intrigue among Faisal's partisans. The menace to the tranquillity of the country came mainly from the Nationalist Turks in the north, and, in a less degree, from the Bedouins. He quite recognised what a burden the administration of these countries was to France (1,200 million fr., of which 800 millions for military expenses), and how important it was to lighten it. Withdrawal from Syria he regarded as disastrous, not only locally but all along Northern Africa. The remedy he advocated was to placate the Turks by conceding them adaptations of the Treaty of Sévres. It was not France's affair if the Greeks were unable to hold Smyrna and Thrace. Under such a policy he thought it would be possible to withdraw troops from Syria and replace them by locally recruited troops.

M. Leygues said that Syria was essential to France's whole policy in the Mediterranean and was the base for all her action in the East. As to Cilicia, France was there only to protect minorities in accordance with the mandate received, and to cover the position in Syria. France would not stay in Cilicia. The Government was most anxious to reduce its commitments. To effect this, the policy he recommended was to suppress the Kemalist movement by amending (not revising) the Treaty of Sévres so as to spare the susceptibilities of the Turks and give them an honourable peace.

On the subject of Greece, M. Leygues expressed himself as highly satisfied with the result of his visit to London to meet your Lordship. The three Governments entirely agreed as to a financial blockade of Greece, and the recent Greek operation would not be recognised. He felt convinced that complete agreement would be reached over the Turkish Treaty by bringing about not its revision but its amendment.

The "Temps" of to-day's date contains the best report of these proceedings, and I have the honour to transmit a copy of it herewith.

I have, &c

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST

Extract from the "Temps" of December 10, 1920

LA FRANCE EN ORIENT

M. Georges Leygues, président du conseil, et le général Gouraud, haut-commissaire en Syrie, ont été entendus, hier, par les commissions sénatoriales des affaires étrangères et des finances réunies, sous la présidence de MM. de Selves et Millières-Lacroix, sur l'action de la France en Syrie et en Cilicie.

DECLARATIONS DU GÉNÉRAL GOURAUD

M. de Selves ayant posé au nom de ses collègues les questions suivantes : « Qu'avons-nous fait en Syrie et Cilicie ? Qu'y faisons-nous ? Qu'entendons-nous faire ? Quel est le coût prévu en hommes et en argent ? » le général Gouraud a pris la parole.

Le général Gouraud, dans un rapide historique, fait connaître les difficultés qui nous ont été suscitées en Syrie par l'émir Faïçal, lequel a couronné sa manœuvre en nous attaquant au cours de nos négociations. A la suite de cette trahison, nos troupes ont dû marcher le 23 juillet, et se sont emparées de Damas après un combat de cinq heures. L'apaisement n'a pas tardé à se faire grâce à l'excellente discipline de nos troupes, qui ont détruit par leur bonne conduite, toutes les légendes semées contre elles.

En Cilicie, nous avons occupé le pays, d'accord avec les Arméniens, comme gage de cet armistice. Les troupes anglaises s'étant retirées, nous avons dû les remplacer, avec des effectifs beaucoup plus faibles. Cette insuffisance d'effectifs, et la présence dans nos forces de bataillons arméniens, à cause de la haine violente des Arméniens et des Turcs, et aussi la présence des Grecs à Smyrne ont déchaîné la crise kemaliste. De là les événements que l'on voit. La défense française a été très belle, le commandement très remarquable.

La situation s'est également très améliorée, le général Gouraud ayant abandonné la politique qui consistait à irriter les Turcs en leur opposant les Arméniens. Au point de vue administratif et économique, la Syrie a été divisée en quatre États : 1° le Liban, devenu Grand-Liban par l'adjonction des cantons de Tyr et de Sidon d'une part et du canton de Tripoli d'autre part, 2° et 3° États d'Alep et de Damas, 4° les Nohalains.

Le général Gouraud donne des détails sur l'organisation administrative de ces divers États. Au point de vue économique, ces pays, qui sont très civilisés et comptent de grandes villes de 350 000 habitants, telles que Damas et Alep, et une infinité d'écoles, peuvent produire de grandes richesses en céréales et en cotons. Comment réduire nos dépenses, qui sont sur un chiffre de plus de 1 milliard, d'environ 500 millions en ce qui concerne les dépenses militaires ? On ne saurait proposer l'évacuation, qui constituerait une immense faillite morale et aurait de graves répercussions dans l'Afrique du nord. Il faut faire un accord avec la Turquie, acceptable pour elle. Si les Grecs ne peuvent faire l'effort militaire et financier pour se maintenir à Smyrne et en Thrace, ce n'est pas notre affaire. Il faut adapter le traité de Sévres pour le rendre acceptable aux Turcs, qui ont été longtemps nos amis, qui ont été des ennemis loyaux et braves, tandis que les Allemands détruisaient tout, jamais les Turcs n'ont tiré sur les bateaux hospitaliers.

La paix étant faite avec la Turquie dans des conditions qui ne heurtent point le sentiment national, il convient de donner au général les sommes dont il a besoin et qui lui sont nécessaires dans la situation actuelle.

M. de Selves a remercié chaleureusement le général Gouraud de son exposé et lui a exprimé les sentiments de respect et de reconnaissance des commissions pour les glorieux services que partout et toujours il a rendus à la patrie.

DECLARATIONS DE M. GEORGES LEYGUES

Après que le général Gouraud eut exposé ainsi la question militaire, le président du conseil, M. Georges Leygues, du point de vue politique, présenta les observations suivantes :

En ce qui concerne la Syrie, nous y sommes allés, non seulement parce que nous avions à soutenir une longue tradition et des œuvres nombreuses, mais pour une raison plus haute encore. La France est une nation méditerranéenne, l'axe de sa politique est dans la Méditerranée, et, si son rôle s'y amoindrisait, son prestige en recevrait un échec grave. Tous les gouvernements sans exception l'ont ainsi pensé. Mais, si l'on considère la situation de la Syrie, on voit que le rôle de la France y est très diminué. Il nous faut établir en Syrie les bases de notre action orientale. C'est pourquoi le gouvernement revendique la zone syrienne et Alexandrette, qui sera, avant trente ans peut-être, un des plus grands ports de la Méditerranée.

La Cilicie ? Nous n'entendons pas y rester. Nous y sommes allés pour les raisons suivantes : 1° mandat reçu d'y protéger les minorités ; 2° les bataillons qui y sont servent de couverture à la Syrie. Il faut que les magnifiques résultats obtenus en moins d'un an en Syrie par le général Gouraud ne soient plus mis en question. Cela dit, allons-nous rester en Cilicie ? Non. Le gouvernement a le plus vif désir de réduire les charges du pays. Pour cela il faut supprimer le mouvement kemaliste, et, dans ce but, non pas réviser, mais modifier le traité de Sévres, en faisant une paix qui ménage la susceptibilité musulmane. Le président a l'intime conviction que l'on s'accordera avant peu pour donner à la Turquie une paix honorable.

LA DISCUSSION

M. de Selvas remercie le président du conseil. Plusieurs commissaires réclament quelques précisions. M. Lucien Hubert, au sujet de l'état sanitaire du corps d'expédition. M. Paul Doumer, M. Lucien Cornet, M. Victor Bérard, qui trouve trop élevée la dépense permanente qu'il nous faudra supporter ; MM. Ribot, et Fatourcelles de Constant.

On peut inférer des réponses du président du conseil et du général Gouraud que la situation sanitaire en Syrie est redevenue bonne, que les relations entre les bolchevistes et Kemal sont, à l'heure présente, assez embrouillées, que le gouvernement entend, tout en restant en Syrie, réduire les dépenses au minimum.

LES QUESTIONS GRECQUE ET TURQUE

Estimant que la question de Syrie est liée au problème turc, lequel l'est lui-même à la situation grecque, M. Antonin Dubost demande au président du conseil de s'expliquer sur ce dernier point.

M. Leygues répondit qu'en ce qui concerne la Grèce, il n'a eu qu'à se louer de ses conversations de Londres avec l'Italie et l'Angleterre. Ces deux gouvernements sont entièrement d'accord avec nous pour faire le blocus financier de la Grèce. D'autre part, le récent emprunt grec ne sera pas reconnu. Sans préjuger les conversations en cours, M. Leygues affirme qu'il a, non pas encore la certitude, mais la ferme conviction qu'un accord interviendra complètement au sujet de la Turquie et qu'on aboutira, selon toute probabilité, non pas à la révision, mais à la modification du traité de Sévres.

Le président du conseil sera entendu samedi par la commission des finances spécialement sur les crédits (1 milliard 200 millions) demandés pour l'occupation militaire et les services civils de la Syrie et de la Cilicie.

E 15381 4164 44]

No 307

Draft Franco-British Convention on the subject of Mandates for Syria and Palestine. The text of the draft convention is as follows :

THE British and French Governments, wishing to settle completely the question raised by the attribution to Great Britain of the mandates for Palestine and

Mesopotamia and by the attribution to France of the mandate over Syria and the Lebanon, have agreed on the following provisions :

ARTICLE 1

The boundaries between the territories under the French mandate of Syria and the Lebanon on the one hand and the British mandates of Mesopotamia and Palestine on the other are determined as follows :—

On the east, the Tigris from Jeziret ibn-Omar to the boundaries of the former vilayets of Diarbekir and Mosul.

On the south-east and south, the aforesaid boundary of the former vilayets southwards as far as Roumelian Kocui, thence a line leaving in the territory under the French mandate a straight line towards the Euphrates, which it crosses at Abu Kurnal, thence a straight line to Istar to the south of Jebel Druse, then a line to the south of Naab on the Hedjaz Railway, then a line to Semakh on the Lake of Tiberias, traced to the south of the railway, which descends towards the lake and parallel to the railway. Deraa and its environs will remain in the territory under the French mandate, the frontier will in

detail in such a manner as to allow for the territory under the French mandate a straight line towards the Euphrates, which it crosses at Abu Kurnal, thence a straight line to Istar to the south of Jebel Druse, then a line to the south of Naab on the Hedjaz Railway, then a line to Semakh on the Lake of Tiberias, traced to the south of the railway, which descends towards the lake and parallel to the railway. Deraa and its environs will remain in the territory under the French mandate, the frontier will in

On the west, the frontier will pass from Semakh across the Lake of Tiberias to the mouth of the Wadi Massadye. It will then follow the course of this river upstream, and then the Wadi Jeraba to its source. From that point it will reach the track from El Kuneitra to Banias at the point marked Skek, thence it will follow the said track, which will remain in the territory under the French mandate as far as Banias. Thence the frontier will be drawn westwards as far as Metullah, which will remain in Palestinian territory. This portion of the frontier will be traced in detail in such a manner as to ensure for the territory under the French mandate a straight line towards the Euphrates, which it crosses at Abu Kurnal, thence a straight line to Istar to the south of Jebel Druse, then a line to the south of Naab on the Hedjaz Railway, then a line to Semakh on the Lake of Tiberias, traced to the south of the railway, which descends towards the lake and parallel to the railway. Deraa and its environs will remain in the territory under the French mandate, the frontier will in

the frontier will reach the watershed of the valley of the Jordan and the basin of the Litani. Thence it will follow this watershed southwards. Thereafter it will follow in principle the watershed between the Wadis Farah-Houroun and Kerkera, which will remain in the territory under the British mandate, and the Wadis El Douleh, El Aroun and Ez Zerka, which will remain in the territory under the French mandate. The frontier will reach the Mediterranean Sea at the port of Ras-el-Nakura, which will remain in the territory under the French mandate.

ARTICLE 2

A commission shall be established within three months from the signature of the present convention to trace on the spot the boundary line laid down in article 1. The commission shall be composed of four members. Two of these members shall be nominated by the British and French Governments respectively, the two others shall be nominated, with the consent of the mandatory Power, by the local Governments concerned in the French and British mandatory territories respectively.

In case any dispute should arise in connection with the work of the commission, it shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations, whose decision shall be final.

The final reports by the commission shall give the definite description of the boundary as it has been actually demarcated on the ground, the necessary maps shall be annexed thereto and signed by the commission. The reports, with their annexes, shall be made in triplicate, one copy shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations, one copy shall be kept by the mandatory, and one by the other Government concerned.

ARTICLE 3

The British and French Governments shall come to an agreement regarding the nomination of a commission, whose duty it will be to make a preliminary examination

of any plan of irrigation formed by the Government of the French mandatory territory the execution of which would be of a nature to diminish considerably the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates at the point where they enter the area of the British mandate in Mesopotamia

ARTICLE 4

In virtue of the geographic and strategic position of the island of Cyprus, off the Gulf of Alexandretta, the British Government agrees not to open any negotiations for the cession or alienation of the said island of Cyprus without the previous consent of the French Government

ARTICLE 5

1 The French Government agrees to facilitate by a liberal arrangement the joint use of the section of the existing railway between the Lake ~~Libanus~~ and Nasib. This arrangement shall be concluded between the railway administrations of the areas under the French and British mandates respectively as soon as possible after the coming into force of the mandates for Palestine and Syria. In particular the agreement shall allow the administration in the British zone to run their own trains with their own traction and train crews over the above section of the railway in both directions for all purposes other than the local traffic of the territory under the French mandate. The agreement shall determine at the same time the financial, administrative and technical conditions governing the running of the British trains. In the event of the two administrations being unable to reach an agreement within three months from the coming into force of the two above-mentioned mandates, an arbitrator shall be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations to settle the dispute. The agreement shall be given as far as possible to those parts of the agreement on which an understanding has already been reached.

The said agreement shall be concluded for an indefinite period and shall be subject to periodical revision as need arises.

2. The British Government may carry a pipe line along the existing railway track and shall have in perpetuity and at any moment the right to transport troops by the railway.

3 The French Government consents to the nomination of a special commission, which, after having examined the ground, may readjust the above-mentioned frontier line in the valley of the Yarmuk as far as Deran in such a manner as to render possible the construction of the British railway and pipe line connecting Palestine with the ~~Highway~~. The ~~commission~~ shall be ~~composed of~~ ~~a representative of the French Government and a representative of the British Government, to whom may be added representatives of the local Governments and experts as technical advisers to the extent considered necessary by the British and French Governments~~. It is agreed, however, that the existing railway in the Yarmuk valley is to remain entirely in the territory under the French mandate. The right provided by the present paragraph for the benefit of the ~~British Government~~ ~~shall be given to the British Government~~ ~~for a period of ten years~~.

The above-mentioned commission shall be composed of a representative of the French Government and a representative of the British Government, to whom may be added representatives of the local Governments and experts as technical advisers to the extent considered necessary by the British and French Governments.

4 In the event of the tracks of the two railways crossing or running alongside one another at certain places, the French Government will recognise the full and complete extra-territoriality of the sections thus lying in the territory under the French mandate, and will give the British Government or its technical agents full and easy access for all railway purposes.

~~In the event of the tracks of the two railways crossing or running alongside one another at certain places, the French Government will recognise the full and complete extra-territoriality of the sections thus lying in the territory under the French mandate, and will give the British Government or its technical agents full and easy access for all railway purposes.~~

paragraph 3 to construct a railway in the valley of the Yarmuk, the obligations assumed by the French Government in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of the present article will determine three months after the completion of the construction of the said railway.

6 The French Government agrees to arrange that the rights provided for above for the benefit of the British Government shall be recognised by the local Governments in the territory under the French mandate.

ARTICLE 6

It is expressly stipulated that the facilities accorded to the British Government by the preceding articles imply the maintenance for the benefit of France of the provisions of the Franco-British Agreement of San Remo regarding oil.

ARTICLE 7

The French and British Governments will put no obstacle in their respective mandatory areas in the way of the recruitment of railway staff for any section of the Hedjaz Railway.

Every facility will be given for the passage of employees of the Hedjaz Railway over the British and French mandatory areas in order that the working of the said railway may be in no way prejudiced.

The French and British Governments agree, where necessary in agreement with the local Governments, to conclude an arrangement whereby the stores and railway material passing from one mandatory area to another and intended for the use of the Hedjaz Railway will not for this reason be submitted to any additional customs dues and will be exempted so far as possible from customs formalities.

ARTICLE 8

Experts nominated respectively by the Administrations of Syria and Palestine shall examine the waters of the Upper Jordan and the Yarmuk and of their tributaries, after satisfaction of the needs of the territories under the French mandate.

In connection with this examination the French Government will give its representatives the most liberal instructions for the employment of the surplus of these waters for the benefit of Palestine.

In the event of no agreement being reached as a result of this examination, these questions shall be referred to the French and British Governments for decision.

In the extent to which the contemplated works are to benefit Palestine, the Administration of Palestine shall defray the expenses of the construction of all canals, weirs, dams, tunnels, pipe lines and reservoirs or other works of a similar nature, or measures taken with the object of reforestation and the management of forests.

ARTICLE 9

Subject to the provisions of articles 15 and 16 of the mandate for Palestine, of articles 8 and 9 of the mandate for Mesopotamia, and of article 8 of the mandate for Syria and the Lebanon, and subject also to the general right of control in relation to education and public instruction of the local Administrations concerned, the British and French Governments agree to allow the schools which French and British nationals possess in the ~~territories~~ ~~under the French mandate~~ ~~to continue their work freely, the teaching of French and English will be freely permitted in these schools.~~

The present article does not in any way imply the right of nationals of either of the two parties to open new schools in their respective mandatory areas.

E 15381 4164 441

No. 304

Earl Curzon to Mr. Vansittart (Paris)

(No 177)

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 11 1920

WITH reference to telegram No. 1379 of the 8th December from His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, and your letter of the same date to Mr. Forbes Adam, I have to inform you that I have had under my consideration the draft of the article marked "B" enclosed in your above-mentioned letter regarding the use of the waters of the Yarmuk and the Upper Jordan and their tributaries, the terms of which you have negotiated with the French Government in execution of the agreement reached at the Anglo-French Conference at No. 10, Downing Street on the 4th December.

2. I approve the terms of this article, subject, however, to the first paragraph being redrafted as follows—

Des techniciens nommés respectivement par les Administrations du la Syrie et de la Palestine examineront en commun dans un délai de six mois après la signature de la présente convention l'emploi pour l'irrigation des terres et la production de la force hydro-électrique, des eaux du Jourdain supérieur et du Yarmuk et de leurs affluents après satisfaction des besoins des territoires sous mandat français."

[5773]

3. The intention of this redraft is merely to make it quite clear that the meeting of the experts is not to take place only after the French have decided whether and how the needs of the territory under the French mandate for water are to be satisfied, but is expressly to consider how these needs can be satisfied and how the surplus can be made available for Palestine. There is no change in substance, but the words "après la signature de la présente convention" have been added to make the article more explicit, and the word *or* after "Yarmuk" has been changed to *et*. It is the streams and (not *or*) their tributaries which are clearly intended to be covered by the article.

4. It is understood that this article is to take the place of article 7 of the draft of the Anglo-French convention enclosed in your despatch No. 96 of the 21st October and that it will now be renumbered article 8. It is also understood that the following article 14, providing for a boundary commission on the lines of those originally inserted in the mandates is now to be inserted in the convention as article 2 —

La commission sera constituée dans les trois mois qui suivront la signature de la présente convention pour fixer sur le terrain la ligne frontière décrite à l'article ci-dessus entre les territoires sous mandat français et sous mandat britannique. Cette commission sera composée de quatre membres. Deux de ses membres seront nommés respectivement par la France et par la Grande-Bretagne; les deux autres seront nommés respectivement avec l'agrément de la Puissance mandataire par les Gouvernements locaux intéressés des mandats français et britannique.

Les conflits qui pourraient résulter des opérations de cette commission seront portés devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations, dont la décision sera sans appel. Les rapports de clôture de la commission donneront la description exacte de la frontière telle qu'elle aura été déterminée sur le terrain. Les cartes nécessaires seront annexées et signées par les commissaires. Les rapports avec leurs annexes seront faits en trois exemplaires, le premier sera déposé aux archives de la Société des Nations, le deuxième sera conservé par la Puissance mandataire et le troisième par l'autre Gouvernement intéressé.

5. This article has been taken, with the substitution of the word "convention" for "mandat" and of the words "trois mois" for "quinze jours" (the latter does not allow sufficient time), from the French draft of the convention dated the 4th November, 1920, which M. Kammerer gave you in London and you communicated to Mr. Forbes Adam.

6. It is also understood that the French Foreign Office have already agreed with you to the substitution of the word "Naab" for the word "Deraa" in the fourth line of paragraph 1 of article 8 (as now numbered) of the convention and to the alteration of the words "des accords franco-britanniques" to the words "de l'accord franco-britannique de San Remo" in article 8 (as now numbered).

7. The beginning of article 9 (as now numbered) should run as follows —

" Sous réserve des dispositions prévues aux articles 15 et 16 du mandat pour la Palestine, des articles 8 et 10 du mandat pour la Mésopotamie ainsi que l'article 8 du mandat pour la Syrie et le Liban —

8. The words "Les Gouvernements de l'Empire britannique et de la France" in the draft in your despatch No. 96 of the 21st October should be changed to "Les Gouvernements français et britannique".

9. It has been necessary to prepare an English text of the convention with these changes. The convention as signed should contain both the English and French texts. A copy of the French text containing the various changes now proposed as well as certain verbal and textual alterations which are necessary is enclosed herein as well as a copy of the English text.

10. A final provision in English and French should be added to the convention. If the convention is to be signed just to the provision, it would be best to arrange that the document to be signed contains both texts without stipulating which of the two is to be regarded as authoritative. You should also suggest to the French Foreign Office that since articles 94 and 95 of the Turkish Treaty provide that the frontiers of Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia are to be determined by the Principal Allied Powers, and as the present convention defines some of these boundaries, there should also be a provision enabling the Japanese and

Italian Governments to adhere to the convention, if they desire. Otherwise the legality of part, at any rate, of the instrument may eventually be challenged.

11. Provided the French Foreign Office agree to these suggestions and to the instruction to Lord Hardinge to arrange with the French Foreign Office for its signature at as early a date as possible.

12. The convention is in the form of an agreement between Governments, and does not in my view require ratification but will come into force on its signature. The word "signature" has therefore been used instead of "mise en vigueur" in the new wording proposed above for articles 2 and 8.

I am &
CURZON OF KIDLESTON

(E 15381 4154 44)

No 805

Projet de Convention franco-britannique au Sujet des Mandats de Syrie et Liban.
Paris, le 11 novembre 1920.

LES Gouvernements britannique et français, désireux de régler complètement les problèmes soulevés par l'attribution à la Grande-Bretagne des mandats de Palestine et de Mésopotamie et par l'attribution à la France du mandat sur la Syrie et le Liban, conférés tous trois par le Conseil suprême à San Remo, le 28 juin 1920, ont convenu des dispositions ci-dessous :

ARTICLE 1^{er}

Les limites entre les territoires sous mandats français et britannique de Syrie et Liban d'une part, et de Mésopotamie et de Palestine de l'autre, sont fixées comme suit :

A l'est, le Tigre depuis Djézireh ibn Omar jusqu'à la limite des anciens vilayets de Diarbékir et de Mossoul.

Au sud-est et au sud, ladite limite des anciens vilayets vers le sud jusqu'à Rumelan Koum, de là une ligne laissant au mandat français l'intégralité du bassin du Kabour occidental et se dirigeant en ligne droite vers l'Euphrate, qu'elle franchit à Abou-Kemal, puis une ligne droite aboutissant à Imtar au sud du Djebel Druse, puis une ligne aboutissant au sud de Nasib sur le Chemin de fer du Hedjaz, puis une ligne aboutissant à Semakh sur le lac de Tibériade, tracée au sud de la voie ferrée descendant au lac, et parallèle au chemin de fer. La localité de Deraa restera en territoire sous mandat français, la frontière laissera en principe la vallée du Yarmouk dans le territoire sous mandat français, mais sera fixée aussi près que possible de la voie ferrée, de manière à permettre la construction par la vallée du Yarmouk d'un chemin de fer entièrement situé sur le territoire sous mandat britannique. A Semakh, la frontière sera fixée de manière à permettre aux deux hautes parties contractantes la construction et l'établissement d'un port et d'une station de chemin de fer donnant libre accès au lac de Tibériade.

A l'ouest, la frontière passera de Semakh à travers le lac de Tibériade jusqu'à l'embouchure du Wadi Massadivé. Elle remontera ensuite cette rivière jusqu'à Wadi Jeraba jusqu'à sa source. De là, elle atteindra la piste allant de Baniyas à Baniyas, au point marqué Skok, ensuite elle suivra ladite piste qui restera en territoire sous mandat français. De là elle se dirigera vers l'ouest jusqu'à Muttallah, qui restera en territoire palestinien. Le détail de cette partie de la frontière sera fixé de manière à assurer aux territoires sous mandats français une communication facile entièrement sur ce territoire avec la région de Tyr et de Sidon, ainsi que la continuité de la route à l'ouest et à l'est de Baniyas.

De Muttallah la frontière gagnera la ligne de partage des eaux de la vallée du Jourdain et du bassin du Litani. Elle suivra ensuite vers le sud cette ligne de partage des eaux. Puis elle suivra en principe la ligne de partage des eaux entre le territoire sous mandat français (qui restera en territoire sous mandat français) et les wadis El Douleh, El Ajoun et Es Zerka (qui resteront en territoire sous mandat français). La frontière aboutira à la mer Méditerranée à l'échelle de Ras-el Nakura, qui restera en territoire sous mandat français.

ARTICLE 2

Une commission sera constituée dans les trois mois qui suivront la signature de la présente convention pour fixer sur le terrain la ligne frontière décrite à l'article 1^{er} entre les territoires sous mandats français et sous mandat britannique. Cette commission sera composée de quatre membres. Deux de ses membres seront nommés respectivement par la France et par la Grande-Bretagne. Les deux autres seront nommés respectivement avec l'agrément de la Puissance mandataire par les Gouvernements locaux intéressés des mandats français et britannique.

Les conflits qui pourraient résulter des opérations de cette commission seront portés devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations, dont la décision sera sans appel. Les rapports de clôture de la commission donneront la description exacte de la frontière telle qu'elle aura été déterminée sur le terrain. Les cartes nécessaires seront annexées et signées par les commissaires. Les rapports avec leurs annexes seront faits en trois exemplaires, le premier sera déposé aux archives de la Société des Nations, le deuxième sera conservé par la Puissance mandataire et le troisième par l'autre Gouvernement intéressé.

ARTICLE 3

La France et la Grande-Bretagne s'entendront pour la nomination d'une commission chargée d'examiner préalablement tout projet d'irrigation formé par le Gouvernement du mandat français, dont la réalisation semblerait de nature à diminuer notablement les eaux du Tigre et de l'Euphrate à leur arrivée dans la zone du mandat britannique en Mésopotamie.

ARTICLE 4

En raison de la situation géographique et stratégique de l'île de Chypre au large du golfe d'Alexandrette, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique s'engage à n'entreprendre aucune négociation pour la cession ou l'aliénation de ladite île de Chypre sans le consentement préalable du Gouvernement français.

ARTICLE 5

1. Le Gouvernement français s'engage à faciliter par un arrangement libre l'exploitation en commun du tronçon du chemin de fer existant entre le lac de Tibériade et Nakh. Cet arrangement devra être conclu entre les administrations des chemins de fer des zones sous mandats français et britannique aussitôt que possible après l'entrée en vigueur des mandats pour la Palestine et la Syrie. L'accord devra permettre notamment à l'administration de la zone anglaise de faire circuler dans les deux sens des trains britanniques avec leur propre traction et leur personnel sur les sections françaises. Les arrangements de circulation des trains britanniques. Au cas où les deux administrations n'arriveraient pas à se mettre d'accord dans un délai de trois mois après la mise en vigueur des deux mandats, l'arbitrage sera demandé au Conseil de la Société des Nations pour régler les points restés en désaccord et l'on mettrait en application immédiate dans la mesure du possible, les parties de cet accord sur lesquelles l'entente serait faite.

Ledit accord conclu pour une durée indéterminée serait sujet à des révisions périodiques selon les besoins.

2. Le Gouvernement britannique pourra faire passer une canalisation le long de la voie existante et aura le droit de faire passer ses troupes par le chemin de fer.

3. Le Gouvernement français agréé la nomination d'une commission spéciale qui, après avoir étudié le terrain, pourra réajuster la ligne frontière ci-dessus mentionnée dans la vallée du Yarmouk jusqu'à Deraa de manière à rendre possible la construction d'un chemin de fer et d'une canalisation britannique reliant la Palestine avec le Chemin de fer de Bagdad.

La commission prévue ci-dessus sera composée d'un représentant du Gouvernement français et d'un représentant du Gouvernement britannique, auxquels pourront

être adjoints des représentants des Gouvernements locaux et des experts à titre de consultants. Ils jugeront nécessaire.

4. Au cas où les tracés de ces deux chemins de fer viendraient à se croiser ou se superposer à certains endroits, le Gouvernement français reconnaîtrait la pleine et entière exterritorialité des tronçons se trouvant ainsi sur les territoires du mandat britannique et faciliterait l'accès pour toutes questions du chemin de fer.

5. Au cas où le Gouvernement britannique serait usage de la facilité prévue à l'alinéa 3 de construire un chemin de fer dans la vallée du Yarmouk, les obligations contractées par le Gouvernement français aux termes des alinéas 1 et 2 du présent article prendraient fin trois mois après l'achèvement de la construction de ce chemin de fer.

6. Le Gouvernement français s'engage à faire reconnaître les droits stipulés ci-dessus au profit du Gouvernement britannique par les Gouvernements locaux sous mandat français.

ARTICLE 6

Il est expressément stipulé que les facilités accordées à la Grande-Bretagne par les articles précédents impliquent le maintien au profit de la France des stipulations de l'accord franco-britannique de San-Remo sur les pétriles.

ARTICLE 7

Les Gouvernements français et britannique ne feront aucun obstacle dans la construction d'une section quelconque du Chemin de fer du Hedjaz.

Toute facilité sera accordée pour le passage des employés du Chemin de fer du Hedjaz sur les zones de mandat français et anglais de manière à ne gêner aucunement le fonctionnement du chemin de fer.

Les Gouvernements français et britannique s'engagent si c'est nécessaire, d'accord éventuellement avec les Gouvernements locaux, à conclure un arrangement par lequel les approvisionnements et le matériel de chemin de fer passant d'une zone sous mandat à une autre destinés à être employés sur le Chemin de fer du Hedjaz ne seront pas soumis de ce fait à de douane additionnelle et seront exceptés autant que possible des formalités douanières.

ARTICLE 8

Des techniciens nommés respectivement par les Administrations de la Syrie et de la Palestine examineront en commun, dans un délai de six mois après la signature de la présente convention, l'emploi pour l'irrigation des terres et la production de la force hydroélectrique des eaux du Jourdain supérieur et du Yarmouk et de leurs affluents après satisfaction des besoins des territoires sous mandat français. En vue de cet examen, le Gouvernement français donnera à ses représentants les instructions les plus libérales pour l'emploi du surplus des eaux au profit de la Palestine.

Au cas où cet examen n'aboutirait pas à un accord, la décision de ces questions sera déférée aux Gouvernements français et britannique.

Dans la mesure où les travaux prévus doivent profiter à la Palestine, celle-ci supportera les frais de la construction de tous canaux, écluses, barrages, tunnels, canalisation et réservoirs ou autres travaux du même ordre ou visant le reboisement et l'aménagement des forêts.

ARTICLE 9

Sous réserve des dispositions prévues aux articles 15 et 16 du mandat pour la Palestine, des articles 8 et 10 du mandat pour la Mésopotamie, ainsi que de l'article 8 du mandat pour la Syrie et le Liban, et sous réserve aussi du droit général de contrôle des administrations locales en matière d'éducation et d'instruction publique, les Gouvernements français et britannique s'engagent à laisser librement fonctionner les écoles que les ressortissants français et britanniques possèdent et dirigent actuellement dans les territoires soumis au mandat de l'une et l'autre partie, l'enseignement des langues française et anglaise sera libre dans ces écoles.

Le présent article n'implique en aucune manière pour les ressortissants de chacune des deux parties le droit d'ouvrir des écoles nouvelles dans les territoires soumis au mandat de l'autre.

E 15695 15695/44]

No. 306

H. Samuel to Earl Curzon. — (Received December 16.)

(No. 149.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, November 27, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch N° 227 of the 27th inst. in the article in the Palestine mandate entitling the mandatory to protect Palestine citizens abroad. I note that in the last printed form of the mandate a change has been made in article 13, and the present form of words appears to be adequate to ensure to Palestine citizens abroad protection in regard to travel.

I note also that you are of opinion that His Majesty's Government would be entitled under the terms of the present article of the mandate to claim that Palestinians, for whom Native Courts in a country such as Egypt would be unlikely to provide an

to know if it would be possible for His Majesty's Government to make an arrangement with the Egyptian Government by which Palestine citizens of Western origin or civilisation should regularly be subject to the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts, so that special steps would not have to be taken in each case as it arose.

I have &c

HERBERT SAMUEL,

High Commissioner

E 15699 116 3 44]

No. 307

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon. — (Received December 16.)

(No. 157.)

My Lord,

W. H.

Jerusalem, November 29, 1920.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch N° 227 of the 27th inst. in the article in the Palestine mandate entitling the mandatory to protect Palestine citizens abroad. I note that in the last printed form of the mandate a change has been made in article 13, and the present form of words appears to be adequate to ensure to Palestine citizens abroad protection in regard to travel.

I have &c

HERBERT SAMUEL,

High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 307

The Judicial System and Jurisdiction over Foreigners in Palestine

THE military administration of Palestine preserved the Ottoman system of courts. In each town of any importance there is a court of a civil magistrate ("juge de paix") which is constituted by a single Palestine judge. He has jurisdiction in civil actions where the value of the subject matter does not exceed £ E. 100—the Turkish limit of £ T. 50 has been raised to this amount. He also has jurisdiction in contraventions and in misdemeanours, for which he may impose a fine or a term of imprisonment. The powers of the district Governors

2 All civil and criminal cases which are outside the jurisdiction of the civil magistrates' court are tried in first instance by the district court, which is composed of a British president and two Palestine judges. Misdemeanours and civil cases can be heard by a bench of two judges, but crimes, i.e., offences punishable with penal servitude, must be heard by a bench of three judges, and capital cases by a bench of four. Any British magistrate or a civil magistrate can be called in as a member of a district court. There are four district courts in Palestine which have their centres at Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa and Nablus, and go on circuit in the area. The district court, besides its jurisdiction in first instance, hears appeals from the magistrate's courts both in civil and criminal cases.

3 The highest court is the Court of Appeal which sits at Jerusalem in two chambers, and is composed of a British Chief Justice as president,

a British vice-president and five Palestine members. It hears appeals in criminal and civil cases decided by the district courts and also in actions concerning the possession of land decided by the magistrate's courts. It will further hear appeals in cases decided by the Land Settlement Court. Commercial cases are dealt with by the district courts and the Court of Appeal, but there is power to appoint assessors.

4 The courts have retained the Ottoman law as it has been introduced by rules of court and ordinances passed by the Administration. The changes have principally affected the procedure in the courts, and the Ottoman civil, commercial and penal codes have been left in force with slight amendment.

5 The courts were re-established as courts of general jurisdiction, and the Ottoman Government at the beginning of the war, have not in any way been restored. All persons, other than those subject to military law, are subject to the jurisdiction of the civil courts. But special rules of court have been issued by the Administration under which foreign subjects are entitled to ask for the presence of a British judge in all but very minor cases in which they are concerned.

6 Copies are appended of the original proclamation issued by the military administration which defined the jurisdiction of the courts, and also of the rules of court made under this proclamation as regards the constitution of the court in proceedings to which a foreign subject is a party. The rules provide that foreign subjects may ask for a British magistrate to try them for offences other than contraventions within the jurisdiction of the magistrate's court, and for a majority of British judicial officers to sit on the assize court (now the district court) when they are tried for a more serious offence. In civil cases they are subject to the jurisdiction of the civil magistrate, but may claim that the appeal should be heard before a court in which there is at least one British judge.

7 The religious courts of the Moslem and non Moslem communities have been maintained and exercise the jurisdiction which they had in the Ottoman régime in all cases of personal status. A committee is now considering certain questions concerned with the jurisdiction of the religious courts, but it is proposed to leave the main lines of that jurisdiction intact.

8 Questions of personal status of foreign subjects have been decided, in accordance with the terms of the proclamation above mentioned, by the civil courts, which apply the personal law of the parties concerned. It is provided, however, that non-Ottoman subjects may consent to their actions being tried by the courts of the religious communities having jurisdiction in such matters.

9 It is recommended that in the future the system of courts and their jurisdiction shall continue as at present, but that there will be a single system of courts for Palestine subjects and foreigners, with special safeguards for the trial of foreign subjects. There are at present a large number of foreign subjects in Palestine though the majority of them, being Jews habitually resident in the country, will become automatically citizens of Palestine when the Turkish Treaty is ratified. There will remain, however, a considerable number of foreign residents, and many of the religious houses enjoy foreign protection. It is suggested that the present safeguards for the trial of foreigners in criminal cases are adequate. They may claim to be tried for any offence more serious than a contravention either by a single British magistrate or by a court containing a majority of British judges. In regard to civil suits the safeguards are less complete, as foreigners' cases, like those of Palestine subjects, are dealt with both in the first instance and on appeal by a court which normally contains one British and Palestine members. The simplest change would be to provide that a civil case in which a foreign subject is a party should be tried by a British judge sitting alone if the foreign party so desired, and should be judged on appeal by a court containing a majority of British judges. As a number of Palestine citizens will be of western or

at matters of personal status, with the modification that in dealing with such matters the court shall contain a majority of British judges. It is suggested that the special arrangements for the trial of foreign subjects in criminal cases should be maintained as at present.

proper interpretation and application of the foreign law. If an appeal is taken from the judgment of the district court in a matter of personal status to the Court of Appeal, the consul or his representative could sit in that court as an assessor.

11. As regards the system of law in Palestine, there is no doubt that the Ottoman codes are in many respects unsatisfactory and unsuited to modern conditions. It would probably be desirable to replace most of them with more modern codes. For criminal law a substitute is ready to hand. It is recommended that the new penal code which has been drafted for the mixed courts in Egypt should be adopted in Palestine. It is a complete and scientific statement of the criminal law, which has been carefully considered by Egyptian lawyers, as well as by English and foreign experts, and the circumstances of the population in Egypt and Palestine are similar in many respects. In place of the Ottoman code of criminal procedure, which allows closely the unreformed French procedure, and is far too complicated and elaborate for the conditions of the country, it is recommended that regulations based on the Indian and Rouman codes should be introduced. In Mesopotamia this step has already been taken and with certain modifications the Mesopotamian rules can be applied to Palestine.

12. The Ottoman code of civil procedure is likewise based on the French model. It is the only procedure known to most of the judges and advocates of Palestine, and it will, therefore be embarrassing to sweep it away altogether. A number of amendments and additions to it based on the English procedure will be required. But with these modifications it may be left in force.

13. The Ottoman civil code, the Mejelle, is admittedly not a satisfactory body of law for modern conditions. But it is regarded by the Moslem population as a religious law, and there will be grave opposition to its replacement. In Cyprus it has been maintained in force since the British occupation for all "Ottoman actions," i.e., actions in which the defendant is an Ottoman subject, while English common law as modified by statute is applied in "foreign actions," i.e., actions in which the defendant is not an Ottoman subject. The system of having in operation in the country two bodies of law of which the application depends on the nationality of the defendant is not satisfactory, and it is not recommended that the Cyprus practice should be followed. Apart from the objections which would be raised by the Moslem community to the abolition of the Mejelle there is no suitable code of civil law to take its place. It is therefore recommended that the Mejelle should be maintained for the time as the civil law, and that necessary amendments should be made where it is defective.

14. On the other hand the greater part of the commercial code could be replaced at once by ordinances embodying English legislation. An ordinance regulating limited companies has already been sent for the approval of the home authorities and similarly the English law of bills and of partnership which are codified and a law of bankruptcy based on the English statute could be adopted.

15. I agree with the judicial secretary of Mesopotamia that it will be desirable also in the law of succession to immovable property for foreign subjects. The Ottoman law of inheritance and the restrictions on the power of disposing of immovable property by will are not in accord with modern ideas. In Cyprus the matter has been dealt with by the Succession Law of 1895 which applies to non Moslem inhabitants and it is suggested that a measure based on that law shall be introduced in Palestine.

16. I agree also with the suggestions of the judicial secretary in paragraph 15 of his memorandum in regard to the right of domiciliary search affecting foreign subjects. In Palestine it would almost always be possible to obtain a warrant of search from a British magistrate because the Governor and the deputy district Governor can exercise magisterial powers, including the issue of a warrant of arrest or search.

17. In the Palestine courts English, Arabic and Hebrew are already recognised as judicial languages. A party can plead in any of the three languages before the more important courts, and is entitled to have any process of the court addressed to him in his own language.

18. The provisional regulations for the legal profession which have been issued in Palestine provide that foreign advocates can be admitted to plead only if they satisfy an examination in the law of the country and produce certificates of character. There are at present two English barristers practicing in the courts and several foreign advocates, nearly all of them Jews.

19. A memorandum has already been submitted on the desirability of introducing

an appeal to the Privy Council from the Palestine courts. It is likely that large commercial interests will be engaged in Palestine, and it is desirable that the parties in big civil and commercial suits shall be able to carry their case to the Supreme Court of the British Empire.

Proclamation

Whereas, owing to the defection of the judges and officials, civil courts of justice have been in abeyance in enemy territory occupied by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force

Whereas, it is desirable for the better administration of justice to define the jurisdiction of the civil and religious courts and to modify in certain respects the constitution and procedure of the civil courts, and

Whereas, certain courts have been sitting during the occupation and it is necessary to ratify their proceedings, and to make provision for appeals therefrom, and

Whereas, certain enactments to the Ottoman Government imposing disabilities upon British and Allied subjects are inequitable and contrary to the principles of international law, and it is proper to repeal the said enactments and to remove the said disabilities, and

Whereas, for the relief of debtors and the protection of small landowners it is desirable to introduce measures in mitigation of the law of execution,

Now, therefore, I, Major General Sir Arthur Wigram Money, in exercise of powers conferred upon me as chief administrator of occupied enemy territory by warrant dated the 24th April 1918, under the hand of the General Officer Commanding in chief the Egyptian Expeditionary Force

Hereby order as follows:—

Preliminary

1. This proclamation applies to all Ottoman territory now occupied, or which may hereafter be occupied by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

Establishment of Courts

2. Subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, the civil courts shall be re-established as courts of general jurisdiction, and will apply the Ottoman law in force at the date of the occupation, with such modifications as may be proper, having regard to international law and to the better administration of occupied territory.

3. Magistrates' courts shall be established in each kaza as may be required. As regards matter, these courts shall have the jurisdiction assigned to them by the Ottoman Magistrates' Law of 1912 as amended.

4. Courts of first instance shall be established at Jerusalem and Jaffa and at such other place as may from time to time be prescribed.

The area of jurisdiction of the court of first instance at Jerusalem shall be the kazas of Jerusalem, Hebron and Beerseba.

The area of jurisdiction of the court of first instance at Jaffa shall be kazas of Jaffa and Gaza.

These courts shall hear cases on appeal from the magistrates' courts.

Save as hereinafter provided, the jurisdiction of the courts of first instance and their jurisdiction as regards matter shall be laid down by Ottoman law provided always that they shall not hear civil cases within the jurisdiction of magistrates' courts.

5. Special courts may be established in any kaza where there is no court of first instance. The constitution and procedure of these courts shall be as laid down by rules of court.

6. A Court of Appeal shall be established at Jerusalem. The court shall be validly constituted by the presence of three judges, and shall decide by a majority of opinions, save when trying crime punishable by death in which case it shall consist of five judges.

Save as aforesaid and subject to the provisions herein contained, the constitution of the Court of Appeal and its jurisdiction as regards matter shall be as laid down by Ottoman law.

7. The right of recourse to the Court of Cassation is abolished.

Religious Courts and Personal Status

8 Moslem religious courts will be established in each kaza and in such other places as may be deemed necessary. Subject to the provisions herein contained, the jurisdiction of these courts shall be as it was before the occupation.

9. The right of recourse from Moslem religious courts to the Sheikh-el-Islam in Constantinople shall be abolished and there shall be substituted therefore an appeal to a court to be established.

10. The jurisdiction of the courts of the Christian and Jewish communities in matters of personal status of Ottoman subjects shall be as it was before the occupation.

11. If in any case within the jurisdiction of a religious court the parties are members of different religious communities, and one of them objects to the jurisdiction of the religious court, the case shall be transferred to the civil court, which shall decide in applying such law as may appear to the court to be just in the circumstances.

12. Matters of personal status affecting persons who are not Ottoman subjects may be decided by the civil courts, which shall apply the personal law of the parties concerned, provided always that—

- (1) The civil courts shall have no jurisdiction to pronounce a divorce, and
- (2) Nothing in this clause contained shall be construed to prevent those persons from consenting to their action being tried by the courts of the religious communities having jurisdiction in like matters affecting Ottoman subjects.

13. Where an action properly brought before the civil courts a question of personal status arises, the civil courts may, notwithstanding the provisions of clauses 8 and 10 hereof, determine the question, and may, to that end, have recourse, whether by way of stating a case for opinion or by oral examination, to a competent jurist having knowledge of the personal law applicable.

Limitation of Jurisdiction over Persons

14. The courts re-established by this proclamation shall have no jurisdiction to try actions—

- (a) Brought against the occupied enemy territory administration or any person employed thereunder in his official capacity, or
- (b) Brought by or against a person subject to military law within the meaning of section 175 of the Army Act, except, in either case, with the consent in writing of the chief administrator.

Foreign Subjects

15. Rules of court made under this proclamation shall define the expression "foreign subjects," and shall set out the manner in which the court shall be constituted in proceedings to which a foreign subject is a party.

(18 28. These articles are not concerned with jurisdiction.)

A. W. MONEY (Chief Administrator)

June 24 1917

Rules of Court

(Issued under the sanction of the chief administrator.)

1. The expression "foreign subjects" means subjects of any European or American State and includes corporations constituted under the laws of States and religious or charitable bodies or institutions wholly or mainly composed of individuals the subjects of such States, but does not include protected subjects.

2. Foreign subjects accused of an offence (other than a contravention) which is within the jurisdiction of a magistrate may claim to be tried by a British magistrate.

3. Foreign subjects accused of an offence which is beyond the jurisdiction of a magistrate may claim that their interrogation during the preliminary investigation

should be undertaken, and the question of their release on bail and of their committal for trial should be decided by a British examining judge.

4. Foreign subjects committed for trial may claim—

- (a) In the case of offences triable by a court of first instance that their trial should take place before a court the composition of which includes at least one British judicial officer.
- (b) In the case of offences triable by the court of assize that their trial should take place before a court the composition of which includes a majority of British judicial officers.

5. In civil actions over £ E 50 in value foreign subjects may claim that the final judgment should be made by a court the composition of which includes at least one British judicial officer.

6. In civil or criminal cases foreign subjects may claim that their appeal should be heard before a court the composition of which includes at least one British judicial officer.

7. Persons claiming to be treated as foreign subjects who do not make their claim either on first appearance or in the first written pleading delivered to the court may be treated as Ottoman subjects. A claim may be made on appeal notwithstanding that it has not been made in first instance.

8. The burden of proof that they are entitled to be treated as foreign subjects shall be upon persons claiming the rights aforesaid.

9. Where any person claims, and substantiates his claim, to be treated as a foreign subject, the court shall be constituted in conformity with the provisions of the Act necessary, the case shall be adjourned to enable this to be done.

ORME CLARKE, Major
Senior Judicial Officer

E 15700 6433 44

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon—received December 16

(No. 158)

My Lord

Jerusalem, November 20, 1921

WITH reference to my despatch No. 130 of the 14th November, 1920, concerning the Wakf Funds, I have the honour to inform you that I have since had two further meetings with the members of the Moslem Committee. The Committee have asked that in ancient wakfs constituted for the maintenance of a Moslem college or school, the funds should be restored to their original purpose. The case of these endowments is of the same nature as that of the wakfs which I mentioned in my despatch of the 14th November. I reported which I sent of the previous conference. I informed the Committee that

In particular they are to give relief to the poor, to maintain the Moslem orphans, and to support Moslem schools in the villages from which the wakf funds are derived. The Committee agreed to leave with the Government the funds of certain lapsed wakfs which had been applied by the Ottoman Administration towards education, on the undertaking that they would be used by the Education Department for the benefit of Moslem boys.

The Committee urged that appointments of kadis and other officials to the Moslem community should be made by a Moslem representative body. The community has expressed a strong desire that a Moslem judge being nominated by a non-Moslem Administration. Provided that the nomination of the Moslem Council is subject to the approval of the Government, I see no objection to the grant of their request.

The Committee proposed that a Council of four Moslems should be elected for a period of four years by all the Moslem notables of Palestine, and should be regarded as the supreme authority in all religious matters. The Council would take the place of

[5779]

302

The establishment of an elected council of four concerned with purely religious

The proceedings throughout have been harmonious, and the conclusions reached will, I believe, be productive of good in the relations of the Administration with the Moslem community.

E 15703 15708/443

No. 11

No. 164.1

My Lord,

Jerusalem, November 22, 1920.

It is desired that these names be brought into use in all official communications and publications, and that, if and when practicable, the necessary alterations be effected upon official maps of the country.

A diagram of Palestine is enclosed showing the position of all the colonies.

Exhibente in No. 309

List of Jewish Colonies

[illegible]

E 15875 476 44]

No. 310.

Mr. Lindley to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 281.)

My Lord,

Vienna, December 16, 1920.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 728 of the 11th November and your Lordship's despatch to Zurich No. 100 of the 2nd December, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship copy of an interesting memorandum by Mr C. M. Young of this ~~document~~ prepared after interviews with the heads of the Agudat Israel and the Zionist organisation.

I agree with Mr. Young that the dispute between the two bodies is of a purely technical character and that the Agents have done for such a long time as to the merits of the case and the propriety of the action taken by the Board of Directors.

the sense of your instructions to Mr. Marx, to which, as I gather from the enclosed letter (handed to me by the Agudas Israel), the practice in Berlin also conforms.

I have, &c.

F O LINDELEY

Enclosure 1 in No. 310

Memorandum respecting the Agudas Israel.

The Agudas Israel is an organisation of supporters of modernism and of accommodation of the Law to the modern world. Like the Old Believers in Russia, whom they resemble in many ways, they are the business classes, and soon, except in Poland, to have comparatively little following.

They spend their remaining days in the exercise of their religion. When as a consequence

the Zionist organisations (the Palastina Aemter) occupied the ground and soon found themselves involved in hostility with the Agudas Israel. The latter view that Palestine is destined to be the home of a Jewish nation.

The Agudas Israel desire to see the Law strictly to the Law and the traditions, and even speak of the Agudas Israel as visionaries; the Agudas Israel contemplate the Palastina Aemter

the Palastina Aemter discriminates against their adherents in the work of repatriation. They have not addressed any actual cases and, on being pressed, their representatives admitted that what they objected to was having to use the Palastina Aemter, which they regard as an irreligious and secular body, at all. It was for this reason that they asked to have equal recognition with the Palastina Aemter. Asked whether they would be content with representation on the executive of the Palastina Aemter, they replied that negotiations to this end had been started but had broken down for want of common ground. The Zionist representative subsequently made an overture had come from his side, and the Agudas Israel had agreed to co-operate. He repudiated the suggestion of discrimination against individual members of the Agudas Israel seemed to feel no difficulty in the Palastina Aemter, and the society itself regularly sent its repatriation recommendations to his office.

The disputes between the two bodies does not in fact seem to have inflicted any hardship on individual Jews or to have any basis except sectarian feeling, which, as a matter of fact, seems now to be acute in Austria. In Hungary the Jewish body has broken up into three hostile communities, a Centre, a Moderate Right Wing and an Orthodox Remnant. The troubles in Galicia and Hungary have brought many thousands of refugees into Austria, and with them many rabbis of the Agudas Israel school, whose proselytising activities threaten the unity of Austrian Jewry. It seems likely that the appeal of the Agudas Israel for recognition is part of this movement.

Enclosure 2 in No. 310

British Passport Office, Berlin, to the Agudas Israel

Sir,

Berlin, undated

His Britannic Majesty's consul-general in Berlin has handed me your letter, dated the 23rd November, 1920, relative to the admission to Palestine of members of the Agudas Israel.

I beg to inform you that, according to the Palestine Immigration Ordinance, Palestine is open in principle to citizens of all nations, independently of their religious persuasions. There never has been any question of demanding of non-Zionists a recommendation from a Zionist organisation, and I should be very grateful if you would

kindly give me your authority for stating that such a recommendation is necessary, as it actually did not emanate from this Office.

Without prejudice to any objection this Office may have to any individual on personal grounds, permission to proceed to Palestine will be given to any person, other than Zionist, who can satisfy this Office that he or she is self-supporting, or can produce evidence that he or she can obtain employment in Palestine—this absolutely irrespective of race or religion.

I am grateful if in future your Committee would take its information from this Office, and not give credit to vague rumours, which may be circulated by persons who are not conversant with the facts.

I am, &c.

J. E. SEYMANT

E 15914 13556 44]

No. 311

Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 21)

(No. 3770.)

His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note which has been addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the proposed French military action in Transjordan.

Paris, December 20, 1920.

Enclosure in No. 311

Lord Hardinge to M. Leygues.

M. le Président du Conseil,

Paris, December 20, 1920.

I HAVE the honour, under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to acquaint your Excellency that, according to information received by His Majesty's Government from the High Commissioner in Palestine, the Sherrefian movement at Amman has been led by Ali-bin-Hussain, who is, Sir Herbert Samuel states, not a son of the King of the Hedjaz. It appears that Ali-bin-Hussain has been endeavouring to incite the inhabitants of Amman and Ajlun to attack the French troops and to declare the independence of Amman, but that this endeavour has met with little response from the inhabitants; indeed the British officials there have reported to Sir H. Samuel that the local defence force is not only able to expel Ali from Amman, but is eager to do so. In these circumstances Sir H. Samuel was about to concur in this being done (as soon as orders had been received from the Mutasarrif at Salt) when news reached him from Amman that Ali had received instructions from the Hedjaz, through Abdullah, to restrain his activities. Sir H. Samuel, who is in telephonic communication with Salt and Amman, has suspended action pending the receipt of information as to the effect which these instructions from King Hussein may have had.

The French consul-general appears to have foreshadowed, in a conversation with Sir H. Samuel, the possibility of the French forces being obliged to pursue the Sherrefians across the frontier into the British zone, though he added that if such infractions did take place, they would be of only a temporary and slight nature. I am instructed by Lord Curzon to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government are confident that the French High Commissioner in Syria will receive instructions from the French Government to take no military action in the British zone unless and until such action appears to him to be unavoidable. Should this eventuality arise, His Majesty's Government will expect to receive, through the usual diplomatic channels, an intimation from the French Government of the action which it is proposed to take.

Lord Curzon desires me to inform your Excellency that a communication will be made at an early date to the French Government in regard to the extent to which the British and French High Commissioners are to be authorised to communicate directly with each other. In the meantime Sir H. Samuel has been informed that, on matters of fact, when time is important, he may communicate through the French consul-

general with the French High Commissioner. He has, however, been instructed to submit through His Majesty's Government any proposals for action and questions involving policy.

I have, &c
HARDINGE OF PENSHURST

E 15998 4164 44

No. 312

Minute by Mr. Nicolson.

Eastern Department.

IN giving me the attached memorandum to-day, M. de Fleurian added that Count Bonin had told the Quai d'Orsay that Count Sforza had gathered the impression when in London that His Majesty's Government would not be disinclined to reconsider the allocation of mandates in Asia Minor.

H. G. NICOLSON

December 21, 1920.

Enclosure in No. 312

Note communicated by the French Ambassador, December 21, 1920.

M. Comte Sforza a fait faire au Quai d'Orsay la déclaration suivante:

"Le Gouvernement italien considère que, les conditions juridiques des territoires ayant fait partie de l'ancienne Turquie devant être réglées par le Traité de Paix avec la Turquie, la Société des Nations ne peut prendre de décision au sujet des mandats jusqu'à ce que ledit traité soit ratifié."

En faisant cette communication, la délégation italienne de la Paix a indiqué que les stipulations de l'accord tripartite présentaient une grande importance pour l'Italie.

Il a été répondu que la décision prise à San-Rémo au sujet des mandats d'Asie Mineure était basée sur l'article 22 du Traité de Versailles et qu'elle devait être considérée comme définitive. Les troupes alliées occupent la Syrie et la Mésopotamie; il est nécessaire d'instituer un régime.

Il a été déclaré de la bonne volonté de son Gouvernement, qui ne craint pas de France et la Grande-Bretagne dans l'exercice de leurs mandats. Le Gouvernement italien a fait auprès du Gouvernement britannique une démarche semblable à celle faite auprès de lui et, dans le cas de l'affirmative, quelle portée Lord Curzon lui attache.

Ambassade de France, Londres.

E 16025 2 44]

No. 313

Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon. — (Received December 23.)

My Lord,

Paris, December 21, 1920.

THE decree (the text of which I had the honour to transmit to your Lordship in my despatch No. 3747 of the 17th instant) for the establishment in Syria of a special corps of "conseillers contrôleurs" has met with considerable criticism in the Committee on Foreign Affairs during the last two days. Objections were raised to it on the grounds that it created a direct administration rather than a protectorate, and that it would involve the French Government in the whole administrative, financial, and military responsibility for Syrian States created without the knowledge of the French Parliament in virtue of military decisions unknown to the public. It is also feared that the "conseillers contrôleurs" will be merely the present French military officials under another name, but in the receipt of far higher salaries. These preoccupations evidently inspired the motion, unanimously adopted by the committee, in the following terms:—

"The Senatorial Committee on Foreign Affairs, anxious not to attack the prestige of the French flag or the duties of France in the East, but no less anxious to preserve

for her her freedom of action, and the defence of her frontiers and the strict maintenance of order in the East, that as large and as speedy a reconstruction as possible should take place in the sacrifices of all kinds imposed on the country in Syria and Cilicia.

The Government was also asked to explain the nature of the engagements in the House of Commons to have been undertaken by the French Government to maintain order in Cilicia after it was handed over to France by England.

The President of the Council appeared before the committee yesterday in order to explain the nature of the engagements. He declared that the French Government were opposed to any direct interference of the French Government in the administration of Syria. He protested that nothing in the decree of the 11th December could be taken to convey the contrary impression. He added, however, that he was prepared to make any modifications in the text of the decree which might be necessary to dispel any doubt and to satisfy any complaints from the population of Syria or the Lebanon, who recently expressed, through a deputation received by M. Poincaré, their dissatisfaction with a decree which did not give them the amount of liberty which had been promised to them. In reply to a question by M. Bonafant as to what part of Syria he intended to occupy and for how long, M. Leygues replied: "The whole of it, and for ever."

He stated that he was not acquainted with the terms of the engagements to which reference had been made, but would endeavour to discover whether any of such engagements undertaken by France towards either the Armenians or the Allies existed in fact.

Syria and Cilicia also formed the subject of a discussion in the Chamber of Deputies yesterday. M. Leygues explained that the mandate in Syria and would carry it out.

We possess schools in Syria and, above all, our influence goes back for centuries. We could not, without losing our rank as a great Mediterranean, African and Asiatic power, renounce our action there, which will cost us less and less as time goes on.

The situation in Cilicia was, M. Leygues pointed out, different. The presence in that province of treaties and conventions, and she was the protection of the oppressed nationalities, and particularly of the Armenians. "On the day when we have a satisfactory peace with Turkey—and in Turkey one cannot but include that large portion of the country over which Kemal exercises so great an influence—a peace which will give every security to the Armenians respecting our rights, on that day we shall be very glad to evacuate."

After hearing M. Leygues' statement, the committee decided to vote the credits for January and February of 1921, and adopted the following order of the day:—

"The Financial Committee of the Chamber, taking note of the Government's declarations regarding the regular policy of France in the East, and the progress being made towards the speedy re-establishment of peace in Asia Minor, approves the credits demanded for Syria and Cilicia."

These credits amount to 106,000,000 fr.

I have, &c
HARDINGE OF PENSHURST

E 16027/9 44]

No. 314

Earl Curzon to M. de Fleurian.

Sir,
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th inst. regarding the proposed modification of the French mandate in Syria. I shall proceed, as I had the honour to inform M. Cambon some weeks ago, to discuss the matter with the Government.

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ago, on the basis that the mandatory principle, which has been approved by the Council of the League of Nations, is not open to discussion, and that the question of Syria should not be broached by either party.

I have, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

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No. 315.

Report of a conversation between Sir J. Tilley, representing the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and His Highness the Emir Faisal, representing the King of the Hedjaz. — (Held at the Foreign Office on December 23, 1920.)

Sir J. Tilley, K.C.M.G., C.B.

Major H. W. Young, D.S.O.

Colonel K. Cornwallis, C.B.E., D.S.O.

His Highness the Emir Faisal

Brigadier General

Rustum Hadar.

Sir John Tilley welcomed the Emir on behalf of the Secretary of State. He explained that Lord Curzon regarded the present moment as suitable for the discussion of matters of common interest to His Majesty's Government and the King of the Hedjaz. As a result of the war with Turkey, in which the Principal Allied Powers had been victorious, there were many problems of reconstruction awaiting solution in the East. Among these was the establishment of permanent relations between His Majesty's Government and the Hedjaz. He alluded to the difficulty of keeping close touch with the Emir.

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as the Foreign Office had
ly.

He wished to assure him

Tilley to inform
to say that for his part
ment. The Emir

between His Majesty's Government and the Turkish

The Emir recognised the importance of these points, and regarded the fact that discussion of them had been suggested as a proof of the sincerity of His Majesty's Government. He wished, however, to make his own position and that of the King of the Hedjaz perfectly clear before entering upon any detailed discussion. For himself, he assured Sir John that his loyalty to, and friendship for, His Majesty's Government were unchanged. He had always been trusted by Field-Marshal Lord Allenby at a time when he was privileged to serve under his command, as some of those present could testify. He had no intention of demanding impositions, or of embarrassing His Majesty's Government by making requests which he well knew they could not entertain. He asked that Lord Curzon might be reminded of the position of King Hussein in the eyes of the Moslem world. When Turkey entered the war against the Allies, the Sultan, in his capacity of Caliph, had proclaimed a holy war. Relying upon certain engagements entered into with him by His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo, King Hussein had raised the standard of revolt against the Caliph of Islam, and had proclaimed to the Moslem world that certain results would follow from his action. He had done this because he honestly believed that Arab interests were British interests, and British Arab. He was not ungrateful for the support and assistance of His Majesty's Government, and had not wavered in his loyalty to them. But he felt that

For example, they were setting up an Arab Government in Mesopotamia. The Arabs had been freed from Turkish domination, and King Hussein could tell the Moslem world that their independence was assured.

The Emir replied that something more than this was needed. King Hussein had no official knowledge of the intentions or policy of His Majesty's Government in certain Arab provinces.

give effect to their policy in a Treaty of Peace. King Hussein had associated himself with this treaty, of which he knew the terms, and which he would presumably sign.

The Emir said that King Hussein did not and would not accept this treaty until he knew officially that, so far as His Majesty's Government were free to act, they proposed to fulfil the pledges which had brought him into the war on the side of the Allies.

There were in his possession certain Arabic documents signed by His Majesty's High Commissioner, Cairo, in which the latter had undertaken, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, to recognise an Arab kingdom. He did not ask for impossibilities, but he had been told by Lord Curzon in 1919 that the pledges given to King Hussein by His Majesty's Government were regarded as equally binding with the engagements to other Powers, and he wished to know what steps were being taken towards the realisation of the Arab kingdom.

Tilley said that what had been proposed was that His Majesty's Government were prepared, subject to certain reservations, to recognise and support the "independence of the Arabs," not an "Arab kingdom."

The Emir maintained that the phrase "Arab kingdom" had been used by Sir H. McMahon, but he disclaimed any intention of insisting on textual interpretations of one passage or another in the correspondence. That was an attitude which he would not adopt. He was prepared to examine and to accept, as a friend, the general spirit of the British undertakings, and he asked that he might be given an opportunity of going through the letters with Sir John Tilley.

In order that there might be no doubt as to the text of these letters, he undertook to bring his copies to the Foreign Office on the following day, and to compare them with the Foreign Office records.

E 16081 4164 44]

No.

Franco-British Convention of December 23, 1920, on certain points connected with the mandate for Syria and the Lebanon, Palestine and Mesopotamia. — (Received at Foreign Office December 24.)

THE British and French Governments, respectively represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, wishing to settle completely the problems raised by the attribution to Great Britain of the mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia and by the attribution to France of the mandate over Syria and the Lebanon, all three conferred by the Supreme Council at San Remo, have agreed on the following provisions:—

ARTICLE I

The British mandates of Syria and the Lebanon on the one hand and the British mandates of Mesopotamia and Palestine on the other are determined as follows:—

On the east the Tigris from Jezret-ibn-Omar to the boundaries of the former vilayets of Diarbekir and Mosul.

On the south-east and south, the aforesaid boundary of the former vilayets southwards as far as Roumelan Kocui; thence a line leaving in the territory under the French mandate the entire basin of the western Kabur and passing in a straight line towards the Euphrates, which it crosses at Abu Kemal, thence a straight line to Imlar to the south of Jebel Druse, then a line to the south of Nasib on the Hedjaz

Railway, then a line to Semakh on the Lake of Tiberias, traced to the south of the railway, which descends towards the lake and parallel to the railway. Deraa and its environs will remain in the territory under the French mandate, the frontier will in fact be drawn as close as possible to the railway in such a manner as to allow the construction in the valley of the Yarmuk of a railway entirely situated in the territory under the British mandate. At Semakh the frontier will be fixed in such a manner as to allow each of the two High Contracting Parties to construct and establish a harbour and railway station giving free access to the Lake of Tiberias.

On the west, the frontier will pass from Semakh across the Lake of Tiberias to the mouth of the Wadi Massadye. It will then follow the course of this river upstream, and then the Wadi Jeraba to its source. From that point it will reach the track from El Kunetra to Banias at the point marked Skek, thence it will follow the said track, which will remain in the territory under the French mandate as far as Banias. Thence the frontier will be drawn westwards as far as Metullah, which will remain in Palestinian territory. This portion of the frontier will be traced in detail in such a manner as to ensure for the territory under the French mandate easy communication entirely within such territory with the regions of Tyre and Sidon, as well as continuity of road communication to the west and to the east of Banias.

From Metullah the frontier will reach the watershed of the valley of the Jordan and the basin of the Litani. Thence it will follow this watershed southwards. Thereafter it will follow in principle the watershed between the Wadis Farah, Haroun and Kerkera, which will remain in the territory under the British mandate and the Wadis El Doubleh, El Aoun and Es Zerka which will remain in the territory under the French mandate. The frontier will reach the Mediterranean Sea at the port of Ras-el Nakura, which will remain in the territory under the French mandate.

ARTICLE 2

A commission shall be established within three months from the signature of the present convention to trace on the spot the boundary line laid down in article 1 between the French and British mandatory territories. This commission shall be composed of four members. Two of these members shall be nominated by the British and French Governments respectively, the two others shall be nominated, with the consent of the mandatory power, by the local Governments concerned in the French and British mandatory territories respectively.

In case any dispute should arise in connection with the work of the commission, the question shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations, whose decision shall be final.

The final reports by the commission shall give the definite description of the boundary as it has been actually demarcated on the ground: the necessary maps shall be annexed thereto and signed by the commission. The reports, with their annexes, shall be made in triplicate: one copy shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations, one copy shall be kept by the mandatory, and one by the other Government concerned.

ARTICLE 3

The British and French Governments shall come to an agreement regarding the nomination of a commission whose duty it will be to make a preliminary examination of any plan of irrigation formed by the Government of the French mandatory territory, the execution of which would be of a nature to diminish in any considerable degree the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates at the point where they enter the area of the British mandate in Mesopotamia.

ARTICLE 4

In virtue of the geographical and strategic position of the island of Cyprus, off the Gulf of Alexandretta, the British Government agrees not to open any negotiations for the cession or alienation of the said island of Cyprus without the previous consent of the French Government.

ARTICLE 5

1. The French Government agrees to facilitate by a liberal arrangement the joint use of the section of the existing railway between the Lake of Tiberias and Nasib. This arrangement shall be concluded between the railway administrations

of the areas under the French and British mandates respectively as soon as possible after the coming into force of the mandates for Palestine and Syria. In particular the agreement shall allow the administration in the British zone to run their own trains with their own traction and train crews over the above section of the railway in both directions for all purposes other than the local traffic of the territory under the French mandate. The agreement shall determine at the same time the financial, administrative and technical conditions governing the running of the British trains. In the event of the two administrations being unable to reach an agreement within three months from the coming into force of the two above-mentioned mandates, an arbitrator shall be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations to settle the points as to which a difference of opinion exists and immediate effect shall be given as far as possible to those parts of the agreement on which an understanding has already been reached.

The said agreement shall be concluded for an indefinite period and shall be subject to periodical revision as need arises.

2. The British Government may carry a pipe line along the existing railway track and shall have in perpetuity and at any moment the right to transport troops by the railway.

3. The French Government consents to the nomination of a special commission, which, after having examined the ground, may readjust the above-mentioned frontier line in the valley of the Yarmuk as far as Nasib in such a manner as to render possible the construction of the British railway and pipe line connecting Palestine with the Hedjaz Railway and the valley of the Euphrates, and running entirely within the limits of the areas under the British mandate. It is agreed, however, that the existing railway in the Yarmuk valley is to remain entirely in the territory under the French mandate. The right provided by the present paragraph for the benefit of the British Government must be utilised within a maximum period of ten years.

The above-mentioned commission shall be composed of a representative of the French Government and a representative of the British Government, to whom may be added representatives of the local Governments and experts as technical advisers to the extent considered necessary by the British and French Governments.

4. In the event of the track of the British railway being compelled for technical reasons to enter in certain places the territory under French mandate, the French Government will recognise the full and complete extra-territoriality of the sections thus lying in the territory under the French mandate, and will give the British Government or its technical agents full and easy access for all railway purposes.

5. In the event of the British Government making use of the right mentioned in paragraph 3 to construct a railway in the valley of the Yarmuk, the obligations assumed by the French Government in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of the present article will determine three months after the completion of the construction of the said railway.

6. The French Government agrees to arrange that the rights provided for above for the benefit of the British Government shall be recognised by the local Governments in the territory under the French mandate.

ARTICLE 6

It is expressly stipulated that the facilities accorded to the British Government by the preceding articles imply the maintenance for the benefit of France of the provisions of the Franco-British Agreement of San Remo regarding oil.

ARTICLE 7

The French and British Governments will put no obstacle in their respective mandatory areas in the way of the recruitment of railway staff for any section of the Hedjaz Railway.

Every facility will be given for the passage of employees of the Hedjaz Railway over the British and French mandatory areas in order that the working of the said railway may be in no way prejudiced.

The French and British Governments agree, where necessary, and in eventual agreement with the local Governments, to conclude an arrangement whereby the stores and railway material passing from one mandatory area to another and intended for the use of the Hedjaz Railway will not for this reason be submitted to any additional customs dues and will be exempted so far as possible from customs formalities.

ARTICLE 8

Experts nominated respectively by the Administrations of Syria and Palestine shall examine in common within six months after the signature of the present convention the employment, for the purposes of irrigation and the production of hydro-electric power, of the waters of the Upper Jordan and the Yarmouk and of their tributaries, after satisfaction of the needs of the territories under the French mandate.

In connection with this examination the French Government will give its representation of the waters for the benefit of Palestine.

In the event of no agreement being reached as a result of this examination, these questions shall be referred to the French and British Governments for decision.

To the extent to which the contemplated works are to benefit Palestine, the Administration of Palestine shall defray the expenses of the construction of all canals, weirs, dams, tunnels, pipe lines and reservoirs or other works of a similar nature, or measures taken with the object of reforestation and the management of forests.

ARTICLE 9

Subject to the provisions of Articles 15 and 16 of the mandate for Palestine, of Articles 8 and 10 of the mandate for Mesopotamia, and of Article 8 of the mandate for Syria and the Lebanon, and subject also to the general right of control in relation to education and public instruction, of the local Administrations concerned, the British and French Governments agree to allow the schools which French and British areas to continue their work freely, the teaching of French and English will be freely permitted in these schools.

The present article does not in any way imply the right of nationals of either of the two parties to open new schools in the mandatory area of the other.

The present convention has been drawn up in English and French, each of the two texts having equal force.

Done at Paris, the 23rd December, 1920, in a double copy one of which will remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic, and the other in those of the Government of His Britannic Majesty.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST
G. JEAGLES

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No 317

Convention franco-britannique signée à Paris le 23 décembre 1920. — (Received at Foreign Office December 24.)

LES Gouvernements français et britannique, respectivement représentés par les Plénipotentiaires soussignés, desirant régler complètement les problèmes soulevés par l'attribution à la Grande-Bretagne des mandats sur la Palestine, et confondés tous deux par le Conseil suprême à San-Rémo, ont convenu des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1^{er}

Les limites entre les territoires sous mandats français et britannique de Syrie et Liban, d'une part, et de Mésopotamie et de Palestine, de l'autre, sont fixées comme suit :

A l'est, le Tigre depuis Djeziret Ibn Omar jusqu'à la limite des anciens vilayets de Diarbekir et de Mossoul.

Au sud-est et au sud, la ligne limite des anciens vilayets vers le sud jusqu'à Ramelan, puis une ligne allant au mandat français l'intégralité du bassin du Kabour, puis une ligne droite aboutissant à l'intar au sud du Djebel Druse, puis une ligne aboutissant au sud de Nasib sur le chemin de fer du Hedjaz, puis une ligne aboutissant à Semakh.

Sur le lac de Tibériade tracée au sud de la voie ferrée descendant au lac et parallèle à la voie de fer. La frontière de l'est passera en territoire sous mandat français, la frontière laissera en principe la vallée du Yarmouk dans le territoire sous mandat français, mais sera fixée aussi près que possible de la voie ferrée, de manière à permettre la construction par la vallée du Yarmouk d'un chemin de fer entièrement situé sur le territoire sous mandat britannique. A Semakh, la frontière sera fixée de manière à permettre aux deux hautes parties contractantes la construction et l'établissement d'un port et d'une station de chemin de fer donnant libre accès au lac de Tibériade.

A l'ouest, la frontière passera de Semakh à travers le lac de Tibériade jusqu'à Wadi Musayyid. Elle suivra ensuite cette rivière, puis le Wadi Jerabeh jusqu'à sa source. De là, elle atteindra la piste allant de El Kuntra à Baalbek au point marqué Skek, ensuite elle suivra ladite piste qui restera en territoire sous mandat français jusqu'à Baalbek. De là, la frontière se dirigera vers l'ouest jusqu'à Mutallah qui restera en territoire palestinien. Les détails de cette partie de la frontière sera fixée de manière à assurer aux territoires sous mandat français une communication facile entièrement sur ce territoire avec la région de Tyr et de Sidon, ainsi que la continuité de la route à l'ouest et à l'est de Baalbek.

De Mutallah, la frontière gagnera la ligne de partage des eaux de l'Euphrate et du bassin du Litani. Elle suivra ensuite vers le sud cette ligne de partage des eaux. Puis elle suivra, en principe, la ligne de partage des eaux entre les Wadi Karah Khatim et Karah Khatim. Elle suivra ensuite cette ligne de partage des eaux jusqu'à Wadi El Douhleh, El Ajoun et El Serka qui restera en territoire sous mandat français. La frontière aboutira à la mer Méditerranée à l'embouchure de l'El-Nakara sur le territoire sous mandat français.

ARTICLE 2

Une commission sera constituée dans les trois mois qui suivront la signature de la présente convention pour fixer sur le terrain la ligne frontière décrite à l'article 1^{er} ci-dessus entre les territoires sous mandat français et sous mandat britannique. Cette commission sera composée de quatre membres. Deux de ses membres seront nommés respectivement par les Gouvernements de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne, deux autres seront nommés respectivement avec l'agrément de la Puissance intéressée par les Gouvernements locaux intéressés.

Les audits qui pourront résulter des opérations de cette commission seront portées à la connaissance du Conseil des Nations Unies. Les rapports de clôture de la commission donneront la description exacte de la ligne frontière telle qu'elle sera fixée sur le terrain. Les rapports avec leurs annexes seront faits par la commission. Les rapports avec leurs annexes seront faits par la commission. Le premier sera déposé aux archives de la Société des Nations, le second sera conservé par la Puissance mandataire et le troisième par l'autre Gouvernement intéressé.

ARTICLE 3

Les Gouvernements français et britannique s'entendront pour la nomination d'une commission chargée d'examiner préalablement tout projet d'irrigation établi par le Gouvernement du territoire sous mandat français. Cette commission devra se proposer d'augmenter notablement les eaux du Tigre et de l'Euphrate à leur arrivée dans le territoire sous mandat britannique.

ARTICLE 4

En raison de la situation géographique et stratégique de l'île de Chypre au large du golfe d'Alexandrette, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique s'engage à n'entamer aucune négociation pour la cession ou l'aliénation de ladite île de Chypre sans le consentement préalable du Gouvernement français.

ARTICLE 5

Le Gouvernement français s'engage à faciliter par un arrangement libéral l'exploitation en commun du tronçon de chemin de fer existant, entre le lac de Tibériade et Nablus. Cet arrangement devra être conclu entre les administrations des chemins de fer des deux sous mandats français et britannique, aussitôt que possible après

l'entrée en vigueur des mandats pour la Palestine et la Syrie. L'accord devra permettre

les avec leur propre traction et leur personnel sur la section précitée, à toutes fins autres que le trafic local des territoires sous les conditions financières, administratives et techniques de la circulation des trains britanniques. Au cas où les deux administrations n'arriveraient pas à se mettre d'accord dans un délai de six mois, la mise en vigueur des deux mandats précités, un arbitre serait nommé par le Conseil de la Société des Nations pour régler les points restés en désaccord et l'on mettrait en

L'accord, conclu pour une durée indéterminée, sera sujet à des révisions périodiques selon les besoins.

Le Gouvernement britannique pourra faire passer une canalisation le long de la voie existante et aura à perpétuité et à tous moments le droit de faire passer ses troupes par le chemin de fer.

Le Gouvernement français agréé la nomination d'une commission spéciale, après avoir étudié le terrain, pourra réajuster la ligne frontalière ci-dessus indiquée dans la vallée du Yarmouk jusqu'à Nasib, de manière à assurer la traction d'un chemin de fer et d'une canalisation britannique reliant la Palestine au chemin de fer du Hedjaz et la vallée de l'Euphrate et passant dans les limites des zones sous mandat britannique. Il est entendu que le chemin de fer actuel de la vallée du Yarmouk doit rester intégral et que le territoire du mandat français. Le droit prévu au présent alinéa ou présentement britannique devra être utilisé dans un délai maximum de dix ans.

La commission prévue ci-dessus sera composée d'un représentant du Gouvernement français et d'un représentant du Gouvernement britannique auxquels pourront être adjoints des représentants des Gouvernements locaux et des experts à titre consultatif. Les techniques dans la mesure où les Gouvernements français et britannique le jugeront.

Les troupes se trouvant ainsi sur le territoire britannique ou à ses agents techniques large et facile accès pour toutes les questions du chemin de fer.

5. Au cas où le Gouvernement britannique ferait usage de la faculté, prévue à l'alinéa 3, de construire un chemin de fer dans la vallée du Yarmouk, les obligations contractées par le Gouvernement français aux termes des alinéas 1 et 3 du présent

le fer

6. Le Gouvernement français s'engage à faire reconnaître les droits stipulés ci-dessus au profit du Gouvernement britannique par les Gouvernements locaux sous mandat français.

ARTICLE 6.

Il est expressément stipulé que les facilités accordées à la Grande-Bretagne par les articles précédents impliquent le maintien au profit de la France des stipulations de l'accord franco-britannique de San Remo sur les pétroles.

Les Gouvernements français et britannique ne feront aucun obstacle dans leurs zones respectives sous mandat au recrutement du personnel du chemin de fer destiné à une section quelconque du chemin de fer au Hedjaz.

Toute facilité sera accordée pour le passage des employés du chemin de fer. Il n'y aura dans les zones sous mandat français et anglais, de manière à ne gêner aucunement le fonctionnement du chemin de fer.

Les Gouvernements français et britannique s'engagent, si c'est nécessaire, et éventuellement d'accord avec les Gouvernements locaux, à conclure un arrangement par lequel les approvisionnements et le matériel de chemin de fer, passant d'une zone sous mandat à une autre, et destinés à être employés sur le chemin de fer du Hedjaz, ne seront pas soumis de ce fait à des droits de douane additionnels et seront exemptés autant que possible des formalités douanières.

ARTICLE 8.

Des techniciens, nommés respectivement par les administrations de la Syrie et de la Palestine, examineront en commun, dans un délai de six mois après la signature de la Convention, la force hydraulique des eaux du Jourdain supérieur et du Yarmouk et de leurs affluents, après satisfaction des besoins des territoires sous mandat français.

En vue de cet examen, le Gouvernement français donnera à ses représentants les instructions les plus libérales pour l'emploi du surplus des eaux au profit de la Palestine.

La décision de ces questions sera déférée aux Gouvernements français et britannique.

Dans la mesure où les travaux prévus doivent profiter à la Palestine, celle-ci supportera les frais de la construction de tous canaux, écluses, barrages, tunnels, canalisations et réservoirs ou autres travaux du même ordre ou visant le reboisement et l'aménagement des forêts.

ARTICLE 9.

La réserve des dispositions prévues aux articles 15 et 16 du mandat pour la Palestine, des articles 8 et 10 du mandat pour la Mésopotamie, ainsi que de l'article 8 du mandat pour la Syrie et le Liban, et nous réserve aussi du droit général de contrôle des administrations locales en matière d'éducation et d'instruction publique, les Gouvernements français et britannique s'engagent à laisser librement fonctionner les écoles que les ressortissants français et britanniques possèdent et dirigent actuellement dans les territoires soumis au mandat de l'une et l'autre parties; l'enseignement de la langue française ou anglaise sera libre dans ces écoles.

Le présent article n'implique pas pour les ressortissants de chacune des deux parties le droit d'ouvrir des écoles nouvelles dans les territoires soumis au mandat de l'autre.

La présente convention a été rédigée en français et en anglais, chacun des deux textes ayant même force et valeur.

Fait à Paris, le 23 décembre 1920, en deux exemplaires dont l'un restera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement de la République française et l'autre dans celles du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique.

(L.S.)
(L.S.)

G. LEYGUES
HARRIDGE OF PENSHURST

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No 318.

Karl Curzon to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem).

(No 493)

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 24, 1920.

1. I HAVE read with much interest your despatch No. 158 of the 29th November on the subject of the control and administration of Moslem Wakf funds in Palestine.

2. I assume that the recommendations made in this despatch are not intended to supersede the request made by the Grand Mufti at the meeting held on the 9th November, a report of which was enclosed in your despatch No. 130 of the 14th November. The Grand Mufti is reported to have said on that occasion that the Council had decided to request the Government to continue its control of the Wakfa and to keep in close connection with the Wakfa, as previously. It had also been decided that the decisions of the Wakf Council might be "enforced and considered" by the Government.

3. I have hitherto refrained from inviting a more detailed explanation of this request, in anticipation of some such communication as that made in your despatch under reference. It is still not quite clear to me to what extent it is proposed that the Government should control the proposed Moslem Council. I understand that you propose that with the exception of the funds of certain lapsed Wakfa, which are to be supervised by the Moslem Council, but in view of the request made by the Grand Mufti, it appears that the Moslems themselves do not wish to be left entirely without guidance or control in their expenditure of these funds.

4. There appear to me to be two alternative courses - either that the composition

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The investigations of the commission shall continue notwithstanding that such a vacancy as aforesaid shall not be filled, and if it shall be filled the investigations made prior to such vacancy shall not be reopened or recapitulated.

7. The High Commissioner may from time to time make rules for regulating the procedure of commissions appointed under this ordinance and for prescribing the fees to be paid with reference thereto and generally for the carrying into effect of the provisions of this ordinance.

8. This ordinance shall be known as the Commission of Enquiry Ordinance.

High Commissioner for Palestine

Government House, Jerusalem, 1920.

E 16181 10977 44

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon. — (Received December 28.)

(N. 1.)
M. 1.

Jerusalem, December 1, 1920.

By despatch No. 3 and subsequent telegrams, I have the honour to inform you that I am appointing immediately a commission to inquire into the relations between the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church and the Government of Palestine. The commission will consist of Sir Anton Bertram, who will be the President, and Mr. Luke, the Acting District Commissioner of the affairs of the Orthodox Church in Cyprus. I propose to nominate three members to the commission, two representatives of the local Orthodox community and one a senior Palestinian official. These members will be able to guide the commissioners in regard to the history of the Patriarchate in Palestine and the more local aspects of the dispute.

The terms of reference to the commission will be —

1. To inquire into the authority provided by the constitution of the Orthodox Church to the Patriarchate to interfere upon and to decide the dispute.
2. If the answer to the first question is in the negative, what action should be taken by the Palestine administration with a view to the immediate restoration of order and authority in the affairs of the Patriarchate.
3. What measures are advisable for the liquidation of the debts of the Patriarchate.

It is necessary I think for the commission to consider the first point, because one of the main questions in dispute between the Patriarch and the Government is whether the Patriarch is amenable to the jurisdiction of an ecclesiastical body. It is also of great importance that the contention of the Patriarch that he is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Government should be decided upon its merits.

I shall keep you informed of the proceedings of the commission.

I have &c

HERBERT SAMUEL,

High Commissioner

E 16167 13556 44

No 321

Report submitted to Sir H. Samuel by the Civil Secretary — (Received at Foreign Office December 28.)

High Commissioner

December 5, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report on my tour through Derakh, Irbid, Jarash and Salt from the 2nd November to 3rd December.

General Conditions.

As far as can be observed riding through the country the people of Transjordan appear to be happy and contented, and fully engaged in their normal agricultural operations.

Public security (apart from raids which have a character of their own) is stated to be good and crime infrequent.

Law courts exist and justice is meted out slowly if not very rarely.

Prices are high, even as compared with Palestine, but the wants of the people are fairly simple.

In the Irbid area—which includes the kazas of Irbid, Ajloun, Mazar (shortly to be incorporated in that of Irbid) and Jarash—the form of government can best be described as patriarchal, with Major the Hon. F. R. Somerset at its head.

The influence of, and the respect and affection of the people for, this officer is remarkable.

Each kaza has its own council, to which are submitted all the affairs of the district.

In the Salt area, which consists of the kazas of Salt, Amman and Madaba, together with the nahie of Ziza (when the latter place is not occupied by the partisans of the Emir Abdulla), there is a somewhat more established and more thorough form of government. The Mutesarrif, known as "Mutesarrif of the Helka." A "Medjlis" in the manner as obtained in Turkish times, has just been formed and will shortly be convened.

A force of locally recruited gendarmes exists throughout both areas, and though somewhat deficient in numbers and somewhat variegated in clothing and equipment it appears to function as satisfactorily as can be expected in present circumstances.

A small force of town police has been raised in Salt, Amman and Madaba.

A body known as the "Reserve Force," comprised of Circassians and other nomads, has been raised, trained and equipped under the supervision of a British officer, and is stationed at Amman. Its ostensible purpose is the protection of the settled population against the depredations of the Bedouin in general and of the much feared Beni Sakhr in particular.

This body is beginning to be regarded as the "force behind the Government," and although it is at present the possession of the "Government of the Helka," demands for the loan of it have already been made by the adjoining areas of Irbid and Kerak.

The export of agricultural produce takes place chiefly into the French zone to the north owing to the lower prices to be obtained therefor in Palestine.

Trade from Palestine into Transjordan is, as yet, very inconsiderable in volume.

The finances of the Irbid area are not thriving, and until the local gendarmerie has been increased in numbers and efficiency it is unlikely that the coffers of local kazas will be much replenished.

In the Mutesarriflik of the Helka the financial situation is more promising, although here again the revenue is largely dependent upon the progress made with the gendarmerie.

Communications are poor but capable of improvement without a great expenditure of money. To this the recently-constructed Salt-Jericho road is an exception, though it yet remains to be seen how it will survive the winter.

The sole telegraph and telephone line at present existing is that between Salt and Amman, but it is hoped very shortly to establish telegraphic communications between Salt and Jerusalem, and thus with Jerusalem.

A brief description of the Administration and of the conditions obtaining in Transjordan. The form of government is light, and in many respects defective.

It is not merely a compliment to the British officers there, but a statement of the truth, to say that the whole fabric owes what little stability it possesses to their own individual influence and to that exerted by them upon others.

There are, however, certain factors in the situation which, though not apparent to the casual observer, yet upon examination considerably modify his estimate of a situation which is only upon the surface a satisfactory one.

There is a widespread feeling of dissatisfaction and apprehension in the minds of the people at the knowledge that they are living under a régime that wholly lacks precision, and under an Administration that wholly lacks moral and material force.

Their Government, in fact, is one without a head and with very weak hands and feet.

This is particularly unfortunate in a country of whose population it may justly be said that one part lives by preying on the other.

The deficiencies of Government are obvious, and are such as are to be expected from one whose officials are irregularly paid and whose numbers are far too few adequately to perform all the functions of Government.

But these are deficiencies that are of comparatively little consequence in a country to whose people the efficiency of Government institutions is quite unknown, and to their minds an object rather to be avoided.

But a Government that has neither head to which they can look up, nor hands (let alone a mailed fist) to keep them in order, is indeed a strange phenomenon and quite incomprehensible to them.

Politically it would probably be true to say that 80 per cent. to 90 per cent. of the people desire nothing more than a continuation of the present regime, with the exceptions and deficiencies above referred to supplemented by something a little more precise and efficient.

If there be any pro-French, pro-Shereefian or "Arab Nationalist" feeling, it is inconsiderable. It would largely disappear if the deficiencies above referred to were removed. If there were some authority at the back of the local Government it is probable that movement from north to south would receive much more encouragement.

Such authority can, in the opinion of the great majority of the people, only be supplied by the presence in the country of a body of British troops until it be possible for the local forces now in process of formation to be able to supply this need.

On the other hand it is not believed that the people are anxious or ready to come directly under the Palestine Government as such, or not to-day at all events.

They would like to consider that they were under the authority of His Majesty's Government in the person of the High Commissioner.

They are afraid of the Palestine Administration on two grounds, one being that it is, to their minds, too much of a Government; and, secondly, because of Zionism.

The following is a summary of some of the impressions derived and of the deductions made from the conditions now obtaining beyond Jordan:—

1. The British prestige there is high, and that the presence of British officers there is appreciated.

2. That a small body of British troops would be almost universally welcomed as evidence of a desire to consolidate the efforts of the local Government, and the attempt of the British officers to promote its establishment.

3. That as regards an ultimate authority under which the people would prefer to live, it is His Majesty's Government, through the person of the High Commissioner for Palestine, and

4. That as regards their immediate authority they would like a thoroughly local and not over complex form of administration with British officers as advisers.

Note.—It is recognized that the question of "sovereignty" in these circumstances still remains open.

5. That if an Emir or any other such person were proposed to the people as the chief a large number would prefer to decline the offer, and a smaller number would accept it after some months of delay.

6. That for any reason whatever there would still be a desire to come under British influence partly for the sake of British advice, and partly as a safeguard against the abuses of an Emir.

7. That, as already stated, inclusion within the orbit of the Palestine Government is not to-day desired, although

8. The happiest and a quite practicable co-operation between the two countries is possible, for

9. Transjordan has potentially great economic and agricultural possibilities and potentialities to offer to Palestine, and

10. It stands in great need of what Palestine is beginning to offer to-day, and will still more be able to offer to-morrow, in the sphere of trade, industry, and capital.

11. That for reasons given above no overt steps whatever should be taken to make the nature of the connection between the two countries anything more than one in name, either that of His Majesty's Government (through the High Commissioner) as suggested

other, as alternatively suggested in article 6.

12. That the connection thus lightly established in the beginning must tend to become more solid in the future.

That if the above premises be correct the following steps should now be taken:—

13. To appoint a Chief Political Officer for the whole area, to ensure uniformity of action and treatment of questions throughout it, and to maintain the initiative of the High Commissioner, and thus to show tangible evidence of the existence of that link.

14. That the so-called "Local Reserve Force" at Amman should be enlarged so as to enable it, or a portion of it, to be used in any part of the whole area, as a general reserve to the local gendarmerie forces, and for action against refractory tribes.

Note.—If British troops were sent to Transjordan the existence of the "Local Reserve Force" would be no less necessary. For it would appear that every effort should be made to avoid the employment of British troops for purely local purposes.

15. That an attempt gradually be made towards the formation of a Central Executive Council for the whole area at (if and when practicable) Amman.

Administrative efficiency, of financial and economic policy, of justice and public security, such a step is eminently desirable.

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No 322

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon, (Received December 28)

No. 180

My Lord,

Jerusalem, December 6, 1920

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a monthly report on political, economic, financial and administrative matters for the month of November.

Political.—The political situation in Palestine continues to be satisfactory. In the north the main topic of conversation is the northern boundary, many conjectures are made on this subject, and the Bedouins are moving down into British territory in order to get away, as they state, from the French zone.

In the south, in the Beersheba district, the Arabs are, since the rain, too busily engaged in ploughing to have time for, or to take interest in, other affairs.

Prior to the 7th November, which is the anniversary of the establishment of the Bolshevik system in Russia, leaflets of a revolutionary character, printed in Hebrew, were distributed in various parts of the country. These are believed to emanate not from the British authorities but from a small group of Russians who have been for some time in the country.

In Tel-Aviv, a Jewish suburb of Jaffa, they were torn down by the people as soon as they appeared on the walls. An open-air meeting, addressed by three Russians, was held there.

Without any sign of approval. A trustworthy eyewitness states that he heard two of the men discussing how long they were expected to remain for the money they had received. Three arrests were made and certain documents seized, which are at present under examination, but which do not promise to furnish any very interesting results.

About the same time the strike at Richon, referred to later in this report, and two other small ones in a tailors' and confectioners' shop at Jaffa took place, but these were due to economic causes, and there is no reason to suppose that there is any connection between them and the Bolsheviks.

In Philadelphia, Pa., the situation is also satisfactory.

Samaria remains a centre of anti-Zionist sentiment, and the assistance of even one or two Jewish families to the town has proved difficult.

The articles in the "Morning Post" which appeared in the beginning of November have attracted some attention, and have been copied by the local press with mischievous results.

The defeat of the Venizelist Government in Greece is likely to affect the dispute in the Orthodox Patriarchate at Jerusalem. The Damianos Party are naturally pleased that the Venizelist Metropolitan at Athens, who supported the Anti-Patriarchal Party, has been deposed in favour of his Constantinist predecessor.

The effect of the decisions arrived at in respect of Moslem Awkaf and of the affairs of the Moslem Religious Courts continues to exert a beneficent political influence.

Customs.—The value of imports for October shows an increase of £ E. 202,000 over the corresponding month of last year. This increase is chiefly due to the general prosperity in Southern Palestine.

In order to encourage the importation of livestock for breeding purposes, agricultural work and food supply, dues have been reduced from 11 to 3 per cent. *ad valorem*.

Agricultural Loans.—An additional sum of £ E. 25,000 has been placed at the disposal of District Governors for disbursement, making a total of £ E. 237,000.

Revenues are coming in satisfactorily.

Archaeological.—The Archaeological Advisory Board met three times during the month and issued various permits to societies to excavate.

The Department has assumed the direction of excavations in the Garden of Gethsemane. Work on the fourth century basilica is proceeding, and religious interests are being carefully safeguarded. Ninety three historical sites in Judea and Galilee have been inspected and registered.

Education.—There are now sixty-three students undergoing instruction in the Training College for Men in Jerusalem. It is hoped to enlarge the Training College for Women in the near future.

Arrangements have been made for all messenger boys and orderlies to attend evening classes.

The educational scheme for next year has been in course of preparation and will be presented to the Advisory Council on the 7th December.

State Lands.—About 30,000 dunams sand dunes, swamps, rocky hills and cultivable land have been leased to the Jewish Colonisation Company.

At Nazareth, Jerusalem and Haifa, the Government has begun afforestation.

Ports and Lights.—A mine was found in the Bay of Acre close to the Haifa harbour.

Commerce and Industry.—The general commercial situation is uneasy. Banks are restricting credits and calling in advances.

Applications for concessions continue to be received, but applicants have been notified that notice has been issued inviting all persons claiming to hold pre-war concessions to register their claims with the Government.

Food.—Sugar, wheat, barley, fish and other essential commodities are somewhat cheaper than last month.

Fuel.—Efforts are being made to obtain cheap firewood from Cyprus and to meet the great shortage at present experienced.

Transport.—Railway rates for the transport of oranges have been cheapened. Prices for farm produce have been doubled.

Strike at Hichon-Le-Zion.—During the month there was a strike at the wine press at Hichon-Le-Zion, owing to the company discharging six of the old workmen. About 120 workers came out and refused to return except on condition that—

- The six dismissed men were reinstated.
- In future when any men were to be engaged or dismissed the Workers' Committee should be consulted.
- The workmen should receive compensation in cases of accident, and participation in medical aid.

After various meetings both sides appealed unofficially to the Government to settle the terms at issue. After the parties had been interviewed separately a settlement was arranged. An Arbitration Board has since been elected composed of an equal number of representatives of the vineyard syndicates and the workers. In the event of disagreement this Arbitration Board is to establish the future relations between the workers and the management.

It is estimated that the damage done to the vines as the result of the strike amounts to some hundreds of pounds.

Agriculture.—Reports from all districts testify an excellent early rainfall, and the ploughing and planting of winter crops is well forward. A serious shortage of draught animals has led to a demand for cast-iron mules.

Ploughing demonstrations are being organised at a number of centres.

Lieutenant-Colonel Fulton, C.M.G., C.B.E., an Australian officer lately demobilised, has leased a farm in the Ludd area, and also leased 2,000 acres of land for wheat growing from local Arabs. He has imported the latest Australian machinery valued at £ E. 5,000 and has in three weeks trained Arabs to drive teams of six horses or mules. He is experimenting with phosphates and anticipates getting three times the present return of crops.

Repeated demands are made by villagers in the hill country to be allowed to grow tobacco. In Turkish times the Regie monopoly was disregarded to a certain extent, but the rigid enforcement under the present administration has prevented this.

Afforestation.—Two thousand trees have been planted in Jerusalem during the year by the Pro-Jerusalem Society, and it is hoped to plant another thousand during the rainy season, provided funds are forthcoming.

Measures in towns and villages and the free distribution of quinine solution have been energetically carried out.

Quarantine and Epidemic.—Although plague has existed in Egypt and Syria, Palestine has remained free.

Considerable progress has been made in the construction of the Jaffa and Haifa quarantine disinfecting stations.

Hospitals.—The Jaffa Hospital has been transferred to its new buildings and the work on the new hospital at Tu Keram started.

Laboratories.—The analysis of specimens of soils submitted by the Department of Agriculture in connection with the soil survey of Palestine has been commenced by the Government analyst.

School Medical Service.—Periodical examination of school children has been developed and extended to a number of private schools at their request.

Police Medical Service.—Certificates in first aid have been granted to seven policemen by the St. John Ambulance Association—the first to be obtained in Palestine.

Jerusalem Drainage.—The Zionist Commission have handed over to the Municipality of Jerusalem the drainage scheme completed by them in the Moenchhoram portion of the city.

Legal Department.—The Courts have disposed of several serious criminal cases during the month. The District Court of Haifa passed two death sentences for murder. In the one case the sentence was commuted by the Court of Appeal to penal servitude for fifteen years, in the other it was confirmed. This is the first death sentence which has been passed in Palestine for more than a year.

Land transactions, which were reopened last month, are proceeding steadily in most parts of the country but there have been few large dealings. Arrangements are being made for the establishment of Land Settlement Courts, which will decide questions of title.

The committee which has been enquiring into questions of jurisdiction of religious tribunals has presented an interim report dealing with the question of the wakfs (charitable endowments) of non-Moslem communities. Hitherto the jurisdiction over such wakfs has lain with the Moslem religious Courts. The general recommendation of the committee is that the Moslem Courts shall in future deal only with questions of personal status and of endowments concerning Moslems.

The commission presented over by the Legal Secretary to enquire into the affairs of the Chief Rabbinate of the Jewish community and the Jewish religious Courts has reported, and has recommended the establishment of a Rabbinical Council which shall exercise supreme religious authority and constitute a Jewish Religious Court of Appeal.

Representatives of all the advocates of Palestine met at Jerusalem and drew up a constitution for a Society of Advocates.

A feature of the last month has been the opening of the legal classes in Jerusalem. Over 100 students have enrolled themselves, of whom fifty are in the different Departments of the Government Service. The classes are held in the evening, and the lecturers, nearly all of whom are judges or advocates, are doing the work in addition to their regular duties.

Public Security.—The police, assisted by military co-operation, have apprehended twelve members of a highway gang who have been at large for some time. £ E. 1,200 of stolen property has been recovered.

There were twenty-two cases of heinous crime reported during the month, of which fifteen have been detected.

Posts and Telegraphs.—The reconstruction of the main telegraph route from Rafah to Haifa is proceeding satisfactorily. The poles are being made from old Turkish

railway lines, and when completed will replace the two existing wooden poles erected by the army, which have greatly suffered from dry rot.

Veterinary Service—An outbreak of cattle plague in the Bessan area is being controlled by quarantine and inoculation.

Fishery Service—An Italian trawler has been obtained for fishery investigations. The practice of dynamiting fish has been checked by convictions under the Fishery Protection Ordinance.

Survey Work—Field work on the survey of environs of Jerusalem has been proceeded with and shows fair progress.

Miscellaneous—One of the directors of the Deutsche-Palästina Bank has arrived and the liquidation of the bank has started.

I have &c.
(For High Commissioner),
W H DEEDEN

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No 314

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 25.)

No. 161)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, December 6, 1920

THE two telegrams from Mr. Fontana at Beyrout of the 3rd December, repeated to me under Nos. 21 and 111, reporting observations made by M. de Caix in conversation, make it desirable that I should review for your Lordship's information the various steps which I have taken in connection with the relations between this Administration and the French authorities in Syria.

1. In August last, after the occupation of Damascus by the French, and at the time when they were seriously threatened with an attack from the Hauran, I received representations from that district seeking some expression of British support. Without any request having reached me from the French authorities I sent the reply to the sheikhs who had approached me that the British Government could not interfere in the affairs of the districts in Transjordan north of the Sykes-Picot line, and that I could receive no deputations from there.

On the 14th August I communicated the step which I had taken to M. Rais, the French consul-general in Jerusalem, who expressed himself much gratified at this friendly action. I informed him also of the course that I proposed to adopt with regard to the establishment of British influence south of the line. I subsequently received a letter from him dated the 23rd August, in which he stated that General Gouraud saw no objection to the steps I was about to take and provisionally agreed that the boundary should be the Sykes-Picot line until the final settlement of the frontiers.

I was subsequently informed that General Toulet had made a speech in Damascus, on behalf of General Gouraud, which was circulated in a special edition of an Arabic newspaper, quoting the declaration that I had made with reference to the Hauran, but adding with regard to the territory to the south of the Sykes-Picot line that the matter remained undetermined. As this was likely to confuse the minds of the people in Transjordan I drew the attention of the French authorities to this statement, which was not in accordance with General Gouraud's previous declaration, and asked that they would be good enough to communicate with me on the subject. Beyond an acknowledgment from M. Rais I have had no reply to this representation. M. Rais, however, rendered me considerable assistance in writing to the officials of the Damascus Government stationed in Transjordan requesting them to acknowledge British influence until the boundaries were finally fixed.

2. When the Emir Feisal was at Haifa with a number of his advisers, M. Rais and I went to see him. I pointed out the disadvantage of this course both to the French and to this Administration.

3. The next incident related to Ali Khulqui, the Kaimakam of Irbid, which was mentioned in my letter to you of the 10th November, together with the question of the withdrawal of the French from the Hauran.

On these matters I wrote fully to General Gouraud on the 10th November, and attached a copy of my letter to you. In this letter also I have had no reply.

4. In the course of M. de Caix's visit, he also raised the question of the extradition of offenders whom the French Government wished to put on trial. After communication with the Foreign Office, I wrote to M. Rais on the 24th September (copy attached), fully detailing the steps which this Administration proposed should be taken in such cases. This letter, like the previous ones, has had no reply, but M. de Caix now complains, in the conversation reported in the telegrams under reference, that I have refused delivery of persons condemned by the French for pillage and murder of French soldiers, maintaining that they were political offenders and considered as refugees from a state of war.

With the exception of the case of Adel Arslan, mentioned above, I have received no request from the French authorities for the surrender of any such criminals, and have given no such reply.

5. Although the press in Palestine enjoys full liberty and no prosecutions have taken place since my arrival in Palestine for any offence relating to the political situation in this country, I thought it right to order the prosecution of a newspaper at Haifa for writing an article inciting the people of the Hauran to rise against French government. The editor was convicted, and was subjected to the excessive sentence of six months imprisonment. I have not previously reported this matter either to your Lordship or to the French authorities, as the editor is appealing, and I was awaiting the result of that appeal. At the same time, the editor of a newspaper in Jerusalem who had published an article very derogatory to the French, though not inciting to violence, was reprimanded in my name by the District Governor, and admonished not to pursue such a course in future. In both cases my action was taken on my own initiative and not at any request of the French authorities, and I quote them as evidence of the spirit that animates this Administration in relation to its neighbour.

I am informed, however, that the press at Damascus and Beyrout frequently contains articles of a violently anti-British tendency including personal attacks upon myself with respect to which apparently no action is taken. I am taking steps to have copies of such newspapers sent to me.

6. I visited some of the sheikhs of the Belka in Transjordan on the 28th November, and then received definite information that the Emir Abdullah had been for some days at Ma'an, and was threatening to attack the French. I communicated this information to M. Rais on the same evening, and at the same time telegraphed it to your Lordship (my telegram No. 300).

M. de Caix appears now to have told Mr. Mackereth that I had informed him that 6,000 Arabs were moving north, and expressed the private opinion that the Arabs should remain free to attack the French in Syria rather than that they should take action against Palestine on anti-Zionist grounds.

I do not know how the figure of 6,000 Arabs was introduced into the matter. No such number was ever mentioned by me. The figure which I gave, on the information furnished to me, was 300 men with six machine guns.

Your Lordship is aware how entirely contrary to the truth is M. de Caix's allegation with regard to the occupation of Transjordan.

There is, in any case, not the slightest danger that the Arabs of Transjordan would attack Palestine on anti-Zionist grounds, and the consideration which he mentions had of course never entered my mind.

If it is thought worth while, the British consul-general in Beyrout might be supplied with information as to the actual facts of the case.

7. Rumours continually reach me, both from different parts of Palestine and from Transjordan, of an active French propaganda being conducted in both territories against Zionism and against the British Administration. I have not been able to verify these rumours, and they have no influence upon my action, but they are widespread and persistent. This Government, of course, does not endeavour to interfere in any way in the internal affairs of the French zone.

I will conclude by drawing your Lordship's attention to the fact that on the 30th August, 1920, I made the suggestion that the British liaison officer at Damascus should be replaced by a consular officer, as I believed this would conduce to better relations with the French authorities. I was informed that this suggestion was not intended.

Again, on the 24th September, 1920 (my telegram No. 272), I recommended that this step should not be further delayed. No action has, however, been taken. Although I am convinced that the present liaison officer is capable and energetic, I am equally convinced that his withdrawal in favour of a civilian official would be of advantage.

9 This despatch is not being repeated to Bevrout, but if it is desired that this should be done perhaps your Turkish would be more than enough to re-telegraph to me accordingly

I have, &c
HERBERT SAMUEL
High Commissioner

Enclosure 1 in No 3

Sir H. Samuel to General Gouraud

(Confidential)

My dear General Gouraud,

Jerusalem, November 10, 1920

LIEUTENANT GENERAL Sir Walter Somerset, I have a copy of your letter of 7th November 1920, in which you raise other matters to be discussed. Major Somerset, the British representative at Alyn, has been asked to discuss these matters. But in the case of operations which are to be maintained, and I therefore welcome this opportunity of answering the points raised in your letter to General Sir Walter Somerset.

The first incidents mentioned, however, took place prior to the establishment of the present Administration. I am not acquainted with the facts and have asked Major Somerset to let me have an explanation with regard to them.

The Ain Jubel Incident

The position of Major Somerset at Yaroun appears to have given rise to misunderstandings. He was there for the purpose of ascertaining the military situation in his capacity as intelligence officer for the General Staff, and was not there in an administrative capacity nor had he administrative powers.

The instructions issued by this Government at the time were to the effect that persons crossing the frontier without arms were not to be interfered with without direct instructions from these headquarters, and that persons crossing with arms were simply to be disarmed.

It is therefore clear from the above that Major Somerset when declining to hand over refugees was not in a position to do so, and was only acting on his instructions.

The Occupation of Aylun District

I have much pleasure in attaching copies of the fourteen points raised by the Sheikh at the meeting at Um Keis, and both Major Somerset's answers thereto and my comments thereon at a later date, for your information.

Questions put to Major Somerset and his replies thereto

Q We ask for an independent national Arab Government consisting of the Liwa of Salt and Kerak and the kazas of Aylun and Irbid. A The British Government will be informed of your wish.

Q We also ask Great Britain to arrange for the Liwa of Hauran and the Kaza of Kunetla with Marj Ayn and Tadmor to be placed under the administration of the High Commissioner will be informed of your wish.

We ask Great Britain to accept the mandate under the following conditions.—

Q 1. A member of the Sherrefian family to be ruler.—A. To be referred to High Commissioner

Q 2. A general council to be formed for the purpose of making laws and administrative regulations.—A. The High Commissioner will decide on this point after consulting the people of Salt and Kerak

Q 3. That the Administration be entirely separate from Palestine.—A. The Government will be quite separate from Palestine.

Q 4. That the Government should forbid Zionism and the sale of land to Zionists.—A. The local Government will make its own regulations

Q 5. A voluntary army to be formed not to leave the country for protection and the maintenance of order, and that the Government should have the right to

use this army in the event of threats from outside.—A. The High Commissioner will probably agree to this, but must consult the people of Salt and Kerak.

Q 6. The Government will not disarm the people or to leave them armed.—A. His Excellency's speech at Salt stated no disarmament at present. If in future local Government wish to disarm, British will raise no objection.

Q 7. Political offenders who take refuge in the country not to be surrendered.—A. Political refugees will not be surrendered

Q 8. Trade between here and Palestine will be free, for Damascus there must be an arrangement with French.—A. Trade between here and Palestine will be free, for Damascus there must be an arrangement with French.

Q 9. As the Hedjaz is waki to the whole of Islam, we ask Great Britain to arrange for the Hedjaz to be under Damascus. Deraa-Medina line not yet decided by Peace Conference

Q 10. The Government can choose its own flag.—A. The national Government can choose its own flag

Q 11. The British will supply necessary arms, &c., on payment to the country.—A. The British will supply necessary arms, &c., on payment to the country.

Q 12. We request that Great Britain be the guarantor for the whole of Syria.—A. This is for the Peace Conference to decide

Comments on above Points sent to Major Somerset.

1. You should reply that the population of Salt, Amman and Kerak have, no doubt, their own views on this question and must be consulted

2. Ditto.

3. The Government of the area in question will be autonomous. It is suggested that you emphasise the word "autonomous."

4. Your reply approved

5. There appears to be no occasion for the formation of the army, there being no aggression on the part of the sheikhs being strongly to be deprecated. A. It would rather be concentrated on the formation of a local police force for maintenance of internal order, collection of taxes, &c

6. Your reply approved

7. Ditto

8. Trade between the whole area and Palestine to be free and to be encouraged, trade with Damascus to be decided by the Peace Conference. British will use their good services. Customs question is under review

9. Your reply approved

10. You should attempt to avoid discussion on the question of the flag

11. See (5) above. It is not quite realised what arms and machine guns are required for now that the war is over

12. The British will accept the mandate without consulting other Powers. The friendship and advice of the British Government will, however, always be forthcoming

It would appear that the version in your possession of the sheikhs' questions and Major Somerset's answers thereto is not identical with the original and I trust that the enclosed copies of the originals may reassure you that the answers given by Major Somerset were in no way calculated to put difficulties in the way of, nor to bring discredit upon your Administration, and were, in any case, a genuine endeavour to express the principles laid down in my address at Es Salt

Political Refugees in Aylun

You mention that according to report from my agents, Major Somerset takes an active interest in the affairs of the leading refugees from the Hauran

This is so and rightly, as the political refugees from the Hauran are a source of concern to the British no less than to the French Administration and need careful supervision. I have no reason to suppose that Major Somerset is in any way prejudiced against the refugees. I will draw your attention to the fact that when he first arrived in the district the natives of Irbid and the immediate neighbourhood had reached Mugheiyir en route to assist the

* A share of customs will be allocated to Transjordan, but part may be taken for (1920-21) Public Debt.

Hawarneh, and by Major Somerset's influence were persuaded to return peaceably to their homes. Also that, subsequent to that date, he on more than one occasion succeeded in checking anti French propagandists who were endeavouring to raise the Ajloun against your troops in the Hauran. I need hardly mention that the ex-Hauranisi miss no opportunity of creating trouble for your Administration, and in a lesser degree for our Administration, and I venture to suggest that it is as much in your interest as in ours that Major Somerset should continue to take an active interest in their affairs, so that he may keep in touch with their movements

Ali Khulki.

Before discussing the position of this individual, I would remind you of the principles under which the local Administration in Transjordan is being established. The task of the British officers in that area is that of tendering advice and rendering assistance in the formation of local institutions, and the promotion of a force for public security.

In accordance with these principles Major Somerset proceeded to assist in the formation of a local council at Ajloun, which, by its reputation and repute, was elected by the local council as their kaimakam.

After my conversation with M. de Caix I wrote to Major Somerset and desired him to use his influence to secure the removal of Ali Khulki Bey, and he did so, but the local council did not concur. I was not in a position to issue an "order" as stated in the note which I have received from Major Somerset and which is attached.

With regard to Ali Khulki Bey's letter to Rachid, he denies having written any such letter and I should be much obliged if you would forward me the original of it. I shall then be able to go further into the matter.

Yours sincerely,
HERBERT SAMUEL.

Enclosure 2 in No. 323.

Ali Khulki Bey to Major Somerset

(forwarded to High Commissioner)

I HAVE the honour to forward to you the decision of the local council of the 23rd October, 1920, the members of which refuse to accept Ali Khulki's resignation unless the accusation against him is proved.

October 26, 1920.

ALI KHULKI

Decision of the Local Council

WHEREAS the High Commissioner in Palestine, requiring the resignation of Ali Khulki for political reasons, the accusation of joining in the attack in the Hauran is untrue and Ali Khulki is prepared to defend himself before his Excellency the High Commissioner.

Therefore we have decided not to accept his resignation unless the accusation is proved.

Enclosure 3 in No.

Letter addressed to French Consul General, Jerusalem

Sir,

Jerusalem September 24, 1920

WITH reference to your conversation with his Excellency the High Commissioner on the 11th September, concerning the procedure to be followed when a person has committed a crime in the French zone of Syria and takes refuge in Palestine. I have the honour to suggest that the rules attached should be provisionally adopted. After the mandates for Syria and Palestine have been granted, it will be possible to enact a law in Palestine which will give effect to the principles of extradition

that are followed by Great Britain. I would suggest that the arrangement be carried out by an exchange of notes between the High Commissioners for Palestine and Syria, who would no doubt prescribe similar conditions for the surrender of a person who committed a crime in Palestine and takes refuge in the French zone.

I have &c

W. H. DEEDES, Civil Secretary

Enclosure 4 in No. 323.

Draft Rules for the Surrender of Fugitive Offenders between Syria and Palestine.

I. WHERE a person who is a fugitive in Palestine is wanted for an offence committed in Syria, the High Commissioner of Syria shall forward a request to the High Commissioner of Palestine for his extradition through the French consul or other official representing the Syrian Government. The application will be accompanied by:

- (1) A warrant of arrest issued by the court or magistrate exercising jurisdiction in Syria, and stating the offence with which the accused man is charged.
- (2) Depositions or statements taken on oath before such court or magistrate clearly stating the actual charge and containing a description of the person claimed, and any particulars that may serve to identify him.

II. The High Commissioner for Palestine will refer the application to an official magistrate, and if the magistrate is satisfied that the evidence would justify committal for trial if the fugitive had been a Palestine subject and the offence had been committed in Palestine, he shall commit the fugitive to prison for extradition. A person shall not be extradited unless he is charged with an offence punishable under the Ottoman Penal Code with at least one year's imprisonment, or if the offence in respect of which the surrender is demanded is, in the judgment of the High Commissioner or magistrate, of a political character. The magistrate shall at any time during the proceedings of extradition receive any evidence tendered to show that the offence in question is of a political character, or that the request for the surrender of the fugitive is made with a view to the trial of the accused for such an offence.

III. Where a fugitive is committed for extradition, the High Commissioner shall issue an order directing that the accused be given up to a person therein described, who shall receive the fugitive at the place and time specified, detain him and convey him out of Palestine, and all reasonable assistance shall be afforded to him in that behalf.

IV. The person surrendered shall only be tried for the offence in respect of which he was surrendered, or an offence provable by the facts on which extradition is granted, and if acquitted on that charge, he must be given a reasonable opportunity of returning to Palestine.

V. A person who has been convicted by a Syrian court in his presence of an offence for which extradition may be granted, he shall be surrendered provided that:—

- (1) The request for his extradition is made in the manner aforesaid, and is accompanied by judicial documents clearly stating the offence, and place, and time of conviction.
- (2) The evidence produced before the magistrate shall be such as to satisfy the magistrate of the fact of conviction.

VI. The Government of Palestine reserves absolute discretion as to granting or refusing the surrender of a British subject for an offence committed in Syria.

VII. The arrangement for extradition between the Governments of Palestine and Syria shall be reciprocal.

E 16190/1136 44

No. 4

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 186.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, December 10, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to submit that it is desirable to lay down the days which are to be recognised as holidays for officials of the Government belonging to the Moslem, Christian and Jewish religions.

It is necessary that each group should have an equal number of days, and I attach a suggested programme allotting eight days to each.

The reason for choosing eight days is that this is the minimum number which can be allotted to the Jews. It would be a gross breach of religious custom for them to work upon any of the days mentioned, almost, if not quite as great a breach, as if they were to work upon the Sabbath.

It has consequently been necessary to find eight days each for Moslems and Christians.

After consulting with local authorities, it has been decided that it will be best to avoid distinguishing between Orthodox on the one hand and Catholics and Protestants on the other, and it has been found that, as regards the Christians, the days suggested are not included because Sunday is in any case a day non to Christians, the Moslem authorities have been consulted regarding the days allotted to them.

It is proposed that Empire Day should not be included because Palestine is not a part of the British Empire. But I should be glad of your Lordship's views as to whether the King's birthday should be added as a holiday common to all creeds.

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL,

High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 324

Proposed Table of Holidays.

The dates vary according to those observed, observe the Gregorian, Julian or	Return from Nabi Musa of Samak and Sherd	Feast
	(Prinshat's birthday)	Christmas (2)
Christmas Day		Pentecost.
Whit Monday		New Year (2)
New Year's Day.	Shogor Harem (3 days)	Atonement.
Epiphany		Tabernacles (2).
Good Friday.	Qurban Harem (3 days)	
Easter Monday.		
Ascension.		

E 16193 13556 44]

No. 325.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 190.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, December 11, 1920.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 263 dated the 24th ultimo, and my despatch No. 181 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith:—

- (a.) The letter dated the 31st October from Ali Khulki to me, and copy of the translation made in my translation bureau.

- (b.) Copy of the covering letter which I sent with this translation to the French consul-general Jerusalem.

- (c.) Copy of the French consul-general's reply.

- (d.) My reply to the letter.

- (e.) The article which appeared in "Al Carmel" on the 10th November, and translation made in the Criminal Investigation Department.

I also attach the following documents:—

- (f.) Copy of letter dated the 7th October from General Gouraud to General

- (g.) Copy of my letter dated the 10th November to General Gouraud.*

It is evident from the investigation it would appear that Ali Khulki's letter in Arabic agrees substantially with the "Carmel" article and with the translation of "Carmel" article, the first translation of Ali Khulki's letter (a) being incomplete as regards the parts marginally marked in (c), which were omitted in the translation of Ali Khulki's

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL,

High Commissioner

Enclosure 1 in No. 32.

Ali Khulki, Bey to Sir H. Samuel

(Transla

Your Excellency,

Ajloun, October 31, 1920.

I have the honour to send to your Excellency the following

Mr Somerset, the British representative in Ajloun, has informed me of your letter and of the communications that have taken place between him and General Gouraud, the French High Commissioner, and your Excellency, in which he states that Ali Khulki Bey has been sentenced to death by the French owing to his hostility to them, and that he disobeyed His Majesty King Faisal's orders and fought against them. Moreover, he sent a letter recently to Rasaid Bey Taha urging him against the French. Therefore Ali Khulki is not a proper person to receive an appointment in a Government protected by Great Britain.

To the above I answer the following:

I fought against the French in the past for the independence of Syria, a country which has been divided into eight Governments, deprived of its power, and its flag it gloried in has been changed for flags of different colours.

We, the Arabs, expected the French Government to reverence every man who served his country and to get his name registered in the pages of history, but the deed of the French Government that we have heard of and seen, and her sentencing to death the nobles of the nation degrades the honour of history and culture of the Arab nation, which was a leader in instructing nations to obtain their independence and liberty.

I, Ali Khulki, shall continue endeavouring to obtain the independence of my country, and my love for independence shall not die as long as I am alive, and when I intend to oppose the French I will render my resignation and rise up fearlessly.

When I disobeyed King Faisal's orders that was a matter between him and me, the truth as to which will be known to all.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant.

Ali Khulki, Bey

has kingship as long as he is

and should not interfere in my affairs with Faisal, and if he enquired from the French representatives about what took place between the King and myself he might learn the reasons.

With regard to my sending a letter to Rasaid Bey Taha, of whose present whereabouts I have no idea, in which I urged him to fight against the French. This accusation of General Gouraud is similar to the accusation he brought against myself

* No. 32.

[5773.]

the Emir Mahmud and Ahmed Eff Murewed of being the leaders in the incident of Khirbat-el-Ghazaleh. At that time I was in Haifa, the Emir Mahmud at Rahub, and Ahmed Eff. Murewed in the Karafat district, but all of us were sentenced to death. Such threats, in any case, will not affect us as we are of those who wish to be free.

Let it be known to your Excellency that since my arrival in Ajloun, my district, I have thought only of the future of the district and its security. Owing to my reputation certain persons may have forged my name to such a letter, the authorship of which I absolutely deny. My handwriting and signature are known to all.

I wish the letter in question to be sent here and that it should be examined by a committee formed of the British representative and a French officer, who shall ascertain the truth about it.

Let it be known to your Excellency also that this my defence is not submitted for the purpose of keeping me in my position, but in order to preserve the rights of the country and my own, and to preserve the honour of the British nation which has taken on her part to ensure self government to the inhabitants of Transjordan.

How can that come about if the influence of General Gouraud and the calumnies of certain persons can make themselves felt?

How are the inhabitants to believe that they are independent when they see that General Gouraud intends to take vengeance upon the natives?

I implore your Excellency to preserve the honour of Great Britain whom we from the bottom of our hearts, wish to be our mandatory owing to the fame of her justice.

I request your Excellency also to forward my statement to his Excellency General Gouraud.

ALI KHULKI, Katmakam

Enclosure 2 in No 323

British High Commissioner to French Consul-General, Jerusalem.

Sir, I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th November, 1920, in which you forward me a copy of a communication received from Ali Khulki, Katmakam of Ajloun, and to request that you will kindly transmit it to General Gouraud.

I have, &c

W. H. DEEDS,
Civil Secretary.

Enclosure 3 in No 323

French Consul-General, Jerusalem, to British High Commissioner

M. le Secrétaire, Jérusalem, le 18 novembre 1920.
J'ai l'honneur de vous accuser réception de votre lettre du 17 de ce mois, et je ne manquerai pas de transmettre au Haut-Commissariat de Beyrouth la pièce qui y est annexée.

Je regrette, cependant que cette communication officielle ne me soit parvenue si tard, et qu'elle soit ainsi exposée à arriver plusieurs jours après le courrier par lequel j'ai expédié à Beyrouth des hier, et par lequel j'ai envoyé le No 673 du journal "Al Carmel" en date du 16 novembre. Cette publication avait inséré une lettre ouverte de Ali Khulki, reproduisant celle que vous avez bien voulu me transmettre, mais en la déformant.

Il est probable que cette réponse par la voie de la presse à une démarche officielle fera la plus fâcheuse impression.

Veuillez agréer,

L. RAIS

Enclosure 4 in N

British High Commissioner to French Consul-General, Jerusalem

Jerusalem, November 25, 1920

Sir, I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th November, and am directed by his Excellency the High Commissioner to state that the occurrence of the incident to which you allude is very much regretted.

It was not, of course, known here that Ali Khulki Bey's letter had appeared in "Al Carmel" at the time when the original received from him was sent to you. A procedure on the part of Ali Khulki Bey was most improper, and the whole matter has been referred to M.

Yours &c
(For Civil Secretary),
E. T. RICHMOND

Enclosure 5 in No 323

Extract from "Al Carmel" dated November 16, 1920

Translation)

To his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the British liaison officer of Ajloun, Mr Somerset has informed me the orders of your Excellency, and also of the communication of General Gouraud, the French High Commissioner with your Excellency, in which he said that Ali Khulki was an enemy to the French, used to fight against and disobeyed the Emir Feisal's orders, and therefore the French Government has sentenced me to death; that I, lastly, wrote a letter to Raschid Bey Talh instigating him against the French, and therefore I should not be given a post in an administration which is under the British mandate.

In reply to this I say: My fighting against the French in the past was for the independence of my country (Syria), which has been divided to-day to eight administrations, dispossessed of its self-government and its flag, which has been changed for flags of strange colours. We Arabs thought and expected that the French Government appreciated the works of him who serves the independence of his nation, and respects him, writing his name in the history books with great respect. The things we saw, the sentence passed on the nation of concession and death does not meet with the historical honour of the French nation, which has been a lesson to the nations in reaching their independence and obtaining their liberty. Therefore I, Ali Khulki, shall never fail to defend the independence of our country, and my sympathies towards independence will not die as long as I live. But if I work against the French I shall resign my Government posts and then rise to work with impunity and without fear.

My disobedience to His Majesty Feisal's orders, that is a case between me and His Majesty, and history may explain it, because I, His Majesty and every Arab are responsible to this fatherland, and everything concerning its independence, and he who shirks this is a traitor. We all respect our King Feisal and confess to his kingdom as long as he is loyal to that view, and General Gouraud has no right to interfere with what was or will be between me and His Majesty King Feisal. Had General Gouraud enquired and asked the French diplomatic officers in Damascus about the things that took place between me and King Feisal, he would have understood the reasons which may have not been made public.

In sending a letter to Raschid Bey Talh, of whose whereabouts to-day I am ignorant, to instigate him against the French, this act is equal to that of General Gouraud in sentencing me, Emir Mahmud and Ahmed Eff Murewi to death, accusing us of being the cause of the Khirbat-el-Ghazaleh incident. At this time during the affair I was at Haifa, the Emir at Rahub, and Ahmed in Karafat, in Ajloun district. At any rate, we have honour, and our efforts will not cease by such threats if we are of those who die for the country. I beg to inform your Excellency since my arrival in my country Ajloun, that I have only worked in the administrative and constructive affairs, as well as in keeping public security in the country. If some people have

letters should be from me. I have also several political enemies who may have forged letters in my name, but I deny that, because I have a handwriting and signature known

to the public. When the actual letter is received and a committee of the British diplomatic officer, together with a French officer, meet in Ajloun district, the truth will be known.

I beg to inform your Excellency that my reason of defence is not in order that I may remain in my post, but to defend my rights, the rights of the country and honour of the British nation, which took the responsibility upon herself to defend the independence of the country. How can Transjordan be independent if the influence of General Gouraud, through intrigues, dominates it? And how can the inhabitants of the country feel that they are independent and their rights respected if General Gouraud's hand stretches over the country to take revenge on the inhabitants?

This is what I submit to your Excellency, and I beg you to defend the rights and respectability of Great Britain, which we rejoice with all our hearts in the mantle of power over us, because of her famous justice. I beg your Excellency also to inform General Gouraud of my statements.

ALJ KHUKI.

Adjutory Colonel and Kaimakam, Ajloun.

Enclosure 4 in No 325.

General Gouraud to General Comptre

M. le 2 octobre 1920
Je vous avez bien voulu prendre au sujet de l'établissement de communications entre nous, par l'intermédiaire du poste de télégraphie sans fil de Hamleh et, au besoin, par aéroplane.

De mon côté, croyez bien que j'ai été heureux de pouvoir donner quelque assistance au Air Vice-Marshal Salmon.

Je suis bien aise que vous me donniez, par votre lettre si cordiale et si franche, l'occasion de m'expliquer avec vous sur certains faits, de nature à jeter un léger trouble sur les relations de nos Gouvernements dans ces pays.

Vous me proposez très loyalement de vous signaler le nom des officiers dont je désignerai les agissements comme peu amicaux envers nous. Je n'hésite pas, dans ce cas, à vous donner le nom du Major Somerset, qui a pris, depuis plus d'une année, une attitude si marquée qu'il n'est plus permis d'avoir de doute à cet égard.

En 1919, le Lieutenant-Colonel Somerset, représentant l'armée britannique dans la Mission franco-anglaise qui fut envoyée dans le pays Alaouite auprès du Sheikh Saleh pour négocier la paix, fut invité à faire sa nomination. "Nous sommes venus pour entendre les plaintes contre le Gouvernement." Pendant un mois que dura la Mission franco-anglaise, le Lieutenant-Colonel Somerset prit ouvertement le parti de la population soulevée dans les cas de Marias et de Tarcous, par l'intermédiaire de son interprète Rustan.

Le Commandant de Courson, qui succéda à la mission du Colonel Nieger, lui faisant remarquer qu'il aidait ainsi le parti des rebelles déjà auteurs de nombreux pillages et meurtres, le Major Somerset s'en défendait en soutenant la théorie que les Français devraient tout accepter pour se faire bienvenir des Arabes, faute de quoi il s'exposeraient à une révolte générale qui leur ferait perdre leur pays.

Je connais cette théorie; les faits l'ont démentie.

Je connais cette théorie; les faits l'ont démentie.

Pendant la colonne qui en l'an au mois de mai, après le massacre de Ain Inbel (au de Tyre), le Major se rencontre à Yarouh avec le Commandant Aelabosse, la colonne, il prit le parti des Chittes, auteurs des massacres, et donna asile aux rebelles réfugiés en zone britannique.

Aucun des meurtriers de Ain Inbel, réfugiés dans la cava de Safed et réclamés par les autorités françaises, n'a pas été livré.

Enfin, depuis notre installation dans la région de Damas, il n'est un rapport de mon service de renseignements qui ne me signale le Major soit comme président des réunions de chefs hostiles, soit se montrant en public et prodiguant des marques de sympathie à nos pires ennemis réfugiés en zone de mandat anglais, à des hommes

lesquels nous demandons extradition. Il aurait fait donner un poste officiel, celui de kaimakan d'Irbid, à l'un d'eux, Ab Khulki Bay, ainsi qu'il appert des lettres adressées par celui-ci récemment au kaimakan de Deran. Or, Ab Khulki est le principal

auteur et instigateur des massacres commis sur les populations chrétiennes de M...

le 2 septembre, avec les chefs d'Ajloun, et par les articles de cette convention nous recevons ceci. Article 1^{er} Réponse à la demande concernant l'annexion au Gouvernement d'Ajloun du Hourge, de Merdjayoun (tous les pays de mandat français : Impossible actuellement, mais on y travaillera auprès du délégué de Sa Majesté le Roi. Article 3. Au sujet des criminels : Aucun individu réfugié dans cette zone pour crime politique ne sera certainement livré, aucun des habitants poursuivis pour crime politique ou autre commis antérieurement. Article 12. Armes seront fournies à l'Ajloun par le Gouvernement suivant nécessités. Article 13. Au sujet du mandat du Gouvernement britannique sur la totalité de la Syrie : Demain le devra être adressée à la Société des Nations.

De tout ceci, je n'ai pas entre les mains les preuves absolues. Vous savez, comme en pareille matière une preuve est difficile à obtenir, et il me repugnerait, d'autre part, de laisser croire que je veux avoir tout à fait...

faits que je vous signale, et dans le cas où mes très fortes prescriptions seraient confirmées, je vous serais obligé de marquer, par un avis, votre désapprobation.

Vous savez, qu'en pareille matière, je m'inspire non seulement des intérêts français, mais de cette considération qu'en Mésopotamie comme en Syrie...

l'anger du nationalisme arabe derrière lequel on peut redouter de voir apparaître le bolchevisme, nos deux nations ont un intérêt commun à "s'aider mutuellement dans toutes les voies possibles, comme nous l'avons si bien fait sur les champs de bataille," pour reprendre votre phrase. On ne saurait mieux dire.

Je vous prie, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL

E 18195 13555 44]

No 326

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 28.)

Jerusalem, December 10, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I have to-day received a visit from M. Raiz, the French consul-general in Jerusalem. M. Raiz came to discuss affairs in the British zone in Trans-Jordan, and to ascertain to what extent the rumours current that there was a concentration of Shensi forces in and about Amman were true. I had already communicated to him portions of the reports received regarding events at Amman and in the neighbourhood, and this I supplemented with the latest in my possession. I further assured him that the British political officers in Trans-Jordan were exerting every effort to maintain tranquillity in the area.

M. Raiz begged leave to call attention to the consideration that...

French and British forces should materialise. French troops in that area might find themselves in the necessity, in order to repel such attacks, to pursue the Arab forces a short distance beyond the French frontier and into the British zone. He pointed out that any such infringement of the boundary would be but temporary and for the more effective conduct of the military operations. I observed that I trusted that the circumstances to which he alluded would not arise, and that, if they did do so, an infringement of the boundary would be of a local and temporary nature.

In reply to a question of M. Raiz, I informed him that the British political officers in Trans-Jordan were in...

forces, M. Raiz, I informed him that the British political officers in Trans-Jordan were in...

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL

High Commissioner

Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 3821)

My Lord,

Paris, December 26, 1920.

WITH reference to paragraph 5 of the note from the French Government dated the 21st instant which I transmitted to you in my despatch No. 15772 18556 44) relative to the agreement made by the Italian Government to the League of Nations were not in a position to take any decision on the question of the mandates affecting those countries which had previously formed part of the Ottoman Empire before the Treaty of Peace with Turkey had been ratified I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a note which I have received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on this subject.

I should be glad to learn what answer I should send to the French Government.

I have, &

HARDINGE OF PENNINGTON

Enclosure in No. 32

by French Ministry for Foreign Affairs

L'ART 23 de la note du 21 décembre concernant la protestation contre la décision de San Remo qui a attribué les territoires de la Mésopotamie à la France et à la Grande-Bretagne.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères, à l'occasion de la réception d'une déclaration verbale faite auprès de lui par le Gouvernement italien et comportant une protestation au caractère juridique des territoires sous mandat, tant que le Traité de Paix avec la Turquie ne sera pas ratifié.

La démarche dont il s'agit paraît, à la réflexion, mériter un examen sérieux à qu'un échange de vues entre les deux Gouvernements. En effet, le retard qui a été maintenant quant à la ratification du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie pose pour les mandataires des problèmes pratiques d'une grande importance.

front, c'était jusqu'ici le régime d'occupation militaire qui seul paraissait régir les territoires. Cependant, cette situation provisoire, qui dure depuis plus de deux ans, paraît devoir durer encore longtemps. La nécessité de procéder à une organisation politique, administrative et judiciaire des territoires, l'obligation stricte de faire régner à la fois l'ordre et la justice, le désir, conforme à l'esprit du mandat, d'assurer le développement intellectuel et moral des populations, toutes ces raisons nous font trouver

une base juridique et légale à la mise en vigueur des lois, décrets, règlements ou arrêtés que l'Administration mandataire devra mettre en vigueur dans le mandat.

Le Gouvernement français pense, après mûr examen, que la situation peut être trouvée d'ores et déjà.

On peut se reporter à l'article 22 du Traité de Versailles, qui a prévu, avant la discussion du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie, le détachement de certains territoires ottomans destinés à être mis sous mandat. D'après ce point de vue, la décision prise à San Remo, le 25 avril, d'attribuer le mandat sur la Syrie et le Liban à la France ainsi que les mandats sur la Palestine et la Mésopotamie à la Grande-Bretagne, apparaît comme la mise en application, par la seule autorité qui pouvait prendre une décision valable, d'un article du traité déjà en vigueur.

S'appuyant à la fois sur l'article 22 du Traité de Versailles et sur la décision de San Remo que les deux Puissances ont pu déposer les termes de leur mandat sur le Bureau de la Société des Nations, malgré le caractère de simple projet que revêt, jusqu'à sa ratification, le Traité de Paix. En vue du but pratique poursuivi, par les deux Gouvernements, il ne paraît pas absolument nécessaire que les termes du mandat soient approuvés par le Conseil de la Société des Nations pour qu'ils soient conformes à l'esprit de l'acte.

C'est cette argumentation qui a été développée auprès du Gouvernement français lorsqu'il a fait la déclaration verbale rappelée ci-dessus, et le Gouvernement français a

exprimé le vœu que le Gouvernement italien ne fasse pas à Genève des déclarations dans le sens de sa déclaration verbale de Paris, afin d'éviter de jeter le trouble dans l'esprit de certains membres du Conseil qui pourraient être tentés de ne pas approuver les termes des mandats avant d'être avisés de l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie. Une telle action de la part de l'Italie aurait même l'inconvénient de laisser les populations indigènes plus longtemps dans le doute sur la validité du mandat, et le Gouvernement français est décidé, en ce qui le concerne, à poursuivre sa politique d'organisation du mandat français sans se préoccuper outre mesure du retard apporté à la ratification des termes du mandat par la Société des Nations ou, éventuellement, par la réserve italienne.

Pour amener le retrait de cette objection du Gouvernement italien, le meilleur moyen paraît être une déclaration faite par les deux Gouvernements, et surtout qu'il ne s'agit pas de revenir sur les termes de

Le Président du Conseil, en priant son Excellence Lord Hardinge de transmettre les considérations ci-dessus à son Gouvernement, serait heureux d'apprendre qu'il est prêt à faire connaître au Gouvernement italien des vues identiques à celles développées dans la présente note.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris,
24 décembre 1920.

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem)

No. 3821)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, December 28, 1920.

I propose to suggest following general lines of procedure to French Government to govern communication between you and French High Commissioner for Syria.

1. Communications should take place direct or through respective consular officers at Damascus and Jerusalem regarding matters of purely local interest of a non-political character, e.g., commercial and customs questions, matters in the regulation of which consular officers have functions recognised by treaty and usage, administrative questions of relative unimportance &c. You would use your discretion as to sending us copies of such communications.

2. As a general rule, no direct communications would take place on questions with a political or politico-military character except for urgent communication of information regarding matters of fact. You would not telegraph in cypher, when consular channel might be employed. You would report substance of such communications at the time by telegraph or by despatch, according to degree of importance and urgency.

Otherwise, unless direct communications were expressly authorised by two Governments in agreement, all communications would take place through respective Foreign Offices, except in very occasional cases of real emergency, where it might be imperative for you to discuss direct a question involving matters of policy. You would then proceed as under 2.

3. We think it of great importance that the status of consular officers in mandated territories should not at present acquire any diplomatic character.

Please telegraph any observations you desire to offer.
Please repeat to Beirut and Bagdad.

Earl Curzon to the Marquis Imperiali

THE Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Italian Ambassador and has the honour to refer to Signor Preziosi's interview with the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the 18th December regarding the mandates over certain territories detached from Turkey by the Treaty of Peace, signed at Sevres August last.

In that interview Signor Preziosi read a telegram from the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs instructing him to inform Earl Curzon of Kedleston that the Italian Government were unable to recognise the right of the Council of the League of Nations to confer any mandates over former Turkish territories so long as the Treaty of Sevres had not entered into force. The telegram contained at the same time an assurance from Count Sforza that the attitude of the Italian Government was in no sense inspired by any ill will against His Majesty's Government, and that the Italian Government did not propose to raise objections, in fact, to the activities of British officials in the zones placed under British influence by the treaty which has not yet entered into force.

Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out to Signor Preziosi on this occasion that it was difficult to reconcile this assurance of Italian benevolence towards His Majesty's Government with a step which is calculated to cause His Majesty's Government the maximum of trouble, whilst bringing no advantage to Italy. The Italian Government on their part have, it is understood, actually ratified the Treaty of Sevres. They know that His Majesty's Government are anxious to obtain Turkish ratification, which whilst it would establish a formal basis on which to proclaim a state of peace, would not in practice preclude such modifications of parts of the treaty as in the circumstances might prove incapable of execution. Nevertheless, the Italian Government, on the one hand, follow a policy opposed to the bringing into operation of the treaty which they have ratified, and, on the other hand, declare that, because the treaty has not been ratified by the other principal Allied Powers, no mandates are to be put into operation. They wish His Majesty's Government at the same time to believe that this procedure is neither unfriendly nor inconsiderate.

It is not easy for His Majesty's Government to regard the matter in the same light. Rightly or wrongly, they have accepted the responsibilities conferred upon them by the principal Allied Powers for the administration of the mandated territories in Mesopotamia and Palestine. This administration is involving them in the loss of numerous gallant troops, the expenditure of large sums of money and the huge perpetual anxieties. The one hope of His Majesty's Government is that their position in these territories may be definitely legalised without delay, so that administration and finance can at last be placed on a proper footing and order maintained in the name of duly constituted authority. They are accordingly

definitely one of the mandates. At the eleventh hour, however, the Italian Government, on the strength of what appears at the most to be a pure bluff, insist on making the position of His Majesty's Government indefinite.

In these circumstances, Lord Curzon wishes to repeat the earnest hope already expressed by Sir Eyre Crowe that on reconsidering the position, the Italian Government will withdraw their declaration, and he would be glad if the Marquis Imperiali would convey this expression of his views at an early date to Count Sforza.

Foreign Office, December 28, 1920.

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No. 330

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon. (Received December 29)

No. 144

My Lord,

Jerusalem, December 13, 1920.

With reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 281 of the 8th December, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the Land Transfer Ordinance, together with a note written thereon.

I have &c
(For the High Commissioner)
E. KEITH ROACH

Enclosure 1 in No. 330

Note on the Land Transfer Ordinance

THE Land Transfer Ordinance, so long expected, has now been issued, and transactions in land will be permitted from the 1st October. The general principle of the ordinance is that all transactions, other than leases for a term of not

three years, must be carried out through the Land Registry and must receive the sanction of the High Commissioner. Any person who is found to be disposing of or acquiring land illegally will be liable to fine and forfeiture of the land.

A reason for requiring the consent of the Administration is to prevent speculation in land, which will cause an excessive rise in prices and prevent the development of the country. Transactions will only be allowed if the person acquiring the land will cultivate it, supposing it is agricultural land, or develop it immediately, supposing it is

the subject of the control of the Administration is to protect the small farmer in his holding. If he is the owner of land he will be unable to sell such part as is necessary for the maintenance of himself and his family and if he is the landlord will be unable to sell without leaving sufficient land for himself. The amount to be left for the small landowner will differ in various parts of the country, and will be determined according to the quality of the land by the District Governor.

Every disposition of land will be commenced by a petition to the High Commissioner. A disposition includes a sale, a mortgage, a gift, a constitution of wakf and any lease for more than three years. The petition will be accompanied by a certificate from the mukhtar as to the title of the transferor and the documents of title.

The High Commissioner in the district registries will give all persons desiring to dispose of land and will furnish them with the necessary forms. The proposed purchaser must be disclosed and the registration must take place in his name. The High Commissioner will see if the conditions of the ordinance are satisfied and will examine the title of the transferor. If the transaction is found to be in order it will be referred to the District Governor for his consent.

The District Governor will give his consent only if the person acquiring the land fulfils the following conditions:

1. He must be a resident of Palestine.

2. He must not acquire land exceeding either £ E. 3,000 in value or a certain

3. He must prove that he intends to cultivate or develop the land immediately.

The ordinance is introduced to prevent the land being bought by speculators from outside the country and also to prevent the increase of large areas of land in a few hands. In order to prevent speculation a further restriction is introduced: that if the land has been disposed of within a year the Governor shall not give his consent to a further disposition, unless the transferor gives a satisfactory reason for wishing to dispose of it again. It would be a satisfactory reason if the original purchaser had died during the year and his heirs had to sell the property. But the ordinance will prevent people from buying land simply in order to sell to others at a profit.

The High Commissioner can consent to land transactions without any restriction, provided that he is satisfied that they will be for the public benefit. And all transactions which can not be passed by the District Governor either because of the value and area of the land to be disposed of, or because the person acquiring is not a resident, will be referred to him.

Companies and associations will be allowed to acquire land in their own name to acquire larger areas than can be consented to by the Governor if they are going to use the land immediately for their business, e.g., for building a factory or an institution for erecting houses, which are so badly needed in the country. The Ottoman law which placed restrictions on associations holding land has been completely modified. A company or association may acquire land for any purpose, but a transfer will only be permitted when the High Commissioner is satisfied that the land will be used for the public good. The High Commissioner may submit to the Land Commission any proposed transaction for their advice.

When the consent of the District Governor or the High Commissioner has been obtained, the transaction will be registered in the Land Registry. The Government cannot give any guarantee of title till the Land Settlement Court has decided on the rights of ownership throughout the country. The Administration intends to introduce immediately a law to secure the good development of towns.

and persons buying land in an urban district will be subject to any rules that may be made in this respect. All these conditions will be brought clearly to the notice of any person acquiring land at the registry.

The prohibition of the execution of judgment by sale of land is continued until further order. A commission on the establishment of credit banks has been sitting, and it is hoped that one or more banks will be founded in Palestine which will enable land-owners to obtain loans at present.

The Courts are also prohibited from making any order directing a caution to be entered against the title of any person for an order directing a caution to be entered against the title of any person.

The Registrar shall show the true record of the land, which is far from being the case at present. The consent of the Government is not required for registration of the title.

Mortgages shall be carried out according to the law passed during the war by the Turkish Government, which introduced a much better system than the old *Bu al Waki*. Under the Turkish law now to be applied, the mortgager retains the ownership of the land, and the lender cannot take advantage of a borrower's needs.

The fees in the Land Registries on transactions will be lower than they were in the Turkish law. Three per cent. of the value of the land will be taken in the case of a sale or gift, and 1 per cent. of the value of the sum lent in a case of mortgage. In the case of successions the fees vary from 1 per cent. to 5 per cent. according to whether the heir is a near or more distant relative. No fees will be charged for people not to evade the law requiring registration, as was the case in the Turkish law.

Once again it may be pointed out that unregistered transactions will not only be null, but will render the parties liable to penalties whenever they are detected by the Land Registry officials or by the Court; and when the Land Settlement Court is investigating titles throughout the country, the true state of the ownership of all the land will be made clear.

Enclosure 2 in No. 330

Land Transfer Ordinance

WHEREAS an Ordinance of the 18th November, 1918, prohibited all dispositions of immovable property pending the re-establishment of the Land Registry offices, and

Whereas the Land Registry offices have been re-established, and in order to meet the needs of the people it is desirable that transactions having in view the immediate use and cultivation of land be permitted, and

Whereas it is necessary to take measures to prevent speculative dealings in land and to protect the present occupants, and

Whereas a Land Settlement Court is shortly to be established which will adjudicate on all titles, and in the meantime no guarantee of titles can be given by the Government, and

Whereas it is intended to introduce legislation to secure the orderly planning of Palestine, and the erection of buildings of land in the neighbourhood of towns will be subject to the control of the Government; and

Whereas the Government is taking measures to facilitate the establishment of credit banks in Palestine which will have power to lend on the security of immovable property, and pending the establishment of such banks it is desirable to continue the prohibition of sales of land in satisfaction of a mortgage or execution of a judgment,

Enacted by the High Commissioner for Palestine, in Council, this 1st day of December, 1918.

By the High Commissioner for Palestine, in Council, this 1st day of December, 1918.

form of immovable property, and shall, so far as it applies, cancel the provisions of the Ordinance of the 18th November, 1918.

The expression "disposition" in this ordinance means a sale, mortgage, gift or waqf of every description, and any other disposition of immovable property, and includes a transfer of a mortgage and also a lease for a term of more than three years, or a lease containing an option by virtue of which the term may exceed three years.

3. No disposition of immovable property will be valid until the provisions of this ordinance have been complied with.

4. Any person wishing to make a disposition of immovable property must first obtain the written consent of the Palestine Government.

5. A petition must be presented through the Land Registry Office in the district in which the land is situated, setting out the terms of the agreement intended to be made and applying for his consent to a disposition in accordance with the agreement. The petition must contain an application for registration of a deed to be executed for the purpose of carrying into effect the terms of the agreement. The petition may also include a clause fixing the damages to be paid by either party who refuses to complete the disposition if it is approved.

5. If the application for registration is made by an agent or nominee on behalf of a person, the agent or nominee must be a person of full age and sound mind, and for whom he is acting and the immovable property disposed of shall be registered in the name of the principal.

If at any time it appears in a judicial proceeding that immovable property has been disposed of under this ordinance otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this ordinance, the court may, if it thinks fit, order the parties to the transaction to pay costs, who may impose upon any of the parties concerned penalties by way of damages not exceeding one-fourth of the value of the property.

The Government will be given through the Governor of the district in which the land is situated, provided that he is satisfied that the person acquiring the property fulfils the following conditions:—

(a) He shall not obtain under this ordinance property, in the case of agricultural land, exceeding either 50 donoms in area or £12,500 in value.

(b) He shall not obtain under this ordinance property, in the case of agricultural land, exceeding either 50 donoms in area or £12,500 in value.

(c) He intends himself to cultivate or develop the land immediately.

6. The High Commissioner may also withhold his consent unless he is satisfied that the person acquiring the land, either the person transferring the property, if he is in possession of the land, or the person acquiring the land, if he is not in possession of the land, is a person of full age and sound mind, and is not a person who is disqualified from holding land in the district or elsewhere for the maintenance of himself and his family.

7. The District Governor shall withhold his consent to a disposition of any immovable property if the land has been sold or otherwise disposed of within a year and the intending transferee fails to give satisfactory reason for wishing again to dispose of it.

8. Except in cases complying with the conditions set out in section 6 hereof, a disposition shall be referred to the High Commissioner for his consent, which he may give or withhold on his absolute discretion.

The High Commissioner may refer the application for any such disposition to any commission which may be appointed by him to report upon the closer settlement of the land.

He may consent to the transfer of larger areas of land than may be transferred with the consent of the District Governor where he is satisfied that it will serve some purpose.

9. The provisions of the 22nd *Rub'ul Awa*, 1331 concerning the right of a corporation to acquire land shall remain in force, provided that the High Commissioner may authorise any bank or company to take a mortgage of land and any commercial company registered in Palestine to acquire such land as is necessary for the purpose of carrying out any public utility which is established for the purpose of the development and closer settlement of the land in Palestine.

10. After the consent of the Government has been obtained, a deed shall be executed in the form prescribed by rules made in accordance with section 16 hereof and shall be registered in the Land Registry.

No guarantee of title or of the validity of the transaction is implied by the consent of the Government and the registration of the deed.

A person acquiring land under this ordinance will be subject to any legislation which may hereafter be introduced for the purpose of regulating the right of building and the development of land in, or in the neighbourhood of, the said land.

10. No mortgage shall be accepted for registration unless it is in conformity with the provisions of the Law of 14th Moharram 1331 and the amendments of the said law.

11. Every disposition to which the written consent of the Government has not been obtained shall be null and void, provided that any person who has paid money in respect of a disposition which is null and void may recover the same by action in the Courts.

Nothing in this section shall affect the operation of the public notice No. 115, dated the 30th April, 1919, concerning promissory notes given on account of an invalid transaction in immovable property.

12. If any person is a party to any disposition of immovable property which has not received the consent of the Government, and either enters into possession or permits the other party to enter into possession of the immovable property, whether by himself or by another person, he shall be liable to a fine not exceeding one-fourth of the value of the immovable property.

13. When any immovable property passes by operation of a will or by inheritance, the legatees or heirs, as the case may be, shall be jointly and severally responsible for the registration of the immovable property in the name of the legatees or heirs within a year of the death. The registration shall be made upon the certificate of a competent Court stating that the person or persons acquiring registration are entitled as legatees or heirs, or upon a certificate signed by the mukhtar or imam and two notables.

If registration does not take place within the period of one year, the person or persons liable shall be liable to a fine not exceeding one-fourth of the value of the immovable property for the delay.

14. Any person who obstructs or prevents the execution of a judgment or order of the Court shall be liable to a fine not exceeding one-fourth of the value of the immovable property.

15. Any person who from giving any judgment deciding the ownership of land shall be liable to a fine not exceeding one-fourth of the value of the immovable property.

16. The Courts may hear actions for the partition of land in accordance with the Law of 14th Moharram 1332.

(a) The legal secretary may in a special case allow an action concerning the ownership of land to be heard.

(b) The legal secretary may with the sanction of the High Commissioner appoint such number of registrars and assistant-registrars as may be necessary.

The general superintendence and control over all Land Registry offices in Palestine shall be vested in the legal secretary, who, with the sanction of the High Commissioner, may from time to time make rules as to any of the following matters:—

- The organization, procedure, and business of the land registration officer.
- The function and duties of the registrar and other officials of the Land Registration office.
- The mode in which the register is to be kept.
- The forms to be used for deeds and documents.
- The requirements for attestation and official verification of the execution of deeds.
- The fees payable for, or in connection with, registration.
- Any other matter or thing, whether similar or not to those above mentioned, in respect of which it may be expedient to make rules for the purpose of carrying this ordinance into effect.

17. This ordinance shall be called "The Transfer of Land Ordinance, 1920."

HERBERT SAMUEL,

High Commissioner for Palestine.

Government House, Jerusalem.

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No. 331.

Her H. Samuel to Lord Curzon. (Received December 29.)

No. 204.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, December 14, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th inst. in relation to the regulation of ports in Palestine, and in reply to inform you that the same will be laid before the next meeting of the Advisory Council, and as it is urgent that it should be decided, I will telegraph your approval of the same.

Considerable expenditure has already been incurred in improving the ports at Jaffa and Haifa, and under the military administration dues were levied on vessels using these ports. No ordinance, however, has been issued to regulate the charges as soon as possible. The Government has been acquiescent in the payment, but recently the agent of the Messageries Maritimes has demanded the charges. An article has been inserted in the ordinance to cover the dues that have been levied in the past.

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL,

High Commissioner

Enclosure 1 in No. 331

Ordinance concerning the Regulation of Ports in Palestine.

WHEREAS in order to assist mercantile commerce expenditure has been incurred in improving and organizing the ports of Palestine, and dues have been charged on vessels using these ports;

And whereas it is necessary to define those dues and to modify and simplify the existing regulations regarding the use of such ports:

It is hereby ordered as follows:—

1. Port dues shall be payable at the rates mentioned below on the net registered tonnage of all vessels of whatsoever nationality making use of any port in Palestine.

1 to 500 tons	5 millimes per registered ton.
501 to 1,000	
1,001 and upwards	

Provided that—

- The maximum due payable on any vessel shall be £1.
- If a vessel has paid dues at one port in Palestine, half only of the dues mentioned above, with a maximum of £E. 10, shall be payable at any other port in Palestine on the same voyage.
- In the case of a vessel arriving at any port in Palestine from a foreign country or from another port in Palestine and leaving without having taken on cargo, and without having landed or taken on board any passengers, only one-half of the dues shall be charged that would otherwise be payable.

2. The Controller of Ports and Lights is of opinion that the actual measurement of the tonnage of vessels cannot be obtained in order to ascertain the registered tonnage, a fee of £T. 15 shall be charged for the measurement.

The following vessels shall be exempt from the dues levied under this article:—

- Vessels belonging to the Government or to a port of refuge.
- Vessels, tugs, lighters, pontoons and launches plying in any port, which shall pay the dues mentioned in article 1.
- Yachts belonging to recognised yacht clubs and wholly in ballast.

3. All port dues herein mentioned shall be payable at the office of the Controller of Ports and Lights previous to clearing outwards, and no vessel shall be taken out of the port by the master without a certificate from the Controller of Ports and Lights that there are no port, quarantine or customs claims upon her. A fee of £T. 5 shall be charged for such certificate.

3. All vessels plying in any port of Palestine shall be registered with the Controller of Ports and Lights, and the following rates shall be charged annually for registration —

Launches and small boats	£ 4
Steamers and motor vessels	£ 100
Other vessels	£ 20

The municipal fees charged on such vessels shall no longer be payable.

4. All boatmen, fishermen, lightermen, stevedores, ship-chandlers, hotel representatives and any other person carrying on any occupation or work afloat in any harbour of Palestine shall obtain a licence from the office of the Controller of Ports and Lights. A fee of 300 mils per annum shall be charged for such licence.

5. Any person other than those mentioned in article 4 whose occupation or business requires him to be in the vicinity of an enclosure or quays of a port shall obtain a licence from the Controller of Ports and Lights. A fee of 200 mils shall be charged for such licence.

6. A fee of 150 mils per diem (of 12 hours) shall be payable in respect of any policeman placed on board a vessel by the orders of the Controller of Ports and Lights or his representative.

7. The Controller of Ports and Lights may, with the sanction of the High Commissioner, issue from time to time a tariff of charges for lighters and any other vessels in any port of Palestine, and shall have power with the like sanction to vary the same.

8. The Controller of Ports and Lights may issue rules, with the sanction of the High Commissioner, for all or any of the following purposes:—

(a.) For regulating the time at which and the manner in which any vessel shall enter into, go out of, or lie in port, and its position placing and removing what is in the port.

(b.) For regulating the manner in which any vessel shall take in or deliver cargo or shall take in or land its passengers, or shall take in or deliver ballast within the port.

9. This ordinance is substituted for any regulations now in force concerning port dues, but all dues hitherto levied at any port of Palestine shall be deemed to have been validly imposed.

10. This ordinance shall be known as "The Port Regulations Ordinance, 1921."

High Commissioner

Enclosure 1 in No. 31

Schedule of Dues now in force

(a.) CHARGEABLE by the Controller of Ports and Lights —

1. Port dues payable on the net registered tonnage of all vessels, exclusive of those mentioned in paragraph 2 —

On the first 500 tons	£ 10
" " second 500 "	£ 10
" " tonnage above 1,000 tons	£ 10

2. All vessels plying in any port of Palestine shall be charged the following dues by the Controller of Ports and Lights —

Sailing steam or motor vessels, steam or motor launches and vessels of a similar nature, lighters, boats, £ T 15 per annum

3. All boatmen, fishermen, lightermen, stevedores, ship-chandlers, hotel representatives and any other person carrying on any occupation or work afloat in any harbour of Palestine licensed by the Controller of Ports and Lights are charged an annual fee of £ T 2

4. Any person other than those mentioned in paragraph 3 whose occupation or business requires him to be in the vicinity of an enclosure or quays of a port shall obtain a licence from the Controller of Ports and Lights. A fee of £ T 20 shall be charged for such licence.

5. A fee of £ T 15 per diem (of 12 hours) is payable in respect of each policeman placed on board a vessel by the orders of the Controller of Ports and Lights or his representative.

6. Chargeable by municipalities under the Ottoman Municipal Tax Law — A fee of £ T 25 per trip on all sailing vessels, steamers and boats trading between a Palestinian port and another, or with foreign ports, providing the vessel is registered at a Palestinian port.

7. Chargeable by Ottoman Public Debt under article 4 of the Ottoman Law of the 30th December, 1882. A fee of £ T. 13 per annum upon all individuals licensed as fishermen.

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No. 38.

H. Samuel to Earl Curzon — (Received December 29.)

(No. 200)

Jerusalem, December 17, 1920

WITH reference to your telegram No. 207, I have the honour to submit the following information as an account of the steps which have been taken in regard to the extradition of fugitive offenders between Palestine and Syria. When the areas of occupied enemy territory to the north and east of Palestine were placed under the French and Arab Administrations, an agreement was come to between the chief administrators of the two territories for the extradition of fugitive offenders. The agreement provided that when a criminal was committed together with a summary of evidence should be transmitted by the Governor of the district to the Governor of the district where the criminal had taken refuge, and should be executed by the court. That arrangement was based on the principle that the areas of occupied enemy territory were administrative divisions of one country.

When a French Civil Court asked for the surrender of certain persons who had committed offences in Syria and had escaped to Palestine, and desired to know precisely what procedure should be followed in such cases. I therefore submitted, through the French consul general on the 24th September, the draft of an arrangement (copy attached) for the extradition of fugitive offenders between Syria and Palestine, which I suggested might be carried out by an exchange of notes between the High Commissioner for Syria and myself. I communicated this to your Lordship in my despatch No. 181 of the 11th December.

No reply has been received up to the present from the French Administration to my proposals, although in several cases they have asked for the surrender of criminals from Palestine. The question of handing over the Arabs who were wanted for political crimes is outside the proposed arrangement. Until the English Extradition Law is introduced into Palestine it appears to be necessary to have a working arrangement, both between Palestine and Syria and between Palestine and Egypt, and I should be glad to know if the proposals submitted to the French Administration have your approval as a temporary measure, and if so whether a similar arrangement may be made provisionally with the Egyptian Government.

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL.

Draft Rules for the Surrender of Fugitive Offenders between Syria and Palestine

WHERE a person who is a fugitive in Palestine is wanted for an offence committed in Syria, an application shall be made by the High Commissioner of Syria to the High Commissioner of Palestine. The application will be accompanied by

- (1) A warrant of arrest issued by the court or magistrate in Syria and stating the offence with which the accused is charged.
- (2) Depositions or statements taken on oath by the court or magistrate clearly stating the actual charge and containing a description of the person charged, and any particulars that may serve to identify him.

The High Commissioner for Palestine will refer the application to an Executive Magistrate who will issue a warrant for the arrest of the fugitive if it is satisfied that the evidence would justify commitment for trial if the fugitive is a Palestine subject and the offence had been committed in Palestine, he shall commit the fugitive to prison for extradition. A person shall not be extradited unless he is charged with an offence punishable by imprisonment, or if the offence in respect of which the surrender is requested is of a political character. The fugitive shall at any time during the proceedings of extradition receive any assistance or show that the offence in question is of a political character, or that the request for the surrender of the fugitive is made with a view to the trial of the accused for such an offence.

3. Where a fugitive is committed for extradition the High Commissioner shall issue an order directing that the accused be given up to a person therein described, who is authorised to receive the fugitive on behalf of the Syrian Government. Such person may receive a fugitive and hold him in custody in Palestine and convey him out of Palestine, and all reasonable assistance shall be afforded to him in that behalf.

The person surrendered shall only be tried for the offence in respect of which he was surrendered or an offence provable by the facts on which he was surrendered, and if acquitted on that charge, he must be given a certificate of acquittal to Palestine.

5. If a person in Palestine is alleged to be a fugitive from Syria and to have been convicted by a Syrian court in his presence of an offence for which extradition may be requested, he shall be surrendered, provided that:—

- (1) The request for his extradition is made in the manner aforesaid, and is accompanied by judicial documents clearly stating the offence and place and time of conviction.
- (2) The evidence produced before the magistrate shall be such as to satisfy the magistrate of the fact of conviction.

6. The Government of Palestine reserve absolute discretion as to granting or refusing the surrender of a British subject for an offence committed in Syria.

7. The arrangement for extradition between the Governments of Syria and Palestine shall be reciprocal.

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No. 433

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 216.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information

Jerusalem, December 29, 1920

I have
For High Commissioner
W. I. P. P. S.

Summary of recent Events in Trans-Jordan

It will be remembered that on the 21st November it was reported by telegram No. 355 that the governing factor in the general political situation in Trans-Jordan was the unsettledness of the population caused by rumours that the Sherifian forces intended to advance from the south. It was also reported that certain tribal sheikhs and others were believed to be in communication with Emir Abdullah.

For some time prior to the 21st November rumours, disturbing the population, of the Sherifian intentions had been current, and had affected the stability of the local Government in both the Kerak and Salt Amman areas, as well as, but to a less extent, in the Ajloun area. The position in Kerak area was so uncertain, not only because of the rumours, but also because of the lack of funds at Kerak owing to the difficulty in collecting taxes, that it was decided to keep the British representative (Captain Kirkbride), who was at the time reporting personally at Government House, at Salt, at Kerak, was very uneasy at the turn of events.

The local Government had practically ceased to operate outside the town of Kerak, and it was evident that no good purpose would be served by sending Captain Kirkbride back without either some promise of assistance in the matter of the local gendarmerie or some authority to enable it to continue functioning. It was ultimately decided that Captain Kirkbride should return with sufficient funds for the latter purpose. An organisation of a small force of gendarmerie, recruited in Palestine, was pushed on energetically by Kaimakam Peake. Captain Kirkbride returned to Kerak on the 21st November, and Kaimakam Peake joined him on the 24th December with the force above referred to. Captain Kirkbride's return with the necessary funds produced a calming effect.

On the 27th November Mr. Camp, the British representative at Salt, reported that he had heard from travellers of the arrival of Emir Abdullah at Maan and Captain Kirkbride writing from Kerak on the same date, gave the 24th or 25th November as the date of the Emir's arrival at Maan, adding that he was accompanied by some regular troops and a force of Hedjaz Arabs, with guns and machine guns. On the 26th November a train from Damascus and Deraa reached Zarka station, north of Amman, with passengers and railway officials, the news of what was happening at Amman caused a difference of opinion to arise between the railway officials, who wished to return to Damascus, and the passengers who wished to continue their journey. The gendarmerie intervened to restore order and induced, by threats but not by force, the passengers to remain. The train, however, returned on a trolley to Deraa, whence his report that the train had been attacked, but no one had been injured, was telegraphed to Damascus. The train continued its journey to Amman, where an attempt was made by Sherifian followers and some slaves of the Bent Sakhr to seize the train. An obstruction was placed on the line to prevent its returning north. A district engineer on the train asked for the assistance of the Amman gendarmerie. These, on the orders (obtained by telephone from Es Salt) of the military, proceeded to the station, and on their arrival the Sherifians dispersed. Orders were given for the train to return to Deraa. Meanwhile the engine-driver had taken the engine to the repair shed.

An employee called Tewfik brought it back to the main track, everyone supposing that his intention was to recouple it to the train ready for the driver to return north, instead he went south, leaving the train of four carriages at Amman station. The railway officials from the train went to Es Salt, thence to Jerusalem on their way back to Damascus and Deraa. Tewfik and the gendarmes at Zarka may have been bribed by one Mustafa Effendi (district engineer at Maan), who recently arrived at Amman, and who about a month previously had told Captain Brunton that he was acting as one of the chief spies of the Sherifian movement.

part of such district is included, at some other public office within the area and shall be published in the "Gazette."

Amendment. Add as second paragraph of article 13 —

Notice of the deposit of the scheme shall also be given to any religious body whose property is situated in the neighbourhood of any land which comprises or is in the neighbourhood of a Holy Site, notice shall be given to any commission which may be established for the protection of Holy Sites in Palestine.

Article 20. When property is compulsorily expropriated for any of the purposes contemplated by this ordinance, the price to be paid by the authority for the property so expropriated shall, in default of agreement, be the market value of the said property estimated at the date immediately prior to the outbreak of war with Turkey plus a sum equal to 50 per cent. of such value.

Amendment. Substitute for article 20 —

When property is expropriated for any of the purposes contemplated by this ordinance, the price to be paid by the authority for the property shall, in default of agreement, be its market value estimated as at the date immediately prior to the outbreak of war with Turkey plus a sum equal to 50 per cent. of such value. Provided that the local commission may in a special case consent to the addition to the pre-war value of a sum equal to 100 per cent. of such value.

The amendments and additions were approved, and the Town Planning Ordinance as a whole was passed by the Council.

(2) The High Commissioner conveyed to the members of the Advisory Council the acknowledgment of His Majesty's Government of the resolution with regard to the northern boundaries of Palestine and the assurance that His Majesty's Government was fully alive to the considerations advanced in that resolution.

(3) The Financial Secretary announced that the Administration had reduced the import duty on live-stock from 11 to 3 per cent. in order to stimulate the import of cattle and thus to reduce the present high cost of meat and, to the same end, to foster the trade in cattle with the Soudan. Dr Salim thanked his Excellency for this beneficial measure.

Suleiman Bey Nassif asked that the Administration should introduce ploughing animals from Egypt. Mr. Hagar pointed out that the Government had already decided to allow the import of such animals, but that there was a question as to the suitability of Egyptian ploughing animals to Palestinian conditions.

PUBLIC HEALTH ORDINANCE

After an explanatory statement had been read by the Director of Health, the articles of the ordinance on the regulations of pharmacies were submitted for discussion seriatim.

On the following article discussions arose —

Article 6. No person shall exercise the profession of pharmacist in Palestine unless he is a duly qualified person as defined by the Government, and has been granted a licence to practise pharmacy by the Government.

It was made clear to Mr. Yellin, in answer to his question, that a licence to practise pharmacy was a written document.

Article 7. Applicants for licences shall be required to produce satisfactory evidence as to their general good character and ability to practise pharmacy in Palestine. If thought necessary by the Government, an applicant shall be required to pass an examination.

Licences shall be granted free to those pharmacists who held the permit of the Ottoman Imperial School of Medicine prior to October 1918.

In other cases, a fee of £E. 1 will be charged for the licence.

A discussion arose as to the applicability of the words "in Palestine," and it was the general opinion that pharmacists coming from other countries could not be required to produce evidence as to their ability to practise pharmacy specifically in Palestine. It was agreed, therefore, that the words be deleted.

Article 12. A pharmacist employed in a hospital, dispensary, or other public institution of service shall not be the proprietor of or conduct a public pharmacy without the written consent of the Government, which will only be given in exceptional circumstances.

Article 13. A student who has been employed in a pharmacy shall not conduct a public pharmacy within 630 metres of the pharmacy where he was previously employed without the consent of the proprietor. But this article shall cease to operate after a period of three years has elapsed from the date when the student ceased to be employed in such pharmacy.

On the motion of Mr. Yellin, the word "public" in the phrase of "a public pharmacy" was deleted as too restrictive.

Article 14. A licensed pharmacist may employ one or more unqualified assistants to help him in the work of a pharmacy, provided such assistant is approved by the Department of Health and works under the direct supervision of the pharmacist.

The Department of Health shall keep a register of the names of such assistants showing the pharmacy in which each is employed, and the proprietor of the pharmacy shall notify the Department of Health when any assistant ceases to be employed, so that his name may be removed from the register. No person shall be registered as an assistant who has not attained the age of 16 years and is not able to read and write in Arabic or English.

Article 15. Mr. Yellin pointed out that the need to obtain the approval of the Department of Health for several assistants would involve considerable hardship upon pharmacists. Dr H. Salim recommended that this approval was necessary as a protection to the public on account of the past that unqualified assistants were employed in the Department of Health in case of irregularities occurring in the pharmacy in which they were employed.

Article 16. In exceptional circumstances a doctor, with the written approval of the Government, may be allowed to dispense on his own premises drugs and medicines for the use of his own patients. These circumstances will usually arise in districts where no pharmacy exists, and will be subject to the provisions of these regulations. Veterinary surgeons also, with the written approval of the Government, shall be permitted to dispense on their own premises drugs and medicines for the use of their own animal patients.

Dr. Salim pointed out that this article deprived doctors in Palestine of a privilege which they enjoyed in Turkey. The Director of Health replied that there was no reflection upon the Turkish code in his statement, which was framed to prevent the covering of pharmacies by doctors, that is, the conducting of pharmacies by doctors nominally by themselves, but really by unqualified assistants. He thought the article suited local conditions. In deference, however, to Dr. Salim's objections, it was agreed to omit the words "these circumstances" to "regulations."

Article 27 — (a) All substances included in Class (A) toxics are to be placed and kept in a locked poison cupboard, the key of which is to be retained by the licensed pharmacist.

(b) The bottles and receptacles in which the toxics are contained shall be of different sizes, shapes, and colours, and shall be marked by touch.

(c) They shall bear an orange label with the name of the drug in black. If these labels are not available the bottles or receptacles must bear a poison label in addition to an ordinary label indicating the name of the drug.

At Mr. Yellin's suggestion, it was agreed that before the word "locked" the word "securely" be inserted.

Article 32 — (a.) Persons other than pharmacists, such as retail druggists, proprietors of small shops, and others, shall not sell or deal in any of the following poisonous drugs, roots, medicines and pharmaceutical preparations scheduled in Appendix 3, and patent and proprietary medicines approved by the Government. They are rigorously forbidden to sell or deal in any of the substances mentioned in Appendices 1 and 2.

(b) Their establishments must be licensed in accordance with article 1, and their names shall be registered in the Department of Health.

(c) They shall not engage in the practice of medicine nor advise treatment nor dispense prescriptions nor compound drugs.

It was pointed out that the sale of simple and harmless medicines would be affected by this ordinance, and it was explained that the provisions of the ordinance would not interfere with the activities of this class of unregistered pharmacist.

Several members raised the objection to this article that its provisions would

seriously harm small tradesmen by taking away from them the right to sell certain articles or household use—such as honey, olive-oil, pepper, &c.—which figured on Appendix 3. It was pointed out, however, that this question was entirely governed by the words "for medicinal usage" in paragraph (a) of the article, which would therefore not in practice act as was inferred by the objectors. Dr. Selim further

obtained from the Health Department, and sold as ordinary dealers. Colonel Heron said it was impossible to legislate for quacks, and if the Administration were to insist on all persons who dealt in the simple medicinal articles shown in Appendix 3 being required to obtain licences, it would not only be going much further than the Governments of European countries, but would also be excluding small herbalists and perfumers from the possibility of gaining a livelihood. It was therefore necessary to allow these persons to trade in and dispense such homely remedies. Dr. Selim agreed.

Article 34 All persons trading in poisons, other than licensed pharmacists practising strictly as such, shall be in possession of a poison permit from the Government Department concerned.

The permit shall state the trade of its holder, the particular poisons in which he is allowed to deal, and the purpose for which the poisons are required, and it shall be granted only to persons of known good character and after satisfactory evidence has been given by the applicant that he can read and write, and that he is well acquainted with the dangerous properties of the poisons, and that he is able to distinguish and recognise one from the other. A pharmacist dealing in poisons for other than medicinal purposes shall be required to hold a poison permit.

Colonel Bramley asked if any control under the ordinance was to be exercised over the sale of dangerous chemical products such as potassium nitrate, nitroglycerine, &c. Colonel Heron replied that the Customs regulations prevented the import of such products except on a certificate from the Director of Public Security.

Article 36 (a) All persons trading in poisons, whether pharmacists, wholesale dealers, dealers, or retailers of poisons for commercial uses, shall be required

of poisons made by them. The pages of these registers shall be numbered and stamped by the Department of Health.

(b) The purchase register shall show the date of each purchase, the substances bought, their amounts, and from whom obtained.

(c) The sales register shall give the date, description of poison and quantity sold, purpose for which intended and name and address of purchaser. The entry shall be made at the time the poison is delivered, and the purchaser shall place his signature opposite the entry, or if the sale is made on a written order the order shall be kept in lieu of signature.

(d) No erasures, additions or alterations shall be permitted once the entry is made in the register, and transactions shall be entered consecutively and given serial numbers.

(e) When a proprietor transfers poisonous substances from his wholesale to his retail establishment, the transaction shall be entered in the registers of each establishment exactly as if a sale had taken place.

(f) The registers shall be preserved and available for inspection by the Department of Health for three years after the date of the last entry.

Mr. Yellin asked whether a purchaser had the right of redress where the price charged for the compounding of a prescription was far in excess of the cost of the components to the pharmacist. He was informed by Colonel Heron that the prescription register was provided with a column showing the price paid for each prescription, which would be a basis for laying complaints, if necessary, against the pharmacists under the profiteering ordinance.

Mr. Smallwood asked what revenues would accrue to the Government from the exercise of the provisions of this ordinance, and by whom would such revenues be administered. He was referred to article 1, under which municipalities might levy small fees for the licence given to the proprietor of a pharmacy establishment, and to article 7, which allowed for a fee of £E. 1 to be charged for a pharmaceutical licence given by the Department of Health under Public Health Ordinance of May 1918.

No further questions arising with respect to its articles or appendices, the ordinance as a whole was submitted to the Council and approved.

The sections of the ordinance were submitted to the Council *seriatim* for approval.

On the following sections discussions arose:

SECTION 3.—Powers of the Director of Public Security Exercise of Powers

The Director of Public Security shall have throughout Palestine the powers of a magistrate and District Governor, as set forth in this ordinance.

Dr. Selim asked what was intended by the granting of magisterial powers to the Director of Public Security, this he thought an unnecessary extension of authority. The High Commissioner agreed with this view, and in accordance with the suggestion by Mr. Bentwich the words "magistrate and" were deleted.

Mr. Nott was doubtful of the precise relationship of District Governor and Director of Public Security, and Dr. Selim arguing on these lines, considered that the article lent itself to misapprehension, that its exercise would lead to a conflict and overlapping of authorities, and that the District Governor should be absolutely supreme over his police officers, for public security in his own district. It was

that in view of article 4, this section was entirely superfluous and should not be retained. It was pointed out, however, by Mr. Deedes that the responsibility of the Director of Public Security for public security covered Palestine as a whole in all its districts, whereas that of the District Governor was strictly delimited to his own area, and furthermore, Mr. Smallwood emphasised this aspect of the case, while the High Commissioner gave practical instances of the function of the Director of Public Security in co-ordinating policy control in two or more districts simultaneously. In view, however, of the importance of the objections raised, it was decided that the section should be further considered and resubmitted for consideration at the next meeting of the Council.

It was considered that any apprehension lest an emergency might find a District Governor unprovided with the necessary power to take action of public security with reference to the Director of Public Security, was fully met by the terms of section 4.

A translation of section 4 in Arabic was to be revised to ensure strict conformity with the original, and the District Governor in respect of public security.

Section 4 The administration of the police throughout Palestine shall be vested in another officer to be styled "the Director of Public Security" and in such deputy directors, and assistant directors as the Government shall deem fit to appoint.

The administration of the police throughout the local jurisdiction of the district shall, under the general control and direction of such district commandant and such assistant district commandants as may be appointed, all consider necessary.

SECTION 6.—Magisterial Powers of Police Officers

It shall be lawful for the Director of Public Security, as occasion arises, to constitute courts of discipline for the trial of members of the police force for grave offences and derelictions of duty under the provisions of this ordinance. Such courts of discipline shall be constituted as follows:—

President A District Governor or Deputy District Governor or a district commandant of police of a district—other than that of the officer to whom the accused may be directly subordinate.

Members Two commissioned officers of police or of the general administration of not less rank than the accused.

Such courts, when constituted, will exercise magisterial powers within the limits of the district, subject to the approval of the Director of Public Security, and to confirmation by the Director of Public Security. Regulations for the control of proceedings of such courts, will from time to time be issued by the Director of Public Security, with the approval of the High Commissioner.

Mr. Nott considered that the nomination of a District Governor or Deputy District Governor as president of a court of discipline should not properly be delegated directly to the Director of Public Security. Such nomination should be only made by or with the sanction of the High Commissioner. The High Commissioner agreed to the force of this objection, but not where trivial cases were concerned, and

thought that the difficulty might be met by modifying the paragraph to read as follows: "A district commandant of police of a district other than that of the officer to whom the accused may be directly subordinate, or, on the appointment of the High Commissioner, the District Governor or Deputy District Governor may be president of the court." (Precise form of words to be drafted by the legal secretary.)

SECTION 15.—Quartering of Additional Police in Disturbed or Dangerous Districts

(i.) It shall be lawful for the High Commissioner, by proclamation to be notified in the "Official Gazette," and in such other manner as may be directed, to declare that any area has been found to be in a disturbed or dangerous state, and that, from the conduct of the inhabitants of such area, or of any class or section of them, it is expedient to increase the number of police.

(ii.) It shall be lawful on such proclamation for the Director of Public Security or other officer authorised by the Government in this behalf to employ any police force in addition to the ordinary fixed complement, to be quartered in the area specified in such proclamation as aforesaid.

(iii.) Subject to the provisions of sub-article (v) of this section, the cost of such additional police force shall be borne by the inhabitants of such area described in the proclamation.

(iv.) The Governor of the district, after such enquiry as he may deem necessary, shall apportion such cost among the inhabitants who are liable to such cost, and who shall not have been exempted under the next succeeding sub-article. Such apportionment shall be made according to the District Governor's judgment of the respective means within such area of such inhabitants.

(v.) It shall be lawful for the High Commissioner by order, to exempt any persons or class or section of such inhabitants from liability to bear any portion of such cost.

(vi.) Every proclamation issued under sub-section (i) hereof shall state the period for which it is to remain in force, but it may be withdrawn any time or continued from time to time for a further period or periods as the High Commissioner may in each case think fit to direct.

Explanation.—For the purpose of this article, "inhabitants" shall include immovable property within such area, and landlords who by themselves or by their agents or servants, collect rents direct from the tenants or occupiers in such area, notwithstanding that they do not actually reside therein.

Paragraph (i).—Dr Selim remarked that this paragraph was somewhat defective in that the word "internal" be inserted before the word "disturbed." The High Commissioner concurred with the need to specify and limit the application of this paragraph, which it was agreed to do by altering the word "or" after "dangerous state" into "and."

SECTION 16.—Awarding Compensation to Sufferers from Misconduct of Inhabitants or Persons Interested in Lands

(i.) If in any area—in regard to which any proclamation notified under the last section has been issued—any damage to property has been caused from the misconduct of the inhabitants of such area, it shall be lawful for the Governor of the district, or the Deputy-Governor of the sub-division of the district within which such area is situated, to make, within one month from the date of the injury, or such shorter period as may be prescribed, an application for compensation to the Governor of the district or the Deputy-Governor of the sub-division of the district within which such area is situated.

(ii.) It shall thereupon be lawful for the Governor of the district, with the sanction of the High Commissioner, after such enquiry as he may deem necessary, and whether any additional police force has or has not been quartered in such area under the last preceding article, to do any of the following things—

- (a.) Declare the persons to whom such injury has been caused by, or has ensued from, such misconduct.
- (b.) Fix the amount of compensation to be paid to such persons, and the manner in which it is to be distributed amongst them, and
- (c.) Assess the proportion in which the same shall be paid by the inhabitants of such area, other than the applicants, who shall have been exempted from liabilities to pay under the next succeeding sub-article.

Provided, that the Governor of the district shall not make any declaration or assessment under this article, unless he is of the opinion that such injury as aforesaid has arisen from a riot or unlawful assembly within such area, and that the person who suffered the injury was himself free from blame in respect of the occurrences which led to such injury.

(iii.) It shall be lawful for the Governor by order to exempt any person, or class, or section of such inhabitants from liability to pay any portion of such compensation.

Every declaration or assessment made, or order passed by the Governor of the district, under this article, shall be subject to revision by the High Commissioner at any time within one month from the date of its issue.

At a meeting of the Legislative Council held on the 14th November 1922, the Government of respect of any person or class or section of such inhabitants from liability to pay any portion of such compensation was referred back for revision of translation and for resubmission.

Dr Selim and Toukan Bey asked what measures were devised to prevent the innocent bearing part of the burden of compensation, which would fall entirely on the guilty *vide* paragraph (b).

Colonel Bramley referred them to paragraph (iii) of the same section which satisfactorily met the case.

SECTION 19.—Powers of Special Police Officers

Every special police officer so appointed shall have the same powers, privileges and immunities as a police officer appointed under this ordinance, and shall be subject to the same discipline as a police officer.

Suleiman Bey Nassif doubted whether such a special police force could be raised from the local inhabitants. They were not amenable to the rigour of military routine and were untrained. He suggested the establishment of a training reserve which might fill the need in question. Mr Bentwich stated that in practice there would be a distinction made between the responsibilities and duties of a regular and special force, but the latter in all cases would have to be subject to the general police supervision. It was agreed by the High Commissioner that the word "penalties" be amended to read "discipline," and the whole section would be reconsidered in the light of Suleiman Bey Nassif's remarks and brought up again at the next meeting of the Advisory Council.

SECTION 22.—Village Police Officers

Nothing in this ordinance shall affect any village police officer, unless such officer shall be enrolled as a police officer under this ordinance. When so enrolled, such officer shall be bound by the provisions of the last preceding articles. No hereditary or other village police officer shall be enrolled without the consent of those who have the right of nominating him.

Several of the non-official members were not clear as to the meaning of the term "village police," nor, since no "village police" as such existed, whether it referred to ghafirs, horos or gardes-champêtres. Mr Bentwich replied that the purport of the section was to provide for the enrolment of such officers. Mr Deed added that the section did not affect private and non-official watchmen, ghafirs, or other form of local protective measures, which were not at present recognised by the Administration. However the whole subject of rural guards was receiving the earnest attention of the Government. Only if and when they were recognised by the Government the provisions of this law would affect them.

On sections 23 and 24 Suleiman Bey Nassif pointed out that inconsistencies existed in the Arabic translations which differed in important respects from the English text—for instance, from the Arabic of section 24, one might assume that a police officer had no authority to effect arrests. The sections were referred back for revision of translations.

SECTION 31.—Liability of Person offering Bribes or attempting to Corrupt Members of the Police Force

Any person who offers a bribe or illegal gratification in any form whatsoever, or who obstructs or interferes with a police officer in the discharge of his duty, or who wears any uniform, kit or equipment resembling the prescribed kit, uniform or

equipment of the police force, which is liable to cause such person to be mistaken by the public for a member of the police force, shall be liable to arrest by any member of the police force. Any person who is liable to a penalty not exceeding twenty pounds or imprisonment with or without hard labour for a period not exceeding six months, or both.

Suleiman Bey Nassif thought that a penalty of six months imprisonment for offering a bribe to a police officer was inadequate, but Colonel Bramley pointed out that section 30 made it possible for serious cases to be more severely dealt with under other existing regulations.

SECTION 41. — *Rewards to Police and Informers payable to "General Police Fund"*

Any person and prosecutions against any person which may be lawfully brought and done or intended to be done under the provisions of this ordinance, or any person who has been complained of shall have been committed, and not otherwise, and notice in writing of such action and the cause thereof, shall be given to defendants or district commandant or assistant district commandant of police in which the act was committed one month at least before the commencement of the action.

In any civil action brought under the provisions of this section, all rules of courts made at any time relative to the payment into court of any sum of money by way of effect as is or may be provided in such rules, including any effect therein provided in respect of the costs of any such action.

Suleiman Bey Nassif asked what would be the procedure in a case where action or prosecution was not commenced within three months after the commission of a contravention of the ordinance?

To this the reply was that it was right that it should be commenced within that time.

Remarking on the ordinance in general Suleiman Bey Nassif pointed out that only be taken to mean an officer of the police force, while in English it denoted any individual of the police force of any rank. The High Commissioner promised that the necessary alterations would be made in the Arabic text.

The Police Ordinance was then as a whole submitted to the Council, and it being thus passed without comment the High Commissioner announced that it would be resubmitted with its amendments to the next meeting of the Advisory Council.

At this stage the meeting adjourned till 9.45 a.m. Wednesday morning.

MEETING

Sheikh Abu Midejn was unable to attend the adjourned session of Council.

His Excellency requested Mr. Bowman to summarise his statement with regard to education as read at the meeting.

Mr. Bowman: The most important thing in education at the present moment is elementary education. The scheme for elementary education is proposed to put into force for all children in Palestine, with the exception of those of the nomad tribes or of outlying districts, and in view of the paucity of funds, it is suggested that villages should be invited by district governors to provide their own schools and their own initial equipment. But as the number of villages where there are no schools is very large, it will be impossible to put this whole scheme into practice at once, and it must be spread over a number of years. It is hoped to make a beginning with the opening of schools during the present financial year. Two points with regard to elementary education should be stressed, that once a building has been provided by a village it will be necessary for the village community to keep that building in repair, and second, that the village communities are invited not only to provide school buildings and equipment, but if they are willing to do so the Government will gladly accept any further subscriptions towards the upkeep and maintenance.

The extension of the training college for men and women teachers is a necessary project. The next step in the present training college has been secured and it will thus be possible to train a few additional teachers.

It is hoped that grants-in-aid will be available for about 25 per cent of the existing non-Government schools, and it is therefore proposed that 25 per cent. of non-Government schools which are willing to submit to the inspection of the Department of Education, and to such conditions as may be laid down from time to time, should receive a grant-in-aid of about 75l per year, which is the minimum the Government proposed to allot to its new village schools.

The Government has already opened during the present school session sections in three primary schools in which the secondary programme has been adopted and it is hoped that in the near future these so-called secondary sections will be allowed to develop on normal lines, to become distinctly secondary schools.

With regard to technical education, it has been pointed out that the Department of Education is most anxious to encourage it as far as possible. All over the world it has been allowed to develop on very advanced lines during the last twenty or thirty years, and regarded as no less important than literary education. At the same time the funds available for education as a whole are not sufficient to deal with all its branches, as is desired.

The technical institutions existing in Palestine are entirely under non-Government control, but will nevertheless receive every possible encouragement provided that they are being organised upon the right lines.

Next I should like to emphasise the very great importance which the Department of Education attach to female education.

In recent years the education of women all over the world has received a very great impetus, more marked in Eastern countries, and for the production of the right sort of citizens—both men and women—in Palestine it is vitally important. Indeed, the training of girls is perhaps the most important function of education, the primary end of which is to train up good citizens of the country, and the Department of Education intends to co-operate with the people of Palestine irrespective of creed or sect, in encouraging through the medium of education the forming of the character of the children of the country. By this character training good homes are created.

From the district of Beersheba there have been special requests to provide peripatetic teachers for Bedouin tribes. It is difficult, if not impossible in some districts of Palestine to provide suitable buildings, particularly where Bedouin tribes are concerned, and that a limited number of teachers may soon be trained especially for the education of Bedouin children, and they will be able perhaps to go from one part of the tribe to another until sufficient teachers are found for each tribe or part of a tribe.

In Mesopotamia the same experiment was tried with a certain tribe, and it was found that of that whole tribe the 100 children receiving education, whose average age was 9 or 10, were the only members of the tribe who could read and write. The same experiment might well be tried in Palestine, and with equal if not greater success, if only the right class of teacher were obtainable.

Tukan Bey thanked Mr. Bowman for his very clear detailed statement of the scheme for the improvement of education in Palestine. The cause of lack of development was the low salaries of teachers. It was suggested that salaries at least as high as those obtaining in other Departments of the Government be offered in order to attract the right type of teacher.

Ismail Bey Hussein emphasised the importance of sending teachers to the tribes in Palestine. As the villagers did not attach sufficient importance to education, the Government should create a better impression. In some villages there were suitable buildings for use as temporary schools, which should be occupied until suitable buildings could be erected. He proposed, therefore, that the revenues of the Mудариса Wakf of each village be assigned to the building of its schools, and where the Wakf did not suffice, the community should pay the balance.

Mr. Yellin thanked the Administration for the interest it took in the need of education, and agreed with the Director of Education on the importance of the training of character apart from instructions. He was glad also that the principle of grants-in-aid to non-Governmental schools had been recognised, but considered that 75l for both village and town schools was unfair, in view of the greater expense of the latter to which he proposed that a minimum of 300l per annum should be given. Further, twenty-three new students were too few for the training college, and there should be external students, who would cost less.

made for at least ten day students besides. In a larger building the training staff in the training college might be increased by 50 or 100 per cent., and of our students by 100 or 150 per cent., but the funds at the disposal of the Department of Education did not permit for the moment of this extension. He agreed with Mr. Yellin that there is a just claim for a higher grant to town schools, but in that case smaller but not less important schools might have to go without their grants. In any case, 75% was only as an average sum to enable a calculation to be made of the amount required for the coming year.

Ismail Bey Huseini asked whether arrangements could be made by the Department of Education to give some training during the summer vacation to untrained teachers.

Mr Bowman, replying to a question by Dr Salim, said that grants-in-aid are made by the British Government to a very large extent not only to non-Government schools but also to private institutions. He pointed out that India has a Government large educational budget every year, and its greater part is devoted to grants-in-aid, as in India most of the schools are private institutions, supported largely by voluntary contributions or fees, and come under the inspection of the Government.

Mr. Sahm asked whether the existing private schools in Jerusalem, Haifa, and Nabhus were entitled to grants-in-aid.

His Excellency thought that this was the most important discussion which had yet taken place in the Advisory Council. The Government had endeavoured to take a comprehensive view of the whole situation. In Palestine there were about 194,000 Jews, of whom 100,000 were in the West Bank and 94,000 in the Gaza Strip. The Government had to take into account the fact that the Jews were not only a minority but also a minority of a minority. These conditions had rightly caused great dissatisfaction among the population in general, and one of the first duties of an enlightened Government was to make good this dissatisfaction. It was the Government's duty to make good the situation and to bring about a state of affairs which would be acceptable to all.

With respect to the finances of the schools, it was hoped that it might be possible to obtain the funds required without increasing existing taxation. In Turkish times 1½ per cent was added to the tithes for the purpose of education. The Administration was in fact already spending more than the yield of that 1½ per cent on education, but it did go a long way towards meeting the expenses of the education budget.

Suleiman Bey Nassif did not think that 75% for grant-in-aid was sufficient to carry out her idea to train the children of Elbire. It was agreed that 100% should be sent to Europe to be trained so that they may come back qualified to be teachers in the secondary and industrial schools of the future.

Mr. Bowman, speaking, stated that the question of salaries was receiving attention. The minimum that a retained teacher receives was 71 a month, which is higher than the salary of a probationer clerk, and he thus was allowed more than the minimum grant of 75 to the large schools. But 75 is a minimum and the maximum might be as much as 300 per school. It is at present impossible to find trained teachers for all the schools, and untrained teachers must be employed temporarily. With respect to Mr. Yellin's comments, Mr. Bowman remarked that the twenty three new students mentioned were boarders, and arrangements have been

There was an additional yield from the Mundariasa Wakfa. It was agreed in the recent discussions with the Moslem authorities that the revenues of these Wakfs should remain with the Education Department for the education of Moslem children. They would be needed for the annual maintenance of the schools, and could not therefore be properly devoted to the cost of the buildings.

With respect to non-Government schools, it was stated at the last meeting of the Council that the principle that grants be paid to these schools could not in justice be insisted if it were insisted. If there was one village already with a school, it was not receiving nothing from the taxes which it paid, while another village had now erected a school for the first time, it did not seem just that the second village should get a grant of perhaps 100/ at the first stage nothing. Of course the grants would be distributed without distinction of religion to any Moslem, Christian or Jewish school which fulfilled the conditions laid down, and no distinction could be made between town and country schools. The final responsibility for the course taken with regard to these schools, as Dr Salim rightly remarked, must rest with the Government itself.

With respect to Mr Kalvaritsky's suggestion that the Hebrew language be taught in Government schools, that would be considered by the Education Department in places where the demand for the teaching of Hebrew existed. Suleiman Bey Nassif's suggestion that young men should be sent to Europe to complete their education might be found desirable and practicable when further funds were available for educational purposes, but undoubtedly the first claim on the finances of the State was to give some measure of education to the 100,000 children who were now untaught.

It was gratifying to know that the Council approved the proposals of the Government to send peripatetic teachers to Bedouin tribes, in such cases as the tribes themselves desired.

As the general proposals have been approved by the Council, the Government would now proceed with activity and zeal to carry them into effect.

11. *Graves*

His Excellency announced that General Sir Fabian Ware, vice-president of the Imperial War Graves Commission, had recently visited Palestine. There were a number of cemeteries in which the soldiers of the Allies were buried, and many Turkish soldiers also. The Imperial Government had agreed to supply the moneys necessary to put these cemeteries into good order, to convert them into gardens, and maintain them in perpetuity.

Imam Bey Hussein said that soldiers who were buried in these cemeteries were regarded with veneration but he thought that the land used for the cemeteries should be paid for to the owners if they demanded it, and the Government should participate in the cost of beautifying the cemeteries. With the latter suggestion Dr Salim agreed.

Mr Yellin said that thanks should be accorded to those soldiers who had sacrificed their lives in order to bring progress to this country by presenting the land as a gift to the Imperial Government. The Government should issue an appeal to the people of Palestine to contribute to the maintenance of the graves of the dead, but all citizens should fulfil this obligation with the greatest respect.

His Excellency said he appreciated highly the observations that had been made by the representatives of the British Government and army. Since a desire had been expressed that the people of Palestine should pay their tribute of honour to the 12,000 fallen, the form in which such participation would be most appreciated would be if the Palestine Government were authorised to present to the Imperial War Graves Commission the land in which the cemeteries are situated. Similar gifts had been made by the people of France, Belgium, Italy and Egypt. If the Council would authorise him to take the necessary measures for this gift to be made, it would be most appreciated by His Majesty's Government and by the British and Dominion armies.

On the motion of Suleiman Bey Nassif the authorisation was unanimously accorded.

Questions, of which written notice had been given by members, now came up for discussion.

Mr. Yellin raised the question of the complaints made in the press and elsewhere against the postal service. It was generally acknowledged that the postal service was made, but some of the complaints were nevertheless justified. Registered correspondence and telegrams were very inadequately handled, and there were long delays in the delivery of letters. Larger premises should be secured, for in pre-war days the various nations had their own post offices, and now that these no longer existed one building did not suffice.

Colonel Hudson replied that pressure in the telegraph service was due to shortage of trained staff, but that was being remedied. As regards registered letters, originally two clerks were detailed, later three, and now four. The proportion of registered letters was very much greater here than in other countries—a fact due to the lack of confidence under the previous regime, but this proportion would no doubt decrease as public confidence grew. Delay in delivery of letters is due to their being insufficiently addressed, and to non-employment of post office box numbers, although a circular had recently been issued asking box renters to remedy this omission.

(2) Mr. Yellin next raised the question of the revenues of municipalities.

Mr. Barron made the following reply—

(a) A commission was appointed on the 17th September, 1920, to investigate and report on the following question—

To examine the existing sources of revenue of municipalities and the methods of collection and to report what changes, if any are desirable.

(b) The following officials have been appointed to act as permanent officials of the Commission—

Mr J. B. Barron, Assistant Financial Secretary
Mr E. Keith Roach, Assistant Civil Secretary

The investigation is being carried out with the assistance of local commissions. The commission for Jerusalem commenced its sittings in Jerusalem on the 20th October, 1920, and consisted of the following members—

Chairman Mr J. B. Barron, Assistant Financial Secretary
Mr E. Keith Roach, Assistant Civil Secretary
Mr H. C. Luke, a District Governor of Jerusalem
Ragheb Bey Nashishibi, Mayor of Jerusalem
Mr D. Yellin M.B.E. Vice-Mayor of Jerusalem
Mr Y. Farraj, Vice-Mayor of Jerusalem
Mr E. Shelley, Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce, Jerusalem

The commission has completed its report, and has unanimously recommended a number of important reforms, which are now under the consideration of the Government.

(c) A local commission for Jaffa consisting of the undermentioned members has been appointed and will commence its sittings at an early date—

Mr J. B. Barron, Assistant Financial Secretary
Mr E. Keith Roach, Assistant Civil Secretary
Mr F. J. E. Campbell, Assistant District Governor, Jaffa
Assem Bey Said, Mayor of Jaffa
Mr M. Dizengoff, President of the Town Council of Tel-Aviv.
Mr S. Tolkowsky, Tel Aviv
Abdallah Effendi Dajant, Jaffa
Mr. Anton Geint

(d) Other towns will be visited subsequently.

(3) Mr. Yellin finally raised the question of the need for a statistical department in the Administration.

Mr. Harari replied as follows:—

With the development of the Palestine Administration along modern lines, the question of official statistics has become one of increasing moment. The importance of complete and accurate Government statistics is universally recognised, but on many difficulties, in so far as this country is concerned, is to secure them without setting up elaborate and costly machinery. A strong case could no doubt be made in favour of a central statistical office, but, on balance, it would seem preferable to improve the present system and postpone radical changes until the expansion of the revenue allows further progress.

In this respect it should be remembered that the statistics now kept by Government departments have not been compiled by experts and can hardly be regarded as more than tentative. The work of a statistician is delicate and highly technical and unless it be carried out by competent officials may result in dangerous errors should a policy be framed in accordance with conclusions based upon inaccurate figures.

We have been in communication with the Royal Statistical Society (London) on the subject, and it would appear that, in order best to achieve the twofold object of efficiency and economy, we should endeavour to secure the temporary services of a qualified statistician to collate such figures as now exist, train the nucleus statistical staff the departments have got together, and place the present records upon a sound footing, and steps are being taken accordingly.

(1) Dr. Salim asked what measures were being taken to safeguard the rights of cultivators &c., as he understood that in several villages cultivators had been expelled from their holdings.

His Excellency quoted the following extract from the Land Transfer Ordinance, and the terms of reference to the Land Commission, to illustrate the precautions taken by the Government to prevent such expulsion:—

Extract from Land Transfer Ordinance, Paragraph 8.—The Governor shall also withhold his consent unless (from a proposed disposition) he is satisfied that in the case of agricultural land the tenant in occupation, if the property is leased will retain sufficient land in the district or elsewhere for the maintenance of himself and his family. The Governor may refer to the High Commissioner any case in which he withholds his consent.

Extract from Instruction to Land Commission.—The Government of Palestine, while desirous to promote in every possible way the closer settlement of the country, is at the same time anxious that the interests of the present tenants and occupants of land, whether Government property or private property, should be properly protected. It will be necessary on the one hand to take steps to prevent the eviction of tenants by the landlords on a sale of the land, and on the other to secure for those who have exercised customary rights of cultivation and grazing, without full legal title, a sufficient area for the maintenance of their families.

With regard to the sale of land, Dr. Salim stated he had made enquiries, and was satisfied that no expulsions had taken place and no sale of land had in fact, been effected.

(2.) Dr. Salim said that there was a general objection on the part of many inhabitants against the use of the Hebrew letters "Aleph, Yod" after the word "Palestina" in Hebrew in Palestinian stamps. The letters were the initials of the Hebrew words "Eretz Israel" (Land of Israel), but if this land were called "Eretz Israel" over 2,000 years ago, it was also known as the Land of Canaan, and it is also known as the Holy Land.

His Excellency said that he had notice of a question by Mr. Yellin on the same point, but in a contrary sense.

Mr. Yellin said that when he gave notice of this question he was not only thinking of postal stamps but of all public documents on which the name "Aleph, Yod" followed the word "Palestina" in Hebrew. He was not concerned now with the relations of the Jews to the country, but with a linguistic point. Every language had a special designation for place-names. For instance, Germany is called in English "Germany," in French "Allemagne," and in German "Deutschland." No German would dream of thinking of compelling a Frenchman to call Germany "Deutschland." The name in Arabic of Austria is "Namsa." No person would think of asking an Arab to change that name to "Austria." Arabs are in the habit

of calling Jerusalem El Kuds, nobody would think of asking them to call it otherwise. In the same way, if the name "Eretz Israel" were used, it would be a mistake. Mr. Yellin quoted documentary evidence from the New Testament, from the Talmud, and from a reference book on Palestine, written by a non-Jew, to prove that for more than 2,000 years the name of the country had only been known in Hebrew as "Eretz Israel," and the reference "Land of Canaan" was only to a very small portion of the country. In fact, if the name "Palestina" were used to describe this country to Jews in Yemen, Bokhara, Persia, they would not recognise that this country was meant. The name "Eretz Israel" was used in the Hebrew press. After the British occupation also, during the military regime, this name was used on postal forms issued in Hebrew. If the arrangement for the stamps could assure the Council that not more than 50 per cent. of the Jewish people would understand it. The Government could not make reforms in the Hebrew language. The proper name that had been used for centuries must be restored to the language.

After some further discussion on the part of several members, His Excellency decided that the name "Eretz Israel" should be used. At the same time he thought that if "Eretz Israel" only were used it might not be regarded by the world as a correct rendering of the word "Palestine," and in the case of passports or certificates of nationality it might perhaps give rise to difficulties, so it was decided to print "Palestine" in Hebrew letters and to add after it the letters "Aleph, Yod," which constitute a recognised abbreviation of the word "Eretz Israel." Dr. Salim wanted to omit "Aleph, Yod," and Mr. Yellin wanted to omit "Palestine." The right solution would be to retain both.

As it was the general desire to discuss the question further, it was adjourned to the next meeting of the Council.

Tukan Bey asked that the prohibition on the export of cereals be now rescinded. The Council decided that the prohibition should be rescinded and to export would greatly relieve financial pressure.

Mr. Harari promised that the Administration would give the matter sympathetic consideration.

It was decided that the next meeting of the Council should take place on the 6th January, 1921 at 9:30 a.m. and be continued on the morning of the 7th January.

E 15260 13556 44)

No. 335

Foreign Office to War Office

Sir,
Foreign Office, London.
WITH reference to a recent discussion at the Inter-Departmental Committee for Palestine Affairs, at which your Department was represented by Captain Macindoe, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to transmit the accompanying copy of a telegram addressed to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine regarding communication with the High Commissioner for Syria, together with a copy of a letter addressed to the India Office in the same subject.

The High Commissioner for Syria is requested to inform the High Commissioner for Palestine as to what procedure the Army Council recommend should be adopted in future. Lord Curzon is inclined to the view that in all questions involving the employment of troops for political purposes the channel of communication should be the High Commissioner in his capacity as titular Commander-in-chief.

2. A copy of this letter is being sent to the India Office.

I am, &c.

D. G. OSBORNE.

1 See No. 335

3 Y

E 15280 13556 44]

No. 336

Foreign Office to India Office

Sir,

WITH reference to the recent discussion at the Inter-Departmental Committee for Palestine Affairs, at which Major Marrs represented your Department, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to transmit the accompanying copy of a telegram which has been addressed to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine regarding communication between him and the French High Commissioner for Syria.

2. Sir H. Samuel has been instructed to repeat this telegram to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Mesopotamia, and Lord Curzon ventures to suggest, for Mr Secretary Montagu's consideration, that Sir P. Cox might be invited to telegraph his observations on a similar procedure being proposed to the French Government to govern the relations between Sir P. Cox and the French High Commissioner for Syria.

3. A copy of a letter addressed to the War Office regarding communication on military matters between the British military authorities in Palestine and the French military authorities in Syria is also enclosed herein.

I am, &c.

D. G. OSBORNE.

E 15728 4164 44]

No. 337

Foreign Office to Sir W. Hankey.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 30, 1920.

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to refer to a memorandum written by Sir Cecil Hurst at Geneva on the 10th December regarding the present position of the mandates before the League of Nations. This memorandum contained the following paragraph—

"There are signs of coming trouble with the Italians in the Council over the 'A' mandates, due apparently to the fact that they have not been consulted. The Turkish Treaty provides that the mandates shall be formulated by the principal Powers and submitted to the Council. They have in fact been prepared and submitted by France and Great Britain alone, to the exclusion of Italy and Japan. Mr Balfour has no information as to why the stipulations of the treaty have not been followed, and would be very glad of any explanations or arguments that he can use."

It is understood that the "A" mandates have not yet been discussed by the Council of the League, but that such discussion is likely to take place at its next meeting, either at the end of January or early in February. In these circumstances, Lord Curzon desires me to explain that the reason why the mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia were not submitted to the Japanese and Italian Governments before their communication to the League of Nations was solely the desire to expedite the preparation of the mandates in time for their consideration while the Council and the Assembly of the League were still sitting at Geneva. When the preparation of the mandates was nearing completion, it was found to be impossible to consult the Japanese and Italian Governments and obtain their formal consent within the time available before the end of the meeting at Geneva. As, however, both the Japanese and Italian Governments were represented on the Council, it was thought that their consent could most readily be obtained by submitting the mandates at once to the Council, thus affording those Powers full opportunity to consider and comment upon the terms of the draft instruments.

3. Lord Curzon trusts that the above argument will enable Mr Balfour to overcome any opposition of the Council to the present form of the "A" mandates. The French representative on the Council will doubtless be prepared to support him if and when a discussion on this point should arise.

I am, &c.

D. G. OSBORNE.

E 16335 6438 44]

India Office to Foreign Office

India Office, December 31, 1920.

AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to transmit to you, for the consideration of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter to the Government of India respecting the control of Annual funds in Palestine.

I am, &c.

F. W. DUKAKIS

Enclosure in N

Mr. Shuckburgh to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India

Dear Sir,

India Office, December 31, 1920.

BY the mail of the 16th December I forwarded to you copies of a despatch No. 130 of the 14th November, from the High Commissioner in Palestine regarding the discussion of measures for the control of Annual funds in that country, together with copies of the covering letter of the 11th December under which it was received from the Foreign Office.

I enclose herewith a copy of paragraph 2 of the Foreign Office letter that wide publicity should be given in India to the proceedings of the conference convened by Sir H. Samuel, and to request that it may be submitted to the Government of India for their consideration.

Yours faithfully,

J. E. SHUCKBURGH

E 15998 4164/44]

No. 339

Earl Curzon to M. de Fleurbaey

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 31, 1920.

IN reply to the memorandum which you communicated to this Office on the 21st December regarding the attitude of the Italian Government towards the conferment of the mandates for Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia, I have the honour to transmit the accompanying copy of a note to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires in reply to his representations.

I would draw attention to the fact that at the morning meeting of the Supreme Council at San Remo on the 25th April at which the decision to confer the above mandates was taken, the Italian Government entered the following formal protest—

"La delegazione italiana, in considerazione dei grandi interessi economici che l'Italia ha in tante Province esclusivamente mediterranee possiede in Asia Minore, protesta alla presente risoluzione finché non si sia provveduto al regolamento dei suoi interessi."

representations, they may yet do so ultimately, and they may then say that they are

at the Tripartite Agreement to which the reservation presumably referred, actually enter into force. I should be grateful for an expression of the views of the French Government as to how such an argument, if and when put forward by the Italian Government, should be met.

4. It is perhaps hardly necessary for me to add that the impression alleged to have been gained by the Italian representatives during the recent Allied conference in London, as to an inclination on the part of His Majesty's Government to reconsider the allocation of mandates in Asia Minor, is completely erroneous.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

CHAPTER IV.—MESOPOTAMIA

E 7879]

No. 340

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 8.)

India Office, July 7, 1920

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a memorandum from Bagdad, dated the 8th May, 1920, on the subject of the Nejd-Heyaz dispute.

I am, &c

F W DUKE

Enclosure 1 in No. 340

Civil Commissioner, Bagdad, to India Office

Bagdad, May 8, 1920.

A COPY of a memorandum, dated the 28th April from the Political Agent, Bahrein, is forwarded with compliments for information.

H. R. LOWISHT

For Lieutenant-Colonel, I.A.S.,

Acting Civil Commissioner in Mesopotamia.

Enclosure 2 in No. 340

Political Agent, Bahrein, to the Civil Commissioner, Bagdad.

I BEG to forward for your information translations of Bin Saud's letter, dated 2nd Rajab, 1338 (12th April, 1920), and its enclosures, which are as follow —

1. Letter from Bin Saud to Political Agent dated April 12, 1920
2. Letter from Emir Faisal to Bin Saud, dated February 29, 11
3. Note from Emir Faisal to Bin Saud, not dated
4. Letter from Bin Saud to Emir Faisal, dated April 12, 1920
5. Note from Bin Saud to Emir Faisal, not dated
6. Copy of a pamphlet.*

H. R. P. DICKSON, C.I.E.

Bahrein, April 28, 1920

Enclosure 3 in No. 340

(1.) Translation of a letter dated 22nd Rajab, 1338 (12th April, 1920), from Ibn Saud to Major H. R. P. Dickson, C.I.E., Political Agent, Bahrein

The object of this friendly letter is to enquire about your honour's welfare and to express my sentiment upon me in virtue of my friendship for and loyalty to His Britannic Majesty's Government, with whom I am in treaty and alliance. It is for this reason that I do not delay or hesitate, in submitting these necessary and important communications, knowing well that these concern His Britannic Majesty's Government and myself. These are as follows: I have received a letter* from Emir Faisal, together with an enclosure, inviting me to an alliance with him and his adherents. These letters were accompanied by certain undesirable instructions and exhortations which are opposed to our interests, that is to say, the interests of His Britannic Majesty's Government as well as my own. (The letters and pamphlet were sent me) with names of unknown identity, and borrowed Arab names with the object of promulgating

* Not printed

sent (similar communications and) men to Ibn Rashid, Ibn Shaubhan, the Imam Y... and the Imam F... of Amur. This evil propaganda is likely to gain a bulk and will set us on fire with its flames. Neglect or inattention of the above will only to mix myself up with the above sort of ideas, I am left face to face with a serious and

friend the British Government and myself, and it is our strictest duty and obligation to be faithful to our promises, just as God the most said "If they abide (by promises made) to you, you should abide (by

This (enclosed) letter of the Sherif (Faisal) is a testimony of what I explained to your honour personally. The contents of the pamphlet are exhortations addressed to the inhabitants of the Arabian peninsula, of which a gist is given below drawn up secretly in the form of a note or memorandum by the

and it is evident that the British Government will fall down

by these means. The near approach of the British Government, which we will refer in brief, as a detailed account, firstly, it is human nature to love freedom and independence, yet all nations now realize that the English are trying to rule over them. By this they (our enemies) would convey that the British Government is not strong enough to hold its own, but is about to meet its downfall, thus they would belittle her (British Government) in the eyes

we have now tried out the British and their Allies, who sought in vain to control and subjugate them. These Bolsheviks have stamped their power and prestige in the East, and are assisted by all the Islamic nations in the East, not only for the sake of Bolsheviks as such, but because they are the enemies of all aggression (i.e. colonialism). Hence they are helping Turkey, Greece, and the East to oppose the English and to India, which is already in the throes of rebellion, against them. With these other Muslims it is hoped that Arabs and Kurds will now join, because all know what they did not know before, namely, the danger to their nation, to our country

This above is said with the object of poisoning the minds of the Arabs of this peninsula, just as they have already done in the case of some Arabs of Mesopotamia, Syria, and Kurdistan, against the British Government and their Allies.

They (the British) are the most words in making agreements, by means of which they find a way out of every difficulty and are enabled to act contrary to these agreements and treaties while still claiming to act in accordance therewith; they in this way manage to make their opponents out as the breakers of these conditions. Prince Bismarck, the greatest politician of his

...as and of them that they are ...
...by means of interpretation. We have an object-lesson in their treaty with the Arab countries and they have acted to the contrary. Also another lesson is their making of a treaty with the Emir Ibn Saud, ruler of Nejd, and then fettering him for years. It is believed that this treaty will not be ratified until they have established their rule in Mesopotamia and extended it to Syria and Palestine by means of strategic railway lines which would give them a hold over his territories and others. By the above it is intended to create a suspicion against the great Government, and to make me hostile to her in order that they might realize their vain hopes.

One more quotation. "She (Great Britain) has derived benefit from the hostilities and fighting that have been going on between the Hejaz and Nejd." They would

whereas that friendship is most essential to my personal as well as political interests. I am sending to your honour the communication which they have published under the title "English aims in Hejaz, &c." Also a letter from Emir Faisal, a photocopy and copy of my reply, together with its enclosures, for information and personal. You will then know their evil tricks, and will see that we have a danger to face now and cannot ignore it. We must find an effective remedy. You will kindly submit copies of these to the authorities in London so that prompt action may be taken without delay, to enable me to check this serious matter (menace) before it spreads over my country. I cannot, without the advice of my friend the great Government, and hope, through your efforts, get an early answer. During your honour's recent visit to Haifa the situation was fully explained to you personally.

The letter of the Sherif Faisal and the booklet may kindly be returned when done with. Usual ending.

Enclosure 1 in No. 349

(1a.) Translation of Emir Faisal's Letter to His

High Command of Northern Arabia.

(After compliments.) 8th Jamad-ul-Thani, 1338 (February 29, 1920)
I ROPE, please God, you are in the best of health and happiness. I inform you that I am visiting this opportunity afforded by your Excellency's side, to strengthen the friendship and regard existing between us, for the continuance of which I hope and pray for ever.

I beg you, in writing this, kindly to give my best respects to your honoured father the Emir Abdur Rahman and to your brother Muhammad and son Faisal, and all who are dear to you and those present to your Majesty.

May I and all other Ashraf also send your Excellency their compliments with respects.

(Seal) FEISAL-BIN-HUSSEIN

Enclosure 5 in No. 349

(2.) Translation of Enclosures to Emir Faisal's letter (without date, address, signature), but written in some handwriting as Faisal's letter.

"MAY your life be prolonged." I do not see that it is necessary for me to enquire upon a subject which you know very well. Lo! that is the duty of everyone who desires to be a non-offender and utter the declaration. "There is no God but God." You know, too, what (duty) devolves on every individual (Muslim) who utters these noble words, namely that of extending a helping hand and assisting his brother Muslim. Especially is this a duty in these dangerous and hard times, when no one of us knows what may befall Islam and Arabs as result of the painful events and deplorable circumstances (now existing). May God protect you and ourselves, as well as all true believers, from the evils of our times.

I say this, and call God to witness and all men can bear witness, that I have been

greatly affected by the regrettable happenings which have taken place between you and my father and brothers, for which there was no real cause or true reason. It was nothing but misunderstanding that led to all these unfortunate differences; but I look to the future with optimistic feelings. I am equally confident in the sincerity of both sides, and in their anxiety to do all that tends to the unity of Islam and of Arabs. I have written this message, in view of my above confidence, with my sincere greetings. By writing this, I do not wish for anything but the glory of God and the good of Muslims. Not am I a superior of yours or of my father's (to advise and compel you), but my sole intention is to secure the great benefits that must result from following the word of God, the gracious. "Do not disunite or you will be weakened and your prestige will be lost" (quotation from Al-Quran). I am only one of those who say "There is no God but God," and who long to see their co-religionists united and helping another in the cause of good and religion. This is all. I have written a similar letter to my father, without his knowing that I written to your Excellency. I hope the gracious God may be pleased to make me a medium for good and the means of preventing bloodshed between Muslims. The events of the world have made it necessary for these times for Muslims to store up their strength and to collect their dispersed forces. If this meets with your approbation, then may God reward you with the highest good for the sake of Islam, the Arabs and for your own sake! I have written this in order not to fail in my duty to my people, who are dearer to me than my own body and soul. I await your Excellency's answer, which will, I hope, be satisfactory, and hope to see the happiness of our country by means of the unity of all Muslims. May we obtain their good. Salaam.

Enclosure 6 in No. 349

Translation of letter dated 22nd Rajab, 1338 (19th April, 1920), from Bin Saud to Emir Faisal.

(After compliments.)

YOUR friendly letter, dated 8th Jamad-ul-Thani, 1338, reached me and I was glad to peruse it, for it conveyed the good news of your welfare, more especially because embodied your good wishes towards us. You have expressed hopes of maintaining that friendship which is so dear to us, and nothing that would cause a rupture. We hope, please God, this friendship will continue to be the same. It is hoped you will present my compliments to your Excellency and to those who are dear to your Excellency.

My father and brothers and sons, Saud and Faisal all send you their salaams and respects.

Enclosure 7 in No. 349

Translation of Note (enclosure to letter) from Bin Saud to Emir Faisal

In the name of God, &c.

That your Excellency communicated was understood by (me) your brother.

Regarding your honoured self to (prevent) what is injurious to the Muslims, and what should be made in their behalf. This is what is wished for, and it is not too much for the like of you to accomplish. This should be the thought of every wise man. However, what you remarked about the matters concerning our father (King Hussein) and your brother (myself), it is obvious that a detailed review of the same will be too long for this note. Your Excellency is doubtless aware of some of the circumstances and initial causes. God knows that I did not bring that situation about, nor did I wish, or even believe it to be so. The following events will bear out the above statement.

Firstly, his (King Hussein's) attack on Nejd and capture of Saud (son of Abdur Rahman - on whom may God have mercy - you know he (Saud) had only a few men from among the Bedouins, and our own forces were quite sufficient to extirpate him. To my mind the capture of Saud in the centre of Nejd and his confinement (by King Hussein) was a disgrace to me, yet I let it pass off only to maintain peace and to show my respect for him (King Hussein) and your Excellency.

Secondly, at the time of your fighting with the Turks, I was able to see the position of the British Government. In spite of all this, I did not make or allow the hostile movement against your interests to be a pretext for inciting them to revolt against us. I have written to them to remain even if they become excited, also letters to Tarsab and Kauran and their friends showing religious hatred and declaring that those who follow the inhabitants of Nejd are "Kafir" (heretics). I have also written to them to remain even if they become excited, also letters to Tarsab and Kauran and their friends showing religious hatred and declaring that those who follow the inhabitants of Nejd are "Kafir" (heretics). I have also written to them to remain even if they become excited, also letters to Tarsab and Kauran and their friends showing religious hatred and declaring that those who follow the inhabitants of Nejd are "Kafir" (heretics).

As regards an agreement with your father, proposed to be arrived at through your Excellency, it is clear that such an agreement would be most welcome to me on all religious as well as political grounds.

As for the people and the people, what is forbidden is to be composed, then the point is not to hold the territories of his ancestors; he is careful to avoid causing loss to one another, do justice, and thus be helpful in securing union and protecting common interests for the good of all without following selfish inclinations or narrow views. (11) Your brother, who prepared to spend my life and money for putting an end to the disturbed state of affairs and to achieve an improvement in the condition. If what I have stated above can be accomplished, I cannot do without the mediation of my friend, the great British Government.

E 9118 38 44

Field Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 12)

(No 742)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward some extracts from the report of the British Agent, Jeddah, for the week ending the 12th June. This report gives a full account of the incident which led to the resignation of the Minister of War, about which your Lordship requested further details in your letter of 11th June.

Considering this incident, account must, I think, be taken of the events which preceded it.

Your Lordship is already aware, King Hussein strongly resented a statement made by the British Agent, Jeddah, in writing to our Government, in which he was asked and objected to the two doctors Hussein, both of whom have shown themselves to be strongly anti-British.

Their opposition manifested itself in the usual oriental way. A false statement was made to stir the fanaticism of the Moslems by the allegation that His Majesty's Government were endeavouring to gain possession of the Government of the Hejaz.

The members of foreign missions were requested to hold all intercourse with the townspeople of Jeddah through the khatib and were forbidden to leave the city. An attempt was made to stir the fanaticism of the Moslems by the allegation that His Majesty's Government were endeavouring to gain possession of the Government of the Hejaz.

The climax was reached when Captain Pinder was prevented from leaving the city. Colonel Vickers demanded an immediate apology and had it been conveyed in the manner at first promised by the King the incident would have been closed.

The King chose instead, at the last moment, to fulfil the condition that the apology must be conveyed by a high official, by sending his Minister of War instead of the Emir Abdullah. Technically speaking he was correct, but he was well aware that his Minister of War was also a junior officer in the Egyptian army and therefore not a proper person to send. He knew also that the demand for a high official was a demand for a high official, and that it was the common belief that the Emir Abdullah would be sent to Jeddah to demand a high official. He knew also that the demand for a high official was a demand for a high official, and that it was the common belief that the Emir Abdullah would be sent to Jeddah to demand a high official.

I consider that the tone of Colonel Vickers's telegram to the King was unnecessarily abrupt and calculated to increase the tension, and I have informed him to this effect. I prefer to withhold my opinion as regards his other actions in what was undoubtedly an extremely difficult situation until I have discussed the whole matter with him. He should arrive in Cairo in a few days.

The facts were not fully reported to me at first, and my telegram No 567 of the 11th instant may have given your Lordship an incorrect impression of the importance of the above-mentioned incident.

The King's resignation, and that I realized that it was based on more general considerations than that of the quarantine control. That this is the case I have no doubt. The decisions of the San Remo Conference as regards the Arab countries, though doubtless anticipated, came as a shock to the King and probably brought home to him, for the first time, the fact that no words of his could alter the decision as regards Syria and Mesopotamia and that his hopes of expansion beyond the Hedjaz had ended in failure. Coupled with these considerations, were the unsatisfactory conditions which prevailed in the Hedjaz, the almost open disobedience of his tribes, the delay in the payment of his subsidy, and the growing menace of the Wahabites.

The question of the quarantine control to which he had raised no serious objections during the previous years, gave him an opportunity, of which he was not slow to take advantage, to vent his accumulated wrath and disappointment.

The instructions of your Lordship as regards the control were explicit, but I venture to think that in view of the King's mental condition it was impossible to carry them out without coming into direct collision with him, and Colonel Vickers was left with the alternative of surrendering the control or of joining direct issue. In view of his instructions, he had no choice, and the subsequent disputes followed.

To show that the King had no justification for continuing his hostile attitude I forward for your Lordship's information a copy of three telegrams which I addressed to him, and of a letter to him from Colonel Vickers. It is my opinion that the King has deliberately attempted to foment the trouble, and that, had the quarantine question not afforded him an excuse, he would have found another.

I have, &c.

ALLENBY F M

Enclosure 1 in No 341

Extracts from Political Report by Colonel C. E. Vickers, C.M.G., D.S.O., British Agent, Jeddah, for the period from the 1st to the 12th June, 1920

The King's position amongst Mohammedans

THE King repeatedly threatened his abdication in 1918 and 1919. In May and June, 1920 he began again to make dark hints which eventually changed to frequent intimations that he was really going to abdicate in a few weeks.

His resignation would be acclaimed with gratitude and relief by all his subjects, but he has no intention of resigning and this opinion was reported last October.

It has consequently been a matter of deep consideration by me whether his removal could be recommended without inflaming Mohammedan opinion, or giving mischief makers a tangible cause for grievance against us. I do not consider that it would be politically advisable to remove him without some petition unanimously signed and presented by the Ashraf of the Koreish. Since he is unlikely to resign,

it would appear that our only course is to accept his resignation whenever offered, until, as it is quite likely, one day in an unusually violent paroxysm of anger he will actually fulfil his threat and embark on a ship for Egypt.

I do not ignore the not improbable possibility of his assassination at the hands of some desperate subject goaded beyond endurance.

It is not the place here, or the time, to enter into a discussion as to the necessity of paying so much attention to Mohammedana, for I have accepted it during many years spent in the East as an axiom. One cannot, however, go on for ever yielding every point to a weak minority out of deference to a religion some six hundred years younger than ours, while I regard as farcical the opinion of those pessimists who talk in hushed whispers of the possibility of a united Arab, or Mohammedan, Kingdom stretching from the Caucasus to Delhi.

At the first flash of their birth the followers of Islam united by their religion and common ideals, made many conquests, but since their early years history can show no records of people more addicted than they to inter-tribal and even internecine fighting, or more incapable of any unity. What is then the strength of the King's position in the Mohammedan world?

Amongst his neighbours he is hated, and has neither prestige nor position. Ibn Saud looks on him with contempt as an immoral spot on Islamism, the Imam of Yemen regards him as an impertinent pretender to the position of Caliph el Mu'minin. The Idri and Ibn Rashid have neither affection, fear or respect for him. Amongst the Turks he is not likely to find much favour, although he is alleged to be the pupil of the Sultan.

Amongst the Mohammedans of India the Ashraf have never been popular.

In the Iraq one gathers from the official reports that the Sherifial family are not held in unanimous affection or respect, nor is their prestige and influence very great.

The Turks accorded royal honours to the Sherif of Mecca whom they appointed, but it is understood that they were loath to remove a Sherif once he had been installed. The present Sherif Hussein had even amongst the Turks an evil reputation for obstinacy and intrigue.

The situation, therefore, at present, is that a Sherif sits on the throne of the Hedjaz, hated and dreaded by his subjects, with whom it is literally impossible to work or even to regard as a sane man. The fear in which he is held is indescribable.

There is no one, I suppose, who has not arrived in the Hedjaz, the country of the Mohammedan religion, gained by contact with Mohammedans in other countries. A few weeks are sufficient to disperse that feeling for there is no cesspool in the world so foul as the cities of the Hedjaz. Sherif Hussein has vetoed every scheme for improvement, has barred all progress, and has plunged the Hedjaz into anarchy, while no law or order exists outside his immediate environment. Petitions have been presented for the return of the Turkish Government, as far preferable to the present situation, and this is the result of the removal of the yoke of the Turks from the neck of the Arabs by Great Britain. Where we thought to shed the light of civilisation we have caused the darkness of a despotic and tyrannical rule as harsh as in the days of Tamarlane or Attila.

General—Since my last report the King has maintained his obstinate and hostile attitude. To my request for an enquiry into the charge against my medical officer he has made a meaningless reply, in all other letters he has evaded the point or made insulting references to how Great Britain disregards her word and how he keeps his promises. No reply has been made by me to his various taunts, as I did not consider it would serve any useful purpose to enter into an argument with him.

The King has never given me notice in writing that he would stop by force my medical officer if he attempted to board pilgrim boats (he has also never actually said that he repudiated Abdullah's letter granting Great Britain the control of the quarantine, but Abdullah has stated privately in writing that it is so repudiated), so I decided to make a test case, for I thought that the King, if he took the action which he threatened, would place himself in a very awkward situation, and one might be able to bring considerable pressure on him as the result.

I instructed the doctor to meet the steamship "Koweit." He did so and attempted to board her after the Hachimite quarantine officials had gone on board and secured her. He was stopped by the quarantine officials, who seized his hand and ordered him to go back. The doctor at once got back into the launch and

steamed away, to the consternation of the Hachimite quarantine officials, who expected the doctor to ask permission to board the ship which they would have graciously given.

Mohd Eff Hussein immediately dashed for the shore to inform the King. I sent telegrams directly I received the doctor's report. I point out that the master of the ship, the pilgrims, and the inhabitants of Jeddah are aware that a British officer in uniform was prevented from going on board a British ship.

I understand the King realised fully that he had put himself in a very delicate position. After receiving his reply (attached), I telegraphed that I could not accept and must insist on the conditions of my previous telegram.

At 2 P.M. on the 8th I was called to the telephone, and through Kaisuni Pasha it was explained to me that owing to Ramadan, my telegram had only just been brought to the King, that he accepted all my conditions in the telegram and that Emir Abdullah would leave that night to make the public apology in person if I would accept my ultimatum by 12 hours. I consented only on the condition that Emir Abdullah gave me his personal word of honour that the King had accepted my conditions and that he would be at Jeddah before noon on the 9th.

On the telephone the Emir gave me his personal word (Kalam Sharf) that he would be at Jeddah before noon, that they deeply regretted such an incident in their happy relations with Great Britain, that the King was in the room and he was repeating his, the King's, words in accepting all the demands which I had asked. I considered this sufficient and accepted the Emir's, which was the King's, word.

At 9.30 A.M. on the 9th I was called to the telephone by Kaisuni Pasha, Minister of War, speaking from the barracks at Jeddah. He said in a very embarrassed and nervous way that he had been sent by the King to make the official apology in place of the Emir Abdullah, whom the King had stopped at the last moment.

Now the King and everyone at Jeddah knows that to all intents and purposes Kaisuni Pasha is an officer of my staff, he is a captain, temporary Lieutenant Colonel, in the Egyptian army, far junior in rank to my chief staff officer, Sadek Pasha. To anyone including Kaisuni, it was obvious that it was most insulting to send a junior Egyptian officer to apologise to the British Agent on behalf of the Hachimite Government. I sent Sadek Pasha to see Kaisuni and he brought me the report that Kaisuni realised it was very insulting to us, that he had been forced to come by the King, and that he now forwarded a wire for me to see and send to the King resigning his post. I am extremely disappointed at Kaisuni's behaviour. I have consistently supported him, although many others have reported that he was running with the hare and hunting with the hounds, and many including Sadek have warned me that he does not use his full influence on our behalf with the King.

I was warned some time ago, and warned Kaisuni Pasha when he was in Cairo, that he should not be allowed to stay in the Hedjaz, as he was a trouble-maker, and would get rid of Kaisuni, whom they hated, if he stayed away too long. During his absence they did get the upper hand and Kaisuni knew his days were numbered.

He knew that he should have refused the mission, and at the worst the King could have dismissed him. He would have returned to the Egyptian army with honour and we should have been under an obligation to him.

He chose the King's side and thought to talk me over.

Kaisuni tried to rectify his mistake by resigning at once, which the King accepted. I, however, could not have recommended that this officer should hold his position any longer. He leaves on the 16th June to rejoin the Egyptian army.

By his action Kaisuni Pasha wrecked the most favourable hope of a settlement. If he had refused the mission, the King would have kept his word and sent Abdullah.

With the Emir at Jeddah I believe that I could have arrived at a settlement. The King had previously stated that he will not let Abdullah come near me as I can convert him to my views, and here he had yielded only to be cancelled as a result of Kaisuni's behaviour.

The King has made a written apology and in an open telegram instructed the Kaiser to deliver it. I am not attached to the Kaiser, but a view of the Kaiser's telegram stated "a high official from Mecca," and the Minister for War technically fulfils that stipulation. I have considered that the King has complied with my demands, and trust that you will concur. It will be seen, though, from the incident related below that he does not keep his word long.

On the afternoon of the 9th another pilgrim boat came in, and to test the King's telegram No. 541 (attached) I sent the medical officer on board. He was again

stopped, but disregarded the order (under my instructions he had an orderly of the Agency police with him) and went on board. The quarantine officials then left the boat without giving any orders about the pilgrims. The boat was clean and had to sail, so Captain Pinder ordered them to land forthwith, which they did.

The sailors of the sambuks started under orders of the Hachimite officials to take the pilgrims to the islands, but the pilgrims, who were a rough-looking lot from the north of India, insisted that the boat should land at Jeddah.

I confess I was surprised at this, but it only shows that the King will get into trouble with the pilgrims. The pilgrims are disappointed by the quarantine regulations, which are framed entirely to get money out of them. They know that the Sherif has only a very few police and a mutinous army of about 500 men in Mecca, and will take advantage of it. I do not think the King has quite realised the different conditions of the present time. There are Bolsheviks amongst the pilgrims, as he will learn.

I am informed privately that the King has now instructed Mohamed Hussein to visit no more boats, and not to let any sambuks go off to ships. His idea is that he will let us give pratique but refuse all facilities to land.

I consider that the King's attitude throughout has been hostile, tactless and discourteous, and that it is necessary to present the ultimatum, which I submitted for your consideration in my last report.

I have previously informed you that the strongest lever in our hands is to threaten to stop the pilgrimages. Now I have private information that the Italian and French have discouraged, if not stopped, pilgrims from Northern Africa this year. The country depends for its existence on the pilgrims, and it is ruined if the pilgrimage is stopped.

If the King takes the action which is mentioned above he will have by his own act stopped the pilgrims from landing, and I suggest great capital could be made out of it.

It is through the pilgrims we can strike at the King, and I am convinced that he could be brought to his knees by a telegram to the effect that owing to his inability to guarantee the roads and secure the safety of the pilgrims, the pilgrims are people from undertaking the pilgrimage this year has been published in our dependencies.

The French have frequently asked me why we did not adopt this course and by the wording of the notices throw the whole blame on the Sherif. It is certainly a fact, that the pilgrimage is more unsafe than it has been for 40 years, and the expenses are heavier every year.

Quarantine and Quarantine Dues

With reference to the 5 rupees dues at Kamaran is the total amount payable (excluding the 25 piastres Jeddah fees), and is in lieu of the former 37½ piastres. I would beg to draw your attention to the fact that the pilgrims have been charged with 5 rupees dues at all concerned by the authorities responsible failing to give timely notice of change. This is in accordance with the report No. 4 dated the 30th April resulting in claims for refund by shipping companies for losses occasioned by pilgrims being charged at the old rates, for lack of any notification of the change, and secondly in this case. Shipping companies have since arranged for charging pilgrims this 5 rupees plus the 37½ piastres on advice from this office, and will now have to change their arrangements again. This would have all been obviated if the Government of India and Quarantine Board had taken steps to keep this Agency properly informed.

2. With regard to the 5 rupees being in lieu of the 37½ piastres, there is nothing to prevent the Hachimite Government now levying an increased charge over and above the 25 piastres Jeddah dues to meet the expenses of upkeep of the quarantine, calling it by any name they choose.

3. In practice, it is highly improbable there would ever be actual need of the elaborate and costly arrangements contemplated here, since the reopening of Kamaran and the thorough measures there carried out. But as pointed out in Lieut.-Colonel Wilkinson's and Major Marshall's reports, the possibility of an outbreak has always to be kept in view, however unlikely it may seem. In addition, money must be found from somewhere if the other measures contemplated for the welfare of pilgrims are to be carried out.

4. The history of the quarantine question and dues may be summarised as follows:

Under the Turks—7½ piastres per day of quarantine irrespective of period were levied with (apparently) a minimum of 37½ piastres. As Kamaran and Jeddah stations were equally under the same administration, the question of sharing dues did not arise. These dues were collected personally from pilgrims and not charged on their tickets and paid through companies.

In 1917 the service directed by the Hachimite Government was reported by Major Thomson as "absolutely inefficient". Kamaran was used, the 1912 Paris Convention being followed. Apparently no dues were collected for Kamaran, it being felt any decision on the point might prejudice the eventual disposal of Kamaran.

In 1918 Kamaran was not used "with the result that quarantine at Jeddah was merely a farce" (Captain Gilmour's report).

In 1919 Kamaran was reopened in view of above. No dues were levied there, although it appears to have been understood generally, that Kamaran was to get 15 piastres per day, and Jeddah 25 piastres.

In 1920 the non-collection of dues at Kamaran being still in force until cancelled by Government of India, 37½ piastres were arranged for by shipping companies.

Kamaran was charged 5 piastres per day, and Jeddah 25 piastres. The latest orders cancel the latter, Jeddah getting nothing and Kamaran 30 piastres—5 rupees. In this connection, please see also Foreign Office despatches to his Excellency the High Commissioner, No. 418, dated the 4th April, 1919, and No. 616 dated the 16th May, 1919, conveying His Majesty's Treasury's proposals.

5. *Status of Quarantine Islands*—It would be convenient to know as soon as possible the status of Kamaran and the Jeddah Islands.

6. As regards the question of British control, I would particularly draw your attention to his Excellency the High Commissioner's No. 861, dated the 26th May, 1919, paragraph 2, Foreign Office to his Excellency the High Commissioner No. 710, dated the 10th June, 1919, and your A R No. 403, dated the 9th March, 1920, all insisting on the importance of British control being accepted.

I have accordingly based my actions on the above. Last year exactly the same position arose but matters did not come to a head. Abdullah signed, as he did this year, but this did not evidently come to the ears of the King, and practically the same series of incidents with regard to the quarantine and Dr. Mohamed Hussein's proposals.

The control was made a straight issue. The opportunity was provided last year during June and July, but it was not taken advantage of, hence the difficulties have increased this year, although they could equally well have been glossed over, which would have left an impossible situation for next year.

7. It has come to light that Dr. Hussein has the running of the coffee and refreshment shops on the Islands. His anxiety to force pilgrims to go to, and stay the longest possible period on, the Islands is therefore explained, in addition to the clunk it provided for levying unauthorised dues.

Cable

I draw your attention again to this question, since with no subsidy it will not be possible to make any more of the Islands. The King is not likely to do. He will demand the control of both ends of the cable, a point which I consider it is impossible to concede without resultant chaos and inconvenience to all classes of the community.

Postscript

General—The Chief of the French Mission informs me that he has repeatedly reported to General Gouraud that there will be a revolution in this country directly one brave man is found. He has also expressed the opinion that no country has so just a cause or right to revolt.

He further informs me that the French Government have practically vetoed the pilgrimage from Morocco and Algeria because of King Hussein's intrigues and propaganda.

Enclosure 2 in N. 1004.

General Jeddah

An Indian has put in a claim for a large sum of money stolen from him by Dr. Khalil Hussein. The King has intimated that as Dr. Khalil is an honourable man and has rendered great service to the Hedjaz, he will pay proved claims against him out of his own pocket. Several other claims are now being put forward, and His Majesty is likely to find his penchant for Khalil somewhat expensive. His Majesty considers any point scored against Khalil is a point scored against himself.

Enclosure 3 in No 341

British Agent to the King of the Hedjaz

$$f_{\text{max}} = \frac{1}{2} \int_0^1 f(r) dr$$

I do not rely upon twenty-four hours or I reserve the right to future action

Enclosure 4 to No 341

The King of the Hedjaz to the British Agent Jeddah

June 7, 1920

With a 50% reduction in the

By order of His Majesty the King,
ALMUD

12. 5 in No 341

British Agent to the King of the Hedjaz

June 8, 1920

I do not accept.

Time limit expires subject to day

Enclosure 6 n. No. 34.

Reply to telegram No 1141 of June 8, 1920

VERBAL message over telephone from King accepting demands and intimating that Four Muslims would leave at once.

FIGURE 7 in No. 343

British Agent to the King of the Hedjaz

After treatment

Jeddah, June 14, 1920

I regret very much that there is some misunderstanding, for I have only asked for British supervision of pilgrim ships in the interests of public health and the lives of the pilgrims as last year.

Your Majesty will I am sure realise that the present situation is very bad for trade and I appeal to your Majesty to favour me with your intentions, for I do not understand the present situation or the reason for it.

Best respects.

C. VICKERY, *Colonel*

Enclosure 5 in No. 341

Paraphrase of telegram from the High Commissioner to King Hussein

(A. B. No. 633.)

June 11, 1920.

THE series of incidents which have occurred lately at Jeddah have caused me great anxiety. I have reported the matter to His Majesty's Government but before receiving their reply I have thought to send your Majesty a private telegram. It seems to me that the worst has been averted for the moment. But from this onward standing troubles have come. I wish to assure your Majesty that we have no

intention to trespass on your sovereign rights, nor do we wish to do anything as regards the quarantine which was not done during the last few years. There was no trouble then, why should there be now? We only want to help your Majesty, to safeguard the health of the pilgrims, and, if illness occurs, to prevent it from spreading throughout the world. This is a most serious question, on which His Majesty's Government is bound to insist, and I assure your Majesty that only good can come of your agreeing to the supervision which we wish to exercise. I am informed that much of the trouble arises from the hostile attitude taken up by the Hussein brothers, and I advise strongly your Majesty to dismiss them.

I speak to your Majesty in the name of our past and present friendship, and earnestly hope that you will not misinterpret our intentions but will so act that all these difficulties may be smoothed away. I shall be glad of an immediate reply.

Enclosure 9 in No. 341

Paraphrase of telegram from the High Commissioner to King Hussein

(A B No. 834)

June 15 1920

I THANK your Majesty for your telegram
1. as I understand

1. That you have withdrawn your resignation
2. That you have agreed to British control of the quarantine.
3. That you have agreed to dismiss the two Husseins from your service. It will be well if they return to Egypt by the first ship.

I am sure your Majesty has acted wisely, and as soon as you have published the dismissal of the two Husseins and appointed a new or temporary Director-General of Quarantine, I will instruct Colonel Vickery to give up the direct control and to work on former procedure and the lines of my letter of the 10th May to you.

This should be done very quickly, as the present procedure, which was only adopted after you had given instructions to your officials not to work, is harmful to us all.

I hope that Major Marshall will arrive in Jeddah in less than three weeks, and that everything will work smoothly in future.

If you wish, I will ask him to select a suitable man with good qualifications as Director-General of Quarantine.

As regards your letter of the 29th May, I hope to send you favourable news concerning your meeting with Ibn Saud and the subsidy in a few days. I am dismissing Colonel Vickery's translator who was responsible for the abrupt tone of some of his letters. Colonel Vickery asked for this, and I am sure has never intended any discourtesy to your Majesty.

Enclosure 10 in No. 341

Telegram from the High Commissioner to King Hussein

(A B No. 843)

June 19 1920

YOUR telegrams Nos. 828 and 571

I am very glad that your Majesty has withdrawn your resignation. Although you do not mention it, I assume that you have agreed to the Quarantine Control, and on this assumption I have no objection to your proposal to dismiss the two Husseins and send them to Egypt within the next two months.

I trust that everything will go smoothly, and I feel sure that your Majesty's fears that there will be trouble between you and Colonel Vickery are unfounded.

I have made enquiries as to the circumstances of the dismissal of the two Husseins. It appears likely that they were made without his knowledge or consent. As your Majesty knows, when subordinates see their chiefs at variance they are always inclined to take advantage of this fact, and it is therefore urgently necessary that you and Ibn Saud should compose your differences.

I hope to communicate with you further on this subject in a few days. I regret that I cannot do so at present.

E 8300 9 44

THESE papers relate to a matter in dispute between the Fore-
sire viz the temporary continuance of the monthly subsidy
paid to the King of the Hejaz. The case of this and other similar subsidies to Arab
Chiefs is raised in its larger as well as in its narrower aspect in the accompanying
Despatch from Lord Allenby and is explained in the Foreign Office Note

Foreign Office

July 13

Memorandum on the Subsidies to King Hussein and Ibn Saud

On the 5th May last Lord Allenby was consulted by the Secretary of State
to the desirability of continuing the payment of a subsidy to the King of the Hejaz.
Lord Allenby gave it as his opinion that continuation was most important and
advised that the amount should be 250,000 rupees per mensem. The Secretary

the Hejaz had been finally ratified by the Peace Treaty, or until some alternative
arrangement had been made. The Hejaz was a most important region and the

in their reply of the 18th June intimated that the
to sanction these payments until some general policy with regard to subsidies
to Arab rulers could be laid down. On the 30th June the Foreign Office replied that
while fully appreciating the desire of the Treasury for a formulation of policy, it
would be premature to attempt this at the present juncture. Sanction for this

being unable to concur, the question would be laid before the Cabinet. On the 7th
July the Treasury concurred in the latter course.

future Arabian policy and draws attention to the indirect responsibilities which
His Majesty's Government might be deemed to have incurred in that region. The
question of the general questions of policy raised by Lord Allenby most await
the result of the negotiations now being conducted in Paris on our "special position"

London to give effect to His Majesty's Government's policy in the Middle East. But
the following statement of the facts is submitted to show how considerable are the
imperial interests involved.

The Hejaz is an original member of the League of Nations and thus with
entirely independent under the Turkish Treaty. Its importance is due to the fact
that the Moslem Holy Places, Mecca and Medina, lie within it. Each year these
Mahomedan countries outside the British Empire. Last year the number of
from India. The interruption of the pilgrimage would cause the most unfavourable
access of pro-Turkish and Pan-Islamic sentiment.

the most powerful chief of Arabia from the military point of view and would
probably not have great difficulty in overruling the Hejaz if hostilities between
the two countries were to break out. His folk were are coming increasingly under
the influence of Wahabism.

Moslem Puritanism. The tenets of Wahabism induce amongst its adherents a stron-
gerly towards fanaticism and intolerance, and they do not regard
everything Christian and European but also against the followers of other Moslem
sects. A Wahabi occupation of the Holy Places would probably close them effectively
to the Pilgrimage from India, Egypt and the Straits Settlements.

A strong rivalry exists between King Hussein and Ibn Saud. Among oth-
er points of difference, there remain certain frontier disputes of long standing. No

actual hostilities of any importance, however, have taken place since early in 1919. An identic communication was recently sent to the two chiefs, by the Foreign Office and India Office respectively, pressing them to agree to a personal meeting, in the hope that their differences could be thus adjusted. The identic communication pointed out that, in the event of either ruler refusing the invitation to meet his rival, he could not expect a continuance of financial assistance from His Majesty's Government.

Both Hussein and Ibn Saud agreed to such a meeting, and it is hoped that they will come together at Mecca, during the present pilgrimage season, and that some *modus vivendi* will then be arrived at on the frontier and other questions at issue, and that the danger of a Wahabi occupation of the Holy Places will thus be averted.

The subsidies to King Hussein and Ibn Saud were originally purely military measures adopted during the war. The payments to the former were made in connection with his successful revolt against the Turks, during which his troops fought with us in Palestine and Syria, and to the latter to assist him in military operations on our behalf during the Mesopotamian campaign.

The subsidy to King Hussein has been continued since the Armistice on a reduced scale, in the interests of the pilgrimage. The Hejaz is an infertile and rocky strip of land whose intrinsic trade and resources are negligible. Its inhabitants outside the towns consist mainly of desert tribes of Beduin who are largely beyond the control of the Hejaz Government. The various routes to the Holy Places, including the Hejaz railway itself, lie open to the attacks of these tribes, who, unless overpowered, will not only prevent the caravans of pilgrims and to cut the railway for the same purpose, and thus render the pilgrimage difficult or impossible. The policy of the Turks during their domination of the Hejaz, was a combination of armed force and subsidies. They maintained a considerable garrison there, and paid subsidies to the various tribes and to the Emir of the Hejaz to enable him to keep the Beduin and keep the pilgrim routes clear. It is believed that the funds received from His Majesty's Government are largely spent in direct subsidies to the tribal sheikhs.

In view of the Hejaz's membership in the League of Nations, there are obvious objections to the indefinite continuance of this subsidy. It may eventually be desirable to arrange some form of international loan to which the various Powers interested in the pilgrimage might subscribe or to resort to some similar measure. But any action in this sense would be premature, before the peace settlement is effected, and before the Hejaz, which is now being negotiated in Paris, is disposed of.

Apart from this aspect of the subsidy question, however, King Hussein has only with great reluctance agreed to meet Ibn Saud. His assent to the meeting is believed to be to some extent due to his apprehension that the subsidy would forthwith cease in the event of a refusal on his part. If His Majesty's Government were now abruptly to withdraw their financial support there would be considerable risk of the proposed meeting not taking place, and the chance being lost of a satisfactory settlement of the Hejaz Nejd question.

The continuance of this subsidy till the peace settlement is effected at 250,000 rupees per mensem (the amount recommended by Lord Allenby) is thus clearly necessary if we are to prevent the outbreak of serious trouble in Arabia, which would react on Islam in general.

The payment of a subsidy to the Emir at Nejd has also been continued since the Armistice. The Emir is described as being in a permanent state of financial difficulty. His military strength however is believed to be adequate to enable him to undertake a successful invasion of the Hejaz on the west or a raid on the south-west portion of Mesopotamia on the east. The opportunities for plunder offered by such expeditions would provide him with an easy and tempting means of replenishing his Treasury. An invasion of the Hejaz by the Wahabis in the early part of the last century resulted in a general massacre of the inhabitants, and such an invasion to-day would in all probability at least result in the closing of the pilgrimage. The dangers of a raid into Mesopotamia are obvious. In the event of a successful raid, the Emir would be in a position to plunder, and he might also meet with some support from the Extremist Party in Bagdad and elsewhere. At present, however, Ibn Saud's attitude to His

is to suppose that

contemplates any aggression against Mesopotamia

to avert the danger of an attack on the Hejaz by the proposed meeting between the two rulers. In the meanwhile Ibn Saud is receiving a rupees per month from Mesopotamian funds. In the event of a settlement being reached at his meeting with King Hussein, the question of this amount will be open to reconsideration but till the meeting taken place any reduction would seem inadvisable.

Foreign Office July 7 1920

E 6160 2854 44

Field Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon — (Received June 10)

(No 338)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 23, 1920

I HAVE the honour to submit the following remarks on the question of the grant of subsidies to Arab rulers, with reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 532 of the 4th May, transmitting the minutes of a meeting held at the Foreign Office on the 17th April in which I observe that the Treasury are not yet convinced of the necessity for the continuance of the subsidies.

It appears to me that to arrive at a just decision on this subject it is necessary in the first place to compare the position of the different rulers now and before the war, to weigh the services of each during that period, to examine whether any responsibility rests on His Majesty's Government for the changes which have occurred, and finally to consider whether on grounds of morality or expediency, it is justifiable to impose on the British taxpayer the burden of providing some or all of them with monetary assistance in the future.

In the Hejaz and Yemen Ibn Rashid a mediocrity Turkish vassal who Idria in revolt against the ruling power, but already discussing terms of peace with the British. On the other hand as Vail of Nejd, and given an adequate stipend. It will be seen that the feeling of racial consciousness, which is now so marked, was already showing itself even in the more remote parts of the Peninsula, but a study of the records of the time will also show that the Ottoman Government, however unwillingly, was beginning to realise its incapacity to retain by force the Arab countries, and was preparing to grant a measure of self government which might satisfy the aspirations of its inhabitants.

The consideration of the subject was, however, abruptly broken off by the entry of the Allied Powers, Great Britain, taking advantage of the discontent which already existed, and determined to cast off their allegiance and throw in their lot with the Allies. I do not propose to examine and compare in detail the services performed by these three rulers, but it is clear that the British Government has been called upon to render real and effective assistance at a time when the result of the war still hung in the balance and, by so doing, brought to nought the plans for a Jihad, diverted or rendered innocuous large Turkish forces, and greatly facilitated our task in keeping open to traffic the Red Sea.

It may be said with some show of justice that they have had their reward in the form of the British subsidy. But it must not be lost sight of that, with the removal of the dominant influence, the Arabian Peninsula was left without administrative and financial means or experience for the preservation of order and for the substitution of effective local government in place of what had existed previously.

This applies in particular to the Hejaz and I cannot refrain from thinking that the promises made by His Majesty's Government impose a certain moral obligation to ensure that the future of these countries is at least as prosperous as their past.

I do not however wish to press unduly this point, since sentimental considerations must give way to those of economy at the present time, and I will pass on to the more practical aspects of the case.

As your Lordship is aware, the Arab revolt was not regarded with sympathy either in India or in our other Mahomedan countries. This feeling still exists to day. The revolt can only be justified by its success, and we shall have ourselves open to severe criticism if the Peninsula passes into a state of anarchy.

Further than this, the Allied policy with regard to Syria and Palestine is not in Majesty's Government to a charge of breach of promise and opened the field to Turkish and Bolshevik propaganda from the north.

The situation in the Middle East to-day gives rise to grave misgivings, and seems unlikely to improve in the near future. On this account I consider it is of great importance that, if we gain a special position in the Arabian Peninsula, His Majesty's Government should so employ it as to earn the gratitude of the people and silence the criticism of those detractors, who accuse us of cynicism and self interest in our treatment of the Arabs.

At the present moment we are in a favourable position to achieve this, since the factors which have rendered so restless the Arabs in Syria and Mesopotamia have not operated with any great force in the Peninsula itself and its rulers, with the exception of the Imam Yahya and the new Emir of Hail, who has in point of fact come under the influence of Ibn Saud, have given satisfactory proofs that they are prepared to look to us for help and guidance and protection.

The questions then arise whether we can gain our object without payment, and, if not, whether the results achieved will justify the expenditure.

As regards the former point I consider that the experience of the last four years shows the answer to be emphatically in the negative. I do not advocate any undue attempt to adjust the relations between the different rulers and claim to influence all foreign relations, and it is only reasonable to suppose that the rulers will require some *quid pro quo*. Furthermore, moral influence has its effect in the East, but it will not always prove such a strong deterrent as the threat to cut off supplies, more impossible to achieve a purpose by armed force.

I do not think it is too much to say that if we attempt to gain a predominant influence in Arabia without being prepared to pay for it our efforts will result in failure.

As regards the advantages to be gained, I place first and foremost, the chance of recovering and maintaining our prestige in the Middle East.

We have destroyed the Power which, however badly, ruled Arabia. We must put something in its place, and, in so doing, endeavour to re-establish our good name for disinterestedness and sympathy with Moslem races. We are and shall continue to be hampered in Syria and Palestine. It is, therefore, the more necessary to seize our opportunity in the Peninsula where the conditions are favourable and where we shall not be exposed to foreign rivalry once our special position is recognised.

Secondly, there is considerable evidence to show that a determined effort is being made to unite Islam against all European Powers. A friendly Arabia will be an important check to this.

Thirdly, it is necessary to have a friendly population in the countries bordering our vital sea routes.

Equal to these in importance is the necessity of keeping open the pilgrimage routes to the Holy Places and of ensuring that the pilgrimage itself is undertaken.

We are under judgment of the Moslems in all parts of the world in this matter and failure will do us incalculable harm.

Fifthly, I would place the advantages to British trade which the opening up of the interior of the Peninsula will afford, and sixthly, the desirability of preventing other Powers from gaining a predominant position, more especially in South-west Arabia.

I trust that the above considerations will be sufficient to show that the advantages to be won are not small and that, in the event of His Majesty's Government being granted a special position there, the necessity of affording monetary assistance, until such time as the different countries can make their own way, will be recognised.

I understand that it may be difficult for His Majesty's Government to provide all the money, and that joint subsidies or loans may be necessary. This would be unfortunate from a British point of view but it would not alter the principle which I am endeavouring to lay down. It would merely mean that the responsibility, and therefore the credit, to be gained would be collective. I am unaware of the reasons

which call for a joint loan, and should have thought that the subsidies granted to the rulers of Bahrain, Muscat, and Kowen by the Government of India before the war would have furnished a useful precedent in claiming the sole right to give

I do not advocate the permanent continuance of subsidies on the present scale and I would gradually replace them with stipends and loans.

All the rulers, with perhaps the exception of Ibn Rashid, possess sea ports or tracts of land or other resources which are capable of development, and I consider that loans should be granted where there seems a good prospect of a productive return and where security can be offered.

Stipends should, I think, be granted to King Hussein, Ibn Saud and the Idri. The case of Ibn Rashid is of relative unimportance, while that of the Imam Fuyh is still so obscure that it is idle to consider it now. Eventually we shall probably find it cheaper to pay than to fight.

I also consider that certain conditions should be attached, such as the maintenance of internal peace, acceptance of our control of foreign relations, and the keeping open of the trade and pilgrimage routes. These would doubtless be embodied in the form of a treaty with each ruler.

With regard to Mr. Phillips's suggestion that it might be more satisfactory to 'pick one ruler only,' I would observe that it has already become evident that the 'al of subsidising the various chiefs through one overlord is an impossible one. There is no ruler who would be accepted by the remainder as paramount, and there is none who could be trusted to make the right distribution of the funds. King Hussein, whom, no doubt, Mr. Phillips had in mind, has indeed proved the least likely to be accepted as suzerain and to endeavour to bolster him up as Grand King of Arabia by paying other subsidies through him, would be a politically unsound, if not actually dangerous, policy to adopt.

The question as to the amounts of the stipends and loans is one which requires further consideration and in this despatch I have not attempted to do more than lay before your Lordship the broad considerations which, in my opinion, justify the adoption of the principle that their payment in the future is an investment which is necessary, and which will bring in its due return.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Resident, Aden, the Civil Commissioner, Bagdad, and to the Foreign Department, D.

I have &c.
ALFRED F. H.

Agent in London and speech by the Acting Civil Commissioner, Bagdad, on the subject of Mesopotamia, see Chapter III, Nos. 220 and 221.

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No. 341.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Lord Curzon.—(Received July 20)

(No. 963.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, July 6, 1920.

I WAS visited some little time ago by Mgr. Pierre Abed, who has recently been appointed Vicar-General in Constantinople of the Chaldean Patriarchate. Mgr. Abed came here from Egypt, where he had spent many years. He appears to take a keen and intelligent interest in political questions affecting the Assyro-Chaldean race, and, notwithstanding the French orientation with which the leaders of the Chaldean Catholic section of that race are usually credited he professes to look to Great Britain to assure the future well-being of the race as a whole.

2. Mgr. Abed propounded the theory that the ideal of the Assyro-Chaldeans should be to concentrate the scattered fragments of their nation in a British controlled area, viz., Mesopotamia, where many of them are already established. He suggested that it would not be difficult to realise this ideal in the quite near future as regards the Chaldeans and Nestorians, i.e., the sections of the Assyro-Chaldean race the bulk of whom already have their homes in Eastern Kurdistan and the northern confines of Mesopotamia. He did not consider his ideal impossible of ultimate realisation even in regard to the Jacobites and other sections of the race, who are mainly established much further west.

3. Mgr Abed asked whether, as a preliminary to this mobilisation of Chaldeans in a British area, it would not be possible to accord British protection to scattered members of the race in Constantinople and other places in Turkey.

4. I questioned Mgr Abed regarding the Assyrian Christians, who some time past been numerous in the Caucasus and South Russia. He gave me information on this subject, and emphasised the point that these repatriated people

rest themselves in the question of the resettlement of those unfortunate exiles, victims of their collaboration with the Allies in the war.

Following on the above conversation, Mgr Abed addressed to me two letters, which I have the honour to enclose. In the first he puts forward a formal request for the extension of British protection to Assyrian Christians here. In the second he gives more precise particulars than he was able to do in conversation of the Assyrian-Chaldean refugees in Russia and the Caucasus.

6. I doubt whether much can be done on either of these letters at the present time, but I should be glad to be instructed as to the general attitude which I should serve in any future conversations on the subjects of which they treat. It would not, in my opinion, be feasible or desirable to undertake the formal individual protection of Assyrian-Chaldeans here. On the other hand, the suggestion that His Majesty's Government should promote the resettlement of the Chaldeans and Nestorians within the limits of the British mandate for Mesopotamia is perhaps deserving of attention. The fate of the remnants of the race now in Russia and the Caucasus would also appear to be of sympathetic interest, as and when opportunity offers.

I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosures to the Chief of the British Legation at Bagdad and the Acting Chief Commissioner.

M. DE ROUSELLE
High Commissioner

Enclosure 1 in No. 343

Mgr. Abed to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck

COMME suite à mes déclarations verbales que je vous avais faites, et vous m'avez autorisé dernièrement, j'ai l'honneur de vous exposer ce qui suit :

Quelques familles de ma nation d'origine de l'Iraq et de la Mésopotamie à Constantinople et plusieurs autres au Yémen.

Pour assurer une position politique fixe à notre nation, veuillez, je vous en prie, intervenir auprès du Gouvernement de la Grande-Bretagne.

En vous remerciant d'avance, daignez agréer :

PIERRE ABED
Vicaire général du Patriarche des Chaldéens
de Babylone à Constantinople

Enclosure 2 in No. 343

Mgr. Abed to Mr. Ryan

Paris, le 15 juin 1920

J'ai l'honneur de vous remercier sous de plus qu'un sens que vous m'avez fait pendant votre dernière entrevue avec M. le Dr Z. la situation des Assyriens-Chaldéens se trouvant actuellement réfugiés en Europe. Les détails ont été accueillis par des gens qui viennent d'arriver dernièrement de ces parages-là.

Veuillez agréer
PIERRE ABED,
Vicaire général du Patriarche chaldéen
de Babylone à Constantinople

1. Le nombre de ces Assyriens-Chaldéens peut s'évaluer à 45,000 personnes, dont la plus grande partie sont des hommes et le reste des femmes et des enfants.

2. Ces Assyriens-Chaldéens, après avoir combattu héroïquement sur le front turco-iranien suite de la défaite des troupes russes sur le même front, ont dû se retirer. Ils s'étaient réfugiés et ravitaillés par le Gouvernement russe jusqu'au mois de mai 1919. Après cette date-là, les Russes ont cessé de s'occuper de ces malheureux.

3. Ils ont commencé à travailler et à gagner chacun son pain quotidien, comme ils le font jusqu'à ce jour.

4. Ces personnes se trouvent disséminées en Russie comme suit :

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the necessity for careful measures to guarantee the practical application of the principles expressed and agreed to during the peace negotiations at Paris. Unfortunately, occurrences subsequent to the submission of this note have not served to clarify the situation or to diminish the concern felt by the Government and people of the United States.

4. The Government of the United States has noted the publication of an agreement between His Majesty's Government and the French Government making certain provisions for the disposition of petroleum produced in Mesopotamia, and giving to France preferential treatment in regard thereto. It is not clear to the Government of the United States how such an agreement can be consistent with the principles of equality of treatment understood and accepted during the peace negotiations at Paris.

5. The Government of the United States desires to record its views that such an agreement, in light of the position the British Government appears to have assumed toward Mesopotamia and its economic resources, will, as a practical matter, result in a grave infringement of the mandate principle which was formulated for the purpose of removing in the future some of the principal causes of international differences.

6. In the interests of a frank discussion of the whole subject the Government of the United States desires further to call the attention of His Majesty's Government to the existence of reports to the effect that the officials charged with the administration of Tanganyika territory have accorded privileges to British nationals that have not been accorded to the nationals of other countries.

7. The Government of the United States desires to express anew the hope that in an early reply to the note of the 12th May 1920 His Majesty's Government will find it possible to elucidate fully its policy regarding the mandated territory of the Near East and other regions.

I have, &c.
JOHN W. DAVIS

E 9124 20 44

No. 345

Sir A. Geddes to Earl Curzon. (Received July 30.)

No. 712

Telegraphic

YOL R telegram No. 620 of 23rd July

Washington, July 28, 1920

May I be advised if agreement has been ratified and if text has been issued to press? If not, am I authorised to issue it, or, alternatively, to communicate it to State Department?

E 9093 20 44

No. 607

Telegraphic

YOL R telegram No. 619 of 23rd July.

Sir A. Geddes to Earl Curzon. (Received July 29.)

Washington, July 29, 1920

publication of text will in all probability be made occasion for misrepresentation, hostile propaganda, and violent protests from oil interests, who may try to bring pressure to bear on Administration to demand modification of arrangements made.

It would be most helpful if French Government could be warned that it is of highest importance in their own interests that they support agreement actively before American public. This Mesopotamian machine works well and covers a large portion of American press.

E 9124 20 44

No. 347

Earl Curzon to Sir A. Geddes (Washington).

No. 45

Telegraphic

YOL R telegram No. 562 of 29th July.

Foreign Office, July 30, 1920

Agreement was ratified by signatures of Prime Minister and M. Millerand on 25th April, it was laid in Parliament on 23rd July and published in press following day. We are consulting French Government as to advisability of making any further communication on the subject. Meanwhile it would be better that you should take no further note.

E 9093 20 44

c. July 31, 1920

in despatch No. 2332 of the 21st instant and to your telegram reporting that arrangements had been made by the French Government for the publication in the French press of the 24th instant of the text of the Anglo-French Oil Agreement, I transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy of a letter which was addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington on the 23rd instant, i.e. on the eve of the publication of the agreement, as also a copy of Sir A. Geddes' report thereon.

Your Lordship will note that Sir A. Geddes states in his reply that he was issuing to the American press an explanation of the principal points of the agreement and prevent so far as possible, misrepresentation of the terms of the agreement.

3. Sir A. Geddes suggests that the French Government might be warned of the danger of the propaganda to which the agreement, when published in the United States, is likely to give rise, and that it is most essential that they should in their own interests, actively support the agreement before the American public. I fully concur in this suggestion.

4. It is, however, of primary importance that to be useful, the explanations and support given by the French and British Governments should follow the same line. The main features of the explanations forwarded to Sir A. Geddes in my telegram of the 23rd instant for his Excellency's guidance are that, in regard to Mesopotamia, the agreement does not exclude other nations, neither does it reserve to Great Britain exclusive rights, and that, so far as French participation is concerned, the French Government, in return for their consent to surrender their claims in the Mosul region and for the grant of facilities for laying pipelines through Syria for the export of oil from the Mesopotamian, and probably also from the Persian oilfields to a port on the Mediterranean, have secured from Great Britain, as the Power ultimately responsible for the development of the Mesopotamian oilfields, a definite supply of oil.

5. In view of the importance that the French Government should give to supporting the agreement against the hostile criticism in the American press which is likely to be provoked, I am glad if your Excellency will take the earliest opportunity of bringing the matter to the serious notice of the French Government and impressing on them how important it is in their own interests that the agreement should be actively supported.

I am, &c.

CHARLES OF KILGERSTON

E 9336 20 44

No. 348

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon. (Received August 4.)

No. 910

Telegraphic

Paris, August 2, 1920

I HAVE spoken at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in sense of instructions in your despatch No. 2031 of 31st July respecting probable misrepresentation in United States of the Anglo-French Oil Agreement.

I urged that instruction should be given to our representative to concert with His Majesty's Ambassador in Washington.

Earl Curzon to Sir A. Geddes (Washington)

No. 1
Telegraphic

Foreign Office, August 6, 1920.

Your telegram No. 565 of 24th July. Publication of the Anglo-French Agreement.

His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris reports he has spoken to Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting probable misrepresentation in the United States of the Anglo-French Agreement, and suggested that the explanations and support to be given by the French Government should, in order to be useful, follow the lines indicated in my telegram No. 619 of 23rd July. Lord Derby urged that instructions should be sent to the French representative at Washington to concert with you in the matter.

E 9619 20 44:

No. 351

Sir A. Geddes to Earl Curzon. — (Received August 9.)

(N. 1)
M. 1.

Washington, July 30, 1920.

Receipt of your telegrams Nos. 619 and 620 of the 23rd July, I caused to be published by the Associated Press which accompanies this despatch to be published by the Associated Press. It is a résumé of your enclose telegrams. As you will see from the enclosed press cuttings the article was reproduced almost exactly in the "Washington Post" next day. Comment on this article has so far only amounted to a statement that the United States intends to maintain open competition in the oilfields and have not as yet issued any statement.

I have, &

A. S. GEDDES

Enclosure in No. 351

Statement published by Associated Press upon Instructions of Sir A. Geddes

INFORMATION has reached Washington of an important agreement between the French and British Governments in connection with oil. It is designed to secure international co-operation and to eliminate competition, which might give rise to friction between them. The agreement shows that Great Britain, far from attempting to secure a monopolistic control of oil, has been willing to enter into undertakings which make the establishment of a control over the oil supplies of her ally, France, impossible.

The agreement is remarkable in showing how far the two countries are determined to shape their future policies in the spirit of co-operation and sympathy created through the hardships of the war. Its provisions extend to all countries where the oil interests of the two nations can be usefully united or might be in conflict. It is a statement of the policy of co-operation by co-operation.

It wells in Roumania, Asia Minor, Galicia and the territories of the old Russian Empire, and there is a proviso for extending it to other countries by mutual consent.

In connection with commercial

to former enemy subjects or bodies in Roumania and sequestered by the Roumanian Government, they will support their claims in Roumania for the acquisition of such properties. Shares and interests belonging to former enemy companies and corporations that can be secured by such joint action will be divided 50 per cent. to British and 50 per cent. to French interests. In companies formed to undertake the exploitation of these concessions, nationals of the two countries will have equal voting power as well as equal proportions of the capital subscribed, and equal representation on the Executive Board.

Not printed

and export facilities in Russia and in any territory which, as the result of the war, have been detached from it.

In its application to Mesopotamia the agreement is of particular interest. If the oilfields there are developed by the British Government, the British undertake to ensure that the French Government or its nominee will receive 25 per cent. of the net output.

In the event of a Franco-British commercial company being formed to develop the oilfields, it is agreed that, while the company is in existence, 1 per cent. in such a company will be placed at the disposal of the French Government. Further the British Government undertakes that any British company which may be projected to develop oil wells in Mesopotamia shall place 25 per cent. of its shares at the disposal of the French Government at a price not higher than that paid by any other participant in the formation of the company. In order to safeguard the interests of the natives of Mesopotamia, the French and British Governments have agreed that native interests shall be entitled, and may as of right, to share, participate to the extent of 20 per cent. of the share capital.

It will be recalled that, before the war, rights of development of Mesopotamian oil were held by the Turkish Petroleum Company under concession from the Turkish Government. The British and French Governments have agreed, as part of the reparations, to assign to France the German shares of the company, which has therefore been reconstituted.

This agreement of the Allies will be freely discussed in oil circles, and it is important to take care to avoid misunderstanding what has been arranged. The effect is merely to guarantee to France a share in the output of Mesopotamian oil at ordinary commercial prices. France has insufficient oil resources of her own, and oil at commercial rates is essential to her reconstruction. The important point is that the agreement does not divide undeveloped oil resources between France and England but ranges to share, on fair terms, between the two Allies oil at the disposal of both. The agreement does not affect the interests of other Governments or their nationals. It reserves no exclusive rights to France or to Great Britain, not even in Mesopotamia, where Britain has been widely suspected of attempting to secure monopolistic rights.

The agreement extends on similar lines to the French colonies and the British Crown colonies. Any Franco-British group of good standing will be given the right to subject to the necessary guarantees for the acquisition of oil concessions in the French colonies and protectorates and zones of influence. It is necessary, under French law, that groups so formed must contain French interests to the extent at least of 67 per cent. On the other hand, French subjects wishing to prospect and exploit petroleum lands in the British Crown colonies will be given advantages similar to those enjoyed by British subjects in the French colonies.

This movement is interesting as an indication of the practical sympathy of Anglo-French co-operation.

At this time adds interest to the speech of the British Ambassador at Asheville, North Carolina, on the 20th July, when he very definitely suggested Anglo-American co-operation as an infinitely better path to follow than its alternative, Anglo-American commercial competition.

It is expected that the text of the agreement will be published at an early date.

E 9082 1331 44

No. 352

Curzon to Mr. Davis

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, August 9, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to refer to the notes dated the 12th May and 28th ultimo which you were good enough to address to me, and in which your Excellency referring to the mandates assigned to Great Britain, had occasion to point out the principles stated to be advocated by the United States Government and agreed to by the Allied Powers which should be adopted and applied to the mandates over former Turkish territory.

You at the same time drew my attention to the existing vested rights of the States citizens in this territory and to the impression which had arisen in the minds of the American people that the authorities of His Majesty's Government in the occupied territory of Mesopotamia had given advantages to British oil interests.

which were not granted to American companies, and that His Majesty's Government were taking steps calculated eventually to bring the oil resources of Mesopotamia under their exclusive control. Instances of activities in various directions were quoted which had led to such conclusions. In view of this impression and of the necessity for the adoption of careful measures which would ensure the practical fulfilment of the principles enunciated, you put forward certain proposals which the United States Government would be glad to see applied in the mandated territories, and explained the necessity for giving practical consideration to certain concessions in those regions granted by the Turkish Government, in some of which United States citizens claimed vested rights.

3. The various points and suggestions which have formed the subject of the report have had the careful consideration of His Majesty's Government, and I desire to furnish you in regard to them with the following observations:—

4. I would wish, at the outset, to refer to the last sentence of the first paragraph of your note of the 12th May, to the effect that the assignment to Great Britain of the mandate for Mesopotamia was made subject to a friendly arrangement with the Government regarding economic rights, and to state categorically that the mandate has been made and accepted subject to no friendly arrangement whatever with any Government regarding economic rights.

I will now deal with the alleged action of the administration in the occupied territories in giving facilities to British companies. It is contended, were these facilities to be granted, that the matter, as you will recall, has formed the subject of previous communications between us, and the home Government has decided that it is not desirable to do so.

5. I will now deal with the alleged action of the administration in the occupied territories in giving facilities to British companies. It is contended, were these facilities to be granted, that the matter, as you will recall, has formed the subject of previous communications between us, and the home Government has decided that it is not desirable to do so.

6. I will now deal with the alleged action of the administration in the occupied territories in giving facilities to British companies. It is contended, were these facilities to be granted, that the matter, as you will recall, has formed the subject of previous communications between us, and the home Government has decided that it is not desirable to do so.

7. In regard to the building of railways and dockyards I need hardly dwell upon the imperative necessity for providing every possible means of transport during the period of military operations and facilities of every kind at the ports for the landing of troops and stores. The construction of railways in a country utterly destitute of any properly organized means of communication has throughout the period of the war and since the cessation of hostilities been of paramount importance from the military as well as from the administrative point of view.

8. The suggestion that Great Britain during the period of military occupation of the mandated territories has been preparing for exclusive control of their oil resources is equally devoid of foundation, and the claims of British commercial interests in those regions, whatever they may be, are to-day no stronger, as they are no weaker, than they were at the outbreak of war.

9. I would like here to make a passing reference to the very mistaken impression which appears to be current in the United States in regard to the oil policy of His Majesty's Government. It is often stated that the production of Persia is 15 per cent. of the world's production, and if the production of Persia be included, the total production of oil in the world is 150 million tons. It is further stated that the United States produces some 70 per cent. of the world's output, besides which United States companies, such as the Standard Oil Company, own and control the production of some 12 per cent. of the world's output. This overwhelming proportion, over 80 per cent., of the petroleum production of the world is under American control, and the

predominance of the United States in regard to oil production is assured for many years to come. There is, in any case, no justification for supposing that Great Britain's present oil resources are altogether insignificant in comparison, can seriously threaten American supremacy, and any prophecies as to the oil-bearing resources of countries at present unexplored and quite undeveloped must be accepted with reserve.

10. The nervousness of American opinion concerning the alleged grasping activities

that the United States, notwithstanding their assured supremacy, have taken power to reserve for American interests the right to drill for oil on United States domain lands and have on various occasions used their influence in territories amenable to their control with a view to secure the cancellation of oil concessions previously and legitimately obtained by British persons or companies. Thus, on the occupation of Haiti by United States forces in 1914, the United States Administration refused to confirm an oil concession which had been approved by the Haitian Government and Legislature and for which the concession money had been deposited in the republic; and more recently the United States representatives at San José urged the present Costa Rican Government to cancel all concessions granted by the previous Government, the only concession in question being an oil concession granted to a British

Very different has been the attitude of the British Government. In assuming the administration of the occupied Turkish territories they have remained fully alive to their obligation as a temporary occupant, to protect not only the natural resources of the country against indiscriminate exploitation, but also the absolute freedom of action which the authority to be created eventually for administering those regions would have rightly expected to enjoy.

11. I will now deal with the alleged action of the administration in the occupied territories in giving facilities to British companies. It is contended, were these facilities to be granted, that the matter, as you will recall, has formed the subject of previous communications between us, and the home Government has decided that it is not desirable to do so.

12. I will now refer to the propositions enumerated by you on which discussion is invited and which have been put forward with the object of guaranteeing to the commerce of all nations the practical fulfilment in the mandated regions of the principles of equal treatment in law and in fact. Reference is made in this connection to the desirability of the adherence of the mandatory Power to the principles expressed and agreed to during the peace negotiations at Paris, as well as to the principles embodied in mandate (A) prepared in London by the Commission on Mandates, for adoption by the League of Nations.

13. I would first point out that, in consequence of a divergence of views, the Commission on Mandates proceeded no further with the draft of the mandate form (A), which was consequently abandoned.

14. The draft mandates for Mesopotamia and for Palestine, which have been prepared with a view to secure equality of treatment and opportunity for the commerce, citizens and subjects of all States who are members of the League of Nations, will when approved by the Allied Powers interested, be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government, while fully appreciating the suggestion for discussing with the United States Government the various propositions mentioned by you, with which they are in full sympathy, are none the less of the opinion that the terms of the mandates can only properly be discussed at the Council of the League of Nations by the signatories of the Covenant.

15. In the matter of concessions granted in the mandated territories by the Turkish Government, His Majesty's Government fully agree with the views of the United States Government that due consideration must be given to all rights legally acquired before the outbreak of hostilities. Provision for the consideration and recognition under certain conditions of concessions situated in territories detached from the Turkish Empire was, moreover, as you no doubt know, made in the treaty of peace with Turkey. His Majesty's Government are aware that certain rights were acquired in Palestine before the war by American citizens, while British interests, such as the Turkish Petroleum Company and other groups, claim similar rights either in Mesopotamia or in Palestine. These claims will naturally have to be given practical consideration and receive equitable treatment consistent with the interests of the mandated territories.

As part of the administrative arrangements under the treaty of peace with Turkey and the mandate, the oil deposits in the Mosul district will be secured for the Arab State, but it is far from the intention of the mandatory Power to place them on its own behalf any kind of a

18. In view of long-standing interests which the French Government possessed in the Mosul district arrangements for the development of the Mesopotamian

the State, France should be entitled to purchase 25 per cent of the oil production at ordinary market rates, or, in the alternative of the oilfields being developed by private enterprise, that French participation should not be less than 25 per cent in the share-holdings, while provision was made that the Mesopotamian Administration should likewise have a certain share.

19. In consideration for such participation, the French Government agreed to permit the laying of a pipe-line from the Mesopotamian oilfields through Syria, besides providing for other facilities. These arrangements, including others for mutual co-operation in other countries, were embodied in an agreement which has been published. The practical outcome of the arrangement, so far as Mesopotamia is

rates, the Mesopotamian State is afforded, in return, facilities for placing the production of the oilfields within easy reach of the world's markets. The agreement aims at no monopoly, it does not exclude other interests, and gives no exclusive right to the mandatory Power, while the Mesopotamian State is free to develop the oilfields in any way it may judge advisable, consistent with the interests of the country.

20. I feel bound to observe that, even if any special privileges were assigned to France under this agreement, such a proceeding would be consistent with the interpretation consistently placed by the United States Government on most favoured nation clauses in treaties, namely, that special privileges conceded to particular countries in return for specific concessions cannot, in virtue of such a clause, be claimed by other countries not offering such concessions. The United States Government have indeed recently taken a further step in the case of the "Jones" Act, and have taken powers actually to withdraw treatment secured by treaties which in some cases contain no provision for denunciation.

21. As regards the alleged action of the Administration of Tanganyika territory referred to in the penultimate paragraph of your note of the 28th ultimo, I should be obliged if you would furnish me with the names of any persons who have been refused privileges granted to British subjects and the dates of their applications.

I have, &c.
CURZON OF KILDARE

representations of Indian Khilafat Delegation in London, see Chapter III, Nos. 35 and 216.

E 9897 95 44

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 14)

Sir,
I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to transmit to you for information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of correspondence dated 1st August 1920, from the Indian Commissioner, Baghdad, on the subject of attack on

W. H. HOLMES

Enclosure 1 in N. 1.

Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to Indian Office

Bagdad, July 1, 1920

A COPY of a memorandum, dated the 25th June last, from the Political Officer, Mosul, respecting the attack at Tel Afar is forwarded, with comments, for information of

I A,
Mesopotamia

Enclosure 2 in No. 35.

Political Officer, Mosul, to Civil Commissioner, Bagdad

(Confidential)

Mosul, June 25, 1920.

I FORWARD herewith a report on the Tel Afar rising. I would add to it that the movement does not appear to have had active Turkish support. The "Iraq army" was allowed to buy food in Nimbin, but the Government there tried to capture an officer who joined the movement.

I have little doubt that the pronouncement regarding Great Britain's policy of establishing, under the mandate, an Arab Government in "Iraq" will be stated by the disaffected here as having been extorted from us by recent events, and will be made the starting point for further demands.

L. F. NALDER, Lieutenant Colonel.

Enclosure 3 in No. 35.

Report on the recent Attack at Tel Afar

VI. Arab occupation of Der-es-Zor in December last there has been a rise in the desert. Dhaman ibn al-Hadi, who at that time was in the desert, was the leader of a big Shammar band in October, immediately after the occupation of Der-es-Zor. He and his band began to move to the north, and in our line of communication began to occur: 500 sheep were looted from Shergat in March, but were subsequently recovered. The band was subject to frequent raids, one party of the Abu Algha & his Major was captured by Nijra-ban-Gand and his band. These events all

On the 21st April the first caravan for some months arrived in Mosul from Der-es-Zor. This appeared to inaugurate a fresh period of isolation in Mosul itself. Frequent meetings were held, and anti-Government notices were frequently posted upon the walls at night. Raids on our lines of communication increased, culminating in the destruction of a train near Am Diels on the 24th May. From one or two sources it appeared that active propaganda was being carried on among the tribes, who did not, however, appear to be affected. In company with the Acting Political Officer, Tel Afar, I toured the Tel Afar district at the beginning of May. Practically all the sheikhs of the district came in to Tel Afar to meet me, and expressed great cordiality and friendship both here and in their own tents where we visited them. Just before Ramadan a party of Tel Afar aghas and sheikhs came in to Mosul to compete in some Arab events which had been arranged for them in the military camp.

On the 26th May news was received of the arrival at Fadghani of a body of "Iraq" troops with a machine gun, led by Jamil "Beg," a Moslem, who was accompanied by a Khabur. Reconnaissance by the Acting Political Officer showed it clear that attempts were being made to raise the tribes in the name of the "Iraq" Government. Motor cars were sent apparently doing a road and water reconnaissance from Fadghani-Bidea-Ain al-Chazal road. Rumours that the force at Fadghani would shortly make a forward move, and on the 30th May I submitted to you and 18th division a report stating that I believed an attempt, with the aid of the tribes, to cut us from Mosul was imminent.

* An officer of Arab army from Syria (Shamir).

el Alexand ... AMR
hazal, but found nothing unusual. Air reconnaissances also
ig suspicious. Colonel A examiner left a Vickers gunner with his
le. A as additional protection to the Acting Political Officer
I had been considerably exercised in my mind as to the advisa
drawing the Acting Political Officer and British staff from Tel Afar
the following grounds—

- (a.) We could get no indication that the attack would develop for a few days.
- (b.) The Tel Afar genuine buluk was one of the best we had, and the Tel Afar
at afforded excellent opportunities for defence.
- (c.) Their removal would have been to abandon the district, and would have sent
ver the tribes en bloc to the other side
have caused a most adverse impression in Mosul the stat of which
among me considerable anxiety.

On 3rd June I spoke to Major Barlow on the telephone. He
reported that shereehan agent had held a meeting in the town the previous night,
calling on the aghas to hold themselves in readiness for the shereef's return
concentrating on the road near Awamat, that Jamal Effendi, the gendarme

had arranged to go out the coming night to reconnoitre in the direction of Awamat to
see if the alleged concentration, of which he had no news, existed in fact.

18th division arranged that aeroplanes or armoured cars should visit Tel Afar
every day, and that pigeons should be sent out the next morning to ensure con
tact, if the line was cut again.

The outbreak occurred in Tel Afar early the next morning, the 4th June. Some
tribesmen rode into the town, and Tel Afar rose. The gendarme officer, Lieut
Stuart, was shot by one of his own native officers, Mohamed Ali

his rounds or in his bed, and no resistance was made by the gendar
the Vickers gunner
time into the arrival

when they were killed by a
Major Barlow, had, as he intended, gone out on the
probably at Bogha had found Sulaiman Agha, of the Gurginys,
to capture him. He got away on foot, but was recaptured the
next morning near Tel Afar. As he was being taken into Tel Afar he saw the armou
cars, which had left Mosul early that morning, on the road. He made a dash for th
and was shot.

The armoured cars were unfortunately ambushed in Tel Afar, none of the crews

4. The fall of Tel Afar was the sign for a general rising of all the tribes in
district. Those originally concerned were various of the Shammar sheikhs, part
Awad Abdul Aziz, Awad Shalal and Hamadi, the Gurginys under Sulaiman Ag
Jahash, Mawud and Mublat of More or less sedentary tribes,
such as Abu Ha had and Abu Bedran, with the tide and contributed
their quota to the raiding parties. On body crossed the Tigris north of
Mosul

parties
severely handled and suffered considerable losses. All wires were cut, and all roads
from Mosul rendered most unsafe.

5. 18th division decided to send a column out, which left on the evening of the
on Abu Ma'in, where Jamal Beg was trying to concentrate for a march on Mosul. He
was surprised and the enemy fled without resistance, the tribes going north, west or
south, Jamal himself, with his officers and soldiers, returning down the Deir-az-Zor road
with six carts. It is most unfortunate that the armoured cars were not able to pursue
owing to shortage of tyres, as, could they have done so, the capture of the instigator
of the rebellion would have been certain.

The results of the column were, nevertheless, most beneficial. It pricked the

Seditionists here had undoubtedly laid stress on the small size of our garrison and
advised we were short of gun ammunition, &c. I also believe they emphasised the
small number of troops sent out on the column, and were the more confounded by
the ease with which it put to flight the tribesmen and the "shereef." Had the "Iraq"
force reached the vicinity of Mosul I have no doubt that the outbreak in the town—
which had been promised—would have occurred.

It is a matter for congratulation that Kirkuk remained quiet. The kaimakam
of Jezrah was in communication with the leaders of the movement, an attack was
expected at Zakho, and at the time of the outbreak there was a "storm focus"
forming in Muzuri; but in spite of all the Kurds did not move. I have no doubt that
circumstances compelled us to evacuate any of our outlying garrisons it would have
confirmation of the shereefian boasts and
promises, and would have led to serious outbreaks right along our northern and
eastern frontier.

It appears that the outbreak was the result of a small number of comparatively
men from this country who accepted service with the shereef's army in 1917 and
relative to our prison or war camps.

When establishment of a Syrian Government they found that places and
posts were for Syrians, and they were left without employment. This bred their
"patriotism" and led them to embark on a kind of "Jameson raid" to establish an
Arab Government in Mesopotamia which would provide posts and pay for all. Their
patriotism did not hinder them raising the tribes by the fictitious use of the name of
the Shereef Abdullah and the hope of loot.

It is a matter of the keenest vexation to me that we have been unable as yet to
unearth the society in Mosul which was the seat of the "Aid" and whose circulars
have, as is now known, been freely distributed throughout the Arab and Kurdish
districts.

7. The losses caused have been considerable. The value of Government and
civilian property destroyed or looted is probably over 300,000 rupees. Last year
revenue from the Tel Afar district was about 350,000 rupees, and at the moment
writing it appears probable that this amount will be lost to the Administration.

8. The outbreak has shown once again the fatal results of having Acting Political
Officers in frontier districts unsupported by a military force. A comparatively small
unlikely that the tribes would ever have attacked the place had it been held.

Small detachments are naturally most undesirable from the military point of view,
but I submit, with all deference, that it is useless for us to hold Mosul town itself
unless we can also hold and control the districts. This at present can only be ensured
by the presence of troops in the districts, whose functions should be not merely to
garrison the headquarter town, but to make patrols, and if necessary take place
of insipient trouble. These functions would normally be
but until public opinion in this division is convinced that to serve
in the winning side—and this opinion is by no means generally
held at present—levies will be most difficult to recruit and unreliable when recruited.

E 10267 20 44

No. 354

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received August . . .)

No.

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit
herewith copy of a memorandum communicated by the French Minister for Foreign
Affairs on the 20th August upon the subject of the Anglo-French Period Agreement.

Paris, August 21, 1920

Enclosure 1 in No. 354

French Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Earl of Derby

L'AMBASSADE de Grande-Bretagne a bien voulu faire connaître au Département des Affaires étrangères les termes de l'accord franco-britannique sur les pétroles du 24 avril, en ce qui concerne l'égalité commerciale.

En réponse à cette communication, le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, s'empresse d'aviser son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté britannique que cette protestation ayant été faite par le Gouvernement américain la note ci-jointe a été remise au Charge d'Affaires des Etats-Unis à Paris.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères
Paris le 20 août 1920.

Enclosure 2 in No. 354

Note communicated by French Minister for Foreign Affairs to United States Charge d'Affaires at Paris

PAR son avertissement du 7 de ce mois, l'Ambassade des Etats-Unis a bien voulu exprimer l'opinion que, dans l'accord franco-anglais de Saint-Rémy du 24 avril 1920 sur les pétroles, publié dans la presse sur l'ordre des deux Gouvernements intéressés, certaines dispositions ayant trait à la répartition de la production du pétrole de la Mésopotamie, accordent un traitement de préférence à la France. Le Gouvernement américain n'étant pas autrement persuadé que cet arrangement soit compatible avec le principe d'égalité tel qu'il a été envisagé par toutes les Puissances alliées au cours de la paix de Paris.

Le Gouvernement français est heureux de pouvoir rassurer le Gouvernement américain sur la politique de pétrole poursuivie par la France. Il est certain que la France ne se propose pas de monopoliser la production du pétrole de la Mésopotamie, mais de la répartir équitablement entre les zones sous mandat français de la Mésopotamie, sous réserve de la surveillance et de la participation des intérêts français dans la production du pétrole de la Mésopotamie.

La participation des intérêts français dans la production du pétrole de la Mésopotamie a été prévue, participation à prendre en principe dans les sociétés privées, et qu'il était toujours loisible aux intérêts privés français de stipuler dans ces sociétés qu'ils n'auraient aucun degré des négociations de même ordre de la part des sociétés privées.

E 8551 88 44,

No. 355.

Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)

(No. 663.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 26, 1920.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 963 of the 3th ultimo, reporting an interview with Mgr Pierre Abed Vicar-General of the Chaldean Patriarchate, I have to inform you that present circumstances in Mesopotamia render impracticable any scheme such as that of the concentration of Assyrians in that country.

A scheme of British protection to Assyro-Chaldeans in Constantinople would appear to be undesirable, but in view of the possibility of an alteration in the circumstances affecting both these questions at some future date, you should maintain a non-committal attitude in the event of your being again approached on the matter.

I am, &c

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

E 10909 1331 44

Mr Wright to Earl Curzon. (Received September 6.)

THE Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to His Majesty's Ambassador at London, and, with reference to his Lordship's note of the 26th August, informs him that he is just in receipt of a communication from the Secretary of State in Washington stating that it is not considered advisable to publish the correspondence exchanged between His Majesty's Government and the United States Government on the subject of economic rights in mandated territories until the reply of the United States Government to Earl Curzon's last note of the 9th August can be included.

We have to state that it is hoped to send this reply forward within a few days, at which time it will be entirely agreeable to publish the correspondence simultaneously.

United States Embassy
September 3, 1920

E 11058 20 44

Petroleum Department to Foreign Office - Received September 8.

Petroleum Department, September 7, 1920.

In reply to your letter of the 28th August, I am directed by Mr Kellaway to request you to inform Earl Curzon of Kedleston that he fully concurs in the views expressed therein in regard to the Italian Ambassador's note on the Anglo-French Agreement.

A moderate output of petroleum is obtained in Italy, but Mr Kellaway is not engaged in oil production outside that country. The possibility of including Italy in an arrangement such as that concluded with France was considered, but in the absence of any form of reciprocity which could render it mutually advantageous, the matter was not proceeded with.

I am, &c

J. C. CLARK

Report on conditions prevailing at Jeddah during early part of August 1920.
Chapter III, No. 241

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No. 354

Earl Curzon to Mr. Wright

THE Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the United States Charge d'Affaires, and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Mr Wright's communication of the 3rd instant, stating that the United States Government do not consider it advisable to publish or lay before Congress the correspondence exchanged between His Majesty's Government and the United States Ambassador on the subject of economic rights in mandated territories. The reply of the United States Government to the note of His Majesty's Government of the 9th August can be included.

Taking due note of the desire of the United States Government in the matter, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has the honour to state that in the circumstances he proposes to address a further communication to Mr Wright at a later date when publication of the correspondence in question may be considered opportune.

Foreign Office, September 15, 1920

Earl Curzon to the Marquis Imperiali

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, September 17 1920

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 11th inst. which your Excellency was good enough to convey to me the views of the French Government regarding the oil agreement concluded between His Majesty's Government and the French Government, and also the suggestion that His Majesty's Government might be disposed to enter into negotiations with the Italian Government in order to guarantee Italian interests.

The nature and object of an arrangement which is the result of negotiations between two Governments, and which is in the way of the acquisition by the signatories of exclusive rights in any country.

3. In view of the fact that the United States control over 80 per cent. of the oil production of the world, it is certainly not easy to conceive the position which has led the Italian Government to suggest such an arrangement, and it can have been negotiated with a view to assure to Great Britain a preponderant position.

4. The arrangement which has been come to between His Majesty's and the French Governments, and which has been published, is based essentially on principles of co-operation and reciprocity in countries where British and French interests are already very considerable—greater perhaps than those of other Allied countries—and where British and French subjects may reasonably be expected to seek new concessions. Full recognition has been given to the importance of concessions being in the hands of serious and responsible firms, and provision has therefore been made in the agreement for giving support to such firms.

5. The provisions of the agreement, in so far as Mesopotamia is concerned, are of a purely commercial nature, and are the outcome of the recognition of long-standing French interests in the Mosul district.

6. In consequence of the renunciation by the British Government of these interests, and of the consent of the French Government to the laying down of a pipe-line from Mosul to the Persian Gulf, the British Government will receive in return a certain share of the oil produced from the Mesopotamian oil-fields, or a participation in any company which may be formed to develop those oil-fields, if it be decided to have recourse to private enterprise.

Mesopotamian Government secures important facilities for the transport of oil to the Mediterranean, and will thus be enabled to place the product of the oil-fields within easy reach of the European markets.

8. The agreement, as I have already had the honour to state, aims at no exclusive rights in any country. Its terms, moreover, cannot in the slightest degree be regarded as prejudicial to the interests of any other country.

The agreement, in fact, contributes in a large measure to the increase of world production and will thus create opportunities than ever for obtaining adequate fuel supplies for industrial and shipping purposes.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[See also Chapter III, Nos. 244, 249, 252, 253, 257, 258 and 259.]

Major-General Stewart to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 17)

(No. 300.)

Telegraphic

Aden, October 14, 1920

IN a letter dated 8th October Captain Fazluddin reports return from Mecca pilgrimage of Sayed Senoussi, the brother of Sayed Mustafa, with very conciliatory letter [two groups omitted] King Hussein and Sherif Abdulla to Idrisi asking for an alliance.

In an interview with Captain Fazluddin on 7th October Idrisi considered there were "personal and religious" aspects regarding Sherif of Mecca's request for alliance.

On personal point, which is explained as personality of sherif and his sons, Idrisi expressed complete mistrust in any stipulation made by sherif and sons who "humble themselves before us at the present moment," as they are in extreme internal and external difficulties, but "will prove a veritable scourge" when they secure their ends.

Looking at the matter from religious aspect, however, in order to provide protection and peace to sacred cities, Idrisi professed readiness to make complete sacrifice of possessions and lives, and therefore desired to come to an understanding with sherif to secure safety of sacred cities. Idrisi stated: "But I assure you that peace and protection of these places, as well as that of roads and religion and prosperity of inhabitants, can be secured with any degree of surety and permanence only by removal of sherif." Idrisi would agree to any arrangement to ensure sacred cities while retaining sherif at Mecca, but fears such extremely difficult, if not impossible. Idrisi expressed himself perfectly willing to attempt arranging amicable settlement between sherif and Ibn Saud, and asked what attitude British Government would be towards alliance between himself and sherif.

Idrisi stated: "As future of this country is closely wound up with nature of its relations with British Government, I would not like to do anything which is not in close union with their wishes." Idrisi therefore asks for early expression of the wishes of British Government on the following points before he replies in full to King Hussein's letter, which he is now acknowledging briefly and politely and asking him to send representatives to discuss preliminaries to an agreement.—

"Firstly, will British Government like me to conduct negotiations for an alliance with Sherif of Mecca?"

"Secondly, if so, will British Government ensure the faithful observance of agreements arrived at by either party? Any agreement arrived at by Sherif of Mecca in which British Government is not going to take part in I shall not trust or agree to."

"Thirdly, will British Government like me to mediate for a settlement between Sherif of Mecca and Ibn Saud?"

"Fourthly, if so, will British Government take part in these negotiations as arbitrator or witness, and ensure the faithful observance of agreements of settlement by parties concerned?"

"Fifthly, in case of a failure of such a settlement or even in the absence of such a settlement at all, will British Government like me to assist Ibn Saud in his attempt on Mecca in order to ensure a better and more peaceful Government there?"

I am sending you copy of Captain Fazluddin's report by mail of 14th October (Repeated to High Commissioner and Bagdad)

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No. 361

Sir P. Cox to Secretary of State for India.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, October 18.)

(Telegraphic) P.

Kut-el-Amara, October 11, 1920

I DISCUSSED subject of boundary dispute between Kuwait and Ibn Saud with both parties. Attitude of latter was that now that issue, which it would have been much better never to have raised, had been raised gratuitously by Sheikh Sakim, he (Ibn Saud) had claim to the "territory over which his ancestors formerly had jurisdiction, i.e., as in time of Colonel Pelly, up to the port of Kuwait." Of the boundaries of

Koweit territory according to the agreement between the Turks and ourselves he took issue, such an agreement, in any case, and especially since the Ali as province him. On the other hand, Sheikh Salim asserted his right to the frontier that we and the Turks had agreed upon. I expressed the opinion to both parties that a compromise was necessary as neither claim would be expected to succeed. I made it clear to Sheikh Salim that we could not necessarily be expected to agree to the frontier which, as against the Turks we had been willing to obtain for him, and that the fixation at some later date of Ibn Saud's frontiers was stipulated in our treaty with the latter. I explained to Ibn Saud that the necessity of a hinterland for Koweit if that town was not to be in perpetual fear of raids, was definitely recognized by His Majesty's Government and myself.

Acceptance of arbitration by us was agreed to by both parties. After full discussion and deliberation I have arrived at the following view:—Long as settlement concerns only the issue of the boundary a dispute about something else will follow since the boundary question is only a single incident caused by the permanently unsatisfactory relations between Ibn Saud and the present Sheikh of Koweit.

On the other hand, the boundary dispute will vanish with other differences if the opposed parties can be brought to a general agreement.

Meanwhile, the settlement of the boundary would prove a difficult matter for depending, as it does, on the use by certain tribes of certain watering-places, these tribes, according to the power of the over-lord to protect them effectively, a legitimate claim to one side, none to the other.

If His Majesty's Government approve, therefore, I propose to try to arrange that Sheikh Salim and Ibn Saud should meet this winter at Basra, at this time reconciled under our auspices by thoroughly discussing the matter. If they fail to reach an understanding, the necessity for arbitration may then arise.

(Government of India, copies by post to Bagdad and Bushra)

[L 12974 1331 44,

No. 361A

Mr. J. Butler Wright to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 21)

THE American Charge d'Affaires presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State and to Mr. Wright's communication of the 3rd September, has the honour to acquaint his Lordship with a communication which he has just received from the Secretary of State at Washington, stating that the United States Government is willing to publish the correspondence exchanged between His Majesty's Government and his Excellency the American Ambassador relative to economic rights in mandated territories.

If it should be the desire of His Majesty's Government that the publication of this correspondence be made simultaneously in this country and in America, Mr. Wright would be glad to learn whether an early date might be fixed for such publication so that the Government might be able to publish it.

United States Embassy, London

Mr. Davis to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 7)

United States Embassy, London,
December 6, 1921

My Lord,

With reference to my note of the 22nd November last, in which I communicated to you a note from the Secretary of State of the United States concerning the mandate and Mesopotamian oil situation, I have now the honour to transmit, herewith enclosed, the communication addressed to your Lordship upon this subject, dated the 20th November, 1920, and signed by the Honourable Bainbridge Colby, Secretary of

State of the United States of America, a comparison of the text of which with that as transmitted in my afore-mentioned note will disclose certain relatively unimportant changes in the verbiage.

I have, &c.

JOHN W. DAVIS

Enclosure in No. 361 B.

Mr. Bainbridge Colby to Earl Curzon

Department of State, Washington,
November 20, 1920.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to refer to the principle of equality of treatment under mandates and specific provisions by that principle.

Before considering the observations of His Majesty's Government on the general principles advocated by the United States and agreed to by the Allied Powers for application to the mandates over former Turkish territory as outlined in the note of the 12th May and of the 28th July addressed to you on behalf of this Government, I think it will clarify the discussion to indicate certain of your statements and assurances which this Government has been pleased to receive. Thus I note that the assignment to Great Britain of the mandate for Mesopotamia was made and accepted subject to no friendly arrangement whatever with any third Government regarding economic rights, which of course would have been wholly at variance with the purpose and contemplation of any mandate.

It is also gratifying to learn that His Majesty's Government is in full sympathy with the several propositions formulated in the note of the 12th May above referred to, which embody or illustrate the principles which this Government believes should be applied in the mandated regions and which are essential to the practical realization of equality of treatment.

In view of your note, to the effect that the British Government has been conducting the petroleum resources of the mandated territories in order to have been conducted for purely military purposes under the immediate supervision of the army authorities and at army expense; and that no private interests whatever are in any way involved, are accepted with a full sense of the good faith of the British Government.

The Government of the United States notes that His Majesty's Government has found it necessary to suspend, during the period of occupation, the grant of licences and opportunities to British as well as to other private interests to investigate the natural resources of the country, either for the purpose of acquiring them or strengthening old ones, and that there is no reason for assuming that the Administration, either of Mesopotamia or of Palestine, has at any time failed to carry out the assurances of His Majesty's Government.

This Government welcomes your pledges to the effect that the natural resources of Mesopotamia are to be secured to the people of Mesopotamia and to the future Arab State to be established in that region and that it is the purpose of the British Government, fully alive to its obligation as a temporary occupant, not only to secure those resources to the Mesopotamian State, but also its absolute freedom of action in the control thereof, and in particular that it is far from the intention of the Mandatory Power to establish any kind of monopoly or preferred position in its own interest.

The Government of the United States appreciates likewise the concurrence with a view that the merits of all claims to rights alleged to have been acquired in the past in the mandated territories should be considered and that the recognition of such claims will be accorded.

Adverting, at this point, to the views of His Majesty's Government regarding the nature of the responsibilities of Mandatory Powers under the League of Nations, I desire to call to the attention of His Majesty's Government the fact that, while the draft mandate, form "A," was not adopted at Paris, it was the understanding of the American representatives there present, that the British Government entertained and expressed convictions favourable to said form, and that, presumably, its representatives would exercise their influence in conformity with those convictions.

I need hardly refer again to the fact that the Government of the United States

has consistently urged that it is of the utmost importance to the future peace of the world that alien territory, transferred as a result of the war with the Central Powers, should be held and administered in such a way as to assure equal treatment to all commerce and to the citizens of all nations. Indeed it was in reliance upon an understanding to this effect, and expressly in contemplation thereof, that the United States was persuaded that the acquisition under mandate of certain enemy territory by the victorious Powers would be consistent with the best interests of the world.

Accordingly that your statements with reference to mandate, A together with the statement that the draft mandates for Mesopotamia and Palestine were prepared with a view to secure equality of treatment for the commerce and citizens of all States which are members of the League of Nations, do not indicate a proposition on your part that the United States can be excluded from the benefits of the principle of equality of treatment.

This Government is pleased to find that His Majesty's Government is in full sympathy with the principle formulated in its communications of the 12th May and of the 26th July. But it is unable to concur in the view, contained in paragraph 15 of your note, that the terms of the mandates can properly be discussed only in the Council of the League of Nations and by the signatories of the Covenant. Such powers as the Allied and Associated nations may enjoy or wield in the determination of the governmental status of the mandated areas accrued to them as a direct result of the war against the Central Powers. The United States as a participant in that conflict and as a contributor to its successful issue cannot consider any of the Associated Powers, the smallest not less than itself, debarred from the discussion of any of the consequences, or from participation in the rights and privileges secured by the mandates provided for in the Treaties of Peace.

This Government notes with interest your statement that the draft mandates for Mesopotamia and for Palestine, which have been prepared, with a view to secure equality of treatment and opportunity for the commerce, citizens and subjects of all States which are members of the League of Nations, will, when approved by the Allied Powers, be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations. The United States is undoubtedly one of the Powers directly interested in the terms of the mandates and I therefore request that the draft mandate forms be communicated to this Government for its consideration before their submission to the Council of the League. It is believed that His Majesty's Government acquiesces in this request, in view of your assurance that His Majesty's Government is in full sympathy with the various principles contained in the two previous Government upon this subject.

The establishment of the mandate principle, a new principle in international relations, and one in which the public opinion of the world is taking a special interest, would seem to require the frankest discussion from all pertinent points of view. It would seem essential that outside publicity should be given to the drafts of mandates when it is the intention to submit to the Council, in order that the fullest opportunity may be afforded to consider their terms in relation to the obligations assumed by the Mandatory Power and the respective interests of all Governments which are or desire to be themselves concerned or affected.

The fact cannot be ignored that the reported resources of Mesopotamia have interested public opinion of the United States, Great Britain and other countries as a potential subject of economic strife. Because of that fact they become an outstanding illustration of the kind of economic question with reference to which the mandate principle was especially designed, and, indeed, a peculiarly critical test of the good faith of the nations which have given their adherence to the principle. This principle was accepted in the hope of obviating in the future those international differences that grow out of a desire for the exclusive control of the resources and markets of annexed territories. To cite a single example: because of the shortage of petroleum, its constantly increasing commercial importance, and the continuing necessity of replenishing the world's supply by drawing upon the latent resources of undeveloped regions, it is of the highest importance to apply to the petroleum industry the most enlightened principles recognized by nations as appropriate for the peaceful ordering of their relations.

This Government finds difficulty in reconciling the special arrangement referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 of your note, and set forth in the so-called San Remo Petroleum Agreement, with your statement that the petroleum resources of Mesopotamia, and freedom of action in regard thereto, will be secured to the future Arab State, as yet unorganized. Furthermore it is difficult to harmonize that special arrangement

with the establishment of the Arab State, as proposed by His Majesty's Government.

This Government has noted in this connection a public statement of His Majesty's Minister in charge of petroleum affairs to the effect that the San Remo Agreement was based on the principle that the concessions granted by the former Turkish Government must be honoured. It would be reluctant to assume that His Majesty's Government has already undertaken to pass judgment upon the validity of concessionary claims in the regions concerned, and to concede validity to certain of those claims which cover apparently the entire Mesopotamian area. Indeed, this Government understands your note to deny having taken, and to deny the intention to take, any such *ex parte* and premature action. In this connection I might observe that such information as this Government has received indicates that prior to the war, the Turkish Petroleum Company, to make specific reference, possessed in Mesopotamia no rights to petroleum concessions, or to the exploitation of oil, and, in view of your assurance that it is not the intention of the Mandatory Power to establish on its own behalf any kind of monopoly, I am at some loss to understand how to construe the provision of the San Remo Agreement that any private petroleum company which may develop the Mesopotamian oil fields be under permanent British control.

Your Lordship contrasts the present production of petroleum in the United States with that of Great Britain, and some allusion is made to American supremacy in the petroleum industry. I should regret any assumption by His Majesty's Government that any other friendly Power that the views of this Government as to the true character of a mandate are dictated in any degree by considerations of the domestic need or production of petroleum, or any other commodity.

I may be permitted to say, however, for the purpose of correcting a misapprehension which your note reflects, that the United States possesses only one-twelfth approximately of the petroleum resources of the world. The oil resources of other nations have been so largely drawn upon for foreign needs, and your Lordship's undeveloped countries must be accepted with reserve, hardly disposed of the scientific

the anticipations of world production are apparently proceeding. The Government of the United States assumes that there is a general recognition of the fact that the requirements for petroleum are in excess of production, and it believes it has an opportunity to explore and develop the petroleum resources of the world, which, I should, without discrimination, be freely extended, as only by the unhampered development of such resources can the needs of the world be met.

But it is not these aspects of oil production and supply, in so far as they are of domestic interest to the United States, with which I am concerned in this discussion. I have alluded to them in order to correct confusing inferences liable to arise from certain departures, which I believe I discern in your Lordship's statement, from the underlying principles of a mandate, as evolved and sought

under their temporary dominion by their joint struggle and common victory. This dominion will be wholly misconceived, not to say abused, if there is even the slightest deviation from the spirit and the exclusive purpose of a trusteeship as strict as it is comprehensive.

HAINBRIDGE COLBY,

Secretary of State of the United States of America

See also Chapter III, Nos. 261, 263, 264, 270, 290, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300

Memorandum by Colonel Cornwallis on the Future Policy of His Majesty's Government with regard to Subsidies to Chiefs of the Arabian Peninsula

AT a meeting of the Inter Departmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs held at the Foreign Office on the 7th December, 1920, it was decided that a memorandum should be prepared in the Foreign Office giving a reasoned statement of policy for the future as regards subsidies, on the basis of—

- (a.) Participation in equal shares by His Majesty's Government and the Government of Ind.
- (b.) Adherence to treaty obligations
- (c.) Provisional yearly total of 100,000/ to be distributed by agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Government of India
- (d.) Participation by other Powers interested in the pilgrimage in financial support to the Hedjaz

This statement of policy to be submitted in the first place to the India Office for concurrence, and subsequently in its final form to the Government of India and the representatives of His Majesty's Government concerned for their views. On receipt of these views, the Treasury to be approached for their final sanction to the total agreed upon between the India Office and the department of His Majesty's Government responsible for Arabian policy.

2. The question of future policy is discussed in paragraphs 3 to 17.

The advisability of making certain temporary arrangements during the current financial year is dealt with in paragraph 18.

3. It will be convenient to consider the policy which His Majesty's Government should adopt for the future under the following heads:—

- (a.) The present position of Arab chiefs in the matter of subsidies
- (b.) The obligations to which His Majesty's Government are already committed either by treaty, custom or policy
- (c.) After deducting the amount which these obligations represent, the manner in which the balance of the provisional sum of 100,000/ can best be divided amongst the remaining chiefs, taking into consideration their relative importance, their past and present services, and their capacity to injure or benefit British interests in the future

4. —(a.) The present position of Arab chiefs in the matter of subsidies
This is as follows:—

- (i.) The Sultan of Muscat receives annually 186,400 rupees
- (ii.) The Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla receives annually 720 rupees
- (iii.) Fahad Beg of the Anazeh receives annually 204,000 rupees
- (iv.) The Aden protectorate chiefs receive annually 70,000 rupees
- (v.) Ibn Saud receives annually 80,000/
- (vi.) King Hussein receives no subsidy
- (vii.) The Idrii receives no subsidy
- (viii.) Ibn Rashid receives no subsidy
- (ix.) Isaam Yahya receives no subsidy
- (x.) The Sheikh of Kuwait receives no subsidy
- (xi.) The Sheikh of Bahrain receives no subsidy
- (xii.) The tribal chiefs receive no subsidy

5. —(b.) The obligations to which His Majesty's Government are already committed by treaty, custom or policy

(i.) *Muscat*—The subsidy paid to the Sultan is made up of the sum of 80,400 rupees, which was first paid by the Government of India in 1873 as representing the amount of the tribute formerly paid by the Sultan of Zanzibar under an arbitration award delivered by Lord Canning, Viceroy of India in 1861, and a further sum of 100,000 rupees approved in 1911 in connection with the agreement for the regulation of the arms traffic. The modification of the former sum is scarcely

by the India Office and the Government of India from the point of view of the desirability of reducing this subsidy to its true proportion in comparison with the subsidies which will be granted to more powerful chiefs.

(ii.) *Shehr and Mokalla*—The nominal stipend of 720 rupees per annum is paid to the Sultan in accordance with the terms of his treaty in 1852. It is not considered necessary to increase this amount since the Sultan was granted a loan of 400,000 rupees in 1917.

(iii.) *Anazeh*—Fahad Beg Ibn Haddhal is paid 17,000 rupees per mensem from Mesopotamian revenues in return for certain specified services, and his case is therefore outside the scope of the present memorandum except in so far as his subsidy is likely to be taken as a standard by other chiefs and compared to the detriment of the amounts which will be offered to them.

(iv.) *Aden*—The stipends, amounting to 70,000 rupees per annum, are paid to the chiefs of the protectorate chiefly by virtue of treaty rights, and cannot therefore be reduced or cancelled so long as His Majesty's Government maintain a hold over the protectorate. It is not however, suggested that they should be increased.

(v.) *Saudi*—The subsidy to Ibn Saud has been paid as a matter of policy and not in fulfilment of a treaty obligation. The question of its reduction is discussed later.

It will be seen that, setting aside the subsidies to Ibn Saud and Fahad Beg, British obligations at present amount to 257,120 rupees per annum, and that the subsidy paid to the Sultan of Muscat is the only one which is susceptible of modification.

6. —(c.) The manner in which the balance of the provisional sum of 100,000/ can best be divided.

His Majesty's Government are now faced with the double task of substantially reducing their financial commitments in Arabia, and at the same time of securing the special position for which the good will of the chiefs is as necessary as is the consent of the Principal Allied Powers. This task will be rendered more difficult by the policy which has been pursued in the past. The exaggerated scale on which subsidies have up to now been calculated has indeed given rulers like King Hussein and Ibn Saud such an undue idea of their own value that the greatest care and tact will have to be exercised in making them realise that the reduced rate at which it is proposed to subsidise them in future carries with it no disparagement and that it is due not to a diminution in confidence or friendship, but to the inevitable transition from war conditions to those of peace.

Ibn Saud in particular, may prove difficult to deal with since he has been pressing for an increase for many months and, in the opinion of Sir Percy Cox who has recommended that his subsidy should be increased to 100,000/ per annum, is in serious monetary difficulties. In this connection, it will be remembered that fears of a similar nature were entertained last year when the question of reducing the subsidy to King Hussein was discussed. These forebodings, however, did not prove true.

months, but was altogether discontinued from the end of February last without causing more than a slight aggravation of his fancied grievances. This precedent may not be without value in forecasting the attitude of Ibn Saud the reduction of whose subsidy is a necessary preliminary to the introduction of the new policy, for the reason that it approximates to the total which is available for division amongst all the chiefs.

7. In his and other cases, it is submitted that the best way of disarming criticism is by making a frank explanation of the situation, coupled with assurances of continued friendship and an indication of the many benefits which any small State must receive by the mere fact of being in treaty relations with and enjoying the protection and support of His Majesty's Government. This may not be appreciated at its full worth in the first instance, but practical evidence can be given in the future by a readiness to assist in other ways. These would, from a financial point of view, consist chiefly in fostering trade, in developing the prosperity of Arabian ports by such steps as inducing steamship companies to call and in taking other measures which might lead to an increase in revenue without burdening the British taxpayer.

8. A factor of more immediate importance, and one on which the success of the new proposals will largely depend, is the necessity of dividing the money available in such a manner as to eliminate all cause of jealousy between the different chiefs and to convince them that it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to treat them justly and with a due regard to the positions which they hold.

A careful appraisal of their respective merits is accordingly necessary, and it will be convenient to consider in the first place the cases of the three small States.

of Koweit, Bahrein and the Trucial Coast and, afterwards, those of the five rulers who dominate the greater part of Arabia.

9 *Koweit*—The Sheikh of Koweit is not in receipt of a subsidy, but he has a stretch of foreshore (Bundar Shwaikh) which is leased by His Majesty's Government, and he is exempted from payment of taxes on his date gardens in Basra to the extent of 60,000 rupees per annum. The civil commissioner at Bagdad has recommended that the lease should be terminated and that in compensation a sum of 10,000 to 12,000 rupees per annum should be paid to him quarterly in arrears, admittedly as a subsidy and subject to his good behaviour. The exemption from payment of taxes on the date gardens in Basra is presumably a matter which only concerns the Mesopotamian Government. The payment of a subsidy in compensation for the lease of the stretch of foreshore is still under the consideration of the India Office and the Indian Government, but the possibility of its becoming a charge against the provisional sum of 100,000/ must be taken into account.

10 *Bahrein and the Trucial Coast*—The advisability of granting subsidies to the Sheikh of Bahrein and the trucial chiefs appears open to argument, since for many years satisfactory relations have been maintained with them without resort to such a course, and, so far as is known, there have been no pressing demands from the sheikhs themselves.

This is a matter on which the India Office and the Government of India must advise, but if it is decided that the exclusion of Bahrein and the trucial coast from the benefits which are being accorded to other chiefs is inadvisable, it is suggested that the respective subsidies should be fixed at the same rate as that granted to the Sheikh of Koweit.

It may be remarked that the question of subsidising the Persian Gulf chiefs is a matter of great importance to His Majesty's Government, and must realise that their geographical position renders their retention of that support vital. It is extremely unlikely that they will ever be able to afford to disregard any personal feelings which they may have in this matter and decide each case purely on its merits.

11 *The Hedjaz and Yezd*—The general peace of Arabia to-day centres round the actions of King Hussein and Ibn Saud, for, although the other great chiefs may make war on their immediate neighbours, there can be no widespread conflagration in which King Hussein and Ibn Saud do not take part. During the last three years war between the two has recurred imminent on many occasions, and the danger is perhaps as great to-day, but always some factor has arisen to avert it and to confirm the impression that neither dares to put the issue to the test.

It is not easy to appraise the fighting strengths of two chiefs whose countries are so inaccessible, and if available evidence turns the scale in favour of Ibn Saud it must not be forgotten that he has formidable enemies in the Sheikh of Koweit and the Shammar, and that he would leave his flank exposed if he attacked the Hedjaz.

From the point of view of His Majesty's Government Ibn Saud is a man to be watched on account of the menace which he might become to Mesopotamia, the Persian Gulf, and the Holy Places of the Hedjaz, and to reward in return for the friendship which he has shown. During the war his services were more of a negative character, but since then he has undoubtedly rendered great assistance by his control of his unruly and fanatical tribesmen. He has proved himself possessed of statesmanlike qualities, and his friendship and dependence on the advice of His Majesty's Government will prove to be of the greatest value in the future. It is generally recognised that the Ikhwan movement represents a danger which, if allowed to continue unchecked, might overwhelm the Hedjaz and spread rapidly northward to Syria and Mesopotamia, and there is little doubt that the restraining influence of Ibn Saud has been chiefly instrumental in keeping it within bounds hitherto.

The claims of King Hussein to the favour of His Majesty's Government rest rather on his past than his present services. It is a matter of history that King Hussein, both by jeopardising his own future at a time when the issue of the war still hung in the balance and by his subsequent actions up to the time of the armistice, rendered assistance which was of real value to the Allies, and if, since then, he has adopted an attitude which is inconsistent with his former protestations, it can at least be argued that it has been for reasons which have found sympathy in the minds of many thousands of Arabs. King Hussein is open to adverse criticism from almost every point of view, but that should not obscure the fact that he is ruler of the land

which contains the Holy Places of Islam, and that, so long as the Hedjaz remains a State with him at its head, it is strongly to the interests of His Majesty's Government to support him and his successors, and to use every effort to promote friendly relations. It is doubtful whether the revenues of the Hedjaz will prove sufficient to ensure the administrative efficiency which is so necessary to the success of the pilgrimage, and the fact that the Allies have driven out the Power

has imposed a further obligation to offer substantial assistance to the newly formed State. King Hussein and his sons are capable of doing great harm if they fall into the

hands of the enemy, and Mesopotamia, but in all parts of the Empire from which pilgrims annually meet at Mecca. It is of the utmost importance that the Holy Places should become centres of friendly instead of corrupting influences, and King Hussein is in a position to earn the gratitude of His Majesty's Government, not only by seeing to the comfort of the pilgrims, but also by rooting out enemy propaganda and creating in its place an atmosphere of friendliness to His Majesty's Government.

From the above survey, it will be seen that from the point of view of His Majesty's Government both Ibn Saud and King Hussein can materially advance or harm British interests, and since each claims to be stronger and more powerful than the other, and each has had for many years at the bottom of his heart the ambition to become the head of a United Arabian Empire, it is suggested that the fairest way of treating them in the matter of subsidies will be to give them each an equal amount, and one which is in excess of that given to any other chief.

This will avoid any accusation of favouritism, and if the smallness of the sum causes disappointment, it can be pointed out to King Hussein that His Majesty's Government have invited the other Principal Allied Powers to support him, while, as indicated in paragraph 7 above, assurances of a more general character can be given to Ibn Saud. The symbol 3 is recommended as showing the share which each of these chiefs should receive.

12 *Asir*—The Idris of Asir, though not so powerful as either King Hussein or Ibn Saud, is nevertheless an important factor in Arabian politics, and his alliance with any other chief, if made with hostile intention, might upset the balance of power which at present exists.

From the point of view of His Majesty's Government, he might prove harmful either by attacking King Hussein, with whom he has long been on terms of scarcely-veiled enmity, or by allowing himself to come under the influence of some foreign Power. His potential value lies chiefly in the assistance which he might render if the Imam Yahya decided to attack the Aden Protectorate. During the war he showed no hesitation in joining the Allies against the Turks and, in spite of a reasonable disappointment over the Kufuda affair, he remained consistently loyal. He received a substantial subsidy during the war, which was not entirely discontinued until the 1st July, 1919. In view of his past and present attitude, and the fact that the Political Resident, Aden, has frequently pointed out the financial difficulties under which he is labouring, it is recommended that he should be treated more generously than either Ibn Rashid or the Imam Yahya, and that his share in comparison with the other chiefs should be represented by the symbol 2.

13 *Yemen and Hail*—The cases of the Imam Yahya and Ibn Rashid differ from those discussed above, in that they were both hostile during the war, and that neither of them has yet come to terms with His Majesty's Government. They are therefore not entitled to any consideration on the grounds of past services, and when the question of the payment of a subsidy to them arises, it will have to be looked at purely in the light of a business proposal and as an insurance against any military commitments.

The ruler of Hail is a small boy whose power at present is overshadowed by that of Ibn Saud, but it is not unlikely that Ibn Saud would gain complete control of Hail after the murder of Saud Ibn Rashid, but his failure to do so and the recapture of Jauf by the Shammar show a possibility of their regaining the dominant position which they held during last

year. Hail is of great importance to His Majesty's Government as the ruler of a country through which many thousands pass annually on their way to and from the pilgrimage as a check on the spread of the Ikhwan to the north and as a possible raider against Mesopotamia. His friendship is, therefore, a matter of some importance. He has made several tentative advances to Sir Percy Cox, who suggested that a meeting should

at Nasiriyah, this winter, but his attitude since that proposal was made is entirely different, and Sir Percy Cox has decided to take no further action at present.

The Imam Yahya has proved more hostile than Ibn Rashid since the armistice. He has laid claim to the whole of the Aden Protectorate, and has maintained his officials at Dhala and other places in the north since the spring of this year. Negotiations have proved of no avail, chiefly owing to the fact that he refuses to recognise His Majesty's Government as having any right to discuss the affairs of the Yemen. It is known that he has approached other foreign Governments, but the special position of His Majesty's Government has been recognised by the Principal Allied Powers, it will probably be found impossible to come to terms with him. The military strength which he could bring to bear at any time in the Aden Protectorate is apt to be exaggerated. It is true that Ahn required 50,000 men in 1904 to reconquer Sanaa, but he had to contend with unitedly hostile people. Since then large tribes, such as the Hashid and Bakil, have proved disloyal and an invasion of the protectorate on the part of the Imam remains hostile to him. The Imam can, however, collect sufficient forces to cause His Majesty's Government considerable embarrassment and to overcome the local tribes, and it will probably be found cheaper in the end to pay him a subsidy than to upset him by force.

Neither in his case nor in that of Ibn Rashid is there any question of immediate payment, but since there is a possibility of some arrangement being made with both of them during the financial year 1921-22 it will be advisable to make some provision in the division of the allotted sum.

It is recommended that the unsatisfactory attitude of these chiefs should be taken into account, and that their shares should each be represented by the symbol 1.

14. The proportions according to which (after the subsidies to Muscat, Shehr and Mukalla, the Aden chiefs and, if approved, Kuwait, Bahrain and the trucial chiefs, have been subtracted) it is recommended that the balance of the provisional sum of 100,000/ should be divided between King Hussein, Ibn Saud, the Idrii, the Imam Yahya and Ibn Rashid are, respectively, 3, 3, 2, 1, 1.

No attempt has been made to indicate the value of these shares in terms of money, since the rate at which it will be decided to calculate the rupee is unknown.

15. In view of the fact that it will be convenient in future to pay all subsidies in rupees, and of the further fact that the payment of regular and unvarying sums to the chiefs is most desirable politically, it is recommended that the provisional sum of 100,000/ should be converted into rupees, with due consideration of the present and possible future rates of exchange, and that the sum in rupees which is finally settled should be considered as representing the amount permanently available for subsidies. Chiefs in Arabia are not versed in the intricacies of questions of exchange, and they would undoubtedly misunderstand the reasons for a sudden reduction in their subsidies which might be necessitated by a change in the rates of exchange. The grant of fixed subsidies which will not be affected by any fluctuations in the value of the rupee is a matter which will materially influence the success of the proposed new policy.

16. The question of the subsidies to which the shares of His Majesty's Government and the Government of India should be respectively allocated is one on which it is difficult to express an opinion before receiving an indication of the views of the India Office and the Government of India. The tentative suggestion is, however, made that the Government of India should supply all the rupees required, and that their moiety should include the amounts paid to the Sultans of Muscat and Mukalla, the Aden chiefs, the sheikhs of Kuwait and Bahrain, and the trucial chiefs, if approved, and half the amounts paid to Ibn Saud and King Hussein, on the ground that these are the chiefs with whom they are most intimately concerned.

17. The further recommendation is made that any balance of the total vote for subsidies, accruing at the end of each financial year, should be expended in presents to those chiefs who have done good service, it being understood that such presents should only be made by agreement between the different Departments and Governments concerned when the political situation clearly renders it necessary.

18. It has been presumed that none of the recommendations set forth above, if approved, will come into force until the beginning of the next financial year, and the question arises what action is necessary before then to give effect to the decision of the Inter-Departmental Conference and to prepare the chiefs concerned for the coming change.

The case of Ibn Saud demands immediate decision. In the normal course of events this chief would receive 20,000/ during the next four months. In view, however, of the fact that, if the proposals made in this memorandum are in any way approved, his share cannot under the most favourable circumstances exceed 25,000/ per annum, it is suggested that he should at once be informed of the new situation on the lines already indicated, and that, as was done in the case of King Hussein last year, his subsidy should be gradually reduced during the next four months. This could be done by sending him the full amount for December, 4,500/ at the end of January, 3,500/ at the end of February, and 2,500/ at the end of March, making a total of 15,000/ for the next four months.

As regards the Idrii, it is suggested that he should be informed without delay of the fact that His Majesty's Government have decided to grant him a small subsidy from the 1st April, 1921, and that he should be given an immediate present of 5,000/ in recognition of his loyalty in consulting His Majesty's Government before consenting to the recent proposals of the Ikhwan to attack the Hedjaz from Asir, and in return for the services he has rendered in drawing off Imdad troops which might have been used against the Aden Protectorate.

The present attitude of King Hussein does not merit any reward, but it is possible that a new situation may be created if the proposed negotiations with the

considerable value, and it is recommended that provisional approval should be given to set aside a sum of 20,000/ to be used if necessary.

No special action is necessary as regards the other chiefs. The Sultans of Muscat and Shehr and Mukalla and the Aden chiefs will receive their normal subsidies, the positions of Ibn Rashid and the Imam are not likely to be cleared up within the next few months, while the case of the Sheikh of Kuwait, which is still under the consideration of the India Office and the Government of India, is, like those of the Sheikh of Bahrain and the trucial chiefs, of no great urgency.

19. Recapitulation

The decision of the Treasury is required on the following points:

- (a) The payment of subsidies in rupees on the basis of a fixed sum representing the permanent value in rupees of the provisional sum of 100,000/ (paragraph 15)
- (b) The payment of unexpended balances as presents to chiefs under certain conditions (paragraph 17)
- (c) The proposed grant to the Idrii
- (d) The proposed provisional grant to King Hussein

The decision of the Government of India is required in respect to the payment of a half share of the provisional sum of 100,000/ before any effect can be given to the proposed policy.

The opinion of the India Office in consultation with the Government of India is required on the following points:

- (a) The desirability of reducing the subsidy of the Sultan of Muscat (paragraph 5)
- (b) Grant of a subsidy to the Sheikh of Kuwait (paragraph 9)
- (c) Grant of a subsidy to the Sheikh of Bahrain (paragraph 9)
- (d) Grant of a subsidy to the trucial chiefs (paragraph 9)
- (e) The proportions according to which King Hussein, Ibn Saud, the Idrii, Ibn Rashid, and Imam Yahya should be subsidised (paragraphs 11-14)
- (f) The payment of subsidies in rupees on the basis of a fixed sum representing the permanent value in rupees of the provisional sum of 100,000/ (paragraph 15)
- (g) The subsidies to which the Government of India should contribute and the proposal that they should provide the rupees required (paragraph 16)
- (h) The proposed reduction of the subsidy of Ibn Saud (paragraph 18)

December 16, 1920

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No. 541
(Telegraph)

From a source which is not so reliable as all this into consideration, it is not without ground to say that the French Ambassador was previously known of by Mr. D. ...
"Was right in Post" to-day completely changes its ground and attacks the French Government without mentioning the French, though up to now it has attacked French over Cable Conference. Mr. Hook, of Associated Press, says that Standard Oil have bought editor of this newspaper.

See also Chapter III, Nos. 312, 316, 317

CHAPTER V. ADEN AND ARABIA

E 7124 47 44

No. 364

Acting Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon. — (Received July 5.)

(No. 21)

My Lord,

Aden, June 1920

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your information, copy of 15th Aden news letter, dated the 2nd July, 1920, addressed to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Egypt.

C. D. FIELD, Lieut. Colonel

Enclosure in No. 364

15th Aden News Letter

(Secret)

THE following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of my last letter dated the 10th June 1920.

1. Reports received from Hodeida this week show that the head sheikh of Ja' Renna has started fighting with the Zaidis there and has already driven them away from some of the villages. In addition to 100 to 200 Idrii soldiers, the sheikh

The people are said to be determined to drive the Zaidis out of their country.

There is quiet on the Qubra and Jabel Bura frontiers. Fresh activity may be expected after the Ramadan. There is rumour that the Imam has made up with Sheikh Ali Moked of Anis, referred to at p. 2 of Aden news letter, dated the 28th February, 1920, and the latter has gone to Sana. On his arrival the Imam is said to have summoned his military commanders and a campaign on a large scale is being planned against the Idrii. This report requires confirmation.

It is reported that the Idrii and Somali mercenaries at Bani went in ...
... the Somalis assuming a threatening attitude paid them ...
... Ketar Sheikh has sent in a letter he has received from ...
... him to come to Dala. The Ketar has replied ...
... the Amil while giving him indirectly to understand that he (Ketar) is ...
... of the British G.

C. D. FIELD

Aden, June 17, 1920

E 8374 47 44

No. 365

Acting Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon. — (Received July 16.)

(No. 22)

My Lord,

Aden, July 2, 1920

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your information, copy of 19th Aden news letter, dated the 2nd July, 1920, addressed to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Egypt.

I have, &c.

C. D. FIELD, Lieut. Colonel

Enclosure in No. 365

19th Aden News Letter

(Secret)

THE following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of my last letter dated the 17th June, 1920.

Tihama. — The Political Officer, Hodeida, reports that the Qubra Sheikh Mahomed Zaid, referred to in my letter of the 2nd June, 1920, died on the 11th June. The Political Officer says that the earlier report that he was progressing favourably and that he was almost well was false, the Qubra sheikhs wishing to conceal the truth.

As the month of Ramadan is over renewed activity on the part of the Imam is anticipated but so far there has been no movement of his troops. He is reported to have summoned all the chiefs from the surrounding country and a number of them have gone to Sana. He asked the sheikhs to provide fighting men, promising better rations and wages. They are said to have promised to give him definite replies after consulting their men.

Sheikh Ali Moked of Anis, referred to in the last letter, has promised the Imam to supply men and to send them against Jabel Bura.

Yemen (Upper and Lower). — The Sana agent of the Political Officer, Hodeida, reports on the 15th June that the Imam is ill, and rumour in Aden says that he is ...

The people of Tair are said to be dissatisfied with the treatment of the Imam. And there, Saryid-ah-al-Wazir, and are looking for an opportunity to revolt against the Imam and join the Idrii.

The commander of H.M.S. "Clematis" recently paid a visit to Mokha and gathered that Sheikh Abdullah Effendi was acting as the Imam's Amil there during the absence of his brother, Ali Othman, who was inland engaged in beating up recruits for the Imam. The commander was told that sheikhs who refuse to respond to advances of Ali Othman were sent by him to the Imam as prisoners.

... long Tair, states that the Arabs in Siber have been making continual raids on Tair and that sheikhs in the neighbourhood are rising against the ...

The trouble appears to have originated in the refusal of one of the Sheikhs of Jebel Saker to pay tribute demanded from him. A force of 300 Zaidis which was despatched to punish the sheikh was repulsed with heavy loss. Negotiations are now said to be proceeding between the parties for a settlement.

Asir. — Captain Fazluddin, I.M.S., writes that ever since the expulsion of Sharif Hamud from Abha after the burning of his house in December, last (vide Captain Fazluddin's diary, dated the 18th December, 1919), Salim Bey, the Idrii commander on that side had been trying to get into the town by negotiations. He lately occupied a fort called Murtaza and another place called Thara (or Sam), two strategically important points on the borders of Abha, and wrote to Hasan Aidh to let him enter Abha and take possession of the arms and ammunition surrendered by the Tarka and kept in his custody for ultimate transmission to the Idrii. Hasan Aidh replied to this communication by a surprise attack by night on Salim Bey's forces with a large force and compelled him to retire from Murtaza as well as Sara and to fall back on Shaiban. Hasan Aidh is said to have sustained a loss of 800 men, while Salim Bey lost 37 of his men. A large number of Asirian soldiers recruited by Salim Bey from Abha and its environments are said to have deserted in a body to Hasan Aidh during the latter's attack on Murtaza and Sara. Abha is now in a state of siege from the west and south, while it is open from the north and east. No fighting has since taken place.

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Aden Protectorate.—The Zaidis attacked the Al Mabrabi section of the caravan on the borders of the Hanashabi and killed the sheikh and his son. In the fighting the Imam's commander, Al Obaidi, and another Zaidi were also killed. The Hanashabi Sultan anticipates that the Zaidis will now come down upon him and asks for the despatch of our troops to Musair. I have advised him, in case he is attacked, to resist as long as possible and then to retire behind our camp at Mahat Dakim.

Al Obaidi is the man who headed the party that came to Labej last April with a letter from the Imam's Amal at Dala to the Resident.

C. D. FIELD

Aden, July 2, 1920

See also Chapter III, Nos. 217 to 220 and 223, and Chapter IV, Nos. 310 to 312]

E 8628/3880 44]

No. 366

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 21.)

N. 100
M. 100

Ramleh, July 10, 1920.

I HAVE the pleasure to forward herewith some extracts from the report of the British agent, Jeddah, for the period ending the 2nd July.

I have, &c.
For High Commissioner,
ERNEST SCOTT

Enclosure 3 in No. 366

Extract from the report of the British agent, Jeddah, for the period ending the 2nd July.

The King's full reply to the Foreign Office suggestions has been sent you under separate cover.

As regards the meeting at Aden see my telegram of the 12th June, 1920, last paragraph, it is possible that he might go if a ship was actually present at Jeddah to take him, although he is, in my opinion, afraid to leave Mecca or Jeddah for fear of a revolt.

As regards his refusal to allow pilgrims from Nejd to come to Mecca until the dispute is settled between him and Ibn Saud (the King does not give him a very courteous title in his letter), I am of the opinion that the King has some justification on his side. There would undoubtedly be a disturbance and many efforts at proselytism.

Pilgrimage.

The King having earnestly requested that a special boat should be sent to take pilgrims from Jeddah to Yanbo owing to the insecurity of the caravan route Mecca-Medina, a boat was sent by Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey.

On the 14th 1,400 pilgrims were carried, and now the King says no more pilgrims are allowed to go. Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey, I understand, are suffering from fear, some financial loss.

I learn that the reason is that Yanbo has now some 4,000 pilgrims congregated in her small area. There are no camels to take them to Medina, as they have been commandeered for other purposes by the King, and there is no food, as all supplies have been "cornered" in Mecca.

The road is also blocked by the tribes.

Arrangements have now been made by the King for pilgrims to make a very long detour and proceed from Mecca to a point on the railway some 50 kilom. north of Medina. From this place they will rail to Medina if there is a train.

The return journey will take at least seven weeks, and pilgrims will consequently miss the Haj.

I notify you that the complaints of Indian pilgrims are growing in volume and intensity, and that there is the greatest dissatisfaction expressed at the insecurity of the caravan routes, at the excessive charges and at many other vexatious and unnecessary arrangements of the Hachemite Government.

No French or Italian pilgrims have arrived.

The French are shortly going to press for an enquiry into their Wakf funds at Medina.

Quarantine.

The situation is unchanged, but Mohamed Hussein and Thabit Bey are quarrelling over the division of the spoil, so it may be possible to come to some understanding with the latter. At present there is no British control, camouflaged or otherwise.

The French chief of mission has informed me privately that on the conclusion of last year's pilgrimage a report was sent to the French Government that our control was entirely nominal, and consisted only of a British medical officer accompanying the Hachemite quarantine authorities on board.

The Dutch consul still presses me to know when an efficient control under our administration will be started. I state again here that there are no pilgrims whom I have seen who are looked after and assisted as the Javanese pilgrims are. All the arrangements made for them up to their arrival in Jeddah are excellent.

In compliance with your telegram No. 463 of the 29th June, nothing more is being done in the instance of our control, except such as can be done by private negotiations to establish a *modus operandi*.

I submit that it is far better to have no control at all than to have the nominal and unsatisfactory arrangements of last year, which left us with the responsibility to the pilgrims without any power to give orders or ensure the compliance of the 1903 convention.

Whether the King will discuss the Husseinis before the 17th August remains to be seen. I do not think so.

I mention here that I cannot agree with the opinion that if the King likes to do so on the pilgrims, it is to his discredit and loss, since it may react on him in the numbers of future pilgrims.

It is to his discredit, but, in my opinion, there is just as much moral obligation on us to assist the pilgrims from wicked extortion and unnecessary suffering and discomfort as there is on us to keep open the Holy Places.

Commercial.

The bank—Gellatly Hankey—has ceased to function altogether, and the efforts and time with the King to obtain the concession appear to have been wasted.

Army.

The Hedjaz army, under its reluctant Commander-in-chief Sabri Pasha, ex-platoon commander in the Turkish army, has left for Taif. There has undoubtedly been much fighting and trouble on the Taif-Mecca road, and the King may have a settlement of this in mind.

King, of Khurma, will of course regard the move as hostile.

The Syrian officers of the army have approached the chief of the French Mission to know his attitude if they desert and claim his protection.

They have received no pay, and do not intend to fight against Ibn Saud—our lesson was enough.

I understand that they have been told that they will receive protection and repatriation.

Enclosure 2 in No. 366

Extract from Jeddah Local News Letter, dated June 22 to July 2, 1920

French Mission.—The chief of the French Mission writes me as follows—

"La Mission française sera supprimée le 1^{er} août. On liquide et on ferme."

E 8622 20 44

No. 367

Earl Curzon to Sir A. Geddes (Washington).

(No. 619.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 1, 1920

FOLLOWING from Mr Philip Kerr on behalf of the Prime Minister

"Colonel House spoke to me yesterday about the oil situation, and said he thought that this was more calculated to produce bad feeling between England and America at the present time than Ireland. My immediately succeeding telegram gives the Anglo-French Agreement about oil, in case you have not already seen it. House and his friends tell me that its publication ought to be accompanied by a very careful explanation, as in its present form it is calculated to give rise to very hostile propaganda.

"As I understand it, the situation is this—

The oil of the war has been the subject of a discussion from the Turkish Government for the development of the Mesopotamian oilfields. As the outcome of the war the British and French Governments agreed to hand over to France the German shares in the company. It is therefore now a predominantly Anglo-French company.

According to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, concluded in 1915, in order to prevent misunderstandings between France, Russia and Great Britain in the event of the collapse of the Turkish Empire, the Mosul areas were included within the French sphere of influence. Inasmuch, however, as Great Britain bore the chief burden of the costs of the war against Turkey, estimated at some 700,000,000L, and suffered considerable losses in it, France agreed to modify the Sykes-Picot Agreement so as to include Mosul in Mesopotamia, of which it is naturally a part.

"3. As the result of France agreeing to this, the British Government agreed that France should be guaranteed an interest in the Mesopotamian oil.

"4. Accordingly the present agreement only prescribes that, if the Mesopotamian fields are developed by Government action, France shall be entitled to purchase at ordinary commercial rates 35 per cent. of the oil output, in consideration of permitting a pipe-line to be built through Syria and providing for other facilities; or in the event

of the oil being developed by private companies, France will be entitled to 25 per cent shareholding, less a certain percentage to be handed over to the Mesopotamian Government.

"The effect of the agreement, therefore, is simply to secure France a share in the output of oil at ordinary commercial rates. It does not exclude any other Power; it is not an agreement to divide the oil between Great Britain and France. Great Britain is perfectly free to develop Mesopotamia in any way it may think advisable, subject only to its being undertaken to sell France 25 per cent. of the output, if worked by Government action, or a participation of 25 per cent. of any company formed, if worked by private enterprise. Of course, Great Britain, as mandatory, is responsible for seeing, in the first place, that the oilfields are properly and economically developed, and, in the second, for seeing that the Mesopotamian people get full advantage from the development of their natural resources. As mandatory, it cannot surrender that responsibility or allow Mesopotamia to be exploited indiscriminately by anybody who comes along.

"As I see it, the point which will have to be made clear to the American people is that, while Great Britain, as the Power ultimately responsible for the development of Mesopotamian oilfields, has thought it necessary to guarantee to France a supply of oil at ordinary commercial rates, because France has got no oil of her own and because oil is essential to her reconstruction."

(See also Chapter III, Nos. 224 to 232.)

E 9325 47, 44]

No. 368

Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 4.)

No. 23.)

My Lord

Aden, July 16, 1920

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your information, three copies of 20th Aden news letter dated the 16th July, 1920, addressed to his Excellency the High Commissioner Egypt.

I have, &c

F. E. SCOTT, Major-General

Enclosure in No. 368

20th Aden News Letter

(Secret.)

THE following is a summary of news reported since the despatch of the last letter dated the 10th July, 1920—

Tihama.—Reports received from Hodeida this week show fresh activity on the part of the Iman. A force of 2,000 men, well provided with rations and medical and other stores, has been despatched to Jebel Renna. The Idrisi who had occupied a part of Jebel Renna has withdrawn his men.

The Idrisi commandant at Bajil, Sheikh Mahomed Tahir, is reported to have received the Bajil and Menaka news agents of the Political Officer, Hodeida. The news for this week is—

Captain Fazlud din writes that while he was in Aden in May last, the Idrisi troops had to evacuate even that portion of Jebel Mihan which they had been holding since their last reverse. They have retired to a place known as Mathwab at the foot of the mountain and to the west of it. Now that the Ramadan is over, the Idrisi is preparing to make another effort to retake Jebel Mihan.

From the same source I learn that Sheikh Ali Yahya Fashiq Zarak, Sheikh Ibrahim of Rakab and Sheikh Dawud of Ma'asala with Syed Yahya Rifsoo, Idrisi commander in Beit-el Fakih, have been in Jizan for more than two months awaiting the Idrisi reply to their request for assistance in releasing Zaid for the Iman.

Captain Fazlud din says that the Idrisi, in view of his unsatisfactory financial condition, is naturally hesitating to proceed further, but in order not to disappoint the deputations and the people of Zaid to whom he had been so long promising relief and

advance on Zaid. For this purpose he has called out men from the various tribes of Asir. There appears to have been no improvement in the condition of the Idrisi finances, which are going from bad to worse. I communicated the Foreign Office instructions regarding the subsidy to Captain Fazlud din but he has not yet told me what the Idrisi has to say in the matter.

Asir.—Captain Fazlud din reports that negotiations are proceeding between the Asir and the Idrisi, but without any further resort to force.

Aden Protectorate.—There exists a long standing feud between the Fadli and the Lower Yafa tribes in the Aden Protectorate over a water-channel which irrigates their fields. All endeavours made by this Residency from time to time have failed to effect a permanent settlement.

Last Saturday, the Yafas attacked a Fadli post at Karn Hilma and tried to occupy it, but the Fadlis having received reinforcement, overpowered the Yafas and drove them away killing twenty-five and wounding fifteen. The losses are apparently exaggerated.

It is reported that on receiving the news of the fighting between the Al Mibrabi and Al Obaid, referred to in the last letter, 250 Zaidis came from Dala and destroyed the Al Mibrabi village and having beheaded the corpses of the sheikh and his son,

This news has been brought to me from various sources but is denied by Sharif Namr-bin-Shakr, King Hussein's representative, who has just returned from Sana.

Rumours regarding the Zaidi intention to invade the Hamahala country continue. An informant, who visited An Nadira last month, reported that the sheikh of the place, Hamahala, nor is extraordinary activity on the part of the Zaidis reported.

Sharif Nasir-bin-Shokr, the emissary of King Hussein, returned to Aden from Sana on the 10th instant. He came escorted by seventy men who returned after accompanying him as far as Nobat Dakim. He again exhorted my first assistant to refer the dispute between the Imam and ourselves to arbitration. He was very reticent about the result of his mission to Sana, merely stating that correspondence is still in progress.

He confirms the news heard from other sources that Ibn Saud has made a determined attack on the Yami tribe and has captured the Da-

T. E. SCOTT

Aden, July 16, 1920

E 9810 47 44

Political Resident Aden, to Earl Curzon. (Received August 12)

EX 241
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Aden, July 30, 1920

I HAVE the honour to forward for your information, copy of 21st Aden news letter, dated the 30th July, 1920, addressed to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Egypt.

I have, &c.
T. E. SCOTT, Major-General

Enclosure in No. 349

21st Aden News Letter

THE following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of my last letter, dated the 16th July, 1920.

Tihama. In my last letter I referred to the reported despatch of 2,000 Imam soldiers, well provided with rations and medical and other stores, to Jebel Reima. It was reported that Sheikh Ali Mikdad, of Anis, who has promised the Imam to recover Jebel Bura for him, was to start with these men, but the expedition had to be postponed owing to the sudden advance of Ibn Saud on the Yami.

The movements of Ibn Saud are causing uneasiness at Sana, and the Imam is said to be actively occupied in strengthening himself against a possible advance of Ibn Saud towards Sana. One Naqib Abdalla Dalwa, a merchant, who lately arrived here bearing letters from the Bakil sheikh, Yahia bin-Yahia Ash-Shayef, states that peace negotiations have started between the Imam and the Idrii through a go-between. I have received no confirmation of this story.

Fighting is reported to have taken place in Jebel Reima between 500 men of Sheikh Al Mula and 400 Idrii men, in which the latter were defeated and had to retire to Shutaba owing to the shortage of ammunition. Both sides suffered heavy casualties.

It is, however, not clear when and from where these 500 men of Sheikh Ali Mikdad

Yemen (Upper and Lower).—The Sana agent of the Political Officer, Hodeida, reports that the military school at Sana held examination on the 19th June, in which thirteen passed as lieutenants, one as engineer and three as gunners. They were given diplomas by the Imam.

According to this agent, the Imam appears to have refused permission to the commandant of his artillery, Mahmood Bey, and some other Turks to leave the Yemen.

The agent says that the Imam reviewed his troops and distributed fruits on the 15th at Jebel Naqam.

Aden.—In my last letter I referred to the Idrii's optimistic view as regards Ebha affairs. It appears from Captain Fazluddin's subsequent letter, dated the 18th July, 1920, that Ibn A. attacked the Idrii force of 100 men at Muhail and killed two ex-Turkish officers who were in the Idrii pay, twenty-five Somalis and twenty Arabas. The Idrii's exasperated the Imam that he appears to be collecting a force sufficient to advance and punish Ibn A.

Captain Fazluddin thinks that such a step on the part of the Idrii would be unwise at the present moment while he is still engaged in the Tihama, and disastrous so far as Aden itself is concerned, inasmuch as the strong confederation of the Beni

Mughaida is well in the hands of Ibn A. at present, unless of course the Idrii obtains the assistance of Ibn Saud.

Reports received from different sources go to show that Ibn Saud's forces (all horsemen) have been progressing into the Kalitan country as well as the highlands of Yemen.

Iden Protectorate. The Zaidis are reported to have occupied Dhaman, which is within our protectorate, otherwise everything is quiet.

Sharif Nasir Shokr, the emissary of King Hussein, left for Jeddah on the 26th instant. He said negotiations were continuing between the King and the Imam, and he will return to Aden shortly for another trip to Sana.

Yours &c.
T. E. SCOTT

Since writing this letter I have received a telegram from Captain Fazluddin that Idrii's army, in company with a large force of Ibn Saud, entered Alba on

W. appears to confirm it.

T. E. S.

Aden, July 30,

E 10513 47 44]

No. 370

Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon. (Received August 27)

My Lord,

Aden, August 13, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your information, copy of 22nd Aden news letter, dated the 13th August, 1920, addressed to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Egypt.

I have, &c.
T. E. SCOTT, Major-General

Enclosure in No. 370.

22nd Aden News Letter

Secret)

THE following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of my last letter, dated the 30th July.

Tihama.—The Idrii commandant at Bajil, Sheikh Mahomed, has written to the Political Officer Hodeida, to say that he has intercepted a letter from Sheikh Omar Mizaji, a Hodeida merchant, to the address of the ex-Vah, Mahmood Nadhim, the purport of which, he states, is that Mahmood Nadhim, President of the Nationalists and enemy of the existing wretched Turkish Government, has entered Constantinople with all his forces and co-operated with the Turks there; that Anwar Pasha has returned from Afghanistan with a large quantity of gold, and has sent a part of it to Mustafa Kemal in order to strengthen his armies, that Colonel Jacob has written an article in the "Times" praising Mahmood Nadhim and the other Turks in the Yemen, and giving hopes for the fulfilment of their aspirations. The Idrii commandant says that Kaimakams Jamil Bey and Khalil Bey, who are in Marawa and through whom Sheikh Omar Mizaji transmits his letters to Mahmood Nadhim are engaged in propaganda work, the object of which is to incite the Arabs against the British Government.

This is a sample of the rumours that float about the Yemen.

Omar Mizaji rendered Major Meek some assistance in procuring the release of the Jacob Mission, but otherwise is reported as a rabid pro-Turk and great personal friend of Mahmood Nadhim. He was decorated for his war services to the Turkish cause.

The news of the Imam's desire to make peace with the Idrii is confirmed, though peace negotiations have not actually started. The Imam is said to be seeking for a go-between.

Captain Fazluddin, in his letter dated the 3rd August, states that the Idrii has occupied nearly all the important centres in Reima, and that Syed Mustafa is at Mithi recruiting soldiers for the Zabid campaign, arrangements for which are expected to be

completed in about a fortnight or so. The Zarnak and other sheikhs referred to in my letter of the 29th April last left Jizan about the middle of July. They are at present at Bayt awaiting the arrival of the above expeditionary force.

The Idriat's financial condition is, however, worse than ever, and this may have a restraining effect on his emotions. Captain Fazluddin, however, reports that the Idriat is very liable to look for the intervention of Providence on his behalf, and that he considers the arrival of Bin Saud's troops for his assistance at Abha as due to the direct act of Providence.

Yemen (Upper and Lower). The Assistant Resident, Perim, informs me that he has been receiving persistent reports of oppression carried on by Sheikh Ali Othman of Khoka, the Imam's Amil for Mokha, and places in the neighbourhood, who has put in custody several small chiefs, including the son of the Sheikh of Moza. The Assistant Resident says that Sheikh Nasir of Sheikh Said, who was summoned by Sheikh Ali Othman to pay tribute, refused to do so, and informed the latter that he should come and take it, as he himself will never willingly send it, and would resist to the best of his ability. The Assistant Resident says that there is general dissatisfaction everywhere against the Imam.

Fighting is reported to have taken place between the Imam's men and the Mushwili, a sub-tribe outside the Subehi border of our protectorate.

Reports continue to come in of the nervousness caused at Sana in consequence of Ibn Saud's movements. Shafaw are said not to have responded to the Imam's call for service. The Kadi of Iddah writes that the people are expecting the British Government to make a forward move now that the Zaidis are in a fix.

Asir. Captain Fazluddin, in a letter dated the 3rd August, 1920, confirms the news of the occupation of Abha by Bin Saud. From the details given, it appears that after the attack by Hasan-bin A'idh on the Muhail garrison, reported in my last letter, the Idriat asked Ibn Saud for assistance, and received a favourable and ready response. A large force of Akhwans, estimated at between 12,000 and 14,000, with about 1,500 men from the Kahla and the Rubia and Rufeida tribes, under the leadership of Muhammad Ibn-ad-Dulaim, the chief Sheikh of kahla, an old and faithful partisan of the Idriat, appeared on the confines of Abha on the 21st July, 1920, and offered the following five conditions to Hasan-bin A'idh:—

1. He should resign the Emirate of Asir at once, but should be allowed to remain with of his own tribe, the Beni Mughaid.
2. Turkish arms and ammunition left in his trust for the Idriat should be distributed at once in the following manner: One-third to the Idriat, one-third to Ibn Saud, one third to be kept for purposes of defence, under the supervision of the Idriat representative in Asir.
3. He should give armed assistance against the Sharif of Mecca.
4. He should hand over to the Idriat at once all the principal men of the force that attacked the Idriat force at Muhail for trial according to the Shria law.
5. No resistance should be offered to the joint forces of Ibn Saud and Idriat occupying Abha, the forces in question undertaking not to molest or plunder anybody.

These conditions were indignantly rejected by Hasan Ibn A'idh, and his cousin, Mohammad Ibn Abdur Rahman, came out with 2,000 men of the Beni Mughaid and Beni Muhik and four guns to give battle to the invaders. The latter, who, it is believed, were at first anxious to negotiate further and avoid bloodshed as far as possible, without waiting for the attack, charged, killing about 300 men of Ibn A'idh's force. The battle lasted for two hours. The remnants of Ibn A'idh's men fled in disorder. Bin Saud's force entered the town of Abha the same day, where, it is said, they gathered a large booty.

In connection with this force of Bin Saud, Captain Fazluddin has gleaned the following information:—

The Akhwan troops numbered about 1,500 horsemen when they started from Nejd, but the number went on increasing as they passed through the territories of the various tribes on their way to Asir. They are mostly camel riders or horsemen. They carry very little provisions with them, but depend for them partly on the loot of the hostile tribes or the hospitality of friendly ones through whose country they pass. They are paid no regular salaries, but a share in the booty they gather, the remount getting as much as the man. Their manner of fighting is to charge in a compact body through fire or odds and engage the enemy in a hand-to-hand fight. They give no quarter while fighting. They refrain from the killing of women, children and old men, or the

destruction of crops or fruit trees. They faithfully observe their words, treaties or truces or write encampment.

The commander of the Akhwan troops is Abdul Aziz, a cousin of Bin Saud. He commands jointly with Qazi Abdullah Rashid. They are still at Abha, but it appears that two representatives of theirs, with two others from the Rubia and Rufeida and two from the Kahla, chief visited the Idriat at Jizan on the 14th July.

Captain Fazluddin says that the Akhwans are uncompromising enemies of the King of the Hedjaz, and they do not make a secret of their chief aim, which is to wrest the holy Kaaba from the hands of a person whom they describe as a monster of iniquity and an infidel. It is surmised by Captain Fazluddin that the object of Ibn Saud in occupying Nejran and a part of Asir is to throw an effective barrier between the King of the Hedjaz and the Imam, who, he thinks, are in alliance. Moreover, by occupying the territories of the Beni Shahr and Sharan, the two most powerful tribes of Asir (after the Kahla), who are believed to be partisans of King Hussein, he desires to deprive the King altogether of any assistance.

Iden Protectorate.—In my letter of the 10th July last, I referred to the fighting between the Yafsa and the Fadli. I have now received an unconfirmed report that the Yafsa have approached the Imam's commander at Dala for assistance to drive the Fadlis out of Karn Hilma.

The Imam told us in February last that he will not come down below Dala. It remains to be seen whether he will abide by his word.

I hear that Sultan Saleh-bin-Omer of Upper Yafa, whom we have recently acknowledged in the place of Omer-bin-Kahten, has been intriguing with the Imam. Before the war he was noted for his Turco-Imamist proclivities. During the war, however, he behaved better, and became friendly with this Residency. His policy now is probably to get as much as possible from us and from the Imam, and give as little as possible in return to either.

T. E. SCOTT

Iden, August 13, 1920

E 11225 9 44

Treasury to Foreign Office. (Received September 11)

My Lord,

Treasury Chambers, September 10.

I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Sir J. Tilley's letter of the 7th instant with reference to the proposed agreement between the King of the Hedjaz.

My Lords observe that it is not stated that the King has yet given any undertaking to the Government of His Majesty's Government, the most important of the three conditions imposed by the draft telegram should be amended to ensure that the first instalment of 15,000L shall only be paid on receipt of an undertaking from the King to sign the treaty, the remaining 15,000L, to be paid as soon as the treaty is actually signed.

I am, &c.

B. P. BLACKETT

E 11362 47 44,

No. 372

Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon. (Received September 14)

My Lord,

Aden, September 2, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your information, copy of a letter, dated the 2nd September, 1920, addressed to the Acting High Commissioner Egypt.

I have, &c.

T. E. SCOTT, Major-General.

Enclosure in No. 372

Political Resident, Aden, to Acting High Commissioner, Cairo

Secret

My dear Mr Scott,

Aden, September 2 1920

THE following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of my last letter, dated the 13th August, 1920—

Tihama.—Reports received from Hodeidah last week show fresh activity on the part of the imam along the Thuban frontier. There is a report that the imam's forces are being reinforced by 480 men.

Several convoys are reported to have arrived at Menakha with rations for the main troops.

It was reported at Hodeidah that the imam's troops had driven the Idrisi out of Jebel Saafan, but Sayed Mustafa denies this story.

The Political Officer, Hodeidah, reports that the Menakha agent, who was imprisoned by the Idrisi commandant at Bapl (vide my letter dated the 16th July), was released after eighteen days' detention. The agent could not explain the reason for this but stated that the commandant was instigated to imprison him by a man named Arif Kharras. The Bapl agent was not imprisoned, but warned that if he continued as news agent he would have to be.

Mr. Barrett visited Jizan on the 26th August and saw Sayed Mustafa, who gave him a warm reception. Unfortunately, however, he did not see the imam, whom he had intended to see.

Sayed Mustafa said that three representatives of Bin Saud were in Sabiza at that time, and that he was anxious to see them. He also stated that he had intended to go to Egypt, as he had intended.

Sayed Mustafa expressed himself as much satisfied with Bin Saud's intervention in the affairs, but it appears that the Idrisi, while consulting Sayed Mustafa for questions concerning relations with the Imam, is still in a state of uncertainty.

It is reported that the Imam, who has been in the Yemen since the Turkish evacuation, is now in a position to head a party of the Egyptian ruling house. They do not desire a locally elected ruler, but in case of absolute necessity would prefer the Idrisi.

Yemen (Upper and Lower). The ex-Vah, Mahmud Nalhum, is reported to have created news that Constantinople has been evacuated by the British and French armies. The anniversary of the Turkish Constitution was celebrated in the house of the ex-Vah, where all the Turks in Sana having assembled, offered prayers for the Sultan and his realm.

There appears to have been some dispute between the imam and the Arab soldiers, instigated by the latter, tried to make a move against the imam and the sheikh. A reconciliation is said to have been effected between the imam and the sheikh.

Aden Protectorate.—The Alawi Sheikh, Ali Nashir, died in Lahaj on the 16th July. His son, Abdul Nabe, succeeded him.

It will be remembered that after the last Zaidi advance on Dala the Alawi made his submission to the Zaidis and was detained at Dala for a time.

Our news correspondent at Dala (Amiri) reports that the imam has ordered the Zaidis to leave Dala, and that the men are gradually leaving under the protection of the imam's forces.

It is also reported that a party of Zaidis, which was proceeding to Beda was stopped on the way and eight Zaidis were killed and others

wounded. The Zaidis are now at a place called Malajim, in Beda, where they had been in the hands of the Beda Sultan, who had been conquering with them.

Yours, &c.

T. E. SCOTT

E 11225 9 44

Foreign Office to Treasury

Foreign Office, September 15, 1920

Sir,
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th inst. in relation to the proposed loan of £15,000 to the King of the Hedjaz, and to inform you that the Treasury has been consulted on the subject.

Lord Curzon ventures to hope that their Lordships will not insist on this condition that the loan should be actually completed part of the bargain or at any rate part of our requirements. It is, however, a condition which is not in the nature of a loan, but of a purchase of the King's signature, which is certainly a valuable asset.

Even apart from this, Lord Curzon is anxious not to give to his end the appearance of a deliberate bargain between him and His Majesty's Government. In his previous instructions he has included in the actual bargain the condition as to signature of the treaty. The present proposal of the Treasury, however, would go even further to make it a case of deliberately purchasing the King's signature, which is certainly a valuable asset.

There is also the consideration that King Hussein has undoubtedly been placed in a very difficult position by the withholding of the subsidy on which he counts for carrying on his ordinary administration during the present year.

Lord Curzon would therefore strongly urge that £15,000 should be paid to King Hussein, on condition only that it will be spent in the Hedjaz, and the remaining £15,000 when the Turkish Treaty is signed.

A. C. TILLEY

[See also Chapter III Nos. 244, 245, 246 and 249.]

E 12150 47 44]

No. 374

Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon

10 October 1920

(No. 29)

My Lord,

Aden, September 17, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, copy of the 24th Aden news letter, dated the 17th September, 1920, addressed to the Acting High Commissioner, Egypt.

I have, &c.

T. E. SCOTT, Major-General

Enclosure in No. 374

24th Aden News Letter

(Secret)

THE following is a summary of news reported since the despatch of my last letter, dated the 2nd September, 1920:—

Tihama.—It is reported that the Imam has sent a firman to the Sheikh of Rikh who had visited the Idrisi to seek his aid in the occupation of Zabed, an

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staying at Bajil awaiting the arrival of the Idrisi troops (vide p. 2 of my letter dated the 13th August 1920). The Idrisi troops are reported to have been sent to him by the Zaidi Imam, and he has granted him full pardon, and exempts him from the payment of taxes for two years. The Idrisi troops are reported to have been sent to him by the Zaidi Imam, and he has granted him full pardon, and exempts him from the payment of taxes for two years. The Idrisi troops are reported to have been sent to him by the Zaidi Imam, and he has granted him full pardon, and exempts him from the payment of taxes for two years.

Heavy fighting is reported at Reima, but the reports are conflicting.

A dhow from Mokha arrived at Aden on the 10th September, 1920, that Italian soldiers had occupied Zabed, their object being to help the Imam against the Idrisi. The dhow also reported that the Italians were buying houses and property at Zabed at fancy prices. From subsequent reports the Assistant Resident Perim learnt that one Italian, a Captain, had been sent to Zabed. The Political Officer, Hodeida, to whom I telegraphed for confirmation, has sent in two letters to the Assistant Resident Perim. The latter three Italians arrived at Khokha on the 10th September, 1920, and were cordially welcomed by the Zaidi. The Political Officer, Hodeida, to whom I telegraphed for confirmation, has sent in two letters to the Assistant Resident Perim. The latter three Italians arrived at Khokha on the 10th September, 1920, and were cordially welcomed by the Zaidi. The Political Officer, Hodeida, to whom I telegraphed for confirmation, has sent in two letters to the Assistant Resident Perim. The latter three Italians arrived at Khokha on the 10th September, 1920, and were cordially welcomed by the Zaidi.

- (a.) To help the Imam against the Idrisi, and thereby to establish their influence in the Yemen.
- (b.) To establish an Italian port at Khokha for trading purposes, for which purpose they are endeavouring to come to an agreement with the Imam.

The Political Officer, Hodeida, has despatched a special messenger to Hama to verify the statements.

Captain Fazluddin writes, from Hama, that the whole of the events in Asir with the Idrisi and the objects of the Akhwan forces in Asir and of the Idrisi. Idrisi replied that Asir affairs became especially complicated after the events of Asir. The Idrisi replied that Asir affairs became especially complicated after the events of Asir. The Idrisi replied that Asir affairs became especially complicated after the events of Asir. The Idrisi replied that Asir affairs became especially complicated after the events of Asir. The Idrisi replied that Asir affairs became especially complicated after the events of Asir.

Captain Fazluddin says that, speaking about the political importance of the Akhwan movement as a whole, the Idrisi is afraid the Akhwan. It is true that Ibn Saud has of late caused certain to settle in villages and groups of villages and allotted which fact has materially increased his strength and. Their forces consist merely of promiscuous. Their forces consist merely of promiscuous. Their forces consist merely of promiscuous. Their forces consist merely of promiscuous. Their forces consist merely of promiscuous.

unaffected, uncompromising and rude manner without the least idea of a proper Government or administration. Their simple ideas of unity of God and equality of al to popular fancy, and they carry everything before them in a fit of mindlessness in treating those who differ from them even in such small matters as smoking or the chewing of tobacco, as Kafirs, leaves in the minds of the people nothing but hatred and repulsion against them. Although the people of Abha have met with merely their demerits on being thus treated by Ibn Saud's men, but in reality the of the burial of the dead bodies of those killed in the town during the according to their

asked whether he will assist Ibn the Idrisi replied: "We are not allowed to fight in the does Ibn Saud intend to fight in Mecca. All that he will do is to besiege Mecca after taking Taif and cut off its communications. I shall avoid practical assistance as far as possible, and, in fact, he does not stand in need of my assistance. As regards Kufida, I am still patiently awaiting the decision of the British Government."

It appears from the further details received of the fighting in Abha, that, although the Akhwans did not suffer many casualties in the open fighting outside Abha, they lost more than 1,000 men at the hands of snipers concealed in selected spots on the outskirts of the town. On their entry the Akhwans carried out a three days' plunder young and old. In the course of this the chief sufferers were Turkish officials and their families, who were

The total amount of the Akhwans from Abha was 35,000 dollars, out of which one fifth went to Akhwan Bait-el-Mal. The balance was distributed amongst the Akhwan troops. The Akhwan troops did not share the boot.

Nearly all the Turkish arms and ammunition in Abha were distributed by Hasan-Ah-Ah amongst the Kufids before his flight from the town, and the remainder was taken over by the Akhwan Bait-el-Mal. After the surrender of Hasan-Ah-Ah and Abdul-Hakim and their party to the Akhwans, they were made to dig out the parts of five guns which they had concealed underground. These guns three small ones have been taken north by the Akhwans. The remainder, which are big guns, being at Hama.

The Akhwan commander prohibited the burial of the dead bodies of the people of Abha killed in the town and left them exposed, until an epidemic broke out amongst the Akhwan troops, hundreds of whom are said to have fallen.

On their departure for the north, the Akhwans left behind them 150 men to await the return of the

The total sum of money received by Hasan-Ah-Ah from King Hussein on different occasions since the Turkish evacuation of Asir amounted to 11,000. The King also promised him Kufida in the event of his successful revolt against the Idrisi.

The Idrisi has received a present of two houses from Ibn Saud, and has sent him in return several bags of rice, flour, coffee, &c.

Aden Protectorate.—News received from Dala this week is very conflicting. While reports continue to come in of the early withdrawal of the Zaidi from our protectorate, other reports speak of reinforcements on their way to Dala with a view to advance. Fifty Zaidi are reported to have already arrived at Dala. I do not consider that the situation has altered materially.

With reference to the report that the Yafisi had approached the Imam's commander at Dala for assistance to drive the Fadli out of Karn Hama (vide p. 1 of my letter dated the 13th August, 1920), a secret agent, who was despatched from here to the Yafa country last month to verify the report, has now returned and reports that two petty Upper Yafa sheikhs, Ahmed Hattam and El Harabi, are in Dala negotiating for the release of the prisoners taken by the Zaidi in the fighting at Al Kuza in December. The Yafa sheikhs met and made a pact to invite all sections of the tribe to resist Idrisi aggression. Sheikhs Ahmed Hattam and El Harabi have not joined the pact as they are dissatisfied at not receiving any share of the ammunition which this Residency had given some time ago for distribution among the Yafa chiefs. According to our news correspondents, the Yafa sheikhs are now in Dala, and are negotiating for the release of the prisoners taken by the Zaidi in the fighting at Al Kuza in December.

and his Amil at Dala with a view to the release of the Yafai prisoners, but have no other aim. The Amil of Dala, however, has availed himself of this opportunity to attempt to induce them to submit to the Imam, but it is unlikely that he will succeed.

T. E. SCOTT

Aden, September 17, 1920

[See also Chapter III, Nos. 251 to 253, 256 to 259, 261 to 264, and Chapter IV, Nos. 267 to 271]

[E 12978 166 14

No. 375.

Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 21)

(No. C 31)

My Lord

Aden, October 5 1920

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, a petition (with its translation), which was handed to me during my recent visit to Hodeidah.

The petition is from the people of Hodeidah, who are in the process of evacuation of Hodeidah in the event of our evacuation, and the possibility of employing these Hawwaka in the event of neither the Idrii nor the Imam being entrusted with the management of the town is receiving my attention.

I have, &c.

T. E. SCOTT, Major-General

Enclosure in No. 375

Petition handed to Political Resident, Aden, from Abdurrahman Bas'ar, Saleh-bin-Uhomed Shaddi, Omar Suleman Misyaj, Taher Hajab, Ubaid Nura and Mirjan-al-Harazi.

1st Muharram, 1339 (September 14, 1920).
IN the months of December 1919 and February 1920 we despatched a letter through Major Meek, Political Officer at Hodeidah, and again on the 26th August we addressed a petition to Major Barrett, first assistant to his Honour the Resident who the former was in Hodeidah. It was also found necessary to address him another petition on the 28th August, 1920, and send it to him through Dr Steele, the present Political Officer. That petition contained the essence of the opinion of the people of Hodeidah as follows—

From the fact that it is our no-religionist, we desire the Ottoman Government to rule this city. Should it not be possible for her to come again she should send us a notification, as similarly as she did to the Tripolitans when she was at war with the Italians, to say that she is no more conversant of Yemen. After this has been done, and from the fact that the honourable English Government is the most powerful and able Government to improve and preserve the country, to develop trade and make people in general enjoy freedom, we shall want no other Government than her for Hodeidah.

Unless one of the two alternatives is decided upon, we shall not at all agree to the evacuation of Hodeidah. We are afraid of our own lives and those of our children as well as of the carrying away of our property by the tribes surrounding Hodeidah, who are prone towards raiding and plundering expeditions.

We do not want to be ruled by an Arab Government. Taking for granted that the English Government will not allow the Imam to rule over the people of Hodeidah, then at that stage even we shall not find ourselves secure, because the Imam Mahomed Yahia Hamid-ud-din of Sanaa will, with all positiveness, come down with a strong force and considerable quantity of war materials and attack the whole of Tihama, including Hodeidah. He will do so in order to disturb the peace of the Idrii and his partisans. This attack we anticipate by hook or by crook.

From a very long time there lived weavers in Hodeidah. They weave cloth and consider Hodeidah as their prerogative. From these weavers about 1,000 men could be enlisted. They are able to carry arms and oppose any aggressor. The Imam

Ma'amila and Manafira join them and espouse their cause. For the purpose of getting their means of livelihood these weavers since the beginning of the war migrated to the villages of Mandhar, Durhimi and Marawina and lived there. For the purpose of giving a helping hand to the military forces in the matter of protecting the country we have been enabled to erect sheds for themselves in lieu of their broken houses. In the event that they should ward off the attack of Al Absiya, Al Quhra or of any other tribe, when they are actually engaged in war, they want no subsidy or rations. Such expenses can be allotted to them from the income of the Turks. In the event of such income proving insufficient, then 14 per cent should be Salama.

[E 12979 47 44]

No. 376.

Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 21)

(No. 32)

My Lord,

Aden, October 7, 1920

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, copy of the Aden news letter, dated the 6th October.

I have, &c.

T. E. SCOTT, Major-General

Enclosure in No. 376

25th Aden News Letter.

The following is a summary of the news received from the Imam to his Excellency, the High Commissioner at Aden, dated the 25th October 1920.

Tihama. Captain Fazluddin was in the town of Sanaa, which he has evacuated. The Idrii had also to remain at Sanaa, which is the present headquarters of the Imam. As mentioned in my letter of the 10th October, a letter from the Imam at Jabel Sanaa was received here early last month, but it was denied by Saad Mustapha.

As the Akhwana have marched north, the Imam appears to have strengthened all his centres in the northern Yemen, and has available for service elsewhere all the forces he had collected to oppose the anticipated Akhwana attack.

Captain Fazluddin says that he has heard from a reliable source that the Hashid and Bakil were reconciled to the Imam's cause, as against Ibn Saud by the Imam's son

Hashid and Bakil. The sheikhs promised to fight against Ibn Saud, but not against the Idrii. Now that the Akhwana menace has passed, at least for the present, it will be interesting to know what will be the future attitude of the Hashid and Bakil towards the Imam.

Reports received this week from Hodeidah disclose a situation which may possibly, in the event of an Idrii reverse, develop into a serious menace to Hodeidah. The Idrii has been driven back at Wadi Har, Beni Saad and Jebel Reimah. All these places have been occupied by the Imam. Sheikh Abu Hach and his men are besieged at Khauh in Jebel Reimah. The Imam's troops failed in an attempt to take Obal, but they are said to be collecting more men for the capture of both Obal and Bajil. If they succeed in taking Bajil, the Idrii will have to fall back on Zaidya, thus exposing Hodeidah to Arab raids.

Hassan Kanjouni, the agent of the Political Officer, Hodeidah, states that while he was detained with the "Jacob" Mission in Bajil last winter, a telegram was received from the Imam by the ex-Vah, Mahmud Nadhim, at Bajil, in which he was asked to do his utmost to send the mission back to Hodeidah, and to inform the Qubra sheikhs that their request for assistance in attacking the Christians could not be granted until the mission was released and had reached Hodeidah safely. After that the Imam would

The Political Officer was accordingly asked in May last to submit proposals with an estimate of receipts and expenditure. An estimate prepared by him is submitted. This shows that a round sum of 47,000 rupees will be needed to carry on the civil administration of Hodeida for the seven months from September 1920 to March 1921. In order to meet this expenditure it is proposed to introduce the following tariff, which is estimated to bring a total revenue of 50,000 rupees (for seven months ending the 31st March, 1921):—

	Rupees.
(a.) $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. duty on imports by sea	...
(b.) $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on goods of foreign manufacture or origin imported by land, i.e., all goods coming into Hodeida by land from places outside the Yemen	...
(c.) 1 per cent. duty on Yemen produce exported by sea	9,000
	50,000

The revenue estimates are based on the actual realisation in September.

The import duty specified at (b) is imposed to counteract imports at Taif and Khokha, at which port goods are landed free and sent by land into Hodeida.

Mrs. Steele's original budget estimate, which allowed only for a 2 per cent. import duty, was explained item by item to twelve of the notables of Hodeida, and several alterations suggested by them were made and all the expenditure items in the budget were passed by them. It was at the request of the merchants themselves that a reduction of $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on import duty was subsequently made and that a tax on

requested that the allowance of 250 rupees to the Political Officer for his services to and of the special allowance of 250 rupees hitherto paid by Government to the Political Officer at Hodeida. The actual pay of the Political Officer will remain as hereto a charge against Government.

The notables have also agreed to bear the expenses of the Political Officer's office establishment, which will undertake the duties of a local treasury. I do not propose that this treasury should be in any way subordinate to the Aden Treasury, as this would defeat my whole object, which is to allow the Hodeida administration as much freedom as possible. If check is found necessary, periodical examination from Aden can be arranged.

The only other item of expenditure calling for remarks is that of 5,000 rupees provided for relief work. This provision is necessary for feeding the large number of paupers present in Hodeida.

I have, subject to your Lordship's approval, introduced a system of town administration by the following committees:—

1. Central Committee, consisting of the Political Officer and two merchants.
2. One Town Committee entrusted with municipal matters, consisting of the Rais Hulehyah, the bazaar master, and two members.
3. One Customs Committee, consisting of the Political Officer and two members other than those appointed to the Central Committee. This is the revenue receiving branch of the administration.

Each committee, subject to the general control of the Central Committee, has power to spend the amounts allotted to it without further reference, and can reappropriate within its own budget.

The Central Committee will keep the general reserve in its own hands, with power to reappropriate sums from one major head to another.

The hospital will be run by the Central Committee with the medical officer added.

The police will remain under the direct control of the Political Officer, who will also be magistrate and judge for suits not falling within the cognizance of the cadi. This arrangement has been made at the request of the notables, who will not accept the cadi's decisions on commercial matters, but are willing to abide by them on religious and social questions.

Appeals against the Political Officer's decisions will lie to the Military Administrator, who has been directed to refer to Aden any legal questions about which he is doubtful.

My original intention was that the Hodeida people should expend their local

revenues for local needs, subject only to the general supervision of the Political Officer who is responsible to the Military Administrator. The meeting of notables, however, asked particularly that the Political Officer should take an active part in the administration owing to the great difficulty the Hodeida factions found in agreeing among themselves on any point.

As much time had already been taken in preparing the budget estimate, in order to save further loss of time, I authorised the Political Officer to start the administration on the above lines and the collection of dues from the 1st September, in anticipation of your Lordship's sanction.

I now submit the scheme as outlined above for your Lordship's approval, and trust that my action in bringing it into force in anticipation of your Lordship's sanction will be approved.

I have, &c

C. S. YITP, Major-General

Enclosure 1 in N. ...

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Political Resident, Aden

Aden, February 10, 1920.

WITH reference to the diary of Captain M. Fazluddin, forwarded under cover of your minute No. C-20 of the 27th January to the Director, Arab Bureau, I have the honour to request that you will let me have any remarks you may have to offer on the six suggestions enumerated on the tenth page.

I should be glad to be informed also, with regard to Captain Fazluddin's first suggestion, how it would be proposed to adjust the importation of coins into Aden from the Yemen and whether rupee notes would serve instead of silver. As gold and silver are now unobtainable, King Hussein's subsidy is being paid in rupees, it would be useful to have your views as to whether this form of payment is practicable in Aden and the Yemen.

The Idriani seems to deserve all the help we can give to him, and it is of course that he should not have to look elsewhere either for political or commercial assistance. This is the more necessary as the Italians are no doubt eager to strengthen their position in Aden and to take advantage of every opportunity that may offer.

I should therefore be glad to know whether any local improvements can be made in the shipping arrangements for his ports, and whether there are serious objections to introducing a customs tariff at Hodeida in order to bring that port into line with those of Aden.

I anticipate that, as the future ownership of Hodeida is undecided, the imposition of a tariff will be a source of difficulty, but most doubts perhaps be avoided by crediting the net receipts to a suspense account for payment to the owner of the port when decided. I shall be glad to have your opinion on the matter.

Enclosure 1 in No. 377

Political Resident, Aden, to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby

Aden, June 21, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to reply to your letter dated the 10th February, 1920, calling for my remarks on the six suggestions made in Captain Fazluddin's diary of the 25th December, 1919:—

1. The Idriani should be allowed to export from Aden ... 100,000 rupees monthly

I have again consulted Captain Fazluddin, and am of opinion that the export of a fixed quantity of rupees is no longer necessary, but I am of opinion that there should be free exchange of silver between Aden and the Idriani country. I do not consider that the rupee notes will prove acceptable, but if free exchange of silver coins is permitted, the silver rupee will drive the dollar from the market, as it has obtained a

[5773]

Messrs. Cowan, Pinshaw and Brothers should be required to send their ships more frequently to Jizan, and to try to ship more cargo to and from Jizan.

• The above-mentioned Burshaw and Brothers' freight charges are double those charged by others.

- There is insufficient trade at present to justify the formation of a new company. It is hoped that by the time arrangements for any new company are made, trade internal security will have been so far advanced that trade would increase and competition of another company ought to have no effect reducing M. S. & W.'s business and freight rates.

- As stated in my letter No. C-19, dated the 13th February 1920, I have had an interview with Mr R G H Hooker of Messrs [redacted] Brokers and Co. of 39, Old Street London and advised him to put himself in direct communication with [redacted]. [redacted] I learnt that the Italian Navy started a service from Marseilles to Rotterdam. Please see my Telegram No. 322 AP dated the 24th May, 1920.

- In this context, it is worth noting that your letter No. 1, dated the 10th May, 1919, and my letter No. 1, dated the 1st September, 1919. The necessity for the payment of the same value of the same value of the same value and half a piece of all of the same value. A profitable trade by taking pieces from Arden and giving them to the value as the larger or smaller.

6. If it is decided not to retain Hodeida for ourselves, the Idrisi should be deprived of it in view of his loyalty to us and the preference for his rule on the part of the people of the 'Ikhama.

M. STEWART, Major-General

for Period September 1920-March 1921

1. Water and Turbidity

99.

[illegible]

1 Fernand Wick attached

Jan 6

1 inch x 6
on 8 x 10

(F.)—Customs.

	Hopson	Rupert
Petty expenses and supplies		
Printing of books and forms		
Purchase of books		
Inform to persons		
Petty expenses and supplies		
Petty repairs		

Revenue and Expenditure.

Total revenue from 14 per cent. duty (import) and 1 per cent. export duty by sea from 1st to 25th September	Rs 2,10,33
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Expenditure for the month of September—

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding dates. The names are: John Doe, Jane Smith, and Bob Johnson. The dates are: 1990, 1991, and 1992.

(E 13232 47 44)

No. 378

Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 1891.)

(No. 35.)

My Lord,

Aden Residence, October 14, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, a copy of the Aden news letter dated the 14th October, 1920

I have. &c

T. E. SCOTT, Major-General

Enclosure to No. 378

¹⁰Elh Aden News Letter.

(Secret.)

THE following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of the last letter, dated the 7th October, 1920:—

Ans.—One Sheikh Saleh Ba Dawi, who recently visited Aden, reported that Ibn Saad's Qaz. Abdulla Raheed, referred to in my letter of the 31st August, 1921, fed from his home at Ebha and died.

Yemen (Upper and Lower).—According to the report of a traveller from Mavia, one of the imam's sons has arrived at Ibb and is expected at Taiz, to which place he will go via Mavia, accompanied by 500 men. A number of sheikhs and skils of Mavia have been invited to meet him. This news is confirmed by Sheikh Mahomed Nasir Mukbil of Mavia in a letter to the Haushabi Sultan.

The news of the imam's death, reported last week, is not confirmed. This week's reports, however, state that he is very ill at Rada.

All leave to the imam's troops at Taiz, Mavia and Dhala is said to have been stopped by order of the imam.

The amir at Dhala is reported to be paying the Zaidi soldiers a portion of their arrears of pay in an attempt to put a stop to the frequent desertions.

Reports of Zaidi feeling point to their entertaining an altogether exaggerated idea of their strength at Nobat Dakim, where they think we have aeroplanes.

Zaidi advances on Nobat Dakim and Lahej are, however, current. Our Upper Yafa correspondent states that these rumours, as well as those about the arrival of reinforcements at Dhala, have been started by the Zaidis to deceive us.

Reports of the prevalence of an epidemic disease among the Zaidis continue to come in, but its nature is still unknown. Numbers are said to be dying daily.

Sheikh Abdo Nubi, the newly-elected chief of the Alawi tribe, returned from his visit to the imam's amir at Dhala, Sayyid Yahia, and has addressed a letter to this effect: "What passed between him and the amir. He says that Sayyid Yahia, the amir at Dhala, mentioned in the daily prayers by the people at Dhala. The state of the country is prosperous, and the Zaidis are not exacting heavy taxes, which are paid to the amir by the sheikhs of villages, without the intervention of tax collectors."

Sheikh Abdo Nubi says that he has received a letter from the amir to come to Dhala and he went, as to do him wrong. He is able on himself and his country. At the same time he professes his firm loyalty to the British and says he is anxiously looking forward to the day when the British Protectorate will be established at Zaidi. He urges an early advance on Dhala.

The officer commanding troops at Nobat Dakim has received a letter from the nakib of Maunatta again pressing for the advance of our troops to Dhala. He says that the Zaidis are exacting heavy taxes, and all the tribes would be glad to see the lust of them.

The Upper Yafa petty sheikhs referred to in my letter of the 10th October, 1920, are reported to be still in Dhala negotiating for the release of prisoners.

The Mufahi Sheikh of Upper Yafa is at present in Aden to urge on me the desirability of an early advance on Dhala, in which he says all the Yafa sheikhs and sultans will co-operate with us.

The Mufahi brings with him letters of recommendation from the nakibs of Maunatta and Saleh-ban Umer, Sultan of the Upper Yafa.

The Mufahi explains the extreme eagerness of himself and other Yafa chiefs to see the Zaidis out of Dhala and the Shami and Shabi territories occupied by them by saying that they have deprived him of his revenues from certain villages in these territories. They feel themselves strong enough to resist further Zaidi aggression, but they are unable to take the offensive.

On account of the shortage of food on board the ship, the pilgrims were sent to the island of Kamaran last month by the British authorities. The pilgrims were sent to the island of Kamaran last month by the British authorities.

The pilgrims were sent to the island of Kamaran last month by the British authorities. The pilgrims were sent to the island of Kamaran last month by the British authorities.

The pilgrims were sent to the island of Kamaran last month by the British authorities. The pilgrims were sent to the island of Kamaran last month by the British authorities. The pilgrims were sent to the island of Kamaran last month by the British authorities.

Hotoudah reports that Mahmud Nadhim's pro-Turkish propaganda still continues and is receiving the support of the imam, who has informed the tribes of the Tehama that the ex Vali is their lawful Governor, and that his own forces and money are at the Vali's disposal.

Zaidi tribesmen are mustering at Sanaa and Zaidi reinforcements have reached Saafan. On the other hand, 1,000 Quhra, Aboon and Jerabeh tribesmen have joined the Idrisi and are reported to have marched to Hujaleh, where they are awaiting the arrival of other reinforcements before attacking the Zaidis at Saafan.

It appears from this that Mahmud Nadhim's propaganda has not yet made much progress in the Tehama, in spite of his efforts to win over the fanatical sayeds of Marawa by constant appeals to Islam.

Sheikh Suleiman Bukheit, of the Aboon tribe, who came into prominence during the negotiations for the release of the Jacob Mission, died on the 7th October, and has been succeeded by his nephew, Sahim Bukheit.

T. E. SCOTT, Major-General

Aden Residency, October 14, 1920.

E 13233 166 44]

No 372

Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 36.)
My Lord,

Aden, October 14, 1920

In continuation of my telegram No. 356 A.P., dated the 14th October, 1920 I have the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information and instructions, extracts from a letter, dated the 8th October, from Captain M. Fazluddin, I.M.S., Liaison medical officer with the Idrisi, reporting the Idrisi's comments on a letter addressed to him by the King of the Hedjaz.

I also attach a translation of the letter addressed by Sherouf Abdulla to the Idrisi.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to the High Commissioners, Egypt and Mesopotamia.

I have,
T. E. SCOTT, Major-General

Enclosure I in No. 372

Extracts from letter, dated the 8th October, 1920, from Captain M. Fazluddin, I.M.S., Liaison Medical Officer with the Idrisi, Jazan, to Major J. C. C. Barrett, C.I.E., Political Resident, Aden.

ON the arrival of the Senoussi at Jazan on the 2nd instant along with me, the Idrisi received him in Syed Mustafa's home, and, after a preliminary talk and the usual greetings and congratulations on his having performed the pilgrimage to Mecca, the letters of the King of Hedjaz and his son, Abdulla, were handed over to him. After reading them he made the following significant remark: "In reality this man is a liar. He is also in his trade and wishes to bring upon us a calamity from these people (the Allies). We do not hate friendship, but this man is dishonest and double-faced. We must be on our guard. He is a suppliant. Lord! save us from the evil, which redounds on us from himself and the tyranny of men."

Next morning I saw Syed Mustafa, and, during the course of our conversation, he brought in the talk about the letters of the King of Hedjaz and his son. He took out the letters from his pocket and read them to me. He asked me to mark the humble tone of these letters and compare it with the tone of his newspapers, which exhibit clearly the double-facedness, treachery, ingratitude, untruthfulness and megalomania of the man. He then read to me parts of the newspaper "Falah" of the 4th September, in which he had described the Senoussi's presence in Mecca as a deputation from the Idrisi, and said that deputations from all the Arabian chiefs had come as suppliants for his aid. He then read to me parts of the newspaper "Falah" of the 4th September, in which he had described the Senoussi's presence in Mecca as a deputation from the Idrisi, and said that deputations from all the Arabian chiefs had come as suppliants for his aid. He then read to me parts of the newspaper "Falah" of the 4th September, in which he had described the Senoussi's presence in Mecca as a deputation from the Idrisi, and said that deputations from all the Arabian chiefs had come as suppliants for his aid.

holds a letter from the father to your Excellency manifesting loyalty and that early steps should be taken so as to relieve the Moslems in general from the wilderness of dispersion of the surrounding destruction and to save the Arab nation especially.

We are sure that your Majesty's proposal will highly be appreciated. Your famous wisdom has enormously increased and we hope that your gracious divine eyes towards us and that He will guide to the proper path the heads of Islama.

AB DULLA

E 13207 8111 44)

No 379A

Mr. Scott to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 1161)

My Lord,

Hamleh, October 16, 1920

IN continuation of my despatch No. 1040 of the 17th September, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of a further report received from the acting British agent, Jeddah, dealing with the subject of harbour works at Jeddah, for the construction of which M. Van de Poll, a Dutch subject, has recently made an offer to the Hedjaz Government.

I have &

ERNEST SCOTT

Acting High Commissioner

Enclosure in No 379A

Major Batten to Mr. Scott

Jeddah, October 3, 1920.

Sir

M. VAN DE POLL, the local agent of the Holt Line and also of the Netherlands steamers, has drawn up a detailed scheme for harbour works in Jeddah.

This scheme is substantially the same as that suggested in my report to you and is based on the assumption that the present harbour works will be completed by the end of the year.

inclusive cost of 10,000,000.

M. Van de Poll has also prepared plans in connection with the extraction of nitrates, and the inception of a salt pan works.

He has offered to take over and run the present condenser, or arrange for its entire replacement, and also to manage the electric-light plant (now in complete disrepair). King Hussein, with whom he is not popular, refused, however, to consider his offer.

The immediate pressing need as regards the harbour is the deepening by two or three feet of the inner channel. Half the delay, and consequent inefficiency and loss, occasioned in unloading ships, takes place owing to sambuks stranding, when in addition their contents invariably get flooded. As many as fourteen sambuks have been stranded in one place for a day or more, the cargoes having to be laboriously shifted to small boats.

One dredger should be able to do this work quickly and effectually. Owing to the depth of the inner channel, it is suggested that the dredger should be of a large size and depth for a long period.

If such a dredger can be provided by a British firm and the inner channel improved, with the consent of King Hussein, it is suggested that the favourable beginning so made should be followed up by the submission of a detailed plan of the harbour works to the field with detailed plans and estimates.

W BATTEN,
British Agent.

E 13696 3880 44)

No 380

Mr. Scott to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 5.)

No. 1205

My Lord,

Hamleh, October 26, 1920

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship extracts from a report (with enclosures) by Major W. Batten, Acting British Agent, Jeddah, for the ten-day period ending the 10th October.

Bagdad and Aden.

ERNEST SCOTT

Acting High Commissioner

Enclosure 1 in No 380.

Extract from Report of Major W. Batten, Acting British Agent, Jeddah, for Period October 1 to 10, 1920.

King Hussein and Mustafa Kemal

With regard to the present political situation, it appears to me that while all the King, even if no actual understanding exists between them, it would be unwisdom on my part, and possibly unfair to King Hussein, to be too much influenced by these reports and give them undue weight.

The [Turkish] agents to me using the King as a tool in this allegation may be tainted by partiality.

As in the present situation of the Middle East, that messages were sent to the King, it does not follow that he should have repudiated otherwise than ambiguously to them, or have done more than acknowledge their receipt.

The chief sources of information on this subject, Omer Shukur and Arif Bey, are by no means reliable, especially the latter, who appears to be a typical Syrian windbag.

Although the King considers he has every reason to be disappointed with Great Britain, and in, I think, genuine in his belief that he has failed to make good the hopes raised among the Arabs, in addition to his unreasonable grievances over the withholding of the subsidy and other matters, he is not likely to be so foolish as to embark deliberately on a course which would endanger his relations with the only Power which is in a position to afford him assistance and secure him from the threat of external aggression.

King Hussein and Syria.

As regards any action on King Hussein's part with regard to Syria, I consider it not improbable that much of the present activity may be due to the desire, so often expressed by him, to free himself from the reproach of having deceived the Arabs, and to put himself right in this respect in their eyes, without his necessarily having the intention of carrying matters to a serious conclusion.

Wireless

With reference to the communications established between the Nationalist wireless station at Kona and that at Maan, King Hussein was reported [unconfirmed] to be in wireless communication with Sherif Jamil Bey in the Hauran.

The wireless station previously reported as intended for Akaba is probably that now at Maan.

The wireless station in Jeddah has been unusually active for about three weeks up to a week ago. Medina has a powerful wireless, those at Wejh, Yenbo and Jeddah being of the mobile field type, with only a restricted radius.

At Jeddah, No. 7 of "Al Faiah" for Jeddah, and posting, were seized by order of the King. I have so far to obtain a copy here or in Mecca.

The paper, however, criticising the treatment of the Agricultural Commission and the methods of the Government. The paper has been

Government. It has been announced that the balance will be issued half in money and half in kind, after expiry of the first six months' supply.

Unconfirmed reports state Emir Ali will also proceed to Mecca. It would confirm the rumours that the Emir Abdulahi's destination is further north.

His chief objection to returning has been lack of funds to pay the Bedouin and the heavy cost of the Haraz establishment, formerly supported by Aqaf funds at Constantinople. These should, now that peace has been signed, be again assigned. The King would like to have control of these funds himself.

E 14065 47 44]

No. 381.

Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon. (Received November 12.)

(No. 41)

My Lord,

Aden, October 29, 1920

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, a copy of the 27th Aden news letter, dated the 29th October, 1920.

I have, &c

T. E. SCOTT, Major-General

Enclosure in No. 381

27th Aden News Letter

(No. 41)

The following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of my last letter, dated the 14th October, 1920:—

Yemen.—Upon the introduction of the scheme of local administration at Hodeida last month, the Qulra and Aboos sheikhs wrote a letter to the notables of Hodeida pointing out that they were foreigners settled in Hodeida and that they had therefore no right to concern themselves in the management of local affairs.

The notables sent a reply which, though couched in friendly terms, repudiated the claim of the Qulra and Aboos to be sole owners of Hodeida.

A report says that the imam has exempted the myids of Zabed, who petitioned him, from the payment of tithes.

Yemen (Upper and Lower).—The visit of the imam's son to Mavia and Taiz, referred to in my last letter, is said to be in connection with a scheme for recruiting Shafi soldiers. The wazir of the imam, Sayid Abdulla, is reported to have departed at Ibb accompanied by 100 horsemen and 200 infantry. These men are said to be of the Zaidi sect.

The Italians in Asab are said to be in communication with the imam. They are reported to be in the habit of sending their letters to the Arabian coast between Sheikh Sared and Khukha, where they are delivered to an imam's messenger. The report requires confirmation.

The Abdul Sultan informs me that Zaidi troops are being withdrawn from the imam's southern frontier and are being replaced by local levies which are being organised by Turkish officers into four regiments with headquarters at Taiz and Ibb and two other places.

The movement and recruitment of troops consequent on this organisation probably accounts for the persistent reports of troops assembling at Ibb, &c.

Aden Protectorate. The disease among the Zaidis referred to in my last letter is said to be due to the very heavy rainfall of this year combined with excessive eating of a crop of bajri.

Recently the Barhami tribe (Subah) in this protectorate attacked and looted an Italian dhow off the Barhami coast. The looted goods belonged to a British subject of Aden. The pirates also carried away 100 rupees and some jewellery belonging to the nakuda of the dhow. I have asked the Abdul Sultan to try to recover the goods from the Barhamis. If they are not restored, the owners will have to be paid compensation, the amount being deducted from the stipend of the sheikh, as was done in a similar case in 1917.

T. E. SCOTT, Major-General.

Aden, October 29, 1920

E 14205 166 44

Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon. (Received November 12.)

No. 41.

My Lord,

Aden, November 12, 1920

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, a copy of a letter dated the 22nd October, 1920, from Captain M. Fazluddin, I.M.S., Medical Officer with the Idris, submitting his remarks on the present political situation in the Yemen.

With reference to this I would invite your Lordship's attention to my letter dated the 14th October. While fully aware that there must be many important questions awaiting decision I feel that Captain Fazluddin's opinion regarding the desirability of an early settlement as regards our position at Hodeida and Salaf is worthy of early consideration.

I have, &c

T. E. SCOTT, Major-General

Enclosure in No. 41

Captain Fazluddin to Political Resident, Aden

Lahore, October 22, 1920

WITH reference to your endorsement dated the 11th instant I have in addition to what I have already written to you on the subject in my semi-official letter of the 18th instant, but I would like to submit the following remarks on the present political situation in the Yemen.

1. Though the general political outlook in the Yemen is not promising, I am not prepared, as yet, to draw up any alarming conclusions from it. I regard the pro-Turkish party in Hodeida mostly responsible for spreading all disquieting and perturbing news.

2. I do not, however, deny that a certain amount of disquietude does exist, and has been spread by the pro-Turkish party in Hodeida, and our enemies never leave a chance of exploiting this fact in undermining our position.

3. Our presence in the above places is a constant source of disquietude to them.

(a.) Is exercising an unwholesome effect on all the Arabs generally, and on the people of Yemen and Asir particularly.

(b.) Is affording a strong weapon in the hands of our enemies, the Imam and his party, to successfully preach a wide anti-British and anti-Idrisi propaganda.

(c.) Is alienating the sympathies of the illiterate and fanatical tribes from the Idris, and thus handicapping the latter seriously in his task of governing and enlightening them. Such a result is not at all a matter of surprise, as the tribes whose separation from the rest of mankind has been the result of the ideas of stranger and enemy, and who consequently, every stranger is looked upon as an enemy.

(d.) Is lending a look of extreme uncertainty to all the affairs in Yemen on account of which the Idris is not able to take any definite and firm steps to settle the political situation in the country.

4. To achieve the above-mentioned task of gradually removing the influence of the pro-Turkish party in Hodeida, and the influence of the Mansabs of Marawa and Munira, &c., on the minds of the fanatical masses. How those ayods and sheikhs were pondered to by the late Turkish Government is well known by Mr. Naras's report dealing with that part of the subject.

[5773]

41

(f.) Is keeping the Idri in a precarious and entirely unsatisfactory financial condition, which is the root cause of all inefficiency in management, inadequacy in equipments, chafings and bickerings. Placed in the same circumstances as the Idri is, it is difficult to imagine what Government can run a military show and a civil administration with such inadequate funds as he possesses. How can we possibly expect him to effect, in so short a time and with such scanty means as are at his disposal at present, the difficult task of establishing a good Government in a land without its hereditary funds, inveterate tribal hostilities and peculiar feudal system, and where the late Turkish Government used to spend annually more than £1,600,000 over and above the income derived from her well-organised local resources?

One cannot ignore or minimise the task which the Idri has accomplished in bringing peace and prosperity in the country where he has established himself firmly. Given the same chance, he would not in the parts he is now occupying in the Idri by removing the uncertainty about the political situation with regard to the future of Hodenda and Salif, there is no reason to doubt that what he has successfully carried out in the other portions of his state shall not be done here too.

He asked for a subsidy and we have practically refused it. He has accepted the situation quietly and has not broached the subject since then. Personally, I am strongly against the principle as well as the practice of giving subsidies to the Arab chiefs (except of course in very rare and special circumstances), because it has a natural tendency to paralyse all initiative and self-reliance in them, but at the same time I am not in favour of withholding from them any legitimate source of income which might go a long way to improve their condition and enable them to stand on their own legs, which undoubtedly is our ultimate goal in the Arabian politics.

Moreover, the fact cannot be lost sight of, that while our Empire with its vast resources can easily afford to ignore for a long time such items of expenditure as Salt Mines, but a chief, placed in the situation of the Idri, cannot bear such a protracted loss to feed him (as was done by the Turkish Government at Constantinople in the case of the late Turkish Government in Yemen), cannot bear such a protracted loss ultimately the Salif peninsula is to be assigned to him. As far as I can see, there is no any reason why Salif should not go to the Idri, and the Government there may have any claim on it, because any other policy with regard to it will be extremely resented by the Idri and all the Arab tribes in general, which shall prove most detrimental to our interests in this country and lead to very bitter political complications.

4. Having been disappointed by the Idri, the Italians are making strong efforts to obtain mercantile concessions in the Yemen, and are backing up Mahmud Nadhim in his anti-Idri and anti-British propaganda.

Although I am not afraid that they shall succeed in their efforts, it is quite possible that by representing themselves as the allies of the fallen Turks and spreading their anti-British propaganda through Mahmud Nadhim and his myrmidons—the Mahab and the mischievous pro-Turkish party in Hodenda—they can succeed in continuing fermentation amongst the people for a long time injurious at once to the Idri, to ourselves, and to the country.

In view of the above facts therefore, and in order to put a stop to the uncertain state of political affairs and to the secret mischievousness of the Italians, as well as the Turkish party in the Yemen, I am sending you a copy of the report of the Idri. I fervently hope that His Majesty's Government will take prompt action on it.

May I request you to kindly spare no pains in impressing on the higher authorities the extreme importance and necessity of expediting their decision about the above questions, as further procrastination is liable to lead to serious complications.

M. FAZLUDDIN, I.M.S.,
Liaison Medical Officer with the Idri.

E 14188 3880 44

Mr. Scott to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 15)

No. 1235

My Lord

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship extracts from a report by Major W. Batten, Acting British Agent, Jeddah, for the ten-days' period ending the 20th October 1920.

Copies of the extracts have been sent to Jerusalem, Bagdad and Aden.

I am, Sir,

Yours faithfully,

LESLIE SCOTT
Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 3880

Extracts from Report by Major W. Batten, Acting British Agent, Jeddah, for period October 10-20, 1920

1. The Idri

There are conflicting reports as to the Emir having left Medina for an unknown destination. I will telegraph on obtaining authentic news.

It is stated in Mecca he would visit the tribes, proceeding possibly as far as Maan and including Akaba in his visit.

During halts at Rabat and elsewhere a certain number of volunteers joined his party.

He was accompanied by a number of Bagdadi officers, but no Syrians.

Sherif M. al-Husayni, Kaimakam of Mecca, who is influential among the Harb and Cosma, Ibrahim Rawi, the Bagdadi A.D.C. to the Emir, have left by sea for Yenbo and Mecca.

The Idri took with him the whole balance, after the remittance to the Jeddah customs (which serves as the King's bank), amounting to £20,000, and a further sum of 20,000l., representing later receipts and disbursements.

A serious difficulty was lack of funds, most of the above may be intended for expenditure round Mecca.

Medina

Returning Indian pilgrims state the town itself is tranquil, but conditions outside very disturbed. Prices were prohibitive, and there was much distress. This was at the beginning of October.

From a reliable source I am informed that no supplies are allowed to be sold to the Bedouin who leave the town.

Large consignments of foodstuffs have been leaving Jeddah for Yenbo by sea, and no more are allowed to leave the town.

Three trains were stated to be in continual readiness to take Emir Abdullah to the north.

French Moslem subjects are being badly treated, reviled as traitors, and expelled.

Army and Recruiting

An order has been issued to each of the four quarters in Jeddah to furnish a certain number of recruits.

As far as can be ascertained, no further large parties have left since Emir Abdullah's departure.

It appears certain that what little enthusiasm was raised by the fictitious reports of victories over the French, has cooled down now that the truth of the situation is widely known.

Ummeleh

In position of stalemate last reported, the garrison was attacked. The Emir al-Urbah and the kaimakam were killed. The garrison is much weakened by casualties and desertion. The above appears to be generally accepted as the truth, but forces sent from here, ostensibly for Ummeleh, are reported to have joined the Emir at Medina.

as paper has been allowed to resume publication. There is nothing of importance in the first new number, but the offending number 7 contains a long and fanatical article on Iraq. The article, for the publication of which the paper was suspended was not written by 'A. F. D.' but by a member of the Agricultural Commission, by name Derwish, and appears quite innocuous, containing a very mild criticism on the closure of the commission.

King Hussein

The King's health has not been very good lately. He is stated to be very nervous as to rumoured preparations by Ibn Saud.

Safema Incident

The Ikhwan raiders appear to have been defeated at Safema. The King has ordered that the Ikhwan should be sent to the prison at Hama.

sort of brass and copper in any form has been prohibited. A small number of people of Hejaz origin, interned in India as Turkish subjects have been repatriated.

The Government absolutely refuse to allow them to remain, and state they should be looked after by the Government under whose flag they were interned. Most of them resided in India for many years before the war. They should not have been sent home without previous reference.

Certain Isthmians wishing to leave Jeddah temporarily for trade purposes, were told they would have to get permission from the King. This would have meant (1) their having to sign as House subjects (2) their having to declare they would not return to the Isthmus, however, arranged the matter without reference to the King.

E 14830 47 44

Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon — (Received November 29)

No. 46

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th Aden news letter, dated the 12th November, 1920.

I have &c

E SCOTT, Major-General

Enclosure in No. 364

28th Aden News Letter

(Secret)

THE following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of the twenty-seventh letter, dated the 28th October, 1920 —

Tihama — Captain Fazluddin writes that the Idrisi has received a letter from Mahmud Nadhim, the ex-Vali of the Yemen, in which he offers to act as mediator between him and the Imam in his capacity as the Turkish Vali of the Yemen and in the name of the Turkish Government. The Idrisi told Captain Fazluddin that he considered the ex-Vali's action entirely mischievous, and that he (the Idrisi) did not propose to send any reply. The Idrisi has received letters from two of the Imam's sons and from a learned man named Sayid Mahomed Ali containing overtures for peace. It would appear that Mahmud Nadhim's move to Menakha is connected with this peace movement, but that he is playing a double game as regards the negotiations for the release of the "Jacob" Mission.

I await Captain Fazluddin's report as to the attitude of the Idrisi in the matter of the release of the "Jacob" Mission.

Mahmud Nadhim is still at Menakha, and is said to have received a reply to his letter to the Tihama sheikhs and Sheikh Mahomed Tahir (the Idrisi commandant at

Bajil) which he has forwarded to the Imam, with whom he is said to be in daily telegraphic communication. The Imam, in reply, has sent the letter he received from Mahmud Nadhim to the Idrisi, who has replied to him, pointing out that Mahmud Nadhim represents a Government which does not exist in the Yemen and which has given up all its rights in it. The Idrisi reminds Sayid Abdul Kadir of the circumstances which led him (the Idrisi) to send his troops to the Tihama.

The number of troops at Menakha is estimated at 600 soldiers with two guns. There are also 30 Turkish officials. Mahmud Nadhim is said to be trying to impress upon people that an attack in force will be made on Tihama shortly, in which all Turkish officers and soldiers in Sana will take part.

The Imam is reported to have written again to the sayids and sheikhs of the Tihama, asking them to take his advice and not to resist him, and warning them of serious consequences in the event of their failure to act on his instructions. At the same time he has written to the ex-Vali and Sayid Abbas, the Amil of Sa'adan, asking them not to advance until they receive orders from him.

It says that the Imam has given orders to Sheikh Ali Mikdad of Anis to lead a force of 1,000 men to Jabel Reima, while another report states that Sheikh Ali Mikdad has gone over to Abu Neb, a relative of the Imam, who is co-operating with Ibn Saud's army near Sada.

The Idrisi appears to be making progress in Jabel Reima, where he has garrisoned all important positions captured by him with his own troops from Anis.

The political officer, Hodeida, states that no fresh reports have been received of any activity in Khokha or of the landing of more goods there.

In connection with the landing of Italians at Khokha, it is reported that the Imam's Amil at Zabed summoned the Amil of Hais to explain his relations with the Italians. The latter refused to obey, and reported the matter to the Imam, who is said to have ordered the Zabed Amil not to interfere.

Jebel Ras, which is near Hais, petitioned the Imam asking for the removal of the Amil, whom they accused of tyranny. The Amil of Wasab al Ali has proceeded to Jabel Ras to inquire into the complaint.

The Idrisi reverses in the Tihama, reported by me last month. The Idrisi writes that owing to a night attack by the Imam's troops the

Idrisi Jash had to retire from some of the posts in Sa'adan, but that the places have been reoccupied. Captain Fazluddin says that the reverse sustained by the Idrisi in Reima just about the same time was more serious than that at Sa'adan, but that the situation there has considerably improved. Jabi, the chief centre of the Reima Kadha, is closely invested by the Idrisi, while a portion of his army is in occupation of Jabi.

Captain Fazluddin states that the excitement in the Tihama in September and October was not due to these reverses, but to the coming of the ex-Vali Mahmud Nadhim to Menakha and the starting of his propaganda. Since the beginning of October the Imam has sustained a severe defeat at Malhan, losing five fortified strongholds, one naqsh and 68 men killed, more than 50 men wounded and one gun, which was shattered. The Idrisi's loss was 5 men killed and 20 wounded. In consequence of this reverse, the Imam's Maqdan has been recalled to Sana.

Captain Fazluddin says that, according to the latest news received from Mahomed Tahir the Idrisi commandant at Bajil, the Arab force collected by Mahmud Nadhim has dispersed, while his Turkish troops are unwilling to fight. The Idrisi has absolutely no fear of Buraa or Bajil being attacked by the Imam, nor has his commander at Bajil expressed any anxiety. The Idrisi is, however, taking steps to reinforce his army at Bajil and its environments, not to meet Mahmud Nadhim's force, about which he does not entertain the slightest fear, but to counteract the pernicious effects of the latter's mischievous propaganda, which the Idrisi fears might turn the heads of the misguided and self-centred Mansabs of Marawa and M. whose co-operation in the future Mahmud Nadhim mostly relies upon.

Yemen (Upper and Lower) — The Menakha agent of the political officer, Hodeida, reports that the village of Rasabah, in the district of Jeharan was attacked by 3,000 Zaidis in consequence of the refusal of the sheikh of the place to supply grain to the Imam. After many excesses had been committed, the Zaidis marched on Jabel Reima. The number of attackers is obviously exaggerated.

The Zaidi ammunition is reported to be deteriorating. The cause for this is said to be that cartridge cases are refilled more than once with the result that they burst in the rifle. The quality of the powder now manufactured is said to be bad.

It has ruined the rifles in which it has been used and lessened their effective range by almost half.

In my last letter I referred to the reported arrival of the Imam's Wazir at Ibb, Saiyid Abdulla-ibn Ibrahim. An informant says that this man has never been known to leave Sana before. While at Yarim the informant paid his respects to him and asked him where he was going. Saiyid Abdulla told him that he was going to Taiz. The informant subsequently learnt from some of his Zaidi soldiers that he was going as an envoy of the Imam to the English and from others that he was going to relieve Ibn-el Wazir, the Imam's Amil at Taiz, as numerous complaints had been made against the latter by the local inhabitants. Another informant states that the Wazir's visit to Ibb is in connection with the repairs of a Turkish aqueduct. He has completed the work as far as El Gened, which is midway between Taiz and Ibb.

I have received no information of the approach of any Imamite representative to renew relations with this residency, and I attach no importance to this report.

Saiyid Abdulla Ibrahim is a descendant of former Imams. He is an ex member of the Turkish Parliament, and is said to be very influential.

Travellers from the Yemen report that Ibn Saud's main forces lately much increased by new adherents, are now at Sada and Kokaban, and are within two days of Shahara and Sana. Abu Neb, an ex-aspirant to the Imamship, is in alliance with Ibn Saud, and is fighting the Imamite troops at Jabel Nom. This news has not been confirmed by Captain Fazluddin.

Reports of an impending attack by Ibn Saud on Sana and Shahara are continuous. According to Captain Fazluddin the Wahabi army marched north after taking Elha, but a new army may have appeared. I am asking Captain Fazluddin for information on this point.

A traveller from Mavia reports that the Imam's Amil at Taiz summoned the local sheikhs of Mavia and demanded from each fifty men to serve in the Imam's army. The sheikhs, who refused to comply with the demand, were put in prison, and have been told that they will be kept there until they have completed the number demanded.

The same informant states that Ibn-el Waziri, the Amil at Mavia, has been relieved by Said Mahomed-el Amir from Sana, and that Sheikh Mahomed Nasir Mukbil of Mavia has been appointed his lieutenant. From another source it is reported that the Imam has assigned 1 000 dollars per mensem to Sheikh Mahomed Nasir Mukbil out of the taxes collected in his country.

Travellers' reports of concentration of Imam's troops at Ibb, Taiz, &c., are continuous, but one of our secret agents, who lately visited these places, states that no troops beyond the usual garrisons have arrived.

Tair—Captain Fazluddin reports that a party of Europeans landed on the island of Saqil, one of the Farsan group, from an unknown ship, on the 19th October last. I suspect that the party referred to is from H M S. "Cornflower," which is at present employed on the Red Sea patrol.

Captain Fazluddin also reports the arrival of an Italian merchant vessel "Nifou" (the Nde) at Jizan on the 20th idem, with the object of securing an oil concession on the Farsan Islands. Two Italians, one the captain of the ship and the other an old man aged about seventy years, named M. Fidiotti or Nidiotti, a merchant of Massawah, landed and saw Syed Mustafa. They had a Somali interpreter with them, but could themselves speak intelligible Arabic.

They said that they belonged to the Massawah merchant community and were returning from Jeddah. They produced a letter from an Arab merchant of Massawah to the address of Sheikh Mahomed Sharawi, the chief sheikh of Farsan, recommending them to his attention at Farsan and requesting him to introduce them to the Idrisi, if necessary. Syed Mustafa, after reading the letter, remarked that it could not help them at Farsan, as the sheikh would not permit them to land without the Idrisi's permission.

They expressed a desire to see the Idrisi, as they wanted to discuss some mercantile matters. In reply to Syed Mustafa, they said that they were acting at the instance of their Government. Syed Mustafa, after seeing the Idrisi, told them that he was unable to see them as he was busy. They told Syed Mustafa that they wanted to go to the Farsan Island to see the oil mines before approaching the Idrisi with offers for working them. Syed Mustafa told them that as the Turkish peace had not yet been finally settled, the Idrisi considered it inadvisable to discuss the question of the Farsan oil mines. The Italians then re-embarked and left Jizan.

Aden Protectorate.—The naqibs of Maasatta write that they have unanimously decided to proceed against the Zaidis in Sbaub to turn them out of their country.

They again press for an advance on our part, and ask that in the event of our not doing they may be furnished with the necessary equipment. I have sent them a suitable reply.

A quarrel is reported between the Imam's Hakim at Dala, Saiyid Yahia, and his assistant, Saiyid Mahomed Ash-Sham, over the accounts which the Imam has asked Saiyid Yahia to adjust. Saiyid Ash-Sham, with two petty mucedams and sixty Zaidis, is said to have left for his country.

Reports continue to come in of the prevalence of sickness among the Zaidis in Dala. The mortality is said to be about ten daily.

The Rijai section of the Subehi tribe recently intercepted a kat caravan and carried away some kat. The kat owners are British subjects. The Abdali has been requested to deal with the marauders, as he is responsible for the safety of the trade routes in the Subehi country.

On the 3rd November two Kotabhis looted some cattle from the Dambari country. Three Dambaris followed and overtook them near the Alawi boundary, but the Kotabhis opened fire and killed two of the Dambaris. The Dambari tribesmen are said to be collecting to start a counter-raid on the Kotabhis.

It is reported that the Attifis (Subehis) have carried away four camels belonging to certain Abdali subjects.

Aden, November 12, 1920

E 14634 166 44

Political Resident, Aden to Earl Curzon — (Received November 29)

(No. 30)

My Lord,

Aden, November 12, 1920

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, extracts from a letter dated the 18th October last, from Captain M. Fazluddin I.M.S., liaison medical officer with the Idrisi, in which he replies to a request for information regarding the Idrisi reverses at Saifan.

One of the letters has been sent to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Egypt, the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, and Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department.

I have, &c.

T. E. SCOTT, Major General

Enclosure in No. 387

Captain M. Fazluddin to Major Barrett

(Extract)

Loheiya, October 18, 1920

IT is true that owing to a night attack by the Imamites the Idrisi Jaish had to retire from some of the posts in Saifan more than a month back, but subsequently the latter has reoccupied these places. The reverse sustained by the Idrisi in Reima just about the same time was more serious than the Saifan affair, but the conditions there, too, have considerably improved by this time. Jaba, the chief centre of the Imamite movement, has been re-occupied. The Idrisi Jaish is now in occupation of the Juma.

What gave rise to a state of alarm in these parts, was, in fact, the coming down of Mahmud Nadhim to Menakha and his propaganda, and not these reverses. But, since then, the Imamites have sustained a severe defeat at Mahan, losing five fortified strongholds, one naqib and sixty-eight men, more than fifty men wounded, and one gun shattered to pieces. The Idrisides are said to have lost only five men killed.

and twenty men wounded. In consequence of this reverse the Imamic Maqdam has been recalled to Basra.

According to the latest news from Mahomed Tahir, all the Arab force of Mahmud Nadhim has dispersed, while his Turkish troops are unwilling to fight. The Idrisi has no doubt that he is still attached to the Imam, nor has his Commander Mahomed Tahir in Bajil expressed any such anxiety.

The Idrisi has a knowledge of the unpopularity of Mahomed Tahir amongst a small section of the local tribes, due to the machinations of a few mischief-mongers, but he regards this as an extremely negligible thing and steps are being taken to reinforce the Idrissian Jaish in Bajil and its environments. These reinforcements the Idrisi says, are not intended to meet Mahmud Nadhim's force, about which not the slightest fear is entertained by him, but they are designed to counteract the pernicious effects of the latter's mischievous propaganda, which might turn the foolish heads of the misguided and self-centred Mansabs of Marawa and Munira. Mahmud Nadhim counts mostly on the mischief of these Mansabs more than any thing else, and it is the Idrisi's aim to demonstrate to these silly worshippers at the shrine of the Turkish rule in Yemen that their power of doing further injury to the best interests of the country is over.

Mahmud Nadhim and Peace Movement

The Idrisi says that Mahmud Nadhim wrote to him a letter offering his services as a Turkish Vakil of Yemen and in the name of the Turkish Government for the conclusion of peace between himself and the Imam. But, as he considers Mahmud Nadhim's action entirely mischievous, inasmuch as he desires to open negotiations in the name of a Government which is extinct in Yemen, and practically non-existent on the face of the earth, he is not willing to send in any reply to these overtures.

He has received letters on the same subject, evidently prompted by Mahmud Nadhim from Syed Abdul Kadir al Ahdal, the Mansab of Marawa. Mahmud Nadhim had proposed a conference between himself and the said Mansab at Hujjarla, but the latter has been refused the permission to meet the former. The following copy of a letter dated the 17th October, 1920 from the Idrisi to Syed Abdul Kadir al Ahdal on the subject of peace, sets forth very clearly the Idrisi's policy in this respect and will form an interesting record.

(After compliments.)

Please note that we look for riches to God and not to others than Him. We have no desire for aggrandisement, &c., but on your addressing us last year desiring us (1) to arrange the matter of the mission, and (2) to advance to repel the wrongdoings of the Zaidi heretics, we did so under the patronage of God, because the point was one of a religious nature, and God has given us arms. The enemies, on feeling the pinch of the thorn of the people of right, decided to make an insidious design through the medium of Mahmud Nadhim. What has been done by him last year is a sufficient proof, i.e., his intentions to bring matters to a complicated state and leave the country open to the awfulness of the powerful Government. But thanks be to God Who made him to meet with a disappointment. The Hadith, i.e., the saying of the Prophet, says: "The believer is not liable to be stung twice from one and the same hole." How can we therefore believe him and deal with him on a second time. Mahmud Nadhim was working for a Government that has now disappeared from this region and substituted by another Government which does not accept the intercession of Mahmud Nadhim nor his work. If we the local people, fail to manage our affairs properly for the preservation of our religion and country we shall jeopardise our country. God forbid. You must first of all understand that the relations that existed before between you and Mahmud Nadhim are not now the same as they were. As we like to hold you in esteem, we do not approve that you should mix with our enemies in any way whatever it may be. In order to effect a settlement there should be disinterested people from both sides, namely, from our side the sect of orthodox, and from the side of that heretic sect. Wake up and be careful of the deceptions of deceivers. May God lead us to the proper path of nature.

In this letter the Idrisi, amongst other things which throw a flood of light on last year's affairs connected with the British mission at Bajil, gives an advice to Syed Abdul Kadir al Ahdal and others to disabuse their minds of all ideas connected with the Turkish Government and its agent, Mahmud Nadhim.

wiped off from the face of the earth, and keep in view the welfare of their country. Again, it is to be noted that peace overtures have been made by the representatives of an absolutely neutral party enter into negotiations between his own and those of Zaidi representatives.

E 15166 38 44.

No. 386

Field Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon — (Received December 3)

N 1282

M 1286

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship a report by Major W. E. Marshall, M.C., R.A.M.C., on the quarantine arrangements at Jeddah during the recent pilgrimage.

As my connection with Hedjaz affairs is terminated there is no need for me to comment on this valuable and instructive report, which I think, rightly describes the pilgrimage as a tragic one, but I would observe that in view of the opposition which proposals made hitherto for the amelioration of the pilgrims' lot have encountered both from King Hussein and the Government of India, there is unfortunately little hope that it will be possible to carry out most of Major Marshall's recommendations.

The difficulties connected with the Egyptian part of the pilgrimage which Major Marshall describes on p. 620, resulted from decisions taken by the International Quarantine Board of Alexandria to whom an extract from the report is being forwarded.

Copies of the report have been despatched to the Foreign Department, India, the British Legation at Jeddah, and the British Legation at Aden.

A long report on the pilgrimage arrangements at Mecca and the interior has been received from the British Legation at Jeddah, and as the requisite copies have been prepared

I have, &c.

ALLENBY F.W.

Enclosure 1 in No. 386

Report by Major Marshall on the Pilgrimage, 1920

1. Pilgrimage

According to our disembarkation statistics 58,584 pilgrims came by sea to the pilgrimage. They were made up as follows:—

From

Singapore	17,737
Tava	6,282
Bombay	1,702
Kat	404
Bustah	1,227
Suakin	4,20
Suez	4,12
Penang	744
Malacca	18
Yemen	5
By dhow	1,375

Total

58,584

K

According to the Arab Government returns ("Qibla" of the 16th September, 1920) the total was 59,370 and they group them in nationalities as follows —

Indians	2,607
Arabs	17,000
Sudanese	4
Yemeni	7-4
Egyptians	5,784
Somalis	4
Black Arabs	40
Moslems	7-4
Mesopotamians	44
Basraw	38
Hadhramites	94
Hedjazis	68
	42
	1,884
Total	59,370

Pilgrimage day was the 24th August and the Id on the 25th, 26th and 27th. Unfortunately for the ten preceding days there was a continuous heat wave which the local inhabitants say was the hottest they remember for forty years. The effect on the pilgrims was very bad. The last Indian boats arrived on the 15th, 16th and 17th August, there was great shortage of camels and dhows, so that many died from sunstroke and heat exhaustion. At Bahra, the main halting place between Jeddah and Mecca, about 250 pilgrims are buried and many died along the road, and were lying incompletely buried or unburied, the prey of scavenging dogs. The total number of deaths between Jeddah and Mecca is estimated at 1,200. The Haahi, in previous years, open an aid post at Bahra, and did nothing to arrange to transport

The hot weather ceased in Jeddah on the 24th August but it remained hot at Arafat, and the mortality there was very high.

The total number of pilgrims at Arafat has been estimated differently by different authorities, but the number probably did not exceed 50,000. The total number who arrived also is variously estimated but if we compare the numbers who arrived and the number who departed, the death rate must have been very high, and at least 10,000 pilgrims remain unaccounted for.

The pilgrims began to return to Jeddah early in September and came down in very large numbers. The ships were rapidly filled but after the "Koweit" left on the 8th September there was a long delay, the next Indian boat "Nairung" leaving on the 20th September. During these twelve days conditions in Jeddah were as bad as they could be. Pilgrims were camped in the streets, and all round the quarantine buildings, Heledia and customs sheds there was a pilgrim camp. The majority of the pilgrims were old, emaciated and unable to fend for themselves. Many suffered from diarrhoea and dysentery. Many were dying absolutely untended and almost naked, and excreta and filth were not removed. The open space behind the quarantine was an open latrine. We organised stretcher parties from the Indian hospital and collected all the worst cases there. Many cases were also taken to the civil Arab hospital, but there they were left in the corridors and outhouses, men and women together, and their condition was terrible. There was no interpreter and no female nurses. Dr Mohamed Hussein was ill so I arranged for Dr Shousha to take all the sick pilgrims from the Arab hospital to the Indian hospital where the conditions were excellent, plenty of nursing orderlies, and a lady doctor and female nurses for women pilgrims. This had been done when the King heard of it and called Dr Shousha, Dr Thabit and Dr Hamdi to the telephone in the presence of the kaimakam. The King asked why the pilgrims were dying in the streets, and why the sick had been taken to the Indian hospital. Dr Shousha told the truth and was severely reprimanded. Dr Hamdi lied that he had visited the streets and pilgrim encampments and had seen nothing wrong. Dr Thabit was told to organise stretcher parties and arrange everything in the civil Arab hospital. Patients began to arrive in the Arab hospital in large numbers, but the conditions were not better and he asked Major Batten to telegraph to the King explaining the conditions and asking

permission to take all female pilgrims to the Indian hospital. This was granted, but until Dr Mohamed Hussein's recovery and return to duty the condition of the Indian and Javanese pilgrims in the Arab hospital was very bad. It seems impossible to get Arab orderlies to take any interest in, or care for, sick pilgrims. We suggested to Dr. Thabit that he should remove the pilgrims who were camped in the streets to the quarantine islands, as the sanitary condition of Jeddah was now very bad, and I feared an epidemic, but he lacks organising ability, does nothing without the King's order, and is interfered with in the performance of his duties and a stretcher, the property of the R. N. S. for the pilgrims was not accepted. For both these incidents I obtained an immediate and ample apology, but it shows how they resented any interference or assistance on our part.

We issued free bread, about 100 oke daily, to the destitute and the Government issued free water. We also received authority from the Egyptian Government to the Egyptian pilgrims who had to await the last trip of the "Kenah" on the 22nd September, and a sum of 2000 was issued. Major Batten, acting British agent, started a fund for destitute Indians and many subscriptions were obtained locally.

With the departure of the "Nairung," "Shuja," and "Hejaz" on the 20th, 21st, and 22nd September, conditions greatly improved, and, on the 8th October, the departure of the "Jeddah," "Darn," and "Zayani," all Indian pilgrims left Mecca and Jeddah, and only Medina pilgrims remained. These number less than 100 and two ships are awaiting to take them back. Of the Javanese pilgrims, 3,270 remained on the 8th October: 400 at Medina, 430 at Mecca, and 2,440 at Jeddah. The shipping arrangements for returning Javanese pilgrims have been

streets of Jeddah have now been cleaned, and, except for flies, which I have never seen so bad, the sanitary conditions have resumed their normal state.

The death returns in Jeddah from the 15th August to the 4th October showed 646 deaths, of which the greatest proportion occurred among destitute pilgrims after their return from Mecca. There is reason to believe that a considerable number in Jeddah were not reported. Nearly all those suffered from dysentery and diarrhoea, and that dysentery was extremely fatal in old emaciated pilgrims. Even in the Indian hospital where they were well nursed and well treated the mortality was high.

The health of the European population has not been good during the summer. The local ice machine has not worked during the summer and we have had to get ice on ships for any ice we could obtain.

There was no infectious disease throughout the pilgrimage. Four Indian medical officers, two Egyptian medical officers, one Javanese doctor and one French doctor (Syrian) were present at the pilgrimage, and all agree that, though the mortality among the pilgrims was high, there was no infectious disease.

2. Quarantine

When I arrived in Jeddah on the 5th July accompanied by Dr. Shousha, bacteriologist, his assistant, and laboratory equipment, I found Dr. Thabit as Director-General of Quarantine, and the King unwilling to accept my appointment as during the pilgrimage of 1919. All he would agree to was that I might inspect and make recommendations, and with this we had to be content. He accepted Dr. Shousha and the laboratory, and these were installed in the civil hospital as during 1919.

It is very difficult to define what are the existing quarantine regulations here, and they do not follow any international convention. In April, 1920, the "Qibla" published the following quarantine rules:—

- (a) Ships from infected or suspected ports undergo ten days, including voyage on Wasta and Abu Al.
- (b) Ships from clean ports twenty four hours on Abu Saad.
- (c) Ships with cases on board ten days on any of the islands.

Practically all pilgrim ships from the south were quarantined twenty-four hours on Abu Saad, but, if there had been many deaths on board even if not infected, Dr. Thabit would impose three days' quarantine. Every ship arrived from Kamaran

with a clean bill of health, and should have been disembarked forthwith according to international convention, and this unnecessary quarantine was a great discomfort and unnecessary expense to the pilgrims.

The steamship "Shuja" had ten cases of cholera between Bombay and Aden, and I reported on this fully in my previous report of the 31st July, no other ship had any infectious disease throughout the voyage.

Pilgrims were not medically inspected on re-embarkation. We have again been put to great inconvenience with regard to the ordinary mail passenger traffic to Suez. In the first place, the Khedivial Company informed their agents here that non-Egyptian pilgrims would not be allowed to disembark at Egyptian ports. Why then were these pilgrims—Algerians, Tunisians, Moors, Syrians, and Palestinians—allowed to come via Egypt and how did they suppose they would get back? If they came to Egypt with their passports duly stamped, surely it could not be expected that the French authorities would send their subjects back to their homes on a special steamer passing the canal in quarantine. After much trouble we were allowed to send sixty-four Palestine pilgrims on the "Kenah" and forty-five Algerians and Tunisians on the last voyage of the same boat.

The next difficulty was that the Khedivial Company, immediately after the 1st of September, stopped all passengers from the Hedjaz, and the mail boat of the 1st of September for Suez left here quite empty. I at once wrote to the International Quarantine Board and said that I presumed the passengers would be as last year. Full complement, first and second class, and 1 per cent. tonnage third class. They replied as follows: "No special disposition preventing the embarkation of passengers in the conditions of the rules, but the Khedivial Company declare they do not wish to embark them so as not to run any risk." Thereafter the Khedivial Company wired to their agents authorising them to carry full complement of first class passengers and fourteen deck passengers, including

those booked Soudan ports, irrespective of whether class and deck. Pilgrims or otherwise. This agrees exactly with the Quarantine Regulations of the International Convention 1903, yet when the "Mansourah," which left here on the 12th September, arrived at Tor, the pilgrim passengers were disembarked and put in quarantine while the boat was delayed one day. I wired for an explanation and received the reply that the boat had carried more than authorised number of pilgrims on passenger steamer. I was not satisfied that this was so, so I wired to Arab Bureau to obtain full particulars and definite numbers. By the mail of the 5th October we received the following decision taken by the International Quarantine Board at its meeting on the 21st September, 1920: "Ships carrying pilgrims of third class in a proportion of not more than one pilgrim per 100 tons net tonnage will not be considered as pilgrim ships, but all pilgrims of whatever class carried by such ships must submit to the quarantine measures applied to pilgrims. Such ships which do not put in at Tor will land their pilgrims at Suez, where they must undergo the prescribed measure."

The reason I dwell on these points is that, unless they are cleared up, the same difficulty and the same dislocation of traffic will occur next year. If the International Quarantine Board will quote the regulations they adhere to and give us an official copy we will know where we stand.

These things have a bad effect on our prestige here. When the King asks why, when the pilgrimage is clean, all these difficulties arise, whereas there have been cases of plague and one case of cholera at Suez, what can we reply? Can we wonder when he wishes to retaliate?

The whole quarantine arrangements for Egyptian pilgrims appear badly arranged. The "Mahmal" left here on the 4th September and had to wait at Tor until the "Kenah" had twice visited Jeddah, so the "Mahmal" could not leave Tor before the 25th September. Surely for such a small number of pilgrims it would have been easier, less expensive and equally efficient to open a small quarantine camp at Suez and to leave Tor closed.

3 Indian Pilgrimage Hospital

The personnel of this hospital, with the exception of two sub-assistant surgeons who arrived in July, arrived on the "Akbar" on the 15th August, and the first part of the equipment (beds, medical stores, tents and rations) arrived on the "Dara" on the 16th August. Unfortunately, the remainder of the equipment did not arrive until the 25th and 26th September on the "Hejaz" and "Jeddah" respectively, when the pilgrimage was over and few pilgrims left in the country. This was a

great drawback, as the hospital was without mattresses, sheets, and many other essential things, which had to be borrowed or made locally.

It was my intention to send the hospital to Mecca, but King Hussein, after telling me personally that it would be acceptable, refused to have the hospital complete, and said he would only allow one medical tent and two doctors. That being so, I wired that I proposed sending them as ordinary pilgrims, and, as there was no objection to this, I sent Captain Ahmed I.M.S., the Officer Commanding, Captain Shaik I.M.S. and sixty-four personnel on the pilgrimage. At the same time I arranged with Dr. Mohamed Hussein, Medical Officer in charge civil hospital, Jeddah, who was also going on the pilgrimage, that all would be available for duty in the event of an epidemic. No epidemic broke out, and Captain Ahmed kept me informed of the health conditions there. The hospital was opened at the old Turkish military hospital north of and outside the town, and was ready for patients early in September. One building was used for personnel and one for equipment, while the sick were accommodated in tents.

It was most fortunate that we had this hospital this year as it was of invaluable help during the terrible conditions prevailing here during September. The hospital was splendidly run by Captain Ahmed, I.M.S., and I think his selection a most fortunate one. He was very interested in his work and in the country, and very popular with other medical officers and with the populace. Many Arabs came for treatment, and there is no doubt that if the hospital were permanent, they would admit a large number of cases, especially surgical and gynecological, from among the inhabitants of Jeddah.

The supply of water was the chief difficulty as it had to be taken in carts from the condenser, and the road across the sand is heavy and difficult. The kaimakam of Jeddah always gave us every assistance.

The hospital staff consisted of Captain Ahmed, the Officer Commanding, Captain Shaik I.M.S., Dr. Nawal Koshore (lady doctor), two sub-assistant surgeons, and 64 personnel. Of the latter some were very good but some indifferent, as they had apparently been collected in a great hurry. The expenses of such a hospital

The equipment is being stored in Jeddah, and the hospital personnel are returning to Bombay on the "Homayun," leaving here about the middle of October.

4 Recommendations

1. The Indian Government should decide now if they are going to send a hospital next year and make arrangements to send it early so that it can be in full working order during the pilgrimage season.

2. The equipment will not keep well in this climate and if the Indian Government cannot decide about the hospital, I think it should all be returned to India. In addition to the equipment already here I think the hospital should have its own transport and this, as forage is difficult to get, should be motor transport. Two

of a permanent hospital both in Mecca and Jeddah and recommend that steps be taken now to procure suitable buildings for the purpose. The King will undoubtedly agree to it because even in Jeddah they talk of "Ihtilal bil ishtalia"—occupation by hospital—but I cannot see how otherwise the sick Indian pilgrims can be looked after.

There is no doubt that our arrangements for pilgrims lacks organisation and forethought and compares very unfavourably with that of the Japanese pilgrims. The local inhabitants and others frequently speak of it and always to our detriment and I think disgrace. What is the remedy?

(a) The Indian Government should not allow so many old people to come on the pilgrimage. They cannot stand the hardships, cannot, when they are sick, look

Of all the destitute who died in Jeddah I should say that the vast majority were over 60 years of age, and this is confirmed by the returns from the Indian hospital. There could be no objection to preventing these aged pilgrims from making the Hajj, as it is expressly stated in the Koran that the pilgrimage is only compulsory for every able-bodied Moslem, provided he has the means to do it without incurring debts, without being a burden to others, and provided he makes sufficient provision for dependents left behind. Those who say that these old pilgrims wish to die in

this country have not seen them clamouring at the gate of the agency and at the shipping offices praying to be sent back to India from this inhospitable land.

(b) No pilgrim should be allowed to leave India unless he possesses at least Rs 500 after his return ticket has been paid. To-day I saw three men who had walked from Medina. They left India with a single ticket and Rs 80 each, with the result that they have begged their way throughout the pilgrimage, are quite destitute, and must be sent back by the charity of the shipping companies or at Government expense.

(c) All pilgrims leaving India should be inoculated against cholera. Why this has not been made compulsory I cannot understand. The Javanese and Egyptian Governments have done it for years.

(d) Arrangements should be made with the shipping companies for an organised supply of steamers. Every year boats arrive too late, have to miss the quarantine, and even then the pilgrims run the risk of losing the pilgrimage. Not only is this not fair to the quarantine authorities here, but it is not fair to the pilgrims. The ideal thing is for the pilgrims to arrive early, go to Medina before the pilgrimage, and then, when the pilgrimage is over, be sent back as soon as possible to India.

2 Little or nothing has been done towards sanitary improvements in the Hedjaz since my 1919 report, and the water supply of Mecca, Mena and Arafat remains as before. The King resents any interference, and any suggestion emanating from here is at once refused.

The water supply of Jeddah gives, I think, reason for anxiety. In the event of a small rainfall the reservoirs would not hold enough water for a large pilgrimage and they say the condenser may break down at any time.

It would appear that we have come to a point where we must either (1) limit the size of the pilgrimage or (2) insist on certain essential reforms being carried out. If for political reasons (2) is inadvisable, then I am in favour of (1). The Arab Government could not cope with the pilgrimages this year, and if next year it most probably will be much bigger, than I foresee another tragic pilgrimage in 1920.

I enclose:

- (1) Copy of my preliminary report on quarantine the 31st July 1920
- (2) Copy of report by Dr. Ali Shousha, bacteriologist
- (3) Copy of report by Captain Ahmed, I.M.S. Officer Commanding Indian Pilgrimage Hospital

In conclusion I beg to bring to your notice the excellent work done by Captain Ahmed, Dr. Ali Shousha, bacteriologist, lent by the Egyptian Public Health Department and Inspector of Police, Said Hassan, Indian Police Department. I also wish to express my thanks to the shipping agents at Jeddah, Haji Zainal Ali Reza, and Gellatly, Parker & Co., who have given us great assistance in the shipping of destitute Indian pilgrims.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.

Jeddah, October 10, 1920

Enclosure 2 in No. 3-6

Preliminary Report by Major Marshall on Quarantine

IT is very difficult to define what are the existing regulations re quarantine here and they do not follow any international convention. One cannot say they are disadvantageous from a medical point of view, except from added discomfort and expenses to the pilgrims and lack of proper medical attention on the quarantine islands. From a point of view of quarantine, they are on the side of excess quarantine.

For the most part, ships arriving from the East who have been to Kamaran are sent to Abu Saad for twenty-four hours, disinfected, and then landed. Dr. Thabit makes an occasional exception if a boat arrives with no return of deaths during the whole voyage. Any ship with a large number of deaths is always looked on with suspicion and are kept three days at Wasta and Abu Saad. Dr. Thabit does not distinguish between infected and non-infected ships. Except in one instance which I will quote in detail, I have not interfered.

The steamship "Shuja" left Kamaran on the 24th July and the Kamaran authorities reported health "fair" which made me suspect previous cases of cholera, and there was a rumour in the Suk to that effect. The boat arrived here about 2.30 p.m., and I went on board about 5 p.m. to find the quarantine flag still flying and the pilgrims being sent to Wasta for quarantine. I saw the captain, chief officer, and medical officer, who informed me that Dr. Thabit had not boarded the ship but had remained in his launch at the bottom of the gangway, had told them they would remain in quarantine, and asked if they had any sick. The answer was in the negative. They said the last case of cholera was the 18th July (in all there were ten cases) before arrival of ship at Aden. Before I left the ship they informed me they had found a pilgrim unconscious, so I saw him, satisfied myself it was cholera, and ordered his admission to the ship's hospital. When I returned I sent for Dr. Thabit, Inspector-General of Quarantine, and insisted:—

- 1) That early next morning he take Dr. Shousha with him, again visit the boat, see the sick man, and make necessary arrangements to admit him to hospital.
- 2) That he take Dr. Shousha to Wasta Island to see all the pilgrims. Dr. Shousha would then select cases requiring bacteriological examination.
- 3) That from now onwards, a qualified medical practitioner must be on the island when pilgrims are there.

I then telegraphed the King and sending a wire to His Majesty's Government. Dr. Thabit accepted and sent Dr. Hamdi, the municipal doctor, to stay on the island.

The hospital accommodation on these islands is quite inadequate. On Abu Saad there is a permanent hospital and on Wasta a tent with some hospital equipment. Dr. Thabit tells me he is going to make use of the permanent buildings at Wasta for the purpose of accommodating pilgrims. It is a pity that these islands are not used for individuals to stay on these islands for a change of air and even when pilgrims are there these private individuals remain.

To sum up—the present system of quarantine here, based on the rules published in the "Quila" of April 1920, errs on the side of excess quarantine. This is very unpopular with the pilgrims, shipping agents and consular authorities, as they never know where they stand. They will not use Dr. Shousha if they can help it, as they look upon him as one of my staff even though the King has accepted him. In the event of cholera breaking out on these islands there are no properly equipped cases for treatment and the mortality will be high.

The total number of pilgrims now arrived by sea is approximately 40,000.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major

Acting British Agent

Jeddah, July 31, 1920

Enclosure 3 in No. 3-6

Report on the Work of the Bacteriological Laboratory at Jeddah from July 15 to September 21, 1920.

ON the 28th June 1920 the "Shuja" left from Cairo to Suez, where they sailed on the 1st July. On the 3th July all arrived safely at Jeddah. The staff consisted of a bacteriologist (the writer) and a laboratory attendant (Mohamed-el-Hawani), the clerk was dispensed with this year.

The laboratory was opened only on the 15th July, when His Majesty the King consented.

The laboratory was installed in the same room as last year. The equipment was also the same as last year, as this proved sufficient and satisfactory.

The following table gives the number of specimens received during the whole period, together with the nature and result of the examination:—

Nature of specimen.	Number of specimens found positive.	Number of specimens found negative.	Total
Blood	1	1	2
Urine	1	1	2
Stool	1	1	2
Mucous	1	1	2
Spinal fluid	1	1	2

Miscellaneous Examinations

Pathologic.	Normal.	Total
1	1	2
1	1	2
1	1	2
1	1	2
1	1	2

Dr. SHOUHUA, Bacteriologist
Public Health Laboratories, Cairo

Enclosure 4 in No. 366

Captain D. Ahmed to Major Marshall

Jeddah October 14 1920
Sir,
I HAVE the honour to submit the following report on the Indian Pilgrimage Hospital, Jeddah, in connection with the pilgrimage 1920.
The following personnel left Bombay by steamship "Akbar" on the 3rd August and arrived at Jeddah on the 15th of the same month:
2 medical officers: Captain D. Ahmed, I.M.S., and Captain A. T. Shaik, I.M.S.
1 lady doctor: Miss E. Newal Kashore, M.B.B.S.
2 sub-assistant surgeons: Ashaq Hussain and Mohamed Sadiq
15 stewards, clerks, and dressers

One of the carpenters, Mohamed Hanif, fell very ill with pneumonia, and was sent to the hospital at Jeddah after recovery. He has not arrived, and nothing is known concerning him.

The hospital arrived here with—

- (a) 10 I.P. tents and 10 100-lb. single fly tents
- (b) 14 sections consisting of 129 boxes of one Indian general hospital, and
- (c) 2 months' land ration without fresh meat and firewood

On account of late arrival at Bombay, the military works equipment and S. & T. equipment arrived in Jeddah either towards the end of September or the beginning of October. Mattresses and bed-sheets were borrowed or made locally.

Rations.—No firewood or fresh meat or vegetables were supplied with rations. These were purchased locally. Of the rations supplied, certain articles had to be condemned, as they had decomposed or were destroyed by sea water during transport. These were replaced by local purchase. The indoor patients were rationed from the

hospital ration, and additional milk was obtained from Suez. Rations for the journey were issued to the thirty-three destitute patients sent to India and to about eighty destitute patients who had been treated as out-patients. During the Hajj season sixty-four of the personnel were sent to Mecca with Captain Shaik, two sub-assistant surgeons, and a certain supply of medicine. I was also present at the pilgrimage. The party returned to Jeddah after the pilgrimage on the 1st September. One of the sweepers named Karim Bannu died of heat-stroke. The hospital was opened at Jeddah on the 3rd September and was closed on the 14th October after the majority of the pilgrims had left.

One hundred and eighty patients were treated as indoor patients. Of these fifty-four died, and the remainder, 126, were either discharged cured or transferred to India convalescent. The patients who died were nearly all over 60 years of age and were in a very advanced condition of exhaustion and nearly all destitute. The principal causes of death were (1) dysentery, (2) old age and debility, (3) fever and diarrhoea, (4) old age and gangrene, (5) pneumonia. Of the fatal cases thirty-nine were males and fifteen were females, and their average stay in hospital was six days.

Seven hundred and fifty new cases were treated in the hospital as out-door patients. The principal diseases were (1) dysentery and diarrhoea, (2) fever, (3) eye diseases, (4) minor surgical cases and sores.

The total number of convalescent patients transferred to India was thirty-one: one to Egypt, and one to Singapore. These were destitute and were provided with rations to last them during the journey.

The personnel, especially amongst the menial staff, were not entirely satisfactory. Amongst the superior class of the personnel some were good, and I mention the names of head steward Moinuddin, assistant stewards Balaran Singh and Dadwad Khan, clerks Syed Nazir Shah and Abdul Rahman Khan, and dressers Dadeo Madhoo and Sheikh Latif as worthy of mention.

Head steward Mohamed Abdur Razzaque worked well at times, but had to be reprimanded once by the British agent for disobeying orders, and again by Major Marshall for conduct prejudicial to good discipline.

Sub-assistant surgeon Mohamed Sadiq fell very ill with dysentery and was sent with Captain Shaik on the 28th September, 1920, on the steamship

In conclusion I beg to say that a hospital like this, if properly staffed and equipped and sent here in good time before the pilgrimage, would be of immense benefit to the thousands of pilgrims who come here annually from India.

I have, &c.

D. AHMED, Captain, I.M.S.,
Officer Commanding, Indian Pilgrimage Hospital, Jeddah

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No. 387

Field Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon — (Received December 3)

(No. 1284)

My Lord,

Cairo, November 23 1920

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of a note by Captain Nasiruddin Ahmed, lately stationed at Mecca, on the status of British subjects in the Hejaz.

The unsatisfactory state of affairs which the note discloses cannot, I presume, be satisfactorily dealt with until after the ratification of the Turkish Peace Treaty when His Majesty's Government will no doubt discuss with King Hussein the question of future Capitulatory and other rights to be enjoyed by British and British-protected subjects in his territory.

At present there is at Jeddah no official with consular experience (a fact which it is necessary to bear in mind when reading Captain Nasiruddin's note), and I suggest that your Lordship will probably find it desirable to call for a further report from the new vice-consul after he has had time to appreciate the local situation.

The British agent at Jeddah has already started a register of persons who have made claim to British citizenship.

Copies of the enclosed report and of this despatch have been sent to Aden and to the Foreign Department, India.

I have, &c.

ALLENBY F.M.

L.

Note by Captain Nasiruddin Ahmed on the Status of British Subjects in the Hedjaz
(October 14, 1920)

CONSIDERING the importance of the subject, and the absence of opportunities for a thorough study of it, the following statement should not be considered as final. It has already been brought to notice that every hindrance was placed by the Hachimite Government in the way, and in that of my predecessor, of meeting the respectable residents of Mecca, and such has been the success of the Arab Government as presented by the sole personality of the King Hussein, in paralyzing public freedom of speech and action that, whenever chance brought me in contact with anyone, scrupulous reticence was observed by him on all matters relating directly or indirectly to the Hedjaz. Ever since my arrival here no permanent Indian resident of Mecca (with one exception) has ever come to see me, and my efforts to see some of the leading members have been looked upon with apprehension. Direct and indirect appeals have been made to me to refrain from seeing them. This was due to nothing but an instinct of self-preservation, and it would have been folly on my part to jeopardise their position by insisting . . . I met . . . on inviting refusals.

Besides this, the official position of the British representative here has not yet been clearly defined nor do the people know whether he is here as a temporary measure or permanently. This also precluded the Indians from taking a rash step on the strength of a precarious and doubtful protection, and I do not at all blame them for their attitude. It is a far cry from Mecca to Jeddah, especially with the means of communication so strictly guarded and controlled, that the presence of a British representative would be welcomed by the British subjects living in the Hedjaz.

There is an overwhelming majority of foreign subjects living in the Hedjaz towns, consisting of Indians, Afghans, Hadramis, Egyptians, Bukharis, Syrians, Persians, Javanese and Maghrabis. Of these the first four are either British subjects or are under British protection, while Persian interests are also looked after by the British agent at Jeddah.

In Mecca itself more than one-third of the present population of about 60,000 is directly or indirectly subject to the British Crown. The Indians are estimated at over 10,000. The Misfah, Jind, Jebel Hindi quarters of Mecca are their special preserves, and, with the exception of Jirwal and Ma'bada, they are also to be found in practically every other quarter of the town. The Afghans, who do not consider themselves separate from the Indians, live in the Fuluk Mohalla. There are about 5,000 Hadramis, and the Egyptians also form quite a large proportion.

The above estimate does not include the large domiciled Indian community forming the elite of Mecca nobility, whose forefathers came here generations back, and who, although known as Indians, are hardly distinguishable from their Arab neighbours, either in custom, dress, language or mode of living. They hate being called Indians, unless there is something to be gained by it. They occupy many important offices under the Arab régime.

The foreign residents may be divided into three important divisions, viz., Muhajirin, Mujawirin and merchants.

The Indian Muhajirin, as their name denotes, are those who have "forsaken their country." Their number is estimated at about 1,000. Most of them have so far maintained their nationality in spite of free intermarriage. They left India with the intention of permanent residence in the Hedjaz, and their long residence has not . . . British subjects, but, although assured to the contrary, I am doubtful whether they would now like to be called such. It is, however, different with their children, who are free to adopt any nationality. Cases are also not unknown where the Muhajirs have retracted their vows and returned to their native land.

Mujawirin, or the "Neighbours (of the House of God)," are not restricted by any vows, and are free to stay or return to their country as they please. They form the majority of the Indian residents.

Mujawirin are also of two kinds, permanent and temporary. The latter, I am told, are so by necessity, as they have no one to look after them in India or elsewhere, and having once arrived here and not possessing the means or temptation to go back, have decided to pass the rest of their lives in prayer. They live in "rabats" (hostels), and subsist on charity mostly. Many of them would go back if they had the chance and means to do so.

The permanent class of Mujawirin are more or less independent, and although some of them, owing to a long stay in the country or to their being born here, have forgotten their native language, yet they call themselves Indian, and maintain their . . . dress, &c. They maintain free relations with their native land, and generally visit it.

The merchants here are mostly foreigners, and the bulk of Hedjaz trade is in their hands. Hadramis alone are said to have over 5,000 shops. The Indians have about 1,000 shops, but their business is of a more important nature. They are obliged to keep intimate relations with India, and some of them, as, for instance, Maimous and Patana, are so particular that they do not even marry in the country. Maimous have now practically become extinct, while the Patana are on the way to that end. They are still, however, a very important factor in the local business world.

I would also include the managers, clerks and agents of firms and rabats, who are sent here to look after the interests of their employers, and do not consider Hedjaz as their permanent home.

The necessarily long stay of the above classes has led them to acquire immovable property either for residence or business purposes. They could not do so without changing their British nationality into Turkish, for which as far as I have been . . . a ten years' residence was a *sine qua non* together with permission . . . The Capitulations, however, gave foreign subjects special . . . which no one, especially a business man, could forego, and many, after having accomplished their object, reverted to their British allegiance. This was done especially when any danger threatened them, such as a forced loan, conscription, taxes or contribution. This so exasperated the Turks that at one time, so I am told, it was actually decided to get rid of the troublesome foreign element from the country altogether. A couple of years before the war orders were given to stop . . . of property by purchase by persons of foreign nationality even if they . . . of naturalisation as Turkish subjects.

The same rule holds good now, and no one but an Arab subject can acquire any landed property in the country. All who already possess immovable property are considered *bona fide* Arab subjects. Whether the Turkish regulation in this respect was justifiable or otherwise is beyond the scope of this paper, but there is no doubt that it was very vexatious, especially in a country which can rightly be called the "Belad-el Musslimin" (country of all the Moslems).

I have shown above that freedom of speech and action is denied to the people in the Hedjaz, and that foreign subjects are also deprived of the right of acquiring property. There are other disadvantages which it is very difficult to express in words, but which are felt.

As stated by me in September last, it would be extremely unjust to say that foreigners are subject to any special and harsh measures, and that their condition is worse in this respect than that of the Arab subjects in Mecca or elsewhere, but all the same the feeling of disadvantage is there, due to improper application of the existing common law. For instance, in a case between an Arab and an Indian resident the latter invariably gets the worst of it. Similarly in . . . Indians of long and short residence in the country the decision goes in favour of the long residence man.

The word "Hindi" is used as a taunt, and shows the spirit of the country. . . of their large numbers, the Indians (I mean the three classes mentioned . . .) are not represented on any of the local councils.

Obstacles are placed in the way of their going to India, and a recent case in point is that of one Izzuddin, a grocer whose father came and settled here, but who was himself born and brought up for some years in India. He applied for permission to proceed to India to settle his accounts with his brothers and partners there, but was told to sever his connection with the Hedjaz altogether. This incident has on the one hand thrown cold water on the intentions of several other persons in similar position, and on the other hand has opened their eyes to the necessity for getting their position defined. Several such references have been made to me during the last fortnight or so.

No one of a doubtful nationality can obtain any employment, however mean, unless he declares himself to be a subject of the Hachimite Government. Similarly no one but an Arab subject will henceforth be permitted to become a Mutawwif.

A Hadrami merchant who had the audacity to tell the King that he was a British subject, and that trade was free under that Government, and that he would only be guilty if he sold his wares at prices higher than those fixed by the Municipality, was sent to prison, and told that there were no British subjects in the Hedjaz. If he were a British subject, he would have to pay taxes, and now that his taxes are gone they would prefer to become British subjects.

The King himself has more than once deprecated the foreign preponderance in the business line, and the local company, "Shirkat-Wataniyah," is another means of benefiting the Arabs at the expense of the Indian and other importers, whose goods are taken over by the "Shirkat Wataniyah" at rates fixed by the latter, below bazaar prices. As the money is not paid, and the commodity is returned in kind several months afterwards when the prices have a falling tendency, they are put to great loss. The practice is also against all business principles. I cannot explain this better than by recording what is being done at this moment.

In July last the King and "Shirkat-Wataniyah" as usual took over (the owner's previous sanction is not considered necessary) from the importers a large proportion of their consignments of flour at the Shirkat's own rates. The price was not paid immediately. During the Haj season prices ran high, and the "Shirkat Wataniyah" made huge profits out of other firms' losses. Now the prices have gone down, and flour, old, musty and unfit for human consumption, is being returned to the owners to replace that taken over in July. It appears that it was the stock of some godown, and advantage has been taken to renew the stock by substituting the surplus of newly bought but unsold flour for the old. No one but an Arab subject is allowed to become a member of this national company, of which the King is the chief shareholder. There is also no appeal against such high-handed

Before coming to the Hedjaz, I expressed my opinion that if ever the British Government declared its intention of granting certificates of nationality and protection to all who applied for them, a large proportion of the townspeople would prefer to register as British subjects. This view is confirmed by the scanty knowledge I have been able to obtain. At one time I had my doubts, which have not quite been dissipated, that the majority were indifferent as to their status and nationality, but such people whom I have questioned assure me that my doubts were and are without foundation. Even a person of the standing of Bekr Khogir, a domiciled Indian, a very staunch supporter of King Hussein and a member of the Mejlis-esh-Sheykh, tried to obtain the protection of our Jeddah agency when he and his son were thrown in the dark underground cell on a flimsy pretext, but the King frustrated all his efforts in this direction.

The following remark, made when the question of British subjects in the Hedjaz was raised by Colonel Wilson, is attributed to King Hussein. He is reported to have said that "the British Government apparently wish to cut the tree it planted, for if the public knew of its intentions, the only subjects left to him would be the Qureish Bedouin and the parish dogs in the streets of Mecca." This is, however, no reason why the British Government should be reluctant to acknowledge its subjects in the Hedjaz and shirk its responsibilities. But a great deal of caution should be necessary so as to give no cause to political agitators in search of a fresh pretext to regard this as a thin end of the wedge for ultimate "protection" and "occupation" of the Sacred Land of Islam.

I have refrained from introducing the pilgrims in this report for two reasons. In the first place there can never be any doubt as to their nationality. And, secondly, the permanent residence of a British representative, provided he is fully acknowledged and empowered, will automatically improve the condition of the pilgrims, in accordance with the suggestion made in a separate report.

At present they lose their nationality immediately on landing on these shores and find it again only when they re-embark. The personal interest and effort of the King, however, have always been to ameliorate their condition, and although they do suffer a great deal it is not the fault of the King but of his administration and its moral and material bankruptcy.

E 15352 166 44]

No. 388.

Lord Curzon to Political Resident Aden

Telegraphic.

Foreign Office, December 13, 1920.

It has been decided to withdraw the garrison at Hodeidah as soon as possible. You should consult the General Officer Commanding, Aden, and telegraph how soon the evacuation can be carried out.

You should also inform Idriis that we have no objection to his making arrangements with the inhabitants of the town with regard to its future administration or to make inclusion within his territory.

Your views are invited on the subject of our representation at Hodeidah after the evacuation.

It appears desirable that either Mr Steele or a British consul should reside there to protect British interests if his safety can be assured in the period immediately succeeding the evacuation.

If the Idriis takes over Hodeidah with our consent the rumour that we have a secret understanding with the Idriis mentioned in your telegram No. 372 A.P. should be dispelled. Would this dispose you to modify the views expressed in that telegram concerning the reduction of the Aden garrison, which is very desirable from the point of view of economy?

E 15802 3850 44]

No. 389.

Idriis Report for the Period November 10-20, 1920. (Received December 20.)

(Secret.)

Mecca Representatives.—King Hussein has started a new line of argument in opposing any British representation at Mecca, attempting to justify his attitude by the argument that the appointment of the Mecca representative, and his acceptance of him with the title of (Pilgrim) Inspector, has given rise to pretensions on the part of the French and Dutch which he cannot countenance.

He even goes so far as to say that this would be unacceptable to Great Britain, as well as causing hostility among Moslems generally.

I attach a translation of his letter received, undated and unsigned, with another copy.

The references to anti-British intrigues on the part of the French should not be admitted, he allowed to pass without comment, and would provide an opportunity of again impressing on the King the solid ground of British policy.

Whatever truth there may be in the allegations, it is submitted that no occasion, however small, should be given to King Hussein to consider that all is not well between the French and ourselves.

The French Algerian representative in Mecca is on good terms with the King and is assiduous in attendance on him, but has privately complained to Captain Nasiruddin that he receives no official encouragement, which, under the circumstances is natural.

Neveu wrote to the King on 11th inst. that in the fifth question put to the King on 30th, the Idriis refers to the fact that if this had been duly arranged.

In this connection, the view held by the French appears to be that Great Britain is again playing the role of perfide Albion, and will allow Ibn Saud to attack King Hussein in order to be able to come to the latter's rescue with Moslem troops, and thus consolidate her position in the Hedjaz.

King Hussein and the French.—The refusal of the King to acknowledge the validity of the Capitulations, which question was raised owing to his treatment and rejection of the French correspondent in Medina, led at the end of length to his stating that should the French Moslem officer in Mecca come to the

King Hussein and the French.—The refusal of the King to acknowledge the validity of the Capitulations, which question was raised owing to his treatment and rejection of the French correspondent in Medina, led at the end of length to his stating that should the French Moslem officer in Mecca come to the

offence against the laws of the country he would be similarly treated without reference to the French consul-general.

I understand the consul-general has received the congratulations of his Government on the tactful handling of his difficult position here.

Certificates of Nationality. I attach a translation of letter No. 208 from the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. In accordance with instructions, certificates are being issued to those entitled to them. The King considers all foreign subjects resident even temporarily in the Hedjaz, as his subjects. The letter may also possibly refer to the passports granted by the Hedjaz representative in Cairo. One such passport, which I have seen, is in favour of an Egyptian who came for the Haj, showing him as a Hedjaz subject. Particulars have been noted.

Capitulations.—Incidents of British subjects being arrested have recently been satisfactorily settled without directly raising this question. Two British subjects have been since arrested for failure to comply with an order for increased maintenance to their father, without reference to me, and seemingly unjustly, in view of a former judgment in my possession. I have protested, and await the King's answer with interest, as this case, coupled with the letter, appear to indicate that he may now be raising the question of the validity of the Capitulations with us, as in the case of the French.

The above and the result of the conference held with the French and Dutch representatives in September, already reported to you, have been telegraphed to London, in reply to a cable.

Cable.—The question of the ownership of the cable has been again raised by the King, as anticipated, on submission of the accounts.

Indians and Pilgrimage Conditions.—The summary of claims made by pilgrims to the agency and submitted to the Government has been returned. Further claims of preparation. I have forwarded separately a statement from a member of the Haj Committee. The King refuses to consider any claims not made to him personally.

Local Press.—Attention is called to the increasing references to Bolshevism both the "Qibla" and "Falah" recently. In view of the approval of the Cairo Fatwa condemning Bolshevism last year, such references are significant.

of Amir Feisal.—King Hussein appears very satisfied by the communication of His Majesty's Government.

Steam Enterprise in the Hedjaz.—The three light Fiat passenger boats previously reported as having arrived belong to a certain M. T. known as a trader in Egypt, and

He was recently in Jeddah, and intends importing machinery for starting operations with a view to founding a general business in works of public utility, offering as an inducement to King Hussein free light and water in his offices, as well as presenting the cars free to the Government, provided he receives a percentage of the profits on a minimum of 4000 trips yearly between Jeddah and

I have ascertained that King Hussein is not at present at all agreeable to considering M. Pastori's offer, but has informed him he will let him know later. He is expected in Jeddah again shortly. The transport project has aroused the keenest opposition from Mohammed Tawil, Director of Customs, and the nominal head of the local transport company.

As the latter has been decorated with the 1st Class of the Order of the Nishan, and King Hussein has stated he now considers him as one of his sons, his opposition will probably be effective.

Arrivals.—A Cavalier Bernabé has again taken up his duties as envoy of the Royal Government.

Sheriff Nassir bin Shakir arrived by the last mail steamer, and Emir Zaid is expected here by the next.

W. BATTEN, Major,
Acting British Agent.

Enclosure 1 in No. 389

Translation of Letter from King Hussein

WE have more than once pointed out to you, but, owing to the bad luck and misfortune which we have had with British officials and great men during the last years, we have been unable to make them understand, that all they wish and want our Government to do we undoubtedly never hesitate to carry out, so long as it is our mutual interests, and this condition is with a view to some important points which nobody can understand, except those who are well acquainted with the country, and especially what happened during these last years.

For the simplest proof of this, look to your dear ally, who is causing agitation against you in Palestine and in Mesopotamia and is spending much money. I do not think that you are unaware of this.

The object of such statement is that we had been easy with you regarding the appointment of a special official in Mecca. At that time we had tried to lessen the special arrangements for the pilgrims who are British subjects.

Now the French and the Dutch are asking for the same privileges, and you are not ignorant of the dangers of granting them. You also know how unwise it would be and what the people of the country and abroad would think of it.

Therefore we have felt obliged to simply mention what your Excellency may probably hear of.

Please, therefore, consider over the results of the requests, because, if we wanted both parties and prevent such a thing happening, you say that we are opposing your wishes and not carrying them out.

"It is God only Whom we can complain."

Enclosure 2 in No. 389

Sharaf Abdel Munsem to Major Batten

November 7, 1920

I BEG to inform your Excellency that some Arab people, especially of the Arabian Peninsula, repeatedly request to be given their nationality certificates, particularly those who are merchants. They ask for such papers to be in their possession in case of travelling purposes, &c., because they are bound by the treaty which is the strongest bond and the clearest proof to such relation.

Therefore I hasten to inform you of same with a view to our mutual interests as pointed out in the original agreements, which say that the Arab interests are to be considered as if they are exactly the British interests, and vice versa.

This is written for your information, to note the connection between the British Government and her stepdaughter the Arab Government.

With best respects,

SHARAF ABDEL MUNSEM,
Under Secretary for the Arab Government.

E 15820 3880 44] No. 390

Acting British Agent, Jeddah to Earl Curzon (Received December 20)

(Secret)
My Lord,
Jeddah, December 2, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period from 1st to 31st Dec 1920.

A copy of this report has been sent to his Excellency the High Commissioner in Egypt.

I have, &c.
W. BATTEN, Major.

Jeddah Report for the Period November 20 to 30 1920

1 Visit of King Hussein to Jeddah

His Majesty arrived on the morning of the 24th November having ridden from Mecca. The visit was primarily to welcome his Highness Emir Zeid, whom the King had not seen for over five years.

I called shortly after his arrival, the ensuing interview being of a most cordial and friendly nature. Beyond certain remarks as to Great Britain having deserted the Arabs, on which subject the King, shaking his head sadly, would accept no assurances, no political matters were referred to, as he was evidently disinclined to discuss business. As usual on such occasions King Hussein was a model of kindly and courteous friendliness.

He appeared remarkably well and vigorous, having evidently recovered from his recent indisposition, and showed no outward sign of the anxieties weighing on him.

The King was fully occupied with local business until far into the night and with the reception of his son the next morning. The latter was received on landing with a salute of twenty-one guns, speeches and processions. Demonstrations in the town were mostly confined to the King's large miscellaneous following from Mecca.

I again called in the afternoon and took the opportunity of paying my respects to Emir Zeid. The Italian envoy was shown in shortly afterwards and a general conversation ensued, the Emir talking Italian fluently with the former, with whom he appeared to be on very friendly terms, having known him while in Italy.

As the King began to show signs of impatience and was due to leave shortly I rose to take my leave but on King Hussein expressing a desire to see me alone, the others present retired.

I ventured to broach the question of passports (referred to later in this report) but the King waved this aside, saying he had more important matters to discuss.

The subsequent interview which lasted over an hour was somewhat painful owing to King Hussein's increasing agitation but an explosion of rage such as was to be expected from former similar interviews, happily did not take place.

King Hussein reiterated at length his well worn theme of having risen not only to his own interests (a refreshing admission) but to the interests of Great Britain a mitigation and counting on her promises, which in turn led him to make promises to the Arabs which he has been unable to fulfil leading to his being accused of having sold himself to foreigners. That, as he had stated numberless times without receiving any reply or satisfaction his present position had, from the point of view of his own honour and that of practical affairs alike, become quite untenable. He was on the one side accused of treachery by the Arabs, and on the other denied support by Great Britain, who had deceived and now deserted him. Great Britain accused him of not meeting her wishes, whereas he was, as ever her friend and would continue to be so, whether as a plain Arab (meaning if he resigned) or as King of the Hedjaz.

The King made reiterated protestations of his friendship and desire to deal with the rest of the world only through His Majesty's Government. He did not care for Leagues of Nations or conferences and relied on Great Britain even now despite his bitter disappointments. Here the King dramatically clutched his beard and was silent for a moment then turning to me again said "Who is trying to work against you at this moment with me? Your good friend the French both here and elsewhere." I deprecated any such remarks but King Hussein cut me short.

In the last report submitted to his Excellency the High Commissioner, mention was made of similar allegations by King Hussein as to French intrigue in Palestine and Mesopotamia.

King Hussein was apparently unconscious of the incongruity of proving his loyalty to Great Britain by making a virtue of refusing alleged French advances, and of the transparency of such efforts to sow distrust between the two Governments.

Continuing, the King then turned to the question of the Akhwan, recapitulating past events, recounting incidents of Akhwan aggression subsequent to the temporary truce agreed upon in September and asking how long he was to be expected to hold his hand in deference to our wishes, permitting Akhwan infiltration to proceed unchecked.

Pointing through the window to the hills he said "They are there now four

hours from the Wadi Futima. The Harb and the Ateibah are at loggerheads and on the border my Arabs are being asked which side they are on by Akhwan. I say to myself they are the precursors of a great host and who threaten destruction. I do not declare for Ibn Saud." Ibn Saud himself was behind it all—he had no proof and his patience was exhausted. Ibn Saud, he knew, was our ally, as he was himself—he had seen the agreements—and Great Britain was in a position to ensure, if she chose, that he should refrain from aggression against the Hedjaz. But apparently Ibn Saud was free to do as he liked while Great Britain refused to countenance, not retaliation, but bare protection against attack.

The King listened to my requests for further details attentively. I reiterated that the incidents of which I knew were but the precursor of a great movement of Tais and Mecca he had no substantial information to offer. I am endeavouring as far as possible to check his statements and collect all the information possible, but am of the opinion he has purposely exaggerated the present undoubtedly restless situation, while at the same time I was convinced of the genuineness of his fears and the sincerity of his feelings as to being at the end of his forbearance.

Any views not in accordance with his one-sided presentation of the situation the King as usual swept aside and I, in my discussions, he replied that successive British agents (excepting Colonel Wilson by name) had continued to put him off with assurances and appeals, without any apparent result or recently even any reply from His Majesty's Government.

The King said it was impossible for this new country just finding its feet, to continue to exist unless supported by its parent Great Britain, and he alluded to the subsidy, likened its present position to a young boy who has been a gardener has light heartedly forgotten to water for two days, remembering too late only to find it withered.

In a subdued and broken voice King Hussein prayed that His Majesty's Government would either support him according to the former promises or relieve him of his unbearable responsibility. His people called him a traitor and a tyrant and the Moslem world looked at him askance. He was an old man and could bear the strain no longer. He had only done so to meet the wishes of His Majesty's Government whose friend he would remain, whatever should ensue. There were many others among the Ashraf capable of taking his place Sherref Ali Ha dar for instance, thus permitting him to retire with his unfortunate sons and pass the few years of his life in peace. If his present policy did not permit Great Britain to support him he must retire.

I attempted to appeal to his better judgment and induce him to take a more hopeful view of his imaginary position, referring to the forthcoming visit of F. E. Fitzgerald but the King closed the interview by asking that his words should be fully reported and not dismissed in a curt telegram as he feared from the result of many similar meetings that His Majesty's Government was not taking his protestations seriously.

The King left very shortly afterwards on horseback for Mecca accompanied by Emir Zeid.

2 Capitulations in the Hedjaz

With reference to the incident referred to in my telegram No. 388 of the 20th November the two British Indian subjects who were imprisoned without reference to the agency are still under detention.

Apart from the question of arrest, careful enquiry into the case has proved that their imprisonment is against all justice, and I have had to advance enough to their family to keep them from starvation pending the detention of these men in prison.

Attempts to have the case reconsidered on its merits have been fruitless, as also requests to King Hussein for release, and no satisfactory reply has so far been received to my protest pointing out that both parties in the case are British Indian subjects.

Briefly summed up, these men have been imprisoned for being unable to comply with an order doubling the maintenance allowed to their father, a British Indian subject resident in Mecca.

In view of the sense of your Lordship's telegram No. 4 of the 19th November no reference has been made to the Capitulations in attempting to settle this matter and care has been taken to avoid any appearance of interference in the points of religious law involved.

3. Refusal of King Hussein to accept Foreign Passports

Attention has been previously drawn to King Hussein's pretension to considering all Moslems while in this country as Hedjaz subjects.

Before visiting Jeddah, he issued secret orders that nobody in possession of foreign papers was to be allowed to leave the Hedjaz unless such papers were dated previous to the war.

Certain Makalla subjects possessing valid passports, made out for Singapore, and actually countersigned as passed by the local officials, were informed at the last moment that they would not be allowed to proceed, but were given no reason.

On their appealing to the agency, reference was made to the kaimakam. Meanwhile, King Hussein had arrived. The kaimakam asked me privately to keep him out of the matter, as I well understood his position.

The last steamer which could take the pilgrims to Singapore direct this year, and by which they had return tickets, was in harbour and due to sail in a few hours.

I accordingly referred the matter direct to the King, who made on my note an endorsement, which he was careful not to sign, referring vaguely to a rule regarding papers being dated before the war, which he sent to the kaimakam.

The same evening the King sent me a letter, also unsigned, stating that owing to the present situation in the East Indies, Egypt and India, he did not wish any of his subjects to proceed to these countries until he had made certain of their identities. There was no reference to foreign subjects.

Meanwhile, the pilgrims again attempted to embark, but were prevented. I accordingly sent my Indian police officer to help them. The officials would neither allow them to leave nor produce any reason why they should not. I was still without any official knowledge of the King's secret order, and his endorsement on my letter directed the kaimakam to let them leave if their papers were in order.

As the kaimakam was not to be found, I offered to let the passport officer give an assurance in writing that the matter was in order, taking the responsibility myself, but he refused to allow the pilgrims to embark in their sambuk without a written order from the kaimakam.

I then sent the pilgrims to reach the steamer in time by any means, and the Indian sub-inspector to take them off in the agency launch. Owing to further delay the launch however did not succeed in reaching the steamer in time.

Learning subsequently that these pilgrims had been imprisoned, I referred the matter to the King and they were released the next morning. The King sent for them but they were told he was too busy to see them.

The same morning a subject of the Anglo-Egyptian Soudan in possession of a proper passport, who had come to Jeddah for ten days on business, was prevented from embarking on the mail steamer leaving for Port Soudan, being informed that as his passport did not date from before the war, he could not leave the country.

The whole matter was complicated by the presence here of King Hussein, his fully employed with official and private business, the necessity of avoiding if possible any unpleasant incidents such as occurred at the time of the quarantine controversy, and the difficulty of obtaining any definite official statement upholding the action of the passport officer. This was, however, eventually obtained.

Since then every effort has been made to induce King Hussein to reconsider his action, to explain the nature of a passport and to point out the incongruity of his expecting me to endorse any Hedjaz passport while at the same time refusing to issue one. I signed and sent to the King the passport of a Hedjaz subject wishing to proceed to Port Soudan by the same steamer, by which the Soudanese subject mentioned above was prevented from returning together with the latter's papers.

A pilgrim from Bokhara, returning from this year's hadj, unable to speak Arabic and already in possession of a pilgrim passport, was informed he could not leave without a passport from the Government. In this he is described as a resident of Mecca, and an Arab subject of the Hashimite Government.

Local officials realise the absurdity of the position, but are powerless. The King's order has now been published in the "Qibla." The French consul-general has protested energetically in the name of his Government. The Italian envoy also informed me he would protest an Italian subject having been similarly detained.

Explanations and conciliation having proved fruitless, should King Hussein's reply to the telegram attached herewith prove unsatisfactory, the only course open

to me in the interests of British subjects is to enter a formal protest and inform him that the matter has been referred to higher authority.

The French consul-general, who has called more than once to ascertain the views of His Majesty's Government, treats the matter as an infringement of the Capitulations. I informed him the matter appeared to me to be due to a misapprehension on the part of King Hussein as to the nature of a passport, but that failing satisfaction I would take action as above.

The following appear to be possible reasons for King Hussein's action:

1. He fears that people whom he wishes to prevent spreading reports unfavourable to himself in Moslem countries may leave under cover of a foreign passport. His own subjects are forbidden to leave the country without special permission granted after a personal interview.
2. In the case of Syrians, he wishes to avoid committing himself by allowing their papers to be endorsed at the French consulate. A large party of destitute Syrians, for whom free transport to Beirut by the armed vessel "Crignet" had been arranged by the Government through the French consul-general, were detained when about to embark.
3. He considers all such as his subjects. No papers are being granted by the agency except to those able to produce former ones, or proof of their having possessed them. The Government has been informed of this, and in addition I am temporarily holding up all applications of those who appear to have made the Hedjaz their home.
4. He considers all Moslems of whatever origin as under his jurisdiction while in the Hedjaz. I understand the King once stated that should all foreigners in the country claim the protection of their nationality, he would be left with no subjects in the two Holy Cities and in Jeddah.
5. He may possibly have created this situation deliberately to prove his independence among the Powers concerned, and make political capital out of any resulting action. In view of his present temper such a motive on his part is not improbable.

4. General

Case of Steamship "Montazah" With reference to this claim by the Khedivial Mail Company against the Hashimite Government, King Hussein refused to admit that the company had any claim, legal or otherwise.

The kaimakam, after a further interview with me, agreed to use his good offices in attempting to persuade the King to acknowledge the moral obligation incurred by the Government, but without any success.

Jeddah Sukin Cable—The outstanding claims of the Soudan Telegraph Administration amount to some £E 11,000. As anticipated when the monthly bills were forwarded for settlement, the Government avoided the question of payment until the end of the Arabic year, submitting then a counter claim showing a large balance due to the Hedjaz.

The King, as before, that until the question of the ownership of the cable is settled, the charges are held in trust in a suspense account, and pressed for an early settlement of these bills, which represent actual expenditure by the Soudan Administration on behalf of the Hashimite Government.

The Director General of Posts and Telegraphs, on my putting the matter clearly before him, promised that a large sum could be paid but promised to remit through me some part of it on account.

I attach no value to his promise, nor is it likely that the King will agree to meet the claim.

It is not expected in this matter as in that of the steamship "Montazah" or the claims submitted through the agency by Indian pilgrims.

I am informing the Finance Department of the Soudan Government in this sense and requesting them to refer the matter direct to the Foreign Office.

Proposed Aden-Kunfidah Service Messrs. Cowasjee Dinshaw of Aden proposed to extend the service of their steamers from Hodeidah to Kunfidah provided they received an assurance of safety.

They were informed the small Italian vessel "Nilo" called at this port, and I

telegraphed to the Political Resident at Aden that such a service was most desirable wishing to avoid reference to King Hussein if possible until the matter was settled

On the above firm requesting an explicit assurance of safety from the local authorities, I mentioned the matter to the King, who has replied that the proposed service is not desirable at present.

3 Abstract from Micca report

Ibn Rashid—It is stated a deputation from Hail is expected shortly in Mecca in connection with negotiations as to the territory between El Ula and the littoral to which apparently Ibn Rashid laid claim on the strength of titles admitted by the Turkish Government.

The trouble in the vicinity of Ummlejh is reported to be not unconnected with the above.

Medina.—The direct route from Mecca is still closed, and no traffic allowed in the vicinity of Medina by the Hanuda pending receipt of wheat promised by the

... from cornucopias to the coast were all held up and rubbed

... to the north was cut for some time recently and a train from Maan

This was partially confirmed to me by King Hussein, who had been for some time anxious at not receiving any letters from Emir Abdullah. Communication has since been restored.

The wheat originally commandeered by Emir Ali from the charitable supplies sent by Egypt is still retained by the Government.

High prices continue to rule in the town. Raids take place up to the walls, and conditions are such that pilgrims cannot visit shrines outside without danger.

Current Rumours.—Meen continues to discuss the alleged intention of King Hussein to sever his connection with the Allies, and secret endeavours to unite as many Arabs of the peninsula as possible against foreign interference, as well as his reported machinations in Iraq through Haid and his secret communications with the Turkish Nationalists.

6. *Рисунки*

Nos. 435 and 436 of the "Qibla" and No. 14 of the "Falah" are forwarded herewith.

The latter contains an article on the Cuhjate, in favour of King Hussein, for publishing which it receives an official warning in No. 435 of the 'Qibla'.

No. 434 of the "Qala," under the heading "The Meaning of Guardianship," quotes, ostensibly from Enur Fural, opinions on the present situation of the Arabs concluding with the statement that the Allies are apparently intriguing against Islam.

W. BATTEN, Mayor

Enclosure 2 to No. 39

Telegram from Major Hotten to King Hussein

(No. 1214. Secret.)

November 30, 1920

AFTER respects. References Under-Secretary's telegram No. 8 replying to my No. 1212. I venture as your Majesty's well-wisher to advise your Majesty that present moment in view forthcoming discussions is most inopportune to choose for denying the plain rights of British subjects to travel as they wish.

I cannot see how your Majesty's protestations that you always wish to help His Majesty's Government and never do anything contrary agree with this particular action, which cannot be called by anything less than an unfriendly act. We afford every facility to your Majesty's subjects when they bring your Majesty's passports

be any cause for suspicion against a traveller, Government has only to advise me that the matter can be examined, and I have also offered take responsibility of countersigning as correct passports issued elsewhere in order help Government in this matter. May I venture suggest to your Majesty that it is difficult to see how it is to your Majesty's advantage in any way to restrict travel of British subjects.

* Not printed

proceeding on proper business, and I most
own interests to consider what I have said

I note in kannakam Jeddah's letter No 546, just received, Indians, & others of Japanese, and all whose nationality is obvious are not required to produce passports, and are not restricted, but this is not the question—it is the refusal of Government to accept a properly authenticated passport wherever issued and at whatever date as presented to your Majesty's

The Government's action in this matter is contrary to the provisions of international law and the rights of free travel open to all people all over the world, and by persisting in this action Government places itself in a very false position by going contrary to universal established rights while at the same time gaining no advantage for itself.

I urge on your Majesty the view that it is impolitic to continue what, to be frank from any point of view is an unjustifiable action which is bound to lead to protests from all concerned and create difficulties unnecessarily.

Enclosure 3 is No. [redacted]

Shipping Intelligence to November 30, 1920

THE following steamers arrived at, and departed from, Jeddah between the 19th and 30th November:

[illegible]

[E 15801 38 44]

No. 391

Field-Marshal Viscount Allday to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 20.)

CAIRO, December 1901

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship a letter, in original, to the
 Hon. W. A. A. to Jeddah, with which he forwarded a
 complaint submitted by a member of the Katruchi Hy. Committee

I have de

1 2 3 4 5 6

† closure 1 in No. 334

Vol. from Major Batten to High 1

WITH reference to the paragraph in the current report on this year's pilgrimages to Mecca, I forward herewith for the information of his Excellency the High Commissioner a statement received from Mr Hafez Mohammed Ghulam Ahmad Khan, honorary magistrate, M R A S, a member of the Kameln Haj Co.

I have replied that the matter is receiving every attention, that the suggestions regarding claims and complaints from pilgrims

W. J. L. J.

• *Three articles about*

Sunday, November 17, 1901

Petition addressed to His Majesty's Consul, Jeddah

Sir

WE, the undersigned, beg most respectfully to approach you on behalf of the Hedjaz pilgrims, and to lay before you the following grievances in the hope that they will receive your fullest and most sympathetic consideration:-

2. It will be remembered that it was in response to the prayer of a deputation of Indian pilgrims which waited upon you at Jeddah on the 18th July, 1920, that His Majesty the King of Hedjaz was moved to arrange for a caravan to take the pilgrims from Jeddah to Medina and back to Mecca in time before the Haj. His Majesty evinced greatest solicitude for the safety of the pilgrims and, although he took all possible precautionary measures and placed the caravan, which started from Jeddah on the 21st July and arrived at Medina on the 2nd August, 1920, under the command of one Sheikh Oudab Ibn-Murzak and Hamid, it encountered difficulties almost at every step, some of which are mentioned below:-

- (1.) On the night of the 24th July two of the Bengali pilgrims were seized by Bedouins, who threatened their life and robbed their belongings.
- (2.) At a place called Hira Sheikh, one Haji Khanjan Mirdha, of Lodia (thana Bakhah, district Backerganj, Bengal), went out to answer the call of Haj but did not return. His disappearance was duly reported to the authorities but to no effect. It transpired subsequently that the Haji had been killed by the Bedouins, who brought him his death. It was suspected that the murder was in collusion with the Jannals.
- (3.) One Abdul Jabbar, of Banisai (thana Godagari, district Rajshahi, Bengal) was severely wounded by his Jannal Muhammad by name, that his face and clothes were besmeared with blood. A complaint was made against the Jannal but he was off on the plea that he had been affected with lunacy.
- (4.) After we passed Hal- we were distinctly told that the road to Medina is dangerous; thus for the safety of our lives, families and children, we bought three magazine rifles and a revolver, though we paid a heavy tax to the authorities; but in some places, being in possession of arms, we remained and did not pay anything, and, in fact, the little command that we had. If we would not have had the above arms we cannot desert to what our fate would have been. Our revolver, along with a hand-bag, was robbed in broad daylight from our Shulghaf at Medina before our departure to Jeddah for Mecca. Two rifles were handed over to Captain Nazeer-ul-Din, Ahmad Sahib at Jeddah, by Mr. Mohammed Ghulam Hassan Khan, and one rifle by Sheikh Imam Baksh Muzaffar-ul-Din to the British Agency at Jeddah.
- (5.) On the 29th July the caravan was stopped a few miles ahead of Hira Sheikh. Sheikh Oudab announced the approach of 500 Bedouins, and required the pilgrims to pay 1 majidi per camel to bribe them off. No trace of the Bedouins was, however, found when the caravan passed.
- (6.) One day it was reported that another party of Bedouins would attack the caravan. The pilgrims did not believe in the report, and the caravan passed without incident.
- (7.) On the 30th July the caravan was again stopped, and a further sum of 3 majidis per camel was extorted on the plea of approaching danger from Bedouins.
- (8.) One Farid, an attendant of Mr. Ghulam Hassan Khan, honorary Consul at Karachi, was given a deadly blow in broad daylight by a Bedouin with the butt end of his gun. Farid fell down unconscious, and his purse was snatched away from him. This incident took place in the presence of the Jannals, who were apparently in collusion with the Bedouins. Asif ul Qadir, son of Muhammad Hussain Motawif, was an eye-witness to the occurrence.
- (9.) One Java pilgrim was said to have been killed by a Bedouin who, it was reported, ran away with the pilgrim's wife.
- (10.) At Rabegh Sheikh Oudab approached the pilgrims and demanded payment at 1 rupee per head, which had to be complied with.

- (11.) The Jannals extorted from the pilgrims - rupees per day for each camel, and they or temper their fiery disposition. The return the pilgrims received from them was nothing short of inhumanity, cowardice and savagery.
- (12.) The pilgrims suffered a loss of 5,703 rupees, as detailed below:-

(a.)	Amount paid to Sheikh Oudab Ibn-Murzak	
b.)	" " to Bedouins at 1 majidi per	
c.)	" " to Bedouins near K. sales at 2 majidis per camel	
	to Jannals at 1 rupee per	
	per diem for twenty-	
	for two halts at Medina at 5 rupees	
	per halt, excluding charge for	
	free ration to Jannals	

Total

5,703

1. The above are only a few of the experiences of the pilgrims of the caravan, but the lot of those who traveled under ordinary circumstances can be better imagined. Robbery, assault, abduction and all conceivable forms of inhumanity to pilgrims. Even the suburbs of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina were not immune from the inhuman atrocities of the Bedouins. Never before were the pilgrims subjected to such

life-long cherished desire of visiting the Prophet's holy mausoleum at Medina in fear

4. It is not at the hands of the Jannals and Bedouins only that the pilgrims had their life and property ought to have remained. They were subjected to difficulties, sufferings, privations, loss and disappointment in consequence of the orders relating the road from Jeddah to Mecca to travellers on foot for one full week till the pilgrims had to reach Mecca, weary and footsore without adequate provisions. This could not be had, as they had been requisitioned for the reception given to the Governor of Medina.

The pilgrims (2,000 in number), who went to Medina via Yambo, were

5. In view of the grave situation apparently caused by a change in the Government it seems to be high time that the British Government should be moved to take proper steps for the security of the life and property of their Indian subjects, who form by far the largest proportion of pilgrims annually visiting the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. In spite of the best of intentions, the Agency the King of Hedjaz lacks the necessary means to enforce orders and secure safety, convenience and comfort. Regard

- (1.) To entrust the entire management of the Haj to a company of Indian Muslims under the terms to be settled by both the Hedjaz Government
- (2.) To improve the condition of the roads, to sink wells, to open serais and rest-houses, to reopen the railway lines between Yambo and Medina, and open new lines between Medina and Mecca, and Mecca and Jeddah, with a four
- (3.) To arrange for military and police escort to lead the caravan at the time of the Haj.
- (4.) To establish a board of enquiry composed of Indian Muslims, with statutory powers to investigate the cases of pilgrims who are killed or injured, and to receive and dispose of properties of deceased pilgrims.

- Pending any satisfactory arrangement with the King of Hedjaz, condition of peace and order, the British Government may be pleased to see the Indian Mussulmans of the insecurity prevailing in Hedjaz, and the pilgrims the magnitude of the hazard which the journey involves. We may say that the Hedjaz Government may be moved to compensate for the loss incurred by the pilgrims in course of their journey to and from Medina, as stated in a foregoing paragraph.

HAJEE MOHD. GHUAM HASSAN KHAN

IN submitting my report on the hadj (pilgrimage) for the year 1920 I must apologise for its unnecessary length, due to my efforts to make it as comprehensive as possible, an effort which in my position and circumstances has been an unsuccessful attempt. Much of what has been written must have been covered ground already, but of which I personally have no knowledge.

travelled by the
who are represented in

Bombay by Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co., and at Jeddah by Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co., and Messrs. Haji Zeinal Ali Reza and Brothers. The passengers by these steamers were, without exception, provided with return tickets.

A small party of about 1,300 pilgrims also travelled by steamship in the property of the Shushtri Company and they carried single tickets only. The return fare charged at the beginning was 125 rupees only, but it was raised to 150 rupees in July.

I have always been a strong advocate of the "return ticket system," but have now been forced to change my opinion on the point for several reasons.

During the war, Messrs. Turner, Morrison had practically the sole monopoly of carrying cargo and pilgrims to these ports, there being only the incompetent and inefficient Shushtri Company to compete with. Last year the two companies arrived at an agreement for interchanging tickets of pilgrims at Jeddah, but this year the arrangements fell through. There was no competitor in the field, and the number of pilgrims waiting to be carried being a large one the shipping firm promptly raised their fare, which was not fair on the public. The Shushtri Company, finding that on the strength of their one or two ships competition was impossible and grant of return tickets would be a hardship on the pilgrims, applied and obtained the Government's permission to issue single tickets. It is apparent to everybody that two different systems are bound to create an anomalous situation, and either the one or the other must go. The single ticket system, with its attendant evils, is the more popular, and is, therefore, recommended for introduction.

(a.) Last year the commissioner of police at Bombay received many complaints that the return tickets issued by the British agent at Jeddah were not valid. All return tickets examined and initialled by the inspector of police attached to the British agency at Jeddah. This may have been necessary and possible during the war time owing to the small number of pilgrims, but it is a physical impossibility for one man to cope with the work during a normal year without giving rise to numerous and serious complaints. After a long discussion with the British agent the system was abolished at my recommendation. As a certain amount of invisible check on the movements of a certain class of people is necessary, this can be more effectively done when the passengers have to buy a new ticket.

(b.) The possession of a return ticket is a great temptation to the local mutawwifs, thieves &c. Cases have occurred where the mutawwif or some other person has sold the return ticket from the simple pilgrim ostensibly to get it changed, but has sold the changed ticket to someone else. The real owner gets stranded. To stop this the British agent suggested that no tickets should be changed through the local brokers, and Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. at least have kindly taken up the suggestion. There is, however, no guarantee against unscrupulous Indians, who present themselves as companions or relatives of the others whom they have cheated.

(c.) In the event of a pilgrim dying, the heirs are put to unnecessary inconvenience and expense to recover the return ticket of the deceased from the Arab Government, who take it over immediately a death is reported.

(d.) The majority of the pilgrims are illiterate and cannot differentiate between a ticket, vaccination certificate or a passport. They cannot remember their ticket numbers, if lost.

(e.) There are others who deliberately sell their tickets, report them lost, and claim compassionate passage back.

(f.) Similarly, people who have travelled on single tickets, finding really deserving people being granted free passages back, try to obtain a return passage fraudulently.

Two alternatives suggest themselves:—

(1.) That the shipping companies should issue only single tickets on payment of the full fare. This would be a hardship on the pilgrims, but, on the other hand, unentitled persons may take the advantage of a free passage to India. Also the companies will be able to raise the fare to the level of the return fare, which would be a benefit to the country, while the right should go to the pilgrims who are the real customers.

(2.) That return tickets should be abolished altogether, and that provision of ample funds, to cover all expenses of the pilgrims' stay in the Hedjaz, return steamer fare, &c., be insisted upon, as suggested in a previous paragraph. The

pilgrims should be forewarned that they will have to deposit the amount, along with the steamer fare. This procedure would, no doubt, entail extra work, responsibility and expense on the companies, for which they could compensate themselves by an additional charge of, say, 1 per cent. on the steamer fare.

In the event of a pilgrim dying, his estate could be forwarded to the British agency at Jeddah for disposal.

I would strongly urge early consideration of this point, and decision announced before February next at the latest.

Healthy competition between rival shipping firms should be encouraged, and at the same time certain much-required improvements in the steamers should also be insisted upon. Wireless installation and provision of a large number of electrical fans on every pilgrim ship are extremely necessary as the travelling for the hadj will, for the next eleven years at least, have to be done during the hot weather when the monsoon season will be at its highest.

Abu Sa'd Quarantine—Strictly speaking the pilgrim's troubles begin when he leaves his house, unprovided and uninformed. But real hardship begins just after the ship anchors off Jeddah, where for the first time he hears spoken a language different to his own. He is met by the quarantine official, who packs him off to the quarantine camp without regard to the general health and cleanliness of the ship.

It is in reality to assert the sovereign rights of the "Independent Kingdom of Hedjaz," and to prove to the world that its King is not the paid creature of a Christian Power.

The pilgrims are carried to Abu Sa'd Island, where they are detained for twenty-four hours at least and sometimes for three days. Their baggage is allowed to remain in the sailing boats, and as it consists of their bedding, food and clothing, they experience great discomfort. A portion of it occasionally gets lost, or is stolen by the boatmen, and in most cases it comprises the whole effects of the pilgrims.

The supplies on the island are sold at very dear prices, and the list of prices, which is generally out of date, is seldom followed.

Hours elapse before the pilgrims can obtain any drinking water. It is distributed by means of tickets and at the convenience of the official in charge. In this hot season such negligence on the part of responsible persons is nothing less than criminal.

Jeddah—Be it said to the credit of the King Hussein that, ever since his arrival at Mecca, first as Emir and then as King, he has taken a keen interest in the welfare of his subjects. He has appointed a committee at Jeddah under the presidency of Sherref Taha, whose function is to provide facilities for the travellers arriving by sea, to attend to their complaints, and to see that they are not charged more than what is reasonable. He also fixed a schedule of charges for boat and coolie hire and for house rent, and had it printed in several languages.

I must say that the King's choice for the chairmanship of this important committee is very unfortunate. Sherref Taha is most unsympathetic, and like everybody else, anxious to make as much money as possible. Twice I had occasion to bring to the King's notice complaints of pilgrims, and on both occasions he reprimanded Sherref Taha severely. But this did not improve matters.

My complaints are as below:—

(a.) The committee occasionally satisfy themselves by asking a stray pilgrim or two the amount paid by him to the boatmen, but take good care not to take notice of any report which is likely to be unsavoury. Very few people could be found who paid the regulation maximum of rupee 1 4 0.

(b.) On arrival at the jetty the pilgrims have to wait the pleasure of the custom authorities, who sometimes take eight hours to release the baggage of a pilgrim. In the interim thieves get busy, some packages get lost, and in cases which I have sent to our inspector of police for enquiry from the Arab officials, the result has always been disappointing.

(c.) No differential treatment is accorded to the first-, second- or third-class passengers, and all are kept herded together pending the search of baggage. Men and women are also kept together, but this, I am afraid, is difficult to arrange otherwise in a place and situation like this without very elaborate arrangements. I have mentioned a case elsewhere and, in view of the existence of

practices as mentioned there, the leaving alone of their womenfolk by the men pilgrims would be the height of folly.

(d) Here again the difficulty of obtaining drinking water during the period of waiting is faced. The King issued repeated orders about this, but the orders were more neglected than obeyed.

The question of water supply at Jeddah is one deserving of the special attention of the authorities. The storage tanks are the private property of merchants in Jeddah, and are a great source of revenue to their owners. The price of water at Jeddah during the period of pilgrims' stay there ranged from 1 piastre per tin to 10. Condensed water was only to be had in very small quantities and only by those who could afford to fight for it and pay. Sherref Taha specially benefits from this source. It was a pitiable sight to see the old, weak and sick pilgrims waiting for hours to obtain water and return disappointed. The King ordered the distribution of water free of charge, but the arrangements made for this purpose were not satisfactory.

For the sake of the health and convenience of the population and pilgrims the installation of a new condenser appears necessary.

Journey from Jeddah.—The pilgrims do not ordinarily stay at Jeddah for long if they can obtain transport. In the slack season this is easily obtainable, but a few days before the hajj no camels can be had, as they are concentrated at Mecca for the journey to 'Arafat and back. The camel hire is fixed by the kaimakam of Jeddah in consultation with the Amir-el-Arban, and varies from time to time, in accordance with the supply and demand. The average hire ranged between 11 rupees and 15 rupees per camel between Jeddah and Mecca, but pilgrims paid as much as 30 rupees, owing to the difficulty of obtaining camels.

This happened only with the last batch of pilgrims who arrived late. The Hashimite Government took immediate steps to despatch a large number of camels from Mecca, but the failure even then of some pilgrims to get them shows that a trick was played somewhere.

Practically the whole stretch of the country from Jeddah to Mecca is bare and sandy. There is no water obtainable for the first 25 miles, except at the coffee shops, where a limited supply is brought from Jeddah or Bahra. It is difficult to give even a rough estimate of the deaths on the route due to heat of the sun from above radiation of heat and glare from below, aggravated by the absence of water, but there are over 200 graves to be seen at Bahra alone, and unburied corpses were found by travellers all along the road. At the representation of Dr. Muhammad-el-Husaini, the King issued orders for their burial.

Railway.—The condition of the country around does not suggest any other solution of this problem, except that of construction of a railway or a tram line between Jeddah and Arafat. Motor service is in contemplation, but the organisers fail to realise the fact that it is an expensive luxury, and beyond the reach of the pilgrims. The railway project is a very good one, and it is hoped that it will succeed.

There are no engineering difficulties in the way of a railway line, and an outlay of 500,000 will not only build a railway line but also provide a certain amount of rolling stock. This outlay will repay itself in a very short time, and once an initiative is taken by the Hashimite Government, I am sure that the whole of the Moslem world will contribute towards the expense. It is a notorious fact that any projects for the improvement of the Hajj are usually approved by the Emirs of Mecca, on the ground that by so doing the Bedous will lose employment. Even the King Hussein stubbornly resisted the Turkish proposal of constructing a railway between Jeddah and Mecca as recently as 1914, and utilised the material brought into the country for this purpose on other things. It is possible he might consider the proposal favourably now. The Bedous can be employed in manual labour, and would certainly not lose in the end by the introduction of this essential comfort.

Mecca.—The house accommodation at Mecca by far exceeds the requirements of the permanent population and largely contributes to the income of the Meccans. The season is at its height about a fortnight before and after the 'Arafat Day, and the visitors have to pay rent for full year for the luxury of living in a house for three weeks or so. With the exception of the poorest class of pilgrims, mostly of the Takturi class, who work and beg during the day, and sleep in the Harem or the streets during the night, all others rent themselves houses. The well-to-do amongst

the Indians, Javanese, and other nationalities take separate blocks or storeys, but the majority are housed by the mutawwifs, in houses rented by them for this purpose. They receive a rent of rupees 12-8-0 per pilgrim for the season. Amongst the first class of pilgrims, there is a tendency to rent a house as near the Harem as possible, while the others are packed by the mutawwifs in the houses set apart for the purpose. In either case the congestion is great, either through the zeal of pilgrims to live near the Harem, or through the greed of the mutawwifs, and is extremely deplorable. It is true that the old Turkish system of marking the capacity of houses and the number of pilgrims permitted to reside there, still exists, but the persons responsible for keeping a check against overcrowding do not perform their duties, either because they are too busy or because they share the spoils. The last theory is not an impossible one, and the first is also not untrue.

The housing conditions of the Indians would be greatly improved, at least for the poorer class, if there were proper control over the Indian rabais here, which are not being put to the use their dedicators intended. This question has been dealt with in connection with the proposed Indian hostel at Mecca, and it is to be hoped that it will receive consideration.

Sanitation.—This does not receive due attention and the activities of the municipality are limited to the daily sweeping of the main thoroughfares. I am told, however, that sanitation during Turkish régime was worse, and that it is better now.

The town of Mecca has a very irregular shape, its streets are crooked and narrow, some only 6 feet in breadth, and the height of the buildings on either side hinders rays of the sun from penetrating to the surface of the street. Even then the main thoroughfare of Mecca, extending from west to east, is not more than 10 feet at places.

A very large establishment is needed for the proper sanitation of the town all the year round, and special extra staff should be engaged during the season.

The few public latrines are insufficient, at least two dozen more are needed, and special arrangements for their cleaning twice, if not thrice, daily and the disposal of the refuse are desirable.

Health and Hospital in Mecca.—There is one Government dispensary in charge of Dr. Khalil el-Husaini, and a general hospital of 200 beds, with Dr. Nodun in charge. The average number of patients in the hospital never exceeded thirty-five. This was not due to any lack of patients, but to the lack of encouragement on the part of the medical officers to the patients to ask for admission.

Bonded for Meccans or persons in the civil and military employ of the State were always taken in. During the season, there could be seen scores of sick men and women lying about the streets of Mecca, with no one to look after them, dependent on the charity of passers-by, suffering from all sorts of diseases, some hardly able to crawl, and constituted a great public danger. I am glad to say that they were eventually removed to the hospital.

I shall be doing a grave injustice to the medical officers if I do not mention the other side of the case as well. They are hopelessly undermanned, their salaries are small, and the present hospital staff is entirely inadequate to look after 200 patients, and at the same time prescribe for the outdoor public. Their knowledge of English languages is another drawback. Moreover, I have seen the medical officers themselves, and am not at all surprised that in the circumstances they do not like to have patients stay in the hospital.

As regards the hospital and wards themselves, they are kept fairly clean, but there are things which, even to a non-professional eye, appear to be hopelessly out of place or wanting. For instance, a case of advanced consumption lay side by side with one of fever or dysentery. Wards have no wire-gauze spring doors and abound in flies. In fact, the medical officer's own room was full of them.

The refusal of the King to permit the Indian hospital to come to Mecca has already caused the Government of India great expenditure and annoyance, but we should insist on his accepting it next year. If he does not do so, he must make other adequate arrangements. I see that he is taking a great pride in the fact that the health of pilgrims has been declared to be satisfactory, and considers that this is all due to his foresight and excellent arrangements. No thanks, however, are due to him for this small feat. It is a pity that he has not sent a foreign hospital into the country as interference in his internal affairs, a blot on the fair fame of his efficient administration, and against his independence. A half-mad autocrat must not be allowed to play with the health and lives of millions of people like this.

Water Supply.—Besides the wells and storage tanks, there is a plentiful supply of water from the 'Ain Zubeida conduit. It takes its source from the Humain spring on the Jebel Tad, about 55 kilom. from Mecca to the north-east of Arafat. A subsidiary aqueduct from Wadi Nonnan, from below Jebel Kara, supplements its water, and there are other catch water drains that help to keep the water at a high level and join the main channel south of Mina, in a large reservoir called "Bir Zubeida." Branches shoot off the main channel to the 'Arafat and Masjid Nimra, but they run only during the hadj days. The last repairs on a large scale were carried out ten years ago.

The channel branches into four smaller channels at "Biadia," east of Mecca which traverse the town through its length breadth, the surplus water finding its way to the southern outskirts of the town, where it irrigates some gardens.

There are underground tanks at a depth varying from 10 to 15 feet, according to the situation of the locality, into which water flows and is drawn and distributed by the "saqqas," who are controlled by a head man called the "sheikh-el-bir" (head of the well). Wells are open, and though protected from a free in-flow of water from the outside, a certain amount of dirty and polluted water does find its way into the well, as the people bathe or wash clothes on the platform alongside the wells, against the standing order of the local Government.

The construction and gravity of the 'Ain Zubeida is such that it should be easy and inexpensive to lay a pipe line and provide the town with good and pure water. There ought to be no opposition to the suggested improvement, as the 'Ain Zubeida is mainly kept up by public subscriptions, and if some generous donors would stipulate the introduction of a pipe system, it would soon be introduced.

Mutawwifs.—The mutawwif is at once a necessity and a curse. He is the veritable blood sucker, selfish, untrustworthy, unscrupulous and an enemy of humanity (except some well-known exceptions), whom the ignorance of the

people cannot altogether be done away with, but he requires a strong curb to his methods.

At one time the provinces and districts were publicly auctioned by the Sherif of Mecca, as also the rich pilgrims, or to the highest bidder. This system was abolished in 1804, when constituted by the Government established in Turkey, and King Hussein's loyal co-operation in the abolition of this evil is well known.

The present modified arrangement is, that theoretically the pilgrim is free to choose his own mutawwif, but as this seldom happens in practice the mutawwif takes charge of him on his arrival at Jeddah according to his nationality, province or district. The agents easily influence the ignorant pilgrim to nominate persons suggested to them. This year a certain mutawwif got hold of the male members of a party from Behar who arrived at Mecca on the 22nd August. The female party, after a long time for their male companions, started a hue and cry, and some of them, finding out their province led them to the house of the real mutawwif, Sayyed Alwi Jamal-el Latif. All through the hadj days the party remained separated.

The mutawwif got news of the men having been seen at Bahra, on their way to Jeddah where they were told by their false mutawwif that the ladies had preceded them. The real mutawwif took the ladies to Jeddah. The false mutawwif is in prison now. He used to calm the men by the statement that their womenfolk were with "zenana."

Some mutawwifs also send their agents in the early months of the year to visit all parts of the Moslem world to preach the necessity of pilgrimage, and to induce the people to employ their masters. These agents offer to see the intending pilgrims through all the necessary formalities of the ceremony and also to make all arrangements for their journey accommodation in Mecca, &c. and to help the weak and old and even the destitute in every possible way. This evil should be stopped at all costs.

The profession of mutawwif is hereditary, and it is therefore natural that the mutawwif is generally ignorant of the most elementary principles of Islam and its teachings. The ignorant pilgrims are taught the very things Islam came to uproot. Children of 8 and 10 years of age are seen leading the pilgrims through Tawaf and guiding them to Ziyarat. From a religious point of view, therefore, it is incumbent on the local Government to make it a condition that everyone desirous of becoming a mutawwif should receive a certain amount of religious education, pass a test, and obtain a diploma as a mutawwif.

The mutawwif's lawful income is only his own fee, and the amounts he makes from the sale of dates and ziyarat or from Bedouins who bring sheep or goats to sell at Mina for him, he is called rightfully his. He gets 20 per cent of the proceeds of the ziyarat lent by his rich pilgrims. It is the common saying of the Hedjaz that "pilgrims are the crops of Hedjaz," and full advantage is taken to reap the crop well. The saying is not restricted to the mutawwif only, but everyone in the Hedjaz, the King downwards, owes his living directly or indirectly to the pilgrims, but instead of being thankful to his bread-giver, the Hedjazi actually hates him, maltreats, abuses and robs him in every conceivable manner and sometimes even murders him.

The mutawwifs are controlled by a sheikh-el-mutawwifin, one of whom is special agent to the King.

Any dispute between two mutawwifs, fall to his share, whom he exploits through his especial agents. The sheikh is supposed to pay a big annual fee to the King for the privilege of maintaining his office.

Zamzam.—Every pilgrim pays at least 2 rupees to the mutawwif, and this entitles him to obtain as many free drinks of the Zamzam water as he likes, every day. There are also free sabils (free drinking booths) endowed by Moslem States or other rich people. Besides these permanent sabils, temporary sabils are established by pious pilgrims during the season, at a fairly heavy expense. Free drinks are only obtainable at the small tank near the Zamzam well where large queues of men and women can be seen at all times of the day and night. There is only one cup to drink from.

I would like to mention that in spite of the payment of fee and the presence of sabils the pilgrims have to pay a small tip every time they are offered Zamzam water.

Arafat.—Wadi 'Arafat is situated about 16 miles east of Mecca. The Arafat or Jebel er Rahum, as it is generally called, is a hillock rising about 1000 feet above the plain and the top is reached by means of steps hewn in the rock. The north-eastern slope runs the water aqueduct, at a height of about 15 feet from the ground.

Otherwise lacks all cover. Tents sheltered the majority, some passed the day under the shudufs, while quite a large number had no such shade. The heat was intense, and it is stated that about 800 pilgrims died on that day alone through exposure, heat and exhaustion. These figures are given as the Hashimite Government had no arrangements either to record or to prevent.

Arafat occupied roughly an area of about 8 square miles, but the pilgrims were crowded together in a small space.

The result of the Hashimite Government's policy of allotting every mutawwif a space to pitch his own and his pilgrim's tents, with instructions that he should arrange to keep all his pilgrims together near him.

Water at Arafat.—The water at Arafat is plentiful, but at a distance from most of the camps. Besides the conduit there is a tank too, where in open disregard of the King's orders, the pilgrims and Bedouins bathed, washed their utensils and drank. The water is all contained in one place, and in full view of the male and female pilgrims. This same water was sold for drinking and drinking.

The halt at Arafat is only of a few hours duration, and the pilgrims depart for Muzdalifa and Mina as soon as the sun sets on camels, ponies, donkeys and mules. The hire of a shughdof camel was 10 Turkish mejdichs, and a donkey cost 5 in gold.

Mina. Mina is situated about 5 miles east of Mecca, and here the pilgrims make a halt of three to five days. Some live in houses which are built for the purpose and others in tents. Tents are pitched by those who can afford them, while others sit under umbrellas or spread sheets over their heads.

On the outward journey, the water we got at Mina was fairly good, but it was boiled and filtered it, but this is more than everybody can do. It was sold so dear

it most poor people tried to live on as little as possible in the excessive heat of August. The diarrhoea and dysentery started from the date of the pilgrims' return to Mecca, and the cause of it is no doubt traceable to the bad water there. Here also piped water supply is possible and exceedingly necessary. A suggestion to this effect was made to the King by Sayyed Ahmad Ha'beq, a mechanical engineer from Syria in my presence, but was received with scant courtesy.

Half hearted attempts at cleaning the roads of the night soil and other dirt were in evidence. The famous mosque at Mina smelt of filth and human excreta, and no attempt had been made to get it cleaned before the arrival of the pilgrims. The mosque is generally used by the Bedouins as a halting place, and the result is obvious. The people who use the mosque for prayers

carried with them, and the putrid air from decomposed carcasses of slaughtered animals were and are responsible for the subsequent diseases of diarrhoea and dysentery. Happily the maladies did not take a virulent form. On the road to 'Arafat from Mina a certain Indian named Shuhun Mohammed Sindhi saw many corpses lying on the roadside but the sight he saw at 'Arafat was very heartrending. He saw many unburied corpses, and also found many Indian, Javanese, Bukhari and Takruri pilgrims in various stages of exhaustion some calling for water, others wounded and waiting for the loss of their money at the hands of Bedouins, &c. He tried to bring the conditions at 'Arafat to the notice of the Hashimite police, but received a rebuff. He then proceeded to the Royal Pavilion, but even there the sentries would not let him get in. He then went to the Javanese Sheikh-el Mutawwifin who heard his story, sent camels to 'Arafat and got the sick pilgrims to Mina. In the absence of any facilities and constant danger to life and property anyone desirous of extending a helping hand to those stranded by the wayside must be prepared to be left behind at the mercy of the wild Bedouins whose object is to kill and rob. Islam as seen in the Hedjaz now is not the Islam that was preached by the Great Founder and should not be judged from the present day so-called professors of it. The Hedjaz, Bedouin and townsman alike, has, by constant living on charity become an entirely heartless brute and it is hopeless to expect sympathy from him.

What is required at Mina is —

- 1 The installation of a pure water supply by means of pipes, and closing of all
- 2 Proper sanitation, provision of public latrines at convenient places, with sufficient conservancy staff
- 3 Incinerators.
- 4 Provision of an ample number of stretcher bearers to look for and carry sick people to the hospital
- 5 Proper arrangement for burying the dead
- 6 Proper burial of the carcasses of slaughtered animals and their offals, &c., and above all
- 7 Sympathy of the governing body

In this connection it would not be out of place to mention that the Hashimite Government could obtain a fair revenue from the collection and sale of bones of slaughtered animals for manure.

Effects of Deceased Pilgrims — A large number of deaths took place amongst the pilgrims during the season. Until recently the mutawwif used to take charge of the effects, either handing them over to the heirs, friends or companions of the deceased (if any) or as was more often the case, keeping them himself. To safeguard against such malpractices, the British agent asked the Hashimite Government to take charge of the effects in the interests of the heirs, and to hand them to the heirs if found in Hedjaz, or transfer to the British agency for despatch to the rightful claimants. I do not see that any better arrangement could have been made or can now be made, but the elaborate system of proving one's right of inheritance expenses connected therewith, the devices of mutawwifs to defraud the heirs of the money, the delay and the worry, have been complained of. In one instance an old man, who was accompanied by his family, died, and it took the heirs nearly three weeks to establish their claim to the inheritance, at the expense of 28 rupees (Government charges do not exceed 6 rupees) the amount involved being only a return ticket of the value of 45 rupees, of

which the refunded portion would only be worth 40 rupees. The decrees of the local Sharia Court have to be countersigned by the British agent at Jeddah, who has to do so in the absence of the heir or heirs, which I think is wrong. If, however, the presence of the heirs were insisted upon, the trouble and expense of the journey are such that many would forgo their claim altogether rather than undertake it. The British representative at Mecca was not empowered to sign these decrees, but he should, I think, be vested with this power in the future.

Again it must be remembered that even with all these safeguards there is no guarantee that the Sharia decree has not been obtained under false pretences. The pilgrims are very little known in Mecca, and but for the temporary companionship that exists between them during the hadj, one knows little about the other. The Sharia Court only requires two witnesses, and the mutawwif is the interpreter who interprets as he thinks fit.

There is no check whatever on the effects of persons dying outside the municipal limits of Mecca, Jeddah or other towns. Invariably their tickets and property are made away with. In cases where there are no heirs in Hedjaz, the effects are handed to the British agency at Jeddah at the end of the season. The delay in the disposal of these was the cause of many complaints to the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, whose deputy spoke to me on the subject in May last. On arrival at Jeddah I found over 140 cases waiting disposal, of which about 100 had already been realised. At my request, orders were given for the despatch of the proceeds of such cases as had already been realised to Bombay, and it is hoped that the rest have also been settled by now.

Postal Arrangements — Postal arrangements are extremely unsatisfactory. Complaints were general that letters of the pilgrims did not reach their destination and those which did, took months in doing so. The pilgrims had to hand over their open letters and cost of postage to their mutawwif. The public sale of stamps is prohibited. It is suspected that the post office officials as well as the mutawwifs defraud the Government of revenue by pocketing the cash realised from the foreign public for postage and destroying the letters. This is the only explanation for the letters not reaching the addressees.

Extra postage is charged in cash on letters received from foreign countries and collected through the postmen. What proportion of this goes to the Government and how much remains in the pockets of dishonest officials, is not known, but in cases where the addressees have objected to paying the money, the postman did not insist on it. The inference is obvious.

No parcels, registered letters, or money orders can be sent or received through the local post office. This is very inconvenient. Some arrangement is especially desirable to facilitate money remittances to and from Hedjaz. Messrs Gellatly, Hankey and Co, the Jeddah agents of Turner, Morrison and Co., contemplated starting a bank but did not do so. A bank would ensure safe custody of the pilgrims' money and would become very popular. Large sums of money are now deposited by the pilgrims with the British agency at Jeddah for safe custody, and they could do the same at Bombay with greater security from loss or theft on board the ship. The bank would of course need a branch at Mecca.

Messrs. Ali Jen of Delhi and Mecca and a few other merchants are at present employed by rich people to send or get drafts through. Not being real bank houses they are not very prompt and long delays sometimes take place. Moreover, great advantage is taken of the rise and fall in the exchange rates of the various currencies, and the pilgrim only gets what he is given. For instance the Government exchange rate of a rupee was 10 piastres, but the bazaar rate fluctuated between 9½ and 12. The pilgrims got rupees when the rate was 9½, but piastres at the rate of 10 per rupee, when the exchange in the bazaar was 11 or 12. The firms thus made money both ways, and the pilgrims lost on the other hand. One or two houses paid at the actual coin remitted through the draft, but the others did not. It would be different with a bank.

Currency — Hedjaz has no standard currency of its own, and the heterogeneous specimens of currency that he sees are greatly puzzling to the poor pilgrims. He is defrauded on all hands by the money changer and the mutawwif also takes advantage of his ignorance in the matter.

Gold is very much valued, and the Indian notes are also very popular as the main business of the country is with India, and in the absence of any facilities for money remittances, notes are the simplest means of transacting business, especially as the Hashimite Government does not allow the export of gold. This latter order

operates harshly on pilgrims who import only gold for expenses in the country, and are debarred from taking back their unspent balance.

Economical Conditions from the Pilgrims point of view—The Hashimite Government and the Shirka Watania (National Company) purchased large stocks of foodstuffs from every consignment imported into the country either by sea or land, on rates of their own, leaving a small percentage to the traders for sale locally. The result was that everything was abnormally dear as will be seen from the statement below.

Flour, per oke, 18-20 piastres, i.e., annas 8 per lb.	
Bread, 20 "	
Meat, 1 "	
Ghee, 1 "	
Sugar, 1 "	

During the season, the Government opened municipal shops for the sale of bread, and flour where a very limited supply was sold daily at a piastre less than the market price. A fortnight before the 'Arafat Day these shops were closed to give the traders of Mecca an opportunity to make money. It is a very well known fact that the pilgrims did not benefit by the cheap Government shops, where first consideration was always accorded to a Meccan. Mecca is well known for being a very dear place but this year beats all previous records. I am again constrained to make a deliberate statement that the dearth was artificial, and that the municipal shops were a deliberate ploy to throw dust in the eyes of observers. That has now been deliberately maintained, is proved by the fact that prices have gone down considerably now that the temporary visitors have gone away (I am writing on the 11th October), since the last two days the price of bread has been reduced by half. The main reason for this is, that all during the season, the King and his confederates held a practical monopoly of the foodstuffs. The merchants who could not, and in fact did not dare show their stocks then have now come out with their stores, the Government having removed restrictions, and where no grain was to be seen a few days ago, hundreds of bags are now on view. There are other causes also which are set forth below.

(a) The export of foodstuffs from India is in the hands of a few well known firms, and there is no competition.

(b) The tender system of permits for rice helps to raise the price of this commodity here by 9 to 12 rupees per bag.

(c) There is no competition amongst the shipping companies, but this is unfortunately unavoidable at present.

(d) Heavy custom duty at Jeddah. This is not calculated on the invoices from India, but on the prices ruling at the time at Jeddah.

(e) Purchase of half and sometimes two-thirds of every consignment of foodstuffs by the King and Shirka Watania at its own price fixed without refund of the cost of transport.

It is invariably lower than what obtains in the bazaar. For instance, a bag of flour costs the importer 350 piastres after payment of custom duty, and he can sell it for 370 in the bazaar, but he will, after he has paid the custom duty, get only 305 to 320 piastres for the same bag from the Government. He naturally spreads the loss over what stuff is left to him.

(f) Monopoly of sale by a few favourites in Mecca and Jeddah in association with the King.

Egypt sends large consignments of wheat annually for distribution among certain people in Mecca, Medina and also Bedoua. Ordinarily the recipients keep a part of their share of grain for their own use and sell the rest to meet other needs. This year bulk of the consignment was taken over by the King and the real recipients were paid a nominal value of the same in cash.

It is noteworthy that the majority of the Indian pilgrims bring sufficient supplies with them to last them during their stay in the country. The conditions would have been still worse if this were not the case.

The Government of India very kindly sanctioned a special consignment of over 22,000 bags of flour at the representation of the British agency at Jeddah for the benefit of the poor pilgrims. This consignment unfortunately arrived too late to be of any use to the pilgrims, 95 per cent. of whom had already left these shores. This consignment was also sanctioned in the name of three merchants only.

Charities—The Egyptian Takia here and at Medina is doing very useful work. The Takias too, but they are unimportant. About 5,000 poor are fed once in twenty-four hours by the Egyptian Takia, during the season. The work continues during the rest of the year but on a smaller scale. The Egyptian Government also pays regular stipends to many a deserving person in the Hedjaz, and contributes a large quantity of grain annually for distribution amongst people of Mecca, Medina, Taif, and also amongst the Bedoua.

India also despatches thousands of pounds annually for distribution in charity, either by the pilgrims personally or through the medium of Indian business houses established in the country. The pilgrims have to render no account to anybody though the firms submit to the donors on account of sorts to show that their

either case, and it is for this reason that very little is known of these charities. The ignorance of the pilgrims forces them to obtain the advice of the Indian merchants here, who are also the channels for the distribution of remitted charities, and it depends on the head of the firm to suggest or give the amounts to anyone he likes to favour. The beneficiaries are mostly those from whom the firms expect some return and for the same reason, some people are paid perhaps ten times over while the really deserving class is very little benefitted. It is very difficult to suggest a method of control over private charities, but the donors would be well advised to establish a local committee to receive and dispense with all the amounts sent or brought to this country for relieving distress, Indians being given prior consideration.

The Hashimite Government pays very little in the way of charity. Thirty-one Bengali pilgrims presented a petition to the King for charity, who transferred it to the Medjias Asaf, where they were paid the large sum of 5 piastres partly in cash and partly with a standing order of the King on the subject.

Numbers of destitute people applied to this office as well as to the British agency at Jeddah for relief, but as no funds existed for this purpose nothing could be done for them. It was only recently that at the urgent representation of Major Batten the Government of India kindly placed a sum of money at his disposal to relieve deserving cases.

Before the war there existed an Anjuman Humat al Hujja at Jeddah, composed purely of Indians, who contributed towards its funds for the purpose of relieving distress amongst the sick and destitute pilgrims. Its income was not very large but it did excellent service with the limited funds at its disposal. It fell through during the war and its resuscitation has been made difficult now by the fact that it was suspected of having secret relations with the Indian Anjuman Khuddam-i Ka'ba, and its secretary was interned at Bombay for several months. Besides this the attitude of the Government towards enterprises of this kind is not very encouraging.

One feels shy of taking a lead. There should be a certain amount placed annually with the British agency at Jeddah, and the representative at Mecca for the relief of really deserving subjects of the British Crown.

Return Journey of Pilgrims to Jeddah—The pleasure of the King has to be obtained for permission for caravans to leave Mecca, and the delay is alleged to be intentional, to give the Meccans a last chance of skinning the pilgrims. As soon as leave is granted, the pilgrims rush back to Jeddah in hot haste, everybody hoping to be the first to get away.

A certain amount of restriction was observed this year in the despatch of pilgrims from Mecca to avoid overcrowding at Jeddah, but this did not stop the congestion. Strange to say it is only the British subjects who are to be found in a pitiful condition like the one seen this year in Jeddah. Inderfed, sick, destitute and old pilgrims camped in the open space near the quay, in the scorching heat of the sun, aggravated by lack of and delay in obtaining passages back to their homes. The Dutch subjects experience no such difficulty. The British subjects in their wretched plight crowd round the shipping offices, British agency or any stray Government official and their one cry is for a passage. They rightly observe that the strong and wealthy get served first but this is no fault of the authorities. The fault lies with the shipping companies who do not keep sufficient ships ready to meet the demand, though they know the conditions fully well through long experience, who transact business through brokers whom only the well-to-do can afford to employ. This latter evil, however, is on the decline and as stated elsewhere, Messrs. Gellatly Hankey and Co., thoroughly appreciate the situation.

Nothing short of a complete change of the present defective mode of shipping will remedy matters. The companies could be assisted by the British representative at Mecca, if he were furnished with a programme of the movements of steamers, and if he were consulted by the Indian Sheikh-el Mutaawif in the matter of the despatch of Indian pilgrims to Jeddah. This would save overcrowding at Jeddah, reduce complaints, help the poor pilgrims, keep the British representative in touch with his fellow subjects, and also keep a slight check over the mutawwifs. All this would, however, be possible if the official position of the representative is recognised at Mecca, and if the shipping companies improve their service.

Journey to Medina. Several caravans went to Medina this year. The first went via Yenbo in March and returned the same way. The pilgrims experienced no difficulty in obtaining camels for the journey, or water en route. On their way back to Yenbo, Bedouin robbers attacked and killed three and wounded two of them.

A second caravan sailed from Jeddah on the 27th June by the steamship "Kina." A large number of pilgrims had preceded this large caravan, by the passenger ship "D. Kina" on the 13th June. It was to be followed by another lot of pilgrims on the 30th June, but the King Hussein stopped them going on board the ship and the pilgrims got a refund of their steamer fare at the intervention of the British agent.

The caravans usually follow the direct route from Yenbo to Medina, where they arrive in five days. This year, owing to the hostile attitude of the tribes astride this route, the caravans went to Bowat, a railway station about 30 miles north-west of Medina. The journey to Bowat took eight days, and the railway journey of 30 miles was accomplished in another twelve hours. The camel hire for the journey to Bowat and back was fixed at 45 mejidiehs, and 17 was charged for a seat on the train. When the returning pilgrims went to the Medina railway station at the time fixed, they found no train ready and were told that they could not go back via the railway but by the overland route. It was only after twenty-two days that they got a train. As far as is known to me, none of the hundreds of pilgrims that travelled by this route have been refunded the return hire of their camels or railway. A few applications have been made to this office, but the others made no such request. Their shughdufs are apparently still at Bowat, or appropriated by the Bedouin. The camelmen stood in the way of pilgrims drawing their own water, and always collected round the wells to water their animals and to fill their own skins for sale to the pilgrims.

Cases came to my notice where the mutawwifs misled pilgrims anxious to visit Mecca, and left Mecca on foot to wait outside its municipal limits. They were then invited to drink their water on the journey, and appropriate such things as take invitation, and shughdufs loose to frighten the riders.

A levy of one to three mejidiehs was made per camel by the tribes, who detained nearly all caravans for twelve hours for the purpose. This happened about 8 miles out of Medina, and shows the extent to which the Government influence extends.

Besides the above peaceful methods of blackmail, thefts, robberies and murders were also committed. Abdul Rahman Basri lost a whole camel load of furniture, &c., valued at about 8,000 rupees. Abdul Haq, an inspector in the Indian C.I.D., was wounded by a club and robbed. One Muhammad Hayat bore marks of one club and two dagger wounds on his body, and a servant of Mirza Ghulam Hussain was treated likewise. Special arrangements were made by the King for Mirza Ghulam Hussain and his party, and even so their losses are estimated at over 5,000 rupees. The caravan consisted of 117 camels.

The conditions in and around Medina itself were so unsatisfactory that life and property were quite unsafe both during the day as well as night. The pilgrims could not visit the shrines within a couple of miles radius of Medina, and those who ventured were fired at by the Bedouins. A Japanese lady died as a result of this firing, and the daughter of Mullah Muhammad Ali Bohrah got a bullet in her foot, while their carriage horse was shot.

The last caravans left Mecca for Medina about the middle of September. Camel hire was raised to 112 mejidiehs. Nothing is known yet about the experiences of these caravans.

NASIRUDDIN AHMED, Captain

Mecca, October 8, 1920

Enclosure 3 in No. 392

Supplementary Report by Captain Nasiruddin Ahmed

IN the course of conversations with the medical officers and the Indian officer in Mecca, it was ascertained that the food supplied to the pilgrims was of indifferent quality—sugar and milk were very seldom issued, the bread was bad, and the majority of the soldiers bought food for themselves in the bazaar.

The number of camels supplied to them was also insufficient, and as they were in "Ihram" and could not wear their boots or shoes, the long march from Jeddah to Mecca, and again to 'Arafat, was found very trying.

Again the King failed to furnish them with camels on due dates, which delayed their return to Jeddah. The medical officers went to wish the King good-bye, but could not get admission. They were in uniform, and had to come back after waiting a long time.

NASIRUDDIN AHMED, Captain

Mecca, September 30, 1920

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No. 393.

Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 21)

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, a copy of the 29th Aden news letter dated the 25th November, 1920.

I have, &c.
E. SCOTT, Major-General

Enclosure in No. 393

29th Aden News Letter.

THE following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of my last letter dated the 12th November, 1920.

Tihama.—The Political Officer, Hodeida, writes that the Italians who visited Khokha and Hais last September were Signor Fazzi, a merchant of Massowah and his accountant. During their visit they are said to have offered to repair the Turkish court, declined both by the Sheikh and the Munsab. The Italians returned to Assab with two dhows laden with skins and coffee. They appear to have given up the idea of staying.

trade with Khokha as Signor Fazzi is reported to have stated on his return to Massowah that it was unsafe at present as the people were hostile to Europeans. This report is confirmed by the Political Officer, Hodeida, who states that the sheikh and the Mangab, although their goods are inferior in quality and very expensive they refuse to trade except on cash terms.

The Political Officer, Hodeida, reports that the Italian ship *N. S. Rossi*, my last letter, called at Hodeida on the 1st November, 1920, and left for Massowah. Rossi, stated that they had visited Port Sudan, Jeddah, Qatif, Jizan and Kamaran, and that their business was to inquire into the facilities for trade with the Yemen ports. They did not seem to be satisfied with the result of their inspection.

Signor Rossi is a merchant. The former, who was born and educated in Turin, Italy, is a member of the Italian Chamber of Commerce in Massowah. He is reported to have been in the Italian ship *N. S. Rossi* when it was captured by the British.

Signor Rossi tried to secure a cargo of goods from the Italian merchant at Hodeida. The ship is expected back about the 15th.

Abdullah Amin, the principal Sheikh of Jebel Rama, has submitted to the Political Officer, Hodeida, a petition, which I am forwarding officially. He requests that we should make both the Imam and the Idria withdraw to their respective frontiers and thus prevent bloodshed and plunder until a settlement about his country is reached.

The Political Officer, Hodeida, on the 3rd instant, stating that he wished to stay in the country of his country was settled, but he has since left for Massowah. He is reported to have been in the Italian ship *N. S. Rossi* when it was captured by the British. The object of their visit to Massowah is not known. Signor Fattigatti is said to have offered them free passage.

The Military Administrator, Hodeida, has sent me copies of two letters written by Signor Fattigatti to the Political Officer, Hodeida, and the Italian merchant at Hodeida, for delivery. The original was received after the addressee had left for Massowah.

Signor Fattigatti, the Italian merchant at Hodeida, for delivery. Signor Fattigatti is said to have offered them free passage. The original was received after the addressee had left for Massowah.

In the letter to the Sheikh of Jebel Rama, the ex-Vah refers to the sheikh's letter of the 19th October, and states that he was grieved to hear what had befallen him. He has got redress at once from the Imam. The ex-Vah states that he has been sent by the Imam to suppress intrigues, secure safe conduct and stop bloodshed among Mussulmans.

He claims the Yemen as a Turkish province and declares that the Imam is the enemy of the Government, who has continued faithful to his pact with the Turks. The Vah asks how he can forsake the Imam and join the friends of Christians.

He further claims that the Tur district is faithful to the Imam as a solid friend of the Turkish Government. He has a corps of local men has been formed by him and other officers. He finally presses the Government to guarantee his safety.

In the letter to Kadi Humood al Harazi, the ex-Vah refers to the former's two letters of the 1st and 15th October, and states that he has been sent by the Imam to suppress intrigues, secure safe conduct and stop bloodshed among Mussulmans.

Referring to a sum of 25,000l., which the Kadi appears to have stated in his letters that he had received no reply. He wants the Kadi to inform him immediately of the result, assuring him that he will receive his share.

This has reference to the ex-Vah's request for money for the relief of Turkish prisoners. The request was forwarded by the latter to his Government, but he has had no reply.

The attempt to capture the fort of Al Hadi in Beni Jurain was unsuccessful. The

ex-Vah is said to have wired to the Imam asking for reinforcement for the fort.

Hodeida merchants are said to continue to correspond with the Imam. Many Harap and others are reported to have written to the Imam asking for the grant of amnesty to Sheikh Abdulla Bahr of Saadan, and for the restoration of his property.

The Zubeed agent of the Political Officer, Hodeida, reports that Awwad Al Sheikh of Rikb, has made his submission to the Imam after having received guarantees for protection of his rights.

The agent says that the Imam's flag has been hoisted on the court-house at Zubeed, and that the Amir has received orders to build barracks for soldiers and also three large halls as additions to the court-house. The cost of building is estimated at 15,000 dolars.

The ex-Vah is said to have sent letters to the tribes of Beni Saad, Madwal and Faraf threatening them that if they do not tender their submission within one week they will be attacked and their country ruined. The sheikhs have called a meeting to discuss the matter, and have invited the Sheikh of Jeddah to preside.

The Imam is reported to have despatched a large force to Jebel Milhan under the command of Raghib Bey, ex-Mutesarrif of Hodeida.

It is reported that Arab leaders at Hodeida have sent letters to the notables of Sana, Zubeed and other important towns stating that they have been appointed representatives of the Arabs throughout the Yemen, and that this news has been received by the people with contempt.

A big Zeidi force has attacked and captured Beni Tuladi in Jebel Rama. The chief notable of the place, Sayid Mahomed-ibn-Ali-al-Kahir is said to have made his submission to the Imam. His brother has refused to follow suit and has gone to Hajl. The Idria's commander at Hajl has despatched a force of 1,500 tribesmen against Beni Tuladi.

Yemen (Upper and Lower).—A traveller from Sana reports that Abu Neb, having men of Ar Rahab, sent a party of Hashid tribesmen to Sana with orders forcibly to release the hostages. The prison was broken into and the hostages released. In the fighting which ensued between Abu Neb's party and the Imam's men thirty were killed.

The traveller further reports that there is much sickness at Shihara, 200 miles from Sana.

A traveller states that he met Syed Abdulla Ibrahim, referred to in my last letter, with Saif Abdullah of Damar and Sayid Ali al-Wazir, the Amir of Taiz, at Aden, and that Saif Ahmed, who came from Sana to Ibb, has gone to Al Gened. He is constantly moving between Ibb, Taiz, Yemam and Al Gened. They all anticipate a British advance, and are showing much activity. They are said to have posted three guns at Taiz to shoot down our aeroplanes.

The Sana agent of the Political Officer, Hodeida, states that Saifid Abdulla Ibrahim is touring to raise a force against Iba Saad, and that he is now at Dama via Katala.

This agent further states that an Imam's mission sent to Sana has been detained there by Saifid Abu Neb, and that the Imam has proceeded to Rada in order to collect troops to attack Abu Neb. The agent says that before his departure to Rada the Imam called a meeting of the people and brought them with tears in his eyes to defend their faith and country against the aggression of the supporters of the infidels. His words and tears aroused the sympathy of the audience, who responded with cries "We are ready to give our lives and property in the cause of our religion and country."

The Imam is said to have refused Mahoud Nadhim's request to send Turkish soldiers to Meekha.

Aden Protectorate.—Our Intelligence Agent at Dala reports that a rumour to the effect that the British force at Nogat Dakin had received some aeroplanes, caused something like a panic among the Zeidis at Dala.

The recently appointed two officials for the defence of the district of Dala, recently appointed two officials for the defence of their district a force of about 1,000 to 1,200 men for the defence of their boundaries against Imam's aggression.

The two petty Upper Yafa sheikhs who had gone to Dala to negotiate for the release of prisoners are now reported to have returned, having failed in their object.

The Lower Yafa Sultan, Ibn Afif, is reported to have made a pact with the Rasasi Sultan of Beda to drive the Zaidis out of Dala. The Lower Yafa Sultan, says an informant, can raise a force of 800 men with little difficulty.

Trouble is said to be brewing between the Lower Yafa and the Fadli tribes over the possession of Husn Hilma, which is still in the hands of the latter (please see news letter dated the 13th August, 1920).

The departure of Saiyid Mahomed Shami referred to in my last letter from Dala is confirmed. One report states that he deserted, while another states that he left with the knowledge of the Imam's commander, and that he has taken with him sixteen mules laden with rifle and gun ammunition, and that there are only six mules and four boxes of ammunition now left in Dala.

Saif Abdulla, a Shufai sheikh of the Ibb district, is reported to have arrived at Dala on the 29th October with 400 men, 200 of whom are Zaidis and the remainder Shufais from Baidan. I have so far received no confirmation of this report.

The Imam's commander at Dala Saiyid Yahya is said to have enlisted 300 Shairis (Amiris) for local service: 240 men, of whom 50 are from Jalala and 190 from Wa'ara (Amiri), are said to have been sent to Sana under Naqib Mansur. These reports are not confirmed.

A traveller from Rada states that he saw at Damar 800 men of whom 500 were Zaidis and the remainder local men. He heard that they were going to Dala to relieve the present garrison which was much reduced by sickness.

The commander at Dala is reported to have taken an additional hostage from each of the Shairi sheikhs, and from Muqbil Abdulla (Kotabi). The Ahawi sheikh, Abdul Nahi, has given his son, Mohsin, as a hostage to the Zaidis. The Kotabis under Muqbil Abdulla said to have sought the help of the Zaidis against the Dhambari tribe, with whom they are at feud. The commander at Dala promised the desired assistance, but on learning that Mohamed Saleh-al-Akrum, the Kotabi sheikh had received ammunition from Aden, he withdrew his assistance and put Muqbil Abdulla's hostages in chains.

Aden, November 25, 1920.

T. E. SCOTT, Major-General.

[E 15923/47/44]

No. 394.

Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 58.)

My Lord,

Aden, December 8, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, a copy of the 30th Aden news letter, dated the 8th December, 1920.

I have, &c.

T. E. SCOTT, Major-General.

Enclosure in No. 394.

30th Aden News Letter.

THE following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of my last letter, dated the 26th November, 1920:—

Tihama.—It appears from reports received from Hodeida that the Imam has concentrated a big force at Jebel Reima. The remnant of the old force is said to have asked the ex-Vali Mahmud Nadhim, to relieve them, as they are war-worn. The Vali has forwarded their request to the Imam and asked them to remain at their posts pending receipt of the Imam's reply, but a party of 400 men is said to have deserted with war spoils.

A report says that in compliance with the ex-Vali's request, the Imam ordered 500 Zaidis to proceed to Menekha. The latter, however, refused to go and offered armed resistance. There is said to be a reserve force of 2,000 men at Sana and Rada, which will be shortly despatched to the Tihama.

In my letter of the 14th October last, I reported the death of the Abuos Sheikh and the election of his nephew, Salim Bukheit, as his successor. The latter is now

reported to have been elected sheikh of the whole tribe in consequence of the death of Sahel Ali, the other sheikh of the tribe. Until the death of this sheikh the tribe was divided into two sections under the rival sheikhs, Suleiman Hassan Bukheit, who was succeeded by his nephew, Salim Bukheit, and Sahel Ali.

The Sana agent of the Political Officer, Hodeida, states that Saiyid Abdulla-bin-Ibrahim, referred to in previous letters, has been deputed by the Imam as inspector of the Wakfs of Zabeed and Khoka, and superintendent of the Public Treasury of the Qadhas of Zabeed, Hais and Jebel Ras.

The Imam is reported to have sent one big gun to Zabeed and another to Dhala.

The Zabeed agent of the Political Officer, Hodeida, reports that a notable of Udain, Hamid-bin-Ali Pasha, has tendered for the lease of the revenues of Zabeed, Hais and Jebel Ras for a sum of 450,000 dollars annually. This bid is said to exceed the actual revenues of the places mentioned by 300,000 dollars, and if it is accepted by the Imam, the result will be heavy exactions from the people and consequent discontent.

The same agent states that he has no fresh news about Italian activity at Khoka beyond the fact that their agent named Shukoor is staying at Khoka. The Zabeed agent says that Shukoor is trying to purchase houses for the Italians.

From a later report received from the Zabeed agent, it appears that Shukoor has made an agreement with the Imam on behalf of the Italians, by which the Imam promises to receive and protect all Italian goods imported into this country via Khoka. The Italians in return promise to supply the Imam with telephone and telegraph apparatus, shell and cartridge-making apparatus, waggons, firearms and other war materials.

The agent reports that the Italians have sent to Khoka animals, carpets and cloth which they are trying to exchange for coffee and skins, and that the Italian merchant referred to in my last letter is expected at Khoka by a special steamer. It is said that the Imam's inspector at Zabeed will proceed to Khoka to meet him.

Signor Pardo, an Italian merchant at Hodeida, confirms the news of this expected arrival of the Italian at Khoka, who, he says, will reside there. Signor Pardo informed the Political Officer, Hodeida, that the Sheikh of Jebel Reima and Qasim Hamood al-Harasi referred to in the last letter have gone from Musowah to Asmara to interview the Italian Governor there.

According to later reports from Hodeida, the Zaidis re-attacked the fort of "Al-Hadi" on the 15th November. After a struggle lasting for five hours, they were forced to retire leaving thirty men killed and five wounded. Heavy fighting is also reported in Jebel Reima, where the Idrisi appears to have concentrated a large force. The strength of the Imam's force in Jebel Reima is said to be 3,000.

One of the Idrisi officials is said to have stated that unless the Hodeida merchants cease taking part in the Hodeida administration and stop their intrigues with Saiyids and recognise the Idrisi as their only ruler after the evacuation of Hodeida by the British, the Quhras and Abura will be obliged to make a raid on Hodeida.

In a later report the Sana agent of the Political Officer, Hodeida, states that owing to the approach of Ibn Saud's army to his borders at Shaharo, Abu Naib has been obliged to make peace with the Imam and to release the Imam's mission detained by him. He has, however, obtained concessions whereby the Imam removed customs houses from his territories and stopped the practice of drinking, singing and other acts which are contrary to the Sheria, and which the Turks had introduced.

This report contradicts the former report that Abu Naib was co-operating with Ibn Saud and is, I think, the more worthy of credence.

The Zeidi tribesmen are reported to have complied with the Imam's latest request for 5,000 fighting men on condition that they serve under their own leaders, and are permitted to return home after the conclusion of the particular campaign for which their services are required. This force is expected to advance on the Tihama on the 10th December.

The ex-Vali is reported to have informed the Imam that he has failed in his anti-Idrisi campaign, and that the only possible remedy now left is to despatch a large force to the Tihama.

These reports, combined with a report received from H.M.S. "Clematis" that the Idrisi and Sayed Mustafa were busy mustering troops during his recent visit to Midi, lead me to anticipate heavy fighting between the Idrisi and the Imam in the near future.

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4 P

Yemen (Upper and Lower).

A Hausabai Akil lately reported to the officer commanding troops at Nobat Dakim that the Amir of Taiz, Saiyid Abdullah-al-Wazir, had arrived at Ibb on the 5th November with 2 guns, 2 machine guns, 7 camel loads of ammunition, 50 horses, 40 mules, 150 donkeys, and a large body of soldiers. The Akil also reported that the Hausabai Sultan had received a letter on receipt of which the latter collected 200 men and proceeded to Ad Darea. The Akil states that the real intention of the Hausabai was to meet the Zeidis either at Ad Darea or Mawia, though he gave out that he was going to the Amiri country.

The real object of Saiyid Abdullah-al-Wazir's visit to Ibb appears to be to disarm the populace, who are in possession of a very large number of rifles and a large quantity of ammunition, which they received from the Turks during the war and prior to the evacuation of Turkish troops. No news confirming the Hausabai's visit to the Zeidis has been received. The Hausabai Sultan, who is one of our protectorate chiefs, has hitherto refused to comply with the Zeidi Amir's frequent invitations to visit Mawia.

An informant from Sana states that Ibn Saud's forces are at Sada and are armed with Turkish and German rifles, and that Ibn Saud has recently come in possession of twenty-five Turkish field guns, which he captured from Ibn Aidi of Ebla. This news appears to be mere town gossip, although our Sana correspondent confirms the report of the presence of Ibn Saud's troops near Shahara, and adds that the Imamite troops directed to march against them refused to fight.

The same informant states that Saiyid Abdullah Ibrahim referred to in previous letters has gone to Zabed from Taiz with 200 men to fight the Idri. This informant confirms the report of the arrival of Saiyid Abdullah-al-Wazir at Ibb with men, guns, &c., and states that he has dismissed all the old clerks who have been serving continuously from the time of the Turks, and has sent them to Sana.

The same informant also states that the Imam has deputed Mahmud Nadhim to arrange peace with the Idri.

The people of Ibb and Baidan are reported to have assumed a threatening attitude towards Ibn-al-Wazir, the Amir of Taiz, who has gone to those places to disarm the people.

Reports have been received from which it appears that the ex-Vali Mahmud Nadhim is being congratulated by his Arab friends on his promotion to the high rank of Vazir. It is not clear whether this is a part of the Vali's propaganda or whether he has been appointed by the Imam as his Vazir.

The Sana agent states that most of the Turks in the Yemen are anxious to leave the country, but that they are afraid of applying for permission, which they know the Imam will not grant.

The same agent reports the arrival of a Turkish officer named Hassan Gamfari, alias Bimbashi Hassan Effendi, from Constantinople. The agent says that he went to Sana via Aden, and has brought letters for the Turks in the Yemen. His statement regarding the present condition of Turkey contradicted Mahmud Nadhim's propaganda to some extent. Bimbashi Hassan is said to have stated that the party of Turkish patriots at Constantinople was in alliance with the British, and that the Khalifat had been transferred to the Arabs. The latter news is said to have caused bitter feelings among the people, who suspect the Bimbashi of being a Turkish spy.

This man subsequently went to Hodeida on his way back to Constantinople. The Arab leaders of Hodeida are said to have had a private interview with him. They told him that they were doing their best for the return of the Turks to the Yemen, and that Turkey should not hesitate to return should the Powers ask her to do so.

From Hodeida Hassan Mahomed Effendi came to Aden and left for Beyrouth via Egypt on the 28th ultimo by the Italian steamer "Porto-di-Savona." His passport has been endorsed for Beyrouth by the French consul here and used by this office.

Hassan Mahomed Effendi is a native of Sana. According to his own statement, he left the Yemen with the Turks after the Armistice and went to Egypt. He subsequently resigned his commission, and from Egypt he went to Beyrouth and thence to Constantinople. A year and a-half ago he left Constantinople and returned to Beyrouth. In September last he left for Mecca on a pilgrimage via Port Said and Massowah, but as he did not find pilgrims at the latter place he came to Aden, arriving here on the 10th October and left for Sana. His object in going to Sana was to dispose of some goods he had left there. His family is in Beyrouth and he is now going to rejoin them.

From enquiries made locally it appears that the family of Hassan Mahomed Effendi is in Sana and that he had gone there to see them. He is reported to be a Turkish propagandist. He was watched during his stay in Aden, but nothing suspicious was noticed.

Aden Protectorate.—Travellers from Dhala report that the Imam's commander, Saiyid Yahya, has written to Syed Abdulla at Yerim, asking him to send his cousin, Syed Kasim of Nadera, to Dhala to relieve him, as he is very ill and wishes to return home. A later report states that Saiyid Kasim, the present Hakim of Nadera and father-in-law of Saiyid Yahya, is coming to relieve the latter by orders of the Imam.

The travellers also report the arrival of 12 Zeidis at Dhala. They say that there are altogether about 100 Zeidis in Dhala, but that 50 of them are sick. Later arrivals state that before they left Dhala they heard a rumour that 600 Zeidis with 3 guns were on their way to Dhala, but that they are at present detained at Ibb owing to the trouble there. It is said that this reinforcement is being sent to Dhala at the request of Saiyid Yahya, the Imam's commander, who complained to the Imam that he was unable to enforce his orders without additional troops.

The Imam's commander at Dhala is said to be annoyed with Mukbil Abdulla, the nephew of the Koteibi Sheikh, because the latter paid a visit to the Amir of Dhala at Lahaj. It is said that the commander sent for Mukbil Abdulla, but he has not gone for fear of being punished. The commander is also said to be annoyed with the Abawi Sheikh for ill-treating travellers and alighting the commander's name when invoked by the travellers.

Dhala and Kataba revenue is reported to have been leased to one Saiyid Husen-al-Bawin for an annual sum of 10,000 dollars.

Letters are said to have been sent by the Imam's commander at Dhala to the Fadli Sultan and to some of the more important Fadli Sheikhs. I await confirmation of this report.

T. E. SCOTT, Major-General.

Aden, December 8, 1920.

[See also Chapter III, Nos. 311, 314 and 315.]

[E 15228/3880/44]

No. 395.

Major Batten to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 29.)

(Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, December 11, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period ending the 10th December, 1920.

A copy of this report has been sent to his Excellency the High Commissioner in Egypt, and his Excellency the High Commissioner for Mesopotamia.

I have, &c.

N. BATTEN, Acting British Agent.

Enclosure 1 in No. 395.

Jeddah Report for the Period December 1-10, 1920.

(Secret.)

1. Passports.

KING HUSSEIN'S reply to my telegram forwarded with the last report was summarised in my telegram No. 383 of the 4th December. The King's communication on the subject was long, and as usual, involved and largely irrelevant. He concluded by complaining of even "this small right being lost," a complete reversal of the true position, and a typical example of his methods.

I replied suitably to the King, assuring him of my continued wish to meet in a friendly spirit in every way possible any views involving a difference of opinion, but notifying him that as I could not fall in with the Government's view, a formal protest would be forwarded through the usual channel.

Subsequent to the despatch and receipt in Mecca of this protest, a copy of

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which I attach for your Lordship's information, and to the attention of the Government being also drawn to the practice of inducing British subjects to obtain papers describing them as Hedjaz subjects, a Burman and the Bokhara pilgrim mentioned in the above protest, were prevented from embarking.

I telephoned to King Hussein who informed me he had set up a special committee in Jeddah to examine all passports, that nobody holding a British passport would be stopped, and to refer such matters to this committee.

The Kaimakam of Jeddah, acting on instructions from Mecca, allowed the Bokhara pilgrim, not a British subject, to proceed by the steamship "Khosrou," but the Burman was told he was not permitted to leave. He came to me for help and I again referred the matter. Eventually the man in his anxiety not to miss the steamer declared himself an Arab subject, obtained at once permission to leave, but missed the steamer.

The practice of the Hachimite Government in describing all and sundry as Hachimite subjects and issuing them with papers to this effect, has been referred to in previous reports.

The matter has only become acute since the refusal of King Hussein to recognise certain foreign passports as valid, owing to persons already holding British passports being thus induced to accept Hachimite papers in the hope of being allowed to return to their homes.

2. Protection of British Subjects.

The case of the two British Indians referred to in my last report is still undecided. After further representation, King Hussein conceded that the parties should meet before the Mahkama in Jeddah to arrange if possible a settlement by consent.

The father of these two men is now in Jeddah en route for India. The case is one of spite against these two sons of a former marriage, he having married again. By gaining the ear of the King, he had them imprisoned on the trivial charge of not doubling a maintenance they could already hardly afford to pay. The father is a merchant, and well-off, and his third son has not been similarly called on to make any allowance. The whole case is another typical example of the justice obtaining under King Hussein, which, notorious as regards his own subjects, is not to be tolerated when applied to British subjects.

On again asking that these men be released, and expressing a wish to see them, I was first put off with excuses, and then informed that they and their father would be brought before the Mahkama "shortly."

The Kaimakam of Jeddah is, as always, most anxious to be conciliatory in this matter, but is helpless, being under the surveillance of the King and tied to the end of the Mecca telephone.

Up to the time of closing this report, the men have not been allowed to see me, nor has the farce of their being confronted by their father been yet enacted.

The increasing difficulties experienced in dealing with the Hachimite Government, so-called, under the conditions occasioned by the character and methods of King Hussein, were pointed out in a memorandum submitted to his Excellency the High Commissioner in Egypt with the Jeddah report ending the 20th September, 1920.

Certain of the contradictory communications received in the course of my efforts to resolve the passport question amicably, and to obtain the release of the above men, cause doubts to arise as to the author being in complete control of all his faculties, and even written assurances from King Hussein can now only be treated as of very doubtful value.

It is submitted that so long as King Hussein continues to rule, and failing the immediate drawing up of satisfactory guarantees for the proper treatment of foreign nationals and respect for rights commonly accepted in all countries, there is no prospect of such incidents ceasing to occur; and British subjects, who form the largest proportion of both the non-Arab population, and of temporary visitors to the Hedjaz, will continue to be at the mercy of the whims of King Hussein, and the victims of whatever political machinations he may be pursuing at the moment.

3. Political Emissaries at Mecca.

A certain Safvet Pasha alias Syed Sadik el Kadari alias al Kebiri is now in Mecca and is treated by King Hussein as an honoured guest.

He arrived in Jeddah recently from Bombay, purporting to be an ex-Colonel of the Russian Imperial army en route from Vladivostok to the Crimea.

I was informed that he had papers in order for the above journey, issued in Vladivostok and endorsed in Bombay and Bagdad, to which latter place he proceeded after arrival in India.

He has been inspecting the Government offices, barracks and forts, in and around Mecca, wearing Russian uniform, mounted on one of the royal horses, accompanied by one of the King's kavasses. The garrison was paraded for his benefit, he was the guest of a banquet at the barracks, and on the night of the 6th December he is categorically stated to have accompanied King Hussein to Rasifa, the headquarters of the camel corps.

He is variously reported to be a Pan-Islamic emissary, connected with the Baku Conference, and an agent of Mustapha Kemal.

The local commandant, who is well disposed to the British, knows this man, who is a Bagdadi of mixed descent, and has dropped hints confirming the above.

I have telegraphed to Bombay and Bagdad for any information available. This man may be merely an adventurer, attempting to better himself, but there is every ground for believing the contrary.

Sheikh Kamel el-Kassab, a Pan-Islamic emissary who arrived recently in the Hedjaz, is still in Mecca.

Enquiries are being made as to another emissary reported to have arrived, and also with regard to an alleged Nationalist officer who is stated to have met King Hussein on the 9th December, during a short visit of the latter to Bahra to inspect the proposed line of the water supply for Jeddah. On arrival in Mecca, this man joined Safvet.

4. Akhwan Aggression.

Enquiry has failed to produce any further information justifying the extremely gloomy views advanced by King Hussein as regards the immediate future. Various incidents have been already reported, after confirmation. One such alleged incident in the vicinity of Taif on enquiry was finally reported to have been an ordinary affray between local Bedouin, and it is significant that at the time many officers of the Taif garrison were permitted to be on leave in Mecca.

I am, nevertheless, still convinced of the genuineness of the King's fears, however exaggerated his statements when attempting to persuade His Majesty's Government of the imminence of a general Akhwan attack.

The King recently sent me a long letter rebutting the attack on Koweit, as a "proof" of the accuracy of his statements as regards aggression against the Hedjaz. Requests for information nearer home have produced little beyond a reiteration from Emir Ali of the former incidents complained of after the departure of Ahmed bin Thanayan.

5. General.

(1) Another anonymous communication from Egypt reviling him has been forwarded me by the King.

The general tenor is to the effect that it is King Hussein and the Arabs who are responsible for the present state of Islam, and not the Young Turks, as originally proclaimed by the King.

(2) An announcement in the "Qibla" notifies the increase of customs dues on tobacco to P.T. 40 per oke from January. A petition from those concerned was thrown in the faces of the petitioners by the King, who remarked it should have been 100 per cent.

On the general customs dues being increased in July without notification, the King gave a written promise to the French consul-general and a verbal one to Major Marshall that no such increases would be made in future without previous notification to the representatives in Jeddah.

The nominal customs dues are in practice doubled by the subterfuge of increasing or doubling the real value of imported goods, and levying duty on the doubled amount.

(3) After reference to the King, certain ex-Turkish subjects of Hedjaz origin interned in India, were repatriated.

In all such cases, whether previously referred from India or not, the King has refused to allow them to remain in the country and has now ordered them to leave, including those for whom he had given permission by name to return. Repeated references to his own permission only produced the stereotyped reply that they should remain under the flag under which they were interned. These wretched people continue to petition me, but I can only refer them to their own Government.

(4.) The reports current in Mecca and now in Jeddah, as to King Hussein's alleged hostile intentions, are reflected by their natural corollary that warships are assembling at Alexandria preparatory to a demonstration off Jeddah.

As regards Jeddah, the wish is father to the thought.

Public opinion, such as it is, can be practically neglected as the wildest rumours are normally in circulation.

There is, however, no doubt that the present general situation is causing keen discussion and a certain amount of excitement.

(5.) The Jeddah garrison has been increased in the last few days by two guns, four machine guns and a company.

(6.) Owing to the embargo on the export of gold, the heavy dues on silver, and the difficulty of obtaining rupee notes, there is a steady approach of the Egyptian pound towards par, due to increased transfers through Egypt to India.

(7.) Nos. 16 and 16 of "Al Falah" and Nos. 437 and 438 of the "Qibla" are forwarded herewith.

No. 16 of "Al Falah" contains an article on the position of the Hedjaz as regards membership of the League of Nations in relation to its non-participation in signing the Turkish Treaty, and also states that the Soviet has recognised the independence of Turkey, Syria and Arabia.

No. 16 has an article alleged to be by a Syrian woman styling herself "Daughter of the Martyr" inciting the Arabs to revenge.

It also notes that the "Abram" having published a statement as to proclamations being published in Egypt in the name of King Hussein, the Arab agency has notified that no new proclamations have been made.

The above is probably connected with the anonymous communication sent to the King.

"Al Qibla," No. 437, quotes a letter to the King from Tehran, stating the writer is working for the Arabs and asking for instructions.

(8.) An abstract from the Mecca report is attached.

N. BATTEN, Major, I.A.
Acting British Agent.

Enclosure 2 in No. 393.

Abstract of Mecca Report.

(Secret.)

King Hussein's Intentions.

THE King is reported, not for the first time, to be considering a breach of relations with the Allies.

If not direct, this is to be carried out by seemingly independent action on the part of Alibullah.

A hint as to this intention is stated to have been made at a secret meeting of Mecca Ashraf held on the 4th December, and an alliance with the Turkish Nationalists was proposed.

The present Cabinet of Ministers, a body with purely nominal powers, is to resign, ostensibly (for foreign consumption) owing to pressure of public opinion, to be replaced by officials favourable to the above policy.

The Mecca sheikhs have been ordered by the King to impress recruits for the army, in spite of his repeated statements that he has a large enough army in his tribesmen.

General.

The usual attacks on caravans continue to occur on the Taif and Yemen routes.

A small quantity of grain is now allowed to be sold to the Bedouin, with the exception of the Ateibah.

The rupee exchange on the gold pound is steadily improving.

Enclosure 2 in No. 393.

Major Batten to the Hachimite Government.

Jeddah, December 5, 1920.

Validity of Passports.

After respects,

I HAVE to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 18.3.39, enclosing a full copy of the "instructions" sent me previously by the Kaimakam of Jeddah.

2. I may remind you that the cause of the lengthy discussions in the matter mentioned does not lie with me.

It was in the interests of Government, and to remove in a friendly spirit what appeared might be a misunderstanding that any discussion was entered into at all.

A simple notification of protest and a report to His Majesty's Government was all that was strictly necessary.

3. I note that all whose nationality is obvious are not affected by the new rule, and that Government treats the matter as one of length of domicile.

I therefore draw your attention to the following:—

(1.) An Egyptian of Zagazig, who came for this year's Hadj, being given a pass by the Hachimite representative in Cairo, describing him as an Arab subject of the Hachimite Government.

(2.) A man from Bokhara, roughly 2,000 miles from the Hedjaz, unable to speak Arabic, possessing already the ordinary pilgrim passport, who also came for this year's Hadj, and was returning to his own country, being informed he could not leave without a passport from the Government.

In this he is described as a resident of Mecca and an Arab Hachimite subject.

4. As regards the five years' rule referred to, I would be grateful if Government would refer me to the authority.

As stated before, nobody is issued with a passport showing his nationality unless he is legally entitled to same.

5. I note, as a conclusion of the whole matter, as regards foreign subjects—

(1.) That Government does not accept properly authenticated passports as evidence of nationality.

(2.) Does not acknowledge such passports as valid unless dated previous to the war, viz., August 1914.

(3.) Forbids all not in possession of such passports to leave the Hedjaz.

6. Having in lengthy correspondence discussed the above with Government, and placed them in possession of all the facts regarding the status of British and British protected subjects, in the interests of the latter I hereby lodge a formal protest with the Government of His Hachimite Majesty, and hold them responsible for all consequences involved by the above action.

With compliments,

N. BATTEN, Acting British Agent.

Enclosure 4 in No. 393.

SHIPPING Intelligence to December 10, 1920

The following steamers arrived at, and departed from, Jeddah between the 1st and 10th December, 1920:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	L. O.	Cargo Discharged.
Khowsu ..	British	Bombay ..	Bombay ..	Dec. 1	Dec. 5	Packages 28,000
Asquith ..	Italian	Suez ..	Suez ..	" 1	" 1	3,314
Ketch ..	British	P. Soudan ..	Suez ..	" 1	" 2	745
Dakshin ..	"	Suez ..	P. Soudan ..	" 3	" 3	494